Raul Castro – Page 5 – dwkcommentaries

President Barack Obama’s First-Term Record Regarding Cuba, 2009-2013

In light of President Barack Obama’s historic December 17, 2014, announcement of rapprochement with Cuba, it is interesting to examine Obama’s earlier statements about Cuba. Prior posts examined his campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination in 2007-2008 and his campaign for the presidency as the Democratic Party’s nominee in 2008. Now we discuss his first presidential term, 2009-2013.[1] Subsequent posts will look at his reelection campaign in 2012 and his second presidential term (up to the December 17, 2014, announcement), 2013-2014.

As we saw in a prior post, Barack Obama and Joe Biden won the November 4, 2008 election with 69.5 million votes (52.9% of the total) to John McCain and Sarah Palin’s 59.9 million votes (45.7%). In the key state of Florida, Obama-Biden had 51.0% of the popular vote against McCain-Palin’s 48.4%. The electoral votes were Obama and Biden, 365; McCain and Palin, 173. Soon thereafter several head of states congratulated Obama while also calling for the U.S. to end its sanctions against Cubs.

Obama’s First Term, 2009

President Obama's Oath of Office with Michelle Obama — President Obama’s Oath of Office with Michelle Obama

Obama was inaugurated as President on January 20, 2009. His Inaugural Address first mentioned that “we are in the midst of crisis. . . . Our nation is at war against a far-reaching network of violence and hatred. Our economy is badly weakened. . . . [T]he challenges we face are real, they are serious and they are many. They will not be met easily or in a short span of time. But know this America: They will be met.” There was no mention of Latin America or Cuba.[2]

On February 25, 2009, the Department of State released its 2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; the chapter on Cuba described it as a “totalitarian state” that “continued to deny its citizens their basic human rights and committed numerous, serious abuses.”

In April 2009 Obama fulfilled the pledge he made in his acceptance of the Democratic Party’s presidential nomination by lifting travel and remittance restrictions for Cuban-Americans while also authorizing U.S. telecommunications companies to contract with Cuba for improved television, radio and telephone service and Internet access.

That same month (April 2009) Obama told a journalist, “Cuba has to take some steps, send some signals that when it comes to human rights, when it comes to political rights, when it comes to the ability of Cubans to travel.” In Obama’s opinion, the previously mentioned U.S. changes called for Cuba to “send signals that they’re interested in liberalizing.”

This U.S. desire or demand for Cuban reciprocity was not well received in Havana. Cuba’s President Raúl Castro declared, “The blockade [embargo] remains intact. . . . Cuba has not imposed any sanction on the [U.S.] or its citizens. Therefore, it is not Cuba that should make gestures.” Nevertheless, “We are willing to discuss everything with the [U.S.] government, on equal footing; but we are not willing to negotiate our sovereignty or our political and social system, our right to self-determination or our domestic affairs.”[3]

Later that same month (April 2009), Obama attended the Fifth Summit of the Americas. Latin American presidents applauded the previously mentioned U.S. changes while simultaneously pressing Obama on the need to reintegrate Cuba into the inter-American community. Obama responded by reiterating his commitment to engagement, “The [U.S.] seeks a new beginning with Cuba.”

Also in April 2009, the U.S. Department of State issued its Country Reports on Terrorism 2008. Again Cuba was listed as a state sponsor of terrorism.

The next month, May 2009, the U.S. proposed to Cuba that they resume bilateral consultations on migration. Cuba agreed, and the talks took place that July. Cuba presented a draft accord to curb people smuggling and indicated an interest in also discussing cooperation on counterterrorism, counter-narcotics operations and hurricane preparation. Although no such formal agreement was reached, both sides agreed it was a productive consultation.

In June 2009 at the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS), Latin American members moved to repeal the 1962 resolution suspending Cuba’s OAS membership. Facing defeat on this proposal, the U.S. negotiated a compromise: repeal the suspension if Cuba accepts “the practice, purposes, and principles of the OAS,” impliedly including the commitment to democracy in the Santiago Declaration of 1991.

In August 2009 Bill Richardson, then the Governor of New Mexico, was in Cuba on a trade mission, and at a meeting with Cuban officials was led to believe that Cuba wanted to move forward with the U.S. although Richardson said Cuba needed to reciprocate with some gestures. Cuba’s Foreign Minister Rodriguez made it clear that Cuba would not make any concessions to win better relations with the U.S. and that the U.S. blockade (embargo) was unilateral and should be lifted unilaterally.

In September 2009 an U.S. Assistant Secretary of State was in Cuba for discussions about restoring direct mail service. Over five days, she met with Cuban officials in the Justice, Agriculture, Health and Interior ministries and academics at the University of Havana as well as bloggers and dissidents. Much to the consternation of Cuban authorities, one of the bloggers was Yoani Sánchez, now an international celebrity. Nevertheless, Cuba’s Assistant Foreign Minister (Bruno Rodriguez Parrilla, now the Minister of that agency) told the U.S. official that Cuba wanted to show her their desire “to move forward in our relationship,” requiring “confidence building” as a “way forward.”

By the Fall of 2009 the White House was frustrated by Cuba’s failure to respond to the U.S. relaxing of travel and remittance restrictions for Cuban-Americans. As a result, Obama asked Spain’s Prime Minister, José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, to have Spain’s Foreign Minister carry a back-channel message to President Rául Castro that if Cuba did not take steps of liberalization, neither could Obama and that the U.S. understands things cannot change overnight, but in the future it will be clear that this was the moment when changes began.

Castro responded with a proposal for a secret channel of communication between the two countries to discuss Cuban steps that might address the U.S. concerns. The U.S., however, at this time rejected the idea for a secret channel. (As we will see below, in December 2012, such a secret channel was opened.)

On December 3, 2009, the process of normalization was thrown off track by Cuba’s arrest of U.S. citizen, Alan Gross, who was bringing communications and computer equipment to Cuba’s Jewish community as an employee of a contractor for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Two weeks later President Castro told Cuba’s National Assembly that the U.S. alleged desire for a new relationship was “a huge propaganda campaign staged to confuse the world. The Truth is that the instruments for the policy of aggression to Cuba remain intact and that the U.S. government does not renounce its efforts to destroy the Revolution.”

By the end of 2009, therefore, things looked bleak for further normalization. Moreover, the press of many other foreign policy challenges for the U.S. pushed Cuba far down the list of priorities for the Obama Administration.

Obama’s First Term, 2010.

The arrest and jailing of Alan Gross continued to disrupt the relations of the two countries in 2010. The U.S. denied that Gross had done anything wrong and that his release from a Cuban jail was necessary for any improvement in the relationship.

The Gross arrest, however, prompted the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee to investigate USAID’s Cuba democracy programs in 2010 and to develop a plan to reorient the Cuba program toward supporting genuine links between the two countries. These changes in the program were briefed for Cuban diplomats, who said it would smooth the way for the release of Gross.

On March 11, 2010, the Department of State released its 2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; the chapter on Cuba described it as a “totalitarian state” that “continued to deny its citizens their basic human rights, including the right to change their government, and committed numerous and serious abuses.”

In the meantime, Spain on its own initiative in May 2010 encouraged Rául Castro and Cardinal Jaime Ortega to discuss Cuba’s lifting the ban on public demonstrations by the Ladies in White, the female relatives of political prisoners, and to the release of political prisoners. In July 2010 this resulted in the government’s agreement to release 52 such prisoners, including everyone who had been arrested in 2003, and those who wished to go into exile would be welcomed by Spain. Eventually the government released 127 such prisoners.

In June 2010 Cardinal Ortega, with the consent of the Cuban government, went to Washington, D.C. to inform them of the then planned prisoner release. The Cuban government believed this prisoner release was a major concession and should “pressure U.S. political leaders to respond with other gestures of good will toward Cuba.” Ortega also told U.S. officials that Castro was ready to talk with the U.S. directly about every issue and that it would be a mistake for the U.S.to maintain the status quo until Cuba became a democracy. ”Everything should be step by step,” the Cardinal said. “It’s not realistic to begin at the end. This is a process. The most important thing is to take steps in the process.”

Obama, however, insisted that first Cuba had to release Alan Gross from prison before the U.S. could do more. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton called the Cuban prisoner release a “positive sign,” but Obama said nothing.

In August 2010 Bill Richardson returned to Cuba on another trade mission and met with officials to try to obtain Gross’ release from prison. Richardson felt encouraged, but did not obtain the release.

Also in August 2010 the Department of State issued its Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, which again listed Cuba as a “state sponsor of terrorism.”

To try to rescue the stalled discussions, an Assistant Secretary of State met with Cuba’s Foreign Minister at the U.N. in October 2010. Rodriguez opened the meeting with a lengthy recitation of Cuba’s historical grievances against the U.S. and refused to engage in discussions about the future. “It was a terrible meeting,” said the U.S. official.

Soon after this terrible meeting, Rodriguez met again with Bill Richardson at the U.N. The Foreign Minister wanted the U.S. to know that Gross was merely a symptom of the troubled relationship, not its heart. Rodriguez also wanted the U.S. to know that Cuba had asked its supporters to tone down their criticism of Obama during the debate on the resolution to condemn the U.S. blockade (embargo) and that Castro had decided to improve ties with the U.S., but that the U.S. had not reciprocated. In addition, Rodriguez stressed the need for the U.S. to make progress on the case of the Cuban Five in U.S. prison.

