University of Havana – dwkcommentaries

U.S. Needs To Improve Relations with Cuba

Cuba recently has been the subject of many related news reports. First, the island is suffering from many economic problems, including many younger Cubans abandoning the island for life elsewhere. Second, many private enterprises on the island are being successful. Third, this year Russia and China have been increasing their connections with Cuba to support that country and oppose U.S. actions against the island. Fourth, the above developments pose challenges to the U.S., which needs to return to its positive relationships with Cuba that were started in the Obama Administration.

Cuba’s Recent Economic Problems[1]

“With sanctions tightened by the Trump Administration (and not repealed by the Biden Administration), Cuban economic mismanagement and the impact of the pandemic and other events, Cuban inflation has soared, basic foods and medicines have become scarce, and money transfers from Cubans in the U.S. have dwindled. The flow of foreign tourists has also dried up.”

In July 2021, this “economic crisis sparked a wave of protests across the island, which prompted a harsh response from security forces. In the following months the government brought charges against 930 protesters and sentenced 675 of them to prison terms, some as long as 25 years, according to Laritza Diversent, director of human-rights group Cubalex.”

In August 2022 a “fire destroyed 40% of the fuel storage capacity at the port city of Matanzas, leading to increased electricity outages that even before the disaster were lasting up to 20 hours a day in many places.”

Cuba’s economic difficulties also were exacerbated by the Trump Administration’s 2019 imposition of the harshest economic sanctions against Cuba in more than a half-century. It ended virtually all non-family travel to Cuba and placed new limits on the money Cuba-Americans could send to family on the island. This Administration also began implementing an old law aimed at blocking both U.S. and foreign investment on the island that had been on hold because of immense opposition from U.S. allies. This move unleashed a law allowing Cuban Americans to sue in U.S. courts any company that benefits from their property on the island that had been confiscated by Fidel Castro’s regime. More significantly, the Trump Administration re-designated Cuba as a state-sponsor of terrorism.[2]

In response to these problems, as of August 2022, “More than 175,000 Cuban migrants were apprehended in the U.S. between last October and July, six times as many as in the previous 12-month period, according to U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Most are young, single adults, according to government statistics. Many are relatively well educated, say people who work with the migrants.” This “exodus reflects the desperation, the lack of hope, and the lack of future people on the island feel,” said Jorge Duany, head of the Cuban Research Institute at Florida International University.”

Recent Expansion of Cuban Private Enterprises on the Island[3]

According to Miami Herald, “over the past two years . . . [p]rivate businesses, banished from the island by Fidel Castro more than 60 years ago, are making a strong comeback, employing more people than state enterprises, gaining trust from foreign creditors and helping put food on Cubans’ tables at a time of widespread scarcity.” Recently Cuba’s economy minister, Alejandro Gil, in a speech at the National Assembly reported that “the private sector is on track to buy over a billion dollars in goods by the end of [this] year—outpacing the government as the country’s largest importer.”

“[P]rivate grocery stores are taking the place of the empty-shelf government supermarkets, and all sorts of [private] businesses are filling the space once monopolized by the state. Some restaurant owners are now opening chains or franchises. Others are entering partnerships with cash-strapped local enterprises owned by the state and paying in foreign currency for the supplies needed for their production lines.”

“Cuban [government] leaders have long resisted [such a development] because it aims at the heart of the state-controlled Marxist economy.” But “[t]they’ve had no choice but to allow it amid the most severe economic crisis.” As a result, Cuba is looking “less like the highly centralized socialist economy . . . and more like a country in transition, where a nascent business community coexists with inefficient state companies.”

According to Ricardo Herrero, executive director of the Cuba Study Group, a Cuban-American organization that helps train entrepreneurs on the island, who “share similar value sets with entrepreneurs here in the United States.” They “want the government off their backs and want to see better relations between the United States and Cuba, particularly between Cuba and the diaspora.” Moreover, “some Cubans living in Miami are even owners or partners in some of these private companies.”

The Cuban “private sector now employs around 35% of Cuba’s work force, about 1.6 million workers, surpassing the 1.3 million employed by state enterprises, according to Cuban economist Juan Triana, a professor at the Center for the Study of the Cuban Economy at the University of Havana.

These non-state actors through the end of this April were responsible for $270 million of Cuba’s imports or 61% of its total imports according to Pedro Monreal, a Cuban economist who works for the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

On August 2, 2023, however, Cuba’s Central Bank announced new regulations that will require small private businesses to offer their customers ways to make digital payments and promptly to deposit all cash revenue in their bank accounts while banning cash withdrawals to pay operating expenses. This also will ban private enterprises from using their Cuban pesos to buy U.S. dollars in the informal market to pay for goods purchased abroad while the government is unable to provide food and essential goods for the people. As a result, these regulations are another government attempt to regulate the private sector and are expected to cause immense practical difficulties in the state-owned banks and system to implement the regulations and regulate increases in retail prices on the island.

