U.S. State Department – dwkcommentaries

More Conflicting News About Cubans Fighting for Russia Against Ukraine While U.S. Continues Anti-Cuban Policies

The last several days have seen more conflicting news reports about whether Cuba condemns or tolerates Cubans fighting for Russia in the Ukrainian war. There also has been an U.S.-Cuba meeting on various issues and U.S. refusal to cancel its designation of Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism as well as the U.S. continued authorization of its embargo of the island.

Cuba and the Ukrainian War[1]

On September 14, Reuters reported that RIA, a Russian state-owned news agency, had stated that “Cuba is not against the legal participation of its citizens in Russia’s war in Ukraine.” RIA’s stated source was the Cuban ambassador to Russia, Julio Antonio Garmendia Pena, who was quoted as saying, “We have nothing against Cubans who just want to sign a contract and legally take part with the Russian army in this operation. But we are against illegality” and those recently arrested in Cuba “had been engaged in illegal activities and had broken the law.”

More details about the Ambassador’s statement were provided by the Miami Herald, which reported that he said the Cubans who had been arrested were “’swindlers’ who had broken the law” and “We are talking about bad people who, on the basis of such an important issue as a military operation, as relations between our countries, want to earn money, want to put money in their pocket and engage in illegal activities.”

A Cuban Foreign Ministry official in Havana, however, on September 14, issued the following statement:

“Cuba reiterates its firm historical position against mercenarism and upholds its active role at the United Nations against that practice. Cuban laws are very explicit in relation to the criminalization of crimes such as trafficking in persons, smuggling of migrants and mercenarism.”
“Cuba likewise reiterates that it is not a part of the war conflict in Ukraine. It also states that, following the uncovering of a trafficking in persons network operating from Russia, intended to recruit Cuban citizens settled in that country, as well as others residing in Cuba, so that they would join the military forces taking part in war operations in Ukraine, several attempts of this same nature have been neutralized and criminal proceedings have been established against persons involved in such activities.”
“The Cuban authorities maintain an exchange with their Russian counterparts in relation to these incidents, given the excellent level of relations that exist between both countries, with the purpose of clarifying these events.”

The Miami Herald also reported that a “U.S. State Department official said the administration is “concerned by reports alleging young Cubans have been deceived and recruited to fight for Russia in its brutal full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s need to use deceit to attract foreign fighters indicates both its military weakness and its disregard for human life. We continue to monitor the situation closely.”

In addition, the Miami Herald reported that the chairman of the Ukrainian parliament’s committee on foreign relations, Oleksandr Merezhko, stated, “the Cuban communist regime pretends that it has nothing to do with this ‘human trafficking.’ In reality, this totalitarian regime is on the side of the aggressor.”

U.S. Actions Regarding Cuba[2]

The U.S. State Department confirmed that on September 11, 2023, Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs Brian Nichols met with the Cuban vice foreign minister and discussed “human rights, migration, and other issues of bilateral interest” after a number of meetings with officials from the Cuban embassy in Washington. But the U.S. did not agree to terminate its designation of Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism.

Another U.S. action continuing its hostility towards Cuba was President Biden on September 13, 2023, signing another year’s extension of the Trading with the Enemy Law, which is the basis for the U.S. embargo of the island. That document urged the Secretary of the Treasury, Janet Yellen, to enforce this sanctioning measure against the Cuban economy, and emphasized that the embargo “is in the national interest” of the United States.

Reactions

The U.S. needs to end its embargo of Cuba and its designation of Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism. In addition, the U.S. needs to press Cuba to stop assisting Russia in its war against Ukraine and to publicly clarify Cuba’s policies and actions regarding Ukraine.

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[1] Conflicting News About Cubans Fighting for Russia, dwkcommentaries.com (Sept. 12, 2023); Cuba is not against its citizens fighting on Russia’s side in Ukraine, RIS cites envoy, Reuters.com (Sept. 14, 2023); RIA Novosti, Wikipedia; Torres, Cuban diplomat says island will not stop citizens from fighting for Russia in Ukraine, Miami Herald (Sept,. 14, 2023); Statement by Lleana Nunez Mordoche, Director for Europe and Canada of the General Division of Bilateral Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba (Sept. 14, 2023). Damage control: the regime says it opposes the participation of Cubans in any conflict, Diario de Cuba (Sept. 15, 2023).

[2] U.S. State Dep’t, Department Press Briefing—September 14, 2023;

Torres, American and Cuban officials meet ahead of Cuban leader’s trip to UN meeting in New York, Miami Herald (Sept. 14, 2023); Spetalnick, High-Level US-Cuba talks yield no progress on top disputes, Cuban official says, Reuters.com (Sept. 14, 2023); Senior Cuban and US officials hold an unusual meeting in Washington, Diario de Cuba (Sept. 15, 2023); Capote, Biden ratifies the blockade with his signature: the genocide against Cuba continues, Granma.com (Sept. 14, 2023); White House, Memorandum on the Continuation of the Exercise of Certain Authorities under the Trading With the Enemy Act (Sept. 13, 2023).

Cuban Criminal Prosecution of “Trafficking Network” for Recruiting Cubans for Russian Armed Forces

On September 4, Cuba’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement that its Ministry of the Interior “has detected and it is working to neutralize and dismantle a human trafficking network that operates from Russia in order to incorporate Cuban citizens living there and even some living in Cuba, into the military forces that participate in military operations in Ukraine. Attempts of this nature have been neutralized and criminal proceedings have been initiated against those involved in these activities.” Moreover, “Cuba’s enemies are promoting distorted information that seeks to tarnish the country’s image and present it as an accomplice to these transact actions that we firmly reject.”[1]

This statement also said, “Cuba is not part of the war in Ukraine. It is acting and it will firmly act against those who within the national territory participate in any form of human trafficking for mercenaryism or recruitment purposes so that Cuban citizens may raise weapons against any country.”

Finally, according to the Cuban statement, “Cuba has a firm and clear historical position against mercenaryism, and it plays an active role in the United Nations in rejection of the aforementioned practice, being the author of several of the initiatives approved in that forum.”

Without mention by the Cuban Ministry, a Russian newspaper in May had reported that “’several’ Cuban citizens had volunteered as contract soldiers in the Russian army, and some hoped to become Russian citizens in exchange for their service.”

Also without mention by the Cuban Ministry, “The Moscow Times [an independent English-language and Russian-language online newspaper now headquartered in Amsterdam] reported that a social media account under the name of Elena Shuvalova had for months been posting ads in a Facebook group called “Cubans in Moscow” offering a one-year contract with the Russian Army. On Tuesday, the group had nearly 76,000 members.”[2]

The U.S. State Department said the U.S. was “deeply concerned” by this news.

Reactions

This situation poses a difficult problem for Cuba.

As noted in other posts, Cuba and Russia recently have commenced various means of cooperating, and Cuba presumably does not want to interfere with that cooperation. Moreover, as previously mentioned, “Cuba has a firm and clear historical position against mercenaryism, and it plays an active role in the United Nations in rejection of the aforementioned practice, being the author of several of the initiatives approved in that forum” and Cuba does not want to blemish that reputation.[3]

Finally, as is well known, the United States is a strong supporter of Ukraine in its war with Russia, and Cuba does not need another point of contention with the U.S.

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[1] Statement of [Cuba] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cuba counters human trafficking operations for military recruitment purposes (Sept. 4, 2023); Satronova, Cuba Says Its Citizens Were Lured to Fight in Russia’s Wat om Ukraine, N.Y. Times (Sept. 5, 2023); Sheridan & Dadouch, Cuba Says Russian human traffickers lure citizens to war with Ukraine, Wash. Post (Sept. 5, 2023); Cordoba, Cuba Says Russian Ring Is Recruiting Cubans to Ukraine, W.S.J. (Sept. 5, 2023).Torres, Cuba says it’s dismantling human trafficking ring sending Cubans to fight for Russia in Ukraine, Miami Herald (Sept. 5, 2023); U.S. State Dep’t, Department Press Briefing—September 5, 2023.

