Granma’s Positive Views on Cuban Free Enterprise 

Granma, the official newspaper of the Communist Party of Cuba, recently praised the achievements of Cuban “small business” or free enterprise that have emerged over the five years since the 6th Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba permitted “economic activity by foreign investors, cooperatives, small farmers, those working land granted in usufruct, renters of state property, and the self-employed.”[1]

In those five years “the non-state sector has grown exponentially. While employment in the state sector constituted 81.2% of the total in 2010, it stood at 70.8% in 2015. Likewise, there were 157,371 registered self-employed in September of 2010, and more than 500,000 at the close of 2016.”

As Raúl Castro, First Secretary of the Party noted at its 7th Congress in April 2016, “The increase in self-employment and the authorization to hire a work force has led, in practice, to the existence of private medium sized, small, and micro-enterprises, which function today without the appropriate legal standing, and are governed by law within a regulatory framework designed for individuals working in small businesses undertaken by the worker and family members,” developing is an atmosphere which does not discriminate against or stigmatize non-state work.

The changes over the last five years include “’pay per performance,’” which means that wages for workers in state and non-state enterprises are increasingly linked to results obtained.” In other words, wages will not be equal, but instead will vary based on performance.

The article also emphasizes that the Cuban “economic system would continue to be based on the entire people’s socialist ownership of the fundamental means of production, governed by the principle that distribution (also socialist) would be based on ‘from each according to their capacity, to each according to their work.’”

These changes over the last five years and into the foreseeable future “are taking place within a reality marked by little population growth, with low birth rates and longer life expectancy, a negative migratory balance, increasing urbanization and aging of the population, which imply great social and economic challenges for the country.”

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[1] González, Small business in Cuba, Granma (Mar. 16, 2017).  Earlier blog posts about the Cuban economy are listed in the “Cuban Economy” section of List of Posts to dwkcommentaries—Topical: CUBA.

Cuban Entrepreneurs Express Frustration and Confidence

A recent study based on interviews of 80 Cuban entrepreneurs found seemingly contradictory results.[1]

There was frustration. As expressed by the Miami Herald, “Like entrepreneurs in any country, Cuban entrepreneurs want more access to resources and fewer bureaucratic obstacles to expand and reinvest in their businesses.”

There also was optimism. Said the author of the study, Cuban-born economist Carmelo Mesa Lago, there was a “very high level of reinvestment that the self-employed engage in. Most, including those renting apartments and houses, reinvest.” The study also found a “high degree of satisfaction expressed by those who have decided to start a private business in Cuba, which has allowed them to gain autonomy and live better than those who depend on state wages.”

With virtual unanimity, the entrepreneurs complained about “the level of state interference” or over-regulations plus high prices for supplies, the absence of a wholesale market and high taxes.

The study looked at four segments of the so-called “non-state sector” of the Cuban economy: (1) the self-employed; (2) farmers who use state-owned parcels; (3) corredores   (brokers) of home sales as well as buyers and sellers of private homes; and (4) workers of non-farm production and service cooperatives. Another sector–owners of private restaurants known as paladares—was not included because, says Lago, they do not want to attract attention to their business.

The study– oces del cambio en el sector no estatal cubano (Voices of Change in the Cuban Non-State Sector)—is published by the Ibero-American publishing house.

Conclusion

This study confirms the existence of a thriving non-state sector of the Cuban economy, contrary to the Senate testimony of the new U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Nikki Haley, as mentioned in a recent post.

The study also confirms the unsurprising difficulties and challenges the Cuban government faces in creating a mixed economy. Indeed, as covered in an earlier post, Raúl Castro in his role as the leader of the Communist Party of Cuba at its Party Congress last year stressed those difficulties and challenges while also acknowledging the essential and important contributions of the non-state sector for the Cuban economy.

Finally the study confirms the need for the U.S. to support the further development and success of this sector by continuing and enhancing the U.S. normalizing of relations with Cuba, especially the enabling of U.S. remittances to those on the island and thereby constituting a major source of capital for this sector. This very point has been emphasized by Engage Cuba, a U.S. coalition, in its lobbying of the new Trump Administration.[2]

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[1] Gámez-Torres, Cuban entrepreneurs dream big, but the government gets in their way, Miami Herald (Jan. 26, 2017).