Russian and Chinese Recent Assistance to Cuba[4]

Starting in February 2023, “high-level Russian officials began a steady stream of public visits to Cuba. Barely a month went by without a high-profile Russia-Cuba visit.” And high-level Cuban officials also were visiting Russia. Here is at least a partial list of those visits this year:

“In March, Nikolai Patrushev, secretary of the Russian Security Council and Igor Sechin, the powerful director of the Russian state oil company, Rosneft, met with leaders in Havana.”
“In April, Russian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, visited the island as part of a regional tour that included two other American adversaries — Venezuela and Nicaragua.”
“In June, Cuban Prime Minister Manuel Marrero Cruz visited Russia for more than ten days, including a meeting with Putin.
More recently, “Alvaro Lopéz Miera, the Cuban defense minister, traveled to Moscow . . . for discussions with his Russian counterparts — including Sergei Shoigu, one of the notorious architects of the war in Ukraine.” And Shoigu announced that “Cuba has been and remains Russia’s most important ally in the [Caribbean] region.” Shoigu promised that Moscow was “ready to render assistance to the island of freedom and to lend a shoulder to our Cuban friends.”
Similar comments came from “Cuban Deputy Foreign Minister Gerardo Peñalver, [who] described the two countries as ‘strategic allies’ cooperating against ‘unilateral coercive measures’ from Washington.”

These contacts have resulted in a memo of understanding whereby Russia will invest in Cuba’s agricultural lands to produce goods for the Russian market, Russia will increase its commercial flights to Cuba’s eight airports, will modernize Cuba’s major industries and reduce tariffs and costs for Russian exports to the island and will construct an all-Russian hotel, shopping mall and banking facilities in Cuba.

In addition, “Russia pledged to give oil and various industrial supplies to Cuba. By one estimate, Moscow has already sent the island more than $160 million worth of oil this year. And Russian news agencies announced that additional supplies will follow.”

“Cuba now receives direct flights from Russia (flights had been suspended after the invasion of Ukraine), and it has joined the ’Mir’ payment system that Moscow created to facilitate the conversion of rubles to pesos and other currencies for tourism, trade and aid. Over 1,000 Russian oil executives and staff are expected to the visit Cuba by year’s end.”

In early July, “the Russian naval ship, Perekop, diverted to Cuba from the country’s Baltic Sea fleet more than 7,000 miles away. The ship carried approximately 100 Russian naval cadets, humanitarian assistance and various equipment to Cuba. The Russian ambassador and the deputy commander of the Russian Navy attended the ship’s elaborate arrival ceremony, symbolizing that this was the beginning of deeper collaboration.”

China, on the other hand, is Cuba’s largest trading partner, and plays a role in the island’s agricultural, pharmaceutical, telecommunications and infrastructural industries. Beijing also owns a significant measure of Havana’s foreign debt.

In early June 2023, there were reports that China was planning to build an electronic listening station in Cuba in exchange for paying Cuba billions of U.S. dollars and that U.S. officials were concerned that such a station could be capable of spying on the United States by intercepting electronic signals from nearby U.S. military and commercial facilities and could amplify Beijing’s technological capacity to monitor sensitive operations across the Southeastern U.S., including several military bases. This Chinese base is part of what the US intelligence community identifies as a wider Chinese effort to intercept American communications, steal secrets and prepare for increased competition.” However, on June 10^th an anonymous Biden official said that before 2019, the U.S. knew there was an operating Chinese spy base or facilities in Cuba that could intercept electronic signals from nearby U.S. military and commercial buildings.

In any event, Evan Ellis, a Latin America analyst at the U.S. Army War College, saw such an electronics facility as “a sign of the island’s financial desperation. China gives money to Cuba it desperately needs, and China gets access to the listening facility.” However, Michael Bustamante, a Cuba expert at the University of Miami, said aside from Cuba’s financial dire straits, the deal with China may reflect that the Cuban government feels it has little to lose given how poor its relationship is with the U.S.

Moreover, according to the Wall Street Journal, in later June 2023, Cuba and China were negotiating to establish a new joint military training facility on the north coast of the island that would be “part of China’s ‘Project 141,’ an initiative by the People’s Liberation Army to expand its global military base and logistical support network. It also is a sign that China now sees its struggle with the U.S. as global and that it must operate around the world to fend off Washington and protect Chinese interests.

U.S. and Cuban Exchanges About Chinese and Russian Connections with Cuba[5]

On June 20, 2023, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the U.S. would “have deep concerns” about Chinese military activity on Cuba, and that he made this message clear on his recent visit to Beijing.

The next day at the June 21 State Department Press Briefing, , the Department’s Principal Deputy Spokesperson, Vidant Patel, said, “The Secretary raised the serious concerns the U.S. would have about any intelligence or military facility in Cuba, saying that we will continue to defend our interests here.” Then in response to a reporter’s question, Patel added, “[W]e we are monitoring and responding to any PRC attempts to expand its military or security presence around the world, and we watch how potential PRC actions may impact the United States. Our experts assess that our diplomatic efforts have slowed the PRC down, and there of course continue to still be challenges, but we continue to be concerned about the PRC’s longstanding activities with Cuba. The PRC will keep trying to enhance its presence in Cuba and we will keep working to disrupt it.”