[2] The Moscow Times is an independent English-language and Russian-language online newspaper now headquartered in Amsterdam. (The Moscow Times, Wikipedia. .)

[3] E.g., U.S. Needs To Improve Relations with Cuba, dwkcommentaries (Aug. 4, 2023).

U.S. Afghan Special Visa Program Still Facing Immense Problems

In August 2023, the U.S. State Department’s Office of Inspector General released its report on evaluation of 2018-22 adjustments to the Afghan Special Visa Program, which was established in 2009 to resettle “Afghans who had worked on behalf of the [U.S.] in Afghanistan and had experienced an ongoing and serious threat as a result.”[1]

The Report’s Findings

“A. The Department Made Efforts To Streamline Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Processing Beginning in February 2021, but Challenges Remain.” More specifically, “as of December 2022, these actions had not eliminated the significant and growing Afghan SIV applicant backlog. Specifically, the Department increased staffing to process emails and determine applicant eligibility; coordinated with the Department of Defense to verify employment; incorporated new software to help process emails; eliminated a portion of the application process; leveraged posts worldwide for SIV interviews; and established remote consular operations in Doha, Qatar. However, because of an increased interest in the program after [the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in] August 2021, the Department experienced an influx of applications causing a backlog for which the Department had inadequate staffing to process. Without additional dedicated resources to address the situation, the backlog in SIV applications will remain a significant challenge.”

“B. COVID-19 Caused Delays to Afghan SIV Processing and Increased the Backlog of Applicants.” More specifically, “the COVID-19 pandemic stalled the Afghan SIV application process, which in-turn increased the number of SIV applicants awaiting in-person interviews….

Embassy Kabul suspended visa interviews twice: from March 2020 to February 2021 and from June to July 2021 because of COVID-19 outbreaks. However, telework allowed the Department to continue some phases of SIV applicant processing.”

“C. The Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Program Faces Challenges and Would Benefit From a Strategic Performance Management Approach.” More specifically, “The Department relies on Taliban cooperation for SIV applicant relocation from the country because of a lack of a [U.S.] ground presence in Afghanistan. In addition, the Department has not developed and implemented a strategic performance management approach to resolving the Afghan SIV applicant backlog, and the Department’s Afghan SIV Senior Coordinating Official position has had periods of vacancy and frequent turnover since 2017. Developing and implementing a strategic performance management approach would benefit the Afghan SIV program and help address the SIV applicant backlog.”

“The reliance on Taliban cooperation because of the lack of US diplomatic ground presence in Afghanistan impacts the ability for Afghan SIV applicants to exit Afghanistan and arrive at a US diplomatic post for visa processing.” Indeed, “one of the biggest challenges to SIV applicants departing Afghanistan is the lack of freedom of movement out of Afghanistan, which is dependent on Taliban cooperation. The Taliban’s willingness to approve flights, to allow women to depart Afghanistan alone, to determine the number of aircraft Kabul International Airport can accommodate, and other factors impacted freedom of movement for Afghans.. . .”

As of April 2023, the Department estimates that 840,000 principal applicants and family members remain in Afghanistan with uncertainty where they are in the application process. As of August 1, the U.S. has “issued nearly 34,000 SIVs to principal applicants and their eligible family members while another 80,000 applicants are in process with tens of thousands having begun the applications.

The Report’s Recommendation

The Report then made the following Recommendation: “OIG recommends that the Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) Senior Coordinating Official, in coordination with the Bureau of Consular Affairs and the Joint Executive Office for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, develop and implement a strategic performance management approach to improve the outcomes of the Afghan SIV program, including establishing goals and measures of success to evaluate progress against those established goals.”

The Department’s Management responded to that Recommendation as follows: “The Department concurred with the intent of the recommendation and requested that OIG revise the recommendation to read “the [Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) Senior] Coordinating Official, in coordination with the Bureau of Consular Affairs and the Joint Executive Office for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, continue to implement procedural changes and allocate resources in service of meeting the Department’s Afghan SIV processing goals. The Department should use the efficiency improvements, Chief of Mission (COM) decisions, and visa interview sections included in the quarterly Congressional reports on SIV processing to track progress, referencing the Program Design and Performance Management Toolkit as needed.”

“Additionally, Department comments noted that ‘after reviewing the Program Design and Performance Management Toolkit [mentioned in the finding] …, the Department maintains that Afghan SIV … adjudication is a process, not a program. However, the Department is aware of the value in this toolkit and will utilize it as a reference, as needed, while we continue to assess existing [Afghan SIV] processing goals.”

Conclusion

This blog already has discussed the Taliban’s human rights violations against in-country Afghans who had helped the U.S. troops before their August 2021 withdrawal.[2]

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[1] U.S. State Dep’t, Office of Inspector General, Evaluation of Adjustments to the Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Program From 2018 through 2022 (Aug. 2023) Hansler, Challenges to Afghan special visa program remain two years after US withdrawal, State Dept, watchdog finds, CNN.com (Sept. 1, 2023) . See also Atwood & Hansler, State Department review of US withdrawal from Afghanistan includes far more findings than White House document, CNN (April 7, 2023)

[2] U.N. Agency Reports Afghan Human Rights Violations Against Former U.S. Partners, dwkcommentaries.com (Aug. 26, 2023); COMMENT: Dangerous Life in Afghanistan of Family of U.S. Interpreter, dwkcommentaries.com (Aug. 29, 2023).

U.S. State Department’s Latest Report on Cameroon Human Rights

On April 12, 2022, the U.S. State Department released its 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights. This report is the latest annual report for nearly five decades that “strive[s] to provide a factual and objective record on the status of human rights worldwide.” The 2021 report covers 198 countries and territories. [1]

Cameroon Human Rights[2]

Here is the outline of the details on the status of various human rights in each of the 198 countries and territories, including Cameroon:

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person

Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings
Disappearance
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading treatment or Punishment
Arbitrary Arrest or Detention
Denial of Fair Public Trial
Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, Or Correspondence

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties

Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media
Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of Religion
Freedom of Movement and the Right To Leave the Country
Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced People
Protection of Refugees

Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process

Section 4. Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government

Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights

Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses

Section 7. Worker Rights

Executive Summary of Cameroon Human Rights

The report on Cameroon begins with the following Executive Summary.

“Cameroon is a republic dominated by a strong presidency. The president retains power over the legislative and judicial branches of government. The ruling political party, the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement, has remained in power since its creation in 1985. The country held legislative elections in February 2020 that were marked by irregularities. The ruling party won 152 of 180 National Assembly seats. Paul Biya has served as president since 1982. He was last reelected in 2018 in an election marked by irregularities.”

“The national police and the national gendarmerie are responsible for internal security. The former reports to the General Delegation of National Security and the latter to the Secretariat of State for Defense in charge of the Gendarmerie. The army shares some domestic security responsibilities; it reports to the minister delegate at the presidency in charge of defense. The Rapid Intervention Battalion reports directly to the president. Civilian and military authorities did not maintain effective control over the security forces. There were credible reports that members of the security forces committed numerous abuses.”

“Casualties rose in the Anglophone crisis in the Northwest and Southwest Regions. Anglophone separatists used improvised explosive devices with greater success. ISIS-West Africa increased attacks in the Far North Region. The government continued to crack down on the opposition Cameroon Renaissance Movement, and in December several of its members were sentenced to prison for terms ranging from one to seven years following protests in 2020.”

“Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: unlawful or arbitrary killings, including extrajudicial killings by the government and nonstate armed groups; forced disappearances by the government; torture and cases of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by the government and nonstate armed groups; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrests or detention; political prisoners or detainees; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; punishment of family members for offenses allegedly committed by an individual; serious abuses in a conflict, including abductions and unlawful recruitment and use of child soldiers by nonstate armed groups; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media, including violence, threats of violence, or unjustified arrests or prosecutions against journalists, censorship, and criminal libel laws; substantial interference with the right of peaceful assembly and freedom of association, including overly restrictive laws on the organization, funding, or operation of nongovernmental organizations and civil society organizations; serious restrictions on freedom of movement; inability of citizens to change their government peacefully through free and fair elections; serious and unreasonable restrictions on political participation; serious government corruption; lack of investigations and accountability for gender-based violence; trafficking in persons; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex persons; and the existence or use of laws criminalizing same-sex sexual conduct between adults.”

“Although the government took some steps to identify, investigate, prosecute, and punish officials who committed human rights abuses or corruption, it did not do so systematically and rarely held public proceedings. Impunity remained a serious problem.”

“Armed separatists, Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa, and criminal gangs also committed human rights abuses, some of which were investigated by the government.”

Conclusion[3]

Commenting on this report, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said governments around the world, including Russia and China, grew more repressive last year. One example was the increasingly brazen way governments were “reaching across borders to threaten and attack critics” while some governments such as Cuba, Egypt and Russia were quick to lock up critics at home. Blinken also noted there had been “a serious erosion of human rights” in Afghanistan.

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[1] U.S. State Dep’t, 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights (April 12, 2022).

[2] U.S. State Dep’t, 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Cameroon (April 12, 2022).

[3] Crowley, U.S. Report Describes a Global Retreat on Human Rights and Democracy, N.Y. Times (April 12, 2022);U.S. State DRyan, Human rights and democracy eroding worldwide, U.S. finds, Wash. Post (April 12, 2022).

U.S. State Department’s Latest Report on Cuban Human Rights

On April 12, 2022, the U.S. State Department released its 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights. This report is the latest annual report that for nearly five decades has striven “to provide a factual and objective record on the status of human rights worldwide.” The 2021 report covers 198 countries and territories. [1]

Cuban Human Rights[2]

Here is the outline of the details on the status of various human rights in each of the 198 countries and territories, including Cuba:

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person

Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings
Disappearance
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading treatment or Punishment
Arbitrary Arrest or Detention
Denial of Fair Public Trial
Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, Or Correspondence

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties

Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media
Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of Religion
Freedom of Movement and the Right To Leave the Country
Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced People
Protection of Refugees

Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process

Section 4. Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government

Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights

Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses

Section 7. Worker Rights

Executive Summary of Cuban Human Rights

The report on Cuba begins with the following Executive Summary.

“Cuba is an authoritarian state. The 2019 constitution codifies that Cuba remains a one-party system in which the Communist Party is the only legal political party. On April 19, President Miguel Diaz-Canel replaced former president Raul Castro as first secretary of the Communist Party, the highest political entity of the state by law. Elections were neither free nor fair nor competitive.”

“The Ministry of Interior controls police, internal security forces, and the prison system. The ministry’s National Revolutionary Police are the primary law enforcement organization. Specialized units of the ministry’s state security branch are responsible for monitoring, infiltrating, and suppressing independent political activity. The national leadership, including members of the military, maintained effective control over the security forces. There were credible reports that members of the security forces committed numerous abuses, and the number of political prisoners increased dramatically, with many held in pretrial detention under extremely harsh and degrading conditions.”

“On January 28, security forces violently arrested more than 20 artists and journalist peacefully protesting in front of the Ministry of Culture for the release of detained artists. On July 11, spontaneous peaceful protests broke out across the island. In the largest and most widespread demonstrations in decades, tens of thousands of citizens across the country poured into the streets to demand an end to repression as well as to criticize the government’s failure to meet their basic needs and its poor response to COVID-19. Social media posts helped spread news of the protests among citizens. Security forces responded with tear gas, beatings, and arrests. First Secretary of the Communist Party and President Miguel Diaz-Canel went on national television to call on “all revolutionaries and communists to confront these protests,” a reference to Article Four of the 2019 constitution, which gives citizens the right to “combat through any means, including armed combat” any who “intend to topple the political, social, and economic order established by this constitution.” Many of those arrested reported cruel and degrading treatment in prison. In October authorities denied permission for a protest planned for November 15 and threatened organizers. The government conducted summary trials for some protesters; sought long prison sentences, some up to 30 years, in hundreds of cases; and held other protesters in extended pretrial detention. Some activists chose to go into exile, and the government forced others to do so.”

“Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: unlawful or arbitrary killings, including extrajudicial killings, by the government; forced disappearance by the government; torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment of political dissidents, detainees, and prisoners by security forces; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrests and detentions; political prisoners; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; reprisals against family members for offenses allegedly committed by an individual; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media including violence or threats of violence against journalists, censorship, and criminal libel laws used against persons who criticized government leadership; serious restrictions on internet freedom; severe restrictions on the right of peaceful assembly and denial of freedom of association, including refusal to recognize independent associations; severe restrictions on religious freedom; restrictions on internal and external freedom of movement; inability of citizens to change their government peacefully through free and fair elections, including serious and unreasonable restrictions on political participation; serious government corruption; a lack of investigation of and accountability for gender-based violence; trafficking in persons, including forced labor; and outlawing of independent trade unions.”

“Government officials, at the direction of their superiors, committed most human rights abuses. As a matter of policy, officials failed to investigate or prosecute those who committed these abuses. Impunity for the perpetrators remained widespread, as was impunity for official corruption.”

Conclusion[3]

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[1] U.S. State Dep’t, 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights (April 12, 2022).

[2] U.S. State Dep’t, 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Cuba (April 12, 2022).

[3] Crowley, U.S. Report Describes a Global Retreat on Human Rights and Democracy, N.Y. Times (April 12, 2022).; Ryan, Human rights and democracy eroding worldwide, U.S. finds, Wash. Post (April 12, 2022).

Immense Problems Hampering U.S. Efforts To Resettle Afghans

Since the U.S. evacuation of Afghanistan on August 31, 2021, the U.S. has been engaged in the complicated task of resettling an anticipated 65,000 to 100,000 Afghans in the U.S. Now the U.S. Government is admitting that its initial goal of completing these resettlements by the end of this year cannot be achieved and that it will take through March 2022 if not longer. [1]

Locations of Afghans Evacuated by U.S.

The only somewhat comprehensive accounting of where these people are today that this blogger has been able to find is a Wall Street Journal article vaguely describing Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s October 8 written responses to written questions from Senator James Inhofe (R-Okla.), the ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Here are those approximate numbers:

During August 2021, 124,000 people were evacuated from that country by the U.S., 85% or 105,400 of whom were Afghans.
Approximately 53,000 of these Afghan evacuees were living at eight U.S. military bases in this country; 34% were male adults, 22% were female adults and 44% were children.
Other Afghan evacuees (perhaps 6,000 to 10,000) were at U.S. military installations in Germany, Spain, Italy and Kosovo.
Another 6,000 have been resettled in the U.S.
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates have provided temporary space for screening and vetting by Departments of Defense and State and other federal agencies..

U.S. Immigration Status of Afghan Evacuees.

Humanitarian Parole

Most Afghan evacuees arrive in the U.S. as humanitarian parolees with eligibility to apply for work authorization. Such permits are granted on a case-by-case basis permitting them to stay for two years after appropriate screening and vetting and subject to medical screening and vaccination and reporting requirements. Failure to meet these conditions may be cause for denial of work authorization and potentially termination of the parole and initiation of detention and removal.

Moreover, “humanitarian parolees lack a path to legal U.S. residency and the benefits and services offered to traditional refugees, according to U.S. officials and aid groups working closely with the government.” Instead, “Afghan parolees who have arrived at U.S. military bases will be eligible for an ad hoc State Department program that provides limited assistance for up to 90 days, including a one-time $1,250 stipend. But they will not have the full range of medical, counseling and resettlement services available to immigrants who arrive through the U.S. refugee program.”