[2] U.S. and Cuba’s Efforts To Continue Normalization, dwkcommentaries.com (Dec. 9, 2016); Lobbying the Incoming Trump Administration To Continue Normalization with Cuba, dwkcommentaries.com (Jan. 18, 2017); Engage Cuba.

Washington Post Endorses Continued Normalization with Cuba

The Washington Post opens its January 10 editorial by properly recognizing that the “lasting foreign policy legacy of a president often doesn’t become clear until years after he leaves office. That may be particularly true of President Obama, because some of his most distinctive initiatives were, in large part, bets on long-term results. . . . [T]he president’s decision to reopen relations with Cuba without requiring any political liberalization by the Castro regime will be judged on whether greater engagement with the United States eventually helps to bring about that change.”[1]

The editorial concludes by urging President-elect Donald Trump to “improve on . . . [President Obama’s policy of normalizing relations with Cuba]. A break with Havana would dash the hopes of millions of Cubans who still expect the [U.S.] to use its leverage to promote real change. Mr. Trump should freeze contacts with the regime’s security agencies and link any further U.S. economic concessions to an increase in political freedom.”

In between these words the editorial laments what it sees as a Cuban escalation of “[r]epression against the political opposition . . . since the death of Fidel Castro;” the decline of U.S. exports to the island; and what it sees as the slow pace of expansion of Cuban self-employment financed, in part, by U.S. remittances to Cuban family and friends.

Conclusion

I applaud the editorial’s recognition that the process of normalizing relations with Cuba is a long-term project that Trump should not abandon, but instead seek to improve.

The editorial, however, fails to acknowledge that Cuba is going through its own long-term project of moving from a state-owned to a mixed economy. This is not an easy task. Indeed, last April Raúl Castro in a speech to the Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba criticized the old habits of many within the state-owned enterprises; praised the economic contributions of the self-employed, now 30% of the national economy; and complained about some low-skilled workers like gas-station attendants earning more money than high-skilled workers like physicians.[2]

This Cuban long-term project is made even more difficult by the economic collapse of its ally Venezuela and the resulting reductions of the latter’s economic support of Cuba, which is briefly mentioned in the editorial along with the 1% decline of the Cuban economy in 2016.

Cuban repression of what we see as political dissent may be factually well founded. But our criticism of such repression needs to be tempered by recognition that the U.S. continues to conduct covert or under-cover so-called “democracy promotion” activities in Cuba and that Cuba has legitimate reasons to be concerned about such activities. This blog, for example, has repeatedly criticized such “democracy promotion” programs and urged that they be conducted only with the cooperation of the Cuban government.[3] Moreover, it would be short-sighted to condition further U.S. economic liberalization on improvements in Cuban human rights; this approach failed in its implementation from 1959 through December 2014.

Finally the U.S. needs to recognize and support Cuban entrepreneurs, many with funding from U.S. remittances, who are improving their own lives and those of their employees and who are becoming an important non-state source of ideas and advocacy.[4]

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[1] Editorial, How Trump could bring real change to Cuba, Wash. Post (Jan. 10, 2017).

[2] Raúl Castro Discusses Socio-Economic Issues in Report to Seventh Congress of Communist Party of Cuba, dwkcommenataries.com (April 19, 2016).

[3] See posts listed in “U.S. Democracy Promotion Programs in Cuba” in List of Posts to dwkcommentaries—Topical (Cuba).

[4] Here are some of the dwkcommentaries.com posts that touch on the Cuban economy: Cuba to Legalize Small and Medium-Sized Private Business, (May 25, 2016); Cuba Press Offers Positive Press About the Island’s Private Enterprise Sector, (June 1, 2016); Economists Discuss Current Cuban Economic and Political Situation, (Aug. 1, 2016); Cuba Faces Economic Challenges (Dec. 14, 2016); Cuba’s Economic Ties with Venezuela Are Fraying (Dec. 14, 2016); U.S. and Cuba’s Efforts To Continue Normalization (Dec. 9, 2016).

Answers to Cuba’s Questions About the U.S. Presidential Policy Directive on U.S.-Cuba Normalization 

Granma, the official newspaper of the Communist Party of Cuba, poses 10 questions about the recent U.S. Presidential Policy Directive—United States-Cuba Normalization.[1]

Here are those questions with my answers.