These U.S. assertions were strongly denounced by Cuba’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bruno Rodriguez Parrilla, in the following statement:

“The assertions made by the US Secretary of State about the presence of a Chinese spy base in Cuba are false, totally false. Cuba’s standing on this subject is clear and unequivocal.”
“These are unfounded allegations.”
“The [U.S.] aim is to use them as a pretext to maintain the economic blockade against Cuba and the measures of maximum pressure that have strengthened it in recent years, and which have been increasingly rejected by the international community, as well as inside the United States. The rejection includes the demand to remove Cuba from the arbitrary list of States Sponsors of Terrorism.”
“Cuba is not a threat to the United States or any other country. The United States implements a policy that threatens and punishes the entire Cuban population on a daily basis.”
“The US has imposed and owns tens of military bases in our region and also maintains, against the will of the Cuban people, a military base in the territory that it illegally occupies in the province of Guantánamo.”
“We are witnessing a new disinformation operation, similar to the many others in the United States throughout its long history of hostility against our country.”

On August 2, Granma, the official organ of Cuba’s Communist Party’s Central Committee, reiterated Cuba’s denunciation of the U.S. embargo (blockade) of Cuba, with the following words:

“The Ministry of Communications (MICOM) is the target of the brutal blockade of the United States against Cuba, according to confirmation of damages that only in the period August 2021-February 2022 caused economic damages and losses that exceeded 104 million dollars.”
“This was denounced by the first deputy minister of the sector, Wilfredo González Vidal, who specified to the Cuban News Agency (ACN) that the cruel economic, commercial and financial monstrosity reduces the dynamism and speed of the digital transformation process of our country.”
“The set of actions developed by the United States, he said, ‘continues to be the main impediment to a better flow of information and broader access to the Internet and Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) for our people.’”
“However, in Cuba the expansion of access to the network of networks and knowledge continues, and today it has 7.8 million mobile phone users and of them almost seven million access the Internet through this important channel, he noted.”
“This, he asserted, is due to the effort and will of the State to advance in the information society, creating a responsible culture on the use of new technologies in favor of the economy and society.”
“The official pointed out that the economic damages and losses caused to the Communications System, as a consequence of the blockade, are evident throughout the sector, that is, in Telecommunications, Information Technologies and Postal Services.”
“Likewise, according to the ACN, it described as significant the effects due to the limitations of supplies of technologies and equipment produced under license, or using North American components, which forces it to go to other markets, much further away, an obstacle for which the greatest effects are quantified to sector.”

In July 2023 the U.S. went beyond words by sending “a nuclear-powered submarine, the USS Pasadena, to the American-held base at Guantanamo Bay. Officially a ‘logistics stop,’ this was a warning and a show of strength. The Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the submarine visit as a ‘provocative escalation.’ The US Navy said the move was ‘not without precedent.’”

U.S. Should Return to Positive Engagement with Cuba[6]

Only a few years ago, the government of Cuba was pursuing closer ties to Washington. According to William LeoGrande, a Latin America expert at American University, “Every major component of Cuba’s economic strategy in the last two decades had been premised on long-term expectations that the relationship with the U.S. would improve.”

In December 2014, this Cuban effort paid off when the two countries presidents (Barack Obama and Raul Castro) announced that their countries would be pursing efforts to improve relations, and that effort produced positive results for the rest of Obama’s presidency ending in early January 2017. Everyone from Conan O’Brien to Andrew Cuomo to Steve Nash began showing up in Havana. As a University of Miami’s Cuba expert, Michael J. Bustamante, noted at the time, “the American flag has even become the most stylish national standard, appearing on Cubans’ T-shirts, tights and tank tops.”

However, the Trump presidency (2017-21) and the Biden presidency since early 2021 have been engaged in U.S. policies of hostility toward Cuba.

Now the emergence of an important private enterprise sector of the Cuban economy has provided the opportunity for the two countries to return to better relations that improve the living conditions of the people on the island. This argument was well put in an op-ed article in the Miami Herald by Miguel “Mike” Fernandez, the Chairman of Coral Gables, Florida’s MBF Healthcare Partners, who said the following:

“It is time to shift our focus toward uplifting the Cuban people, primarily by supporting and empowering the emerging private sector, to restore hope and a bright future for the nation.”
“By promoting and facilitating engagement and collaboration with Cuba’s emerging private sector, the United States can foster positive change, enhance regional stability and tap the vast potential of Cubans’ entrepreneurial spirit, while reducing the vast numbers of Cuban immigrants arriving at the southern border.”
“A notable, and not so quiet, course change has begun as the Cuban government has had to accept the reality that it’s broke. Hence the emergence of a private sector, which can use our support because of our know-how and capital resources as a viable alternative to a punitive strategy. . . . [This private sector] is providing solutions for Cubans where the government no longer can. . . . [and] presents an opportunity to transform the country’s economic landscape.”
“It is crucial for the United States to support and engage with Cuba’s private sector to reduce emigration to this country and promote stability and prosperity within the island. . . . By redirecting our efforts toward supporting the growth of entrepreneurship, small businesses and foreign investment, we can foster an environment of economic independence for Cubans.”

