Parties’ Latest Reactions to Issues for Trial in George Floyd Criminal Cases

On November 5, the Hennepin County District Court issued five significant orders regarding the joint criminal trial of Derek Chauvin, Thomas Lane, J. Alexander Kueng and Tou Thao over the killing of George Floyd. These orders (1) granted the State’s motion for a joint trial of the four defendants; (2) preliminarily denied the defendants’ motions for change of venue; (3) provided for  juror anonymity and sequestration; (4) allowed audio and video coverage of the trial; and (5) narrowed its previous order regarding four members of the Hennepin County Attorney’s Office’s participation in the cases.[1]

On November 16, various motions and briefs were submitted objecting to the recent orders for a joint trial and allowing audio and video coverage of the trial as well as the pending motions for allowance of evidence of prior incidents of the four defendants and of Mr. Floyd. The most significant of these papers, in this blogger’s judgment, was Thomas Lane’s motion for reconsideration of the order for a joint trial of the four defendants, which, therefore, will be discussed first.

Lane’s Motion To Reconsider Joinder for Trial[2]

Lane argued that the order for joinder is premature as it does not consider the prejudice that will be caused by admission of evidence of prior incidents involving the other three defendants, none of which involved Lane.

Most significantly, Lane asserted that his  defense will be antagonistic to Chauvin in that he will be “pointing the finger” at Chauvin and that if Lane had known of Chauvin’s prior incidents, Lane would have acted differently. (Emphasis added.) (This is believed to be the first time that any of the defendants has pointed the finger at Chauvin, the principal actor in the death of Floyd.)

Moreover, said Lane’s attorney, the Court’s opinion regarding aiding and abetting liability was erroneous since it was inconsistent with a 2014 opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court, which, among other things, said such liability requires the defendant to have “advance knowledge that a crime is being committed.” (Emphasis added.)[3]

Finally, according to Lane’s attorney, a recently disclosed FBI report about its July 8th interview of Hennepin County Medical Examiner, Dr. Andrew Baker, contains significant points helpful to Lane and the other defendants.. Here are this blogger’s extracts of that report with emphasis on the points helpful to the defendants.

  • Baker’s office’s press release about its examination of Floyd’s body apparently mentioned ”cardiopulmonary arrest,” which “for a lay person would be the stopping of the heart and lungs. Other factors that contributed to Floyd’s cardiopulmonary arrest included hypertension, the presence of fentanyl and methamphetamine, as well as arteriosclerotic heart disease.”(P. 038777) (Emphasis added.)
  • “The term ‘complicating’ in the case title was a medical term meaning occurring after, during, or as a result of.” (P. 03877)
  • Baker defined the mechanism of death as Floyd’s heart and lungs stopping due to the combined effects of his health problems as well as the exertion involved in Floyd’s interaction with police prior to being on the groun” (Pp. 038777-78.) (Emphasis added.)
  • There was no evidence that Floyd’s airway was literally blocked shut. When viewing the body camera footage, the pressure did not appear to be directly over Floyd’s airway. Floyd would have been unable to speak if pressure was directly over his airway.” (P. 03778.) (Emphasis added.)
  • Officer Chauvin’s positioning on Floyd’s body does not fit anatomically with occluding Floyd’s airway.” (P. 038778.) (Emphasis added.)
  • There was no anatomic evidence of injury to Floyd’s neck but that does not rule out that pressure was applied by Chauvin.” (P. 038778.) (Emphasis added.)
  • The absence of petechiae weighs against strangulation.” (P. 038778.) (Emphasis added.)
  • Baker noted that that Floyd had no injury to . . .[his lower buttocks or upper end of Floyd’s thigh which were being held by Kueng].” (P. 038778) (Emphasis added.)
  • Baker noted that there was no relation to Floyd’s cause of death by Lane’s position [on Floyd’s feet].” (P. 038778.) (Emphasis added.)
  • “The struggle between officers and Floyd weighed into Baker’s opinion because physical exertion increases heart rate, releases adrenaline, and increases respiratory rate as well as cardiac demand. All of these things increased the likelihood of a bad outcome.” (P. 038778.)
  • Baker had no opinion on when Floyd became critical or near death.” (P. 038780.) (Emphasis added.)
  • Baker did not believe that the prone position was any more dangerous than other positions based on an article or journal he had read. “ (P. 038780.) (Emphasis added.)
  • Baker could not provide an answer on a ‘but for’ cause [of death]. (P. 038781.) (Emphasis added.)
  • Absent suspicious circumstances, if Floyd had been found dead in his bed with the level of fentanyl in his blood that was present for this autopsy, it may be classified aa fentanyl fatality due to the level of fentanyl.” (P. 039781.) (Emphasis added.)
  • When a death was labeled a homicide, it was not a legal ruling being made. The label was classified as such for public health reasons.” (P. 0388782.) (Emphasis added.)

Parties’ Battle Over Evidence of Defendants’ Prior Incidents[4]

 The State previously had argued for admission of evidence of eight separate incidents involving Chauvin’s actions in the course of his duties as a Minneapolis Police Officer. On November 16 the State submitted a supplemental argument in support of such evidence in light of its obtaining the body worn camera videos for one of those incidents that are relevant to show modus operandi, intent and lack of mistake and rebut any defense of reasonable use of force and that their probative value outweighs any potential unfair prejudice.

Lane’s objection to such evidence was just discussed.

In addition,  Chauvin’s attorney argued that these incidents are inadmissible to show his intent in the Floyd case or his alleged knowledge of the need to move Floyd from the prone position or a common scheme or plan or modus operandi and that evidence of such incidents is cumulative and unfairly prejudicial.

