State Department’s New Travel Advisory System for Cuba and Other Countries          

On January 10, the U.S. State Department announced its new system for travel advisories for all other countries in the world.[1] The sources in footnote 1 describe this new system. Here are the highlights from a Department briefing.

General Information

First, the Department “needed to make it more accessible to people. And that’s why in November we went to a mobile-friendly design for our website. We also needed to make sure that the information was more easily understood, putting it into plain language, making it clearer why we were ranking countries, why we were citing them as a threat or a risk, and making that very obvious to people. And finally, making the information more actionable. We often got questions from people saying, ‘Well, I’ve read your Travel Warning, but what does it mean? What am I supposed to do?’”

“We have gone to a Travel Advisory for every country . . . . And within that Travel Advisory, we have gone to a four-level ranking system, starting with a Level 1, which is ‘Exercise normal precautions’ (e.g., Aruba);  Level 2, ‘Exercise increased caution’ (e.g., Jamaica); Level 3, ‘Reconsider travel’ (e.g., Cuba); and level 4, ‘Do not travel’” (e.g., Mexican states of Colima, Guerrero, Michoacán, Sinaloa and Tamaulipas due to crime).

“And for each country that has a Level 2 or above, we will specify what we think those risks or threats are, why is it that we’re telling people to consider – reconsider travel or to exercise caution or not to travel at all. And those risks and conditions and circumstances are going to be very clearly spelled out with icons – C for crime, T for terrorism, U for civil unrest, H for health issues, N for natural disasters, E for time-limited events such as elections or major sporting events, and O for other, which is our catch-all for the things that don’t fit into those other categories.”

 Travel Advisory for Cuba.[2]

The new Travel Advisory for Cuba  has the “Level 3: Reconsider Travel” ranking, rather than its previous warning not to go to Cuba. Here is what the new Advisory says:

“Reconsider travel to Cuba due to health attacks directed at U.S. Embassy Havana employees.”

“Over the past several months, numerous U.S. Embassy Havana employees appear to have been targeted in specific attacks. Many of these employees have suffered injuries as a consequence of these attacks. Affected individuals have exhibited a range of physical symptoms including ear complaints and hearing loss, dizziness, headaches, fatigue, cognitive issues, visual problems, and difficulty sleeping.”

“Because our personnel’s safety is at risk, and we are unable to identify the source of the attacks, we believe U.S. citizens may also be at risk. Attacks have occurred in U.S. diplomatic residences and at Hotel Nacional and Hotel Capri in Havana.”

“On September 29, 2017, the Department ordered the departure of non-emergency U.S. government employees and their family members to protect the safety of our personnel. Due to the drawdown in staff, the U.S. Embassy in Havana has limited ability to assist U.S. citizens”.

“Read the Safety and Security section on the country information page.”

“If you decide to travel to Cuba:

In the State Department briefing on the new system, the spokesperson said the following about Cuba:

  • “As we were putting all this together, we did a very careful assessment. We talked to all of our experts, and this is where we came out on Cuba.” The new Advisory “eliminated a reference to the responsibility of the Cuban government to prevent attacks on U.S. diplomats, which was included in the previous one.”
  • We “have significantly reduced our staffing at our embassy in Havana. Whenever we do that, traditionally we have always issued a Travel Warning, and that has not changed. This is reflected now in the Level 3 ranking that we’ve given to Cuba.” We now “have a very small footprint in our embassy in Havana. We have very, very limited consular resources and our ability to help people in an emergency is extremely limited. So that’s another factor that plays into it.”

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[1] State Dep’t, Fact Sheet: New Travel Advisories for U.S. Travelers (Jan. 10, 2018); State Dep’t, Briefing on the Department of State’s New Travel Advisories (Jan. 10, 2018).

[2] State Dep’t, Travel Advisory: Cuba—Level 3: Reconsider Travel (Jan. 10, 2018); Torres, State Department softens travel warning to Cuba, recommends ‘reconsidering’ trip, Miami Herald (Jan. 10, 2018).

U.S. Senate Hearing on Medical Problems of U.S. Diplomats in Cuba

On January 9, a subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing entitled “Attacks on U.S. Diplomats in Cuba: Response and Oversight.” The Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women’s Issues was chaired by Senator Marco Rubio (Rep., FL), a noted critic of normalization of U.S.-Cuba relation, who said the purpose of the hearing was “to establish the facts surrounding the attacks on U.S. diplomats in Cuba, and conduct oversight over the State Department’s handling of the attacks.”[1]

The witnesses were three officials of the U.S. State Department: Mr. Francisco Palmieri, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs; Mr. Todd Brown, Diplomatic Security, Assistant Director, International Programs; and Dr. Charles Rosenfarb, Medical Director, Bureau of Medical Services.