At the top of the “to do” list for the U.S. is cancelling (1) the U.S. embargo [blockade] of Cuba; (2) the U.S. designation of Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism, which the Obama Administration had done in 2015; and (3) the ban on U.S. tourist visas for Cuba. The U.S. should also initiate diplomatic discussions with Cuba regarding many issues, including U.S. positions on Cuba set forth in U.S. annual reports on world-wide trafficking in persons; religious freedom; and human rights.[7]

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[1] E.g., Cordoba, Cuban Migrants Head to the U.S. in Record Numbers, W.S.J. (Aug. 24, 2022)

[2] Trump declares economic war on Cuba, the Conversation (April 18, 2019); Communications sector severely damaged by the US blockade, Granma (Aug. 2, 2023).

[3] Torres, Capitalism makes strong comeback in Cuba after six decades of socialism. Will it last?, Miami Herald (June 23, 2023); Torres, How Miami companies are secretly fueling the dramatic growth of Cuba’s private businesses, Miami Herald (June 23, 2023); Fernandez, Transforming U.S.-Cuba relations: From dominating to elevating/Opinion, Miami Herald (July 19, 2023); MF Healthcare Partners, Rodriguez, Evaluate new proposals for measures in commerce to promote payment through electronic channels, Granma (Aug. 3, 2023); Torres, Sudden banking cash-withdrawal limit threatens private sector and food imports to Cuba, Miami Herald (Aug. 4, 2023).

[4] Demirjian & Wong, China to Build Station That Could Spy on U.S. from Cuba, Officials Say, N.Y. Times (June 8, 2023); Strobel & Lubold, Cuba to Host Secret Chinese Spy Base Focusing on U.S., W.S.J. (June 8, 2023); Cordoba, Cuba’s Spy Deal With China Has Echoes of Cold War Tensions, W.S.J. (June 8, 2023); Gale & Ramzy, Cuba Base Would Help China Identify Strike Targets in U.S., W.S.J. (June 9, 2023); Hutzler & Vyas, Cuba Spy Station Brings China Closer to America’s Doorstep, W.S.J. (June 9, 2023); Demirjian & Wong, China Has Had a Spy Base in Cuba for Years, Official Says, N.Y. Times (June 10, 2023); Lubold & Strobel, White House Says China Has Had Cuba Spy Base Since at Least 2019, W.S.J. (June 11, 2023); Strobel, Lubold, Salama & Gordon, Beijing Plans a New Training Facility in Cuba, Raising Prospect of Chinese Troops on America’s doorstep, W.S.J. (June 20, 2023); Editorial, China’s New Military Footprint in Cuba, W.S.J. (June 20, 2023; Yu, China Plans With Cuba for Global Dominance, W.S.J. (June 29, 2023); Suchlicki, The Russians are coming back to Cuba, prepared to challenge U.S. on its doorstep/Opinion, Miami Herald (June 23, 2023); Bihart, America’s Foes Are Joining Forces, N.Y. Times (July 3, 2023); Torres, China has had a spy base in Cuba for decades, former intelligence officer says, Miami Herald (July 5, 2023).Suri, Opinion: In tough times, Russia turns to a Cold War comrade, CNN.com (July 20, 2023).

[5] Editorial, China’s New Military Footprint in Cuba, W.S.J. (June 20, 2023); U.S. State Dep’t, Department Press Briefing—(June 21, 2023); Cuba Foreign Minister Parrilla, Cuba is not a threat to the United States or any other country, Granma (June 13, 2023). Communications sector severely damaged by the US blockade, Granma (Aug. 2, 2023);

[6] President Obama Rescinds U.S. Designation of Cuba as a ‘State Sponsor of Terrorism,” dwkcommantaries.com (04/15/15); U.S. Rescinds Designation of Cuba as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism, dwkcommantaries.com (05/29/15) U.S. State Dep’t, U.S. Relations with Cuba (Nov. 22, 2019).

[7] This post does not comment on the multitude of issues regarding U.S.-Cuba relations. However, this blog has published a list of many of these posts about many of these issues, which has not been recently updated, (See, e.g., List of Posts to dwkcommentaries—Topical: CUBA [as of 5/4/20].

State Department Creates Cuba Internet Task Force and Suspends Enforcement of Statutory Liability for Trafficking in Certain Cuban Expropriated Property

This week the U.S. State Department has taken two actions regarding Cuba: (1) creation of the Cuba Internet Task Force and (2) granting another six-month extension of the right of U.S. persons to sue traffickers in U.S. property that was expropriated by the Cuban government.

U.S.’ Cuba Internet Task Force.