State’s Objection to Evidence of  Floyd’s Prior Incident with Minneapolis Police[5]

All Defendants intend to offer evidence of George Floyd’s May 6, 2019, incident with the Minneapolis Police Department even though the Court at the September 11, 2020, hearing held that such evidence was inadmissible. The State said the Court’s prior decision was correct and that the defendants intend to offer this evidence at trial was for the improper purpose of attacking Floyd’s character and suggesting he had a propensity to commit crimes or should be punished for his prior actions; that the prior incident does not show Floyd’s common scheme or plan in the incident that led to his death; that his state of mind in the prior incident is irrelevant; that the unfair prejudice of evidence of that prior incident far outweighs its probative value and that the defendants’ other arguments for such evidence are unpersuasive.

State’s Objection to Audio and Video Trial Coverage[6]

The State asked the Court for reconsideration of its order for audio and video coverage of the trial. The motion provided no reasons for that motion other than its previous objection to such coverage under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 4.02(d) and a brief to be filed on or before November 30.

A StarTribune editorial, however, supported this court order. It said, “It is in the best interest of trial participants and the public for this high-profile trial to be as accessible as possible. . . . [Judge] Cahill’s ruling is well-reasoned and fair.”

Reactions

An important reason for the Court’s November 5th order for a joint trial of the four defendants was there was no indication at that stage of the proceedings “that any of the Defendants is likely to be prejudiced by joinder because their defenses are not antagonistic but instead are mutually supportive.” Now, however, Defendant Lane has stated that his  defense will be antagonistic to Chauvin in that Lane will be “pointing the finger” at Chauvin and that if Lane had known of Chauvin’s prior incidents, Lane would have acted differently. This latest statement, therefore, is a serious challenge to the wisdom of a joint trial.

In addition, Lane’s disclosure of the FBI memorandum of its interview of the Hennepin County Medical Examiner, assuming it accurately reflects what the Examiner said, provides boosters for the defense and problems for the prosecution.

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[1] Court’s Orders Regarding Criminal Trial of Defendants in George Floyd Killing, dwkcommentaries.com (Nov. 5, 2020).

[2]  Defendant’s [Lane’s] Objection to the State’s Spreigl Notice and Motion to Reconsider the Court’s Order for Joinder, State v. Lane, Court File No. 27-CR-20-12951 (Nov. 16, 2020); Exhibit A [FBI Memorandum], Lane Objection to Spreigl and Motion to Reconsider Joinder Order,  State v. Lane, Court File No. 27-CR-20-12951 (Nov. 16, 2020).

[3]  This case was Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 64 (2014), which requires close analysis.

[4]  State’s Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of Other Evidence, State v. Chauvin, Court File No. 27-CR-20-12646 Nov. 16, 2020); Defendant’s [Chauvin’s] Objection to State’s Proposed Introduction of Spreigl Evidence, State v. Chauvin, Court File No. 27-CR-20-12646 Nov. 16, 2020); Defendant’s [Kueng’s]Objection to the State’s 404(b) Evidence, State v. Kueng, Court File No. 27-CR-20-12953 Nov. 16, 2020); Defendant’s [Thao’s] Memorandum in Opposition to State’s Motion for Spreigl Evidence Against Mr. Thao, State v. Thao, Court File No. 27-CR-20-12949 Nov. 16, 2020); Defendant’s [Lane’s] Objection to the State’s Spreigl Notice and Motion to Reconsider the Court’s Order for Joinder, State v. Lane, Court File No. 27-CR-20-12951 (Nov. 16, 2020); Jany, Seeking to show pattern of excessive force by Chauvin, prosecutors cite incident with 14-year-old boy who couldn’t breathe, StarTribune (Nov. 17, 2020);Bailey, Former Minneapolis police officer charged in George Floyd’s death seeks to bar evidence of past neck and body restraints, Wash. Post (Nov. 17, 2020).

[5] State’s Response Opposing Defendants’ Motions To Admit Spreigl Evidence, State v. Chauvin, Court File No. 27-CR-20-12646 Nov. 16, 2020).

[6] State’s Motion for Reconsideration, State v. Chauvin, Court File No. 27-CR-20-12646 Nov. 16, 2020) State asks judge to reconsider permission for audio, video coverage of officers’ trial in George Floyd Killing, StarTribune (Nov. 16, 2020); Editorial, A victory for courtroom access in George Floyd case, StarTribune (Nov. 17, 2020).

Chauvin Moves To Dismiss Criminal Complaint 

On August 28, former Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin filed a motion to dismiss the criminal complaints against him.[1] Here is a summary of this motion.

Dismissal of Count I–Second Degree Unintentional Murder

 Count I of the Amended Complaint alleges Chauvin is guilty of Second Degree Unintentional Murder by reason of his allegedly committing a Third Degree Assault. But it does not even “allege that Mr. Chauvin possessed the intent to inflict bodily harm upon Mr. Floyd.” And “the State has offered no evidence to support the intent element of third-degree assault.” (Chauvin Memo at 9.)

Instead, the evidence shows that Floyd “was struggling in and around the squad [car] at a busy Minneapolis intersection. He was handcuffed and acting erratically. Continued struggle posed a risk of injury to Mr. Floyd and, potentially, to officers. The decision to use MRT allowed officers to restrain Mr. Floyd without injury until EMS arrived on scene. Mr. Chauvin, who arrived at the scene as officers were already struggling with Mr. Floyd, checked to ensure that EMS had been called.” (Id. at 9-10.)