  1. (a) Will the U.S. ever recognize that the embargo/blockade has been an illegal and unjust policy of aggression that has caused Cuba economic damages and incalculable human losses? 

Answer: No. As Ambassador Samantha Power stated at the U.N. on October 26, the U.S. believes that the embargo has been legal. As mentioned in an earlier post, I have suggested that the dispute over this issue could be and should be resolved by an independent panel of international arbitrators, such as those provided by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague in the Netherlands.

  1. (b) Is the U.S. willing to compensate the Cuban people for damages and losses [allegedly] caused by the embargo/blockade?

Answer: No. The major premise for the Cuban damages claim is the contention that the embargo/blockade is illegal. The U.S. does not accept this contention. Nor, I assume, does the U.S. accept the Cuban calculation of such alleged damages. The amount of any alleged damages undoubtedly would be challenged by the U.S. in the international arbitration proceedings previously mentioned. After all, even Cuba admitted in presenting its most recent resolution against the embargo at the U.N. General Assembly that there are many other reasons for Cuba’s poor economic record, including its own mistakes.

2. [Will the U.S. end its occupation of Guantanamo Bay?]

Answer. No. The Directive clearly states that the U.S. believes that its lease of Guantanamo Bay from Cuba is legal and that the U.S. will not voluntarily return the territory to Cuba. Cuba, on the other hand, persistently asserts that the U.S. use of the territory is illegal. As a previous post suggests, this dispute should be submitted to an international arbitration panel similar to the one previously mentioned. In such a proceeding both parties would submit evidence and legal arguments, and the arbitration panel would render a decision. At any time the parties could settle this dispute by negotiating a new lease at a much higher annual rental.

  1. Should the U.S. terminate its so-called “Democracy Assistance” programs?

Answer. Yes, as this blog has consistently argued, these programs are counterproductive and illogical.[2] One cannot promote democracy with anti-democratic and undercover programs. But the U.S. continues to do so, and I will continue to object to them and call for their abolition.

  1. What does the Directive mean when it says that “democracy assistance” programs will be more “transparent” and “consistent with programming in other similarly situated societies around the world?”

Answer. I do not know what is meant by “transparent,” unless it means the U.S. Government publicly solicits applicants to conduct such programs. But such programs are not “transparent” when conducted secretly or undercover as such programs have done so in Cuba.

  1. Should the U.S. end its Radio and TV Marti?

Answer. Yes. This blog previously has called for the ending of such programs as antithetical to promoting democracy and human rights in Cuba. Now there is less need for such programs given the increasing availability of the Internet with its overwhelming information in Cuba. As the Directive states, “increased access to the internet is boosting Cubans’ connectivity to the wider world and expanding the ability of the Cuban people, especially youth, to exchange information and ideas.”

  1. What is the point of applying [U.S.] measures only benefiting a small part of the population, [the 24% currently in the] private sector?

Answer. The U.S. clearly believes that private enterprise and the private sector will enhance Cuban prosperity and that this sector needs and deserves external assistance. And President and First Secretary Raúl Castro said essentially the same thing at last April’s Seventh Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba.

7. Why [does the U.S.] maintain the restriction on creating joint ventures [with Cubans] for the development and marketing of these products, [I.e., medicines and vaccines]?

Answer. As the Directive states, the U.S. “will promote joint work [with Cuba], such as development of vaccines, treatments, and diagnostics; partner with Cuba to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease outbreaks; collaborate in the field of cancer control, treatment programs, and joint research; and exchange best practices related to access to healthcare.” This blogger does not know if there are restrictions against joint ventures in this area, but he clearly favors elimination of the U.S. embargo and other restrictions on U.S.-Cuba business and trade.

  1. Does [the U.S.] acknowledge that Cuba’s socio-economic model, based on the public control over the fundamental means of production, guarantees achievements in two spheres strategic for the nation’s future, [i.e., medical care and education]?

Answer. Yes, as the Directive states, the U.S. recognizes, “Cuba has important economic potential rooted in the dynamism of its people, as well as a sustained commitment in areas like education and health care.” In addition, President Obama in his March 2016 speech in Havana said, “Cuba has an extraordinary resource — a system of education which values every boy and every girl” and “no one should deny the service that thousands of Cuban doctors have delivered for the poor and suffering.”

