Cuba’s Current Economic and Political Crises

Introduction[1]

At least by early December 2023, it was evident that Cuba was experiencing a horrible economic crisis. One commentator put it this way: “Cuba is going through the worst crisis it has experienced in decades, with widespread shortages of food and medicines, rolling blackouts and a sky-high 400% annual inflation rate. The calls on the communist leadership to open up the economy to the market are getting loud, even from close political allies.”

t also was a Cuban political crisis on how to respond to this economic crisis.  As John Kavulich, the president of the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council based in New York City, said in early December, Cuban “bureaucrats have become more reluctant to take risks since there is uncertainty about who is really in charge.” They are “either frightened or untrusting, and certainly not risk-takers.”

The most vivid criticism of this situation came from Roberto Alvarez-Quinones, a Cuban journalist, economist and historian who after working in Cuba for Granma and Cuban television stations has been doing that work in Los Angeles, California. He said, “Never in the history of the entire West has there been such an overwhelming economic and social crisis that it has affected practically 99% of the total population of a country, without having been caused by a natural catastrophe or a war, but by the Government of the nation.”

Cuban Government’s Response[2]

 At a December 20-22, 2023, meeting of Cuba’s National Assembly, the Minister of the economy and planning, Alejandro Gil Fernandez, reported that for 2023 Cuba’s GDP fell almost 2%; exports were $770 million below predictions; food production was less than that for 2022;  tourism, although more than the prior year, had a yield only 69% of the 2019 figures; overall production was down; there were shortages of supplies and fuels; and health care and education sectors where harmed by loss of workers to emigration.

Fernandez attributed Cuba’s inflation to international price hikes, the government’s release of money to finance its budget deficit, fewer goods being produced, the agricultural sector being burdened by labor shortages, high costs and low yields and Cuba being forced to import over 70% of the food that [was] being consumed.

Prime Minister Manuel Marrero Cruz said the government’s lack of control over production and distribution “adversely affects production by state entities and lets currency exchanges on the illegal market determine the pricing of products from the non-state sector.”

President Diaz-Canel, of course, criticized the U.S. embargo (blockade), but admitted that the Cuban government had made some errors in the “design and implementation of currency unification,” “approving new economic actors without performance norms having been established” and “the complexity of making decisions in a context of extreme tension [and of] commitment to preserving social conquests.”

All of these “difficult realities” were summarized by W.T. Whitney, Jr. (an U.S. political journalist focusing on Latin America) as “the adverse effects of diminished tourism, inflation, and emigration; social inequalities based on varying access to resources; production stymied by shortages of resources; inadequate food production; lack of buying-power for most Cubans, and for importing necessary goods; and the near impossibility of securing foreign investment.”

To meet these problems, Whitney said, Cuba was preparing these responses: “further decentralization of political and economic administration; cutbacks on the expenditure of central government funds; reduced subsidies for the purchase of water, fuel, transport, and electricity by business entities; adjustment of import tariffs to favor the availability of resources for production; capturing more tourist dollars; protecting state-operated production entities; fixing prices; and producing more food.”

Moreover, Whitney said, the U.S. needs to cancel its embargo (blockade) of Cuba and remove Cuba from the U.S. list of countries that are sponsors of international terrorism.

Criticism of Cuban Government Responses[3]

Javier Perex Capdevila, Doctor of Economic Sciences and Professor at the University of Guantanamo, said the Government measures are based on cutting subsidies, but “there are no measures to get out of economic stagnation and . . . to reduce inflation, accompanied by a fiscal deficit that entails generating more liquid money which does not stimulate the economy, but rather inflation. The measures that have been announced in a confusing and ambiguous manner are supposed to achieve macroeconomic stabilization, but that is not a real solution . . and there is no guarantee that they will work.”

In addition. Capdevila noted that increases in long-distance transportation rates will adversely affect many people who have to use such transportation to reach competent medical personnel. He said, “You cannot save a country if you do not save the people.”

Pedro Monreal, a Cuban economist, criticized the purported justification for increasing black market prices for currencies by saying the government had not designed that market. Monreal said this was “a fig leaf to cover up the poor design of the ‘organization that made this informal market necessary.’”   The Cuban State did something worse in 2020 when “it designed a defective official exchange market with an overvalued [peso].” Monreal also “predicted more inflation” this year with a government deficit of 18.5% of gross domestic product.

Cuban economist Emilio Morales commented on the continued emigration of Cubans in 2023 while there was a 3.3% decrease in remittances to those on the island due to the need for those now in other countries to pay for their outbound transportation and expenses of living in other countries on their “march for family freedom.” Morales concluded that this result shows “the systemic crisis demands radical reforms and the entrenchment of the mafia regime in its totalitarian model blocks any possibility of survival. History teaches that bayonets cannot sustain a regime for long, indefinitely without fundamental reforms.”

The most recent news about Cuba’s laws affecting private enterprises was the January 16th announcement of new income tax regulations. Now “private sector employees will have to pay a 20% income tax on earnings above 30,000 Cuban pesos, about $109 per month. That’s a 15% tax rate increase from the previous scale set up in 2021, which imposed a 5% income tax for earnings over 9,510 Cuban pesos. Business owners must automatically deduct the tax payments monthly, the decree says.”

