Tag: John Kavulich

U.S. House Hearing on Cuban Private Enterprise  

On January 18, the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs held a hearing that opened with its chair, Rep. Maria Elvira Salazar (Rep., FL), delivering a speech entitled “The Myth of the New Cuban Entrepreneurs: An Analysis of the Biden Administration’s Cuba Policy.”[1]

Salazar said, “according to information she has, the growth of private enterprises in Cuba is a ‘scheme’ by the Cuban government to violate the U.S. embargo and that only the children of Cuban leaders have an easy path to own these businesses.” That comment was echoed by Rep. Mark Green, a Tennessee Republican, saying, “the Cuban military is embedded in every single business, so the concept of a private sector is almost non-existent in the country.”

At the end of the hearing, however, after hearing about the Biden Administration’s position discussed below, Salazar “seemed to have softened her initial stance, telling the State Department officials that Republicans are ‘on the same page.’ Apparently contradicting her early views, she asked, “How can we help this administration really help those small business owners in Cuba that have no contact or connection with the regime to open up a good store if they want or to own a privately owned business? What can we do together?”

The Biden Administration’s Position on Cuban Private Enterprise

Eric Jacobstein, deputy assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere Affairs, testified at the hearing, “In an acute twist of irony, the island’s communist government must now rely on private enterprise to provide food and basic services for its people. We believe the organic expansion of the private sector on the island – led by the Cuban people themselves and not by any foreign government – is an opportunity that should not be wasted. Above all, we must encourage the freedom of Cuban citizens to define their economic future. Failing to engage and support Cuba’s private sector would leave space for Russia and the [People’s Republic of China] to shape the direction of the Cuban economy. We must not allow this to happen.”

Jacobstein added, “We believe the organic expansion of the private sector on the island – led by the Cuban people themselves and not by any foreign government – is an opportunity that should not be wasted. Above all, we must encourage the freedom of Cuban citizens to define their economic future. Failing to engage and support Cuba’s private sector would leave space for Russia and the [People’s Republic of China] to shape the direction of the Cuban economy. We must not allow this to happen.” Moreover, “the private businesses give some young Cubans reasons to stay on the island despite the challenges. . . . In an acute twist of irony, the island’s communist government must now rely on private enterprise to provide food and basic services for its people,”

Enrique Roig, the deputy assistant secretary in the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, said that “the Biden administration is not solely focused on supporting independent private entrepreneurs but also on improving the human-rights situation on the island. In particular, the administration has pushed for the release of about 1,000 political prisoners.”

Rep. Joaquin Castro (Dem, TX), the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, said, the U.S. should support Cuban entrepreneurial efforts, not stifle them.” He added, “Our policies of the last 60 years have not resulted in the changes we would like to see; in some cases, they have even emboldened the Cuban government and strengthened their relationship with key adversaries like China and Russia. The United States can both recognize the threat that the Cuban regime poses to regional and national security while also engaging on key priorities and supporting the Cuban people’s efforts to further their own democratic aspirations.” This includes embracing “former President Barack Obama’s engagement policies, including removing Cuba from the list of countries that sponsor terrorism,” calling it ‘a baseless, extremely harmful designation.’

California Democrat Sydney Kamlager-Dove said that the denial that the Cuban private sector truly exists was a “conspiracy theory.”

Other Comments on Cuban Private Enterprises

Before the hearing, John Kavulich, the president of the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, a Washington-based organization tracking business with Cuba, wrote in the Cubatrade blog, “The hearing premise is established on a falsehood” and that it is “wrong” to define those who have created and manage the private enterprises “as participants in a myth, as dupes of the government … rather than instruments of change. [The Cuban government] “does not embrace the re-emerging private sector. It’s tolerated. That should not mean the United States Congress should dismiss it. Or worse, work against it. “

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[1] Torres, Republicans and Democrats in Congress clash over the existence of the private sector in Cuba, Miami Herald (Jan. 18, 2024),

 

Cuba’s Current Economic and Political Crises

Introduction[1]

At least by early December 2023, it was evident that Cuba was experiencing a horrible economic crisis. One commentator put it this way: “Cuba is going through the worst crisis it has experienced in decades, with widespread shortages of food and medicines, rolling blackouts and a sky-high 400% annual inflation rate. The calls on the communist leadership to open up the economy to the market are getting loud, even from close political allies.”

t also was a Cuban political crisis on how to respond to this economic crisis.  As John Kavulich, the president of the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council based in New York City, said in early December, Cuban “bureaucrats have become more reluctant to take risks since there is uncertainty about who is really in charge.” They are “either frightened or untrusting, and certainly not risk-takers.”