On January 23, the U.S. Department of State issued a terse announcement that it “is convening a Cuba Internet Task Force composed of U.S. government and non-governmental representatives to promote the free and unregulated flow of information in Cuba. The task force will examine the technological challenges and opportunities for expanding internet access and independent media in Cuba.” The announcement also stated that the first public meeting of the Task force would be on February 7.[1]

This action was pursuant to President Trump’s June 16, 2017’s National Security Presidential Memorandum on Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba that he dramatically signed at a public meeting in the Little Havana district of Miami, Florida. The purpose of that document was to announce various policies “to promote a stable, prosperous, and free country for the Cuban people. . . . [to] channel funds toward the Cuban people and away from a regime that has failed to meet the most basic requirements of a free and just society [and to condemn abuses by the Cuban regime]. . . . [The] Administration will continue to evaluate its policies so as to improve human rights, encourage the rule of law, foster free markets and free enterprise, and promote democracy in Cuba.” (Section 1)[2]

More specifically Section 2 (d) of that Presidential Memorandum stated that the U.S. was to “Amplify efforts to support the Cuban people through the expansion of internet services, free press, free enterprise, free association, and lawful travel.”

The creation of the Task Force was criticized by Michael Bustamante, an assistant professor of Latin American history at Florida International University. He said, “By casting the issue of internet access in an explicitly political frame, it will only create greater obstacles for those U.S. telecom companies that have made inroads toward partnerships with the Cuban side. Measures like these strengthen the hand of those in Cuba for whom the prospect (and reality) of external meddling justifies maximum caution with respect to internal reform.”

Cuba immediately registered strong objections to the creation of this Task Force with good reason.[3]

Granma, the official newspaper of the Communist Party of Cuba, said, “In the past phrases like promoting “’freedom of speech’ and ‘expanding access to the internet in Cuba’ have been used by Washington as a pretext for schemes to destabilize the country using new technologies.”

One of Granma’s journalists, Sergio Gómez, declared, “If the administration of President Donald Trump intends to use new technologies to impose changes in the internal order of Cuba, he chose very old roads that have already demonstrated their ineffectiveness, without mentioning the obvious fact that they violate the laws of the affected country. even those of the United States.” Moreover, the “terrain chosen for the new aggression, Internet, clearly demonstrates what the true objectives of Washington are when it demands ‘ree access’ to the network in the countries that oppose it, while in its territory it maintains a tracking system and accumulation of data about what citizens do on the web.”

Gómez also asserted that the U.S. “shows a clear pattern of the use of social networks and the internet with objectives geopolitical and domination. All part of a doctrine of unconventional war designed to destabilize nations without the direct use of military forces, which has taken root after the failures in the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.”

In another article, Gómez added details about Cuba’s expanded Internet access apparently to reject the implicit premise of the U.S. announcement that Cuba was continuing to suffer from lack of such access. Gomez said, “Cuba, by sovereign decision and to the extent of its economic possibilities, is increasing the access of its citizens to the network of networks. According to information provided by specialist Rosa Miriam Alizada, ‘2017 will be remembered as the boom in the expansion of access to the network in our country, with 40% of Cubans connected to the Internet, 37% more than in 2010, and for the naturalization of the internet connection in urban spaces from one end of the island to the other.’”

Another Cuban journalist with a Doctorate in Political Science from the University of Havana, Randy Alfonso Falcón, reported this was not the first time the U.S. had attempted to use the Internet regarding Cuba. On February 14, 2006, then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice created the Global Internet Freedom Task Force for “maximizing freedom of expression and free flow of information and ideas, especially in Cuba, Iran and China. The author also asserts that this general strategy was continued in the Obama administration.

Therefore, Falcón believes, “In the face of US action In the Cuban digital public space, our response cannot be merely defensive. We must look forward with a scientifically based vision that mobilizes responses and alternatives from Cuba to the extraordinary ideological and cultural confrontation that arises. Take by assault, from the knowledge, the tools of the new colonizers, build ours and endow them with symbols and emancipating essences.”

Suspension of Right To Sue Over Trafficking in Expropriated Property[4]

On January 24, the day after the creation of the Task Force, the State Department announced that once again it was suspending for six months the right to bring a legal action under Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (a/k/a the Helms-Burton Law).

That Title III in section 302 states, “any person that . . . traffics in property which was confiscated by the Cuban Government on or after January 1, 1959, shall be liable to any United States national who owns the claim to such property for money damages.”

Since its adoption in 1996, however, Title III has been suspended for consecutive six-month periods by orders of Presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama and now Donald Trump. These suspensions have been made to avoid risking the alienation of U.S. setting legal precedents that contradict other principles of U.S. or international law and opening the door to a potential flood of claims.

John Kavulich, president of the United States-Cuba Economic and Trade Council, said last year that this clause could be “used as a surgical tool to pressure” governments and foreign companies to encourage the Government of Cuba to resolve the 5,913 certified claims that there is in the United States ,” for a total amount of $1.9 billion (with interest).

As previous posts have explained, Cuba recognizes its obligation under international law to pay reasonable compensation for expropriation of property owned by foreigners and in fact has done so for claimants from other countries. Thus, Cuba has conceded the major premise of any I.S. claim for damages for expropriation. In addition, this blog has suggested that the dispute over compensation for expropriation of property owned by Americans be submitted for resolution by an international arbitration tribunal. Presumably the only issue that might be disputed is the value of the property at the time of the expropriation and the amount of interest thereon.[5]

Conclusion

U.S. citizens who support U.S.-Cuba normalization now must see who is appointed to the Cuba Internet Task Force and what it proposes to do. For this blogger, the Task force is based on the erroneous premise that the U.S. may and should unilaterally decide what Internet facilities and access another country should have and unilaterally provide such facilities and technology. Instead, the U.S. should seek to negotiate bilateral agreements with other countries to cooperate on such issues.