Afghan Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs)

Some evacuees may qualify for the Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) by meeting the following requirements:

“Employment in Afghanistan for at least one year between October 7, 2001, and December 31, 2023, by or on behalf of the U.S. government or by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), or a successor mission in a capacity that required the applicant to serve as an interpreter or translator for U.S. military personnel while traveling off-base with U.S. military personnel stationed at ISAF or to perform activities for U.S. military personnel stationed at ISAF; “and
“Have experienced or be experiencing an ongoing threat as a consequence of their employment.”

On October 21, U.S. Senators Inhofe (R-Okla.), Risch (R-Idaho) and Portman (R-Ohio) sent a letter requesting a joint review and audit of the SIV program to the inspectors general of the Departments of State, Defense and Homeland Security and the U.S. Agency for international Development. These Senators contend that in the “chaotic and haphazard U.S. withdrawal” from Afghanistan “thousands of SIV applicants were shamefully left behind,[putting them] at great risk, vulnerable to retaliation from the Taliban due to their association with the [U.S.].”

The same day (October 21), Senator Inhofe stated that a classified briefing on security in Afghanistan confirmed that after the U.S. withdrawal the U.S. “is now less safe” and that the “Taliban can’t—and won’t –do anything to prevent al-Qaeda from training or launching attacks from Afghanistan” and in fact will only “enable al-Qaeda.” These issues will be probed in an upcoming hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Priority 2 (P-2) Designations

Other evacuees may be eligible for Priority 2 (P-2) designation granting U.S. Refugee Admissions Program access for Afghans and their eligible family members by satisfying on of the following conditions;

“Afghans who do not meet the minimum time-in-service for a SIV but who work or worked as employees of contractors, locally-employed staff, interpreters/translators for the U.S. government, U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOXRX-A), International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), or Resolute Support;”
“Afghans who work or worked for a U.S. government-funded program or project in Afghanistan supported through a U.S. government grant or cooperative agreement;” or
“Afghans who are or were employed in Afghanistan by a U.S.-based media organization or non-governmental organization.”

Priority 1 (P-1) Designations

Afghans also could be eligible for “the Priority (P-1) program by virtue of their circumstances and apparent need for resettlement who are referred to the P-1 program . . . by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), a U.S. embassy, or a designated NGO.”

Asylum Applicants

Another option for the parolees is to apply for asylum on proof of “persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Such a claim realistically requires the services of a U.S. attorney knowledgeable about asylum law and procedures, preferably a pro bono attorney who serves without a fee. The current horrible backlog in immigration courts makes this a very challenging undertaking.

Green Card Proposal

On September 7, President Biden submitted to Congress a request for authorization of green cards for Afghan s after a year in the U.S. This was part of a request for $6.4 billion for the Afghan resettlement effort.

Other Practical Problems

Another problem causing delays is an outbreak of measles in the Afghan evacuees that prompted military base officials to carry out a broad vaccination effort against measles, Covid-19 and polio.

Yet another problem causing delays in Afghan resettlement is the current U.S. housing shortage coupled with soaring rents and the resulting reluctance of landlords to take on potential tenants with no existing income or credit scores. Moreover, initially the Afghans had to live within a hundred miles of a resettlement agency, the number of which shrunk as a result of the Trump Administration reducing the number of refugees the us. would accept for resettlement.

Resettling them in places that have sizable existing Afghan communities would make a lot of sense except that many of those places like California and northern Virginia are particularly expensive.

There also have been other practical problems. Some of the living facilities on U.S. military bases at least initially were inadequate in many ways, and warmer clothing for the Afghans was in short supply. In addition, travel for the Afghans from military bases to their final destinations was organized by the International Organization for Migration, a U.N. agency that has been understaffed in the U.S.

Conclusion

The issues presented by resettlement of Afghan evacuees are very complex, and this blogger would greatly appreciate comments correcting or amplifying this post’s discussion.

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[1] U.S. Dep’t Homeland Security, Fact Sheet on Operation Allies Welcome; Friedman, U.S. Housing Market Needs 5.5 Million More Units, Says New report, W.S.J. (June 16, 2021); Parti & Hackman, Biden Administration Proposes Asylum Overhaul to Reduce Backlog, Speed Deportations, W.S.J. (Aug. 18, 2021); Hackman, U.S. Refugee Organizations Race to Prepare for Influx of Afghans, W.S.J. (Aug. 31, 2021); Hackman & Hughes, Biden Administration Seeks New Law to Ease Afghan Refugees‘ Path to Green Cards, W.S.J. (Sept. 8, 2021); U.S. Resettlement of Refugees and Recent Afghan Evacuees, dwkcommentaries.con (Sept. 8, 2021); McBride & iddiqui, U.S. Suspends Flights of Afghans After Four Test Positive for Measles, W.S. J. (Sept. 10, 2021); Parker, Soaring Rents Makes It a Very Good time to Own an Apartment Building, W. S. J. (Sept. 14, 2021); Hackman, Afghan Refugees in the U.S.: How They’re Vetted, Where They’re Going and How to Help, W.S.J. (Sept. 15, 2021); Kesling, A U.S. Military Base Needs to Make 13,000 Afghan Evacuees Feel at Home, W.S.J. (Oct. 1, 2021); George & Mehrdad, Routes out of Afghanistan dwindle as Pakistan cancels flights, Wash. Post (Oct. 14, 2021); Kesling & Hackman, U.S. Afghan Resettlements Slowed by Housing Shortage, Old Technology, W.S.J. (Oct. 17, 2021); Youssef, Almost Half of Afghan Evacuees at U.S.Bases Are Children, Pentagon Says, W.S.J. (Oct. 20, 2021); Sen. Inhofe Press Release, Inhofe, Risch, Portman request Investigation of SIV Program Shortcomings Amid Afghanistan Withdrawal (Oct. 21, 2021); Sen. Inhofe Press Release, Inhofe Statement on Afghanistan Security Briefing (Oct. 21, 2021).

Cuba and U.S. Debate Cuba’s Treatment of José Daniel Ferrer

On March 11, the U.S. State Department released its latest annual report on human rights around the world. A previous post discussed some of the details of that criticism while another post looked at the limited positive comments in that report. Now we examine the report’s criticism of Cuba’s treatment of José Daniel Ferrer after a review of what previous posts have set forth on that subject followed by a review of more recent events.

Previous Posts’ Discussion of Ferrer[1]

As the leader of the Patriotic Union of Cuba (UNPACU), which has criticized the Cuban government for a long time, Ferrer has had many conflicts with the Cuban government. The most recent started on October 1, 2019, with his arrest and detention for allegedly kidnapping and beating a fellow Cuban (Sergio Garcia) and with an October 17^th rejection of Ferrer’s plea for a writ of habeas corpus.

On October 18, 2019, the State Department publicly condemned this arrest and detention as part of an escalating “wave of repression against freedoms of speech, expression, and religion” and demanded his immediate release from detention.

