George Floyd Family’s Complaint Against the City of Minneapolis Over His Death: Count II     

As noted in a prior post, on July 15, the family of George Floyd filed a federal civil action with two claims (Counts II and III) for money damages against the City of Minneapolis. This post will discuss Count II while Count III will be covered in a subsequent post. That civil action also asserted one claim (Count I) against the four ex-police officers who were involved in Floyd’s death—Derek Chauvin, Tou Thao, Thomas Lane and J. Alexander Kueng– as discussed in another prior post.

Legal Basis [1]

Count II is asserted against the City of Minneapolis under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, which states as follows:

  • “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. . . .”

Count II also is based on so-called “Monell Liability,” which refers to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Monell v. Department of Soc. Svcs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), that held, “Local governing bodies (and local officials sued in their official capacities) can . . .be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief in those situations where, as here, the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted or promulgated by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy. In addition, local governments, like every other § 1983 “person,” may be sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental “custom” even though such custom has not received formal approval through the government’s official decision-making channels.”

Factual Allegations [2]

The Parties

“6. Plaintiff Kaarin Nelson Schaffer (“Schaffer”) resides in Hennepin county, Minnesota, and is an attorney duly licensed to practice before the State and Federal; Courts of Minnesota. On July 6, 2020, Schaffer was appointed as trustee for George Floyd’s next of kin.”

“7. Mr. Floyd is survived by next of kin including his children and siblings.”

“8. Minneapolis is and was at all times material hereto a political subdivision of the State of Minnesota, organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of Minnesota.”

“9. The Minneapolis Police Department (“MPD”) is and was at all times material hereto a Minneapolis agency, providing the vehicle through which the City fulfills its policing functions.

MPD Trains its Officers to Use Deadly force in Non-Deadly Circumstances

“86. MPD trained its officers that a ‘neck restraint’ was an authorized form of non-deadly force, and that a ‘chokehold’ was a form of deadly force capable of causing serious bodily injury and/or death.” [3]

“87. At all times material hereto, MPD defined a ‘neck restraint’ as ‘[c]ompressing one or both sides of a person’s neck with an arm or leg, without applying direct pressure to the trachea or airway (front of the neck).’ MPD defined a ‘chokehold’ as ‘applying direct pressure on a person’s trachea or airway (front of the neck).’”

“88. At all times material hereto, MPD trained its officers that a proper ‘neck Restraint’ required the officer to ‘[c]ompress veins. arteries, nerves & muscles of the neck.'”

“89. Serious bodily injury and/or death is reasonably likely to result from an officer ‘compress[ing] a person’s veins, arteries, nerves & muscles of the neck,’ regardless of whether direct pressure is applied to the front or back of the neck.”

“90. The use of a ‘neck restraint’ as defined by MPD constitutes deadly force.”

“91. The Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of deadly force in non-deadly circumstances which do not pose an immediate threat of serious bodily injury and/or death.”

“92. At all times material hereto, MPD’s written policies authorized the use of a deadly ‘neck restraint’ in non-deadly circumstances posing no immediate threat of serious bodily injury or death.”

“93. At all times material hereto, MPD trained its officers that use of a ‘neck restraint’ was authorized non-deadly force which officers could use in non-deadly situations.”

“94. It has long been known by the law enforcement community that the use of neck restraints on subjects can lead to death.”

“95. However, from at least April 15, 2012 until June 8, 2020, Minneapolis Police Department Policy 5-311 defined a neck restraint as ‘non-deadly force’ and did not warn it can cause death.”

“96. By policy, the MPD permitted and condoned the use of both conscious and unconscious neck restraints by its officers from at least April 15, 2012 until June 8, 2020.”

“97. At all times material hereto, MPD’s written policies authorized the use of a ‘neck restraint’ in non-deadly circumstances posing no immediate threat of serious bodily injury or death.”

“98. The City of Minneapolis possessed data indicating that since 2012, neck restraints/holds were used by its police officers on 428 people at an average rate of about one a week.”

“99. Of those 428 people, 14% who were subjected to a neck restraint/hold lost consciousness.”

“100. Upon information and belief, MPD officers regularly used neck restraints on passively resisting arrestees despite not being permitted to do so under policy.”

“101. Training offered by the City of Minneapolis in 2014 and received by Chauvin and Thao authorized and instructed on the use of neck restraints by officers, presented it to officers as a ‘non-deadly force’ option, and included instruction on how to employ neck restraints in order to most efficiently render subjects unconscious.”

“102. Upon information and belief, all training offered by the City of Minneapolis on the use of neck restraints, including that provided to the Defendant Officers, presented neck restraints to officers as a ‘non-deadly force’ option, and included instruction on how-to employ neck restraints in order to most efficiently render subjects unconscious.”

“103.Training offered by the City of Minneapolis to MPD officers, including the Defendant Officers, encouraged officers to “compress veins, arteries, nerves, and muscles of the neck” of arrestees.”

“104.Training materials offered to officers in 2014, including Defendants Chauvin and Thao, depict an officer placing a knee on the neck of an arrestee who is handcuffed in a prone position.”

“105. Since at least April 16, 2012, MPD policy has required that ‘[a]fter a neck restraint or choke hold has been used on a subject, sworn MPD employees shall keep them under close observation until they are released to medical or other law enforcement personnel.”

“106. Since at least April 16, 2012, the MPD failed to provide its officers with proper policy guidance and training on how to properly observe and attend to the medical needs of arrestees subjected to neck restraints.”

“107. At all times material hereto, MPD trained its officers that a ‘neck restraint’ could be used in non-deadly situations despite the fact that it constituted deadly force as utilized by MPD.”

Prone Restraint Training by the MPD and the Death of David Smith

“108. It is well known throughout the law enforcement and medical communities that holding a subject in a position of prone restraint for prolonged periods of time can be deadly.”

“109. Compressing an arrestee in a prone position with weight on their back and/or abdomen restricts their ability to breathe and can result in asphyxiation.”

“110. Deaths caused by this form of asphyxiation are often interchangeably referred to as deaths from positional, mechanical, or compression asphyxia, even if technical distinctions exist.“

“111. The United States Department of Justice has warned law enforcement for decades about the dangers of prone restraint and as early as 1995: ‘The risk of positional asphyxia is compounded when an individual with predisposing factors becomes involved in a violent struggle with an officer or officers, particularly when physical restraint includes behind-the-back handcuffing combined with placing the subject in a stomach-down position. National Law Enforcement Technology Center, Positional Asphyxia—Sudden Death at *2 (June 1995).”

“112. These dangers were acknowledged in an October 18, 2012 deposition by then-MPD Chief Timothy Dolan in addition to many other high-ranking officers in the matter of Smith v. Gorman, Case No. 11-cv-3071 (SRN/JJK).”

“113. Due to the well-known risks associated with prone restraint, it has long been national best practice that once a subject is controlled, it is imperative that they be moved from the prone position, and that their breathing be assessed.”

“114. Minneapolis has had a policy in place addressing this issue since at least May 29, 2002: ‘When ANY restraint technique is used on a subject, the subject shall not be left in a prone position and shall be placed on their side as soon as they are secured. Once the subject is secured, an officer shall watch for any of the following signs:

  • Significant change in behavior or level consciousness;
  • Shortness of breath or irregular breathing;
  • Seizures or convulsions;
  • Complaints of serious pain or injury; and/or
  • Any other serious medical problem.’

MPD Policy & Procedure Manual § 9-111.01 (emphasis in original).”

“115. Despite this knowledge, as of 2012, officers were not provided official training on the dangers of positional or mechanical asphyxia associated with prone restraint.”

“116. As of 2012, officers were trained that if a subject in a prone restraint is speaking, that they need not be concerned that the subject may be having difficulty breathing.”

“117. Despite the well-known risk of death associated with placing a subject in prolonged prone restraint, particularly without properly monitoring their medical condition, Mr. Floyd was not the first black man to be killed by MPD officers under such circumstances.”

“118. On September 9, 2010, veteran MPD Officers Timothy Gorman (“Gorman”)and Timothy Callahan (“Callahan”) responded to the Minneapolis YMCA, where David Smith (“Mr. Smith”) was experiencing the effects of mental illness.”

“119. Rather than use de-escalation techniques, Gorman and Callahan immediately went hands on with Mr. Smith and subjected him to five Taser deployments in addition to other force.”

“120. Gorman and Callahan placed Mr. Smith a prone restraint position with his hands handcuffed behind his back.”

“121. Despite Smith being handcuffed and adequately controlled, Mr. Smith was restrained in a prone position by Callahan and Gorman for at least 4 ½ minutes, with Gorman kneeling on Mr. Smith’s back and Callahan straddling Mr. Smith’s upper thigh/buttocks region.”

“122. Despite the fact that Callahan and Gorman had Smith adequately controlled, they failed to monitor Mr. Smith’s breathing or medical condition throughout their restraint of Mr. Smith.”

“123. Rather than assist Mr. Smith, Callahan berated him, calling him a ‘mother fucker.’”

“124. It was 6 and ½ minutes before either Callahan or Gorman made any effort to check on Mr. Smith’s medical condition.”

“125. Mr. Smith was pulseless, breathless, and lifeless by the time Callahan and Gorman finally made the effort to observe Mr. Smith’s medical condition.”

“126. Paramedics were able to resuscitate Mr. Smith’s heart, but he never regained consciousness and was removed from life support and officially died on September 17,2010.”

“127. Hennepin County Chief Medical Examiner Andrew Baker determined that the manner of death was homicide, and that the cause of death was anoxic encephalopathy due to or as a consequence of cardiopulmonary arrest due to or as a consequence of mechanical asphyxia.”

“128. Callahan filmed the mechanical asphyxiation of Mr. Smith on a personal and non-departmentally issued ‘pen camera’ that Callahan wore in his short pocket.”

“129. Callahan and Gorman were both aware of the fact that Callahan filmed Mr. Smith’s asphyxiation on the pen camera, yet the pen camera was intentionally concealed from MPD investigators on September 9, 2010.”

“130. Callahan did not disclose the existence of the pen camera video of Mr. Smith’s asphyxiation until nearly a week later on September 15, 2010, but was not disciplined for concealing evidence of a homicide.”

“131. MPD pretended to conduct a homicide investigation into the acts of Callahan and Gorman but made no legitimate effort to investigate the actions of the officers.”

“132. The Grand Jury no-billed Gorman and Callahan due to the complete and utter lack of investigation conducted by the MPD as to Gorman and Callahan’s conduct.”

“133. The MPD Internal Affairs Unit then conducted no legitimate investigation into Gorman and Callahan’s conduct, also concluding that the officers did nothing actionably wrong—including the hiding of evidence (i.e., the pen camera) from investigators.”

“134. The MPD failed to take any disciplinary or other remedial action towards Callahan and Gorman despite the fact that multiple high-ranking officials within the MPD observed obvious constitutional or policy violations by officers Gorman and Callahan.”

“135. The City of Minneapolis ultimately approved a substantial settlement to the family of David Smith to resolve that litigation, one of the highest amounts it had ever paid.”

“136. As part of that settlement, the City of Minneapolis “agreed to require its sworn police officers to undergo training on positional asphyxia in the 2014 training cycle of the Minneapolis Police Department…”

“137.Despite publicly stating an intent to properly instruct its officers on the risks of asphyxiation during arrest, internally the MPD continued to minimize that risk and promote a false narrative that deaths like David Smith were the result of ‘excited delirium’ instead of asphyxiation.”

“138. Upon information and belief, the City of Minneapolis did not comply with the terms and/or the spirit of its 2013 Settlement Agreement with the family of Mr. Smith with respect to training on positional asphyxia.”

“139. Upon information and belief, the City of Minneapolis routinely trains officers to place handcuffed arrestees in a prone position without proper training on putting arrestees in a recovery position and monitoring their breathing and consciousness.”

“140. The impact of the excited delirium false narrative and the MPD’s failure to properly train on asphyxiation risks is highlighted here by Lane’s statement: ‘I am worried about excited delirium, or whatever.’”

“141. When holding a subject in a prone position, well-trained officers in Minneapolis should not be concerned about ‘excited delirium, or whatever.’ Officers in Minneapolis should know the risks of asphyxiation associated with prone restraint.”

“142. High-ranking MPD personnel have continued to publicly maintain other deadly false narratives.”

“143. MPD Lieutenant and agent of the City of Minneapolis Bob Kroll- who has served as the president of the Police Officers Federation of Minneapolis since 2015 and has sat on its board since 1996-has publicly expressed the opinion that Eric Garner, a Black man asphyxiated by the New York Police Department in 2014- could breathe at the time of his death because he was able to state ‘I can’t breathe’ several times as he was dying.”

“144. It is an accepted scientific fact that the ability to speak does not imply that someone is getting sufficient air to survive.”

“The MPD’s History Providing and Permitting Killology Training”

“145. Up and until 2019, the City of Minneapolis permitted officers to receive ‘Killology’ or ‘warrior style’ training, which teaches officers to consider every person and every situation as a potential deadly threat and to kill ‘less hesitantly.’”

“146.The City of Minneapolis was aware prior to the death of George Floyd that the officer who shot and killed Philando Castile in the nearby suburb of Falcon Heights had received Killology training.”

“147. Upon information and belief, a significant proportion of police officers employed by the MPD in May of 2020 had received Killology training during their employment.”

“148.High-ranking officers and agents of the MPD, including Kroll, encouraged all officers to receive warrior-style police training.”

“149. High-ranking officers and agents of the MPD, including Kroll, offered this training free of charge to all officers of the MPD who wanted to receive it.”

“150. The City of Minneapolis was aware that its officers had received and continued to receive Killology training before and through May of 2020, but did nothing to prevent officers from receiving it or re-training officers who had received it.”

“151. Kroll has further encouraged officers to behave aggressively, stating that MPD officers who do not receive citizen complaints are ‘low-level slugs’ who ‘[don’t] get out and investigate anything. And that’s not what we’re paying our officers to do.’”

“152. Kroll has stated that policing should be viewed like ‘a basketball game, in that if you’re not getting any fouls, you aren’t playing hard enough.’”

“153.The City of Minneapolis and high-ranking members of the MPD are aware that Kroll is an influencer for rank-and-file officers, and that its officers follow his lead with regard to law enforcement beliefs and behaviors.”

“154. Upon information and belief, Defendant City of Minneapolis has control over the amount of influence the Minneapolis Police Federation has over the officers, discipline, training, decision-making, and policy decisions of the Minneapolis Police Department.”

“155. The Minneapolis Mayor and City Council are responsible for negotiations with the Minneapolis Police Federation, including matters of officer discipline and retention. The Minneapolis Police Department Chief of Police is responsible for all decisions of hiring.””

“156.The Minneapolis Police Federation membership is made up of employees, agents, and officers of the Minneapolis Police Department.”

“157.The Police Officers within the Minneapolis Police Federation continue to be employees of the Minneapolis Police Department subject to the policies, training and orders.”

“158. The Minneapolis Police Department is responsible for maintaining training and discipline to ensure its officers follow its policies, orders, and training regardless of the opinions and actions of the Minneapolis Police Federation.”