Also in October 2010, John Kerry, then Senator and the Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, met Rodriguez, Cuba’s Foreign Minister, to discuss the U.S. democracy programs and Alan Gross, and an informal deal for his release seemed to be on track. However, the Administration abandoned the proposed changes in the Cuba democracy programs after objections from New Jersey Senator Robert Menendez. The Obama Administration was unwilling to wage a political fight with Menendez. This resulted in the Cuban government concluding that the Administration could not be trusted.

Earlier in 2010 advocates for lifting U.S. restrictions on travel to Cuba launched a major campaign over opposition from Senator Menendez and others. During his June trip to Washington Cuba’s Cardinal Ortega urged members of Congress to allow freer travel in light of Pope John Paul II’s injunction that Cuba “open itself to the world and . . . the world open itself to Cuba.” The resistance from Menendez and Miami Congresswoman Debbie Wasserman Schultz, however, prevented any congressional action to eliminate or reduce restrictions on U.S. citizens traveling to Cuba. Apparent indifference from President Obama also contributed to nothing happening in Congress on this issue.

Instead, at Obama’s direction, the Administration worked on a more limited expansion of travel through new regulations on “people-to-people” educational travel, but in August-September 2010 opposition by Menendez and Wasserman Schultz forced the Administration to shelf the new regulations.

Obama’s First Term, 2011

In mid-January 2011, on a late Friday before a holiday weekend, the Administration finally released the new regulations on expanded “people-to-people” educational travel. Cuba’s Foreign Minister said these regulations were “positive,” but they had “a very limited scope and do not change the policy against Cuba.”

In March 2011 Jimmy Carter, former U.S. President, went to Cuba at the invitation of Rául Castro. Before Carter left, Cuban officials made it clear that Gross would not be granted freedom. Carter met with Cardinal Ortega to discuss the Roman Catholic Church’s dialogue with the government, with blogger Yoanni Sánchez, dissidents, former prisoners, relatives of the Cuban Five in U.S. prison and with Alan Gross. Foreign Minister Rodriguez stressed the importance of the Cuban Five case for Cuba. Over dinner with Rául Castro, Carter emphasized that Gross’ imprisonment was a serious obstacle to improving relations and urged his release on humanitarian grounds. Castro said there was no consensus in the Cuban government on the Gross case, but reiterated Cuba’s willingness to engage in wide-ranging talks with the U.S., “without preconditions,” and “on equal terms with full respect for our independence and sovereignty.” Any topic could be discussed. “We are ready.”

Before his departure, Carter said the U.S. should fully normalize relations with Cuba immediately; Cuba should allow full freedom of speech, assembly, travel; the U.S. embargo should be ended; Cuba should be removed from the terrorism list; the Cuban Five should be released from U.S. prison; and Alan Gross should be released from Cuban jail. Rául Castro, standing nearby, quipped, “I agree with everything President Carter said.”

Upon Carter’s return to the U.S., he had a cool meeting with Secretary of State Clinton, and the next day the Administration advised Congress it was requesting $20 million of funding for the democracy promotion programs in Cuba.

On April 8, 2011, the Department of State released its 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; the chapter on Cuba described it as a “totalitarian state” that “denied citizens the right to change their government. In addition, the following human rights abuses were reported: harassment, beatings, and threats against political opponents by government-organized mobs and state security officials acting with impunity; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions, including selective denial of medical care; arbitrary detention of human rights advocates and members of independent organizations; and selective prosecution and denial of fair trial.”

In August 2011 the Department of State released its Country Reports on Terrorism 2010, which again listed Cuba as a “state sponsor of terrorism.”

Obama’s First Term, 2012

On May 24, 2012, the Department of State released its 2011 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; the 27-page chapter on Cuba described it as a “totalitarian state” whose “principal human rights abuses were: abridgement of the right of citizens to change their government; government threats, intimidation, mobs, harassment, and detentions to prevent citizens from assembling peacefully; and a significant increase in the number of short-term detentions, which in December rose to the highest monthly number in 30 years.”

In July 2012 the Department of State released its Country Reports on Terrorism 2011, which again listed Cuba as a “state sponsor of terrorism.”

During the latter part of 2012 Obama and Biden were engaged in their campaign for re-election against Republican nominees Mitt Romney and Paul Ryan, which will be covered in a subsequent post.

In the meantime, in September 2012 Bill Richardson made another trip to Cuba after Cuba’s Supreme Court had affirmed Alan Gross’ conviction. The State Department gave him a list of things the U.S. was prepared to do if Gross were pardoned and released from prison. Most were possibilities, rather than commitments. The others were commitments, but already had been announced by the U.S.

The Richardson trip got off to a bad start when he leaked word of it to CNN’s Wolf Blitzer, who reported that the Governor had been invited by the Cuban government to negotiate the release of Gross. To the Cubans, this looked like an attempt to force their hand. Later the Cuban Foreign Minister told Richardson “One, you won’t get Gross; two, you won’t see Rául; and three, you won’t even see Gross.” An angry Richardson held a press conference to announce that he would not leave Cuba until he saw Gross, who was a “hostage” held by the Cubans. An angry Cuban government responded that Gross’ release was never on the table, that Richardson was aware of that position, that his request to see Gross was impossible after Richardson’s slanderous statements and that Cuba was a sovereign country that did no accept blackmail, pressure or posturing.

At the time nothing of consequence regarding Cuba is believed to have happened during the two months after the November 2012 election, in which Obama and Biden won re-election.

However, over the last seven months, we have learned that in December 2012 after his re-election President Obama held a long meeting with aides in the White House situation room to establish priorities for the second term. According to Ben Rhodes, the Deputy National Security Advisor who played a central role in shaping Cuba policy and who participated in that meeting, the aides all knew that Obama always had thought that the decades-long U.S. policy of trying to isolate Cuba through the embargo and other measures made no sense, and at the end of the discussion, Obama instructed aides to make Cuba a priority and “see how far we could push the envelope.”[4]

Moreover, at this December 2012 meeting the President also concluded that “it would be a good fit to have someone who was known to be very close to the President [involved in such an effort on Cuba] because the Cubans are very wary of engagement and they want to know that the engagement is reaching the top. They felt like there [had] been several other efforts of engagement where it turned out to be kind of “Lucy with the football,” where they had conversations with the Americans, [but after] they reached a certain point . . . there was never follow through [by the U.S.]. We can debate whether it was the Cubans’ fault or not, but that was their perception. So . . . [the Cubans] wanted someone . . . [involved for the U.S.] who were very close to the President and . . . they wanted it to be discreet.” Hence, the President designated Mr. Rhodes to be in charge of this new effort to engage Cuba.

Thereafter, Mr. Rhodes sent a secret message to the Cuban government that the U.S. wanted “to initiate a dialogue about prisoners and other issues.”

Obama’s First Term, January 2013

Nothing of consequence regarding Cuba was believed to have happened during the rest of President Obama’s first term, which ended on January 20, 2013, although the exact dates of the secret discussions with Cuba in 2013 are not yet known.

Conclusion

After fulfilling a campaign pledge In April 2009 to lift travel and remittance restrictions for Cuban-Americans while also authorizing U.S. telecommunications companies to contract with Cuba for improved television, radio and telephone service and Internet access, President Obama’s desire to seek normalization with Cuba was thwarted by Cuba’s December 2009 arrest and subsequent conviction and imprisonment of Alan Gross. The rest of Obama’s first term regarding Cuba seemed, at the time, concentrated on unsuccessful efforts to obtain Gross’ release. Now, however, we know that at the end of the first term a new and secret effort to engage with Cuba was launched.

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[1] This post and the subsequent posts about Obama’s prior statements about Cuba are not based upon comprehensive research. The primary research tool was online searching of the New York Times for articles mentioning “Obama and Cuba” for the relevant time period although the details have been lost in the process of editing this post. Therefore, this blogger especially welcomes comments with corrections and additions. Ultimately after public release of many Obama Administration documents after the completion of his presidency, scholars will undertake a detailed examination of those documents and provide their assessments of his record regarding Cuba.

[2] Transcript: Barack Obama’s Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2009).

[3] At about the same time (April 2009), the U.S. Interests Section in Havana turned off its external streaming electronic news billboard, and Cuba replaced the black flags on poles outside the Section with Cuban flags.

[4] Reuters, How Obama Outmaneuvered Hardliners and Cut a Cuba Deal, N.Y. Times (Mar. 23, 2015); Rhodes, The Obama Doctrine: America’s Role in a Complicated World, Aspen Ideas Festival (June 29, 2015).

Barack Obama’s Comments About Cuba During His Campaign for the Democratic Party’s Presidential Nomination, 2007-2008

In light of President Barack Obama’s historic December 17, 2014, announcement of rapprochement with Cuba, it is interesting to examine Obama’s earlier statements about Cuba.[1] This post will examine his campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination in 2007-2008.[2] Future posts will look at his 2008 presidential campaign; his first presidential term (including his 2012 presidential election campaign), 2009-2013; and his second presidential term (up to the December 17, 2014, announcement), 2013-2014.

Barack Obama's Announcement Speech April 2007 — Barack Obama’s Announcement Speech February 2007

On February 10, 2007, at theI llinois State Capitol in Springfield Barack Obama announced his candidacy for the Democratic Party’s presidential nomination. Almost all of his speech was about domestic issues with the exception of his pledge to end the war in Iraq and “bring our combat troops home by March of 2008.” There was no mention of Cuba.

