Edward B. Burling, The  Prominent Washington, D.C. Attorney, 1919-1966

This series about the life of Edward B. (“Ned”) Burling commenced with a post about his connections with Katherine Graham, the owner and publisher of the Washington Post, and then retreated in time to a post about his birth and early years in Iowa, 1870-1890, followed by a post about his four years at Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1890-1894, another post about his 22 years as a Chicago attorney, 1895-1917, and a post about his two years as a federal government attorney in Washington, D.C., 1917-1918.[1]

Burling’s Private Legal Career in Washington, D.C.

In 1919, Burling co-founded the Covington & Burling law firm (C&B and n/k/a Covington) and thereafter served as its de facto managing partner. In the words of his partner and former U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, Ned helped to create “a practical organization, engaged in achieving practical ends, for real people, who were in real trouble.” To that end, Burling hired talented recent law school graduates, gave them responsibility as soon as possible and compensated them on the basis of merit, rather than seniority.” Burling also developed a personal practice focusing on corporate transactions and federal taxation.

C&B’s first big case shortly after its founding was a contingent fee case for the Kingdom of Norway against the United States for $16 million arising out of the U.S. taking of contracts for ship construction during World War I. For assistance, Burling hired his old law school friend, George Rublee, and the 28-year old Acheson, who had just finished a clerkship with U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis. Recognizing Acheson’s talents, Ned asked him to argue an important and difficult issue in the six-week hearing before the arbitral panel at the Peace Palace at The Hague. During the young Acheson’s argument, Burling slipped him a terse note: “Shut up.” Acheson, however, ignored this order and continued the argument, which lead to an important concession by the other side (the U.S.). The result was a 1922 award of nearly $US 12 million to Norway and a subsequent Norwegian knighthood for Burling.

Later Burling ironically pointed out that after Acheson made his very first court argument at the Peace Palace, the rest of his legal career would all be downhill. Fortunately for the law firm and the U.S. that was not true. Whenever Acheson was not holding high positions in the U.S. Government, he was practicing law at C&B. Through it all, Acheson and Ned had a strong friendship. Shortly after Acheson became Secretary of State in 1949, Burling wrote to him,

  • “I have been impressed by the growing kindness and consideration for others that you have shown. The absence of any feeling of importance is rare in one who has attained the high office that is yours. And at the same time a growing strength is apparent. Your head has always been better than other heads but once you were inclined to defer to more assertiveness. You show less of that trait. And you have no reason to yield your opinion when you have come to a considered conclusion. You have a right to believe that your conclusion is probably better than what will be offered by anyone else. So trust in yourself and go ahead and do a swell job for the world.”

A year later, Burling observed that Acheson was “one of our great men. Great, I mean, looking at the entire history of our country. I am greatly impressed by the way he has grown. He is a powerful figure.”

As noted in previous post about Burling and Katherine Graham, on October 3, 1996, Edward B. Burling died at age 96 in Washington Hospital Center. According to an editorial in his honor in the Post that Graham may have helped write,  Burling was the city’s “grand old man of the law [who from] the days when he was graduated from Harvard Law School in 1894, with one of the best records ever made there, he had been an outstanding legal scholar. And with the law as the base of his operations, he also  exerted a substantial influence in the fields of business, government and community relations.”

The editorial also stated that at the C&B law firm the “scholarly and retiring Mr. Burling, who made a specialty of cultivating and training brilliant young lawyers, was chiefly responsible  for keeping the firm’s performance  at a high level of professional excellence.”

Covington is still one of the world’s preeminent law firms with over 1,000 lawyers in 12 offices in the U.S. and around the world, and it remains dedicated to the founders’ values of excellence, tolerance, integrity and commitment to public service and professionalism [1]

Conclusion

We next will look at some of the highlights of Burling’s life-long friendship with Learned Hand.

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[1] Citations to the sources for this post are found in this blogger’s Edward Burnham Burling, The College’s Quiet Benefactor (April 2008)(18-page essay and bibliography; on file in Grinnell College’s Special Collections and Archives).

 

 

 

Medical Report on U.S. Diplomats with Health Problems Occurring in Cuba 

Since late 2016, some U.S. diplomats, now numbering 24, have suffered various medical problems while stationed in Cuba. Perplexingly investigations by the FBI and other U.S. agencies as well as Cuban investigators over nearly the last 16 months have failed to ascertain the cause or the culprit, if any, of the cause of their problems.[1] On February 14 a new medical report was released on these individuals.