This recent announcement is in addition to the tax burden on Cuban private businesses: 35% tax on profits, a 10% tax on sales or services provided, a 5% payroll tax, a one percent revenue tax to support local governments and contributions to social security equal to 14% of workers’ salaries. Owners of the [private businesses] also have to pay up to 20% taxes on dividends.

Such private businesses “cannot hire more than 100 employees, they cannot be involved in economic activities handled by the state, such as telecommunications, and must import products and supplies through state companies working as intermediaries. According to the new regulations published this week, they can also be hit with price controls at any time ‘when circumstances advise it to achieve more favorable prices for the population.’”

At about the same time as this announcement of new taxes on private enterprises, the Cuban government announced a new “’ethics code’ for government officials and members of the Communist Party and similar organizations that mandate them to ‘be faithful to socialism,’ fight against the ‘genocidal’ U.S. embargo and ‘be loyal to the Cuban Communist Party, the Revolution… and to the Revolution´s Commander in Chief, Fidel Castro.”

Conclusion[4]

This blog consistently has advocated for U.S. repeal of the embargo (blockade) of Cuba and the U.S. designation of Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism. However, all of the blame for Cuba’s current crises cannot be attributed to these U.S. measures. Indeed, the U.S. now is the sixth largest exporter to Cuba.

Moreover, now the U.S. is preoccupied with the Israel-Hamas and the Russia-Ukraine wars, problems with Iran, North Korea, China, Yemen and the Red Sea and the problems created by large number of immigrants at our southwestern border. As a result, the U.S. does not have the time and resources to devote to Cuba’s problems and U.S. policies regarding same.

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[1] Analysis of Cuba’s Current Economic Crisis, dwkcommentaries.com (Dec. 5, 2023); Almost All Cubans Suffer Worst Economic Crisis in the History of the Western Hemisphere, dwkcommentaries.com (Dec. 11, 2023);

[2] Whitney, A revolution in trouble: Cuba’s government, People’s World (Jan 8, 2024).

[3] ‘You can’t save a country if you don’t save the people.’ a Cuban economics doctor explodes in response to the package, Diario de Cuba (Jan. 13, 2024); Another rise in the price of the dollar and the euro on the Cuban black market, Diario de Cuba (Jan. 15, 2024); Emigration grows, but remittances to Cuba sink, Diario de Cuba (Jan. 16, 2024);Through resolutions, the Castro regime intends to stop the astronomical fiscal deficit that it approved, Diario de Cuba (Jan. 17, 2024); Reyes, The economic package opens a political crisis in the Government of Cuba, Diario de Cuba (Jan. 17, 2024); Torres, As the economy craters, the Cuban government hits private-sector workers with tax hike, Miami Herald (Jan. 18, 2024).

[4] E.g., posts listed in sections “Cuba: State Sponsor of Terrorism?” and “U.S. Embargo of Cuba” in List of Posts to dwkcommentaries—Topical: CUBA [as of 5/4/20]Cuba Still on U.S. List of State Sponsors of Terrorism, dwkcommentaries.com (Dec. 2, 2023);U.S. Senators and Representatives Demand Ending of U.S. Designation of Cuba as State Sponsor of Terrorism, dwkcommentaries.com (Jan. 12, 2024); COMMENT: Another Congressman Calls for Ending Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, dwkcommentaries.com (Jan.13, 2024); U.S. Increasing Exports to Cuba, dwkcommentaries.com (Jan. 12, 2024).

Economists Discuss Cuba’s Current Economic and Political Situation

On July 28, Cuba’s “Current Economic and Political Situation” was the opening session of the annual meeting of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, a U.S. non-political, non-profit organization dedicated to promoting “research, publications, and scholarly discussion on the Cuban economy in its broadest sense, including on the social, economic, legal, and environmental aspects of a transition to a free market economy and a democratic society in Cuba.”[1]

The presenters at this session were (1) Joaquín P. Pujol, International Monetary Fund (retired); (2) Omar Everleny Pérez Villanueva, Cuban Economist, Temas Magazine;[2] and (3) Jorge R. Pińón, Researcher, Center for International Energy and Environmental Policy, University of Texas at Austin.

Economists’ Comments

Joaquín P. Pujol discussed “Cuba: Great Expectations, but How Real Are They?” Cuba is facing problems in servicing its foreign debt, unifying its unwieldy dual currency system, fixing its decrepit infrastructure and promoting sluggish foreign investment. “The Cuban government now finds itself again in need of foreign financing and they’re not going to get it. In fact, it has turned to Miami” as Cuban relatives and friends have become an important source of funding for small start-up businesses in Cuba.

Omar Everleny Pérez Villanueva discussed “Cuba: Economia y Desafios” [Cuba: Economy and Challenges]. Although the government has projected the Cuban economy will grow by 1 percent this year, “I’m not sure it will reach that this year.”