“The City of Minneapolis and the MPD’s Failure to Terminate Dangerous Officers”

“159. The City of Minneapolis frequently fails to terminate or discipline officers who demonstrate patterns of misconduct.”

“160. Upon information and belief, Chauvin was the subject of 17 citizen complaints from 2006 to 2015, only one of which resulted in discipline, in the form of a letter of reprimand.”

“161. Upon information and belief, Chauvin has participated in the shooting and killing of at least three different individuals, including Wayne Reyes, Ira Latrell Toles, and Leroy Martinez.”

“162. In 2005, Defendant Chauvin engaged in a reckless police chase resulting in the deaths of three individuals but was not discharged from the Minneapolis Police Department.”

“163. Upon information and belief, the MPD has observed unlawful or otherwise improper conduct by Chauvin throughout his career but has tolerated it and refused to remedy or mitigate it.”

“164. Chauvin was precisely the type of reckless and dangerous officer that Kroll and other leaders of the Minneapolis Police Department encouraged him to be.”

“165. Upon information and belief, Thao was the subject of six citizen complaints from 2013 to 2017, none of which have resulted in discipline.”

“166. In 2017, Thao was the subject of a lawsuit for his use of excessive force, which the City of Minneapolis paid money to settle on his behalf.”

“167. Upon information and belief, the MPD has observed unlawful or otherwise improper conduct by Thao throughout his career but has tolerated it and refused to remedy or mitigate it.”

“168. The MPD has engaged for years in contract negotiations with the Minneapolis Federation of Police which make it more difficult for the MPD to terminate officers who have demonstrated repeated misconduct.

“The MPD’s History of Overlooking Racially Biased Policing”

“169. Upon information and belief, Black community members make up 19% of the population of Minneapolis and 58% of the subjects of police force.”

“170. The Minneapolis Police Department is currently being investigated for unlawful race-based policing, which deprives people of color, particularly Black community members, of their civil rights under the Minnesota Human Rights Act.”

“171. Prior to 2007, African American members of the MPD, including now-Chief Arradondo, received hate letters signed from the Ku Klux Klan in their interoffice mail, accessible only to MPD agents and employees.”

“172. Kroll has been accused by fellow officers, including now-Chief Arradondo,of publicly wearing a jacket with a patch depicting a racist ‘white power’ logo.”

“173. In recent years, Kroll, as president of the Minneapolis Police Federation, has publicly referred to the Black Lives Matter movement as a ‘terrorist organization.’”

“174. The Minneapolis Police Department ratified the culture of systemic racism and disparate treatment of the Black Community, by failing to remove or otherwise discipline Lt. Bob Kroll.”

“175. By 2018, as the result of a settlement, the Minneapolis Police Department was required to conduct racial sensitivity training which, upon information and belief, has not yet been completed.”

“The City of Minneapolis’s Notice of Prior Incidents of Excessive Force”

“176. The City had notice of a 2009 incident wherein MPD officers used excessive force against Ira Alexander Stafford for which Mr. Stafford filed suit against the City in 2010, alleging that while he was lying on the ground, face down with his arms around him, ‘at least one officer had a knee in Stafford’s back, making him effectively helpless.’ (Compl.) Stafford v. City of Minneapolis, et al, Civil Action No. 0:10-cv-03149-MJD-TNL (D. Minn. 2010).”

“177. According to media sources, the City entered into a monetary settlement with Zach King for a 2012 incident wherein MPD officers violated the Fourth Amendment and used excessive force against Mr. King by beating him and pressing a knee on Mr. King such that he could not breathe “almost like George Floyd.” Mr. King was hospitalized with a concussion and multiple visible physical injuries as a result of the police beating. The City took no disciplinary action against the officers for their use of excessive force against Mr. King.https://www.cbsnews.com/news/minneapolis-officers-cited-in-misconduct-lawsuits-face-little-discipline/.”

“178. The City had notice of a 2014 incident wherein MPD officers used excessive force against Alfred Flowers after he had been fully secured in handcuffs and not physically resisting. Mr. Flowers filed suit against the City and alleged that an officer suddenly grabbed him by his throat, choked him, and threw him to the ground and handcuffed him. After handcuffing Mr. Flowers, an MPD officer punched him in the head, following which several other officers entered the room and proceeded to kick and stomp on Mr. Flowers while he was handcuffed and laying on the ground. Flowers v. City of Minneapolis, et al, Civil Action No. 0:15-cv-03015-RHK-HB.”

“179. The City had notice of a 2014 incident wherein MPD officers used excessive force against Lamar Allen Ferguson after he had been fully secured in handcuffs and not physically resisting. Mr. Ferguson filed suit against the City in April 2017 and alleges that two MPD Officers threw him to the ground after he had been handcuffed and began punching him, following which MPD Officer Thao, a defendant in this action, lifted Mr. Ferguson’s head off of the ground and kicked him directly in his mouth. Ferguson v. City of Minneapolis, et al, Civil Action No. 0:17-cv-01110-PJS-TNL (D. Minn. 2017).”

“180. The City had notice of a 2016 incident wherein MPD officers used excessive and unjustified force against Abdi Hussen Hagad, a black male. MPD officers approached Mr. Hagad and violently threw him against a brick wall and dislocated his shoulder despite the absence of physical resistance from Mr. Hagad. Wagad v. City of Minneapolis, et al, Civil Action No. 0:17-cv-05239-MJD-TNL (D. Minn. 2017).”

“181. The City had notice of a 2016 incident wherein MPD officers used excessive force against Tomas Garcia-Orihuela during the course of an arrest. Mr. Garcia-Orihuel filed suit against the City and alleged that after he was handcuffed on the ground, ‘several police officers began to kick and hit him’ and continued to do so for several minutes while he was handcuffed and laying on the ground. Garcia-Orihuela v. City of Minneapolis, et al, Civil Action No. 0:17-cv-00292-RHK-KMM (D. Minn. 2017).”

“182. The City had notice of a 2018 incident wherein multiple MPD officers used excessive and entirely unjustified force against Jeremiah Jermaine Thomas when an officer drop-kicked Mr. Thomas in the chest area following which three other MPD officers joined in and immediately started punching, kneeing, and kicking. Mr. Thomas suffered a punctured lung, internal bleeding, fractured ribs, and various scratches and bruises as a result of MPD’s use of excessive force, and the City thereafter entered into a monetary settlement to resolve his claims. Jeremiah Jermaine Thomas v. City of Minneapolis, et al., 0:19-cv-00954-WMW-DTS (D. Minn 2019).”

“183. The City had notice of a 2013 incident wherein MPD officers used excessive and unjustified force against Catrina Johnson, a disabled woman who used a cane, by throwing her against her living room wall and onto the floor while using racial slurs. While MS. Johnson was pinned to the ground face down, an MPD officer put his knee on the back of her head and applied direct pressure thereby causing injury. The City entered into a monetary settlement with Ms. Johnson to settle her claims. Catrina Johnson v. City of Minneapolis, et al., 0:15-cv-02861-JRT-SER (D. Minn 2015).”

“184. The City had notice of a 2018 incident wherein multiple MPD officers used excessive and entirely unjustified force against Rico McKinnies during the course of a traffic stop, after he was handcuffed and not resisting arrest. The City entered into a monetary settlement with Mr. McKinnies for the injuries he sustained therein. Rico McKinnies v. City of Minneapolis, et al., 0:18-cv-02738-NEB-BRT (D. Minn 2018).”

“185. Each of the above-referenced incidents involved more than one officer at the scene and in each of those incidents, the non-participating MPD officers failed to intervene in the unconstitutional use of force against handcuffed, non-resisting citizens.”

“186. In addition to a substantial settlement with the family of David Smith, the City of Minneapolis has been forced to pay significant sums of money for the unlawful deaths caused by its officers.”

“187. In 2019, the City of Minneapolis approved a significant settlement with the family of Justine Ruszczyk, who was shot and killed by a Minneapolis Police Officer.”

“188. In 2019, the City of Minneapolis approved a significant settlement [with] the family of Jamar Clark, who was shot and killed by a Minneapolis Police Officer.”

“189. In 2020, the City of Minneapolis approved a significant settlement with the family of Terrance Franklin, who was shot and killed by a Minneapolis Police Officer.”

“190. While the settlement of the Justine Ruszczyk [claim] was locally billed as transformational, it had no meaningful impact on how the MPD conducts its business.”

“191. The Mayor and City Council receive notice of each lawsuit filed against the City.”

“192. All monetary settlements made by the City must be approved by the Mayor and City Council.”

“193. MPD’s Policy Manual requires that the Chief of Police report to the Mayor each instance of officer misconduct and in accordance with the same, the Chief of Police reported to the Mayor each instance of officer misconduct.”

“Count II—42 U.S.C. sec. 1983-Monell Liability”

“222. MPD’s Policy Manual provides that the Mayor is ‘vested with all the powers of said city connected with and incident to the establishment, maintenance, appointment, removal, discipline, control, and supervision of its police force, subject to the limitations herein contained and the provisions of the Civil Service chapter of this Charter, and may make all needful rules and regulations for the efficiency and discipline, and promulgate and enforce general and special orders for the government of the same, and have the care and custody of all public property connected with the Police Department of the city.’ (MPD Policy Manual Sec. 1-301 (citing City Charter reference-Chapter 6, Section 1)).”

“223. The Mayor, the City Council, and the Police Chief had final policymaking authority with regard to establishing written policies and training programs governing the conduct of MPD officers performing policing functions on behalf of the City.”

“224. The Mayor, the City Council, and the Police Chief established and/or approved of MPD’s written policies and training governing the conduct of MPD officers performing policing functions.”

“225. The written policies and training established and/or approved by The Mayor, the City Council, and the Police Chief constitute the official policy of the City and were the moving force behind and caused Plaintiff’s injuries.”

“226. The City, acting by and through its Mayor and/or other policymakers, had knowledge of MPD’s unconstitutional patterns and practices and knowledge that the same gave rise to a risk of violations of citizens’ federal rights. ”

“227. The City, acting by and through its Mayor and/or other policymakers, made a deliberate and/or conscious decision to disregard the known risk of harm that would result from MPD’s unconstitutional patterns and practices and was deliberately indifferent to and/or tacitly authorized the same.”

“228. On or prior to May 25, 2020, Minneapolis, with deliberate indifference to the rights of arrestees, detainees, and the like, tolerated, permitted, failed to correct, promoted, or ratified a number of customs, patterns, or practices that failed to provide for the safety of arrestees, detainees, and the like during arrest, including but not limited to the handcuffing and restraint process.”

“229. On or prior to May 25, 2020, Minneapolis, with deliberate indifference to the rights of arrestees, detainees, and the like, tolerated, permitted, failed to correct, promoted, or ratified a number of customs, patterns, or practices that condoned and required officers to turn a blind eye to and not intervene with the use of excessive force by MPD officers.”

“230. On or prior to May 25, 2020, Minneapolis, with deliberate indifference to the rights of arrestees, detainees, and the like, tolerated, permitted, failed to correct, promoted, fostered or ratified a number of customs, patterns, or practices that condoned and required officers to treat the members of the Black Community of Minneapolis differently, including but not limited to implementing deadly force at a higher rate against Black men who did not pose a threat to officers.”

“231. On or prior to May 25, 2020, Minneapolis, with deliberate indifference to the rights of arrestees, detainees, and the like, tolerated, permitted, failed to correct, promoted, or ratified a number of customs, patterns, or practices that shall be further identified in discovery.”

“232. Minneapolis, with deliberate indifference to the rights of arrestees, detainees, and the like, continued to employee Chauvin and Thao despite knowledge of their repeated unconstitutional, unlawful, or other improper conduct.”

“233. Minneapolis had to the power to terminate or appropriately discipline Chauvin and Thao for their misconduct prior to May 25, 2020, but failed to do so despite the City’s knowledge of a pattern of complaints regarding excessive force.”

“234. By refusing to terminate Chauvin or Thao, Minneapolis caused Chauvin and Thao to act with impunity and without fear of retribution.”

“235. Minneapolis’ failure to terminate or properly discipline Chauvin or Thao is part of its larger custom, police, or practice of failing to supervise, terminate, or properly discipline its officers for unconstitutional, unlawful, or otherwise improper conduct, and thereby encouraged Chauvin, Thao, and the other Defendant Officers to continue engaging in unlawful acts towards arrestees, including George.”

“236. On or prior to May 25, 2020, Minneapolis, with deliberate indifference to the rights of arrestees, detainees, and the like, tolerated, permitted, failed to correct, promoted, or ratified its agents, including Lt. Bob Kroll, providing improper and harmful training to officers.”

“237. Minneapolis had to the power to terminate or appropriately discipline Kroll prior to May 25, 2020, but failed to do so despite the City’s knowledge of Kroll’s perpetuation of dangerous ideology to officers.”

“238. By refusing to terminate or discipline Kroll or denounce his ideology, Minneapolis caused officers act with impunity and without fear of retribution.”

“239. On or prior to May 25, 2020, Minneapolis, with deliberate indifference to the rights of arrestees, detainees, and the like, participated in contract negotiations with the Police Officers Federation of Minneapolis that granted officers powers that allowed them to avoid discipline for misconduct, including but not limited to:

a. A grievance process that resulted in a nearly 50% rate of overturns of terminations of officers;

b. The ability to review evidence and video footage prior to giving statements in use of force and misconduct matters.”

“240. This participation by the City of Minneapolis caused officers to act with impunity and without fear of retribution.”

“241. The unconstitutional policies, practices, and customs defined herein were the moving force behind George’s death.”

“242. George died as a direct and proximate result of the acts and omissions by Minneapolis.”

“243. As a direct and proximate result of the acts and omissions described herein, George suffered compensatory and special damages as defined under federal common law and in an amount to be determined by jury.”

“244. Plaintiff is entitled to recovery of costs, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.”

“245. The conduct described in all of the preceding paragraphs amount to wrongful acts and omissions for purposes of Minnesota Statute Section 573.02, subdivision 1.”

“246. As a direct and proximate result of these wrongful acts and omissions, George’s next of kin have suffered pecuniary loss, including medical and funeral expenses, loss of aid, counsel, guidance, advice, assistance, protection, and support in an amount to be determined by jury.”

Conclusion

All of the legal references and assertions by the parties, of course, are subject to legal research to determine their current validity in light of any subsequent federal statutes and decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court and lower federal courts, especially by the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota and its direct appellate court (the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit).

As previously noted, Count I of this Complaint against the four ex-officers has been covered in a prior post while Count III against the City will be the subject of a future post.

Now we await the defendants’ responses to this Complaint and other further developments in this civil case and in the criminal cases against the four ex-officers.

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[1] Complaint, Kaarin Nelson Schaffer, as Trustee for the next of kin of GEORGE P. FLOYD, Jr., Deceased v. Derek Chauvin, in his capacity as a Minneapolis police officer; Tou Thao, in his capacity as a Minneapolis police officer; Thomas Lane, in his capacity as a Minneapolis police officer; J. Alexander Kueng, in his capacity as a Minneapolis police officer; and the City of Minneapolis, Case 0:20-cv-01577-SRN-TNL (July 15, 2020).