Later that month (February 2007) the New York Times’ Nicholas Kristof asked Obama, “Is the [Cuba] embargo a failure?” Obama responded, “I think we’ve got a potential opportunity with Castro’s health waning to reopen the debate. We probably shouldn’t be overly optimistic that it’s going to change overnight. And I think it’s important that the United States isn’t too heavy-handed post-Castro in swooping [in] and suggesting that somehow Cuba’s going to change immediately. I do think that it opens up the conversation among not just the United States but among Cubans both in the U.S. and in Cuba about breaking down some of the restrictions on travel and commerce….I don’t think we automatically ease those restrictions simply because Castro has died. What I think is that with Castro’s death there are going to be a new set of players, I think it’s going to be important for us to do an entire reevaluation of our strategy towards Cuba. And I think the aim should be to create a more open relationship….But that is still going to be contingent on having some desire on the part of the Cuban government to initiate that process as well.”

In the CNN/YouTube debate with Hillary Clinton in July 2007, Obama was asked, “’Would you be willing to meet, separately, without preconditions, during the first year of your administration, in Washington or anywhere else, with the leaders of Iran, Syria, Venezuela, Cuba and North Korea, in order to bridge the gap that divides our countries?” Obama replied, ‘I would,’ and added that it was a “disgrace that the Bush administration had refused on principle to do so.”

The Obama campaign team anticipated that the Clinton campaign would seize on Obama’s willingness to meet, without preconditions, with leaders of so-called rouge regimes. Obama, however, welcomed this attack and told his aides “we will not back down on this one bit.” This position was supported by polling in Iowa, the early caucus state, and showed that Obama represented change and Hillary did not.

Indeed, as anticipated, immediately after the debate, Hillary Clinton charged that Obama was too soft on talking with such countries. The Obama campaign responded that Mr. Obama would pursue “tough diplomacy,” but also use carrots like leader-to-leader talks.”

On August 21, 2007, Obama wrote an op-ed article in the Miami Herald “calling for ‘unrestricted rights’ for Cuban Americans to visit and send money to family in Cuba.” The following Saturday he campaigned in Miami’s Little Havana and told the crowd at a rally, “We’ve been engaged in a failed policy with Cuba for the last 50 years, and we need to change it.” He went on to promise to end restrictions on remittances and family travel for Cuban-Americans, to revive “people-to-people” educational and cultural exchanges and to engage Cuba on issues of mutual interest. Such engagement, he said, offered the best hope for promoting “a democratic opening in Cuba,” which is the “foremost objective of [U.S.] policy.”

At a December 1, 2007, televised Iowa debate among the Democratic candidates for their presidential nomination, Obama agreed with Mrs. Clinton, John Edwards and Joe Biden that the U.S. should not normalize relations with Cuba while Fidel Castro was still in power. Only Christopher Dodd and Dennis Kucinich were in favor of working for change with Fidel.

On February 19, 2008, the outside world provided a new circumstance for the candidates to react to. Fidel Castro resigned as President of Cuba due to poor health, and his brother, Raúl Castro, became Acting President and five days later (February 24, 2008) the President upon election by Cuba’s National Assembly.

In the meantime in a February 21, 2008 debate with Hillary Clinton in Austin, Texas, Obama made extensive comments about the U.S. and Cuba. He said, “The starting point for our policy in Cuba should be the liberty of the Cuban people. And I think we recognize that that liberty has not existed throughout the Castro regime. And we now have an opportunity to potentially change the relationship between the United States and Cuba, after over half a century. I would meet without preconditions, although Senator Clinton is right that there has to be preparation. It is very important for us to make sure that there was an agenda and . . . that [the] agenda [included] human rights, releasing of political prisoners, opening up the press. And that preparation might take some time.” His other points about Cuba were the following:

More generally “it is important for the United States not just to talk to its friends but also to talk to its enemies. In fact, that’s where diplomacy makes the biggest difference.”
“One other thing that I’ve said as a show of good faith, that we’re interested in pursuing potentially a new relationship, what I’ve called for is a loosening of the restrictions on remittances from family members to the people of Cuba as well as travel restrictions for family members who want to visit their family members in Cuba. And I think that initiating that change in policy as a start and then suggesting that an agenda get set up is something that could be useful, but I would not normalize relations until we started seeing some of the progress that Senator Clinton talked about.”
When challenged that he had had a different position on Cuba in 2003, Obama responded, “I support the eventual normalization [with Cuba], and it’s absolutely true that I think our [Cuba] policy has been a failure. . . . [D]uring my entire lifetime . . . you essentially have seen a Cuba that has been isolated but has not made progress when it comes to the issues of political rights and personal freedoms that are so important to the people of Cuba. So I think that we have to shift policy. I think our goal has to be ultimately normalization, but that’s going to happen in steps.”
“[T]he first step . . . is changing our rules with respect to remittances and with respect to travel. And then I think it is important for us to have the direct contact not just in Cuba, but I think this principle applies generally. [As] John F. Kennedy once said, . . . we should never negotiate out of fear, but we should never fear to negotiate. And this moment, this opportunity when Fidel Castro has finally stepped down, . . . is one that we should try to take advantage of.”

Immediately after this Democratic candidates debate, Senator John McCain, then a candidate for the Republican presidential nomination, jumped in with his criticism of Obama. McCain said, “Not so long go Senator Obama favored complete normalization of relations with Fidel Castro’s Cuba. Last night, he said that as president he’d meet with the imprisoned island’s new leader ‘without preconditions.’ So Raul Castro gets an audience with an American president, and all the prestige such a meeting confers, without having to release political prisoners, allow free media, political parties, and labor unions, or schedule internationally monitored free elections. Instead, Senator Obama says he would meet Cuba’s dictator without any such steps in the hope that talk will make things better for Cuba’s oppressed people. Meet, talk, and hope may be a sound approach in a state legislature, but it is dangerously naive in international diplomacy where the oppressed look to America for hope and adversaries wish us ill.”

Obama’s campaign promptly retorted, ““John McCain would give us four more years of the same Bush-McCain policies that have failed U.S. interests and the Cuban people for the last fifty years. My policy will be based on the principle of liberty for the Cuban people, and I will seek that goal through strong and direct presidential diplomacy, and an immediate change in policy to allow for unlimited family visitation and remittances to the island. In November, the American people will have a clear choice: a new direction versus more war in Iraq, more not talking to leaders we don’t like, and more of a Cuba policy that has failed to achieve freedom for the Cuban people. I am confident that the American people will choose the promise of the future over the failed policies and predictable political attacks of the past.”

President George W. Bush echoed some of McCain’s criticisms of Obama at a February 28, 2008 press conference. Bush called Cuba’s new President, Rául Castro, a “tyrant,” who was “nothing more than an extension of what his brother [Fidel] did, which was to ruin an island, and imprison people because of their beliefs.” Bush also rejected Obama’s willingness to meet with the new Cuban leader because it would “send the wrong message. It’ll send a discouraging message to those who wonder if America will continue to work for the freedom of prisoners, it’ll give great status to those who have suppressed human rights and human dignity.”

John McCain continued his criticism of Obama’s stance on Cuba on March 6, 2008. According to McCain, he would meet with Cuban leaders “as soon as the political prisoners are free … and free elections have been held. Then I would sit down with any freely elected president or leader of Cuba. But until that day came I would not in any way, as Senator Obama wants to do, legitimize an individual who has been responsible for education, repression, political prisons and a gulag. I don’t think that it would be appropriate to legitimize someone like Raul Castro by quote, sitting down with him. And under no circumstance would I do it.’’

On May 20, 2008, this line of criticism was reiterated by McCain. At a rally in Miami, he said, “Now Senator Obama has shifted positions and says he only favors easing the embargo, not lifting [it]. He also wants to sit down unconditionally for a presidential meeting with Raul Castro. These steps would send the worst possible signal to Cuba’s dictators — there is no need to undertake fundamental reforms, they can simply wait for a unilateral change in U.S. policy.”

Responding from a campaign stop in Oregon the next day (May 21, 2008), Obama said, “with Fidel Castro stepping down from the presidency” and his brother Raul now in that post, “I think it’s a good time for us to reassess our Cuba policy. Cuba is a dictatorship that does not respect human rights or the free exercise of religion.” On the other hand, Obama argued, “our Cuba policy was shaped when I was born and basically hasn’t changed for 46 years.” Since that policy of political and economic isolation “hasn’t worked,” he added, it is now time to “try different things.” Mr. Obama spoke of the possibility of normalizing relations with Cuba if diplomatic contacts prove fruitful. But he also argued that “it is important to send some signals right now,” recognizing that “our relationship may be at a moment of transition right now.” In particular, Mr. Obama indicated that he favors lifting restrictions both on visits by Cuban-Americans to their families on the island and on the money they send back to those relatives.

Two days later (May 23, 2008) Obama appeared in Miami before the Cuban American National Foundation, the most prominent of the anti-Castro Cuban exile groups. Obama said he would meet with the Cuban leader, Rául Castro, “at a time and place of my choosing.” After eight years of the disastrous policies of George Bush, “it is time to pursue direct diplomacy, with friend and foe alike, without preconditions.” Obama also said that if elected president he would immediately lift the bans on family travel to Cuba and the limits on how much money people can send to their relatives in the communist nation. But he “will maintain the embargo. It provides us with the leverage to present the regime with a clear choice: If you take significant steps toward democracy, beginning with the freeing of all political prisoners, we will take steps to begin normalizing relations.”

Three months later, August 25 to 28, the Democratic Party held its National Convention in Denver, Colorado, where it adopted its national platform and officially nominated its candidates for President and Vice President. Obama was nominated on August 27, when his former opponent, U.S. Senator Hillary Clinton, interrupted the official roll call to move that Obama be selected by acclamation. U.S. Senator Joe Biden also was nominated for Vice President that same night, following which he accepted the nomination.