The Medical Report [2[

U.S. physicians at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perelman School of Medicine in an article in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) have published the  preliminary results of their examination of 21 of these 24 individuals. Here are the key findings of their report:

  • The patients “appeared to have sustained injury to widespread brain networks.”
  • The patients have experienced “persisting disability of a significant nature” involving “hearing, vision, balance and brain symptoms similar to the brain dysfunction seen with concussions, but without histories of head trauma.”
  • In most cases, the affected diplomats reported hearing a loud, painful noise that they later associated with their symptoms, but the physicians concluded, “There is no known mechanism for audible sound to injure the brain” and “it is currently unclear if or how the noise is related to the reported symptoms.”
  • “Viruses or chemical exposures are unlikely,” but could not be “systematically excluded.”
  • “Advanced MRI scans spotted a few changes in some patients in what are called white matter tracts,” but these might be attributed to previous events.
  • “Several of the objective manifestations consistently found in this cohort,” including vision and balance abnormalities, “could not have been consciously or unconsciously manipulated.”

The study’s lead author, Dr. Douglas H. Smith, director of the Center for Brain Injury and Repair at the University of Pennsylvania, said, “This is a preliminary report.We thought it was important to get it out from a public health standpoint.” Nevertheless, “Uniformly, everyone who saw these patients was absolutely convinced. It looked like concussion pathology. Processing speed, inability to remember — those are such classic symptoms we see in concussion. We all believe this is a real syndrome.This is concussion without blunt head trauma.”

JAMA Editorial About the Report [3]

An accompanying JAMA editorial by Drs. Christopher C.Muth and Steven L. Lewis emphasized caution in interpreting the data of this report. It stated, “although the patients were united to some extent by the common locations in which their symptoms first developed, there was some variability between patients in terms of the symptoms that each experienced. The precise time course over which each individual’s symptoms evolved was not provided. Given that evaluations were conducted a mean of 203 days after onset, it remains unclear whether individuals who developed symptoms later were aware of the previous reports of others. Furthermore, the quantitative results for specific tests (eg, neuropsychological tests) are not yet available for all affected patients, so independent assessment as to the scope and severity of deficits among all individuals remains challenging.”

This JAMA editorial also listed several limitations in this case study that “should also urge caution in interpreting the findings.” It concluded, “Before reaching any definitive conclusions, additional evidence must be obtained and rigorously and objectively evaluated.”

Another Reaction to the Report [4]

Another medical expert offered comments. C. Edward Dixon, a professor of neurological surgery at the University of Pittsburgh, who was not involved in the research, said, “The study was conducted by the top concussion research team in the world utilizing state-of-the-art methods” and the findings suggest “a significant brain insult.”

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[1] The problems of these diplomats have been discussed in previous posts listed in the “ U.S. Diplomats Medical Problems in Cuba, 2016-2018” section of List of Posts to dwkcommentaries—Topical: CUBA

[2] Drs. Swanson, Hampton, McKenzie, et al., Neurological Manifestations Among U.S. Government Personnel Regarding Directional Audible and Sensory Phenomena in Havana Cuba, JAMA (Feb. 15, 2018); Assoc. Press, Report Details Harm to Cuba Diplomats, but Offers No Cause, N.Y. Times (Feb. 14, 2018); DeYoung, Doctors find neurological damage to Americans who served in Cuba, Wash. Post (Feb. 14, 2018).

[3] Drs. Muth & Lewis, Editorial: Neurological Symptoms Among U.S. Diplomats in Cuba, JAMA (feb. 15, 2018). 

[4] Kolata, Diplomats in Cuba Suffered Brain Injuries. Experts Still Don’t Know Why, N.Y. Times (Feb. 15, 2018). 

U.S. and Cuba Continue To Confer Over Common Concerns 

Despite various Trump Administration’s hostile actions regarding Cuba, the two countries continue to confer over common concerns. Three such conferences occurred this week in Washington, D.C..[1]

Conference on Money Laundering [2]

On February 12, 2018, the two countries met in Washington, D.C. to discuss combatting the crime of money laundering. This exchange, which falls within the context of the law enforcement dialogue between both countries, provided both parties with the opportunity to discuss this crime at a regional level, the main experiences gained in combatting this crime and the next steps that would be taken to advance the bilateral collaboration on this matter. 

The Cuban representatives underscored the necessity to increase the two countries’  cooperation and both parties shared the view that determined action is required against these acts and against those who commit them and the consensus was that impunity cannot be permitted.

The Cuban delegation also stated that for the comprehensive analysis of these issues, Cuba favors the exchange in different forums, mainly of the U.N. system. In addition, the Cuban government actively collaborates with the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America (GAFILAT), a regional inter-governmental organization to prevent and combat money laundering, terrorist financing and the funding of the proliferation of mass-destruction weapons. In its Mutual Evaluation Reports, GAFILAT acknowledges that the general risk for money laundering and terrorist financing in Cuba is low, highlights the inter-institutional coordination and cooperation existing at all levels in the country to combat these crimes and the updated legal framework Cuba has for this purpose.

The Cuban delegation was composed of representatives of the Ministry of the Interior, Banco Central de Cuba, the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The U.S. delegation was composed of officials of the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, State, Health and Human Services and Treasury.