[2] Count II also includes by reference all of the allegations regarding the four ex-policemen defendants (Complaint, para. 247) that were recited in the post about Count I of the Complaint.

[3] On June 5, 2020, the City of Minneapolis and the Minnesota Department of Human Rights agreed to ban the Minneapolis police from using chokeholds and neck restraints, and on June  that was so ordered by the Hennepin County District Court. (Ban on Police Choke Holds and Neck Restraints in Agreement Between City of Minneapolis and Minnesota Human rights Department, dwkcommentaries.com (June 6, 2020); Court Approves Agreement on Police Conduct Between City of Minneapolis and Minnesota Department of Human Rights (June 9, 2020).)

 

 

 

 

 

Two Federal Appellate Courts Uphold Subpoenas for Trump Accounting Records  (Updated 11/22/19)   

Over the last two weeks two federal appellate courts have upheld different subpoenas to the Mazars USA accounting firm for records relating to Donald J. Trump.

D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals

As discussed in a prior post, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit on October 11, 2019, upheld (2-1) a subpoena by an U.S. House of Representatives committee to Mazars for certain Trump accounting records.

A month later, on November 13, that court denied, 8-3, Trump’s motion for the full (en banc) court to review that decision of the three-judge panel.[1] As is typical, there was no opinion by the eight judges denying the motion. However, two of the three dissenting judges, wrote opinions.

Judge Gregory Katsas joined by Judge Karen Henderson, said, “this case presents exceptionally important questions regarding the separation of powers among Congress, the Executive Branch, and the Judiciary. For the second time in American history, an Article III court has undertaken to enforce a congressional subpoena for the records of a sitting President. The first time this was attempted with then President Nixon, this court refused to enforce the subpoena, stressing “the availability of impeachment foreclosed any conclusion that the records at issue were ‘demonstrably critical to the responsible fulfillment’ of Congress’s legislative prerogatives, even when Congress was investigating significant allegations of presidential misconduct. Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 731–33 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc).”

The other dissenting opinion, by Judge Neomi Rao, who also was joined by Judge Henderson, emphasized that this subpoena was not really justifiable by the congressional power to enact new laws. It was really a subpoena looking for impeachable offenses, which is not part of the legislative power.

Afterwards an attorney for Trump said that he would now petition the U.S. Supreme Court to review the case.

And on November 15, his attorneys did just that by asking Chief Justice John Roberts, who is responsible for emergency requests from the D.C. Circuit, for a stay of proceedings while the Supreme Court considers his petition for review of the merits of the lower court’s decision. This request argued for such a stay for the following reasons: (I) “There is a reasonable probability that the Court will grant certiorari to determine whether the Committee’s subpoena is lawful.” (II) “There is a fair prospect that this Court will reverse the D.C. Circuit’s decision upholding the subpoena.” (III) “Applicants will suffer irreparable harm without a stay.” (IV) “The balance of equities and relative harms weigh strongly in favor of granting a stay.” [2]

On November 18, the attorneys for the House Committee filed a letter with the Supreme Court announcing that they planned to file an opposition to the requested stay on November 22, but that out of courtesy to the Court the Committee does not oppose “a short ten-day administrative stay, beginning on November 20, 2019, to enable the Court to receive an opposition by the Committee and then rule on the request for a stay. Thereafter the same day, Chief Justice Roberts ordered “that the mandate of . . . [the D.C. Circuit] is hereby stayed pending receipt of a response, due on or before Thursday, November 21, 2019, by 3 p.m. ET, and further order of the undersigned or of the Court.”[3]

One of Trump’s attorneys, William S. Consovoy, “said the Supreme Court’s intervention was imperative. Under the lower court’s decision, ‘any committee of Congress can subpoena any personal information from the President; all the committee needs to say is that it’s considering legislation that would force Presidents to disclose that same information. Given the temptation to dig up dirt on political rivals, intrusive subpoenas into personal lives of Presidents will become our new normal in times of divided government — no matter which party is in power. If every committee chairman is going to have this unbounded authority, this Court should be the one to say so.”

In accordance with that order, the House Committee on November 21 submitted its opposition to the Trump motion. It argued that the Court’s precedents involving Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Bill Clinton make clear that the chief executive enjoys no special privilege to be free from investigation or legal action and that a stay would cause irreparable harm to the Congress and the public, outweighing whatever harm enforcement of the subpoena would cause Trump and Mazars. The House Committee also argued that if the Court agrees to a stay of a lower court’s order, the Court should expedite a decision on whether to order a full briefing and a hearing on the case.[4]

Second Circuit Court of Appeals

Such a petition to the Supreme Court would join a similar one by Trump from a November 4 unanimous decision by a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in New York City upholding a state grand jury subpoena for accounting records from the Mazars firm relating to a probe into whether the accounting for payments Mr. Trump’s former lawyer, Michael Cohen, made to two women violated state laws against falsifying business documents. .[5]

During the oral appellate argument of this case, one of the judges asked the Trump attorney if local authorities could investigate President Trump if he shot someone on Fifth Avenue in New York City, and the attorney said the authorities could not so investigate.

After the Second Circuit’s decision, Jay Sekulow, an attorney for Trump, said that Trump would ask the U.S. Supreme Court to review the case because, he claimed, ““The issue raised in this case goes to the heart of our republic. The constitutional issues are significant.”

In fact, on November 14, Trump petitioned the Supreme Court for a review of the following issues in this case: (I) “Whether the President is absolutely immune is an important and unsettled issue of federal law that the Court should resolve” and (II)   “The Second Circuit incorrectly decided this important immunity question.” The petition also alleged, “For the first time in our nation’s history, a state or local prosecutor has launched a criminal investigation of the President of the United States and subjected him to coercive criminal process. . . . Politically motivated subpoenas like this one are a perfect illustration of why a sitting president should be categorically immune from state criminal process.”[6]

In a contemporaneous statement, Sekelow stated, “”The Second Circuit decision is wrong and should be reversed. In our petition, we assert that the subpoena violates the U.S. Constitution and therefore is unenforceable. We are hopeful that the Supreme Court will grant review in this significant constitutional case and reverse the dangerous and damaging decision of the appeals court.”

The Department of Justice also filed with the Supreme Court an amicus brief supporting Trump’s petition while saying that there are instances when a local prosecutor might legally seek a president’s documents — but that this was not one of them.[7]

Trump filed this petition so immediately because of his attorneys’ agreement with the New York prosecuting attorneys whereby the latter “agreed not to seek the tax returns until the case is resolved by the Supreme Court” so long as Trump agreed to “a very quick briefing schedule, one that would allow the Supreme Court to announce whether it will hear the case as soon as next month and to issue a decision by June, as the presidential election enters its final stages.”

Conclusion

Now the parties to these cases will be joined by all of us in the U.S. and elsewhere for the briefing on whether the Supreme Court should grant such review, the Court’s decision on these petitions and, if review is granted, the briefing and oral arguments in that court and its ultimate decision (in the midst of the 2020 presidential campaign).

==================================

[1]  Order, Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP and Committee on Oversight and Reform of the U.S. House of Representatives, No. 19-5142 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 13, 2019); Savage, Court Rejects Trump’s Appeal in Fight to Keep Financial Records from Congress, N.Y. Times (Nov. 13, 2019); Reuters, U.S. Appeals Court Again Backs House Request for Trump Tax Documents, N.Y. Times (Nov. 14, 2019).

[2] Emergency Application for a Stay of Mandate Pending the Filing and Disposition of a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, Committee on Oversight and Reform of the U.S. House of Representatives, No. 19A545 (Nov. 15, 2019); Liptak, Trump Again Asks Supreme Court to Block Release of His Financial Records, N.Y. Times (Nov. 15, 2019); Hurley & Freifeld, Trump asks Supreme Court to block disclosure of financial records to Congress, Reuters (Nov. 15, 2019); Barnes & Marimow, Trump appeals to Supreme Court again, this time to block House committee’s subpoena seeking his financial records, Wash. Post (Nov. 15, 2019).

[3] Letter, House Committee to Clerk of Supreme Court, Trump v. Mazars USA, No. 19A545 (Nov. 18, 2019); Order, Trump v. Mazars USA, No. 19A545 (Nov. 18, 2019) Trump v. Mazars USA, No. 19A545 (Nov. 18, 2019); Barnes, Supreme Court puts temporary hold on Trump financial records ruling, Wash. Post (Nov. 18, 2019); Liptak, Chief Justice Gives Trump Temporary Reprieve in Financial Records Case, N.Y. Times (Nov. 18, 2019).

[4] Barnes, Supreme court precedents do not shield Trump financial records, House, prosecutors argue, Wash. Post (Nov. 21, 2019); Reuters, Democrats Urge U.S. Supreme Court Not to Protect Trump Financial Records, N.Y. Times (Nov. 21, 2019); House Committee, Opposition to Emergency Application for a Stay of Mandate, No. 19A545 (Sup. Ct. Nov. 21, 2019).

[5] Opinion, Trump v. Vance, No. 19-3204 (2d Cir. Nov. 4, 2019); Weiser & Liptak, Trump Taxes: Appeals Court Rules President Must Turn Over 8 Years of Tax Returns, N.Y. Times (Nov. 14, 2019); Neumeister, Appeals court agrees Trump tax returns can be turned over, Wash. Post (Nov. 4, 2019).

[6] Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Trump v. Vance, No. —- (U.S. Sup Ct. Nov. 14, 2019); Liptak, Trump Asks Supreme Court to Bar Release of His Tax Returns, N.Y. Times (Nov. 14, 2019); Barnes & Marimow, Trump asks Supreme Court to shield his tax returns from prosecutors, setting up historic separation-of-powers showdown, Wash. Post (Nov. 14, 2019); Bravin, Kendall & Ramey, Trump Asks Supreme Court to Block New York Subpoena for Tax Records, W.S.J. (Nov. 14, 2019); Samuelson & Gerstein, Trump lawyers take fight over tax returns to Supreme Court, Politico (Nov. 14, 2019); deVogue, Trump asks Supreme Court to block subpoena for tax returns, CNN.com (Nov. 14, 2019).

[7] Barnes, Supreme court precedents do not shield Trump financial records, House, prosecutors argue, Wash. Post (Nov. 21, 2019); Reuters, Democrats Urge U.S. Supreme Court Not to Protect Trump Financial Records, N.Y. Times (Nov. 21, 2019); Liptak, Justice Dept. Urges Supreme Court to Back Trump in Tax Records Case, N.Y. Times (Nov. 22, 2019); Vance, Jr.,  Brief in Opposition, No. 19-635 (Sup. Ct. Nov. 21, 2019).

 

 

 

 

U.S. Establishes Task force To Coordinate Response to Health Problems of U.S. Diplomats in Cuba and China 

On May 23, the U.S. State Department established the Health Incidents Response Task Force to coordinate a response to unexplained health problems affecting some diplomats stationed in Havana, Cuba and in China.[1]

As the Department’s press release stated, this group will “direct a multi-agency response to the unexplained health incidents that have affected a number of U.S. government personnel and family members stationed overseas” and coordinate “Department and interagency activities, including identification and treatment of affected personnel and family members, investigation and risk mitigation, messaging, and diplomatic outreach.” This Task Force “includes interagency partners, such as the Departments of Health and Human Services, Commerce, Justice, Defense and Energy, as well as other members of the foreign affairs community.”

As has been noted in previous posts, 24 U.S. personnel and family members who had served in Cuba have been “medically-confirmed as having symptoms and clinical findings similar to those noted following concussion or minor traumatic brain injury.[2] In addition, on May 16, 2018, “a U.S. government employee serving in China was medically-confirmed with similar findings.”

This Task Force, at least initially, ignores the recent request by an eminent Cuban scientist for the creation of a joint task force of Canadian, Cuban and U.S. scientists and medical personnel to conduct an investigation of these medical issues.[3]

===================================

[1] U.S. State Dep’t, Establishment of the Health Incidents Response Task Force (June 5, 2018); Reuters, U.S. Sets Up Task force Over Unexplained Diplomatic Heath Incidents, N.Y. Times (June 5, 2018).

[2] Previous posts about the medical incidents of U.S. diplomats in Cuba may be found in the “U.S. Diplomats Medical Problems in Cuba, 2017-18” section of List of Posts to dwkcommentaries—Topical: CUBA.

[3] Cuban Scientist Calls for U.S., Canada and Cuba Joint Investigation of Medical Problems of U.S. and Canadian Diplomats in Cuba, dwkcommentaries.com (May 30, 2018).

 

 

On Visit to Turkey, Vice President Biden Discusses Possible U.S. Extradition of Fethullah Gulen

As discussed in a prior post and two comments thereto, the United States and Turkey continue to be involved in discussions regarding Turkey’s request for the U.S. to extradite to Turkey a Muslim cleric, Fethullah Gulen, who now is living in the U.S.

The subject also came up with respect to U.S. Vice President Joe Biden’s August 24 visit to Turkey: first in the White House Press Secretary’s August 22 press briefing; second in Biden’s August 24 joint press conference with Turkey’s Premier Binali Yildirim; third in Biden’s August 24 joint press conference with Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan; fourth at the White House Press Secretary’s August 24 press briefing; and fifth at the State Department’s August 24 Daily Press Briefing.

White House Press Briefing[1]

On August 22 White House Press Secretary Josh Ernest addressed Biden’s then upcoming visit to Turkey. He said that Biden will “indicate our continued, ongoing support for our allies in Turkey.  It’s a country that obviously is going through a lot.  This is a country that was subject to a failed coup attempt earlier this summer.  That is a coup attempt that was roundly and publicly condemned by the United States government.  And we continue to strongly support the democratic government of our allies in Turkey” and “the steps that Turkey has taken to make contributions to our counter-ISIL effort.”

As it relates to Mr. Gülen, the Press Secretary stated, Biden “will say what President Obama [already] has communicated directly to President Erdogan, which is that there is a treaty, an extradition treaty, that’s been on the books between the United States and Turkey for more than 30 years.  And the United States is committed to following the procedure and guidelines that are outlined in that treaty.” This includes “extensive coordination between officials at the Department of Justice and their Turkish counterparts.”  But extradition is “not a presidential decision.  There is a process that is codified in that treaty and in U.S. law. . . . But . . . [the decision] will be guided by the evidence and . . . by the rules and procedures that are codified in the extradition treaty and in United States law.”

Biden and Yildirim Press Conference[2]

BCiden+Premier

Upon his arrival in Ankara, Biden and Turkey’s Premier Yildirim held a joint press conference. To the right is a photograph of them.

Biden emphasized, “President Obama asked me to come to Turkey today in order to remind the world of the paramount importance that we place on the relationship between our nations as allies, as partners, and as friends. It is as an ally and a long-term friend of the Turkish people, that I’m here today to express in no uncertain terms the continuing, unwavering support of the United States for Turkey in the wake of last month’s attempted coup.”