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[1] U.S. State Dep’t, Creation of the Cuba Internet Task Force (Jan. 23, 2018); Reuters, State Department creates Cuba Internet Task Force (Jan.23, 2018); Torres, Trump administration wants to expand internet access in Cuba, Miami Herald (Ja. 23, 2018).

[2] President Trump Announces Reversal of Some U.S.-Cuba Normalization Policies, dwkcommentaries.com (June 19, 2017). Surprisingly this Presidential Memorandum is no longer available on the White House website.

[3] Washington creates Internet Task Force to promote subversion in Cuba, Granma (Jan. 24, 2018); Gomez, The United States takes up failed policies towards Cuba, Granma (Jan. 23, 2018); Gomez, United States creates a new Task Force on the Internet for subversion in Cuba, Granma (Jan. 24, 2018). See also posts cited in the “U.S. Democracy Promotion in Cuba” section of List of Posts to the List of Posts to dwkcommentaries.com—Topical: CUBA.

[4] U.S. State Dep’t, United States Determination of Six Months’ Suspension Under Title III of Libertad (Jan. 24, 2018); Provision that allows Cuban Americans to sue for confiscated property in Cuba is suspended, Miami Herald (Jan. 24, 2018); Trump suspends for another six months the clause of the Helms Burton that allows expropriation lawsuits, Diario de Cuba (Jan. 24, 2018); Falcón, The US strategy for Cuba in the digital public space, CubaDebate (Jan, 24, 208).

[5] See Resolution of U.S. and Cuba’s Damage Claims, dwkcommentaries.com (April 6, 2015); Resolving U.S. and Cuba Damage Claims, dwkcommentaries.com (Dec. 13, 2015).

U.S. Agricultural Coalition for Cuba Sends Delegation to the Island

On March 1-4, the United States Agricultural Coalition for Cuba sent a delegation of 90-plus agricultural leaders to Cuba to meet with Cuban officials and farmers. [1]

In announcing the visit, the Coalition’s Chair, Devry Boughner Vorwerk of Minnesota-headquartered Cargill Incorporated, said it would be a “learning journey” to expand knowledge of Cuban agriculture. It will include meetings with Cuban business and government leaders, as well as interaction with Cuban farmers and agricultural cooperatives. The idea is to expand understanding of the Cuban agricultural economy. During the trip she said, “”The message we hope will get back to Washington is that we are a unifying voice that would like to see Congress act in 2015 and end the embargo.”

She also expressed a desire for a bilateral agricultural trading relationship with the U.S. importing such things as Cuban snuff, rum, cigars, coffee, sugar, seafood (lobster and shrimp) and encouraged a Cuban delegation of officials and farmers to visit the U.S. to explore those opportunities. Indeed, some believe that Cuba’s warm winter climate could enable Cuba to export tomatoes and other vegetables all across the eastern U.S. during the cold-weather months, along with its traditional crops.

On Monday the U.S. delegation met with Cuba’s Foreign Minister, Bruno Rodriguez; Agriculture Minister, Julian González; Azcuba Business Group; the National Association of Small Farmers; and directors of other companies and agricultural cooperatives.

The next day the Americans visited farms and agricultural businesses in four provinces near Havana, including the El Trigal wholesale market, on the outskirts of the capital; the 30 de Noviembre Sugar Mill (Artemisa); the Heroes de Yaguajay Fruit and Vegetable Cooperative (Alquizar), and the tobacco cooperatives of Consolacion del Sur and Los Palacios (Pinar del Rio).

Significant U.S.-Cuba trade growth appears likely to come fastest in agriculture, the sector of the Cuban economy that has the deepest ties to the U.S. and that has been undergoing market-oriented reforms longer than any other on the island. After years of declining sales, the U.S. and mostly Republican states sold nearly $300 million of food to the island last year, primarily frozen chicken and soybean products, under a long-standing humanitarian exception to the U.S. embargo.

Such U.S. exports, however, have been hampered by U.S. sanctions limiting sales to a cash-only and barring U.S. banks from financing the sales. American trade officials and farmers are dreaming of dominating a food import market that could grow to $3 billion in coming years if Cuba’s economy improves.

The delegation included two former U.S. Secretaries of Agriculture (Democrat Mike Espy and Republican John Block); the marketing and development director for the Virginia Department of Agriculture; Missouri’s agriculture director and the spouse of its Governor, Jay Nixon, who was unable to go. Another member was Thomas Marten, an Illinois soybean farmer and the Zanesville Township GOP Committeeman. He observed, “As a Republican, I believe in trade for the betterment of all people. Prohibiting it is something that hurts us all.”

Afterwards, a Cuban researcher at the Center for Hemispheric Studies, University of Havana, Luis René Fernández, said that open trade with the U.S. is a matter of justice. Care, however, must be taken that the changes are not chaotic or overwhelmed by the U.S. interests.