This was the second such meeting and took place in a respectful and professional ambience. Both parties agreed to continue with these technical exchanges in the future and to coordinate actions that may contribute to the effective combat against this crime.

Conference on Human Trafficking [3]

On February 13, 2018, at the U.S. State Department the parties met to give updates on the advances made, experiences gained and the challenges faced in the prevention of, and combat against, trafficking in persons and protection of victims.

Cuba emphasized its ratification of the zero-tolerance national policy against human trafficking, adoption of a National Plan of Action for 2017-2020 to Prevent and Combat Trafficking in Persons and to Protect the Victims thereof, the establishment of  a Commission to implement the multidisciplinary actions contained in said Plan, and the results of the visit to Cuba by Ms. María Grazia Giammarinaro, U.N. Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially in women and children.

Cuba also mentioned its establishment of a Family Protection Division and the operation of a Unique Telephone Line of the Attorney General’s Office; its specialized training seminars for prosecutors, judges and law enforcement officers, the workshops and training courses for educators, and the celebration of the World Day against Trafficking in Persons. In addition, Cuba stresses the preventive nature of its National Health System and the important role played by the Cuban medical doctors in the early detection and attention of potential victims of human trafficking, both in Cuba and in other countries where our nation provides medical cooperation.

In 2016, 21 cases were prosecuted in Cuba for crimes with typical features of trafficking in persons, through the typified crimes of “Corruption of Minors” and “Procurement and Trafficking in Persons”. In this same period, Cuba maintained international collaboration for the investigation and solution of cases transcending the national territory.

Cuba also asserted that the low incidence of trafficking in persons in Cuba is associated with its social and public safety achievements, equal opportunities and policies and programs aimed at empowering women, providing free access to health services, education, culture and sports, which reduces the country’s vulnerability and strengthens its capacity to increase international cooperation in this field, as a State Party to the legal instruments signed on this and other related matters.

This was the fifth such bilateral meeting on this subject since December 2014, the last occurring in January 2017, and both parties ratified the usefulness of the exchange, which took place in a professional and respectful ambiance, and agreed to continue holding these exchanges in the future.

Conference on Technical Issues About Human Trafficking [4]

On February 14, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security hosted a technical exchange on trafficking in persons, one of the eight working-level exchanges under the U.S.-Cuba Law Enforcement Dialogue. Participants discussed best practices on investigations and prosecutions, human trafficking trends in the region, and potential areas of coordination to fight the scourge of trafficking, which threatens national security and public health and safety in both countries.

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[1] Other posts to dwkcommentaries have discussed other U.S.-Cuba bilateral meetings in the Trump Administration: U.S. and Cuba Hold Discussions About Human Trafficking and Migration Fraud (Dec. 10, 2017); U.S. and Cuba Hold Bilateral Migration Talks (Dec. 12, 2017); Cuba and U.S. Continue To Hold Bilateral Meetings on Various Issues (Jan. 18, 2018).

[2] Cuba Foreign Ministry, Cuba and the United States hold exchange on the cooperation to prevent and combat money laundry (Feb. 13, 2018). 

[3] Cuba Foreign Ministry, Delegations from Cuba and the United States Hold Exchange on Trafficking in Persons (Feb. 13, 2018); U.S. State Dep’t, United States and Cuba Meet to Combat Trafficking in Persons (Feb.14, 2018).

[4]  U.S. State Dep’t, United States and Cuba Meet to Combat Trafficking in Persons (Feb.14, 2018); Cuba Foreign Ministry, Cuba and the USA carry out technical exchanges on trafficking in persons and child sexual abuse (Feb. 14, 2018).

Objections to the U.S.’ Cuba Internet Task Force

The original post about the U.S. establishment of the Cuba Internet Task Force (CITF) set forth the objections from Granma, the official newspaper of the Communist Party of Cuba, and two Cuban journalists (Sergio Gomez and Randy Alfonso Falcón) and another post focused on the Cuban Government’s objections to the CITF.

Now other objections have been registered by Cuban and other sources

Cuban Objections

Cuban objections came from representatives of its independent media and more from journalists Sergio Gomez and Randy Alonso Falcon.

Cuban Independent Media [1]

The day before the CITF’s inaugural meeting, Reuters reported from Havana that there are now “a handful of web-based news outlets in recent years in Cuba in the wake of the expansion of internet and broader social and economic freedoms. . . .These new outlets have been tolerated as long as they are not ‘counter-revolutionary’” and “have been chipping away at a half-century state monopoly, offering independent reporting and winning prestigious journalism prizes.”

Several representatives of these independent media, according to Reuters, have expressed opposition to the CITF.

Elaine Díaz, 32, in 2015 founded Periodismo de Barrio which focuses on the environment. She said, “We are not just talking about something that heightens tension in the country’s political situation but . . . [the CITF] could also damage the credibility of the independent media.” She added that “her outlet would refuse any money that the Trump program might award because in Cuba, people who receive aid from the U.S. government are branded mercenaries. These media are called independent, and that means independent of Cuban authorities as well as any other government.”