The hearing started with lengthy opening statements by Rubio and the Ranking Member, Bob Menendez (Dem., NJ), both very critical of the Department’s response to these incidents or “attacks.” [2] The hearing itself focused on the following four topics:: (1) the nature of the injuries; (2) the cause of the injuries; (3) the perpetrator of the “attacks;” and (4) the State Department’s appointment of an accountability review board.

  1. The Nature of the injuries

 While the symptoms may vary, all 24  of the medically-confirmed cases  have described some combination of the following symptoms: sharp ear pain, dull headaches, tinnitus (ringing in one ea), vertigo, visual focusing issues, disorientation, nausea, extreme fatigue. Some have been diagnosed with mild brain injuries similar to what might happen from a concussion.

  1. The cause of the injuries[3]

In early July, the Bureau of Medical Services at the State Department convened a panel of academic experts to review case histories and the test results up to that point. And they arrived at [the following] consensus: ‘the patterns of injuries were most likely related to trauma from a non-natural source.”

Mr. Brown said investigators are considering possible causes other than a sonic attack, including a viral attack. He also said the possibility that someone deliberately infected people with a virus has not been ruled out. Dr. Rosenfarb testified that evidence suggest that( this is “not an episode of mass hysteria.”

Brown also said he would not rule out a sound component entirely. He said there had been an “acoustic element” associated with the sensations and feelings experienced by diplomats who fell ill. He said it’s possible the sound masked some other technology that caused the damage.

Dr. Rosenfarb said investigators are confident that something indeed caused medical harm to the Americans.

“Perplexing” was a frequent word in this discussion.

  1. Perpetrator(s)

Senator Rubio in a Fox News interview before the hearing said Havana is one of the most tightly controlled cities in the world. “There is no way you can conduct sophisticated attacks targeting American government officials in Havana without the Cuban government at least knowing about it.” [4] He repeated this opinion or conclusion at the start and at the end of the hearing.

  1. Accountability Review Board

Senator Rubio obtained admissions from the witnesses that a “serious injury” of at least one U.S. diplomat in Cuba happened no later than May 2017 and that the Secretary of State had not appointed an accountability review board within 60 days thereafter, as required by statute, and indeed had not yet done so.[5]

Acting Secretary Palmieri tried to remedy this apparent breach by testifying that Secretary Tillerson on December 11, 2017, had decided to convene such a Board and that the statutory required notice to Congress was “forthcoming.”

The same question came up later the same day at the Department’s Press Gaggle, [6] when the Department spokesperson, Under Secretary I. Steven Goldstein, initially said, “We are going to create, as we’ve said previously, an accountability review board, and I would expect that we would have the announcements of the chair and the members of the board available for release within the next week.” He then was pressed with a reporter’s question about Senator Rubio’s apparent contention that the Department and the Secretary had violated the law by not making an earlier appointment of such a board. Goldstein had the following response:

  • “We don’t agree with [the allegation that the law was violated].The assistant secretary today made clear [at the hearing], and we have said too, that it took us time to get the investigation in place. The investigation is continuing, and we believe that we . . . had the authority to determine when the accountability review board should be set in place. I think let’s not lose focus here. There’s 24 people that had injuries, and those people are receiving treatment, and we’ve had over 20 conversations with the people of Cuba. . . . [The] government investigators have been down four times; they’re going down again within the next few weeks. And so our primary goal at the present time is to find out why this occurred, to prevent it from happening again in Cuba and the embassy of Cuba or in any other place where American citizens are located.”
  • “It took time to set up the . . . board because we were hopeful that we would be able to know what occurred. . . . [T]his investigation has taken longer than we anticipated, . . . but it is now time to go forward. . . . I expect the names [for the Board] to be announced over the next several days.”

Conclusion

Only five of the nine subcommittee members attended the hearing, and the members will be submitting written questions to the witnesses, and there will be classified briefing of the subcommittee. Thus, the complete record will not be available until later. [7]

At the conclusion of the hearing, Rubio said that the following were two established facts: (1) 24 Americans had been harmed while in Cuba and (2) the Cuban government at least knew who was responsible for causing such harm. “The idea that someone could put together some sort of action against them, 24 of them, and the Cuban government not know who did it, it’s just impossible,” Mr. Rubio said. He noted that the Americans in Havana became sick just after Mr. Trump’s election, and speculated that rogue government officials from either Cuba or Russia had sought to create friction between Havana and the new administration in Washington.

Under Secretary Goldstein voiced a similar opinion by saying, “We believe that the Cuban government knows what occurred. So what we’d like to them to do is tell us what occurred.”