On November 20, 2019, an editorial in Granma, the official newspaper of the Communist Party of Cuba, alleged that Ferrer was in detention because he was “a salaried agent of the United States, with a long history of provocative actions, disruption of public order, and violations of the law” and that the U.S. Embassy in Havana and Chargé d’ Affaires Mara Tekach had been “the fundamental . . . [instrument for the] orientation, and financing of . . . Ferrer’s conduct, clearly interfering in Cuba’s internal affairs, openly inciting violence, promoting the disruption of order and contempt for the law by this citizen. . . .”[2]

That same day, UNPACU said this editorial was “a complete manipulation of the judicial process against” Ferrer by asserting “two fundamental lies, first, it locates the process of searching for freedom and universal rights of the Cuban people under the authorship of the United States Government, and, second, it states that . . .Ferrer is a salaried agent of the service of United States, with a violent trajectory.” [3]Instead, UNPACU stated the following:

The “demonstrations of popular discontent against the Cuban regime, which we can see daily thanks to the internet’s social networks, are a direct consequence of 60 years of communist government of the single party that deprives them of fundamental rights and freedoms to Cuban citizens. What translates into a permanent state of material and spiritual crisis, which from time to time reaches critical levels like the current one. It is worth asking the Cuban regime if the two 2.5 million citizens that they recognized who did not agree with the new constitution [and voted against it in the referendum], were also cared for, guided and financed by the United States Embassy in Cuba. The Chargé d’Affaires of the United States Embassy, Mara Teckach.”
“Our organization receives help without imposition from various foreign institutions that promote values such as democracy, freedom, the rule of law and the division between the powers of the State, without which it is impossible for a Government to guarantee and respect human rights. With the help we receive, we do not buy weapons, bombs, or terrorism. With that help we buy printers and sheets to print thousands of copies of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and distribute them among the population.”
“With regard to the slander against José Daniel Ferrer, we can say that in his case and in that of the Patriotic Union of Cuba there is no record of activism during these years of activism against any member of the repressive bodies of the Cuban State.”
“During this time [60 days of unjust imprisonment of Ferrer and three of his colleagues] we have published several testimonies of people who demonstrate the pressure exerted by members of the Ministry of the Interior (MININT) against activists and neighbors of the community of Mármol, where the main headquarters of UNPACU is located, to raise false charges against him. We have even alerted the use by the State Security of agents that we have expelled from our ranks for being at their service, to make false accusations.”
“Other evidence of the political police maneuvers in the case is that the wife of the alleged accuser declared through a phone call that we made public, that her husband suffered a traffic accident and that the police were pressing him very insistently to who said that the injuries contracted in the accident had been caused by . . . [Ferrer].. Also, the sister of Roilán Zárraga Ferrer, one of the activists detained with José Daniel, publicly stated that his brother communicated to him on a recent visit to the Center for Criminal Instruction in Santiago de Cuba, where he is being held, that they are pressuring him to sign a false statement against José Daniel.”
“Among the serious violations that occurred in this case, the conditions of confinement of the detainees are of great concern, as well as the torture, cruel, degrading and inhuman treatment to which . . .Ferrer is being subjected, as confirmed by his wife on a recent visit to the Aguadores prison in Santiago de Cuba, after 34 days of being kept missing.”

The U.S. State Department on November 22 vehemently denied the Cuban government’s charges and said “these baseless accusations . . . [were] an attempt to distract the international community from its abysmal treatment of the Cuban people, especially the ongoing arbitrary detention of . . Ferrer.”

Cuba, however, on November 26, returned to this attack on the U.S. and Ferrer in an open letter from Cuba’s Ambassador to the EU to the latter’s Parliament asserting that the U.S. and its diplomatic mission in Cuba have been “guiding, instigating and financing the violent and destabilizing behavior of Ferrer” while intending “to fabricate the image of [him as] a persecuted and mistreated” political dissident. The Cuban Ambassador also denied allegations of subsequent Cuban jail mistreatment of Ferrer as “lies . . . deliberately conceived and guided by the United States Government and its Embassy in Havana.”

The next day (November 27) on Cuban national television the Cuban government alleged that Ferrer that year had received $50,000 form the U.S. Government via the Miami-based Cuban-American National Foundation and showed a video of him banging his head against a metal table.

These Cuban allegations, however, did not persuade the EU Parliament, which on November 28 adopted a resolution condemning Ferrer’s arbitrary detention and torture and demanding his immediate release.

On January 30, 2020, Ferrer’s wife and children were permitted to visit him in prison, when he appeared to be very thin and told his wife that he had not been receiving any medical attention. In addition, the prison did not allow him to eat food and take medicines brought by his wife.

On February 24, Secretary Pompeo sent an open letter to Cuba Foreign Minister Bruno Edwardo Rodriguez Parrilla demanding the immediate release of Ferrer. This letter stated the following:

“Cuban human rights defender Jose Daniel Ferrer has endured more than 100 days of unjust imprisonment and repeatedly has been dragged, chained, beaten, and burned at the hands of the regime, which you represent. The United States government joins a chorus of international voices demanding Ferrer’s immediate release. The European Parliament, the United Nations, the Organization of American States, Amnesty International, and journalists and human rights organizations from countries across the globe have condemned your regime’s treatment of Ferrer and other human rights defenders like him.”
“This is not the first time your regime has targeted Ferrer. He was imprisoned from 2003 until 2011 for advocating for democracy and respect for human rights in Cuba.”
“The current spurious charges against Ferrer follow a familiar pattern of harassment, violence, and arbitrary arrests against Cubans who seek only to advocate for democracy and the political and economic freedoms that would enable the Cuban people to create prosperity in Cuba. It cannot be a crime to criticize policies that have set Cuba’s development tumbling backwards for the past 61 years.”
“The United States will never forget the brave Cubans who put their lives on the line for the sake of a free Cuba. Until there is democracy and respect for human rights in Cuba and all political prisoners are freed, the United States will continue to hold the regime accountable for its abuses. For the sake of the Cuban people and for the betterment of your nation, we urge you to free Jose Daniel Ferrer immediately.”
On February 26, 2020, Ferrer was put on trial in Santiago de Cuba for the alleged crimes of injury, deprivation of liberty to third parties and attack. According to the Cuban Prisoners Defenders (CPD), the court did not permit any of the witnesses at this 12-hour trial to utter the words “opponents, dissidents, political police, State Security, headquarters, UNPACU, regime, dictatorship, dictators and illegal.”

Secretary Pompeo’s Comments About the New U.S. Human Rights Report and Ferrer[4]

The Secretary’s comments upon the release of the report included the following: “The name Jose Daniel Ferrer appears 17 times in this report. He’s one of thousands of political prisoners who, over the years, have been dragged, chained, and beaten at the hands of the [Cuban] regime. Tomorrow (March 12) he will be sentenced by a Cuban court.” (Emphasis added.)

The New Report’s Discussion of Ferrer[5]

The Executive Summary of the report on Cuba stated the following:

“On February 24, the country adopted a new constitution in a coerced referendum marred by violent government repression against those that opposed the proposed constitution. On February 12, for example, 200 police and security agents raided the homes of leaders of the Patriotic Union of Cuba (UNPACU) [which is headed by José Daniel Ferrer] for openly campaigning against the draft constitution, detaining and reportedly beating UNPACU members. Other opponents reported that the government had blocked their email and texts to keep them from disseminating opposition campaign materials. Article 5 of the constitution enshrines one-party rule by the CCP, disallowing for additional political expression outside of that structure. Although the new constitution adds explicit protections of freedom and human rights, including habeas corpus, authorities did not respect them, nor did the courts enforce them.” (Emphases added.)