  1. Why are U.S. companies still prohibited from investing in Cuba, with the exception of the telecommunications sector, approved by Obama in 2015?

Answer. This blogger does not know, but he clearly favors elimination of the U.S. embargo and other restrictions on U.S.-Cuba business and trade.

  1. Is President Barack Obama willing to continue using his executive prerogatives to make the policy change toward Cuba irreversible?

Answer. This blogger does not know the answer to this question, but to the extent President Obama has executive authority to enact additional liberalizations of restrictions on business and trade with Cuba in his remaining weeks in office, I hope he will do so.

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[1] Ten key questions, Granma (Oct. 27, 2016).  The Presidential Policy Directive is replicated in a previous post.

[2] See posts listed in “U.S. Democracy Promotion in Cuba” in List of posts to dwkcommentaries—Topical: CUBA.

U.S. Continues Objectionable “Democracy Promotion” Programs in Cuba

On October 19, the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) announced another objectionable “democracy promotion” program in Cuba.[1]

The New DRL Program

This time it was a DRL request for persons to submit “program ideas to promote internationally-recognized, civil, political, and labor rights in Cuba as set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international instruments.” Such submissions shall be evaluated by DRL and some applicants will be selected to submit full proposal applications. The eventual successful applications are expected to have funding of $5.6 million.

The announcement stated that DRL does not fund programs to support Cuban government institutions. Instead, examples of typical funded programs include:

  • “Organizational assistance to Cuban civil society to improve management, strategic planning, sustainability, and collaboration of local civil society groups such as labor groups, civil and political rights groups, youth groups, and religious freedom advocates, and that encourage the participation of marginalized populations;
  • Capacity building on and off the island. Off-island activities sometimes include short-term fellowships;
  • Access to software that would be easily accessible in an open society, or the adaption of said software for the Cuban technological environment;
  • Assistance mechanisms designed to provide independent Cuban civil society with tools, opportunities, and trainings that civil society counterparts in open societies can access;
  • Incorporation of independent Cuban civil society into initiatives, fora, and coalitions led by their regional and global civil society counterparts; and
  • Increase access to uncensored information within the island.”

This program, says DRL, purportedly is justified by its allegation: “The Cuban government fails to respect the above universal rights, in particular the freedom of speech, by limiting independent journalists and media, censoring and limiting access to the internet, maintaining a monopoly on political power and media outlets, circumscribing academic freedom, and limiting religious freedom. The government refuses to recognize non-governmental human rights groups or permit them to function legally. The government continues to prevent workers from forming independent unions and dismisses or otherwise limits economic opportunities for workers who exercise any of their rights in contradiction of government policy. Common human rights abuses in Cuba include a lack of periodic and genuine elections-thereby denying citizens the right to participate in their government -selective prosecution and denial of fair trial, as well as the use of government threats, extrajudicial physical violence, intimidation, organized mobs, harassment, and detentions to prevent free expression and peaceful assembly. Authorities lack transparency and pervasively monitor private communications.”

Cuban Reaction[2]

Granma, the official newspaper of the Communist Party of Cuba, noticed this DRL public announcement and immediately condemned it as “subversive” and “containing all the usual ingredients of the typical aggressive and interventionist policies of the past.”

Moreover, Granma says, the DRL announcement was inconsistent with the recent “Presidential Policy Directive—United States-Cuba Normalization,” which was replicated in a prior post. That Directive said that so-called democracy promotion programs for Cuba would be “transparent.”

Granma also rejects the allegation that it does not respect human rights while asserting that the U.S. has many blemishes on its human rights record.

Conclusion

I share DRL’s belief in the importance of “internationally-recognized, civil, political, and labor rights . . .  as set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international instruments.” I also share the DRL’s belief that Cuba has deficiencies in these rights while regretting U.S. inability to appreciate Cuba’s legitimate suspicion of such U.S. criticism as a cover for regime-change efforts by its larger and more powerful northern neighbor. I also concur in the Presidential Policy Directive’s statement that any and all U.S. democracy programs in Cuba should be “transparent.”