The most vivid criticism of this situation came from Roberto Alvarez-Quinones, a Cuban journalist, economist and historian who after working in Cuba for Granma and Cuban television stations has been doing that work in Los Angeles, California. He said, “Never in the history of the entire West has there been such an overwhelming economic and social crisis that it has affected practically 99% of the total population of a country, without having been caused by a natural catastrophe or a war, but by the Government of the nation.”

Cuban Government’s Response[2]

 At a December 20-22, 2023, meeting of Cuba’s National Assembly, the Minister of the economy and planning, Alejandro Gil Fernandez, reported that for 2023 Cuba’s GDP fell almost 2%; exports were $770 million below predictions; food production was less than that for 2022;  tourism, although more than the prior year, had a yield only 69% of the 2019 figures; overall production was down; there were shortages of supplies and fuels; and health care and education sectors where harmed by loss of workers to emigration.

Fernandez attributed Cuba’s inflation to international price hikes, the government’s release of money to finance its budget deficit, fewer goods being produced, the agricultural sector being burdened by labor shortages, high costs and low yields and Cuba being forced to import over 70% of the food that [was] being consumed.

Prime Minister Manuel Marrero Cruz said the government’s lack of control over production and distribution “adversely affects production by state entities and lets currency exchanges on the illegal market determine the pricing of products from the non-state sector.”

President Diaz-Canel, of course, criticized the U.S. embargo (blockade), but admitted that the Cuban government had made some errors in the “design and implementation of currency unification,” “approving new economic actors without performance norms having been established” and “the complexity of making decisions in a context of extreme tension [and of] commitment to preserving social conquests.”

All of these “difficult realities” were summarized by W.T. Whitney, Jr. (an U.S. political journalist focusing on Latin America) as “the adverse effects of diminished tourism, inflation, and emigration; social inequalities based on varying access to resources; production stymied by shortages of resources; inadequate food production; lack of buying-power for most Cubans, and for importing necessary goods; and the near impossibility of securing foreign investment.”

To meet these problems, Whitney said, Cuba was preparing these responses: “further decentralization of political and economic administration; cutbacks on the expenditure of central government funds; reduced subsidies for the purchase of water, fuel, transport, and electricity by business entities; adjustment of import tariffs to favor the availability of resources for production; capturing more tourist dollars; protecting state-operated production entities; fixing prices; and producing more food.”

Moreover, Whitney said, the U.S. needs to cancel its embargo (blockade) of Cuba and remove Cuba from the U.S. list of countries that are sponsors of international terrorism.

Criticism of Cuban Government Responses[3]

Javier Perex Capdevila, Doctor of Economic Sciences and Professor at the University of Guantanamo, said the Government measures are based on cutting subsidies, but “there are no measures to get out of economic stagnation and . . . to reduce inflation, accompanied by a fiscal deficit that entails generating more liquid money which does not stimulate the economy, but rather inflation. The measures that have been announced in a confusing and ambiguous manner are supposed to achieve macroeconomic stabilization, but that is not a real solution . . and there is no guarantee that they will work.”

In addition. Capdevila noted that increases in long-distance transportation rates will adversely affect many people who have to use such transportation to reach competent medical personnel. He said, “You cannot save a country if you do not save the people.”

Pedro Monreal, a Cuban economist, criticized the purported justification for increasing black market prices for currencies by saying the government had not designed that market. Monreal said this was “a fig leaf to cover up the poor design of the ‘organization that made this informal market necessary.’”   The Cuban State did something worse in 2020 when “it designed a defective official exchange market with an overvalued [peso].” Monreal also “predicted more inflation” this year with a government deficit of 18.5% of gross domestic product.