Barack Obama @ Democratic Party's National Convnetion 2008 — Barack Obama @ Democratic Party’s National Convention 2008

Barack Obama @ Democratic Party's National Convention 2008 — Barack Obama @ Democratic Party’s National Convention 2008

On August 28 Obama accepted his nomination in a speech at INVESCO Field before a record-setting crowd of 84,000 people in attendance plus additional millions on national and international television. The speech concentrated on his visions for the future of the U.S. economy and better lives. He did not mention Cuba or any other foreign policy issue other than his promise to end the war in Iraq.

Conclusion

Obama in his campaign for the nomination consistently asserted that he favored discussions or negotiations with Cuba and other rogue states “without preconditions.” That, in fact, is what he did in the 2013-2014 secret negotiations with Cuba that led to the December 17, 2014, announcement of rapprochement with Cuba.

This campaign position was based upon the assumption that the nearly 50-years of U.S. policy regarding Cuba was a failure and needed to be changed. This, in fact, is what he said in the December 17^th announcement and the July 1^st announcement of re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba.

In this campaign Obama advocated liberalizing U.S. restrictions on travel to Cuba and U.S. citizens’ remittances to Cubans. This, in fact, is what he did in early 2009 and in 2014.

Obama in this campaign also talked about the importance of the U.S. pressing Cuba on human rights, releasing of political prisoners and opening up the Cuban press. This, in fact, since December 17 these subjects are being discussed with Cuba.

There, however, was one discordant note in this campaign. On May 23, 2008, Obama said he would maintain the embargo whereas in the December 17, 2014, announcement he called for Congress to end the embargo.

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[2] This post is based on the following: David Plouffe, The Audacity to Win (Viking; New York; 2009); Assoc. Press, Ill. Sen. Barack Obama’s Announcement Speech, Wash. Post (Feb, 10, 2007); Kristof, Obama on the Issues (and his Grandfather’s Wives), N.Y. Times (Mar. 5, 2007); Seelye, Clinton-Obama Commander Duel, N.Y. Times (July 24, 2007); Falcone, 2008: Obama Speaks, N.Y. Times (Aug. 21, 2007); Traub, Is (His) Biography (Our) Destiny?, N.Y. Times (Nov. 4, 2007); Healy, Though Caucuses Loom, Democrats Tone It Down, N.Y. Times (Dec. 1, 2007); McKinley, Fidel Castro Resigns as Cuba’s President, N.Y. Times (Feb. 19, 2008); Transcript: Democratic Debate in Austin, Texas, N.Y. Times (Feb. 21, 2008); Phillips, McCain Hits Obama on Cuba, N.Y. Times (Feb. 22, 2008); McKinley, Raúl Castro Named Cuba’s New President, N.Y. Times (Feb. 24, 2008); Stout & Knowlton, Bush Calls Surveillance Bill an ‘Urgent Priority,’ N.Y. Times (Feb. 28, 2008); Stolberg, Bush Criticizes Democrats Running for President on Trade, Iraq and Cuba, but Not by Name, N.Y. Times (Feb. 29, 2008); Cooper, Vice Presidential Tea Leaves and a Dig at Obama, N.Y. Times (Mar. 6, 2008); Luo, McCain Now Hammers Obama on Cuba, N. Y. Times (May 20, 2008); Rohter, Obama to Address Cuban Group, Marking Shift from GOP Alliances, N.Y. Times (May 22, 2008); Zeleny, Obama Discusses Cuba Policy, N.Y. Times (May 23, 2008); Zeleny, Obama, in Miami, Calls for Engaging with Cuba, N.Y. Times (May 24, 2008); Wikipedia, 2008 Democratic National Convention; Transcript: Barack Obama’s Acceptance Speech, N.Y. Times (Aug. 28, 2008).

Imminent U.S.-Cuba Restoration of Normal Diplomatic Relations?

May 29^th is the date for the official U.S. rescission of its designation of Cuba as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism.” This was covered in a prior post.

In anticipation of that rescission, Cuba’s President, Raúl Castro on May 12^th said to journalists, “This sort of unjust accusation [sponsor of terrorism] is about to be lifted, and we’ll be able to name ambassadors.” [1]

Later that same day the U.S. State Department said, “an exchange of ambassadors would be a logical step . . . only once we re-establish diplomatic relations. We do not have a fixed time for that. We are still in negotiations . . . with Cuban authorities about re-establishing diplomatic relations.”

The latter statement confirms there are still unresolved issues for such normalization.

The main one appears to be whether or not U.S. diplomats in Cuba would be free to travel wherever and whenever they wanted and Cuba’s complaints that U.S. diplomats having meetings with Cuban dissidents amounted to meddling in Cuba’s internal affairs in violation of international treaties on diplomatic relations.

Indeed, yesterday President Castro stated he had told President Obama that such diplomatic encounters remained Cuba’s chief concern about establishing normal relations, particularly programs at the American Interests Section in Havana to assist independent journalists. In Castro’s own words (English translation), “I told . . . President Obama . . . that . . . I was most worried about . . . they continue to do illegal things. For example, graduating independent journalists. [The U.S. gives Cuban journalists] . . . I don’t know how many classes, on screen, in teleconferences from the United States. I don’t know if they give them a diploma and of course they give them their corresponding monthly payment.”

The U.S. Interests Section does offer free classes in journalism, English and information technology, but students are not paid by the U.S.

Another unresolved issue for establishment of normal diplomatic relations is the U.S. insistence that it must be allowed to bring secure shipping containers into the country, in accordance with global diplomatic protocols.

Castro in his remarks to journalists yesterday also mentioned that the U.S. embargo or blockade “must be removed” [2] and the Guantanamo Naval Base, which was leased after the U.S. had taken over Cuba in the early 20^th century, “should be returned to Cuba.” [3] Neither of these will happen immediately, and the latter may never happen.

Cuban negotiators are due to arrive in Washington as soon as this week for a fourth round of talks. Presumably at least some of these issues will be at the top of the agenda.

Conclusion

Once the U.S. and Cuba resolve these issues, each country first would change the names on their respective buildings from “interests section” to “embassy.” And the U.S. presumably would change the title of Jeffrey DeLaurentis, the current “Head of Mission” of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana to “Charge d’Affaires” or “Acting Ambassador.” (He already has the title of “Ambassador” from the previous Senate confirmation of his appointment as Alternate Representative for Special Political Affairs at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations.)

President Obama at some point would appoint someone to be the U.S. Ambassador to Cuba, but under Article II, Section 2(2) of the U.S. Constitution, the U.S. Senate, by a simple majority vote, has to give its “advice and consent” to such an appointment. Such a vote would be taken after hearings and consideration of the appointment by the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, currently chaired by Senator Bob Corker (Rep., TN). Two members of the Committee, both Cuban-Americans, Marco Rubio (Rep., FL) and Bob Menendez (Dem., NJ), are ardent foes of U.S.-Cuba reconciliation and are potential problems for such confirmation. And Rubio is the Chair of the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women’s Issues, which might consider the nomination before the full Committee does so.

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[1] This post is based upon the following: Archibold, Cuba Ready to Exchange Diplomats, Raúl Castro Says, N.Y. Times (May 12, 2015); Trotta, Cuba’s Castro concerned over “illegal” activity at U.S. mission, Reuters (May 12, 2015); Assoc. Press, US and Cuba Ambassadors To Be Named Soon, N.Y. Times (May 12, 2015); Miroff, Cuba ready to name U.S. ambassador, Castro says, Wash. Post (May 12, 2015); Hernández, French President culminated successful visit to Cuba, Granma (May 21, 2015) (Google translation); Raúl: The process of updating the Cuban economic model “goes well, our pace” (+ video), Cubadebate (May 12, 2015) (Google translation); U.S. State Dep’t, Daily Press Briefing (May 12, 2015).

[2] Prior posts discussed bills to end the embargo in the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate that were introduced in this Session of Congress. According to the Library of Congress, as of May 12^th there had been no committee action on any of these bills.

[3] An earlier post reviewed issues relating to Guantanamo Bay while another post looked at whether Cuba had a legal right to terminate its lease of the Guantanamo territory..

Pope Francis Holds Private Audience with Raúl Castro

On Sunday, May 10^th, Pope Francis held an hour-long private audience at the Vatican with Raúl Castro, the President of Cuba.[1]

Immediately afterwards President Castro gave the Pontiff two gifts. One was a painting of a large cross made with several boats and a child praying to the cross; the Cuban artist Alexis Leyva Machado said the painting was referring to the suffering of thousands of African people trying to reach Europe by crossing the Mediterranean Sea. The other gift for the Pope was a medal commemorating the 200th anniversary of the Cathedral of Havana. In turn, the Holy Father gave Raúl a copy of his apostolic exhortation “The Joy of the Gospel” and a medal “St. Martin of Tours and the beggar covered with the mantle,” explaining that he gave it to world leaders because it recalls the obligation to help the poor and at the same time promote dignity.

At a subsequent press conference, Castro praised the Pope for helping Cuba and the United States to reach an agreement to restore diplomatic relations and resolve other issues and promised a warm welcome for Francis when he goes to Cuba in September. Castro also said he had been “very impressed by [Francis’] wisdom, his modesty, and all his virtues that we know he has.”