José Jasán Nieves, 30, director of El Toque, an online platform that focuses on entrepreneurship and citizenship, offered this comment. The CITF was “damaging us by giving arguments to [Cubans opposed to the independent media] … who are trying to link us to the enemy to minimize our presence in Cuban society.” Trump’s new policies were damaging the normalization of relations initiated by the Obama Administration.

Miguel Alejandro Hayes, 22, who writes for the outlet La Joven Cuba (The Young Cuba), said, “Trump’s policy is aimed at destruction: toppling the Cuban government. We don’t agree with that,” as elaborated in its open letter complaining to the State Department.

Sergio Gomez [2]

Gomez provides two additional comments.

In the first he says, “Although the State Department tries to camouflage its . . . [CITF] as a philanthropic project to improve access to the network of networks in . . .  [Cuba], the list of participants in the first [CITF] meeting . . . betrays its true intentions.”

One participant, the Office of Cuba Broadcasting, “is the umbrella of Radio and TV Martí, two relics of the Cold War designed to issue enemy propaganda and carry out psychological operations against Cuba. Millions of dollars of American taxpayers have been wasted in the failed projects of this organization, [which has been] subjected to several audits for corruption scandals and embezzlement.”

Another participant, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), ”is the public arm of the CIA and financier of subversive projects against Cuba such as ZunZuneo and Commotion, whose disclosure by the press was a shame for the US authorities due to its ineffectiveness and violation of international laws.”

“If we take into account the history of those who make up . . .  [CITF], nothing good can be expected.”

The second offering from Gomez with Iramsy Peraza Forte as co-author states that “the U.S. has been using communications technologies to attack Cuba ever since the age of shortwave radios and the emergence of television.” Indeed, “From psychological warfare propagated by the mass media to unconventional warfare, which has been adapted to the internet age, Cuba has been a test site for U.S. schemes designed to overthrow governments which do not respond to its interests.”

They then provide a list starting from March 17, 1960, of 14 U.S. schemes  to do just that in Cuba before the CITF. Here are the ones specifically involving the Internet:

  • In 2004, the “Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba . . .is created . . . to identify additional ways to hasten an overthrow of the ‘Cuban regime.’” It proposes  to ‘encourage willing third-country governments to create public access Internet facilities in their missions in Cuba” and to expand “‘the distribution of information and facilitate pro-democracy activities,” and “‘greater access to these types of equipment’ in order to do so.”
  • In 2006 the “Cuba Fund for a Democratic Future was created, providing 24 million USD worth of funding for anti-Cuban propaganda, including online initiatives.”
  • In February 2006 the State Department  “creates the Global Internet Freedom Task Force, specifically aimed at ‘maximizing freedom of expression and free flow of information and ideas’ in China, Iran and Cuba.”
  • In December 2009 “U.S. citizen Alan Phillip Gross [is] arrested [in Cuba] for bringing illegal communication devices into Cuba as part of a USAID program. In March 2011 Gross was [convicted and sentenced by a Cuban court for violating Cuban law] to 15 years imprisonment.” On December 17, 2014, Gross was released from prison and returned to the U.S. “following the announcement of a process of rapprochement between the two countries.”
  • In March 2011 Cuban officials discovered and stopped the U.S. “Operation Surf,” which “consisted of smuggling equipment and software into the country to install illegal antennas to access the internet.”
  • In April 2014 USAID financed the launch of ZunZuneo, which “was designed as a messaging network similar to Twitter through which thousands of Cubans [eventually] would receive “political content aimed at inspiring Cubans to organize mass demonstrations akin to ‘smart mobs’ to destabilize the country.”
  • Also in April 2014 the U.S. “Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB) which oversees Radio and TV Martí, launched a service similar to ZunZuneo.”
  • In September 2016 OCB “organized the ‘ . . . [for] independent” journalists from the island and digital innovators and activists who support the use of new technologies to bring about a regime change in Cuba.”

Randy Alonso Falcon [3]

In CubaDebate, Randy Alonso Falcon attacked the CITF premise that Cuba has subnormal access to the internet and information. He asserts, “there are more than 4 million Cubans who access the internet services through various means, among them tens of thousands of students, professors, health workers, journalists, scientists and other workers who receive free connectivity by virtue of their professional needs.”

Moreover, according to Falcon, “Cuba was the fastest growing country in social networks last year, according to the  Digital in 2017 Global Overview report . [It] highlights the growth of new users in the networks-with more than 2.7 million new users and 365% increase over the previous year-and the use of mobile phones to access social networks had 2.6 million new users and an increase of 385%.” Falcon also provides graphics to emphasize the rapid growth in Cuban access to the internet.