After the hearing, Cuba’s diplomat who has been intimately involved in U.S.-Cuba relations , Josefina Vidal, said  the hearing was chaired by two Senators (Rubio and Menendez)  “both with a vast record of work against better relations between Cuba and the United States, and the promoters of all kinds of legislative and political proposals that affect the interests of the Cuban and American peoples, and only benefit an increasingly isolated minority that has historically profited from attacks on Cuba.” She continued:

  • “From [the hearing’s] very title “Attacks on U.S. Diplomats in Cuba,” it was evident that the true purpose of this hearing . . . was not to establish the truth, but to impose by force and without any evidence an accusation that they have not been able to prove.”
  • “The State Department does not have any evidence that allows it to affirm that there have been attacks against its diplomats in Havana, or that Cuba may be responsible, or have knowledge of the actions of third parties.”
  • “I categorically reiterate that the Cuban government has no responsibility whatsoever for the health conditions reported by U.S. diplomats. Cuba never has, and never will, perpetrate such acts, nor has it or will it permit third parties to act against the physical integrity of any diplomat, without exception. The Cuban government is aware of its responsibilities and fulfils them exemplarily.”
  • “I affirm that the investigation carried out by Cuban authorities, the results of which the State Department and specialized agencies of the United States have had ample and systematic access to, has shown that there is no evidence at all regarding the occurrence of the alleged incidents and no attack of any kind has occurred.”
  • “Nothing presented by the government of the United States throughout this period, including today, provides evidence that the health problems reported by its diplomats have their origin or cause in Cuba.”
  • “We reject the politicization of this matter and the unjustified measures adopted by the United States government, with a high cost for our population, Cuban émigrés and the U.S. people. We also condemn the political manipulation of these events by anti-Cuban elements, who seek to aggravate the bilateral atmosphere, with the sole purpose of returning to a an era of confrontation, with negative consequences for both countries and the region.”
  • “Cuba is a safe, peaceful and healthy country for Cubans, for foreigners, for accredited diplomats and for the millions of people who visit us every year, including U.S.”[8]

This blogger’s opposition to Senator Rubio’s hostile approach to Cuba has been expressed in a prior post. That approach is against U.S. economic and strategic interests. It provides openings to Russia and the EU, for example, to pursue various developments with Cuba while the U.S. stands on the sidelines. Moreover, that approach contradicts Rubio’s stated desire to support Cuba’s emerging private sector and the Cubans investing and working in that sector.

Senator Rubio also erroneously stated that it is a fact that Cuba has one of the world’s most pervasive surveillance systems in the world and, therefore, has to know if some third-party has perpetrated attacks on U.S. (and Canadian) diplomats. At most that is an allegation or theory, which has been denied by Cuba. Rubio also ignores that whatever security and surveillance system Cuba has undoubtedly is prompted, at least in part, by the long history of U.S. hostility towards the Cuban Revolution, including covert or undercover efforts to promote regime change on the island. Moreover, in its responses to the medical problems of some of its diplomats in Cuba, the U.S. repeatedly has emphasized Cuba’s obligation under the Geneva Convention on Diplomatic Relations to protect other countries diplomats on the island, an obligation that presumably requires Cuba and other nations, including the U.S., to have some idea as to the whereabouts of  those diplomats.

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[1]  Senate Foreign Relations Comm., Subcommittee Hearing: Attacks on U.S. Diplomats in Cuba: Response and Oversight (Jan. 9, 2018); Reuters, U.S. Won’t Send Americans Back to Embassy in Havana Yet: U.S. Officials, N.Y. Times (Jan. 9, 2018); Assoc. Press, In Wake of ‘Attacks,’ Tillerson Not Returning Staff to Cuba, N.Y. Times (Jan. 9, 2018); Assoc. Press, US Considers Whether Virus Might Explain Attacks in Cuba, N.Y. Times (Jan, 9, 2018); Assoc. Press, US Says ‘Viral Attack’ Among theories in Cuba Illnesses, N.Y. Times (Jan. 9, 2018); Harris, U.S. to Open Formal Inquiry on Americans Sickened in Cuba, N.Y. Times (Jan. 9, 2018). In the days before the hearing, disputes erupted over what happened to the diplomats, as discussed in a prior post. (See also posts listed in the “U.S. Diplomats Medical Problems in Cuba” section of List of Posts to dwkcommentaries–Topical: CUBA.)

[2] Press Release, TOMORROW: Rubio Chairs Hearing on Attacks on U.S. Diplomats in Cuba (Jan. 8, 2017); Press Release, Menendez Opening Statement at Cuba Hearing (Jan. 9, 2018).

[3] Some Canadian diplomats in Cuba have suffered similar injuries or effects, but on January 10, a Canadian official said Canada has not reached any conclusions on the cause(s) of such ailments. Reuters, No Conclusion on Cause of Health Symptoms at Embassy in Cuba-Canada Official, N.Y. Times (Jan. 10, 2018).