But DRL’s public announcement on the Internet of its solicitation of submissions of interest from U.S. or foreign NGO’s (non-governmental organizations) or universities in becoming contractors to conduct such programs does not constitute transparency. It does not because the DRL announcement does not say that such programs will be conducted with the knowledge and cooperation of the Cuban government. Indeed, DRL affirmatively states that it does not fund programs to support Cuban government institutions and previous DRL programs on the island were not conducted transparently. Instead they were conducted undercover or secretly.

A prior post criticized the Policy Directive’s failure to announce cessation of U.S. secretive “democracy promotion” programs and this blogger had hoped that there would be a subsequent announcement to that effect. Instead, we have this objectionable DRL request for proposals.

Such DRL programs, in this blogger’s opinion, are inherently self-contradictory. Promote democracy and human rights with anti-democratic programs that are secret and undercover and without the permission and cooperation of the country’s government? NO!

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[1] U.S. State Dep’t, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Request for Statements of Interest: Programs Fostering Civil, Political, and Labor Rights in Cuba (Oct. 19, 2016).

[2] Gomez, U.S. subversion against Cuba continues, Granma (Oct. 24, 2016).

Reactions to New Presidential Policy Directive on U.S.-Cuba Normalization

As replicated in a prior post, on October 14, President Barack Obama issued a Presidential Policy Directive on U.S.-Cuba Normalization.

This Directive, to my knowledge, has no special U.S. legal status and instead is a roadmap for the next administration on the multiple ways the complex U.S. government is implementing such normalization. President Obama in a statement about the Directive said, “This Directive takes a comprehensive and whole-of-government approach to promote engagement with the Cuban government and people, and make our opening to Cuba irreversible. . . . [It] consolidates and builds upon the changes we’ve already made, promotes transparency by being clear about our policy and intentions, and encourages further engagement between our countries and our people.”[1]

Here are comments on some of the key unresolved issues in that process.

  1. Ending the U.S. Embargo of Cuba

 Cuba repeatedly has called for ending the U.S. embargo, and on October 27 it will present its annual resolution condemning the embargo (blockade) to the U.N. General Assembly, which undoubtedly again will overwhelmingly approve the resolution.

The Presidential Directive correctly notes that the Obama Administration repeatedly has asked Congress to end the embargo and states that the U.S. Mission to the United Nations “will participate in discussions regarding the annual Cuban embargo resolution at the [U.N.], as our bilateral relationship continues to develop in a positive trajectory.”[2]

  1. Expanding U.S.-Cuba Trade

The Directive correctly includes a “prosperous and stable Cuba” and expanded U.S.-Cuba trade as parts of its vision for normalization, and the Directive correctly reported that the Obama Administration has adopted regulations relaxing some of the restrictions on U.S. trade with Cuba.[3]

In addition, President Obama’s statement about the Directive noted that on the same day, “The Departments of Treasury and Commerce issued further regulatory changes . . . to continue to facilitate more interaction between the Cuban and American people, including through travel and commercial opportunities, and more access to information.”[4]

According to the two departments’ press release, these new changes will enable “more scientific collaboration, grants and scholarships, people-to-people contact, and private sector growth.” More specifically, the changes “are intended to expand opportunities for scientific collaboration by authorizing certain transactions related to Cuban-origin pharmaceuticals and joint medical research; improve living conditions for Cubans by expanding existing authorizations for grants and humanitarian-related services; increase people-to-people contact in Cuba by facilitating authorized travel and commerce; facilitate safe travel between the United States and Cuba by authorizing civil aviation safety-related services; and bolster trade and commercial opportunities by expanding and streamlining authorizations relating to trade and commerce.”[5]

There is also “a new authorization that will allow persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction to provide services to Cuba or Cuban nationals related to developing, repairing, maintaining, and enhancing certain Cuban infrastructure in order to directly benefit the Cuban people.” Other new rules permit certain foreign ships carrying certain cargo to travel directly to U.S. ports after docking in Cuba, the export of U.S. pesticides or tractors to Cuba without advance payment in cash and U.S. businesses to enter into binding contracts with Cubans that are contingent on the lifting of the U.S. embargo.

  1. U.S. Promotion of Economic Change in Cuba

The Directive states the U.S. “will not pursue regime change in Cuba. We will continue to make clear that the [U.S.] cannot impose a different model on Cuba because the future of Cuba is up to the Cuban people.”