On a personal note, Castro said, “When the Pope comes to Cuba in September, I promise to go to all his Masses and I will be happy to do so.” He added that he reads all of the speeches of Francis, who has made defense of the poor a major plank of his papacy. Moreover, Castro said, “If the Pope continues to talk as he does, sooner or later I will start praying again and return to the Catholic Church, and I am not kidding.” (Both Mr. Castro and his brother Fidel Castro were baptized as Roman Catholics.)[2]

Raúl was kidding, however, when he said, “The pontiff is a Jesuit, and I, in some way, am too. I studied at Jesuit schools.” Castro also observed that he was “from the Cuban Communist Party that used to not allow [religious] believers, but now [since 1991] we are allowing it. It’s an important step.”

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[1] This post is based upon the following: Yardley, Raúl Castro Meets with Pope Francis at Vatican, N.Y. Times (May 10, 2015); Pullella, Raul Castro meets pope, says might return to the Church, Reuters (May 10, 2015); Scammell, Castro thanks Pope Francis for brokering thaw between Cuba and US, Guardian (May 10, 2015); Ordoz, Castro: “If the Pope continues, I’ll pray and return to the church,” El Pais (May 10, 2015) (Google translation); BBC, Raul Castro thanks Pope Francis for brokering Cuba-U.S. deal, (May 10, 2015); Francisco Raul and the Pope meet in historic meeting, Granma (May 10, 2015) (Google translation).

[2] The Cuban newspaper Granma previously cited report of this historic meeting and the subsequent press conference did not mention Castro’s comments about his plan to attend all the Pope’s masses in Cuba and perhaps to start praying and return to the Catholic Church.

Cuba Holds Municipal Elections

On April 19^th Cuba held the first round of elections for representatives or delegates to its municipal assemblies (Municipal Assemblies of People’s Power), a sort of neighborhood council that oversees local matters like water, sewers, street repair and insect fumigation. The total vote was approximately 7,553,000, representing 88.3% of the total electorate. [1]

Eligible voters, under article 132 of the Cuban Constitution, are all Cuban men and women, 16 years of age and older, unless ruled ineligible in accordance with electoral law. Voting in Cuba is a right and a civic duty, but is not a legal obligation. Voting is secret and the public can witness the count under Cuban law.

Elected were 11,425 delegates to the municipal councils while 1,164 districts where no candidate received at least 50% of the vote will go to a second round of voting on April 26^th. Of those elected, 34.87% are women and 14.95% are youth. Of the elected delegates, 59.24% are members of the Communist Party of Cuba, which shows that it is not obligatory to be a party member in order to be elected.

Of the 27,379 candidates competing for 12,589 positions, two were Cuban dissidents who failed to become the first openly declared political opponents to win election in Cuba since the 1959 revolution, each failing in races for Havana municipal assemblies. In response to these two candidacies, Cuban media and electoral officials published disparaging information about the two men, including in the official candidate biographies hung by the government around their electoral districts.

One of these dissident candidates, Hildebrando Chaviano, 65, a lawyer who writes for Diario de Cuba, a website fiercely critical of the government, said, “The vote was clean. The count was clean. The people don’t want change. They still want the revolution. I still consider this a success. People know who we are now.”

Mercedes López Acea, First Secretary of the Communist Party in Havana and member of its Political Bureau, as well as a Council of State Vice President, said, “Today we ratify and defend the socialism we are constructing.” She emphasized that the election safeguards the rights of Cubans and validates the country’s participative democracy. “Among those nominated are young people, women, workers in a variety of occupations. . . . . This is an opportunity for all of us together to make the homeland stronger, on the basis of what all Cuban men and women want.” She added that the updating of Cuba’s economic model will advance in accordance with the work and dedication all Cuban men and women put to the task, saying, “Difficulties exist and have been identified, now we must work to resolve them.”

Articles in Granma featured photographs of Cuban leaders voting: Fidel Castro, Raúl Castro and Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez, the First Vice President and the reputed presidential successor to Raúl Castro.

The date of the election, April 19, was chosen because it is the date when Cuba defeated the U.S.-sponsored invasion at the Bay of Pigs.

This is this blogger’s first examination of a Cuban election. It is based almost exclusively on Cuban sources. Do those sources provide fair reporting of the election? Was it a fair election? Those are questions to ponder as the hoped-for U.S.-Cuban reconciliation goes forward.

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[1] This post is based upon Loforte, More than 7 million Cubans exercised their right to vote, Granma (April 20, 2015); Hernández, Raúl casts his vote, Granma, April 20, 2015); Loforte, Fidel exercises his right to vote, Granma (April 19, 2015); Election day in Cuba, Granma (April 19, 2015); Castellanos, Voting is a tribute to our history, Granma (April 19, 2015); Hernández, Elections during historic times, Granma (April 19, 2015); Reuters, Two Cubans Lose Bids to Become First Opponents Elected to Office, N.Y. Times (April 19, 2015); Assoc. Press, 2 Cuban Dissidents Up for Election in Unprecedented Vote, N.Y. times (April 18, 2015); Mendoza & Medina, The right to vote in the Cuban electoral rules (final) (+inforgraphic), Granma (April 16, 2015).

U.S. and Cuba Hold Unproductive Extension of Second Round of Talks

On March 16, the U.S. and Cuba met in Havana for further discussions, mostly on re-establishing diplomatic relations and re-opening embassies. The focus was to be on so-called “nuts-and-bolts issues of limits on the number of diplomats and their travel in the host country. [1]

Although the U.S. expected the talks might continue for several days, they lasted only one day. The next day (March 17), the Cuban government released a statement: “At the end of the meeting, which took place in a professional climate, the two delegations agreed to maintain communication in the future as part of this process.” The U.S. had a similar statement: “The discussion was positive and constructive and was held in an atmosphere of mutual respect.”

Neither side said whether they had resolved any of the obstacles to reopening embassies.

There was concern before this week’s session that the recent U.S.-Cuba disagreement over U.S. sanctions against certain Venezuelans, as discussed in a prior post, might adversely affect the talks, but there was no overt indication, one way or the other, whether that was a factor in the apparently unproductive one-day session. Julia Sweig, an expert on U.S. relations with Cuba and Venezuela, said there was no sign that the increasingly strained U.S. relationship with Venezuela was affecting the warming of relations with Cuba.

On the other hand, there are other indications that the Venezuela situation may have been at least one of the reasons for the short and apparently unproductive U.S.-Cuba negotiations this week.

Yesterday Cuban President Raúl Castro was in Venezuela for an emergency meeting of the ALBA group that was called to discuss and react to President Obama’s executive order imposing sanctions against seven Venezuelans. In a speech at the meeting, Castro used some his strongest anti-American language in months, thrashing Mr. Obama over the sanctions and any suggestion that détente would lead to political change on the island. For example, Castro said, ““The United States should understand once and for all that it is impossible to seduce or buy Cuba nor intimidate Venezuela. Our unity is indestructible.”

In any event, the Venezuelan campaign against the sanctions threatens to put the damper on a celebration of U.S.-Cuba rapprochement at the Summit of the Americas in Panama on April 10-11.

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[1] The sources for this post are the following: Office of Spokesperson, Assistant Secretary Roberta Jacobson Travels to Havana, U.S. Dep’t State (Mar. 13, 2015); Schwartz, Cuba, U.S. to Resume Talks to Restore Diplomatic Ties, W.S.J. (Mar. 13, 2015); DeYoung, U.S., Cuba set for third round of talks aimed at agreement to open embassies, Wash. Post (Mar. 13, 2015); Statement by the Director of Bilateral Issues US Department Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Granma (Mar. 13, 2015); Reuters, Cuba, U.S. Renew Talks on Restoring Diplomatic ties, N.Y. Times (Mar. 16, 2015); Reuters, Latest U.S.-Cuba Talks on Diplomatic Ties Ends After One Day, N.Y. Times (Mar. 17, 2015); Assoc. Press, Cuba, US Say Third Round of Diplomatic Negotiations Ends, N.Y. Times (Mar. 17, 2015); Serra, Meeting between officials of Cuba and the United States, Granma (Mar. 17, 2015); Archibold, U.S.-Cuba Talks on Restoring Diplomatic Ties End Abruptly, N.Y. Times (Mar. 17, 2015).

European Union and Cuba’s Negotiations Over Human Rights and Other Issues

Since 1996 the European Union (EU) has had an overall strategy about engaging with Cuba that the EU calls its Common Position on Cuba. In early 2014, the EU determined that this Position would not be a precondition to negotiations and thus the two countries held negotiations in April 2014 in Havana and in August 2014 in Brussels. The third round of these negotiations took place in Havana, March 4-5, 2015, with the next round to take place in Brussels on a date to be determined. [1]

After reviewing the EU Common Position on Cuba and the subsequent history of EU-Cuba relations, we will discuss the recent negotiations and their implications.

EU’s Common Position on Cuba [2]

On December 2, 1996, the Council of the European Union [3] adopted its Common Position on Cuba, whose objective was “to encourage a process of [Cuban] transition to pluralist democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as a sustainable recovery and improvement in the living standards of the Cuban people. A transition would most likely be peaceful if the present regime were itself to initiate or permit such a process. It is not European Union policy to try to bring about change by coercive measures with the effect of increasing the economic hardship of the Cuban people” (Para. 1).

The Common Position also acknowledged “the tentative economic opening undertaken in Cuba to date” and the EU’s “wish to be Cuba’s partner in the progressive and irreversible opening of the Cuban economy. The [EU] considers that full cooperation with Cuba will depend upon improvements in human rights and political freedom, as indicated by the European Council” (Para. 2). To achieve these objectives, the E.U.