“The Medical Examiner found no bruising on Mr. Floyd’s neck or on any neck muscles or any injury to neck structures. There was no bruising on Mr. Floyd’s back or evidence of blunt trauma to his back. If Mr. Chauvin had intended to inflict harm to Mr. Floyd’s back and neck with his knee, surely there would be evidence of bruising. But clearly, Mr. Chauvin was cautious about the amount of pressure he used to restrain Mr. Floyd—cautious enough to prevent bruising. Video evidence shows Mr. Chauvin was calm and professional throughout the application of MRT” or Maximal Restraint Technique that was a technique approved by the Minneapolis Police Department. (Id. at 10.)

Dismissal of Count II–Third-Degree, Depraved Mind Murder

“Count II of the Amended Complaint charges Mr. Chauvin with Third Degree Murder— Perpetrating Eminently Dangerous Act and Evincing Depraved Mind, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.195(a). Under Minnesota law, however, ‘[d]epraved mind murder cannot occur where the defendant’s actions were focused on a specific person.’ State v. Barnes, 713 N.W.2d 325, 331 (Minn. 2006) (citing State v. Wahlberg, 296 N.W.2d 408, 417 (Minn. 1980)).” (Id. at 11.)

“As the Minnesota Supreme Court has explained, ‘We have made clear that the statute covers only acts committed without special regard to the effect on any particular person or persons.’ State v. Zumberge, 888 N.W.2d 688, 698 (Minn. 2017). ‘[T]he act must be committed without a special design upon the particular person or persons with whose murder the accused is charged.’ Id. (appellant’s claims that he shot “toward” not “at” the decedent precludes a third degree murder instruction) (citation omitted). Third degree murder is reserved to cover cases where the act was ‘reckless or wanton,’ such as firing a gun into a bus or driving a vehicle into a crowd. Wahlberg, 296 N.W.2d at 417. That is simply not the case here.” (Id. at 11.)

Dismissal of Count III—Culpable Negligence Manslaughter

 This charge requires proof of the actor’s “objective gross negligence” and “subjective recklessness.” (Id. at 12.)

Under Minnesota cases, “objective gross negligence” is an act that was “a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation.” Here, Chauvin as a police officer in an emergency situation under Minnesota case law had ‘significant independent judgment and discretion’ . . . ‘precisely because a more stringent standard could inhibit action.’ (Id. at 12-13.)

Chauvin’s attorney then argues,  “Such discretion often comes into play when an officer must gauge how much force to use in order to effect an arrest. The amount of force authorized is dependent on the subject being arrested, the circumstances of the arrest, and the ever-developing fact pattern of any arrest scenario.” (Id. at 13.)

Here, “Chauvin was acting within his duties to execute a legitimate legal process—assisting other officers with effecting their arrest of George Floyd,” who was actively resisting arrest when Chauvin arrived on the scene. Quoting Minnesota cases, in such cases, an ‘officer may use all necessary and lawful means to make the arrest’ and is authorized “to escalate their use of force, short of deadly force, as necessary.” Here, under MDP policy, the use of MRT was authorized because Floyd was ‘handcuffed, . . .combative and still pose a threat to themselves, officers or others, or could cause significant damage to property if not properly restrained.” (Id. at 14-19.)

Moreover, the evidence shows Chauvin performed the MRT in accordance with MPD training materials and manuals and did not actually and consciously disregard the risks associated with MRT. And the Hennepin County Medical Examiner found no bruising on Floyd’s neck or muscles or neck structures or on his back. (Id. at 14-20.)

Dismissal of All Counts—Chauvin Did Not Cause Floyd’s Death

According to the relevant Minnesota statutes and cases, conviction for homicide requires that ‘the act of the defendant [was] the proximate cause of death of [the victim] without the intervention of an efficient independent force in which the defendant did not participate or which he could not reasonably have foreseen” or that “the defendant’s conduct was a ‘substantial causal factor’ in bringing about the victim’s death.” (Id. at 21.)

Chauvin’s attorney then asserts, “Mr. Chauvin was not the proximate cause of Mr. Floyd’s death, because an ‘independent force’ . . . in which Mr. Chauvin ‘did not participate’ and which ‘he could not reasonably have foreseen’ intervened: Fentanyl.” (Id.)

“It is clear from the evidence that Mr. Floyd was under the influence of narcotics when he encountered the officers and that he most likely died from an opioid overdose. . . . His body contained a lethal dose of fentanyl—[1ng/ml—as well as methamphetamine, at the time of his death.” Indeed, Chauvin quotes the Hennepin County Medical Examiner, Dr. Andrew Baker, telling the prosecutors on June 1, ‘If he were found dead at home alone & no other apparent causes, this could be acceptable to call an OD [overdose].’ [2] But Chauvin’s attorney does not quote the next note: “Baker. I am not saying this killed him.” (Emphasis added.)

Moreover, Chauvin’s attorney does not quote Dr. Baker’s actual autopsy report (5/26/20) that was titled “Cardiopulmonary Arrest complicating Law Enforcement Subdual, Restraint, and Neck Compression” or the County Medical Examiner’s Press Release (05/26/20) with the same statement for “Cause of Death” plus ‘How injury occurred: Decedent experienced a cardiopulmonary arrest while being restrained by law enforcement officer(s)’ and ‘Manner of death: Homicide.’[3]

Also not quoted by Chauvin’s attorney were the June 10 report by the Defense Health Agency concurring with the ‘autopsy findings and the cause of death certificate’ by the Hennepin County Medical Examiner. Or the findings of Dr. Michael Baden and Dr. Allecia Wilson, who were retained by the attorneys for the Floyd family, that found that Floyd ’died of traumatic asphyxia due to the compression of his neck and back during restraint by police’ and ‘Manner of Death’ was ‘homicide.’ State v. Chauvin, Court file No. 27-CR-20-12646 (Hennepin County District Court Aug. 28, 2020).[4]

Chauvin’s attorney admits in this brief that Floyd “told officers that he had suffered from COVID-19.” Moreover, Chauvin arrived at the scene with fellow ex-officer Thao, who testified during an interview by the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) and FBI, that when he and Chauvin were driving to join Lane and Keung at the scene they were told on the phone that someone who had appeared to be intoxicated had passed a fake bill at Cup Foods and after arrival Thao had heard Floyd say he had had COVID-19 while he was in the back seat of a squad car before he went to the pavement outside the car and Thao had been worried that Floyd was on drugs.