Cuban economist Emilio Morales commented on the continued emigration of Cubans in 2023 while there was a 3.3% decrease in remittances to those on the island due to the need for those now in other countries to pay for their outbound transportation and expenses of living in other countries on their “march for family freedom.” Morales concluded that this result shows “the systemic crisis demands radical reforms and the entrenchment of the mafia regime in its totalitarian model blocks any possibility of survival. History teaches that bayonets cannot sustain a regime for long, indefinitely without fundamental reforms.”

The most recent news about Cuba’s laws affecting private enterprises was the January 16th announcement of new income tax regulations. Now “private sector employees will have to pay a 20% income tax on earnings above 30,000 Cuban pesos, about $109 per month. That’s a 15% tax rate increase from the previous scale set up in 2021, which imposed a 5% income tax for earnings over 9,510 Cuban pesos. Business owners must automatically deduct the tax payments monthly, the decree says.”

This recent announcement is in addition to the tax burden on Cuban private businesses: 35% tax on profits, a 10% tax on sales or services provided, a 5% payroll tax, a one percent revenue tax to support local governments and contributions to social security equal to 14% of workers’ salaries. Owners of the [private businesses] also have to pay up to 20% taxes on dividends.

Such private businesses “cannot hire more than 100 employees, they cannot be involved in economic activities handled by the state, such as telecommunications, and must import products and supplies through state companies working as intermediaries. According to the new regulations published this week, they can also be hit with price controls at any time ‘when circumstances advise it to achieve more favorable prices for the population.’”

At about the same time as this announcement of new taxes on private enterprises, the Cuban government announced a new “’ethics code’ for government officials and members of the Communist Party and similar organizations that mandate them to ‘be faithful to socialism,’ fight against the ‘genocidal’ U.S. embargo and ‘be loyal to the Cuban Communist Party, the Revolution… and to the Revolution´s Commander in Chief, Fidel Castro.”

Conclusion[4]

This blog consistently has advocated for U.S. repeal of the embargo (blockade) of Cuba and the U.S. designation of Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism. However, all of the blame for Cuba’s current crises cannot be attributed to these U.S. measures. Indeed, the U.S. now is the sixth largest exporter to Cuba.

Moreover, now the U.S. is preoccupied with the Israel-Hamas and the Russia-Ukraine wars, problems with Iran, North Korea, China, Yemen and the Red Sea and the problems created by large number of immigrants at our southwestern border. As a result, the U.S. does not have the time and resources to devote to Cuba’s problems and U.S. policies regarding same.

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[1] Analysis of Cuba’s Current Economic Crisis, dwkcommentaries.com (Dec. 5, 2023); Almost All Cubans Suffer Worst Economic Crisis in the History of the Western Hemisphere, dwkcommentaries.com (Dec. 11, 2023);

[2] Whitney, A revolution in trouble: Cuba’s government, People’s World (Jan 8, 2024).

[3] ‘You can’t save a country if you don’t save the people.’ a Cuban economics doctor explodes in response to the package, Diario de Cuba (Jan. 13, 2024); Another rise in the price of the dollar and the euro on the Cuban black market, Diario de Cuba (Jan. 15, 2024); Emigration grows, but remittances to Cuba sink, Diario de Cuba (Jan. 16, 2024);Through resolutions, the Castro regime intends to stop the astronomical fiscal deficit that it approved, Diario de Cuba (Jan. 17, 2024); Reyes, The economic package opens a political crisis in the Government of Cuba, Diario de Cuba (Jan. 17, 2024); Torres, As the economy craters, the Cuban government hits private-sector workers with tax hike, Miami Herald (Jan. 18, 2024).

[4] E.g., posts listed in sections “Cuba: State Sponsor of Terrorism?” and “U.S. Embargo of Cuba” in List of Posts to dwkcommentaries—Topical: CUBA [as of 5/4/20]; Cuba Still on U.S. List of State Sponsors of Terrorism, dwkcommentaries.com (Dec. 2, 2023);U.S. Senators and Representatives Demand Ending of U.S. Designation of Cuba as State Sponsor of Terrorism, dwkcommentaries.com (Jan. 12, 2024); COMMENT: Another Congressman Calls for Ending Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, dwkcommentaries.com (Jan.13, 2024); U.S. Increasing Exports to Cuba, dwkcommentaries.com (Jan. 12, 2024).