In addition, the report had the following references to the persecution of José Daniel Ferrer:

Authorities “detained UNPACU leader Jose Daniel Ferrer several times during the year. He was often held for several days at a time incommunicado or without being charged in court. Although uniformed security officials were present for his arrest, authorities denied having him in their custody (see also sections 1.d. and 2.d.). On October 1, police detained him for almost six weeks before allowing his family to see him and did not announce charges against him until November 15, 45 days after his disappearance. In the interim, authorities rejected writs of habeas corpus filed by his wife. As of December, Jose Daniel Ferrer remained in custody.” (Section 1.B) (Emphases added.)
“When authorities did allow Nelva Ismarays Ortega Tamayo, the wife of Jose Daniel Ferrer . . ., to visit him in prison, she found him emaciated with signs of repeated physical torture. He was reportedly unable to lift his arms and recounted daily psychological trauma inflicted at the instruction of his jailers.” (Section 1.C) (Emphasis added.)
“On August 27, authorities detained UNPACU leader Jose Daniel Ferrer in connection with a fabricated murder case from 2018. He was previously detained in August 2018 in Santiago de Cuba for 12 days and charged with attempted murder following a car accident in which he hit and injured an official in Palmarito del Cauto. There were reports the official intentionally jumped in front of the vehicle Ferrer was driving, resulting in minor injuries to the official. Despite reported coercion of witnesses, police could not obtain corroborating evidence against Ferrer, and the prosecution was forced eventually to release him. Police, however, continued to use the case as justification for detaining him.” (Emphases added.) Prison officials refused to consider pleas from Ferrer’s wife to consider his failing health or accept medicine she brought to the prison for him, and they banned her from further visits to the facility. On November 15, the government provided her a copy of the charges filed against Ferrer on October 7. As of December 3, Ferrer still had not received access to a lawyer, and a trial date had not been set. (Section 1.D) (Emphases added.)
“In connection with a planned march on September 8, several UNPACU activists were arbitrarily detained on September 7. On September 8, immediately after leaving his house with several supporters, Ferrer and other supporters were arrested (see section 2.b. for more information). On October 1, he was arrested again, this time on different charges that he was involved in a physical assault of an UNPACU member. The charges were likely fabricated, due to testimony from multiple individuals that the alleged victim left UNPACU headquarters unharmed and testimony from the alleged victim’s wife that the injuries were sustained in a motorcycle accident. A separate activist said she was threatened with prison if she did not sign a false statement implicating Ferrer in the alleged crime. (Section 1.D) (Emphases added.)
“Ferrer was held incommunicado for 72 hours before authorities acknowledged he was in custody, and they denied his wife access to him. Several days later, she was finally allowed access to him and received permission to send him a change of clothes, but not medication to tend to his chronic medical condition. On October 18, after not seeing him for more than two weeks, she filed a writ of habeas corpus stating Ferrer’s family did not know his whereabouts or if he was still alive, and that they had not been informed of charges filed against him or been given the opportunity to provide a lawyer to represent him. The court ruled against the petition, claiming that charges were brought on October 3 and formally filed October 7, without stating his location or the charges against him.” (Section 1.D) (Emphases added.)
“On October 25, still without access to her husband for herself or her lawyers, and still without knowing the public charges, Ferrer’s wife and his three minor children demonstrated against her husband’s mistreatment in a public park in Santiago de Cuba; security officials arrested all individuals. On November 7, she was allowed a five-minute supervised visit with him–the first proof she had received in more than one month that Ferrer was still alive. He described extremely punishing treatment he received at the hands of his jailers, who chained him hand and feet, offered him only spoiled food and foul water, and held him with a known violent criminal who said he was offered privileges in exchange for beating Ferrer (which he did regularly).” (Section 1.D) (Emphases added.)
“Prison officials refused to consider pleas from Ferrer’s wife to consider his failing health or accept medicine she brought to the prison for him, and they banned her from further visits to the facility. On November 15, the government provided her a copy of the charges filed against Ferrer on October 7. As of December 3, Ferrer still had not received access to a lawyer, and a trial date had not been set.” (Section 1.D.) (Emphases added.)
On “September 6-7, the internet access of several UNPACU members was suspended ahead of a planned march, and on October 3, the government suspended the internet access of UNPACU national committee member Katherine Mojena Hernandez after she repeatedly tweeted about a government crackdown on the group. (Section 2.D) (Emphases added.)

Subsequent Developments[6]

Although, as Secretary Pompeo stated, Ferrer’s sentencing was scheduled for March 12, it did not happen, but was postponed to March 14. This delay prompted UNPACU to release the following statement on social media:

“The sentence against José Daniel Ferrer will not be issued by an impartial Court, but by the Cuban regime, which probably already has his sentence from the moment of his unjust arrest more than five months ago.”
“If there were in Cuba a system with guarantees for its citizens, both José Daniel Ferrer and the other three activists would have been acquitted on the day of the manipulated trial of which they were victims, because with evidence it was shown that all the accusations were part of an orchestrated theater by the political police. “
“The UNPACU dismisses the sentence that will be delivered, because it is the product of a perverse dictatorship that for fear and hatred represses and imprisons those who courageously oppose them peacefully, such as José Daniel Ferrer García.”

On March 14, there was still no sentencing. Thus, on March 17, Ferrer’s teenage son went to the court to demand an explanation for the delay in the sentencing, but was told that the court would not receive anyone. Now it is March 19, and there still is no announcement of the sentencing, which, whenever it comes, will be the subject of a future post.

Conclusion

Given the hostile rhetoric and actions of the Trump Administration against Cuba, it seems exceedingly unlikely that the two parties could peaceably negotiate an end to this dispute over the charges against Ferrer. If there were some country or person who had the trust of both sides, perhaps that country or person could act as a mediator to try to resolve the conflict. Or the two countries could arbitrate this (along with many other) disputes before the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague in the Netherlands.[7] Otherwise, this dispute just adds to the stack of such disputes.

An independent U.S. source (Cuba Money Project) quotes the previously mentioned UNPACU acknowledgement of receiving support from “various foreign institutions that promote values such as democracy, freedom, the rule of law and the separation of powers of state, without which it is impossible for a government to guarantee and respect human rights.” The Project then states that the Cuban American National Foundation on a 2016 U.S. federal tax form reported that it gave $99,431 to UNPACU.

In addition, this Project recently reported the following two other U.S.-financed efforts to promote democracy in Cuba:

First, the U.S. government-financed National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in 2019 managed Cuba projects worth $5,411,535.50 for organizations other than UNPACU and another $565,964.50 going to undisclosed organizations.[8]
Second, the U.S. Embassy in Havana has announced plans to award grants to Cuban NGOs, institutions and individuals to strengthen Cuba’s independent civil society’s “professional ties” with the U.S. Although there was no announcement of the total amount of such grants or the number of such grants, it did say that they would be at least $10,000 each.[9]

These U.S. programs that were uncovered by the Cuba Money Project provide support for the previously mentioned allegations of Granma’s November 2019 editorial. While the purpose of these U.S. programs sounds good to the ears of U.S. citizens, it is easy to understand why that is not so for the Cuban government.

Ideally the two governments should discuss, negotiate and agree on the details of any such programs. We were headed in that direction during the last 25 months of the Obama Administration.

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[1] Among the many posts about Ferrer, see these posts in dwkcommentaries.com: Secretary Pompeo Demands Release of Cuban Dissident (Feb. 27, 2020)(and previous posts and comments cited in footnote 2); José Daniel Ferrer Tried for Common Crime in Cuba (Feb. 28, 2020).

[2] Cuba Accuses U.S. of Using Ferrer Case To Try to Discredit Cuba, dwkcommentareis.com (Nov. 21, 2019).

[3] Response of the Patriotic Union of Cuba to the article in the Granma newspaper about José Daniel Ferrer, unpacu.org/en (Nov. 20, 2019).

[4] State Dep’t, Secretary Michael R. Pompeo on the Release of the 2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Mar. 11, 2020); Jakes, Critics Hear Political Tone as Pompeo Calls Out Diplomatic Rivals Over Human Rights, N.Y. Times (Mar. 11, 2020).

[5] State Dep’t, 2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Cuba (Mar. 11, 2020).

[6] The regime postpones the sentence against José Daniel Ferrer, Diario de Cuba (Mar. 12, 2020); The authorities still do not reveal the sentence against José Daniel Ferrer, Diario de Cuba (Mar. 17, 2020).

[7] See Proposed Resolution of U.S.-Cuba Issues, dwkcommentaries.com (Jan. 31, 2019).