Chauvin’s attorney boldly states that even though Lane and Keung may have observed signs of Floyd’s overdose and medical trauma, “none of this information was shared with Mr. Chauvin. Therefore, “Chauvin was unaware of the potential dangers of using MRT on Mr. Floyd.” (Chauvin Memo at 25-26 (emphasis in original).) This appears to be an unfounded overstatement of the record.

Conclusion

Given the recent filing of this Chauvin motion, as of noon on September 9, the State had not yet responded to this motion, but clearly it will oppose same before the court considers and rules on the four dismissal motions on the briefs and record.

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[1] Defendant’s Notice of Motions and Motions To Dismiss, State v. Chauvin, Court file No. 27-CR-20-12646 (Hennepin County District Court Aug. 28, 2020);  Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss, State v. Chauvin, Court file No. 27-CR-20-12646 (Hennepin County District Court Aug. 28, 2020); Defendant’s Exhibit List in Support of Motion To Dismiss for Lack of Probable Cause, State v. Chauvin, Court file No. 27-CR-20-12646 (Hennepin County District Court Aug. 28, 2020); Hennepin County Medical Examiner’s autopsy report (5/26/20) (Ex. 20),  State v. Chauvin, Court file No. 27-CR-20-12646 (Hennepin County District Court Aug. 28, 2020); Hennepin County Attorney’s Office memos of interviews of Dr. Andrew Baker (Hennepin County Medical Examiner) on 5/26/20, 5/27/20 & 5/31/20, (Ex.6), State v. Chauvin, Court file No. 27-CR-20-12646 (Hennepin County District Court Aug. 28, 2020); Notes from Hennepin County Attorney’s [6/1/20] interview with Dr. Andrew Baker{Hennepin County Medical Examiner], (Ex.6), State v. Chauvin, Court file No. 27-CR-20-12646 (Hennepin County District Court Aug. 28, 2020); Hennepin County Attorney’s Office summary of communications with Chief Tim Longo, University of Virginia Police Department (5/26/20-6/3/20) (Ex.6), State v. Chauvin, Court file No. 27-CR-20-12646 (Hennepin County District Court Aug. 28, 2020); Defense Health Agency autopsy summary report (6/10/20) (Ex. 19), State v. Chauvin, Court file No. 27-CR-20-12646 (Hennepin County District Court Aug. 28, 2020); Summary of autopsies of Floyd by Drs. Baden and Wilson on behalf of Floyd Family (7/2/20) (Ex.6), State v. Chauvin, Court file No. 27-CR-20-12646 (Hennepin County District Court Aug. 28, 2020). See also Raice & Ailworth, George Floyd’s Death Likely Caused by Drug Overdose, Argue Derek Chauvin’s Lawyers, W.S.J. (Aug. 28, 2020); Bailey, In new filing, Derek Chauvin previews his defense, but also seeks dismissal of charges, Wash. Post (Aug. 29, 2020); Olson, Chauvin lawyer: Restraint didn’t kill Floyd, ill health and drug abuse did, StarTribune (Aug. 29, 2020).

[2] Chauvin Memo at 22; Hennepin County Attorney’s Office, Notes from Notes from [6/1/20] interview with Dr. Andrew Baker{Hennepin County Medical Examiner], (Ex.6), State v. Chauvin, Court file No. 27-CR-20-12646 (Hennepin County District Court Aug. 28, 2020).

[3] Affidavit of Matthew Frank Exs. 4 & 5 (Aug 10, 2020), State v. Lane, Court file No. 27-CR-20-12951 (Hennepin County District Court Aug. 10, 2020).

[4] Summary of Dr. Michael Baden and Dr. Allecia Wilson’s findings (7/2/20), (Ex.6), State v. Chauvin, Court file No. 27-CR-20-12646 (Hennepin County District Court Aug. 28, 2020) (Exs. 6, 19)

 

Derek Chauvin’s Policing Background

On July 19, the New York Times published a report on its investigation of the policing background of Derek Chauvin, the former Minneapolis police officer who led the February 25th physical restraint and killing of George Floyd.[1] Here are the highlights of that report.

From the start of his career with the Minneapolis Police Department in 2000, “Chauvin stood out as gung-ho.”

In May 2013, Kristofer Bergh, than a 17-year old, and three friends were playing “Nerf Gun Assassin” when one of them accidently fired an orange dart out the window. Chauvin and another officer “pulled up, pointed their guns at the teenagers and shouted orders laced with expletives.” The four teenagers then were put into the police car  for what seemed like an hour. As they were being released, Chauvin said, “Most of you will be 18 by the end of the year. That means you’ll be old enough for ‘big boy jail.’” This led to a complaint against Chauvin. And one of these boys, now in their early 20’s, told the Times reporters that Chauvin “was overly aggressive and not understanding that we were just kids.”

Moreover, many interviewees said Chauvin “did his job as if he were playing a role — a tough Dirty Harry on the lookout for bad guys” and he “seemed to operate at an emotional distance from those around him. Mr. Chauvin was a quiet and rigid workaholic with poor people skills and a tendency to overreact — with intoxicated people, especially — when a less aggressive stance might have led to a better outcome.” In other words, he “was awkward. Other officers often didn’t like him or didn’t know him. He didn’t go to parties and didn’t seem to have many friends. Some neighbors knew so little about him that they didn’t even know he was a police officer until after his arrest.”