Analysis of Cuba’s Current Economic Crisis 

“Cuba is going through the worst crisis it has experienced in decades, with widespread shortages of food and medicines, rolling blackouts and a sky-high 400% annual inflation rate. The calls on the communist leadership to open up the economy to the market are getting loud, even from close political allies.”[1]

“But deep divisions at the top of the regime regarding how much freedom to give the new private sector, compounded by a leadership vacuum, are creating paralysis and keeping the country from adopting broader market reforms.”

“Among the people most opposed to any change that smacks of capitalism are hardliners who have the most invested in the regime that has ruled Cuba since 1959: Men in their 90s, with deep roots in the Revolution and historic ties to Castro, who still serve in high-profile positions and who enjoy a standard of living vastly superior to the average Cuban. They resist market reforms, seeing them as a betrayal of Marxist ideology and a challenge to continuing authoritarian rule.”

“Carlos Alzugaray, a former Cuban diplomat who lives in Cuba [and who participated in] an event organized by the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies at Harvard University in October, said, “The country’s top leadership is made up of people who have very dogmatic views of reality and are very attached to certain things from the past. A closed ideological vision prevails in many sectors, in people from the old guard like Ramiro Valdés or in new people like Díaz-Canel.” He also criticized the island’s “immense Cuban bureaucracy that enjoys much discretionary power in implementing changes.”

This point was echoed by John Kavulich, the president of the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, a New York group monitoring business with Cuba, who has three decades of experience dealing with Cuban government officials. He said, “bureaucrats have become more reluctant to take risks since there is uncertainty about who is really in charge.” They are “either frightened or untrusting, and certainly not risk-takers.”

Observers say that there are at least the following centers of power in Cuba:

  • “The administrative branch of the government, including Díaz-Canel, Prime Minister Marrero, the Council of Ministers, the individual ministries and big state-owned companies.
  • The Communist Party, “the superior leading political force of society and the State,” according to the country’s 2019 Constitution.
  • GAESA, a vast business conglomerate run by the military, which runs most of the island’s economy, especially the tourism industry.
  • The military itself, which manages other industries outside GAESA and has developed close relations with the Russian and Chinese military, and whose generals and other top current and former officials hold leadership positions across the government.
  • The Interior Ministry, which oversees the police, the state security apparatus, and intelligence and counterintelligence agencies. The intelligence services have the most to fear from a transition to a market economy that could bring demands for regime change.”

The military is believed by many to have the upper hand. “They exert notable influence not just by commanding the armed forces and security agencies but also through GAESA, whose finances are believed to be untouchable, even by the Ministry of the Economy. The generals have seats in all the major decision-making bodies, including the Communist Party’s Politburo, the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers. The country’s prime minister, Marrero, is a former army colonel who later served as tourism minister. Ultimately, the military may see the private sector as an unwelcome competitor.”

“Government officials, generals and Communist Party leaders have heavily courted traditional allies like Russia, China and Belarus, hoping for a lifeline to keep the economy afloat without giving more space to capitalism. That strategy worked well for Fidel Castro, who struck a deal with Soviet leaders in the early days of the Revolution that resulted in billions of dollars in subsidies during the Cold War.”

“’There seems to be a sort of paralysis and a lack of clear hierarchy in the decision-making process that has grown worse in the last couple of years,’ said a source who has interacted with the island’s authorities over the years to help American companies do business with Cuba and who asked to remain anonymous to speak about meetings with Cuban officials. ‘What was once a fairly clear power hierarchy is now sort of a patchwork, and it’s a guessing game as to why a proposal is getting denied and who is making this decision. And that’s a fundamental change.’”

Some people involved in the private sector “believe Díaz-Canel understands the need to expand the private sector. But he lacks the power to push reforms, despite his position at the top of the Communist Party.”