“So on behalf of President Obama and the people of the United States, I want to once again, Mr. Prime Minister, extend to all the people of Turkey our condolences to the families and loved ones who were injured, but particularly those who lost a loved one.  We pay tribute to not only their bravery but their incredible resolve, their incredible commitment to their democracy, to ensuring that their country remains strong, vibrant and resilient, and democratic.”

“The . . . people of the United States of America abhor what happened, and under no circumstances would support anything remotely approaching the cowardly act of the treasonous members of your military who engaged in this behavior.  We did not have prior knowledge.  We did not support.  We immediately condemned.  And we continue, as we did before the coup, to stand shoulder to shoulder with not only the government of Turkey, but with the people of Turkey.”

“I understand the intense feeling your government and the people of Turkey have about [Mr. Gulen] . . . . We are cooperating with Turkish authorities.  Our legal experts are working right now with their Turkish counterparts on the production of and the evaluation of material and evidence that needs to be supplied to an American court to meet the requirements under our law and the extradition treaty to extradite Gulen. And we’re going to continue to do so as you continue to bring forward additional information.  We have . . . no interest whatsoever in protecting anyone who has done harm to an ally.  None.  But we need to meet the legal standard requirement under our law.”

“[U]nder American law:  No President of the United States has authority to extradite anyone on his own power.  That only an American court can do that.  Were a President to attempt to do that, it would be an impeachable offense.  But we have no reason to do anything other than cooperate with you and take every substantiating fact and make it available to the extent it exists to an American court.”

Premier Yildirim in his remarks welcomed the Vice President and recognized that “the relationship between Turkey and the United States has a very long history, a very deep-rooted history.   Therefore, from time to time, there might be incidents that tend to damage this relationship.  But on both sides, of course, we should never allow this to happen.”

“[T]his heinous coup attempt was, in our opinion, orchestrated and instructed by Fethullah Gulen.  And as per the treaties that we have between our two countries, the necessary steps should be taken with a view to his extradition to our country.  And we have taken the initial step in that process.  And you have had very frank remarks for the Turkish people and also for our government . . . of vital importance for a sound functioning of this process, and we are grateful to you for those remarks.”

“So having a [U.S.] technical team . . . here in Turkey, and talking to our judges and prosecutors here on the ground, is a clear sign from your side that you’re taking this very seriously, that you’re attaching great importance to this.  Therefore, I would like to once again thank you for being sensitive about the matter.”

“The process of extraditing the head of the terrorist organization that was behind the attempted coup, if it can be expedited and accelerated, and if we can have more cooperation in the process, I think the grief and grievances of the Turkish people, of the Turkish nation, will be remedied to a certain degree, and their overall sentiments about the issue will go back to being more positive.”

The Premier repeated this last thought in later responding to a journalist’s question: “I am sure that the healthy and sound functioning of the processes with regard to the extradition of the head of the terrorist organization will also, in a short amount of time, return or rectify the people’s perception back to their normal, positive situation.”

Biden and Erdogan Press Conference[3]

BidenErdogan

At the joint press conference after their private meeting, Biden opened by expressing his “personal condolences and the condolences of my country for the brutal, unconscionable attack in Turkey. . . .The attempted coup went to the heart of who your people are — principled, courageous and committed.  And for a people who have struggled so long to establish a true democracy, this was, from my perspective and the President’s perspective, the ultimate affront.  So my heart goes out to not just the government, but to the Turkish people.” He added, “the United States stands with our ally, Turkey.  We support the people of Turkey.  And our support is absolute and it is unwavering.” (Above is a photograph of the two men.)

“That’s why the United States.” Biden said, “is committed to doing everything we can to help [Turkey] through your justice [system] hold all those responsible for this coup attempt while adhering to the rule of law. . . . [O]ur American experts are on the ground, here in Ankara, meeting with your people, closely coordinating with our Turkish counterparts to evaluate and gather the material with regard to Turkish requests to extradite Gulen, in accordance with our bilateral extradition treaty.”

As “powerful as my country is, as powerful as Barack Obama is as President, he has no authority under our Constitution to extradite anyone.  Only a federal court can do that. . . . If the President were to take this into his own hands, . . . he would be impeached for violating the separation of powers.”

The U.S. has no “reason to protect Gulen or anyone else who, in fact, may have done something wrong. . . . [T]his case, like all others, is going to have to be assessed by an independent federal court along with evidence backing it up.  That’s what we’re working on together now.  And it takes time to work an extradition request, but there should be no doubt that we’ll continue to work closely with the Turkish government as this process unfolds.”

In response to a journalist’s question at the end of the press conference, Biden repeated these thoughts about extradition. “We are a nation of laws.  We are bound by a constitution. . . . The constitution and our laws require for someone to be extradited, that the court in the United States has to conclude with probable cause to be extradited.  Not only do we apply that standard as it relates to extradition; we apply that standard every day we do our country.”

Biden continued, “we have a team of our lawyers and experts who were here in Ankara yesterday, sitting down with your experts on the judiciary and your prosecutors, saying, give us the data we need in order to be able to bring these to a court of law that will say, yes, we must extradite [Mr. Gulen]. . . . What possible interest could the United States have in wanting to protect someone who, in fact, met the standard under our law of being deported?”

Until yesterday, the Vice President added, “[T]here has been no evidence presented about the coup.  When you go to an American court, you can’t go into a court and say, this is a bad guy, generally.  You have to say this is a guy or a woman who committed the following explicit crime.  That’s what we’re working with President [Erdogan] right now to gather the evidence that will establish in a court of law probable cause to believe he may have done this.  We are determined — we are determined to listen to every scrap of evidence that Turkey can provide or that we can find out about.”

“We will continue to abide by [our] system.  And God willing, there will be enough data and evidence to be able to meet the criteria that you all believe exists.  We have no reason to shelter someone who would attack an ally and try to overthrow a democracy.” (Emphasis added.)

President Erdogan thanked the Vice President for coming and saluted him with “all my most heartfelt emotions.”

Erdogan then stressed that the “leader of the FETO terrorist organization [Gulen] needs to be extradited to Turkey as soon as possible.  That is the first measure that needs to be taken.  There are references made to the verdicts to be issued by courts, and we have previously submitted all of the folders regarding the actions engaged in by these terrorists before July the 15th.  And right now, we are amassing certain documents pointing out to their involvement in this failed coup that took place on July the 15th.”

Under the U.S.-Turkey extradition treaty, Erdogan said, “those individuals should be taken into pretrial detention, they should be arrested, and throughout the trial they need to remain in custody.  This person [Gulen], however, is currently managing and directing the terrorist organization where he lives.  They are present in more than 170 countries around the world, and they are present through school associations and other sorts of educational institutions. . . . [He] is still providing interviews to media outlets in the United States.  Some journalists are being taken into the Pennsylvania residence, and he is still continuing his actions around the world, and he’s shaping his actions for the future using these outlets.  That’s why it is very important for him to be contained through pretrial detention, which is actually part of the bilateral extradition treaty that was signed between our two countries, which we should not ignore.  And that is something I especially feel that I need to remind you of.  And I’m confident that the United States will take the necessary measures to cater to our expectations in that regard.”

Another White House Press Briefing[4]

Biden’s “God willing” comment came up in a question at the Wednesday afternoon, August 24, White House press briefing. Josh Earnest responded that the “point that the Vice President was making is that this is not going to be a decision that is made by the executive branch.  The decision about the evidence that Turkey has compiled is one that will follow the guidelines of the extradition treaty, and will ultimately involve a federal judge who will have to render [his or her] . . . own judgment, [his or her] . . . own assessment of the situation consistent with U.S. law and consistent with the terms of the extradition treaty.”

The White House Press Secretary also said that the U.S. has “concerns about the Turkish government’s activity since the coup have been a reflection of our longstanding concerns about protection of human rights inside of Turkey.  Turkey is a valuable NATO ally, and we’re able to work effectively with them on a variety of issues in a way that advances the interests of both our countries.  But even in the midst of our progress in pursuit of those shared priorities, the President has periodically raised concerns directly with President Erdogan, particularly on issues like freedom of the press inside of Turkey.” Nevertheless, “since the coup, we’ve understood the significant concerns that have been raised in Turkey and the need for a thorough investigation to get to the bottom of what exactly happened.”

With respect to Mr. Gülen, “there is a well-established process, and both the United States and Turkey are engaged in that process.  That process is governed by an extradition treaty between the United States and Turkey that’s been on the books for 35 years or so. . . . [T]here is a rather high bar, a high evidentiary standard that’s required.  So considering that the coup took place — what was it — six or eight weeks ago, I think it’s understandable that Turkey wouldn’t be able to build such a robust case, if there is one to be presented, against Mr. Gülen in such a short period of time.”

In addition, “Turkey has longstanding concerns with Mr. Gülen’s activity and they have presented significant evidence to the United States, and Department of Justice officials are carefully reviewing that evidence.  In fact, Justice officials are in Turkey this week, meeting with their counterparts to discuss and review that evidence.  What we have said all along is that the terms of the treaty and the law on the books here will ultimately determine how this is resolved.”

State Department Daily Briefing[5]

The Department’s spokesman said “our legal experts are working right now with their Turkish counterparts to evaluate the material, the evidence that needs to be supplied to meet the standards for extradition under our treaty. . . . As we’ve said, Turkey has provided materials relating to Mr. Gulen. We continue to analyze those materials. Under our laws, extradition requests must be assessed by an independent federal court along with the evidence backing it up. . . . It always takes time to work through an extradition request. However, there should be no doubt that we will continue to work through this working with our Turkish counterparts.”

Conclusion

Vice President Biden, President Obama and other U.S. officials consistently and rightly have emphasized that Turkey’s requested extradition of Gulen will be handled in accordance with the U.S.-Turkey extradition treaty and U.S. law, which were explained in a prior post and which were illustrated in February 6 and August 22 posts about the ongoing proceedings for extradition of a former Salvadoran military officer to Spain for the criminal case regarding the 1989 murder of the Jesuit priests.[6]

Turkey’s refusal to make a public acknowledgement of this reality cannot be based on ignorance of its extradition treaty or U.S. law. Instead it has to be based in part on Erdogan’s wanting to appear to the Turkish people as a strong leader and fomenting Turkish public pressure for the extradition. Perhaps too it is based upon Erdogan’s apparently increasing belief in his own power to control everything.

In any event, at least one Turkish journal had a very negative reaction to Biden’s remarks in their country.[7] An editorial in Istanbul’s Daily Sabah stated, Biden “came all the way from the U.S. just to mention the importance of rule of law of his own definition.” He “parroted the same stale remarks Turkey has heard since July 15. . . . Unfortunately, Biden came and went without leaving a trace. His sly smile, insincere apology about not having come sooner and feeble remarks of friendship between the people will deservedly fall on deaf ears.”

The Daily Sabah editorial even claimed the U.S. was not abiding by Article 9 of the bilateral extradition by not detaining Gulen. That Article states, “The Contracting Parties shall take all necessary measures after the information and documents related to the request for extradition have been received, including a search for the person sought. When located the person sought shall be detained until the competent authorities of the Requested Party reach their decision. If the request for extradition is granted, the detention shall be continued until surrender.”[8]

Yes, the editorial accurately quotes Article 9, but that Article states the obligation to detain arises only “after the information and documents related to the request for extradition have been received” (here, by the U.S.). The published reports indicate that some information and documents regarding Gulen have been provided to the U.S. by Turkey, but it is unclear if Turkey has completed that process. Moreover, as indicated above, the U.S. is meeting with Turkish officials to aid them in providing the necessary materials for the application.

The editorial also fails to examine Article 10(1) of the treaty, which provides, “In cases of urgency, either Contracting Party may apply for the provisional arrest or detention of the person sought before the request for extradition has been submitted to the Requested Party through diplomatic channels. The request for provisional arrest or detention may be made either through diplomatic channels or directly between the Department of Justice of the United States and the Ministry of Justice of Turkey.” Article 10(2) then goes on to list what needs to be in such an application. Public information has not indicated that Turkey has availed itself of this remedy.

Relevant here, but unacknowledged by the Daily Sabah, is the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual that covers the procedures for detention or arrests of persons potentially subject to extradition in these situations.[9]

Therefore, the Daily Sabah editorial, in this blogger’s judgment, is not well founded.

========================================================

[1] Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest, 8/22/16.

[2] White House, Remarks by Vice President Joe Biden and Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim at a Press Availability (Aug. 25, 2016); Reuters, Biden Says U.S. Cooperating With Turkey on Evidence Against Gulen, N.Y. Times (Aug. 24, 2016); Assoc. Press, Biden Calls on Turkey to Be Patient in Gulen Case, N.Y. Times (Aug. 24, 2016); Kraychik, Biden Apologizes To Turkey For US Constitution, Daily Wire (Aug. 24, 2016).

[3] White House, Remarks by Vice President Biden and President Erdogan of Turkey in Pool Spray (Aug. 25, 2016); Reuters, Biden Tells Turkey’s Erdogan: Only a Federal Court Can Extradite Gulen, N.Y. Times (Aug. 24, 2016); Reuters, Turkey Must Control Its Own Border, U.S. Vice President Biden Says, N.Y. Times (Aug. 24, 2016); Reuters, Turkey’s Erdogan Says U.S. Agreements Require Coup Suspect Arrest, N.Y. Times (Aug. 24, 2016); Wayne & Sink, Biden Met by Snubs as He Seeks to Mollify Turkey’s Angry Erdogan, Bloomberg News (Aug. 24, 2016).

[4] Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest, 8/24/16; Reuters, U.S. Reviewing Turkey’s Evidence on Coup Suspect Gulen: White House, N.Y. Times (Aug. 24, 2016).

[5] U.S. State Dep’t, Daily Press Briefing (Aug. 24, 2016).

[6] See also Assoc. Press, U.S., Turkey at an Impasse Over Extraditing Muslim Cleric, N.Y. Times (Aug. 25, 2016).

[7] Editorial, Biden wasted a trip, Turkey wasted time, Daily Sabah (Aug. 25, 2016). Daily Sabah also published two articles about the alleged Gülinist involvement in the recent attempted coup. One is a special report on the subject. The other asserts that a prosecutor who has been arrested for membership in the alleged Gülenist terror group says that it first started plans to topple President Erdoğan in 2011, instigated two coup attempts in 2013 and an attempted assassination of Erdoğan in the recent attempted coup. (Turkey coup attempt of Gülinist explained in special report, Daily Sabah (Aug. 24, 2016); Karaman, Güllenist prosecutor says group has sought to topple Erdoğan since 2011, Daily Sabah (Aug. 24, 2016).)

[8] U.S.-Turkey Extradition Treaty, 32 U.S.T. 3111.

[9] U.S. Attorneys’ Manual § 9-15.700.

 

Turkey Presses U.S. to Extradite Muslim Cleric in U.S.