An unnamed officer said, “In a group setting he would never connect and [instead] stand there like a small child. I was put off by his lack of communication skills. You never felt like he was present.”

Lucy Gerold, a retired police commander, said Chauvin “occasionally . . . would seem a little  cocky” and was “the guy not everybody liked or wanted to work with.” When he left work “in full uniform,” he “stood ramrod straight like he was still in the military.”

Although Chauvin received some kudos for his work, he did receive 22 complaints or internal investigations. According to Dave Bicking, a board member of the Twin Cities’ Communities United Against Police Brutality, this is a high number and “should have definitely raised alarm with the department and triggered a review,” when most officers might get one or two complaints in the same period of time.

As has been noted in other reports, the Times says that Chauvin on most weekends for 17 years worked an off-duty police gig outside the El Neuvo Rodeo nightclub in south Minneapolis, whose owner said he “often overreacted when he saw something that bothered him, like unruly behavior around the club, including drunk patrons congregating on the street — especially on ‘urban nights’ when the clientele was largely Black.” Chauvin also frequently used pepper spray when there was a disturbance at the club, and when the owner complained, he merely said, “That is protocol.”

George Floyd also worked on security at that nightclub, but the owner said she does not recall ever seeing the two men together. Apparently the Times’ reporters never sought out other nightclub employees to see if they ever saw any contact between the two men, including any conflicts or arguments. This should have been an obvious line of inquiry to see if Chauvin had some grudge against Floyd that the May 25th encounter near Cup Foods gave Chauvin an opportunity to redress.

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[1] Barker & Kovaleski, Officer Who Pressed His Knee on George Floyd’s Neck Drew Scrutiny Long Before , New York Times (July 18, 2020).

 

George Floyd Family’s Complaint Against the City of Minneapolis Over His Death: Count III       

As noted in a prior post, on July 15, the family of George Floyd filed a federal civil action with two claims (Counts II and III) for money damages against the City of Minneapolis and one claim (Count I) against the four ex-police officers who were involved in Floyd’s death—Derek Chauvin, Tou Thao, Thomas Lane and J. Alexander Kueng. This post will discuss Count III.[1] while Counts I and  II were discussed in prior posts.

Legal Basis

Count III is asserted against the City of Minneapolis under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, which states as follows:

  • “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. . . .”

Count III also is based upon so-called “Canton Liability,” which refers to the U.S. Supreme Court case, Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), which held that a municipality may be held liable under section 1983 for constitutional violations resulting from its failure to train its employees where such failure to train in a relevant respect amounts to deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.

Factual Allegations

The Parties

“6. Plaintiff Kaarin Nelson Schaffer (“Schaffer”) resides in Hennepin county, Minnesota, and is an attorney duly licensed to practice before the State and Federal; Courts of Minnesota. On July 6, 2020, Schaffer was appointed as trustee for George Floyd’s next of kin.”

“7. Mr. Floyd is survived by next of kin including his children and siblings.”

“8. Minneapolis is and was at all times material hereto a political subdivision of the State of Minnesota, organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of Minnesota.”

“9. The Minneapolis Police Department (“MPD”) is and was at all times material hereto a Minneapolis agency, providing the vehicle through which the City fulfills its policing functions.”

“Count III – 42 U.S.C. §1983 – Canton Liability”

“247. Plaintiff hereby incorporates and re-alleges all preceding paragraphs as though fully pleaded herein.”

“248.Minneapolis failed to properly train or modify its training to Defendant Officers and its other officers, including but not limited to, matters related to the reasonable and appropriate use of force during such arrests, and intervention in the excessive use offorce by fellow officers.”

“249. Effectuating an arrest, using force to effectuate an arrest, and intervening in the use of force is a usual and recurring situation with which Minneapolis law enforcement officers and other agents encounter on a regular basis.”

“250. As such, Minneapolis was aware of a need for more and different training.Minneapolis specifically knew that its officers needed training regarding the use of prone restraint and was required to provide its officers with such training.”

“251. Minneapolis also specifically knew that its officers needed specific training on the use of neck restraints.”

“252. With deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens, Minneapolis failed to provide adequate training to its officers on the use of prone and neck restraint.”

“253.Minneapolis was aware that deprivation of the constitutional rights of citizens was likely to result from its lack of training and the failure to modify its training.”

“254. As such, Minneapolis was deliberately indifferent and exhibited reckless disregard with respect to the potential violation of constitutional rights.”

“255. The failure to train and/or to appropriately modify training constituted official Minneapolis policies, practices, or customs.”

“256. Minneapolis’s failure to train and/or to modify training was behind the acts and omissions the Defendant Officers made toward Mr. Floyd.”

“257. As a direct and proximate result of Minneapolis’s acts and omissions, Mr. Floyd suffered injuries, experienced pain and suffering, and ultimately died.”

“258. As a direct and proximate result of the acts and omissions described herein, Mr. Floyd suffered compensatory and special damages as defined under federal common law and in an amount to be determined by jury.”

“259. Plaintiff is entitled to recovery of costs, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.”

“260. The conduct described in all of the preceding paragraphs amount to wrongful acts and omissions for purposes of Minnesota Statute Section 573.02, subdivision 1.”