“Much remains to us to advance in the utilization of the new technologies, and especially in his better [means] to attain productivity and economic efficiency; but it will not be with Trump’s interventionist and subversive plans that we will achieve it. Political disposition, created talent, unity of action, culture and knowledge, will be our best weapons in that sovereign walk along the roads of the Internet. Without fear, with amplitude, with better contents and greater connectivity, but without naiveties.”

Other Objections [4]

Alan Gross, the previously mentioned U.S. citizen who was arrested, convicted and imprisoned in Cuba for illegally bringing communications equipment to the island, has objected to the CITF.  “My first response was ‘Are you kidding me?’ We are supposed to learn from our mistakes. I learned the hard way that it’s illegal to distribute anything in Cuba that’s funded in full or part by the U.S. government. Until the government of Cuba wants the kind of assistance United States is capable of providing, the United States shouldn’t be doing stuff there.” 

Cuba expert Ted Henken at Baruch College in New York, author of Freedom House’s annual report on Cuba, said, “”The solution proposed by the Trump administration is perhaps even worse than the disease. It will likely empower not the independent media or citizens but only the Cuban government to more easily justify the unjustifiable – more control and repression of independent media and unmediated access to information.”

Conclusion

The CITF is based upon the false and illegal premise that the U.S. unilaterally may and should decide what Internet services Cuba or any other country should have and then take unilateral steps to provide those services and equipment. Instead the U.S. should politely ask Cuba or any other country whether there was any way the U.S. could assist in improving their Internet service.

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[1] Reuters, Cuban Independent Media Say No Thanks to Trump Free Press Initiative, N.Y. Times (Feb. 6, 2018).

[2] Gomez, Operational Force on the Internet Against Cuba: the same as always with the same objectives, Granma (Feb. 7, 2018); Peraza Forte & Gomez, Internet wars: U.S. plans to  overthrow the Cuban Revolution with new technologies, Granma (Feb. 8, 2018). Many of the previous U.S. covert efforts to promote regime change in Cuba have been discussed in posts listed in the “U.S. Democracy Promotion in Cuba” section of List of Posts to dwkcommentaries–Topical: CUBA

[3] Falcon, US Special Group for the Internet meets to draw the digital guidelines of subversion (+Inforgraphics and Video), CubaDebate (Feb. 7, 2018).

[4] Reuters, Ex-Cuba Prisoner Gross Criticizes U.S. Plan to Foster Internet on Island, N.Y. Times (Feb. 4, 2018); Reuters, Trump Task Force on Expanding Cuba Internet Meets for First Time, N.Y. Times (Feb. 7, 2018). 

U.S.’ Cuba Internet Task Force Holds Inaugural Meeting  

On February 7, the U.S.’ Cuba Internet Task Force (CITF) held its inaugural meeting in Washington, D.C., published its Charter and launched its website. As discussed in a prior post, this group burst onto the scene on January 23 with a State Department announcement of its creation “to promote the free and unregulated flow of information in Cuba” and expand “internet access and independent media in Cuba.”

Now we examine the CITF’s membership, inaugural meeting, Charter and website.

CITF Membership[1]

The CITF is chaired by Deputy Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs John S. Creamer, a foreign service officer with a distinguished career of service in Latin America. Other members are officials of the Office of Cuba Broadcasting, which operates TV and Radio Marti; the Federal Communications Commission; the Department of Commerce’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration; the U.S. Agency for International Development; Freedom House; and the Information Technology Industry Council.

CITF Inaugural Meeting[2]

Chair Creamer said estimates show internet penetration in Cuba is between 5 percent and 40 percent, with the higher figure including those who only can access government-run internet. He said the $1 per hour cost for wi-fi is onerous considering the average salary of roughly $30 per month. For internet access at home, Cubans must pay $17 to $80 per month, depending on speed, for only 30 hours of connectivity, Creamer said. He also claimed that  Cuba’s government uses “filters and blocks websites in a bid to impede the Cuban people’s ability to criticize government institutions and policies.”

Tom Sullivan, chief of the FCC’s International Bureau, said there are no direct, undersea cables between the U.S. and Cuba, though he said there appear to be some U.S. satellites providing service in the island.

Apparently at the meeting, Andre Mendes, acting director of the Broadcasting Board of Governors’ Office of Cuba Broadcasting, declared, “Mr. Castro, tear down this firewall.”

The CITF decided to form two subcommittees: one to explore the role of media and freedom of information in Cuba, and the other to explore Internet access in Cuba. The subcommittees will provide the task force a preliminary report of recommendations within six months (by the end of August) based on input from relevant experts and stakeholders. The task force agreed to reconvene in October to review the preliminary reports, after which it will prepare a final report with recommendations for the Secretary of State and the President.

At the end of the meeting, the public was invited to make comments. Several Cuban dissidents lambasted Cuba’s government, drawing comparisons to World War II and to the governments of Syria and Iran. Others centered on a critique of the decades-old U.S. economic embargo and Trump’s policy toward Cuba. Some argued that any U.S. efforts would backfire, by undermining the perceived independence and credibility of burgeoning independent media in Cuba.