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[1] Torres, As Cuba’s economy craters and private businesses grow, here’s what’s holding up change, Miami Herald (Dec. 5, 2023).

State Department Creates Cuba Internet Task  Force and Suspends Enforcement of Statutory Liability for Trafficking in Certain Cuban Expropriated Property 

This week the U.S. State Department has taken two actions regarding Cuba: (1) creation of the Cuba Internet Task Force and (2) granting another six-month extension of the right of U.S. persons to sue traffickers in U.S. property that was expropriated by the Cuban government.

U.S.’ Cuba Internet Task Force.

On January 23, the U.S. Department of State issued a terse announcement that it “is convening a Cuba Internet Task Force composed of U.S. government and non-governmental representatives to promote the free and unregulated flow of information in Cuba. The task force will examine the technological challenges and opportunities for expanding internet access and independent media in Cuba.” The announcement also stated that the first public meeting of the Task force would be on February 7.[1]

This action was pursuant to President Trump’s June 16, 2017’s National Security Presidential Memorandum on Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba that he dramatically signed at a public meeting in the Little Havana district of Miami, Florida. The purpose of that document was to announce various policies “to promote a stable, prosperous, and free country for the Cuban people. . . . [to] channel funds toward the Cuban people and away from a regime that has failed to meet the most basic requirements of a free and just society [and to condemn abuses by the Cuban regime]. . . . [The] Administration will continue to evaluate its policies so as to improve human rights, encourage the rule of law, foster free markets and free enterprise, and promote democracy in Cuba.” (Section 1)[2]

More specifically Section 2 (d) of that Presidential Memorandum stated that the U.S. was to “Amplify efforts to support the Cuban people through the expansion of internet services, free press, free enterprise, free association, and lawful travel.”

The creation of the Task Force was criticized by Michael Bustamante, an assistant professor of Latin American history at Florida International University. He said, “By casting the issue of internet access in an explicitly political frame, it will only create greater obstacles for those U.S. telecom companies that have made inroads toward partnerships with the Cuban side. Measures like these strengthen the hand of those in Cuba for whom the prospect (and reality) of external meddling justifies maximum caution with respect to internal reform.”

Cuba immediately registered strong objections to the creation of this Task Force with good reason.[3]

Granma, the official newspaper of the Communist Party of Cuba, said, “In the past phrases like promoting “’freedom of speech’ and ‘expanding access to the internet in Cuba’ have been used by Washington as a pretext for schemes to destabilize the country using new technologies.”

One of Granma’s journalists, Sergio Gómez, declared, “If the administration of President Donald Trump intends to use new technologies to impose changes in the internal order of Cuba, he chose very old roads that have already demonstrated their ineffectiveness, without mentioning the obvious fact that they violate the laws of the affected country. even those of the United States.” Moreover, the “terrain chosen for the new aggression, Internet, clearly demonstrates what the true objectives of Washington are when it demands ‘ree access’  to the network in the countries that oppose it, while in its territory it maintains a tracking system and accumulation of data about what citizens do on the web.”

Gómez also asserted that the U.S. “shows a clear pattern of the use of social networks and the internet with objectives geopolitical and domination. All part of a doctrine of unconventional war designed to destabilize nations without the direct use of military forces, which has taken root after the failures in the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.”

In another article, Gómez added details about Cuba’s expanded Internet access apparently to reject the implicit premise of the U.S. announcement that Cuba was continuing to suffer from lack of such access. Gomez said, “Cuba, by sovereign decision and to the extent of its economic possibilities, is increasing the access of its citizens to the network of networks. According to information provided by specialist Rosa Miriam Alizada, ‘2017 will be remembered as the boom in the expansion of access to the network in our country, with 40% of Cubans connected to the Internet, 37% more than in 2010, and for the naturalization of the internet connection in urban spaces from one end of the island to the other.’”

Another Cuban journalist with a Doctorate in Political Science from the University of Havana, Randy Alfonso Falcón, reported this was not the first time the U.S. had attempted to use the Internet regarding Cuba. On February 14, 2006, then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice created the Global Internet Freedom Task Force for “maximizing freedom of expression and free flow of information and ideas, especially in Cuba, Iran and China. The author also asserts that this general strategy was continued in the Obama administration.