“(a) will intensify the present dialogue with the Cuban authorities and with all sectors of Cuban society in order to promote respect for human rights and real progress towards pluralist democracy;
(b) will seek out opportunities – even more actively than heretofore – to remind the Cuban authorities, both publicly and privately, of fundamental responsibilities regarding human rights, in particular freedom of speech and association;
(c) will encourage the reform of internal legislation concerning political and civil rights, including the Cuban criminal code, and, consequently, the abolition of all political offences, the release of all political prisoners and the ending of the harassment and punishment of dissidents;
(d) will evaluate developments in Cuban internal and foreign policies according to the same standards that apply to [EU] relations with other countries, in particular the ratification and observance of international human rights conventions;
(e) will remain willing in the meantime, through the Member States, to provide ad hoc humanitarian aid, subject to prior agreement regarding distribution; currently applicable measures to ensure distribution through non-governmental organizations, the churches and international organizations will be maintained and, where appropriate, reinforced . . .; [and]
(f) will remain willing, through the Member States, also to carry out focused economic cooperation actions in support of the economic opening being implemented” (Para. 3).

Finally the EU Common Position stated, “As the Cuban authorities make progress towards democracy, the [EU} will lend its support to that process and examine the appropriate use of the means at its disposal for that purpose, including: the intensification of a constructive, result-oriented political dialogue between the [EU] and Cuba; the intensification of cooperation and, in particular, economic cooperation; the deepening of the dialogue with the Cuban authorities, through the appropriate instances, in order to explore further the possibilities for future negotiation of a Cooperation Agreement with Cuba” (Para. 4).

EU-Cuba Relations 1997-2013

The EU suspended ties with Cuba in 2003 after the regime of President Fidel Castro arrested 75 dissidents in 2003 in a fierce crackdown known as Black Spring.

Upon the imprisonment of these political dissidents, the EU imposed stiff sanctions on Cuba in 2003. High-level visits to Cuba were reduced, and Fidel Castro stopped European aid from entering the country. European embassies were encouraged to invite both government officials and political dissidents to cultural events. Thereafter the Cuban government officials declined to attend any such events. Between 2003 and 2005, Cuba and the EU experienced a time of tension and animosity.

In 2005, relations between the EU and Cuba began to warm up again with Spain’s encouragement. The Cuban government released 14 political prisoners in 2005, an encouraging sign for anxious EU members looking for signs of progress. Thereafter the EU suspended sanctions and gradually repaired the economic ties between the two entities. Between 2005 and 2008, Cuba released another six political prisoners, which prompted the EU to remove all sanctions. In addition, the 2008 change of power from Fidel Castro to Raúl Castro produced optimism in the EU regarding future relaxation of tension.

After October 2008, the EU committed around € 60 million for cooperation on post-hurricane reconstruction and rehabilitation, food security, climate change and renewable energy, culture, and education. Cuba also took part in several EU-funded regional programs. The first EU Country Strategy/Paper Indicative Program for Cuba was adopted in May 2010 making available € 20 million between 2011 and 2013 for food security, climate change adaptation, and expertise exchanges. The EU also allocated € 4 million to support the population affected by Hurricane Sandy in November 2012.

In 2010, Spain unsuccessfully tried to muster support for a change in the EU’s Common Position on Cuba. The need for unanimity for such a change was thwarted by Poland and Czech Republic – both former Soviet bloc nations – which have been opposed to shifts in relations with Havana.

EU-Cuba Negotiations, 2014

In early 2014, the Dutch Foreign Minister called on the EU to change its policy toward Havana during a visit to the Caribbean island in January 2014.

The EU then decided that its Common Position on Cuba was not working and would not be used as preconditions for EU negotiations with the country. As a result, the EU Foreign Affairs Council, on February 10, 2014, extended an invitation to Cuba to start negotiations for a future bilateral agreement.

Following Cuba’s acceptance of the invitation, they conducted such negotiations In April and August 2014 on a “Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement” which would serve as an enabling framework for closer engagement in support of the on-going reform and modernization process in Cuba. According to the EU, human rights remain at the heart of its policy towards Cuba while seeking to expand relations with all parts of Cuban society, promoting economic and social progress, dynamic dialogue and strengthened respect for fundamental rights.

The April 29-30, 2014, round took place in Havana and focused on establishing modalities and a roadmap for negotiations. An understanding was also reached on the overall structure of the agreement, after which the parties held a first exchange of views on the main chapters and elements.

The August 27-28, 2014, negotiations took place in Brussels. The parties concentrated on the cooperation heading in the proposed agreement with progress on the global structure of the chapter, the issues and sectors to be addressed, as well as on the concrete wording of a number of articles. The EU also made a presentation on the trade chapter that would enhance commercial and investment relations based on joint objectives and established rules and principles of international trade. The political and institutional issues were not addressed.

Immediately after the August session, Christian Leffler, the European External Action Service Managing Director for the Americas, stated the parties had made “substantial progress” towards agreeing on a trade and political co-operation treaty and would discuss “more sensitive political questions,” in the next round to be held in Havana.

In addition, the August session prompted a NGO (Civil Rights Defenders) to urge the EU to press Cuba to ratify and implement the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [4] and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [5], which Cuba had signed in 2008. The group also called for inclusion of Cuban civil society and political opposition in the discussions.

The third round of negotiations was scheduled for early January 2015 in Havana, but on December 8, 2014, Cuba cancelled that round because it said it felt “disrespected” by a March 2014 cultural exhibit in Washington, D.C., which featured photos of Havana by a Lithuanian artist. (The real reason for the suspension is now apparent: the then upcoming December 17^th announcement of Cuba-U.S. rapprochement.)

March 2015 Negotiations

The latest round of negotiations was focused on the proposed agreement’s largest and most important chapter: Cooperation and Cooperation Dialogue Sectoral Policies. This included discussion of Political dialogue and issues related to national and government policy: governance, human rights, rule of law, and joint efforts in addressing global challenges.

Before the session, Christian Leffler said such talks with Cuba require “a clear vision, steady nerves and tons of patience” and “ no illusions there will be a sudden radical transformation of Cuban society and government structures.”

Afterwards Leffler said the parties had “progressed substantially in technical legal provisions and the scope of cooperation.” He also said that human rights “was deeply discussed,” but without reaching any concrete agreements, leaving the “finding of solutions” for future meetings without the EU seeking to “impose a model” on Cuba. (In the photograph, the Cuban delegation is on the left; the EU’s on the right.)

Leffler also noted that the recent decision of Cuba and the U.S. to restore normal diplomatic relations promises should aid the EU and Cuba in their negotiations. The EU goal is to advance a “concrete, constructive and honest dialogue, to identify areas of political and economic cooperation.”

Cuba reported making that the parties had made progress on issues such as labor, culture, education, health, agriculture, trade and aid.

Future Negotiations

Although no date has been set for the next round of negotiations, some of the 28 EU members are insisting the EU accelerate the process because of concern the U.S. might progress more quickly with normalization. Spain, which counts Cuba as a key trade partner, has urged fellow members to “give EU businesses the chance to compete with American companies” on the island. And French President Francois Hollande plans to visit Cuba on May 11, the first visit ever by a French president and the first by a European or American leader since the US rapprochement.

The EU is already Cuba’s top foreign investor. EU officials say the proposed accord would give Brussels a bigger role in Havana’s market-oriented reforms, position EU companies for Cuba’s transition to a more open economy and allow the Europe to press for political freedoms on the Communist-ruled island.

Conclusion

Despite protestations to the contrary, the EU and the U.S. are now competing to gain an economic competitive edge in future dealings with Cuba. This should be an additional argument for the U.S. quickly to rescind its designation of Cuba as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism, ” to end the embargo of Cuba and to proceed on the many other issues to effectuate a normalization of relations with the island.

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[1] This post on EU-Cuba relations and negotiations is based upon the following: Council on Hemispheric Affairs, The European Union and Cuba: The Common Position (July 15, 2010); Abellán, European Union prepares to defrost icy relations with Cuba, El Pais (Jan. 16, 2014); Council of EU, Authorizing Negotiations with Cuba (Jan. 28, 2014); LeoGrande, Relaxing the EU’s Common Position on Cuba would allow Europe to play a more active role in shaping the country’s future, LSE Blog (Jan. 28, 2014); LeoGrande, More Cracks in the EU’s “Common Position” on Cuba, AULA Blog (Jan. 31, 2014); Council of EU, Adopts Negotiating directives (Feb. 10, 2014); Council of EU, Press release on negotiating directives (Feb. 10, 2014); EU External Action, EU and Cuba launch talks on new agreement (May 5, 2014); European Parliamentary Research Service, A new phase in EU-Cuba relations (June 25, 2014); European Union, Second round of EU-Cuba negotiations toward a bilateral Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (Aug. 28, 2014); Fox, EU hails ‘substantial progress’ towards Cuba trade deal, eurobserver (Aug. 29, 2014); Civil Rights Defenders, Platform for Discussion on the Current EU-Cuba Negotiations (Aug. 2014); Civil Rights Defenders, The EU must put pressure on Cuba to respect human rights (Aug. 29, 2014); Reuters, EU-Cuba talks delayed by dispute over cultural event, Daily Mail (Dec. 9, 2014); EU External Action, Statement of the High Representative and Vice President Federica Mogherini on US-Cuba relations (Dec. 17, 2014); Whitefield, EU tip for U.S.-Cuba negotiators: patience is a virtue, Miami Herald (Feb. 11, 2015); Reuters, EU and Cuba to Restart Talks After Cultural Dispute, N. Y. Times (Feb. 27, 2015); Bendavid, EU, Cuba Officials to Meet in Wide-Ranging Talks, W.S.J. (Feb. 27, 2015); Abellán, Brussels starts talking about human rights with Cuba, El Pais (Mar. 1, 2015); Trotta, Cuba, EU renew talks on relations; will discuss human rights, Bus. Insider (Mar. 4, 2015); Reuters, Cuba, EU Renew talks on Relations; Will Discuss Human Rights, N.Y. Times (Mar. 4, 2015); Negrin, Dialogue between Cuba and the EU progresses in cooperation issues, Granma (Mar. 4, 2005); France hopes to shore up business with Cuba amid US policy shift, France 24 (Mar. 4, 2015); Perez & Rivero, Cuba and the European Union have “progressed substantially,” CUBADEBATE (Mar. 5, 2015); Trotta, EU says U.S. policy change helps its own talks with Cuba, Reuters (Mar. 5, 2015); EU-Cuba Negotiations Impacted by Cuba-USA, Havana Times (Mar. 6, 2015); Grosbois, US, EU in race to normalize Cuba ties, Business Insider (Mar. 6, 2015).