CITF Website[3]

In addition to repeating the information about the CITF’s  inaugural meeting and membership, the website has links to its Charter and Membership Balance Plan.

More importantly, it provides a form for submission of public comments. 

CITF Charter and Membership Balance Plan[4]

The Charter provides that the “Task Force will examine the technological challenges and opportunities for expanding internet access in Cuba, including through federal government support of programs and activities that encourage freedom of expression through independent media and internet freedom so that the Cuban people can enjoy the free and unregulated flow of information.”

According to the Membership Balance Plan, the CITF shall have no more than 12 members, of whom 10 shall be from relevant U.S. federal government departments and agencies. The other two shall be (a) a representative from an internet-related non-governmental organization and (b) a representative from an internet-related private-sector entity.

Conclusion

A subsequent post will examine reactions to the CITF and its inaugural meeting.

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[1] U.S. State Dep’t, Inaugural Meeting of the Cuba Internet Task Force (Feb. 7, 2018).

[2] Assoc. Press, ‘Tear Down This Firewall’—US Looks to Expand Cuba Internet, N.Y. Times (Feb. 7, 2018). 

[3] U.S. State Dep’t, Website: Cuba Internet Task Force.

[4] U.S. State Dep’t, Charter of the Cuba Internet Task Force (Dec. 4, 2017); U.S. State Dep’t, Membership Balance Plan, Cuba Internet Task Force (Nov. 1, 2017).

Secretary of State Tillerson’s Provocative Remarks About Latin America

On February 1, U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson embarked on a seven-day trip to five Latin American countries (Mexico, Argentina, Peru, Colombia and Peru). Before he did so he delivered an overview of this trip in a major speech at the University of Texas, Austin entitled “U.S. Engagement in the Western Hemisphere.” In addition to talking about the countries he will be visiting, he touched on Cuba and Venezuela and, in response to a professor’s question, the Monroe Doctrine, which will be discussed below. [1].

The Secretary’s Speech and Answers to Questions

  1. Cuba

The Secretary’s prepared remarks about Cuba essentially reiterated President Trump’s National Security Presidential Memorandum, which has been discussed in previous posts. In addition, in response to a professor’s question, Tillerson criticized President Obama’a policy of normalization’s allegedly not obtaining advantages for the U.S. “other than a clear economic opportunity for U.S. business interests, which is great.” But  “that was coming on the backs of the Cuban people, who are still very repressed.”

The Trump Administration’s policies, he claimed, are all directed to helping the Cuban people. “That’s what we want to do is help the Cuban people.” Nevertheless, at the same time, “we stay engaged with the Cuban authorities that in this transition, can they find their way to maybe a different future? I don’t know. We’ll see.”

2. Venezuela

According to Secretary Tillerson, “he corrupt and hostile regime of Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela clings to a false dream and antiquated vision for the region that has already failed its citizens. It does not represent the vision of millions of Venezuelans – or in any way comport with the norms of our Latin American, Canadian, or Caribbean partners.”

“Our position has not changed. We urge Venezuela to return to its constitution – to return to free, open, and democratic elections – and to allow the people of Venezuela a voice in their government. We will continue to pressure the regime to return to the democratic process that made Venezuela a great country in the past. . . .”

“We encourage all nations to support the Venezuelan people. The time has come to stand with freedom-loving nations, those that support the Venezuelan people, or choose to stand with the Maduro dictatorship, if that is your choice.”

Tillerson returned to Venezuela in response to a student’s question whether the removal of President Maduro was “ necessary, and what could the U.S.’s role be in the possible regime change, especially considering the turmoil that could surmount from such a change?”

The Secretary’s response: “Well, President Maduro could choose to just leave. . . . “We have not advocated for regime change or removal of President Maduro; rather, we have advocated that they return to the constitution. We do not recognize the constituent assembly as legitimate, and they need to get back to the constitution and follow the constitution.” (Emphasis added.)

“I think there will be a change. We want it to be a peaceful change. Peaceful transitions, peaceful regime change is always better than the alternative of violent change. In the history of Venezuela and in fact the history in other Latin American and South American countries, oftentimes it’s the military that handles that, that when things are so bad that the military leadership realizes they just – they can’t serve the citizens anymore, they will manage a peaceful transition. Whether that will be the case here or not, I do not know. Again, our position is Maduro should get back to his constitution and follow it. And then, if he is not re-elected by the people, so be it. And if the kitchen gets a little too hot for him, I’m sure that he’s got some friends over in Cuba that can give him a nice hacienda on the beach, and he can have a nice life over there.” (Emphasis added.)