Nevertheless the Directive recognizes as does the Communist Party of Cuba (CPC) that “Due to Cuba’s legal, political, and regulatory constraints, its economy is not generating adequate foreign exchange to purchase U.S. exports that could flow from the easing of the embargo.” Helping to meet this economic problem, both the U.S. and the CPC also recognize, “With an estimated 1 in 4 working Cubans engaged in entrepreneurship, a dynamic, independent private sector is emerging. Expansion of the private sector has increased resources for individual Cubans and created nascent openings for Cuban entrepreneurs to engage with U.S. firms and nongovernmental organizations. We take note of the Cuban government’s limited, but meaningful steps to expand legal protections and opportunities for small- and medium-sized businesses, which, if expanded and sustained, will improve the investment climate.” While the Cuban government pursues its economic goals based on its national priorities, we will utilize our expanded cooperation to support further economic reforms by the Cuban government.”[6]

The Directive makes clear that the U.S. seeks and promotes Cuban economic reform that includes “the development of a private sector that provides greater economic opportunities for the Cuban people.”

  1. U.S. Promotion of Human Rights in Cuba

According to the Directive, Cuba continues with “repression of civil and political liberties.” As a result, the U.S. “will utilize engagement to urge Cuba to make demonstrable progress on human rights and religious freedom” and “continue to speak out in support of human rights, including the rights to freedoms of expression, religion, association, and peaceful assembly as we do around the world. Our policy is designed to support Cubans’ ability to exercise their universal human rights and fundamental freedoms. . . . In pursuit of these objectives, we are not seeking to impose regime change on Cuba; we are, instead, promoting values that we support around the world while respecting that it is up to the Cuban people to make their own choices about their future.”

  1. U,S. Democracy Promotion Programs in Cuba

The U.S. through private contractors with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the U.S. State Department and other U.S. government agencies surreptitiously has been conducting what the U.S. calls “democracy promotion” programs in Cuba. Cuba rightfully and consistently has objected to such programs.[7]

Nevertheless, the Directive asserts the U.S. “will not pursue regime change in Cuba. We will continue to make clear that the [U.S.] cannot impose a different model on Cuba because the future of Cuba is up to the Cuban people.”

“While remaining committed to supporting democratic activists as we do around the world, we will also engage community leaders, bloggers, activists, and other social issue leaders who can contribute to Cuba’s internal dialogue on civic participation. We will continue to pursue engagements with civil society through the U.S. Embassy in Havana and during official [U.S.] Government visits to Cuba.”

“We will pursue democracy programming that is transparent and consistent with programming in other similarly situated societies around the world.” (Emphasis added.) The State Department will continue to be responsible for “coordination of democracy programs” and “will continue to co-lead efforts with the U.S. Agency for International Development to ensure democracy programming is transparent and consistent with programming in other similarly situated societies. (Emphasis added.)

The Directive correctly anticipates that “the Cuban government will continue to object to U.S. democracy programs, [and] Radio and TV Marti.” This blog has consistently agreed with the Cubans on this issue because the so-called democracy programs are carried out surreptitiously by the U.S. How can they be promoting democracy if they are undercover? If indeed the U.S. wants to do so transparently, then they should only be done with the knowledge and consent of the Cuban government.

Is the statement that such programs in Cuba are to be “consistent with programming in other similarly situated societies” supposed to be the purported justification for conducting such programs in Cuba secretly from its government?

  1. U.S. Special Immigration Rules for Cubans

Cuba repeatedly has called for the U.S. to end its special immigration benefits to Cubans: (a) the U.S. dry feet/wet feet policy that allows any Cubans who arrive on land at a U.S. point of entry to be admitted into the U.S.; and (b) the U.S. Cuban Medical Professional Parole Policy that allows such Cubans to gain entry to the U.S. as parolees from other countries. Therefore, the Directive correctly anticipates “the Cuban government will continue to object to U.S. migration policies and operations.”

This blog has concurred with Cuba’s objections to these policies.[8]

The Directive correctly recognizes that “significant emigration of working-age Cubans further exacerbates Cuba’s demographic problem of a rapidly aging population.” Yet the Directive fails to discuss either the specific U.S. immigration rules for Cubans themselves or their being one of the causes of this societal and economic problem for the island. This, in my opinion, is a major failing of the Directive.