Therefore, Falcón believes, “In the face of US action In the Cuban digital public space, our response cannot be merely defensive. We must look forward with a scientifically based vision that mobilizes responses and alternatives from Cuba to the extraordinary ideological and cultural confrontation that arises. Take by assault, from the knowledge, the tools of the new colonizers, build ours and endow them with symbols and emancipating essences.”

Suspension of Right To Sue Over Trafficking in Expropriated Property[4]

On January 24, the day after the creation of the Task Force, the State Department announced that once again it was suspending for six months the right to bring a legal action under Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (a/k/a the Helms-Burton Law).

That Title III in section 302 states, “any person that . . . traffics in property which was confiscated by the Cuban Government on or after January 1, 1959, shall be liable to any United States national who owns the claim to such property for money damages.”

Since its adoption in 1996, however, Title III has been suspended for consecutive six-month periods by orders of Presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama and now Donald Trump. These suspensions have been made to avoid risking the alienation of U.S. setting legal precedents that contradict other principles of U.S. or international law and opening the door to a potential flood of claims.

John Kavulich, president of the United States-Cuba Economic and Trade Council, said last year that this clause could be “used as a surgical tool to pressure” governments and foreign companies to encourage the Government of Cuba to resolve the 5,913 certified claims that there is in the United States ,” for a total amount of $1.9 billion (with interest).

As previous posts have explained, Cuba recognizes its obligation under international law to pay reasonable compensation for expropriation of property owned by foreigners and in fact has done so for claimants from other countries. Thus, Cuba has conceded the major premise of any I.S. claim for damages for expropriation. In addition, this blog has suggested that the dispute over compensation for expropriation of property owned by Americans be submitted for resolution by an international arbitration tribunal. Presumably the only issue that might be disputed is the value of the property at the time of the expropriation and the amount of interest thereon.[5]

Conclusion

U.S. citizens who support U.S.-Cuba normalization now must see who is appointed to the Cuba Internet Task Force and what it proposes to do. For this blogger, the Task force is based on the erroneous premise that the U.S. may and should unilaterally decide what Internet facilities and access another country should have and unilaterally provide such facilities and technology.  Instead, the U.S. should seek to negotiate bilateral agreements with other countries to cooperate on such issues.

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[1] U.S. State Dep’t, Creation of the Cuba Internet Task Force (Jan. 23, 2018); Reuters, State Department creates Cuba Internet Task Force (Jan.23, 2018); Torres, Trump administration wants to expand internet access in Cuba, Miami Herald (Ja. 23, 2018).

[2] President Trump Announces Reversal of Some U.S.-Cuba Normalization Policies, dwkcommentaries.com (June 19, 2017).   Surprisingly this Presidential Memorandum is no longer available on the White House website.

[3] Washington creates Internet Task Force to promote subversion in Cuba, Granma (Jan. 24, 2018); Gomez, The United States takes up failed policies towards Cuba, Granma (Jan. 23, 2018); Gomez, United States creates a new Task Force on the Internet for subversion in Cuba, Granma (Jan. 24, 2018).  See also posts cited in the “U.S. Democracy Promotion in Cuba” section of List of Posts to the List of Posts to dwkcommentaries.com—Topical: CUBA.

[4]  U.S. State Dep’t, United States Determination of Six Months’ Suspension Under Title III of Libertad (Jan. 24, 2018); Provision that allows Cuban Americans to sue for confiscated property in Cuba is suspended, Miami Herald (Jan. 24, 2018); Trump suspends for another six months the clause of the Helms Burton that allows expropriation lawsuits, Diario de Cuba (Jan. 24, 2018); Falcón, The US strategy for Cuba in the digital public space, CubaDebate (Jan, 24, 208).

[5]  See Resolution of U.S. and Cuba’s Damage Claims, dwkcommentaries.com (April 6, 2015); Resolving U.S. and Cuba Damage Claims, dwkcommentaries.com (Dec. 13, 2015).