3. Monroe Doctrine

A  professor asked about Tillerson’s opinion of the Monroe Doctrine, which was a unilateral principle of U.S. foreign policy first enunciated in the 1823 State of the Union Address by President James Monroe and in 1850 became known in U.S. parlance as the Monroe Doctrine. Monroe stated that any “further efforts by European nations to take control of any independent state in North or South America would be viewed as “the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.” At the same time, Monroe noted that the U.S. would recognize and not interfere with existing European colonies nor meddle in the internal concerns of European countries.[1] 

Perhaps caught off guard by this question, Tillerson said, “Well, I think it clearly has been a success, because as I mentioned at the top, what binds us together in this hemisphere are shared democratic values, and while different countries may express that democracy not precisely the same way we practice democracy in this country, the fundamentals of it – respect for the dignity of the human being, respect for the individual to pursue life, liberty, happiness – those elements do bind us together in this hemisphere. So I think it clearly was an important commitment at the time, and I think over the years, that has continued to frame the relationship.”

Tilleson added, “it’s easy for the United States as a country, because of our size and our engagements with so many countries and regions around the world, . . . through nothing more than just perhaps a period of neglect, to let certain relationships atrophy a bit. . . . I think we’ve gone through those periods of time in our history as well, and if you look back and whether . . . by individual country or regionally as well, due to other events, sometimes I think we have forgotten about the importance of the Monroe Doctrine and what it meant to this hemisphere and maintaining those shared values. So I think it’s as relevant today as it was the day it was written.”

Cuba’s Criticism of the Secretary’s Remarks [3]

Cuba’s Criticism of the Secretary’s RemarksOn February 5, 2018, Cuba’s Foreign Ministry registered its strong objection to the Secretary’s comments about Cuba, its ally Venezuela and the Monroe Doctrine, which, Cuba said, were ones of “arrogance and contempt.”

According to Cuba Tillerson had “reiterated U.S. interference “ in Cuba’s internal affairs, on demanding from our upcoming electoral process changes that are to the liking of the United States.” He also ”aimed at undermining the unanimous repudiation of the region of the retrogressive measures and tightening of the economic, commercial and financial blockade against Cuba, whose purpose is to harm the Cuban economy and people to attempt to subdue the country.”

Cuba added that “Tillerson’s comments about the history of military overthrowing elected governments in Lain America “openly instigate the overthrow, by any means, of the legitimate government of Venezuela” and are also “clearly in line with the regime change schemes that have claimed the lives of millions of innocent victims in various parts of the world and promoted violence, war, humanitarian crises and instability, demonstrating their failure.”

Moreover, said Cuba,  the Secretary’s defense of the Monroe Doctrine reiterated “the postulates of the infamous doctrine that established as a policy that the Americas were the backyard of the United States.”

In short, the Secretary’s remarks “adds a new act to what has been a pattern of successive outrages in the history of domination of our region, and confirms the sustained contempt with which the government of President Donald Trump has unequivocally referred to the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean, whose peoples it denigrates whenever it has the opportunity.”

“The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba condemns this new attack against Cuba and Venezuela, which follows the recent disrespectful statements of President Trump in his State of the Union Address.”

“Before departing for his imperialist tour, the Secretary of State announced that 2018 will be the year of the Americas and made clear that he will seek to encourage division and submission among Latin American governments. In doing so, he will come up against the repudiation inspired by his announcements and the dignity of the peoples of the region, who bear the memory of the hundreds of thousands of dead and disappeared by the military dictatorships sponsored by the United States, and that Secretary Tillerson today calls to repeat.”

“Ours has been a continent subjected to the humiliating dominance of the U.S., interested only in extracting its resources in an unequal relationship. But Our America has awakened and it will not be so easy to crush it.”

Conclusion

Tillerson’s direct comments abut Cuba were rather limited and by themselves did not deserve Cuba’s strong rejection. However, the Trump Administration’s announced policies regarding Cuba do deserve the Cuban rebuke. Those policies also are not aimed at helping the ordinary Cuban people, especially those who are now engaged in the island’s private sector.

Although this blogger has not  carefully followed recent developments regarding Venezuela, he does believe that the country is in a horrible mess and that President Maduro’s actions are a major cause of this situation. While Tillerson did call for a peaceful solution to the country’s problems, was his unnecessary reference to military coup d’tat solutions in Latin America an implicit call for such action in Venezuela? If so, it was totally inappropriate and undiplomatic. And Cuba was right to criticize him for those remarks.

Unless Tillerson previously has been tipped off about the professor’s interest in the Monroe Doctrine, the question may have caught him off guard and the Secretary’s response obviously did not recognize the hostility throughout Latin America to the U.S. history of trying to impose its solutions to various problems upon the countries Latin America. This too deserved Cuba’s criticism.

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[1] U.S. State Dep’t, [Secretary’s] Travel to Texas, Mexico, Argentina, Peru, Colombia, and Jamaica, February 1-7, 2018  (Feb. 1, 2018); U.S. State Dep’t, Secretary of State Remarks, U.S. Engagement in the Western Hemisphere (Feb. 1, 2018).

[2] Monroe Doctrine, Wikipedia.