Even though final figures for 2015 haven’t been announced yet, he said Cuba would show a deficit in goods and services trade. And even though tourism is growing briskly, he said taking into account expenditures in the tourism sector, the yield can be disappointing.

Jorge R. Pińón’s subject was “Cuba’s Energy Crisis: Truth or Fiction?” Faced with mounting energy problems, Cuban officials announced strict energy savings measures at state enterprises earlier this month in hopes of avoiding blackouts during the sweltering summer months. Officials have said Cuba will have to cut fuel consumption by 28 percent during the second half of the year.

Cuba produces about 50,000 barrels of crude oil a day and has relied on Venezuela for the other 80,000 to 90,000 daily barrels it needs. But with Venezuela on the ropes economically, continued oil supplies are uncertain. Indeed, over the last six months, he said, total Venezuelan oil production has come dangerously close to dropping below 2 million barrels a day. “In our business that’s catastrophic.”

“As of last week there was enough oil . . . [in Cuba] to keep the lights on,” Piñón said. “June and July deliveries were sufficient.”

Some analysts, looking only at declines in oil arriving in Cuba directly from Venezuela, have predicted an even worse outlook for the island, but Cuba also receives oil from offshore Venezuelan facilities.

Cuba also has been stockpiling oil, and there is an estimated 60-day supply on the island. The question is what happens with Venezuelan deliveries in August and September. “The [economic] hurricane is coming in Venezuela and it’s a Category 5 hurricane. The question is: Will it hit Cuba?”

Already hours have been cut for some state workers, fleets at nonessential enterprises have been parked and some neighborhoods have reported blackouts, drawing comparisons to the 1990s “special period” when after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of its generous subsidies, there were severe shortages in Cuba in everything from fuel to food.

Indeed, Raúl Castro in his recent speech to the National Assembly said, “There is speculation and rumors of an imminent collapse of our economy and a return to the acute phase of the special period.” Raúl Castro said during a recent speech to Cuba’s National Assembly. But he said the island was “in better conditions than we were then to face them.”[3]

The surge in Cuban tourism and the growth of private enterprise also is putting more pressure on Cuba’s energy sector. About 68 percent of oil consumption in Cuba is fuel oil for its inefficient electrical power sector. The government has said it will protect the tourism sector and private businesses from cutbacks.

If Venezuelan oil supplies dry up, it’s unlikely Cuba would be able to find another benefactor like Venezuela in Algeria, Angola, Russia, China or any other country, forcing it to go to the world market to buy about $1 billion worth of petroleum annually.

In recent years, Cuba has actually been receiving more oil from Venezuela than it needs and has been selling the excess on the world market as refined petroleum products. But Piñón suggests it would be cheaper and more efficient for Cuba to shut down its refineries and buy gasoline and jet fuel than buying crude and refining it.

Other Gloomy Outlooks [4]

An even gloomier outlook was voiced by Pavel Vidal, a former Cuban central bank employee who is now a professor at Colombia’s Pontificia Universidad Javeriana Cali. He said, “Under current conditions, [Cuban] gross domestic product will dip into negative territory this year and decline 2.9 per cent in 2017. If relations with Venezuela fall apart completely, GDP could decline 10 per cent.”

Another economic negative is anticipated declines in Cuba’s export of medical services (its foreign medical missions), especially to Algeria, Angola and Brazil. In 2014 such medical services earned Cuba about $8 billion or 40% of its total exports.

Karina Marrón, deputy director of Granma, has warned of possible street protests. “A perfect storm is brewing . . . this phenomenon of a cut in fuel, a cut in energy. This country can’t withstand another ’93, another ’94.”Rapid response brigades in the 1990s were formed to quell social unrest; they are now reportedly on alert.

“Just when we thought we were going forward, everything is slipping away again,” says Havana retiree Miriam Calabasa. “I am worried people are going to decide enough is enough: then what?” A mechanic, Ignacio Perez, stated, “Nothing will get better any time soon; it can only get worse. The roads won’t be paved, schools painted, the rubbish picked up, public transportation improved, and on and on.”

But foreign businesses hope these great economic challenges may speed economic opening. “Venezuela’s problems increase the chance of Cuban reforms. This government only acts when it has to,” says one Spanish investor on the island.

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[1] Whitefield, Economists debate how hard Venezuela economic storm will hit Cuba, InCubaToday (July 28, 2016).

[2] As mentioned in a prior post, Omar Everleny Perez was one of the Cuba’s best-known academics, an expert in developing economies and a consultant for Castro’s government when it launched a series of market-oriented economic reforms in 2011. This last April (three weeks after Obama’s visit to Cuba), he was fired by the University of Havana for allegedly having unauthorized conversations with foreign institutions and informing “North American representatives” about the internal procedures of the university. Perez said he believed he was fired because of his critical writings about the slow pace of economic reforms.

[3] President Castro’s recent speech to the National Assembly was discussed in a prior post. His earlier speech to the Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba also touched on Cuba’s economic problems; this speech was covered in another post.

[4] Frank, Venezuela’s Economic Woes Send a Chill Over Closest Ally Cuba, Fin. Times (July 25, 2016).

 

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