“261. As a direct and proximate result of these wrongful acts and omissions, Mr. Floyd’s next of kin have suffered pecuniary loss, including medical and funeral expenses,loss of aid, counsel, guidance, advice, assistance, protection, and support in an amount to be determined by jury.“

Conclusion

All of the legal references and assertions by the parties, of course, are subject to legal research to determine their current validity in light of any subsequent federal statutes and decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court and lower federal courts, especially by the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota and its direct appellate court (the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit).As previously noted, Count I of this Complaint against the four ex-officers and Count II against the City have been covered in prior posts.[2]

Now we await the defendants’ responses to this Complaint and other further developments in this civil case and in the criminal cases against the four ex-officers.

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[1] Read the lawsuit filed by family of George Floyd against Minneapolis, four ex-police officers, StarTribune (July 15, 2020).

[2] George Floyd Family’s Complaint Against the Four Ex-Police Officers Over His Death, dwkcommentaries.com (July  17, 2020); George Floyd Family’s Complaint Against the City of Minneapolis Over His Death: Count II, dwkcommentaries.com (July 18, 2020).

 

George Floyd Family’s Complaint Against the City of Minneapolis Over His Death: Count II     

As noted in a prior post, on July 15, the family of George Floyd filed a federal civil action with two claims (Counts II and III) for money damages against the City of Minneapolis. This post will discuss Count II while Count III will be covered in a subsequent post. That civil action also asserted one claim (Count I) against the four ex-police officers who were involved in Floyd’s death—Derek Chauvin, Tou Thao, Thomas Lane and J. Alexander Kueng– as discussed in another prior post.

Legal Basis [1]

Count II is asserted against the City of Minneapolis under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, which states as follows:

  • “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. . . .”

Count II also is based on so-called “Monell Liability,” which refers to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Monell v. Department of Soc. Svcs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), that held, “Local governing bodies (and local officials sued in their official capacities) can . . .be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief in those situations where, as here, the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted or promulgated by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy. In addition, local governments, like every other § 1983 “person,” may be sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental “custom” even though such custom has not received formal approval through the government’s official decision-making channels.”

Factual Allegations [2]

The Parties

“6. Plaintiff Kaarin Nelson Schaffer (“Schaffer”) resides in Hennepin county, Minnesota, and is an attorney duly licensed to practice before the State and Federal; Courts of Minnesota. On July 6, 2020, Schaffer was appointed as trustee for George Floyd’s next of kin.”

“7. Mr. Floyd is survived by next of kin including his children and siblings.”

“8. Minneapolis is and was at all times material hereto a political subdivision of the State of Minnesota, organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of Minnesota.”

“9. The Minneapolis Police Department (“MPD”) is and was at all times material hereto a Minneapolis agency, providing the vehicle through which the City fulfills its policing functions.

MPD Trains its Officers to Use Deadly force in Non-Deadly Circumstances

“86. MPD trained its officers that a ‘neck restraint’ was an authorized form of non-deadly force, and that a ‘chokehold’ was a form of deadly force capable of causing serious bodily injury and/or death.” [3]

“87. At all times material hereto, MPD defined a ‘neck restraint’ as ‘[c]ompressing one or both sides of a person’s neck with an arm or leg, without applying direct pressure to the trachea or airway (front of the neck).’ MPD defined a ‘chokehold’ as ‘applying direct pressure on a person’s trachea or airway (front of the neck).’”

“88. At all times material hereto, MPD trained its officers that a proper ‘neck Restraint’ required the officer to ‘[c]ompress veins. arteries, nerves & muscles of the neck.'”

“89. Serious bodily injury and/or death is reasonably likely to result from an officer ‘compress[ing] a person’s veins, arteries, nerves & muscles of the neck,’ regardless of whether direct pressure is applied to the front or back of the neck.”

“90. The use of a ‘neck restraint’ as defined by MPD constitutes deadly force.”

“91. The Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of deadly force in non-deadly circumstances which do not pose an immediate threat of serious bodily injury and/or death.”

“92. At all times material hereto, MPD’s written policies authorized the use of a deadly ‘neck restraint’ in non-deadly circumstances posing no immediate threat of serious bodily injury or death.”

“93. At all times material hereto, MPD trained its officers that use of a ‘neck restraint’ was authorized non-deadly force which officers could use in non-deadly situations.”

“94. It has long been known by the law enforcement community that the use of neck restraints on subjects can lead to death.”

“95. However, from at least April 15, 2012 until June 8, 2020, Minneapolis Police Department Policy 5-311 defined a neck restraint as ‘non-deadly force’ and did not warn it can cause death.”

“96. By policy, the MPD permitted and condoned the use of both conscious and unconscious neck restraints by its officers from at least April 15, 2012 until June 8, 2020.”

“97. At all times material hereto, MPD’s written policies authorized the use of a ‘neck restraint’ in non-deadly circumstances posing no immediate threat of serious bodily injury or death.”

“98. The City of Minneapolis possessed data indicating that since 2012, neck restraints/holds were used by its police officers on 428 people at an average rate of about one a week.”

“99. Of those 428 people, 14% who were subjected to a neck restraint/hold lost consciousness.”

“100. Upon information and belief, MPD officers regularly used neck restraints on passively resisting arrestees despite not being permitted to do so under policy.”

“101. Training offered by the City of Minneapolis in 2014 and received by Chauvin and Thao authorized and instructed on the use of neck restraints by officers, presented it to officers as a ‘non-deadly force’ option, and included instruction on how to employ neck restraints in order to most efficiently render subjects unconscious.”

“102. Upon information and belief, all training offered by the City of Minneapolis on the use of neck restraints, including that provided to the Defendant Officers, presented neck restraints to officers as a ‘non-deadly force’ option, and included instruction on how-to employ neck restraints in order to most efficiently render subjects unconscious.”

“103.Training offered by the City of Minneapolis to MPD officers, including the Defendant Officers, encouraged officers to “compress veins, arteries, nerves, and muscles of the neck” of arrestees.”