[4] Press Release, Rubio Presses State Department on Response to Attacks on U.S. Diplomats in Cuba (Jan. 9, 2018).

[5] The State Department has a statutory obligation to “convene an Accountability  Review Board” . . .  not later than 60 days after the occurrence of an incident [of] . . . .any case of serious injury.” The Department also has an obligation to “promptly notify the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate of the incident” of the convening of such a board. (22 U.S.C. §4831.) U.S.

[6] U.S. State Dep’t, Press Gaggle (Jan. 9, 2018).

[7] The subcommittee members in attendance were Senators Rubio and Tom Johnson (Rep., WI), Bob Menendez (Dem., NJ),), another Cuban-American critic of normalization; Tom Udall (Dem., NM); and Jeanne Shaheen (Dem., NH). The absentees were Jeff Flake (Rep., AZ), a supporter of normalization who was just in Cuba; Cory Gardner (Rep., CO); Johnny Isakson (Rep., GA); and Tim Kaine (Dem., VA). Two of these absentees (Flake and Gardner) and Menendez were attending the simultaneous White House conference on immigration.

[8] Vidal, Cuba is a safe, peaceful and healthy country, Granma (Jan. 10, 2018).

Senator Rubio Takes Credit for More Hostile U.S. Policies Regarding Cuba 

On December 22, Senator Marco Rubio (Rep., FL) released a “summary of his 2017 accomplishments.”[1]

Second on this list was “Shaping U.S. Policy Toward Cuba.” It stated, “Rubio worked closely with President Trump and his Administration to develop a new U.S. policy toward Cuba that rolls back the Obama Administration’s one-sided concessions to the Castro regime, and instead works to economically and politically empower private Cuban citizens and entrepreneurs.”

The hyperlinked article for Rubio’s working closely with President Trump was written in Politico by Marc Caputo, formerly of the Miami Herald.[2] It asserts that on May 5 Rubio along with his fellow Miami Republican and Cuban-American, Representative Mario Diaz-Balart, met at the White House with President Trump, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster, then White House Chief of Staff Reince Priebus and Advisor Jared Kushner. Rubio and Diaz-Balart warned the President not to rely upon career service people in the State and Treasury Departments because they did not favor abandoning President Obama’s policy of normalization with the island. Instead, it was suggested, the President himself and his close advisors should develop the new policy themselves.

Trump immediately accepted the suggestion and McMaster volunteered to implement the decision to change U.S. policy towards Cuba, which was announced in the President’s speech in Miami on June 16  and formalized in the National Security Presidential Memorandum on Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba, which he signed immediately after the speech.[3]

This blogger already has expressed his opposition to this reversal of U.S. policy and rhetoric regarding Cuba and suggested instead on overturning the new ban on individual person-to-person travel and emphasizing the ban’s adverse impact on Cuba’s emerging entrepreneurs while continuing to advocate for implementation of other normalization measures.[4]

Although Rubio is a Cuban-American, he has never lived there or even visited the island. Thus, he is subject to legitimate criticism for having a distorted view of what U.S. policy should be. Addressing this glaring gap in his knowledge, a group of Cuban businesswomen have invited him to visit Cuba to learn about Cuba, the island’s emerging private sector and the adverse impact on those new businesses from the U.S. policies advocated by the Senator and President Trump. The Senator, however, has not accepted the invitation or even acknowledged this graceful gesture by the women.[5]

The Senator also could learn from Living Waters for the World, a project of the Synod of Living Waters of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) that has installed nearly 900 clean water systems in 25 countries, including nearly 50 in Cuba. A recent U.S. volunteer group visited 10 such clean water sites in Cuba and said there was a sense of God whispering, “Pay attention, I have something important to show you—our inherent connectedness. Clearly, God does extraordinary things when we reach beyond our boundaries to know, be with, and pay attention to our brothers and sisters in Christ.”[6]

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[1] Press Release: Rubio Highlights 2017 Accomplishments (Dec. 22, 2017).

[2] Caputo, Inside Marco Rubio’s campaign to shape Trump’s Cuba crackdown, Politico (June 15, 2017).

[3] See these posts to dwkcommentaries.com: President Trump Announces Reversal of Some Cuba Normalization Policies (June 19, 2017); U.S. Reactions to Trump Reversal of Some U.S.-Cuba Normalization Policies (June 21, 2017); Cuban Reactions to Trump Reversal of Some U.S.-Cuba Normalization Policies (June 22, 2107).

[4] This Blogger’s Reactions to Trump Reversal of Some U.S.-Cuba Normalization Policies, dwkcommentaries.com (June 23, 2017).