Instead, the Directive merely states that the DHS “will safeguard the integrity of the U.S. immigration system, to include the facilitation of lawful immigration and ensure protection of refugees. The Secretary of Homeland Security (the United States Government lead for a maritime migration or mass migration) with support from the Secretaries of State and Defense, will address a maritime migration or mass migration pursuant to Executive Orders 12807 and 13276 and consistent with applicable interagency guidance and strategy.”

  1. U.S. Lease of Guantanamo Bay from Cuba

Cuba repeatedly has alleged that the U.S. use of Guantanamo Bay for a naval base is “illegal” and that the U.S. should return this territory to Cuba while the U.S. consistently has rejected such allegations and demands. The Directive maintains this U.S. position; it states, “The [U.S.] Government has no intention to alter the existing lease treaty and other arrangements related to the Guantanamo Bay Naval Station, which enables the [U.S.] to enhance and preserve regional security.”

This blog has analyzed this dispute, rejected Cuba’s unsupported allegation that the U.S. use of this territory is illegal and suggested that the dispute over Guantanamo be submitted to an international arbitration panel for resolution. A better solution, as this blog also has recommended, would be a renegotiation of the lease with a much larger annual rent to be paid by the U.S. Such a change, in my opinion, would provide Cuba with much-needed foreign exchange to pay its foreign obligations, including the undoubted obligation to pay U.S. nationals for expropriation of property at the start of the Cuban Revolution in the early 1960’s. Returning the territory to Cuba, while it would probably provide an emotional boost to its pride, would which not add to its economy. In the background is the larger geopolitical threat to the U.S. if Russia (or China) and Cuba agree to the installation of Russian (or Chinese) military bases on the island.[9]

  1. Other Issues

Although the Directive is stated to be “comprehensive,” it does not mention at least the following serious unresolved issues that have arisen in the two countries’ discussions since December 17, 2014:

  • Cuba’s claims for over $ 300 billion of alleged damages resulting from the embargo and certain other U.S. actions;
  • Cuba’s claim against U.S.for unpaid rent for Guantanamo Bay, 1960 to date;
  • The U.S. claims for nearly $8 billion (including interest) for property owned by U.S. nationals that was expropriated by the Cuban government in the early days of the Cuban Revolution in the early 1960’s;
  • Mutual return of fugitives from the other’s criminal justice system.[10]

Conclusion

There are many reasons why a supporter of U.S.-Cuba normalization like this blogger should be happy over this Directive. It provides a roadmap for the complex U.S. governmental pursuit of normalization that should be helpful to a new U.S. president who wants to continue that pursuit. Moreover, many of the specifics are laudable, in this blogger’s opinion.

However, the Directive has failed to announce cessation of secretive “democracy promotion” programs for Cuba and special immigration benefits for Cubans, as urged by this blogger and others. In addition, as just noted, the Directive fails to cover some of the serious, unresolved issues between the two countries. All of these points, in this blogger’s opinions, are serious deficiencies.

Cuba immediately responded to this Directive.[11] Josefina Vidal, Cuba’s Foreign Ministry’s Director General of the United States, said the Directive “is a significant step in the process towards lifting the blockade and to the improvement of relations between the two countries. We consider it important that the Directive recognizes the independence, sovereignty and self-determination of Cuba, which should continue to be essential in relations between the two countries.” On the other hand, she noted, the Directive “does not hide the [U.S.] purpose of promoting changes in the economic, political and social system of Cuba.”

Yes, as President Obama recently said to the author of an article in The New Yorker, the President and many Americans, including this blogger, believe that changes in Cuban human rights and economy would be beneficial to the Cubans and the hemisphere. So long as the U.S. seeks these objectives above-board and with the knowledge and consent of the Cuban government, both governments and peoples should be pleased.

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 [1] White House, Statement by the President on the Presidential Policy Directive on Cuba (Oct. 14, 2016); Davis, Obama, Cementing New Ties With Cuba, Lifts Limits on Cigars and Rum, N.Y. Times (Oct. 14, 2016).

[2] This blog also repeatedly has pleaded with Congress to end the embargo. (See posts listed in “U.S. Embargo of Cuba” in List of Posts to dwkcommentaries—Topical: CUBA).