[2] EU Common Position on Cuba (Dec. 2, 1996 ). Before EU governments finally agree on a new piece of Union legislation, they usually reach a sort of pre-agreement called a common position. This can serve as a useful marker showing just how far governments have come towards agreeing the terms of a particularly complex piece of legislation. They have a certain legal weight and are published in the EU’s Official Journal. EU governments must adopt a common position before the European Parliament can begin its second reading of a particular proposal.

[3] The Council of the EU is part of the essentially bicameral EU legislature (the other legislative body being the European Parliament) and represents the executive governments of the EU’s member states.

[4] The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which is part of what is referenced as the International Bill of Human Rights, establishes international minimum standards for self-determination; legal redress; equality; life, liberty, freedom of movement; fair, public and speedy criminal trials, privacy; freedom of expression, thought, conscience, religion; peaceful assembly; freedom of association (including trade union rights); family; and participation in public affairs.. It also forbids “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; slavery; arbitrary arrest; double jeopardy; and imprisonment for debt. This treaty was approved by the U.N. General Assembly in 1966. Now 168 states, including the U.S., are parties to this treaty. The U.S. signed this treaty in 1977, but did not ratify it until 1992 with many qualifications (five reservations, five understandings, four declarations and a proviso), and the agency responsible for monitoring compliance with the treaty (U.N. Human Rights Committee) has criticized the U.S. for noncompliance with various provisions, including voting.

[5] The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Political Rights, also part of the International Bill of Human Rights, calls for the “progressive realization” of the rights to gain a living by work; to have safe and healthy working conditions; to enjoy trade union rights; to receive social security; to have protection for the family; to have adequate housing and clothing; to be free from hunger; to have health care and free public education; to participate in cultural life, creative activity and scientific research. This treaty was approved by the U.N. General Assembly in 1966, and now 162 states are parties thereto. Compliance is monitored by the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The U.S. by President Jimmy Carter signed this treaty in 1977, but the U.S. has never ratified it and thus is not a party thereto.

International Reaction to U.S.-Cuba Reconciliation

The overwhelming international response to the December 17th announcement of U.S.-Cuba reconciliation has been very positive, especially in Latin America. Future posts will examine the responses in Cuba and the U.S.

Latin American Reactions [1]

Virtually all Latin American countries had been increasingly frustrated with the 50 years of estrangement and hostility between the U.S. and Cuba. According to a historian of the region, Enrique Krauze, “Cuba has been the epicenter of anti-Americanism in modern Latin America” and the Cuban Revolution of 1959 “opened a new cycle of anti-Americanism.”

Now, Krauze continues, the U.S. has renounced its “imperial destiny and recovers much of the moral legitimacy needed to uphold the democratic ideals that led to its foundation (and also of the countries of Latin America).”

The President of Brazil congratulated Raul Castro, Obama and Pope Francis. Similar comments were made by the leaders of Mexico, Peru, Colombia and Nicaragua.

Jose Miguel Insulza, Secretary General of the Organization of American States, the regional forum where Cuba’s seat has been empty since 1962, said Obama’s decision removed a major irritant in Washington’s relations with Latin America. “This ends the attempt to isolate Cuba for so long. Cuba is undertaking a process of economic reforms that will, I hope, lead to political reforms.”.

These reactions were emphasized by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, Roberta Jacobson, who said, ““Our previous Cuba policy was clearly an irritant and a drag on our policy in the region,” adding that it had caused friction even with countries friendly to Washington. She said that countries “with whom we have significant differences are going to be, let’s say, thrown off their stride by a move like this.”“It removes an excuse for blaming the United States for things,” she added.

The Wall Street Journal reported the day after the announcement of the detente that government officials, diplomats and scholars believe this change has “the potential to redraw political and economic alliances across the hemisphere,” especially with countries like Argentina, Ecuador and others. It will be most difficult for Venezuela, which has held “a long-held animosity toward El Imperio–the empire.”

But the President of Venezuela immediately called the detente a “victory for Fidel and the Cuban people” while also acknowledging President Obama’s “courage” in “perhaps the most important step of his presidency.”

On January 26th the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) [2] applauded the agreement’s making possible Cuba’s attending the Summit of the Americas in Panama this coming April.

European Reactions [3]

On the day after the historic announcement, the European Union released a statement hailing it as a “historic turning point.” It continued, “Today another Wall has started to fall. These moves represent a victory of dialogue over confrontation.”

The leading newspaper of Spain, El Pais, editorialized, “Today, when freedom seems to be calling for an end to the doors of Cuba, Spain must accompany Cubans in their new journey: supporting their political, economic and social modernization, with clarity, consistency and realism; aware of the limits of his diplomatic skills-but place value on the european-dimension and also aware that resetting relations with Cuba, the United States restored its relations with Latin America.”

Positive comments of the change came from leaders of Germany, Italy, France and Spain.

Other International Reactions [4]

Canada, we recall, hosted some of the secret U.S.-Cuba negotiations that resulted in the December 17th announcement of the start of the process of their reconciliation. Afterwards Canada’s Foreign Minister, John Baird, said, “”I agree with this policy. I don’t think previous U.S. policy has been effective. If you flood Cuba with American values, American people, and American investment, it will help transform the country.”

U.N. Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, said at a press conference on December 17th, “I have been informed in advance by the US Government. This news is very positive. I’d like to thank President Barack Obama of the United States and President Raul Castro for taking this very important step towards normalizing relations. As much of the membership of the United Nations has repeatedly emphasized through General Assembly resolutions during the last many, many years, it is time that Cuba and the United States normalize their bilateral relations. In that regard, I heartily welcome today’s development. I sincerely hope these measures, this announcement will help to expand further the exchanges between the two peoples who have been separated quite a long time. The United Nations stands ready to help both countries to cultivate their good neighbourly relations.”

Conclusion

I would appreciate comments identifying other international reactions.

As was anticipated in the December 17th announcements by presidents Obama and Castro and as we already have seen, the path to lasting reconciliation is not easy for either country. There are many unresolved issues for the two countries over the last 50-plus years.

These words of congratulations from around the world will have to justified by the further negotiations of the two countries. If they fail to resolve these issues, the international reaction will be severe, and if other countries and international organizations believe the U.S. was primarily responsible for such failure, then there could be even worse anti-Americanism unleashed.

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[1] Rebussio, Maduro: It is a victory for Fidel and the Cuban people, El Pais (Dec. 17, 2014); Mezzi, Venezuela is left alone, El Pais (Dec. 17, 2014); Anderson, Mynaya & Vyas, Detente Scrambles Political Calculus in Latin America, W.S.J. (Dec. 18, 2014); Assoc. Press, AP Analysis: U.S. Was at Odds With World Over Cuba Policy, N.Y. Times (Dec. 18,2014); Romero & Neuman, Cuba Thaw Lets Rest of Latin America Warm to Washington, N.Y. Times (Dec. 18, 2014); Assoc. Press, Latin America Cheers U.S.-Cuba Rapprochement, N.Y. Times (Dec. 18,2014); Krauze, End of Anti-Americanism?, N.Y. Times (Jan. 7, 2015); ECLAC applauds presence of Cuba in Summit of the Americas, Granma (Jan. 26, 2015)

[2] ECLAC was established by the U.N. in 1948 to contribute to the economic development of the region and to promote its social development. Its 44 members include 11 from Asia (Japan and Republic of Korea), Europe (France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom) and North America (Canada and U.S.) with historical, economic and cultural ties to the region. In addition, 13 non-independent Caribbean territories are associate members.

[3] Rebussio, Maduro: It is a victory for Fidel and the Cuban people, El Pais (Dec. 17, 2014); Reuters, “Another Wall Falls:’ Europe Hails U.S.-Cuba Breakthrough, N.Y. Times (Dec. 18, 2014); Editorial, With Cuba, El Pais (Dec. 21, 2014).

[4] Goldberg, Canada’s Foreign Minister:U.S. Influence Will Make Cuba Better, Atlantic (Dec. 21, 2014), Reuters, U.N.‘s Ban Hails Obama for ‘Courageous’ Cuba Move, N.Y. Times (Dec. 20, 2014); U.N., Press Conference by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon at United Nations Headquarters (Dec. 17, 2014).