[5]  Reuters, Cuban businesswomen seek Rubio meeting as U.S. policy bites (Nov. 17, 2017).

[6] Zehnder, Changing Subjectivity, Waters of Life (Nov.-Dec. 2017).

Congressional Proposal for Extradition of U.S. Fugitives in Cuba 

On December 13 U.S. Representative Peter King (Rep., NY) and eight cosponsors filed a proposed House resolution calling for the extradition of U.S. citizens in Cuba who are fugitives from the U.S. That proposal will be summarized and analyzed below.

Contents of the Proposed Resolution[1]

The preamble of the proposed resolution, which was referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, recited that  “more than 70 fugitives from the United States, charged with offenses ranging from hijacking to kidnapping to drug offenses to murder, are believed to be receiving safe harbor in Cuba,” including William Morales and Joanne Chesimard. It also mentioned that the U.S. and Cuba have a bilateral extradition treaty from 1905 and 1926 and that “it is imperative that Cuba abide by its extradition treaty with the United States and immediately extradite or render to the United States those legally indicted or convicted of serious criminal offenses in the United States.”

Therefore, the proposed resolution called for the following:

  • “the immediate extradition or rendering to the United States of convicted felon William Morales and all other fugitives from justice who are receiving safe harbor in Cuba in order to escape prosecution or confinement for criminal offenses committed in the United States;”
  • the U.S. urging “the international community to continue to press for the immediate extradition or rendering of all fugitives from justice that are receiving safe harbor in Cuba;” and
  • “the Secretary of State and the Attorney General to continue to press for the immediate extradition or rendering of all fugitives from United States justice so that they may be tried and, if convicted, serve out their sentences.”

Analysis of the Proposed Resolution

The resolution may make for good publicity for these representatives, but it is a waste of time because the terms of the U.S.-Cuba extradition treaty bar such extraditions, because the U.S. repeatedly has called for Cuba to make these extraditions and because Cuba repeatedly has denied such requests under the very terms of the extradition treaties recited in this resolution.

  1. The Legalities of Extradition[2]

First, extradition is the legal process “by which one country (the requesting country) may seek from another country (the requested country) the surrender of a person who is wanted for prosecution, or to serve a sentence following conviction, for a criminal offense.

In the U.S., international extradition is treaty-based, meaning that the U.S. must have an extradition treaty with the requested country in order for the latter to consider the request for extradition. U.S. extradition practice is based almost entirely on individually negotiated bilateral treaties, which the U.S. brings into force following Senate advice and consent to ratification. The U.S. is currently a party to 109 such treaties. While most of these treaties currently in force have been negotiated in the last 30-40 years, many of the treaties still in force are quite old, in some cases dating back to the 19th Century.

For many reasons, however, not every request for extradition results in a fugitive being delivered to the requesting country. Sometimes the requesting state doesn’t know where a fugitive is located and makes multiple contingency requests for provisional arrest and extradition. In other cases, fugitives learn they are being sought and flee or go into hiding. Even following a fugitive’s arrest, court proceedings and appeals can last a very long time and can be delayed by fugitives’ exercising all possible rights to challenge extradition.

In addition, most such treaties provide specific bases on which extraditions can be delayed or denied. The obligation to extradite under a bilateral extradition treaty is not absolute and protections are included in the treaty to accommodate both U.S. and foreign interests. While the exact terms of such treaties result from country-specific negotiations and thus vary somewhat among the treaties, there are the following typical types of qualifications on the obligation to extradite:

  • An almost universal treaty exception, known in international extradition law as the “non bis in idem” doctrine, is similar to the double jeopardy doctrine under U.S. domestic law. It provides that extradition will be denied when the person has already been either acquitted or convicted for the same offense in the country from which extradition is requested, or, in some instances, in a third country.
  • A similarly widely adopted exception is where the crime at issue is a “political offense” (a term which can cover treason, sedition or other crime against the state without the elements of any ordinary crime, or which under U.S. law can cover ordinary crimes committed incidental to or in furtherance of a violent political uprising such as a war, revolution or rebellion, especially when such crimes do not target civilian victims) or a “military offense” (a crime subject to military law that is not criminalized under normal penal law).
  • U.S. treaties also typically provide that extradition may be denied if the request is found to be politically motivated. Some of our treaties provide that extradition may be denied if the request was made for the primary purpose of prosecuting or punishing the person sought on account of race, religion, nationality or political opinion.
  • Perhaps the highest profile exceptions to the obligation to extradite are bars or limitations in some countries on the extradition of their own nationals.   The U.S., however, makes no distinction between extraditing its own nationals and those of other countries and advocates that all countries adopt the U.S. policy due to the ease of flight and the increasingly transnational nature of crime.
  • Some U.S. treaties provide that if the offense for which surrender is sought is punishable by death under the laws in the country requesting extradition but not in the country holding the fugitive, extradition may be refused unless the requesting country provides assurances that the death penalty will not be imposed or, if imposed, will not be carried out. Sometimes these provisions are included in the treaty at the insistence of our treaty partner, because many countries in Europe and elsewhere oppose the death penalty. Sometimes the U.S. insists on such provisions in order to retain sufficient flexibility to ensure that the U.S. is not obliged to surrender persons for execution for relatively less serious crimes.