[8] Eaton, Dissident’s arrest triggers debate over funding, Cuba Money Project (Dec. 7, 2019); Eaton, NED kept secret more than a half million dollars in Cuba projects, Cuba Money Project (Jan. 2, 2020). The Cuba Money Project was started and is operated by Tracey Eaton, a U.S. journalist and former Havana bureau chief for the Dallas Morning News; it aims to report stories about U.S. government programs and projects related to Cuba.

[9] Eaton, Public diplomacy or interference?, Cuba Money Project (Feb. 1, 2020); U.S. Embassy in Cuba, Education & Culture: Annual Program Statement. (undated).

How Does Jesus See Love?

This was the question addressed in Rev. Tim Hart-Andersen’s November 10, 2019, sermon at Minneapolis’ Westminster Presbyterian Church and in his reflections on his gathering four days earlier with 15 other U.S. and Cuban clergy and lay leaders on a rooftop in Havana.[1]

As previously noted in this blog, Westminster has had partnerships with the Presbyterian-Reformed Church of Cuba for nearly 19 years,[2] and the purpose of the recent gathering in Havana was to meet with the leaders of the Seminario de Evangelico de Teologia (SET) and learn about their vision for establishing a facility in Havana to supplement the offerings at its main facilities in the city of Matanzas on the north coast of the island east of Havana.[3]

According to Rev. Hart-Andersen, “It’s an exciting time for the church in Cuba, full of possibility. There’s a great awakening of spiritual hunger on the island as it emerges from decades of atheism and isolation. With its unique circumstances, Cuba offers the Church a living laboratory for spreading the faith.”

“Younger Cubans have virtually no experience of Christianity. They were raised in a system that rejected religion. As a result, for our Presbyterian sisters and brothers and other Christians on the island, it’s if they were starting the church all over.”

“Differing versions of the faith are rushing in to try to fill the void. Some cling to a traditional, conservative Roman Catholicism. Others mix African-traditions with Christianity. Some proclaim an imported, privatized, prosperity gospel designed to meet individual need. And others – including our Seminary partners – pursue a gospel that seeks justice and works to transform individuals and systems.”

“We have our own competing versions of Christianity . . . [in the U.S.] There’s little consensus among us in our land about what it means to be faithful. In our country today, religion is as divided as politics – and sometimes it can be hard to tell the difference between the two.”

“Whether in Cuba or . . . [the U.S.], those seeking to live as God’s people are struggling with how to do that in our time. The old ways are not working; we need a refresher course in following Jesus. What do we do?”

The response to this question for us [in the U.S.] and for the church in Cuba comes from Jesus when He answered the question, “What is the greatest commandment?” Jesus’ answer: “‘You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind.’ This is the greatest and first commandment. And a second is like it: ‘You shall love your neighbor as yourself.’ On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets.”[4]

“How does Jesus see love? It has more than one dimension, and it moves in multiple directions. It starts with each individual human being, created in the image of God, each one of us a living expression of the love of God – and then moves outward, in visible ways to those near us and into our communities, and in invisible ways, to God who joins us in loving the world. It’s a trinity of love: God, neighbor, self. In choosing to follow Jesus, you and I wrestle with finding the right balance among the three – and oftentimes we find ourselves tilting in the direction of self. And we get into trouble when we do that.”

These thoughts occurred to Rev. Hart-Andersen as he and the others on a Havana rooftop sang this hymn:

“Open our eyes, Lord. Help us to see your face.

Open our eyes, Lord. Help us to see.

Open our ears, Lord. Help us to hear your voice.

Open our ears, Lord. Help us to hear.”

Said Rev. Hart-Andersen, “We looked out at the city [of Havana] and saw its many-hued people, beginning to meet the challenges of another day in a difficult time and place. Help us to see.” We heard “the sounds of children and babies crying and car horns honking, laughter and shouts rose from the streets below to accompany our song. Help us to hear.”

“Our rooftop singing [of this song] placed the worship of God right where worship should be: in the midst of the world. We were no longer hidden and quiet behind walls. It was love of God meets love of neighbor.”

“The practice of Christianity requires a context as close to the real world as possible, and that was the real world. Love needs someone to love. A “neighbor” is not theoretical. We can’t love by staying inside these walls [of our church in Minneapolis or Havana]. . . . Loving our neighbor requires that we encounter our neighbor.”

From the Havana rooftop, “we looked into a city teeming with life, yet impoverished materially and spiritually. And as we looked, we caught a glimpse of the makings of the Beloved Community—people working together, hoping for a better future, refusing to be overwhelmed by their circumstance, wanting to be loved by one another.”

“That’s how Jesus sees love—as a community of people reconciled to God and reconciled to one another, eager to worship and ready to serve.” (Emphasis in original.)

State Department’s Contrary Opinion of Cuban Religious Freedom[5]

This sermon also implicitly contradicts the U.S. State Department’s December 20^th addition of Cuba to the Department’s Special Watch List of countries engaging in or tolerating “severe violations of religious freedom” while not meeting all of the criteria for the worse status of Countries of Particular Concern.

The Department did not provide any purported factual basis for this action regarding Cuba even though only six months earlier, on June 21, 2019, the Department’s latest annual report on this subject for every country in the world had harsh, and unjustified, criticism of Cuba, but did not designate the island as a member of the “Special Watch List” or as a “Country of Particular Concern.’ [6]

Conclusion

Jesus’ reminder that we all are commanded to love God with all our heart, soul and mind and our neighbor as ourself should remind us that each of us and everyone else (and every country) often fail to meet these obligations and, therefore, need forgiveness. We need to be humble.

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[1] Westminster Presbyterian Church, Rev. Tim Hart-Andersen, Sermon: How Does Jesus See Love? (Nov. 10, 2019).

[2] As its website says, SET is an ecumenical seminary that “was founded on October 1, 1946,” and that now “is governed by a Board of Directors, with representative, legislative, consultative and executive functions; composed of ten members of the Cuban founding Churches: Episcopal Church of Cuba (4), Presbyterian-Reformed in Cuba (4); and by a representative of the Fraternity of Baptist Churches of Cuba (1) and of the Los Amigos Church “Quakers” (1).” SET works “in the academic, ecumenical, ethical, moral and spiritual formation of those who feel called by God to exercise the ordained ministry, and other ministries in the Church, as well as in the training of the faithful who wish to serve in the work of the Lord through the broadest universal ministry of International believers, through regular and special courses, in permanent residence or through meetings, among others. We are also engaged in the development of an ethical, theological and biblical culture and, for this purpose, we are open to people who do not intend to enter the Christian ministry in any of its forms.”

[3] Minneapolis’ Westminster Presbyterian Church’s Connections with Cuba, dwkcommentareis.com (Jan.13, 2015); Minneapolis’ Westminster Presbyterian Church Celebrates U.S.-Cuba Reconciliation, (Jan. 4, 2015) dwkcommentaries. com (Jan. 4, 2015).

[4] Matthew 22: 34-40; Mark 12: 28-31; Luke 10: 25-28. This answer from Jesus quoted from the Hebrew Bible that would have been well known to the individuals asking this question: Deuteronomy 6:5 and Leviticus 19:18.

[5] State Dep’t, Press Statement: United States Takes Action Against Violators of Religious Freedom (Dec. 20, 2019).

[6] See State Dep’t, 2018 Report on International Religious Freedom (June 21, 2019); U.S. State Department Unfairly Criticizes Cuban Religious Freedom, dwkcommentaries.com (July 18, 2019); U.S. State Department’s Positive Assessment of Cuban Religious Freedom, dwkcommentaries.com (Aug. 19, 2017).

U.S. Imposes New Sanctions on Cuba and Denounces Cuba’s Detention of Dissident

On October 18, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) imposed new sanctions against Cuba while the State Department denounced Cuba’s detention of dissident Jose Daniel Ferrer.