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[1] A previous post described the January 8, 2015, launch of the Coalition. This post about their visit to the island is based upon the following sources: Thomas, Ag Coalition to lead trade trip to Cuba in March, Farm Futures (Feb. 20, 2015); Reuters, U.S. Agricultural Delegation Visits Cuba, Protests Embargo, N.Y. Times (Mar. 2, 2015); Cuba Hosts Delegation of 96 US Farm Sector Businesspeople, Havana Times (Mar. 2, 2015); Sosa, US farmers promote lifting the blockade on Cuba, Granma (Mar. 3, 2015); Miroff, Why Midwestern farmers want to break the Cuban embargo, Wash. Post (Mar. 3, 2015); U.S. agribusinessmen visiting Cuba call for end to embargo, FoxNewsLatino (Mar. 3, 2015); US Agriculture Organization Looks for Business Opportunities in Cuba, Escambray (Mar. 3, 2015); Weissenstein, Cuba looks north to US farmers for help with food crisis, Assoc. Press (Mar. 4, 2015); Sosa & Gomez, The fertile field for trade between US and Cuba, Granma (Mar. 5, 2015).

More Observations on Cuba’s Reactions to U.S.-Cuba Reconciliation

A prior post discussed the reactions to U.S.-Cuba reconciliation by Cuba’s government and its people. Here are additional observations on these topics.

As noted in that prior post, Josefina Vidal, Cuba’s deputy foreign minister in charge of North America, gave an extensive interview on the U.S.-Cuba negotiations to a Granma journalist, and more recently Granma published the official English translation of the interview. Vidal reveals a great knowledge of the intricacies of U.S. law on the embargo and “wet foot/dry foot” immigration practices.

She also rebutted the contention by some U.S. critics of the rapprochement that the U.S. failed to obtain a “quid pro quo” for its concessions. She said, “Relations between Cuba and the United States have historically been asymmetrical. Therefore, the notion of quid pro quo cannot automatically be applied, taking into consideration that there are many more things to dismantle on the U.S. side than on the Cuban side. Cuba does not have sanctions against U.S. companies or citizens; nor do we hold occupied territory in the United States; we don’t have programs financed by Cuba intent upon influencing the situation within the United States or promoting changes in the internal order of the United States; we don’t have radio or television broadcasts, specially conceived in Cuba and directed toward the U.S.”

Moreover, she said, “questions of an internal nature for Cuba or questions directed toward promoting changes in our internal order will never be put on the table during this process of negotiation.”

Meanwhile, President Raúl Castro on February 13th received Army General Sergei Shoigu Kuzhuguetovich, Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. During the meeting, Granma reported, they discussed the historical ties between the two nations and ratified the willingness to continue strengthening the bonds of cooperation.

In January a el Nuevo Herald journalist from Miami visited the island and concluded, “many Cubans, including laborers who have started up their own small businesses, employees of state enterprises and retirees were hopeful that the new approach in relations between the U.S. and Cuba would result in greater prosperity for the average citizen after 56 years under the control of Castro.”

The journalist also saw Cuban children with T-shirts emblazoned with the face of President Obama and Cuban women and men wearing shirts or pants with “American flag.”

This February, a BBC journalist talked with some of the young people at the annual March of the Torches at the University of Havana to commemorate Cuba’s revered poet and independence hero, Jose Marti. They welcomed the announcement of a thaw with Washington. “In the past, the two countries have had their problems, not between the people but our governments,” said 18-year-old Daimara. “But now we can improve relations with the US and the whole world.” Her friend, Sandra, added, “It was about time! It’s a step forward, a step towards better ties with everyone.”

Cuban Government Meets with Religious Leaders

Granma, Cuba’s state-owned newspaper, and the Cuban News Agency have reported that Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez, the First Vice President of the Cuban Councils of State and Ministers and a member of the Cuban Communist Party’s Central Committee (Political Bureau),[1] recently met with Cuban evangelical and protestant leaders from the Cuban Council of Churches. [2] The meeting’s purpose was to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the first meeting between Comandante en Jefe Fidel Castro and leaders of the Council and to discuss current challenges facing the organization.

After the first meeting in 1984, considered to be milestone in relations between the church and State, a practice developed of holding periodic meetings between all religions and the leadership of the country to promote work and dialogue.

The Recent Meeting

Rev. Joel Ortega Dopico, the President of the Cuban Council of Churches and a pastor of the Presbyterian-Reformed Church of Cuba, highlighted the importance of sustaining the churches’ relations with the government and of the role the Council has played, at crucial moments, for the Revolution, such as the Council’s “staunch opposition to the U.S. blockade against the Cuban economy, fighting for the return of Elián [Gonzalez to Cuba from the U.S.] and the release of our five anti-terrorist brothers from the unjust incarceration they have been subjected to in the U.S.”

Rev. Raúl Suárez, the pastor of the Ebenezer Baptist Church in Havana, recalled Fidel’s comments at the first of these meetings in 1984 about the need for mutual understanding between Cuban religious organizations and State institutions and Cuban society.