Older U.S. treaties that were negotiated before the late 1970’s contained a list of offenses that would be covered. In newer U.S. treaties, however, this list approach has been replaced by the concept of “dual criminality,” usually providing that offenses covered by the treaty include all those made punishable under the laws of both parties by imprisonment or other form of detention for more than one year, or by a more severe penalty (such as capital punishment). Such a formulation obviates the need to renegotiate the treaty to provide coverage for new offenses, strikingly exemplified by the currently evolving area of cyber-crime. Indeed, to avoid having the dual criminality analysis applied too narrowly, most treaties provide further guidance, including that an offense is extraditable whether or not the laws in the two countries place the offense within the same category or describe it by the same terminology. A major goal in the U.S. current ambitious treaty-negotiating program is to negotiate new, modern treaties that eliminate the “list” approach in favor of dual criminality treaties.

U.S.-Cuba Extradition Treaties[3]

The issues posed by the new proposed House resolution are governed by the “Treaty between the United States and Cuba for the mutual extradition of fugitives from justice,” which entered into force on March 2, 1905. Under this treaty, as amended, each country shall grant extradition of persons covered by Article I for crimes covered by Article II, as amended and expanded by Articles I and II of the Additional Extradition Treaty between the parties, which entered into force on June 18, 1926 (44 Stat. 2392; TS 737).

The persons covered by Article I are “persons who, having been charged as principals, accomplices or accessories with or convicted of any crimes or offenses specified in the following article, and committed within the jurisdiction of one of the high contracting parties, shall seek an asylum or be found within the territories of the other: Provided that this shall only be done upon such evidence of criminality as, according to the laws of the place where the fugitive or person so charged shall be found, would justify his or her apprehension and commitment for trial if the crime or offense had been there committed.”   However, under Article V of the treaty, “Neither of the contracting parties shall be bound to deliver up its own citizens under the stipulations of this Treaty.”

The long list of crimes covered by Article II, as amended, includes the following: (1) “Murder, comprehending the offenses expressed in the Penal Code of Cuba as assassination, parricide, infanticide and poisoning; manslaughter, when voluntary; the attempt to commit any of these crimes.” (2) “Arson.” and (3) “Robbery, defined to be the act of feloniously and forcibly taking from the person of another money, goods, documents, or other property, by violence or putting him in fear; burglary; housebreaking and shopbreaking.”

Under Article VI of the original treaty, however, the requested country is not obligated to extradite someone when the offense is of “a political character.” The exact language of this provision states, “A fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered if the offense in respect of which his surrender is demanded be of a political character, or if it is proved that the requisition for his surrender has, in fact, been made with a view to try or punish him for an offense of a political character.” (Emphasis added.)

The only limitation on this exception is in Article VI itself, which states, “An attempt against the life of the head of a foreign government or against that of any member of his family when such attempt comprises the act either of murder, assassination, or poisoning, shall not be considered a political offense or an act connected with such an offense.” (Emphasis added.)

Moreover, Article VI states, “If any question shall arise as to whether a case comes within the provisions of this article [VI], the decision of the authorities of the government on which the demand for surrender is made, or which may have granted the extradition shall be final. (emphasis added.) [3]

To have a better understanding of this treaty, it would be useful to see all documents regarding (a) the negotiation of the treaty in 1904-1905 and its amendment in 1926; and  (c) previous U.S. and Cuban requests for extradition.

U.S. Fugitives In Cuba

According to U.S. Department of State annual reports purportedly justifying the previous designations of Cuba as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism,” there have been or still are over 70 individuals living in Cuba who are fugitives from criminal charges in U.S. relating to violent acts in the 1970’s purportedly committed to advance political causes. Pursuant to a 2005 Cuban government statement, however, these U.S. reports also say no additional U.S. fugitives have been permitted on the island and in a few instances Cuba has extradited such fugitives to the U.S.

However, a U.S. newspaper recently asserted, “The U.S. has no idea how many fugitives Cuba’s harboring,” And on January 23, 2015, U.S. Senator Marco Rubio (Rep., FL) and two other Republican Senators (David Vitter (LA) and Ted Cruz (TX)) asked the F.B.I. to submit a complete list of such fugitives with copies of their U.S. indictments, but a FBI response to this request has not been located.