[3] This blog has applauded these relaxations of restrictions. (See posts listed in “U.S. & Cuba Normalization, 2014-2015,” and “U.S. & Cuba Normalization, 2015-2016” in List of Posts to dwkcommentaries—Topical: CUBA).

[4] Reuters, Obama Eases Restrictions on Cuba, Lifts Limits on Rum and Cigars, N.Y. times (Oct. 14, 2016); Schwartz, U.S. Takes Additional Steps to Ease Restrictions on Trade, Ties with Cuba, W.S.J. (Oct. 14, 2016); Whitefield, Obama moves to make Cuba policies ‘irreversible,’ InCubaToday (Oct. 14, 2016).

[5] U.S. Treasury Dep’t, Treasury and Commerce Announce Further Amendments to Cuba Sanctions Regulations (Oct. 14, 2016).

[6] Raúl Castro as First Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba at its April 2016 Congress bluntly laid out Cuba’s economic problems, including state-owned enterprises’ inefficiencies, and the need to facilitate the growth and prosperity of private-owned businesses. (See Raúl Castro Discusses Socio-Economic Issues in Report to Seventh Congress of Communist Party of Cuba (April 19, 2016).) See also, e.g., Other Signs of Cuban Regime’s Distress Over Economy (April 21, 2016); Cuban Press Offers Positive Articles About the Island’s Private Enterprise Sector (June 1, 2016).

[7] This blog repeatedly has objected to these “democracy promotion” programs and called for any such programs to be conducted with the cooperation of Cuban authorities. (See posts listed in “U.S. Democracy Promotion in Cuba” in List of Posts to dwkcommentaries—Topical: CUBA.)

[8] See posts listed in “Cuban Medical Personnel & U.S.” and “Cuban Migration to U.S., 2015-2016” in List of Posts to dwkcommentaries—Topical: CUBA).

[9] This blog has discussed various issues relating to Guantanamo Bay. (See posts listed in “U.S. & Cuba Damage Claims” in List of Posts to dwkcommentaries—Topical: CUBA).

[10] These issues have been discussed in posts listed in “U.S. & Cuba Damage Claims” and “U.S. Embargo of Cuba” in List of Posts to dwkcommentaries—Topical: CUBA  and in and in Issues Regarding Cuba and U.S. Extradition of the Other’s Fugitives (Feb. 24, 2015).

[11] Ellizalde, Obama presidential directive is a significant step: Josefina Vidal, CubaDebate (Oct. 14, 2016).

Caveats to Cuba’s Communist Party’s Decision To Legalize Small and Medium-Sized Businesses 

Based upon secondary sources, a prior post asserted that the Communist Party of Cuba at its recent Seventh Congress had decided to have small and medium-sized businesses legalized. Now, another secondary source suggests that there are significant qualifications to that Party decision.[1]

First, this new source says “the legalization of the so-called PYMES (Spanish acronym for small and medium enterprises) is part of a . . . Party . . . project to ‘conceptualize’ the ‘theoretical basis … for the economic and social model that we aspire to as part of the process of actualizing’ the island’s system.” This project is “part of another document on a ‘Projected National Economic and Social Development Plan until 2030’ … whose fulfillment will contribute to reaching that model, in the long run.’” (Emphasis added.)

The “strategic sectors singled out for development in the 2030 Plan” include “construction, electricity, telecommunications, internet connectivity, transportation and warehousing for commercial activities, hydraulic installations and networks; tourism and related activities such as marinas, golf and real estate; professional services, especially medical personnel; non-sugar agriculture and the food industry; production of pharmaceuticals and biotechnology; the sugar industry and light industry for the domestic market.”

The Party documents also note that “’in the future society to which we aspire’ the socialist economy and central planning will occupy ‘a primordial place’” and that “the ‘existence of non-state forms (of economic activity) will depend on the goals of socialist development.’” In addition, the government will “recognize private property that fulfills a public function in specific activities and whose owners are people or companies — Cuban as well as foreign.” Moreover, “Cubans will be able to establish ‘small businesses carried on basically by the worker and his family’” as well as “’private companies of medium, small and micro sizes, according to the volume of the activity and the number of workers, (to be) legally recognized as companies.’”

As a result, this secondary source predicts a slow pace in adopting these reforms.

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[1] Torres, Cuba’s Communist Party lays out a vague future for private enterprise, InCuba Today (May 31, 2016).