“104.Training materials offered to officers in 2014, including Defendants Chauvin and Thao, depict an officer placing a knee on the neck of an arrestee who is handcuffed in a prone position.”

“105. Since at least April 16, 2012, MPD policy has required that ‘[a]fter a neck restraint or choke hold has been used on a subject, sworn MPD employees shall keep them under close observation until they are released to medical or other law enforcement personnel.”

“106. Since at least April 16, 2012, the MPD failed to provide its officers with proper policy guidance and training on how to properly observe and attend to the medical needs of arrestees subjected to neck restraints.”

“107. At all times material hereto, MPD trained its officers that a ‘neck restraint’ could be used in non-deadly situations despite the fact that it constituted deadly force as utilized by MPD.”

Prone Restraint Training by the MPD and the Death of David Smith

“108. It is well known throughout the law enforcement and medical communities that holding a subject in a position of prone restraint for prolonged periods of time can be deadly.”

“109. Compressing an arrestee in a prone position with weight on their back and/or abdomen restricts their ability to breathe and can result in asphyxiation.”

“110. Deaths caused by this form of asphyxiation are often interchangeably referred to as deaths from positional, mechanical, or compression asphyxia, even if technical distinctions exist.“

“111. The United States Department of Justice has warned law enforcement for decades about the dangers of prone restraint and as early as 1995: ‘The risk of positional asphyxia is compounded when an individual with predisposing factors becomes involved in a violent struggle with an officer or officers, particularly when physical restraint includes behind-the-back handcuffing combined with placing the subject in a stomach-down position. National Law Enforcement Technology Center, Positional Asphyxia—Sudden Death at *2 (June 1995).”

“112. These dangers were acknowledged in an October 18, 2012 deposition by then-MPD Chief Timothy Dolan in addition to many other high-ranking officers in the matter of Smith v. Gorman, Case No. 11-cv-3071 (SRN/JJK).”

“113. Due to the well-known risks associated with prone restraint, it has long been national best practice that once a subject is controlled, it is imperative that they be moved from the prone position, and that their breathing be assessed.”

“114. Minneapolis has had a policy in place addressing this issue since at least May 29, 2002: ‘When ANY restraint technique is used on a subject, the subject shall not be left in a prone position and shall be placed on their side as soon as they are secured. Once the subject is secured, an officer shall watch for any of the following signs:

  • Significant change in behavior or level consciousness;
  • Shortness of breath or irregular breathing;
  • Seizures or convulsions;
  • Complaints of serious pain or injury; and/or
  • Any other serious medical problem.’

MPD Policy & Procedure Manual § 9-111.01 (emphasis in original).”

“115. Despite this knowledge, as of 2012, officers were not provided official training on the dangers of positional or mechanical asphyxia associated with prone restraint.”

“116. As of 2012, officers were trained that if a subject in a prone restraint is speaking, that they need not be concerned that the subject may be having difficulty breathing.”

“117. Despite the well-known risk of death associated with placing a subject in prolonged prone restraint, particularly without properly monitoring their medical condition, Mr. Floyd was not the first black man to be killed by MPD officers under such circumstances.”

“118. On September 9, 2010, veteran MPD Officers Timothy Gorman (“Gorman”)and Timothy Callahan (“Callahan”) responded to the Minneapolis YMCA, where David Smith (“Mr. Smith”) was experiencing the effects of mental illness.”

“119. Rather than use de-escalation techniques, Gorman and Callahan immediately went hands on with Mr. Smith and subjected him to five Taser deployments in addition to other force.”

“120. Gorman and Callahan placed Mr. Smith a prone restraint position with his hands handcuffed behind his back.”

“121. Despite Smith being handcuffed and adequately controlled, Mr. Smith was restrained in a prone position by Callahan and Gorman for at least 4 ½ minutes, with Gorman kneeling on Mr. Smith’s back and Callahan straddling Mr. Smith’s upper thigh/buttocks region.”

“122. Despite the fact that Callahan and Gorman had Smith adequately controlled, they failed to monitor Mr. Smith’s breathing or medical condition throughout their restraint of Mr. Smith.”

“123. Rather than assist Mr. Smith, Callahan berated him, calling him a ‘mother fucker.’”

“124. It was 6 and ½ minutes before either Callahan or Gorman made any effort to check on Mr. Smith’s medical condition.”

“125. Mr. Smith was pulseless, breathless, and lifeless by the time Callahan and Gorman finally made the effort to observe Mr. Smith’s medical condition.”

“126. Paramedics were able to resuscitate Mr. Smith’s heart, but he never regained consciousness and was removed from life support and officially died on September 17,2010.”

“127. Hennepin County Chief Medical Examiner Andrew Baker determined that the manner of death was homicide, and that the cause of death was anoxic encephalopathy due to or as a consequence of cardiopulmonary arrest due to or as a consequence of mechanical asphyxia.”

“128. Callahan filmed the mechanical asphyxiation of Mr. Smith on a personal and non-departmentally issued ‘pen camera’ that Callahan wore in his short pocket.”

“129. Callahan and Gorman were both aware of the fact that Callahan filmed Mr. Smith’s asphyxiation on the pen camera, yet the pen camera was intentionally concealed from MPD investigators on September 9, 2010.”

“130. Callahan did not disclose the existence of the pen camera video of Mr. Smith’s asphyxiation until nearly a week later on September 15, 2010, but was not disciplined for concealing evidence of a homicide.”

“131. MPD pretended to conduct a homicide investigation into the acts of Callahan and Gorman but made no legitimate effort to investigate the actions of the officers.”

“132. The Grand Jury no-billed Gorman and Callahan due to the complete and utter lack of investigation conducted by the MPD as to Gorman and Callahan’s conduct.”