In the wake of the July 15 failed coup in Turkey, its President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and others in his government have been pressing the United States as soon as possible to extradite Fethullah Gülen, a Muslim cleric now living in Pennsylvania. This request is based upon Turkey’s allegations that Gülen was the mastermind of the attempted coup.[1] The U.S., however, has not done so, stressing instead that the established U.S. legal procedures for extradition need to be followed. Turkey publicly has not accepted this response and repeatedly has criticized the U.S. for not extraditing Gülen.[2]

As explained in an earlier post, extradition is the legal process “by which one country (the requesting country) may seek from another country (the requested country) the surrender of a person who is wanted for prosecution, or to serve a sentence following conviction, for a criminal offense.  In the U.S., international extradition is treaty based, meaning that the U.S. must have an extradition treaty with the requesting country in order to consider the request for extradition.”[3]

Here then is a preliminary analysis of the U.S. legal issues governing any such extradition request by Turkey.

The U.S.-Turkey Extradition Treaty[4]

 The U.S. and Turkey do have such an extradition treaty that was signed in Ankara, Turkey on June 7, 1979, and entered into force on January 1, 1981.

Under Article 1 of the treaty each party has an obligation “to surrender to each other, in accordance with the provisions and conditions laid down in this Treaty, all persons who are found within the territory of the Requested Party [here, the U.S.] and who are being prosecuted for or have been charged with an offense, or convicted of an offense, or are sought by the other Party [here, Turkey] for the enforcement of a judicially pronounced penalty for an offense . . . .”

Here, Mr. Gülen apparently is found in the U.S. (the territory of the Requested Party) and is being prosecuted by Turkey (the Requesting Party). Thus, the preliminary condition of the treaty is satisfied.

Thus, the next issue is where did Mr. Gülen allegedly commit the offense. Since he apparently has not been in Turkey for many years, it would appear that whatever alleged offense he allegedly has committed was done “outside the territory of the Requesting Party” (Turkey).

That presents the next issue. Is Mr. Gülen still a citizen and thus a “national” of Turkey (the Requesting Party)? If he is, it would appear that Turkey “has jurisdiction, according to its laws, to try” him. Thus, the issue becomes whether the U.S. has an obligation to extradite him under other provisions of the treaty.

If, on the other hand, Mr. Gülen no longer is a national of Turkey, then the issue is whether “the laws of the Requested Party [the U.S.] provide for the punishment of such an offense committed in similar circumstances” and if so, whether the U.S. has an obligation to extradite him under other provisions of the treaty. Analysis of this issue would have to start with the particulars of the criminal charges under Turkish law, which so far are not readily available in public sources.

A potential treaty-based ground for the U.S. refusing to extradite Gülen is found in Article 3 (a), which states that extradition is not required, “If the offense for which extradition is requested is regarded by the Requested Party [here, the U.S.] to be of a political character or an offense connected with such an offense; or if the Requested Party concludes that the request for extradition has, in fact, been made to prosecute or punish the person sought for an offense of a political character or on account of his political opinions.” However, Article 3 (a) goes on to provide that “any offense committed or attempted against a Head of State or a Head of Government or against a member of their families shall not be deemed to be an offense of a political character.” Here, the public statements by the Turkish government certainly indicate that this exception might apply.

Another potential ground for a U.S. refusal to extradite is found in Article 3 (e): “If the offense for which extradition is requested has, according to the laws of the Requested Party [here, the U.S.], been committed in its territory and has been or will be submitted to its appropriate judicial authorities for prosecution.” (Emphasis added.) This obviously would require a U.S. prosecution, which has not yet happened and probably will not happen, in my opinion.

Yet another potential ground for a U.S. refusal to extradite Gülen is in Article 4(1): “Neither of the Contracting Parties shall be bound to extradite its own nationals.” This would require him to be a naturalized U.S. citizen, and the public information does not indicate if Gülen is such a citizen. There was a source that said he obtained a U.S. “green card” or permanent residency status in 2001, and the U.S. ambassador to Turkey in January 2015 said he believed that Gülen was not a U.S. citizen.[5]

Article 7 of the treaty has great details about the evidence that needs to be submitted, here by Turkey, to initiate a formal request for extradition. The public information to date indicates that Turkey has provided the U.S. with certain information and evidence, but whether it satisfies the requirements of Article 7 is not clear.

U.S. Obligations Under the Torture Treaty

As discussed in prior posts, the U.S. is a party to the multilateral Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and under Article 2(1) of that treaty the U.S. is obligated not “to extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture [as defined in Article 1 of that treaty].”

As indicated in a prior post, the final step in the U.S. process of determining whether an individual should be extradited includes the Secretary of State examining whether extradition would violate the U.S. obligations under the torture treaty.

With respect to Turkey this is a serious concern.

A. Concerns Raised by the U.S. State Department

The most recent U.S. State Department report on human rights around the world said this about Turkey and torture in 2015.[6] “The [Turkish] constitution and law prohibit torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, but there were reports that some government officials employed them. Human rights organizations continued to report allegations of torture and abuse, especially of persons who were in police custody but not in a place of detention, and during demonstrations and transfers to prison, where such practices were more difficult to document.”

“[Turkish] Prosecutors investigated allegations of abuse and torture by security forces during the year but rarely indicted accused offenders. The National Human Rights Institution (NHRI) is administratively responsible for investigating human rights violations, including allegations of torture, excessive use of force, or extrajudicial killings. Domestic human rights organizations claimed the NHRI’s failure to follow through in investigating potential human rights violations deterred victims of abuse from filing complaints. Authorities regularly allowed officers accused of abuse to remain on duty during their trial.”

“Human Rights Watch (HRW) alleged in a report published in September [2015] that [Turkish] police abused detainees in August and September while responding to perceived security threats in the Southeast. It documented three cases in which police severely beat detainees, forced men to remain in kneeling positions for hours, and threatened them with torture and execution. In another case police detained a boy who had a severe gunshot wound and for several hours denied him medical treatment.”

“[Turkish] Police in several parts of the country sometimes used disproportionate force to disrupt protests, often leading to injury.”

“Human rights groups alleged that although torture and mistreatment in police custody decreased following installation of closed-circuit cameras in 2012, police continued to abuse detainees outside police stations. On July 13, [2015] a media report included footage from security cameras showing police beating 24-year-old university student Tevfik Caner Ertay multiple times in 2013 during the Gezi Park protests before transporting him to a police station in the trunk of a police car. Ertay suffered multiple injuries, including a broken nose. Police perpetrators included some of the same officers later accused of killing fellow university student Ali Ismail Korkmaz.”

“Some human rights observers reported detainees often refrained from reporting torture and abuse because they feared retaliation or believed complaining to authorities would be futile. Human rights organizations documented cases of prison guards beating inmates and maintained those arrested for ordinary crimes were as likely to suffer torture and mistreatment as those arrested for political offenses, such as speaking out against the government.”

“Through the first nine months of the year [2015], the [Turkish] Ministry of Justice reported 98 investigations regarding allegations of torture, 26 of which resulted in indictments.”

“The HRA reported receiving hundreds of allegations of torture and excessive use of force, including 213 cases through September 21 [2015] that involved the alleged abuse of detainees. For example, on January 29, in Sirnak, police reportedly beat four citizens whom they had detained during raids of their homes.”

B. Concerns Raised by the U.N. Committee Against Torture

As explained in an earlier post, the multilateral treaty against torture created a Committee Against Torture, one of whose responsibilities is to review the records of the parties to the treaty. That Committee on June 4, 2016, did just that for Turkey by issuing 20 numbered paragraphs of “principal subjects of concern.”[7] Here are the key concerns for purposes of the pending extradition request.

“The Committee is concerned that, despite the fact that the State party has amended its law to the effect that torture is no longer subject to a statute of limitations, it has not received sufficient information on prosecutions for torture, including in the context of cases involving allegations of torture that have been the subject of decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. The Committee is also concerned that there is a significant disparity between the high number of allegations of torture reported by non-governmental organizations and the data provided by the State party in its periodic report . . ., suggesting that not all allegations of torture have been investigated during the reporting period. Further, while the State party has undertaken many investigations into allegations of ill-treatment and excessive use of force by its officials, these have resulted in relatively few cases of disciplinary sanctions, and in fines and imprisonment in only a small number of cases. The Committee regrets that the State party did not provide information requested by the Committee on the six cases in which officials received sentences of imprisonment for ill-treatment between 2011 and 2013, nor on any cases in which officials received sentences of imprisonment for ill-treatment in 2014 or 2015. The Committee further regrets that State party did not respond to the concern raised by Committee members that law enforcement authorities have on many cases brought ‘countercharges,’ such as ‘resisting’ or ‘insulting’ police officers, against those individuals lodging complains of torture, ill-treatment and other police brutality. The Committee further regrets, with reference to its previous recommendations . . . that the State party has not yet created an independent State body to investigate complaints of torture and ill-treatment against law enforcement officers.”

“The Committee is seriously concerned about numerous credible reports of law enforcement officials engaging in torture and ill-treatment of detainees while responding to perceived and alleged security threats in the south-eastern part of the country . . . in the context of the resurgence of violence between the Turkish security forces and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) following the breakdown of the peace process in 2015 and terrorist attacks perpetrated by individuals linked to the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The Committee is further concerned at the reported impunity enjoyed by the perpetrators of such acts.”

“In addition to the allegations of torture and ill-treatment of detainees noted above, the Committee is concerned at reports it has received concerning the commission of extrajudicial killings of civilians by the State party’s authorities in the course of carrying out counter-terrorism operations in the south-eastern part of the country. The Committee regrets that the State party did not respond to requests for information as to whether investigations are under way into widely reported cases, such as the alleged killing by police snipers of two unarmed women, . . . on 8 September 2015. The Committee also regrets the failure by the State party to ensure accountability for the perpetrators of killings in cases previously raised by the Committee, such as the killing by security forces of . . . in November 2004, which was the subject of a decision of the European Court of Human Rights. The Committee is further concerned at reports that family members of those killed in clashes between security forces and members of armed groups have been denied the ability to retrieve their bodies, which has the effect of impeding investigations into the circumstances surrounding those deaths.”

“The Committee is concerned that allegations of excessive use of force against demonstrators have increased dramatically during the period under review. The Committee notes with regret that the State party’s investigations into the conduct of officials in the context of the 2013 Gezi Park protests in Istanbul and Ankara have not resulted in any prosecutions, despite the allegations of excessive use of force noted by observers, including the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The Committee also regrets that the State party did not provide any data on the specific sentences, if any, that police officers tried on charges of excessive use of force during the reporting period had received. It further expresses concern over the recent legislative amendments in the Domestic Security Package granting additional powers to the police, in particular the expanded power to use firearms against demonstrators.”

“Although the Criminal Code defines torture as a specific offence, the Committee notes that the definition set out in article 94 [of the Code] is incomplete inasmuch as it fails to mention the purpose of the act in question. There is also no specific mention of the act of torture carried out in order to intimidate, to coerce or to obtain information or a confession from a person other than the person who was tortured.”

“While taking note of the legal safeguards enshrined in Turkish legislation, the Committee is concerned at recent amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure, which give the police greater powers to detain individuals without judicial oversight during police custody. Placing suspects under constant video surveillance in their cells is another matter of concern.”

“The Committee is concerned at the ‘almost complete lack of accountability for cases of enforced disappearance’ in the State party and its ‘palpable lack of interest [in] seriously investigating, prosecuting and adjudicating these cases’, as reported by the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances in its preliminary observations publicly . . . announced at the end of its visit to Turkey from 14 to 18 March 2016. . . .”

“The Committee regrets the lack of complete information on suicides and other sudden deaths in detention facilities during the period under review.”

“The Committee is concerned by the restrictive conditions of detention for persons sentenced to aggravated life imprisonment, a sentence that was established after the abolition of the death penalty in 2004.”

C. Human Rights NGOs and Others

 Especially after the failed coup, human rights NGOs have raised increasing concerns about human rights in Turkey. These concerns were heightened by the Turkish government’s July 20 declaration of a state of emergency for the next three months. This gives the government the power to impose rule by decrees that are published and rushed through parliament for approval the same day. The possibility of review by the Constitutional Court is curbed. Human Rights Watch expressed its alarm over this development: “A state of emergency imposed where there are clear signs that the government is ready to crack down more broadly – combined with far more scope for unchecked executive action – is an alarming prospect. It risks further undermining democracy by providing a legal – if not justifiable – basis for a crackdown on rights.”[8]

Amnesty International (AI) on July 18 (only three days after the attempted coup) said that several Turkish “government officials have suggested reinstating the death penalty as punishment for those found responsible for the failed coup, and . . . [AI] is now investigating reports that detainees in Ankara and Istanbul have been subjected to a series of abuses, including ill-treatment in custody and being denied access to lawyers.” Two days later AI stated, “We are witnessing a crackdown of exceptional proportions in Turkey,” including freedom of expression.[9]

On July 24 AI reported that it had “gathered credible evidence that detainees in Turkey are being subjected to beatings and torture, including rape, in official and unofficial detention centers in the country.” According to these accounts, “police held detainees in stress positions, denied them food, water and medical treatment, verbally abused and threatened them and subjected them to beatings and torture, including rape and sexual assault.”[10]

On August 2 President Erdogan in a public speech challenged AI’s research underlying its assertion that some detainees had been tortured. In response AI’s Secretary General stated, ““The serious human rights violations documented by an . . . [AI] team on the ground in Turkey are alarming. These findings are based on detailed interviews with lawyers, doctors, family members and an eyewitness to torture in a detention facility.”[11]

A Turkish bar group in the capital of Ankara has stated that some of its members have reported alleged abuses of their clients in detention while other lawyers and human rights organizations have made similar allegations.[12]

The Turkey-U.S. Dispute Over the Requested Extradition of Gülen

Turkey’s Foreign Ministry has to be aware of the terms of its extradition treaty with the U.S. and the latter’s procedures for handling extradition requests. Thus, Erdogran and his government’s strident complaints about the U.S. not immediately granting the request for Gülen has to be intended to show Turkish citizens the strength and resolve of the regime. There even have been rumors that the U.S. was behind the attempted coup.

In any event, “Usually deeply polarized, the two sides [of Turkey’s population] are largely united in their opposition to military coups and the . . . [extradition] of Fethullah Gülen, a Muslim cleric who lives in self-exile in Pennsylvania and has been accused by Turkey of orchestrating the failed uprising.” There even is widespread support for the “sweeping purge of suspected followers of Mr. Gülen from the state bureaucracy and other professions” and Mr. Erdogan’s asking “Turks to inform on those they believe are connected to Mr. Gülen.”

Istanbul

The unity was on vivid display at a recent Istanbul rally of at least two million Turks who put aside their political differences to express solidarity.”[13] (To the right is a photograph of that rally.)

 

The U.S., however, needs to continue to resist acquiescence in these strong-arm tactics and to insist on following U.S. law and procedures for such requests. Secretary of State Kerry and President Obama have done just that.[14] So too have State Department spokespeople at daily press briefings.[15] This is not easy since the U.S. has a strong national security interest in maintaining Turkey as an ally in the fight against ISIS/ISIL.