In any event, one of the most notable U.S. fugitives still on the island is JoAnne Chesimard (a/k/a Assata Shakur), a political radical and former member of the Black Panther Party and the militant Black Liberation Army, who in 1979 broke out of a New Jersey state prison where she was serving a life sentence for assault, armed robbery and aiding and abetting the murder of a New Jersey state trooper. After hiding in the New York area, she fled to Cuba in 1984, where she was granted political asylum that same year and has lived ever since. According to her U.S. attorney, she “has maintained from the time she was arrested that she was a victim of a counter intelligence program by the FBI and that she was stopped on the New Jersey turnpike as result of her being targeted by FBI.” In May 2013 the FBI added her name to its “Most Wanted” list.

Cuba, however, before the December 2014 rapprochement had rejected U.S. requests for her extradition on the ground that Cuba had determined she was being sought on “political” grounds and, therefore, had decided to grant her asylum. In addition, there are also some indications that Chesimard/Shakur has been granted Cuban citizenship, which would provide Cuba with another reason under the treaty to deny a U.S. request for her extradition. It would be useful to know the details of all prior U.S. requests for her extradition.

After the announcement of  rapprochement, the two countries have discussed various extradition issues, including at least some of the U.S. nationals in Cuba who are mentioned in the new proposed resolution in the House of Representatives, including Chesimard/Shakur.[4]

However, after a bilateral negotiation session in Washington, D.C. in February 2015 Josefina Vidal, Cuba’s lead diplomat for these negotiations, said the issue of extraditing people between Cuba and the U.S. had been discussed many times in the past and that the two countries had signed a treaty on the topic in 1906 which has a clause such that it would not apply in cases involving political activities. “Therefore, Cuba has legitimately given political asylum to a small group of U.S. citizens, because we have reason to believe that they deserve this and that is how far we’ve gone. And when one grants political asylum, then you cannot get into these types of discussions.” She added that after the Cuban Revolution of 1959 the U.S. had not honored the treaty when Cuba asked the U.S. to extradite “members of the Cuban dictatorship who were responsible for terrible crimes.”

In June 2016, the two countries held another negotiating session in Havana focused on counterterrorism cooperation Afterwards the State Department merely stated that the U.S. “continues to seek the return by Cuba of fugitives from US justice” and that the Department “brings out the cases of fugitives to the Cuban Government to be settled and will continue to do so at every appropriate opportunity.”

Conclusion

As a result, the new proposed Resolution does not deserve to be adopted, and if adopted, it will not have any practical effect.

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[1]  H.Res. 664, Calling for the immediate extradition or rendering to the United States of convicted felons William Morales, Joanne Chesimard, and all other fugitives from justice who are receiving safe harbor in Cuba in order to escape prosecution or confinement for criminal offenses committed in the United States (115th Cong. (Dec. 13, 2017). The co-sponsors are Representatives Leonard Lance (Rep., NJ), Bill Pascrell (Dem., NJ), Frank LoBiondo (Rep., NJ), Ron De Santis (Rep., FL), Albio Sires (Dem., NJ), Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (Rep., FL), Mario Diaz-Balart (Rep., FL) and Carlos Curbelo (Rep., FL).

[2] Extradition Has Become a Hot Topic for the United States, dwkcommentaries.com (July 26, 2016).

[3]  Issues Regarding Cuba and U.S. Extradition of the Other’s Fugitives, dwkcommentaries.com (Feb. 24, 2015).

[4] Criticism of U.S.-Cuba Law Enforcement Agreement, dwkcommentaries.com (Jan. 21, 2017).

 

U.S. and Cuba Hold Discussions About Human Trafficking and Migration Fraud     

Despite the significant cooling of relations, the U.S. and Cuba held discussions about human trafficking and immigration fraud at the State Department in Washington, D.C. on December 12.[1] This was the day after they held their biannual meeting about migration.[2]

The Cuban statement about the later meeting was short.  It said the two countries “reviewed the bilateral cooperation actions carried out in the period, updated on the trends of illicit trafficking of migrants and immigration fraud in the current bilateral situation and identified new actions that will favor operational cooperation in the future.” They a;so “agreed to advance in the prevention and confrontation of this scourge with the aim of continuing to reduce their negative impact on migration relations between the two countries, something that the authorities of both parties have been seeing since the adoption of the Joint Declaration of January 12, 2017.”[3]

According to Cuba,“this meeting is part of the dialogue on the application and enforcement of the law that both parties have to coordinate the confrontation of transnational scourges that affect the two countries. The meeting took place in a climate of respect and professionalism” and “both parties agreed on the usefulness of the meeting and agreed to hold the talks in the future.”