Cuba Fulfills Its Commitment To Release 53 Political Dissidents from Prison or Penal Restrictions

As mentioned in a prior post, as part of the December 17^th joint announcement of the U.S. and Cuba embarking on the path of reconciliation, Cuba agreed to release 53 Cuban political dissidents from its prisons.

On January 12^th, Cuba fulfilled this agreement by completing its release of the 53 individuals. This was announced by senior Obama administration officials, who said, “Our Interests Section in Havana was able to verify these releases.”[1]

The 53 Cubans were named by the U.S. in the two countries’ earlier negotiations based upon reports from independent human rights organizations as “having been jailed for promoting political reforms or trying to exercise free speech and other internationally respected rights.” (Additional details about the development and negotiation of the list are provided in a New York Times article.)

It now appears possible that not all 53 had been in prison. On December 17, Cuban President Raúl Castro said that Cuba had agreed to grant “penal benefits including release” to those on the list. That raises the possibility that some on the list were already free but under restrictions including travel bans that may have been lifted as part of the U.S. deal.

All of this was confirmed at the January 12th afternoon Daily Press Briefing. A State Department spokesperson said, “the Cuban Government has notified us that they have completed the release of the 53 political prisoners that they had committed to free. We welcome this very positive development and are pleased that the Cuban Government followed through on this commitment. These political prisoners were individuals who had been cited by various human rights organizations as being imprisoned by the Cuban Government for exercising internationally protected freedoms or for their promotion of political and social reforms in Cuba.” The spokesperson added, “During our discussions with the Cubans we shared the names of individuals jailed in Cuba on charges related to their political activities. The Cuban Government made this sovereign decision to release those individuals.” In addition, the Department of State has shared the full list with Congress and “fully expect[s] it will be in the public domain.”

Before the announcement of Cuba’s completing the release of the 53, some members of Congress and U.S. journalists revealed their impatience by being quite agitated over the fact that not all 53 had been released within three weeks of the announcement of the historic agreements. [2] My response: relax for implementation of a multifaceted agreement.

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[1] This post is based upon Reuters, Exclusive: Cuba Has Freed All 53 Prisoners as Agreed in U.S. Deal—U.S. Officials, N. Y. Times (Jan. 12, 2015); Assoc. Press, U.S.: Cuba Completes Release of 53 Political Prisoners, N. Y. Times (Jan. 12, 2015); Malkin & Burnett, Cuba Frees 53 Prisoners in Deal to Restore U.S. Relations, N. Y. Times (Jan. 13, 2014).

[2] E.g., U.S. Dep’t State, Daily Press Briefings (Jan. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 2015); Assoc. Press, Cuban dissident says he believes 2 on US list are freed, Wash. Post (Jan. 7, 2015); Editorial, Three weeks after Cuba accord, why haven’t more political prisoners been freed?, Wash. Post. (Jan. 8, 2015); Archibold, Cuba Is Reported to Release 26 Dissidents (Jan. 8, 2015); House Comm. For. Affairs, Royce, Engel Call on Kerry to Publicly Name 53 Cuban Political Prisoners (Jan. 9, 20215).

Cuban Government Meets with Religious Leaders

Granma, Cuba’s state-owned newspaper, and the Cuban News Agency have reported that Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez, the First Vice President of the Cuban Councils of State and Ministers and a member of the Cuban Communist Party’s Central Committee (Political Bureau),[1] recently met with Cuban evangelical and protestant leaders from the Cuban Council of Churches. [2] The meeting’s purpose was to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the first meeting between Comandante en Jefe Fidel Castro and leaders of the Council and to discuss current challenges facing the organization.

After the first meeting in 1984, considered to be milestone in relations between the church and State, a practice developed of holding periodic meetings between all religions and the leadership of the country to promote work and dialogue.

The Recent Meeting

Rev. Joel Ortega Dopico, the President of the Cuban Council of Churches and a pastor of the Presbyterian-Reformed Church of Cuba, highlighted the importance of sustaining the churches’ relations with the government and of the role the Council has played, at crucial moments, for the Revolution, such as the Council’s “staunch opposition to the U.S. blockade against the Cuban economy, fighting for the return of Elián [Gonzalez to Cuba from the U.S.] and the release of our five anti-terrorist brothers from the unjust incarceration they have been subjected to in the U.S.”

Rev. Raúl Suárez, the pastor of the Ebenezer Baptist Church in Havana, recalled Fidel’s comments at the first of these meetings in 1984 about the need for mutual understanding between Cuban religious organizations and State institutions and Cuban society.

Rev. Pablo Odén Marichal, Executive Secretary of the Cuban Council of Churches and Vice-President of the Evangelical Theological Seminary of Matanzas, Cuba, stated that “protestant churches have been a means of cultural penetration in Cuban society” and given this reality he urged for “a greater strengthening of the ethical and behavioral work of the faith toward the community of believers and society, based on human and patriotic values.”

Marichal emphasized greater participation of the inter-faith movement and churches in the search for solutions to problems facing Cuban society, such as an aging population. He stated, “We must revive Fidel’s idea of a strategic alliance between revolutionary Christians and Marxists, for which permanent dialogue is necessary.”

Díaz-Canel, the government Minister, commented on the importance of transmitting this historic occasion to the current generation in order to strengthen dialogue and unity among Cubans. He described the meeting as an encounter of faith, friendship and memories. He said, “It is touching to remember all those moments – lack of understanding at times which was later overcome through respectful dialogue.”

He also expressed the desire to address concerns about Cuba’s social and economic order, as well as challenges being faced in the struggle to strengthen and promote social values “in order to prevent the establishment of a base of neocolonial and neoliberal capitalist reconstruction. This is the struggle we must assume, strip away all the pseudo culture, all the banality and selfishness and individualism,” he concluded.

The First Meeting in 1984

In 2007 I heard directly from Rev. Raúl Suárez about the circumstances surrounding the first meeting between Cuba’s Revolutionary government and the Cuban churches. This happened when I was with a group of Westminster Presbyterian Church members from Minneapolis that visited Havana’s Martin Luther King, Jr. Center, which is affiliated with the adjacent Baptist Church, where Rev. Suárez was the pastor.

Suárez told us that in 1984 he learned that Jesse Jackson, a candidate for the Democratic nomination for President that year, was coming to Cuba. Jackson said that Fidel Castro had invited him to discuss the status of 22 U.S. citizens then being held by the Cuban Government. Jackson said that he also wanted an invitation from a Cuban church so that he could participate in a religious service in Cuba. Jackson asked Suárez, then Executive Secretary of the Cuban Council of Churches and Director of International Relations of the Cuban Baptist Church, if that would be possible. Jackson also gave Suárez a letter to provide to Castro on this issue.

Suárez then contacted Fidel, who responded that it would not be a problem even though atheism was the established “religion” in the Cuban constitution at the time.

Jackson made his trip to Cuba in June 1984 and gave a speech to 4,000 students at the University of Havana with Castro in attendance. Afterwards the two of them and their aides walked a few blocks to the nearby Methodist Church where Jackson would be preaching. As they neared the church, Suárez heard a Castro aide say to Fidel, “Take off your hat, you are close to a church.” Fidel took off his hat. Suárez was surprised by this comment and Fidel’s response. Suárez told Fidel that the people in the Plaza de Revolution (supporters of the Revolution) and the people in the church were one and welcomed Fidel to the church. Fidel said, do not ask me to preach.

There were 700 to 800 people in the church that day, including 35 church leaders and the Roman Catholic Archbishop (in 2007, a Cardinal). When Castro entered the church, the choir extemporaneously cried, “Fidel, Fidel, Fidel.” Castro did make a short speech from the pulpit with a cross behind him. (Another Cuban pastor who was present told me that Castro obviously felt uncomfortable with the Bible on the lectern and awkwardly put his hands behind his back.) Castro praised Dr. King and Jackson and said there was a need for more exchanges between the churches and the government.

Later that same day Suárez was invited to a dinner with Fidel and Jackson. This was the first time he had ever shaken Fidel’s hand, and Fidel asked him to come to the airport the next day to say goodbye to Jackson.

Soon thereafter Suárez asked for a meeting of religious leaders with Fidel and submitted to Fidel a document of concern about the official policy of atheism’s limiting the space for religion.

This resulted in a four-hour meeting between Fidel and about 14 Protestant leaders and the College of the Roman Catholic Bishops. Fidel expressed surprise at the Protestants, saying that when he was a boy in Jesuit schools, Roman Catholics disparaged Protestants. At the end of the meeting Castro made a covenant with these leaders: the churches will made an effort to understand “us” while Fidel and the Cuban Communist Party will make an effort to understand the churches. This agreement, said Fidel, should be easier for the churches than for the Party.

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[1] Díaz-Canel often is seen as a potential successor to Raúl Castro as President of Cuba.

[2] The Council was founded in 1941 as “a fellowship of churches, ecumenical groups, and other ecumenical organizations which confess Jesus Christ as Son of God and Savior, according to the holy scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, and seek to respond to their common calling, to the glory of God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.” It gives “unity to the Christian Churches of Cuba” to facilitate cooperation with other churches around the world. Its purposes include encouraging “dialogue between different movements and institutions as a means for churches to expand their ecumenical vocation of service, thus deepening their responsibilities towards society and all of God’s creation. [The Council] also promotes study, dialogue, and cooperation among Christians to increase Christian witness and enhance life in Cuba.” Its membership now includes 22 churches, 12 ecumenical groups and centers, 3 observers and 7 fraternal associates.