Tomorrow U.S. Vice President Joe Biden will be visiting Turkey to see President Erdogan. The Associated Press opines that Biden will have difficulties in persuading Turkey that the U.S. values Turkey as a key NATO ally amid worrying signs that Turkey is flirting with having closer ties with Russia and that the U.S. and Turkish approaches to the Syrian conflict may be diverging.[16]

Today, says the Associated Press, a U.S. Justice Department team is meeting with Turkish officials in Ankara to discuss U.S. technical requirements of Turkey’s extradition request. This includes firm evidence of Gülen’s involvement in the coup whereas senior officials in the Obama administration say Turkey’s extradition requests to date have been based on allegations of other crimes against Gülen, not evidence of involvement in the coup attempt. A Turkish professor of international relations said that Turkish “people have an expectation that Gülen should be returned to Turkey immediately. If the extradition request is refused or delayed I’m afraid that’s going to have serious repercussions.”

The Washington Post editorial board urges the Vice President “to reassure Mr. Erdogan once again that the two nations share vital interests, not the least of which are fighting the Islamic State and ending the conflagration that has consumed Syria.” The Vice President also “should make clear he understands how much Turkish civilians are suffering from terrorist attacks” and “convince Mr. Erdogan that the United States does not desire to destabilize Turkey.”[17]

The Washington Post editorial further urges Biden “to candidly tell his host that the United States did not instigate the coup and that it will not relinquish Mr. Gülen to a witchhunt. Mr. Erdogan may not want to hear it, but he also should be reminded that crushing the rule of law will dim Turkey’s prospects.”

In the midst of this high-stakes squabble between the two countries, Gülen wrote an article for the New York Times in which he stated, “During the attempted military coup in Turkey this month, I condemned it in the strongest terms. ‘Government should be won through a process of free and fair elections, not force.’ I said, ‘I pray to God for Turkey, for Turkish citizens, and for all those currently in Turkey that this situation is resolved peacefully and quickly.’” President Erdogan’s suggestion that I was the mastermind of the coup “run[s] afoul of everything I believe in, it is also irresponsible and wrong. My philosophy — inclusive and pluralist Islam, dedicated to service to human beings from every faith — is antithetical to armed rebellion.”[18]

Moreover, Gülen said, “Throughout my life, I have publicly and privately denounced military interventions in domestic politics. In fact, I have been advocating for democracy for decades. Having suffered through four military coups in four decades in Turkey — and having been subjected by those military regimes to harassment and wrongful imprisonment — I would never want my fellow citizens to endure such an ordeal again. If somebody who appears to be [my] . . . sympathizer has been involved in an attempted coup, he betrays my ideals.”

Gülen concluded his article with this plea to the U.S. government. The U.S. “must not accommodate an autocrat [Erdogan] who is turning a failed putsch into a slow-motion coup of his own against constitutional government.”

===========================================================

[1] Reuters, Turkey to Ready Dossier for Gulen Extradition in 10 Days: Foreign Minister, N.Y. Times (July 23, 2016); Dugan, Turkey’s Failed Coup Puts Spotlight on a Rural Pennsylvania Town,W.S.J. (July 24, 2016); Fethullah Gullen Website, https://www.fgulen.com/en/Fethullah Güllen; Wikipedia. Fethullah Güllen; LaPorte, Watson & Tuysusz, Who is Fethullah Gulen, the man blamed for coup attempt in Turkey? CNN (July 16, 2016).

[2] E.g., Reuters, Turkey Says U.S. Could Extradite Cleric Gulen Quickly if Wants to, N.Y. Times (July 22, 2016); Assoc. Press, Turkey Criticizes U.S. Over Cleric Accused of Coup Plot, N.Y. Times (July 22, 2016); Kalin, The Coup Leader Must Be Held Accountable, N.Y. Times (July 24, 2016); Coker, Turkish Premier Demands U.S. Help with Gulen, W.S.J. (July 26, 2016).

[3] U.S. State Dep’t, Report on International Extradition Submitted to the Congress Pursuant to Section 211 of the Admiral James W. Nance and Meg Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001 (Public Law 106-113) (2001); U.S. Justice Dep’t, Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Extradition.

[4] U.S.-Turkey Extradition Treaty, 32 U.S.T. 3111.

[5] Fathullah Gullen, Wikipedia; U.S. Embassy to Turkey, Transcript of Ambassador Bass’s Interview with Sabah Ankara Bureau Chief Okan Muderrisoglu and Daily Sabah Correspondent Alli Unal (Jan. 12, 2015).

[6] U.S. State Dep’t, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015 (updated 4/18/16 & 6/14/16).

[7] Comm Agst Torture, Concluding observations on Turkey (June 2, 2016).

[8] Human Rights Watch, Dispatches: Turkey’s State of Emergency (July 22, 2016); Yeginsu & Arango, Turkey Cracks Down on Journalists, Its Next Target After Crushing the Coup, N.Y. Times (July 25, 2016).

[9] Amnesty Int’l, Human rights in grave danger following coup attempt and subsequent crackdown in Turkey (July 18, 2016); Amnesty Int’l, Media purge threatens freedom of expression in Turkey (July 20, 2016); Amnesty Int’l, Turkey: Intensified crackdown on media increases atmosphere of fear (July 28, 2016).

[10] Amnesty Int’l, Turkey: Independent monitors must be allowed to access detainees amid torture allegations (July 24, 2016).

[11] Amnesty Int’l, Turkey: Response to President Erdogan’s speech challenging Amnesty International’s findings (Aug. 2, 2016).

[12] Morris, ‘Law is suspended’: Turkish lawyers report abuse of coup detainees, Wash. Post (July 24, 2016).

[13] Yeginsu, After Failed Coup, Turkey Settles Into a Rare Period of Unity, N.Y. Times (Aug. 23, 2016).

[14] Assoc. Press, Kerry to Turkey: Send Us Evidence, Not Allegations on Gulen, N.Y. Times (July 20, 2016); White House, Remarks by President Obama and President Peno Nieto of Mexico in Joint Press Conference (July 22, 2016).

[15] E.g., State Dep’t, Daily Press Briefing (July 21, 2016); State Dep’t, Daily Press Briefing (July 22, 2016).

[16] Assoc. Press, U.S., Biden Face Tough Task to Mend Relations with Turkey, N.Y. Times (Aug. 23, 2016).

[17] Editorial, Biden needs to give Turkey’s Erdogan tough advice, Wash. Post (Aug. 22, 2016).

[18] Gulen, Fethullah Gulen: I Condemn All Threats to Turkey’s Democracy, N.Y. Times (July 25, 2016).

 

 

 

 

Extradition Has Become a Hot Topic for the United States

Extradition is the legal process “by which one country (the requesting country) may seek from another country (the requested country) the surrender of a person who is wanted for prosecution, or to serve a sentence following conviction, for a criminal offense.  In the U.S., international extradition is treaty based, meaning that the U.S. must have an extradition treaty with the requesting country in order to consider the request for extradition.”[1]

That process is now a hot topic in the U.S. Most recently Turkey is pressing the U.S. to extradite Fethullah Gulen, a Muslim cleric living in Pennsylvania, to Turkey to face charges of being involved in the attempted coup in that country. Another pending request, this from Spain, seeks the U.S. extradition of Inocente Orlando Montano Morales, a former Salvadoran military officer living in the U.S., to face criminal charges involving the 1989 murders of Jesuit priests in El Salvador. Extradition also is one of the many unresolved issues in the process of normalizing U.S.-Cuba relations: will Cuba extradite certain U.S. fugitives and will the U.S. do likewise for certain Cuban fugitives.[2]

Therefore, a better understanding of international extradition is necessary to follow these developments. Such a primer can be found in a 2001 U.S. State Department report to Congress and a recent U.S. government brief in the previously mentioned Spanish case for extradition of the former Salvadoran military officer from the U.S.[3] Assuming those sources are fair summaries of the process, this post omits citations to statutes and cases other than  to note that extradition is the subject of 18 U.S. Code, Chapter 209.

U.S. Extradition Treaties

U.S. extradition practice is based almost entirely on individually negotiated bilateral treaties, which the U.S. brings into force following Senate advice and consent to ratification. The U.S. is currently a party to 109 such treaties.[4] While most of these treaties currently in force have been negotiated in the last 30-40 years, many of the treaties still in force are quite old, in some cases dating back to the 19th Century.

For many reasons, however, not every request for extradition results in a fugitive being delivered to the requesting country. Sometimes the requesting state doesn’t know where a fugitive is located and makes multiple contingency requests for provisional arrest and extradition. In other cases, fugitives learn they are being sought and flee or go into hiding. Even following a fugitive’s arrest, court proceedings and appeals can last a very long time and can be delayed by fugitives’ exercising all possible rights to challenge extradition.

In addition, most such treaties provide specific bases on which extraditions can be delayed or denied. The obligation to extradite under a bilateral extradition treaty is not absolute and protections are included in the treaty to accommodate both U.S. and foreign interests. While the exact terms of such treaties result from country-specific negotiations and thus vary somewhat among the treaties, there are the following typical types of qualifications on the obligation to extradite:

  • An almost universal treaty exception, known in international extradition law as the “non bis in idem” doctrine, is similar to the double jeopardy doctrine under U.S. domestic law. It provides that extradition will be denied when the person has already been either acquitted or convicted for the same offense in the country from which extradition is requested, or, in some instances, in a third country.
  • A similarly widely adopted exception is that extradition is not required where the crime at issue is a “political offense” (a term which can cover treason, sedition or other crime against the state without the elements of any ordinary crime, or which under U.S. law can cover ordinary crimes committed incidental to or in furtherance of a violent political uprising such as a war, revolution or rebellion, especially when such crimes do not target civilian victims) or a “military offense” (a crime subject to military law that is not criminalized under normal penal law).
  • U.S. treaties also typically provide that extradition may be denied if the request is found to be politically motivated. Some of our treaties provide that extradition may be denied if the request was made for the primary purpose of prosecuting or punishing the person sought on account of race, religion, nationality or political opinion.
  • Perhaps the highest profile exceptions to the obligation to extradite are bars or limitations in some countries on the extradition of their own nationals.   The U.S., however, makes no distinction between extraditing its own nationals and those of other countries and advocates that all countries adopt the U.S. policy due to the ease of flight and the increasingly transnational nature of crime.
  • Some U.S. treaties provide that if the offense for which surrender is sought is punishable by death under the laws in the country requesting extradition but not in the country holding the fugitive, extradition may be refused unless the requesting country provides assurances that the death penalty will not be imposed or, if imposed, will not be carried out. Sometimes these provisions are included in the treaty at the insistence of our treaty partner, because many countries in Europe and elsewhere oppose the death penalty. Sometimes the U.S. insists on such provisions in order to retain sufficient flexibility to ensure that the U.S. is not obliged to surrender persons for execution for relatively less serious crimes.

Older U.S. treaties that were negotiated before the late 1970’s contained a list of offenses that would be covered. In newer U.S. treaties this list approach has been replaced by the concept of “dual criminality,” usually providing that offenses covered by the treaty include all those made punishable under the laws of both parties by imprisonment or other form of detention for more than one year, or by a more severe penalty (such as capital punishment). Such a formulation obviates the need to renegotiate the treaty to provide coverage for new offenses, strikingly exemplified by the currently evolving area of cyber-crime. Indeed, to avoid having the dual criminality analysis applied too narrowly, most treaties provide further guidance, including that an offense is extraditable whether or not the laws in the two countries place the offense within the same category or describe it by the same terminology. A major goal in the U.S. current ambitious treaty-negotiating program is to negotiate new, modern treaties that eliminate the “list” approach in favor of dual criminality treaties.

Other limitations on the obligation to extradite, which vary to some extent from treaty to treaty, would relate to requests for extradition for extraterritorial offenses where the two countries’ laws differ on the reach of jurisdiction over such crimes. In such cases, the U.S. seeks the greatest possible flexibility in our treaties to permit extradition for offenses that have taken place in whole or in part outside the territory of the requesting party.

U.S. Practice Regarding Foreign Government Requests for Extradition

The U.S. practice regarding foreign government requests for extradition involves the Department of State, the Department of Justice, a U.S. attorney, a U.S. district court and the Secretary of State.

  1. U.S. Department of State

The extradition process in the U.S. starts when the Department of State receives a request for extradition from a foreign country. That Department initially determines whether the request is governed by a treaty between the U.S. and that country, and if there is such a treaty and the request conforms to the treaty, that Department will prepare a declaration authenticating the request and send it to the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of International Affairs.

  1. U.S. Department of Justice[5]

The Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs examines the foreign country’s request to determine if it contains all of the necessary information. If it does, the request is sent to the U.S. Attorney for the district where the subject of the request is located. Thereafter the Office’s attorneys will assist, as needed, the U.S. Attorney.

  1. U.S. Attorney

The U.S. Attorney then prepares and files a complaint with the local U.S. district court seeking a warrant for the individual’s arrest and certification that he or she may be extradited. The U.S. Attorney also files briefs and appears at any hearings in the district court in the case.

  1. U.S. District Court

The complaint, of course, is served upon the subject of the proceeding, who has a right to be represented by counsel and to contest the complaint.

The court then conducts a hearing to determine if there is probable cause that the subject has violated one or more of the criminal laws of the country seeking extradition. This is not a criminal trial, but like a preliminary hearing in a criminal case to determine if the evidence is sufficient to sustain the charge under the treaty’s provisions.

At such a hearing, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure and Evidence do not apply. Thus, the evidence may consist of hearsay and unsworn statements, and the judicial officer does not weigh conflicting evidence and make factual determinations. Instead the officer only decides whether there is competent evidence to support the belief that the individual has committed the charged offense under the other country’s laws.

At this hearing, the individual has no right to submit a defense to the charges or evidence that merely contradicts the other country’s proof or poses conflicts of credibility.

If the court finds after the hearing that (a) there is a criminal charge pending in the other country against the individual; (b) the offense underlying the charge is encompassed by the relevant treaty; (c) the individual is the person sought by the foreign government; (d) the evidence supports a finding that the crime for which the individual is sought was committed; (e) the evidence supports a finding that the individual committed the crime; and (f) the treaty has no other basis for denying extradition; then the court issues a certification that the individual is subject to extradition.

Such a certification may be challenged only by the individual’s filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to the same district court.[6]

If there is no petition or it is denied, the court sends the certification to the Secretary of State.

  1. U.S. Secretary of State[7]

Under U.S. statutes, the Secretary of State is the U.S. official responsible for determining whether to surrender a fugitive to a requesting state. In making this decision, the Secretary may consider issues properly raised before the extradition court or a habeas court as well as any humanitarian or other considerations for or against surrender, including whether surrender may violate the United States’ obligations under the Convention Against Torture. The Secretary also will consider any written materials submitted by the fugitive, his or her counsel, or other interested parties.

If the Secretary decides to extradite, the Secretary issues and serves a warrant for the extradition, and the individual is extradited to the other country.

=========================================================

[1] U.S. State Dep’t, Report on International Extradition Submitted to the Congress Pursuant to Section 211 of the Admiral James W. Nance and Meg Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001 (Public Law 106-113) (2001); U.S. Justice Dep’t, Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Extradition;Memorandum in Support of Motion To Dismiss Application for Habeas Corpus at 2, Montano Morales v. Elks, No. 5-16-HC-2066-BO (E.D.N.C. April 26, 2016).