[3] Cuba rejects a return to the Monroe Doctrine, Granma (Feb. 5, 2018). 

 

Guantánamo: Trump’s Order Re-Ignites Controversy

President Trump on January 30 issued an executive order regarding the prison at Guantánamo, Cuba entitled the “Presidential Executive Order on Protecting American Through Lawful Detention of Terrorists.” It stated, ion part, ““Detention operations at U.S. Naval Station Guantánamo Bay shall continue to be conducted consistent with all applicable United States and international law, including the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005” and the U.S. “may transport additional detainees to U.S. Naval Station Guantánamo Bay when lawful and necessary to protect the Nation.” [1]

Shortly thereafter in his State of the Union Address the President announced this action with an additional  ad-libbed remark: “”in many cases terrorism detainees who are captured in the future will now be sent there.”

However, also after the speech, State and Pentagon officials said there were no plans to send new detainees to Guantanamo, a continuation of the practice for nearly the last 10 years.  And John Bellinger, a legal adviser in the Bush White House, said he thought that, given past failures, there would be institutional resistance to refilling the camp. “I  suspect the Departments of Defense, Justice and State would oppose sending new detainees to Guantánamo.”

This action has re-ignited controversy over the U.S. prison at the eastern end  of the island of Cuba in addition to those criticisms mentioned in the prior post.[2]

                                                     Re-Ignited Controversy

According to Robert M. Chesney, a law professor at the University of Texas, Austin who on the U.S. Justice Department detention policy task force in 2009, “Nothing in the new executive order changes the various legal and policy obstacles that help explain why no one was brought there in 2017.” Those obstacles are the Islamic State, transfers and the military commissions trial system at the prison.

  1. Is the U.S. at war with Islamic State detainees?

The legal basis for detention of al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters in the prison is the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) Act that was enacted imIslamic mediately after the 9/11 attacks for military action against the perpetrators of those attacks.

But it is at best unclear, and at worst illegitimate, to claim that AUMF covers Islamic State or ISIS fighters. Thus, transferring any of these individuals to Guantánamo runs the risk of a U.S. federal court ruling that such transfers and detentions are illegal.

This legal risk could be eliminated if Congress passed a new law specifically authorizing the use of U.S. military force against ISIS of the Islamic State, but is it safe to assume Congress would do so.

2. Would the U.S. have legal authority to transfer Islamic State detainees from Guantánamo?

Although the new Executive Order says that Guantánamo detainees may be transferred to the U.S. for trial in U.S. federal courts, there are existing federal statues that forbid such transfers.

Again Congress could pass new laws abolishing those restrictions, but is it safe to assume Congress would do so.

3. Are the military commissions at Guantánamo effective ?

Professor Chesney observes that this system “has floundered in practice, with contested cases bogging down in years of pretrial hearings.” Indeed, President Trump himself this last November acknowledged this problem when he explained why he had decided token the New York truck-attack suspect in the civilian criminal justice system instead of transferring him to Guantánamo.

4. Is the operation of the Guantánamo prison too expensive?

According to the most recently available government figures, Guantanamo cost $445 million to run in fiscal year 2015—making its current costs about $11 million per inmate.

By contrast, the average cost per inmate in the federal prison system was $31,620, the federal Bureau of Prisons said in a 2016 filing.

5. Is the Guantánamo prison a tainted symbol that fuels anti-Americanism?

Indeed, the prison is such a symbol and enhances anti-American sentiment throughout the world. This was a major reason for a Washington Post editorial condemning the Trump executive order. Said the Post, the prison has “incited a storm of international criticism, handed a recruitment tool to al-Qaeda.” This cost of the prison, the Post adds,  is exacerbated by the “hopelessly bogged down” military commissions at the prison in contrast to the over 600 convictions in terrorism cases in U.S. federal courts since 2001.

Mark Fallon, a former chief investigator of the Defense Department’s Criminal Investigation Task Force, said, even if no more prisoners are sent there, Trump’s announcement itself had already caused damage. “Globally [Guantánamo] symbolizes injustice, oppression and torture. And so when you see the president out there talking about expanding upon it, I’m just afraid that that it puts our troops in greater danger overseas and it jeopardizes our national security.”

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[2] President Trump’s Unsound Action Regarding the U.S. Prison at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, dwkcommentaries.com (Jan. 31, 2018).

[2] Savage. Ordering Guantánamo to Stay Open Is One Thing, But Refilling It Is Another, N.Y. Times (Jan. 31, 2018); Editorial, Trump says he wants to refill Guantánamo. Bad Idea, Wash. Post (Feb. 1, 2018); Schwartz & Lubold, Trump’s Guantaanamo Move Keeps Prison and Detainees n Limbo, W.S.J. (Feb. 1, 2018);Borger & Smith, Guantánamo: Bush-era officials warn keeping prison open may be $6bn error, Guardian (Feb. 1, 2018).