Surprisingly there has been no public notice of this meeting from the U.S. State Department or the U.S. media.

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[1] Cuba Foreign Ministry, Cuba and the USA Celebrate Meeting on the Illegal Trafficking of Migrants and Immigration Fraud (Dec. 13, 2017)

[2] U.S. and Cuba Hold Biannual Migration Talks, dwkcommentaries.com (Dec. 12, 2017).

[3] U.S.-Cuba Joint Statement (Jan. 12, 2017). This Joint Statement or Declaration was issued in the last days of the Obama Administration. See these posts to dwkcommentaries.com: U.S. Ends Special Immigration Benefit for Cubans and Meets with Cubans To Discuss Claims (Jan. 13, 2017);  Additional Reactions to End of U.S. Immigration Benefits to Cubans (Jan. 14, 2017).

 

Salvadoran Attorney General Requests Reopening of Jesuit Priests Murder Case

On December 5 El Salvador’s Attorney General advised a Salvadoran court that the case over the 1989 murder of the Jesuit priests should be reopened. This follows a similar request on November 27 by the Institute for Human Rights of the University of Central America (UCA), where the priests lived and worked.[1]

The defendants in the case are the alleged intellectual authors of the crime: former president, Alfredo Cristiani; the former head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, René Emilio Ponce (now deceased); ex-commander of the Air Force, Juan Rafael Bustillo; Deputy Defense Minister, Juan Orlando Zepeda; Public Security Vice Minister, Inocente Orlando Montano; the former commander of the First Infantry Brigade, Francisco Elena Fuentes; and the former Minister of Defense, Rafael Humberto Larios.

Another former Salvadoran military officer and intellectual author of the crime, Guillermo Alfredo Benavides, earlier was convicted of the crime in El Salvador and now is imprisoned in that country.

Montano, as reported in previous posts,[2] is now in Spain facing the same charges in a Spanish court. Apparently he is asserting the following defenses: (a) he had no knowledge of the orders to kill the priests, (b) he was not part of the military chain of command; and (c) at the time of the assassination of the Jesuits, former President Cristiani was present in the Joint Staff of the Armed Forces. At least one of these defenses is supported by an attorney for the Salvadoran military, who is asserting that Montano had no command over military personnel since as deputy minister he only could give  orders to members of the military corps security.[3]

In response, the prosecution in Spain is arguing that Montano was present at the Salvadoran Military General Staff meetings when the orders were given to commit the murders and that as Deputy Minister of Defense and Public Security he was empowered to command the security forces (National Police, National Guard and Treasury Police) while as a Colonel he had command over the military units.

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[1] Labrador, Prosecutor requests the reopening of the Jesuits case in El Salvador, El Faro (Dec, 7, 2017)

[2] See posts in “The Jesuit Priests” section of List of Posts to dwkcommentaries—Topical: EL SALVADOR.

[3] Burgos, Montano’s defense sins innocent, El Faro (Dec. 5, 2017).

Former Salvadoran Military Officer Extradited from U.S. to Spain for Trial in Jesuits Murder Case 

On November 29 Inocente Orlando Montano Morales, a former Salvadoran military officer, was extradited from the U.S. to Spain to face trial in the 1989 murders of five Jesuit priests in El Salvador.[1]

On November 30 Montano appeared before Judge Manuel Garcia Castellón of Spain’s National Court, who sent the Salvadoran to prison for pre-trial detention because the Spanish probe showed Montano had taken an “active part in the decision and design of the assassinations” and because there was a risk he would flee the jurisdiction. (Montano arrived at the court by ambulance and entered the court in a wheelchair.) [2]

Montano is to return to the court next week for testimony in the case.

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[1] Reuters, U.S. Deports Ex-Salvadoran Officer to Face Trial on Massacre of Priests, N.Y. Times (Nov. 29, 2017); Faus, The United States extradites to Spain the Salvadoran colonel implicated in the murder of Ellacuría, El Pais (Nov. 30, 2017). Many previous posts in this blog have discussed the murders of the Jesuits and legal proceedings regarding this horrendous crime, including Spain’s case under the principle of universal jurisdiction and the U.S. proceedings for extradition of Montano; they may be found in “The Jesuit Priests” section of List of Posts to dwkcommentaries—Topical: EL SALVADOR.

[2] Reuters, Spanish Court Orders Prison for Ex-Salvadoran Officer Over Priests’ Massacre, N.Y. Times (Nov. 30, 2017); Assoc. Press, Salvadoran Official Jailed Pending Trial for Jesuits’ Death, N.Y. Times (Nov. 30, 2017); Pérez, Prison for a Salvadoran ex-military for the murder of the Jesuits in 1989, El Pais (Nov. 30, 2017).