[2] Future posts will examine the requests from Spain and Turkey while an earlier post reviewed a district court’s issuance of the certification for extradition to Spain of the former Salvadoran military officer: Resumption of Spanish Criminal Case Over 1989 Salvadoran Murder of Jesuit Priests?, dwkcommentaries.com (Feb. 6, 2016). Another post reviewed U.S. and Cuban extradition issues: Issues Regarding Cuba and U.S. Extradition of the Other’s Fugitives, dwkcommentaries.com (Feb. 24, 2015).

[3] See n.1.

[4] The U.S. currently has bilateral extradition treaties with 109 countries.

[5] Justice Dep’t, Office of International Affairs.

[6] A prior post erroneously stated that such a certification was subject to an ordinary appeal to the relevant U.S. court of appeals.

[7] State Dep’t, Extradition.

United States and Cuba Hold Second Law Enforcement Dialogue   

On May 17, in Havana U.S. and Cuba representatives held their Second Law Enforcement Dialogue. The U.S. delegation was led by John S. Creamer, Department of State, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs; Bruce Schwartz, Department of Justice, Deputy Assistant Attorney General; and Alan Bersin, Department of Homeland Security, Assistant Secretary for International Affairs and Chief Diplomatic Officer. Cuba’s delegation, by its Ministers of Interior, Justice and Foreign Affairs as well as its Attorney General and Customs General.[1]

The Department of State said that “law enforcement is an area of mutual interest to both the U.S. and Cuba as we advance toward normalized relations. We anticipate that the dialogue will be productive, and an additional opportunity to reinforce the benefits of law enforcement cooperation. During the dialogue, the United States and Cuba will continue to discuss a wide range of areas of cooperation, including counterterrorism, counternarcotics, transnational crime, cybercrime, secure travel and trade, and fugitives.”

The framework for the dialogue was the Memorandum of Understanding between Homeland Security and the Ministry of Interior of Cuba, signed in May 2016. This MOU sets the basis of cooperation in exchanging risk information for travelers, cargo or conveyances in international transit; the continuation of periodic, mutual, and reciprocal assessments regarding air, sea, and port security; and the coordination of transportation security, screening of cargo, travelers and baggage, and the design of secure, efficient inspection facilities at ports and airports, among other things.[2]

The day before the Dialogue (May 16), the Department of Homeland Security Deputy Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas met with the U.S. and Cuban delegations in advance of the dialogue and to conduct bilateral meetings with his counterparts.

======================================================

[1] Mayorkas returns to Cuba to activate dialog implementation of the Law, Marti (May 17, 2016); Department of Homeland Security, Statement by Press Secretary Marsha Catron on Deputy Secretary Mayorkas’ Upcoming Trip To Cuba (May 13, 2016).

[2] Written testimony of PLCY Assistant Secretary for Border, Immigration, and Trade Policy Seth Stodder, et al., for a House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Transportation Security hearing titled “Flying Blind: What are the security risks of resuming U.S. Commercial Air Service to Cuba? (May 17, 2016).  I have not yet been able to find a copy of the actual MOU.

 

University Students Investigate Jim Crow-Era Killings

Students at Atlanta’s Emory University are investigating Jim Crow-era murders of blacks in Georgia. They then publish their results online. This is the focus of Emory’s “The Georgia Civil Rights Cold Cases Project.” Similar projects exist at least three other universities. Important federal legislation and actions by the U.S. Department of Justice provide important background for such efforts. These subjects will be explored in this post.

Emory’s Project[1]

The Project was started in 2011 as an interdisciplinary Civil Rights Cold Cases class examining incidents that occurred in Georgia. In January 2015, it launched a website, coldcases.emory.edu, that is the joint product of more than fifty students’ work during seven semesters of the course.

The Emory class is taught by Hank Klibanoff, the James M. Cox Jr. Professor of Journalism and the Pulitzer Prize–winning author of The Race Beat: The Press, the Civil Rights Struggle, and the Awakening of a Nation, and by Brett Gadsden, Associate Professor of African American Studies.

Professor Gadsden said the class is run like “a research seminar, with intense focus on individuals’ lives and attention to the historical context in which these folks lived. These stories come alive for students. They aren’t just presenting cases or telling the stories of lowly black victims. They are really trying to understand what happened, what the circumstances were, what happened to the people, how they lived, how they died, who killed them, and why, but understanding these victims’ deaths as a part of the historical record.”

The students prepare both a ten-page academic paper on their topic of choice and a condensed article for publication on the website. Gadsden emphasizes that the students are “writing for the professors, for each other, and also for a public of both academics and non-academics. They are accountable to the descendants of the lost, and that comes with a special responsibility—one that the students embrace.”

The recent Wall Street Journal article about Emory’s project tells the moving story of the students’ investigation of the September 8, 1948, killing by two white men of Isaiah Nixon, a black man who had voted that same day in Georgia’s gubernatorial primary election. One of the white men was charged with murder, but was acquitted in a one-day trial by an all-white jury. Afterwards the accessory-to-murder charge against the other white man was dropped. The Emory students’ investigation led them to conclude that Nixon had been murdered because he had voted in that primary election.

The students also discovered Nixon’s grave in a Georgia cemetery and invited his daughter, Dorothy Nixon Williams, who at age 6 had witnessed the murder of her father, to visit the grave last week with them and her son. Now 73 years old, Dorothy said when seeing the grave, “Lord have mercy,” sobbing into her son’s shoulder. Professor Klibanoff commented, “Isaiah Nixon matters; his life matters and his death and disappearance from history matter. What matters more is his reappearance now and I think that is miraculous.” At the conclusion of the visit, Dorothy said her anger over her father’s murder “now is completely released.”

Other Similar Projects

Similar projects are being conducted by Northeastern University School of Law, Syracuse University College of Law and Louisiana State University.

Northeastern’s Civil Rights and Restorative Justice Project investigates “the role of state, local and federal law enforcement agencies and courts in protecting activists and their work. [The Project] examines the geo-politics that led to the large-scale breakdown of law enforcement, the wide-spread repression against the movement’s participants, and the reforms that have been initiated to rectify these abuses. The project engages teachers and students across the university and is directed by faculty from the School of Law and the College of Criminal Justice.” [2]

Syracuse’s Cold Case Justice Initiative was established in 2007 by Syracuse law professors Paula Johnson and Janis McDonald to investigate “racially motivated murders that occurred during the Civil Rights era and [to advocate] on behalf of the victims and their families to get justice for the crimes. The program works with law students to conduct research, identify victims and find new information that could assist law enforcement in resolving cases. The Initiative as of has identified [nearly 200] cases from the civil rights era they believe warranted further investigation by federal authorities.”[3]

Louisiana State University’s Manship School of Mass Communication started its Cold Case Project in 2010 to investigate Civil Rights-era hate murders in Louisiana and southern Mississippi. Since then nearly three-dozen students, comprised mainly of seniors and graduate students, have worked on such cases. Their “primary focus is to bring closure to African-American communities which have lingered decades without fully knowing what federal agents learned about the deaths of family members and friends.” Jay Shelledy, who is in charge of the Project, said FBI agents at the time did their best to solve these vicious killings, but were thwarted by intimidated witnesses, Klan-sympathizing local lawmen and white juries which refused to convict whites of murdering blacks.[4]

In February 2015 the LSU Project launched a searchable website detailing heretofore sealed FBI investigative findings in a dozen such murders. It contains more than 150,000 pages of FBI findings, resulting stories, photographs and letters from the U.S. Department of Justice to the victims’ next of kin. Many thousands of additional pages of FBI case files are pending release under FOIA requests; when released, they will be added to the digital database.

Background for These Projects

These projects have been stimulated and assisted by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). In 2006, the Department began its Cold Case Initiative—a comprehensive program to identify and investigate racially motivated murders committed decades ago. The effort was reinforced in 2008 with the passage of the Emmett Till Unsolved Civil Rights Crime Act that authorized the Department to investigate unsolved civil rights murders before 1970. This statute had been introduced in 2007 by Congressman John Lewis of Georgia and unanimously passed by both houses of Congress in 2008 and signed into law by President George W. Bush.[5]

As of May 2015, the Department reported to Congress that it had concluded 105 of 113 relevant cold cases involving 126 victims, but that “very few prosecutions have resulted from these exhaustive efforts.” (The single case that went to court involved Jimmie Lee Jackson, who was shot by Alabama State Trooper James Fowler after a civil rights protest in 1965. In 2010, at age 77, Fowler pleaded guilty to manslaughter and was sentenced to six months in prison.)[6]

This was due, said the report, for many reasons. Federal statutory law limits the Department’s ability to prosecute civil-rights era cases at the federal level. There is a five-year statute of limitations on federal criminal civil-rights charges that existed prior to 1994. The Fifth Amendment protects against double jeopardy, which prevents the re-trial of someone for an offense for which he or she was previously found not guilty. In addition, cold cases can be difficult to prosecute because “subjects die, witnesses die or can no longer be located, memories become clouded, evidence is destroyed or cannot be located.”

This statute is due to expire in 2017, and efforts are being made to lobby for its extension.

Conclusion

These projects are significant and inspiring. First, they complement and should be coordinated with the amazing justice advocacy of Bryan Stevenson at the Equal Justice Initiative that was discussed in a prior post. Second, these projects are excellent examples of a mode of teaching an important subject that should be included in this blogger’s reflections on modes of teaching and learning as set forth in another earlier post.

We all should give thanks to Emory, Northeastern, Syracuse and Louisiana State University for their leadership in this important work.

=======================================================

[1] McWhirter, College Class Investigates Jim Crow-Era Killings, W.S. J. (Jan. 24, 2016),; Lameiras, Cold Cases Project helps student uncover history of civil rights era crimes, Emory Mag. (May 25, 2015); Emory Libraries, Georgia Civil Rights Cold Cases; Justice, Emory student research debuts on Georgia Civil Rights Cold Cases website (Jan. 7, 2015); Emory Univ., Special Topics Seminar: Cold Cases (description of seminar and tentative list of readings).

[2] Northeastern Univ. School of Law, Civil Rights and Restorative Justice Project. An earlier version of this post erroneously included Northwestern University College of Law’s important Wrongful Conviction Center, and I thank Professor Hank Klibanoff for pointing out this error.

[3] Joiner, Inside the Effort to Solve Civil Rights Crimes Before It’s Too Late, Time (Oct. 15, 2015).

[4] LSU Manship School of Mass Communication, Cold Case Project; Lemoine, Cold Case, LSU Gold (Fall 2011); LSU Manship School of Mass Communication, Cold Case Project website released (Feb. 25, 2015).

[5] U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Cold Case Initiative.

[6] U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General’s Sixth Annual Report to Congress Pursuant to the Emmett Till Unsolved Civil Rights Crime Act of 2007 (May 2015).

Resolving U.S. and Cuba Damage Claims

On December 8, the U.S. and Cuba held discussions in Havana about the two countries’ damage claims: (1) U.S. claims to recover damages for U.S. property interests that were expropriated by the Cuban government at the start of the Cuban Revolution in 1959.; (2) U.S. courts’ money judgments against Cuba; (3) Cuba’s claims for alleged damages resulting from the U.S. embargo of Cuba; and (4) Cuba’s alleged damage claims for Cubans personal injuries and deaths from U.S. hostile actions.

This post will briefly examine those claims, the recent U.S.-Cuba discussions on the subject and an analysis of the issues by Washington, D.C.’s Brookings Institution.

Summary of the Claims

  1. Cuba’s Expropriation of U.S. Property[1]

Some 5,913 U.S. corporations and individuals have $1.9 billion worth of claims (without interest) for factories, farms, homes and other assets that were nationalized in Cuba after Fidel Castro’s rebels came to power in 1959. These claims have been registered and validated by the U.S. Justice Department’s Foreign Claims Settlement Commission. They are now worth roughly $8 billion when including 6.0 percent annual interest. These claims (without interest) have been categorized by the Brookings Institution’s report discussed below:

Claimants Claims Amount ($USD)
Corporate 899 1,677,280,771
Individual 5,014 229,199,112
TOTAL 5,913 1,906,479,883

 

Nevertheless, the Brookings’ report identifies these potential issues with respect to the claims validated by the U.S. Commission: (1) Whether to recognize the Commission rulings as a legitimate procedure in which cuba did not participate; (2) Whether to accept or challenge its valuations of lost properties; (3)  Whether Cuba should recognize accumulated interest as awarded by the Commission on its certified claims or whether to negotiate an alternative benchmark interest rate or other formula for partial payments.

2. U.S. Court Judgments Against Cuba[2]

In U.S. courts various plaintiffs have sued the Cuban Government, which did not appear in the cases. As a result the courts entered default judgments against Cuba, now totaling $2 billion.

3. U.S. Embargo of Cuba[3]

In a 2015 report to the United Nations General Assembly, Cuba asserted that the accumulated economic damages from the U.S. economic sanctions had reached $121 billion. The annual report offers some estimates on sectoral damages but does not discuss methodology. An earlier 1992 Cuban statement detailed these estimated cumulative losses among others:: (a) $3.8 billion for losses in the tourist industry; (b) $400 million for losses in the nickel industry; (c) $375 million for the higher costs of freighters; (d) $200 million for the purchase of sugarcane crop equipment to substitute for U.S.-manufactured equipment; and (e) $120 million for the substitution of electric industry equipment

4. Cubans Killed or Injured by Alleged U.S. Hostilities[4]

The Cuban government claims that U.S. “acts of terrorism against Cuba have caused 3,478 deaths and 2,099 disabling injuries.” Examples of such alleged acts include (a) U.S.-supported hostilities in Cuba resulting in 549 deaths between 1959-1965; (b) the Bay of Pigs invasion resulting in 176 deaths and over 300 wounded of whom 50 were left incapacitated; (c) the explosion of the French vessel La Coubre on March 4, 1960 in Havana Harbor, resulting in 101 deaths including some French sailors; (d) the terrorist bombing of Cuban Airlines Flight 455 in 1976 killing all 73 persons on board including 57 Cubans; (e) the September 11, 1980 assassination of Cuban diplomat Félix García Rodriguez in New York City; (f) Numerous aggressions from the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo resulting in the deaths of Cuban citizens; and (g) suspicions that the U.S. employed biological warfare to spread fatal dengue fever in Cuba.

Recent U.S.-Cuba Discussions[5]

Immediately before the December 8 discussions, a U.S. State Department spokesperson said the U.S. expected this to be “a first step in what we expect to be a long and complex process, but the United States views the resolution of outstanding claims as a top priority for normalization.”

Afterwards a U.S official said that reaching a settlement of these claims was “a top priority” for the U.S. and that these talks were “fruitful” and would continue in 2016. This official also said that the U.S. had provided information on the additional $2 billion in judgments awarded to plaintiffs who had sued the Cuban government in U.S. courts, proceedings that ­Havana does not recognize.

Other than the above sketchy summary, very little has publicly emerged about the specifics of the talks. It sounds as if the discussions were akin to the pretrial discovery process in U.S. civil lawsuits when parties learn about each other’s evidence and arguments.