Rev. Pablo Odén Marichal, Executive Secretary of the Cuban Council of Churches and Vice-President of the Evangelical Theological Seminary of Matanzas, Cuba, stated that “protestant churches have been a means of cultural penetration in Cuban society” and given this reality he urged for “a greater strengthening of the ethical and behavioral work of the faith toward the community of believers and society, based on human and patriotic values.”

Marichal emphasized greater participation of the inter-faith movement and churches in the search for solutions to problems facing Cuban society, such as an aging population. He stated, “We must revive Fidel’s idea of a strategic alliance between revolutionary Christians and Marxists, for which permanent dialogue is necessary.”

Díaz-Canel, the government Minister, commented on the importance of transmitting this historic occasion to the current generation in order to strengthen dialogue and unity among Cubans. He described the meeting as an encounter of faith, friendship and memories. He said, “It is touching to remember all those moments – lack of understanding at times which was later overcome through respectful dialogue.”

He also expressed the desire to address concerns about Cuba’s social and economic order, as well as challenges being faced in the struggle to strengthen and promote social values “in order to prevent the establishment of a base of neocolonial and neoliberal capitalist reconstruction. This is the struggle we must assume, strip away all the pseudo culture, all the banality and selfishness and individualism,” he concluded.

The First Meeting in 1984

In 2007 I heard directly from Rev. Raúl Suárez about the circumstances surrounding the first meeting between Cuba’s Revolutionary government and the Cuban churches. This happened when I was with a group of Westminster Presbyterian Church members from Minneapolis that visited Havana’s Martin Luther King, Jr. Center, which is affiliated with the adjacent Baptist Church, where Rev. Suárez was the pastor.

Suárez told us that in 1984 he learned that Jesse Jackson, a candidate for the Democratic nomination for President that year, was coming to Cuba. Jackson said that Fidel Castro had invited him to discuss the status of 22 U.S. citizens then being held by the Cuban Government. Jackson said that he also wanted an invitation from a Cuban church so that he could participate in a religious service in Cuba. Jackson asked Suárez, then Executive Secretary of the Cuban Council of Churches and Director of International Relations of the Cuban Baptist Church, if that would be possible. Jackson also gave Suárez a letter to provide to Castro on this issue.

Suárez then contacted Fidel, who responded that it would not be a problem even though atheism was the established “religion” in the Cuban constitution at the time.

Jackson made his trip to Cuba in June 1984 and gave a speech to 4,000 students at the University of Havana with Castro in attendance. Afterwards the two of them and their aides walked a few blocks to the nearby Methodist Church where Jackson would be preaching. As they neared the church, Suárez heard a Castro aide say to Fidel, “Take off your hat, you are close to a church.” Fidel took off his hat. Suárez was surprised by this comment and Fidel’s response. Suárez told Fidel that the people in the Plaza de Revolution (supporters of the Revolution) and the people in the church were one and welcomed Fidel to the church. Fidel said, do not ask me to preach.

There were 700 to 800 people in the church that day, including 35 church leaders and the Roman Catholic Archbishop (in 2007, a Cardinal). When Castro entered the church, the choir extemporaneously cried, “Fidel, Fidel, Fidel.” Castro did make a short speech from the pulpit with a cross behind him. (Another Cuban pastor who was present told me that Castro obviously felt uncomfortable with the Bible on the lectern and awkwardly put his hands behind his back.) Castro praised Dr. King and Jackson and said there was a need for more exchanges between the churches and the government.

Later that same day Suárez was invited to a dinner with Fidel and Jackson. This was the first time he had ever shaken Fidel’s hand, and Fidel asked him to come to the airport the next day to say goodbye to Jackson.

Soon thereafter Suárez asked for a meeting of religious leaders with Fidel and submitted to Fidel a document of concern about the official policy of atheism’s limiting the space for religion.

This resulted in a four-hour meeting between Fidel and about 14 Protestant leaders and the College of the Roman Catholic Bishops. Fidel expressed surprise at the Protestants, saying that when he was a boy in Jesuit schools, Roman Catholics disparaged Protestants. At the end of the meeting Castro made a covenant with these leaders: the churches will made an effort to understand “us” while Fidel and the Cuban Communist Party will make an effort to understand the churches. This agreement, said Fidel, should be easier for the churches than for the Party.

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[1] Díaz-Canel often is seen as a potential successor to Raúl Castro as President of Cuba.

[2] The Council was founded in 1941 as “a fellowship of churches, ecumenical groups, and other ecumenical organizations which confess Jesus Christ as Son of God and Savior, according to the holy scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, and seek to respond to their common calling, to the glory of God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.” It gives “unity to the Christian Churches of Cuba” to facilitate cooperation with other churches around the world. Its purposes include encouraging “dialogue between different movements and institutions as a means for churches to expand their ecumenical vocation of service, thus deepening their responsibilities towards society and all of God’s creation. [The Council] also promotes study, dialogue, and cooperation among Christians to increase Christian witness and enhance life in Cuba.” Its membership now includes 22 churches, 12 ecumenical groups and centers, 3 observers and 7 fraternal associates.