New Sanctions[1]

The BIS revoked “existing licenses for aircraft leases to Cuban state-owned airlines, and will deny future applications for aircraft leases.” This was based upon the Department’s assertion that “the Cuban regime is resorting to transporting tourists on leased aircraft subject to BIS jurisdiction.”

Additionally, “BIS is expanding Cuba sanctions to include more foreign goods containing U.S. content, and is imposing additional restrictions on exports to the Cuban regime.” According to a regulation set for October 21 publication, the Export Administration Regulations will be amended so that goods with as little as 10% U.S. content will be subject to U.S. jurisdiction and, thus, require a license from the U.S. Department of Commerce for export or reexport to Cuba. Previously, the policy only applied to goods with 25% or greater U.S. content. In addition, the amendment will, prohibit certain donations to the Cuban government and communist party and clarify the scope of telecommunications items that the Cuban government may receive without a license.

This action, says the Department, “supports the Administration’s earlier decision to hold the Cuban regime accountable for repressing its own people as well as continuing to provide support to the illegitimate Maduro regime which has terrorized the Venezuelan population and wantonly destroyed the once-prosperous economy relied on by millions.”

The Department’s Secretary, Wilbur Ross, said, “This action . . . sends another clear message to the Cuban regime – that they must immediately cease their destructive behavior at home and abroad. The Trump Administration will continue to act against the Cuban regime for its misdeeds, while continuing to support the Cuban people and their aspirations for freedom and prosperity.”

Cuba’s President Miguel Diaz-Canel in a tweet said these new sanctions were “an expression of impotence, moral degradation and imperial contempt. It is an inhuman, cruel, unjust and genocidal act that we strongly reject. We will not give up. and we will give sovereign answer.”

A similar tweet came from Cuba Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez: these are “additional acts of economic blockade, representative of a moral bankruptcy policy, internationally isolated and promoted by a corrupt government. The Cuban people will continue to give due and sovereign response.”

Denouncing Cuban Detention of Dissident[2]

The Cuban dissident who has been detained is Jose Daniel Ferrer, the founder of the Patriotic Union of Cuba (UNPACU).

According to the State Department, “On October 1, “Castro regime officials detained Mr. Ferrer and several other human rights defenders in Santiago de Cuba. Mr. Ferrer reportedly has still not been informed of any charges against him, and has been denied access to a lawyer and to medical care. Mr. Ferrer’s family has not been permitted contact with him since October 4.” In addition, other “UNPACU activists Roilan Zarraga Ferrer, José Pupo Chaveco, and Fernando González Vailant also remain in custody.”

“Ferrer’s case is one more example of the Castro regime’s continuous and flagrant violation of human rights, which has recently escalated into a wave of repression against freedoms of speech, expression, and religion. The United States will not allow these abuses against the Cuban people to go unnoticed or unanswered. We will continue to increase sanctions and trade restrictions to diminish the resources available to the Cuban regime, which uses its income to suppress its own citizens and to prop up other regimes with shameful human rights records, including the former Maduro regime in Venezuela.”

Therefore, the U.S. “strongly condemns the Cuban regime’s unconscionable detainment of . . . [Senor] Ferrer, founder of the Patriotic Union of Cuba (UNPACU). We call on the Castro regime to immediately disclose Mr. Ferrer’s location and condition, to treat him humanely, and to release him from detention without condition.”

Similar protests of this detention have been registered by UNPACU, Cuba’s Legal Information Center (CUBALEX), Cuban Prisoners Defenders, Freedom House and Amnesty International.

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[1] Commerce Dep’t, U.S. Department of Commerce Further Tightens Cuba Sanctions (Oct. 18, 2019); Reuters, U.S. Hits Cuba With New Sanctions Over Human Rights, Venezuela, N.Y. Times (Oct. 18, 2019); Assoc. Press, U.S. slaps new sanctions on Cuba over human rights, Venezuela, Wash. Post (Oct. 18, 2019);Center for Democracy in Americas, U.S. restricts additional exports and re-exports to Cuba, U.S.-Cuba News Brief: 10/18/2019.

[2] State Dep’t, Detention of Cuban Human Rights Defender José Daniel Ferrer (Oct. 18, 2019); The arrest of José Daniel Ferrer is ‘a mechanism of repression against all civil society,’ Diario de Cuba (Oct. 17, 2019); Cuban Prisoners Defenders denounces the Cuban regime in Geneva for the case of José Ferrer, Diario de Cuba (Oct. 17, 2019).

U.S. Orders Cuba To Remove 15 Cuban Diplomats

On October 3, the U.S. Secretary of State issued a Statement about the ordered departure of 15 Cuban diplomats from the U.S. This post will review that Statement and U.S. State Department press conferences regarding that decision. Subsequent posts will review reactions by the Cuban Government and by others.

The Statement[1]

The Statement announced that the Department had just informed the Cuban Government that the Department “was ordering the departure of 15 of [Cuba’s] . . . officials from its Embassy in Washington, D.C.” because of “Cuba’s failure to take appropriate steps to protect our diplomats in accordance with its obligations under the Vienna Convention [on Diplomatic Relations]. This order will ensure equity in our respective diplomatic operations.”

The Statement then noted that on September 29 the Department had announced the voluntary withdrawal of diplomatic personnel and their families from the U.S. Embassy in Havana as a result of concerns about the still unresolved problem of medical “incidents” or “attacks” on those diplomats and their families

The Statement concluded, “We continue to maintain diplomatic relations with Cuba, and will continue to cooperate with Cuba as we pursue the investigation into these attacks.”

Department’s Press Briefings[2]

There were two Department briefings on October 3 that concerned U.S.-Cuba relations. The first was a pre-announcement briefing exclusively about the Statement when an unnamed State Department official added the following additional details:

The Cuban ambassador in Washington was informed of the expulsions in a 9 a.m. phone call.
The expelled embassy personnel were identified by the Department and must be out of the U.S. within seven days. By then, the American embassy in Havana will have completed its own drawdown.
The Cuban government need to give a clear assurance that the attacks would not continue before the personnel in either embassy could return.”
All of this was done even though these “officials emphasized that they are not accusing the Cuban government of complicity in the attacks.”
“We are not assigning culpability. The expulsions aim to “underscore to the Cubans that they must take more actions to protect our people on the ground.”

That same afternoon Heather Nauert, the Department’s Spokesperson, held another press briefing that opened with a reiteration that the decision to expel Cuban diplomats did “not signal a change of policy or determination of responsibility for the attacks on U.S. Government personnel in Cuba. Investigations into those attacks are still ongoing [in cooperation with Cuban authorities].” She also added, “We recognize that at this time there is a need to keep a post open there with a skeleton crew handling emergency type issues down there. Frankly, . . . our State Department personnel want to serve in countries all around the world. We have many of them who are serving in very dangerous capacities, and they don’t get enough credit for doing this incredible, amazing work on behalf of U.S. citizens.”

There also was more information about the 21 Americans who have medical problems caused by an unknown device in Havana: 17 were government employees and four were spouses (three of whom worked at the embassy). Another person was added to this list, making it 22.

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[1] U.S. State Dep’t, On the Expulsion of Cuban Officials from the United States (Oct. 3, 2017).

[2] U.S. State Dep’t, Background Briefing: State Department Official on Cuba (Oct. 3, 2017); U.S. State Dep’t, Press Briefing (Oct. 3, 2017); Harris & Davis, U.S. Expels 15 Cuban Diplomats From Embassy in Washington, N.Y. Times (Oct. 3, 2017); Reuters, U.S. to Expel Nearly Two-thirds of Cuban Embassy Staff, N.Y. Times (Oct. 2, 2017); Assoc. Press, Ties Threatened: US to Tell Cuba to Remove Most Diplomats, N.Y. Times (Oct. 3, 2017).