A Cuba legal expert, Pedro Freyre, said, “It’s the first time the two countries are going back to look at this history and try to sort out a system for fixing it.” The Cubans, he added, were “very tough, very clever” in such negotiations.

Brookings Institution’s Analysis[6]

Richard Feinberg
Richard Feinberg

On the same day as the U.S.-Cuba discussions (December 8), the Brookings Institution released a cogent report on the subject by Richard Feinberg, a nonresident senior fellow in Brookings’ Latin American Initiative. [7]

Introducing the report at a press conference, Feinberg said, “The convening of these talks in Havana [is] a major milestone in the process of gradual full normalization of relations between the United States and Cuba, especially important with regard to commercial relations. Property ownership and claims are at the strategic heart of the Cuban revolution, dating from the early 1960s and also a major cause, perhaps the major cause, of the conflict between the United States and the Cuban revolution. The seizure of U.S. properties was the proximate cause of the imposition of U.S. economic sanctions back in the early 1960s.” These talks are of “strategic importance in the bilateral relationship.”

Feinberg also emphasized that both the U.S. and Cuba “agree on the principle of compensation” for expropriation of property.” Indeed, he said, to do so is in Cuba’s national interest. It “wants to demonstrate [that] it is not a rogue nation . . . [that] it is a nation of laws” and it “wants to remove major irritants to its international diplomacy and commercial relations” and “to attract international investment.”

Another point made by Feinberg was Cuba was not so poor that it could not pay any compensation, especially if the payments were spread out over time, as seems likely.

In addition to setting forth information about the above claims, the report examined the following ways of resolving these claims.

  1. The Grand Bargain

The Report asserts that “a much more promising alternative approach” is “to take advantage of the very size and complexity of the conflicting claims and to make their resolution the centerpiece of a grand bargain that would resolve some of the other remaining points of tension between the two nations, and embrace an ambitious, forward-looking development strategy for Cuba.”

In such a grand bargain, “the settlement of U.S. claims could be wrapped in a package of economic opportunities for Cuba. Importantly, the United States could further relax its economic sanctions (amending or repealing Helms-Burton), providing more trade and investment opportunities – and the capacity for Cuba to earn the foreign exchange needed to service debt obligations. In turn, Cuba will have to accelerate and deepen its economic reforms, to offer a more attractive business environment for investors and exporters. Politically, the Cuban government could present a significant softening of the U.S. embargo as a victory, offsetting any concessions made in the claims negotiations. A comprehensive package might also be more attractive to the U.S. Congress; formal Congressional consent would enhance the measures’ legitimacy and durability and help to close off any court challenges, should some claimants be unsatisfied with the final settlement.”

“The [U.S.] strategic goals in a massive claims resolution process must be political: to heal the deep wounds of past conflicts, to lay foundations for peaceful coexistence and the non-violent resolution of disputes, to avoid jeopardizing fiscal balances and crippling debt burdens, to build investor confidence and international reputation, and to help render the Cuban economy more open and competitive. . . . In the interests of both Cuba and the United States, the twentieth-century trauma of massive property seizures should be transformed into a twenty-first century economic development opportunity.”

“Wrapping a claims settlement within a more sweeping diplomatic package could have large advantages. A robust accord could help overcome long-simmering bilateral animosities and reconcile the fractured Cuban family. Potentially embarrassing ‘concessions’ by either party could be masked by larger victories on more weighty or emotive issues. What to some might appear the unseemly materialism or inequity of property claims would be subsumed within a higher-toned humanitarian achievement. Having turned the page on a half-century long era of conflict, Cuban society could begin in earnest on a new path toward social peace and shared prosperity. The claims settlement, which would bolster investor confidence, could also be linked to a reformed economic development model for Cuba actively supported by the international community.”

2. Lump-Sum Settlement

Separate resolution of the damage claims could be done in a lump-sum settlement, whereby “the two governments negotiate a total amount of financial compensation that is transferred in a lump-sum or global indemnity to the plaintiff government which in turn assumes the responsibility to distribute the transferred monies among its national claimants.” Such a settlement would provide “greater efficiency in coping with large numbers of claims; enhanced consistency in the administration and adjudication of claims; promoting fairness among claimants in setting criteria for evaluating claims and distributing awards; and upholding professionalism and integrity in the national claims commission.” In addition, sometimes lump-sum arrangements “allow the two governments to address other matters, such as broader investment and trade relations.”

3. Two-Tier Resolution

Another way for separate resolution of the U.S. expropriation damage claims is what Brookings calls a two-tier solution, “whereby corporate claimants can choose either to seek creative bargains, or join individual claimants in a lump-sum settlement.”

The 5,014 individual claims validated by the U.S. Commission total about $229 million (without interest). Of these, only 39 amount to over $1 million each while only four were valued at over $5 million. A lump-sum cash settlement of these claims could be shared share equitably by all or with caps on those over a certain figure, such as $ 1 million.

The 899 corporate claims are heavily concentrated: the top 10 corporate claims are valued at nearly $1 billion while the top 50 at $1.5 billion. “The corporate claimants could be given the opportunity to be included in a lump-sum settlement—albeit possibly facing an equity hair-cut to limit the burden on Cuba and to ensure a minimum payment to the smaller claimants—or to ‘opt out’ of the general settlement and instead seek alternative remedies” in Cuba, such as a voucher for new investment; a right to operate a new business; a final project authorization for a new venture; a preferred acquisition right for a venture; Cuba sovereign bonds; and restoration of properties.

Conclusion

Although I hope that the Brookings’s “grand bargain” or more limited negotiated solution is reached, a Miami Herald article emphasizes the difficulties in reaching any settlement. First, some of the claims that were validated by the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission could be stricken from the list that the U.S. may negotiate if the claims have not always been owned by a U.S. citizen or business. Second, the U.S. government is not authorized to negotiate the previously mentioned U.S. courts’ default judgments against Cuba. As a result, U.S. attorneys for the plaintiffs in those cases could seek to seize any assets in the U.S. of the Cuban government such as a Cuban plane or ship to satisfy the outstanding judgments. Third, Cuba also has to fear that any payment of U.S. claimants for expropriated property will invite demands for similar payments by Cuban exiles around the world and by Spanish claimants after some Spanish courts have ruled that Spain’s 1986 settlement of such claims with Cuba is not binding on at least some Spanish claimants. Fourth, the time to complete such a settlement at the end of the Obama Administration is rapidly shrinking, and a new administration in January 2017 may not be as willing to do such a deal.[8]

I, therefore, reiterate the solution proposed in a prior post: an agreement by the two countries to submit all of their damage claims against each other for resolution to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague in the Netherlands under its Arbitration Rules 2012 before a panel of three or five arbitrators.[9]

My experience as a lawyer who handled business disputes in U.S. courts and in international arbitrations leads me to believe that arbitration is the appropriate way to resolve these claims by the two governments. The International Court of Arbitration was established in the late 19thcentury to resolve disputes between governments. It would be a third-party, neutral administrator of the proceedings and the arbitrators who would be selected would also be neutral. Finally it has an existing set of arbitration rules and procedures. Moreover, in the arbitration process, both sides would gain a better understanding of the opponent’s evidence and argument that could lead to a settlement before the arbitrators would be asked to render an award.

=====================================================

[1] Brookings, Reconciling U.S. Property Claims in Cuba: Transforming Trauma into Opportunity (Dec. 2015); Resolution of U.S. and Cuba’s Damage Claims (April 6, 2015).

[2] Id.

[3] Id.; U.N. General Assembly Again Condemns U.S. Embargo of Cuba (Oct. 30, 2014).

[4] Brookings, Reconciling U.S. Property Claims in Cuba: Transforming Trauma into Opportunity (Dec. 2015).

[5] Robles, Cuba and U.S. to Discuss Settling Claims on Property, N.Y. times (Dec. 4, 2015); U.S. State Dep’t, Daily Press Briefing (Dec. 7, 2015); U.S. State Dep’t, Press Release: United States and Cuba Hold Claims Talks in Havana (Dec. 7, 2015); Reuters, U.S., Cuba to Negotiate Billions in Claims Against Each Other, N.Y. Times (Dec. 7, 2015); Assoc. Press, Cuba, US Begins Talks on Confiscated Property, Damages,, N.Y. Times (Dec. 8, 2015); Miroff, In major breakthrough, Cuba and U.S. discuss $1.9 billion in property claims, Wash. Post (Dec. 8, 2015); Schwartz, U.S., Cuba Hold First Talks on Rival Claims, W.S.J. (Dec. 8, 2015); Briefing on compensation held between the governments of Cuba and the United States, Granma (Dec. 9, 2015).

[6] Brookings, Reconciling U.S. Property Claims in Cuba: Transforming Trauma into Opportunity (Dec. 8, 2015); Feinberg, Reconciling U.S. Property Claims in Cuba (Dec. 2015); Brookings Institution, Cuba Media Roundtable (Dec. 8, 2015).

[7] Brookings is a non-governmental organization that “brings together more than 300 leading experts in government and academia from all over the world who provide the highest quality research, policy recommendations and analysis on a full range of public policy issues.” Feinberg is a professor of international political economy in the School of Global Policy and Strategy (formerly the School of International Relations and Pacific Studies) at the University of California, San Diego. Previously, Feinberg served as special assistant to President Clinton for National Security Affairs and senior director of the National Security Council’s Office of Inter-American Affairs; his other government positions include positions on the policy planning staff of the U.S. Department of State and in the Office of International Affairs in the U.S. Treasury Department.

[8] Torres & Garvin, Claim game: U.S., Cuba try to hash out differences over property, Miami Herald (Dec. 12, 2015).

[9] Resolution of U.S. and Cuba’s Damage Claims (April 15, 2015).

Developments in Using U.S. Immigration Law To Enforce International Human Rights

As noted in a prior post, U.S. immigration law provides at least two means of enforcing international human rights.

Removal or Deportation from the U.S. 

Foreigners can be deported or removed from the U.S. if they “ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in genocide . . . or . . . any act of torture . . . or . . . any extrajudicial killing.” (Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 sec. 5501, 118 Stat. 3638, 3740 (2004).

Responsibility for enforcing these provisions lies in the Human Rights Violators and War Crimes Unit (HRVWCU) within the National Security Investigations Division (NSID) of the Homeland Security Investigations (HIS) Directorate of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) of the Department of Homeland Security.

This unit conducts investigations focused on foreign human rights violations by individuals in the U.S. in an effort to prevent the U.S. from becoming a safe haven to those individuals who engage in the commission of war crimes, genocide, torture and other forms of serious human rights abuses from conflicts around the globe. Since fiscal year 2004, ICE has arrested more than 250 individuals for human rights-related violations under various criminal and/or immigration statutes. During that same period, ICE has denied more than 117 individuals from obtaining entry visas to the United States and created more than 20,000 subject records, which prevented identified human-rights violators from attempting to enter the United States. In addition, ICE successfully obtained deportation orders to physically remove more than 590 known or suspected human rights violators from the United States.

Currently, ICE is pursuing more than 1,900 leads and removal cases that involve suspected human rights violators from nearly 96 different countries.

Illustrating such cases are two former Salvadoran military officers, Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova and Jose Guillermo Garcia,[1] and a former Guatemalan military officer, Pedro Pimentel Rios.

In 2012, an immigration judge ruled that Casanova could be deported for his role in multiple acts of killings and torture committed by the Salvadoran military, including the 1980 slayings of the four American churchwomen.

On February 6, 2014, the U.S. Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) heard Casanova’s appeal from this decision. The main issue was his argument that the removal order was unjustified because the U.S. tacitly had approved the aggressive tactics of the Salvadoran military. In response the ICE attorney argued that U.S. support for the Salvadoran military did not excuse Casanova’s actions and that the U.S. repeatedly had demanded that the Salvadoran military clean up its human rights record. One of the three BIA judges asked whether Casanova was “too far up the chain [of command] to control those units?” The ICE attorney said “no” as Casanova himself testified at his own trial that he kept tight control of the unit. Once the BIA issues its decision, the losing party has the right to appeal to a federal court of appeals.

On February 26, 2014, an immigration judge ordered Garcia to be removed or deported from the U.S. after a trial had determined that he had helped conceal the involvement of soldiers who killed four American churchwomen in 1980 and that he “knew or should have known” that army troops had slaughtered the villagers, including women and children, in the hamlet of El Mozote in 1981. Garcia plans to appeal to the BIA.

In July 2010, ICE charged Guatemalan Pedro Pimentel Rios with being deportable for having assisted or otherwise participated in extrajudicial killings during the Dos Erres massacre in that country. In May 2011 an immigration judge, after trial, determined that he had in fact participated in extrajudicial killings in that massacre and ordered his removal to his home country. That removal occurred in July 2011.

After his return to Guatemala, he was tried by a three-judge court and found guilty of participation in the massacre and sentenced to imprisonment of 6,060 years (30 years for each of the 201 victims). This sentence was largely symbolic since Guatemalan law does not permit prison terms longer than 50 years.

U.S. Conviction and Imprisonment

Foreigners who had gained legal entry or presence in the U.S. can be criminally prosecuted for committing fraud in obtaining a U.S. visa or other immigration benefit (18 U.S.C. § 1546(a)) or committing perjury in statements to U.S. immigration officials (18 U.S.C. § 1621(2)) for failure to disclose their involvement in foreign human rights violations.

Responsibility for enforcing these provisions lies in the U.S. Department of Justice’s Human Rights and Special Prosecutions Section, which “primarily investigates and prosecutes cases against human rights violators and other international criminals . . . for genocide, torture, war crimes, and recruitment or use of child soldiers, and for immigration and naturalization fraud arising out of efforts to hide their involvement in such crimes.”

Examples of such cases are those involving former Salvadoran military officer, Innocente Orlando Montano, and two former Guatemalan military officers, Gilberto Jordan and Jorge Sosa Orantes.

Montano allegedly was involved in various human rights violations in his country, including the November 1989 murder of the six Jesuit priests and their housekeeper and her daughter.[5] Based on his guilty plea, on August 27, 2013, the federal court in Boston, Massachusetts sentenced Inocente Orlando Montano to 21 months in prison for violating U.S. immigration laws.

In 2010, Guatemalan Gilberto Jordan was arrested in Florida for allegedly lying on naturalization forms that allowed him to become a U.S. citizen. He pleaded guilty to failing to disclose on those forms that he had participated in the 1982 killings of at least 162 countrymen in the village of Dos Erres. In September 2010 a federal judge sentenced him to 10 years imprisonment

On October 1, 2013, Jorge Sosa Orantes, a Guatemalan military officer who lead a massacre of a village in his home country, was convicted by a federal jury for making false statements and unlawfully procuring U.S. citizenship when he applied for U.S. residency in 1997 and when he obtained citizenship a decade later. On February 10, 2014, the presiding judge sentenced Sosa with a revocation of his U.S. citizenship and imprisonment for 10 years.

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[1] Garcia and Casanova jointly had been held civilly liable for torture in their country by U.S. federal courts under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA), but who jointly had escaped similar civil liability under the TVPA for the torture and murder of the four American churchwomen in El Salvador.