“133. The MPD Internal Affairs Unit then conducted no legitimate investigation into Gorman and Callahan’s conduct, also concluding that the officers did nothing actionably wrong—including the hiding of evidence (i.e., the pen camera) from investigators.”

“134. The MPD failed to take any disciplinary or other remedial action towards Callahan and Gorman despite the fact that multiple high-ranking officials within the MPD observed obvious constitutional or policy violations by officers Gorman and Callahan.”

“135. The City of Minneapolis ultimately approved a substantial settlement to the family of David Smith to resolve that litigation, one of the highest amounts it had ever paid.”

“136. As part of that settlement, the City of Minneapolis “agreed to require its sworn police officers to undergo training on positional asphyxia in the 2014 training cycle of the Minneapolis Police Department…”

“137.Despite publicly stating an intent to properly instruct its officers on the risks of asphyxiation during arrest, internally the MPD continued to minimize that risk and promote a false narrative that deaths like David Smith were the result of ‘excited delirium’ instead of asphyxiation.”

“138. Upon information and belief, the City of Minneapolis did not comply with the terms and/or the spirit of its 2013 Settlement Agreement with the family of Mr. Smith with respect to training on positional asphyxia.”

“139. Upon information and belief, the City of Minneapolis routinely trains officers to place handcuffed arrestees in a prone position without proper training on putting arrestees in a recovery position and monitoring their breathing and consciousness.”

“140. The impact of the excited delirium false narrative and the MPD’s failure to properly train on asphyxiation risks is highlighted here by Lane’s statement: ‘I am worried about excited delirium, or whatever.’”

“141. When holding a subject in a prone position, well-trained officers in Minneapolis should not be concerned about ‘excited delirium, or whatever.’ Officers in Minneapolis should know the risks of asphyxiation associated with prone restraint.”

“142. High-ranking MPD personnel have continued to publicly maintain other deadly false narratives.”

“143. MPD Lieutenant and agent of the City of Minneapolis Bob Kroll- who has served as the president of the Police Officers Federation of Minneapolis since 2015 and has sat on its board since 1996-has publicly expressed the opinion that Eric Garner, a Black man asphyxiated by the New York Police Department in 2014- could breathe at the time of his death because he was able to state ‘I can’t breathe’ several times as he was dying.”

“144. It is an accepted scientific fact that the ability to speak does not imply that someone is getting sufficient air to survive.”

“The MPD’s History Providing and Permitting Killology Training”

“145. Up and until 2019, the City of Minneapolis permitted officers to receive ‘Killology’ or ‘warrior style’ training, which teaches officers to consider every person and every situation as a potential deadly threat and to kill ‘less hesitantly.’”

“146.The City of Minneapolis was aware prior to the death of George Floyd that the officer who shot and killed Philando Castile in the nearby suburb of Falcon Heights had received Killology training.”

“147. Upon information and belief, a significant proportion of police officers employed by the MPD in May of 2020 had received Killology training during their employment.”

“148.High-ranking officers and agents of the MPD, including Kroll, encouraged all officers to receive warrior-style police training.”

“149. High-ranking officers and agents of the MPD, including Kroll, offered this training free of charge to all officers of the MPD who wanted to receive it.”

“150. The City of Minneapolis was aware that its officers had received and continued to receive Killology training before and through May of 2020, but did nothing to prevent officers from receiving it or re-training officers who had received it.”

“151. Kroll has further encouraged officers to behave aggressively, stating that MPD officers who do not receive citizen complaints are ‘low-level slugs’ who ‘[don’t] get out and investigate anything. And that’s not what we’re paying our officers to do.’”

“152. Kroll has stated that policing should be viewed like ‘a basketball game, in that if you’re not getting any fouls, you aren’t playing hard enough.’”

“153.The City of Minneapolis and high-ranking members of the MPD are aware that Kroll is an influencer for rank-and-file officers, and that its officers follow his lead with regard to law enforcement beliefs and behaviors.”

“154. Upon information and belief, Defendant City of Minneapolis has control over the amount of influence the Minneapolis Police Federation has over the officers, discipline, training, decision-making, and policy decisions of the Minneapolis Police Department.”

“155. The Minneapolis Mayor and City Council are responsible for negotiations with the Minneapolis Police Federation, including matters of officer discipline and retention. The Minneapolis Police Department Chief of Police is responsible for all decisions of hiring.””

“156.The Minneapolis Police Federation membership is made up of employees, agents, and officers of the Minneapolis Police Department.”

“157.The Police Officers within the Minneapolis Police Federation continue to be employees of the Minneapolis Police Department subject to the policies, training and orders.”

“158. The Minneapolis Police Department is responsible for maintaining training and discipline to ensure its officers follow its policies, orders, and training regardless of the opinions and actions of the Minneapolis Police Federation.”

“The City of Minneapolis and the MPD’s Failure to Terminate Dangerous Officers”

“159. The City of Minneapolis frequently fails to terminate or discipline officers who demonstrate patterns of misconduct.”

“160. Upon information and belief, Chauvin was the subject of 17 citizen complaints from 2006 to 2015, only one of which resulted in discipline, in the form of a letter of reprimand.”

“161. Upon information and belief, Chauvin has participated in the shooting and killing of at least three different individuals, including Wayne Reyes, Ira Latrell Toles, and Leroy Martinez.”

“162. In 2005, Defendant Chauvin engaged in a reckless police chase resulting in the deaths of three individuals but was not discharged from the Minneapolis Police Department.”

“163. Upon information and belief, the MPD has observed unlawful or otherwise improper conduct by Chauvin throughout his career but has tolerated it and refused to remedy or mitigate it.”

“164. Chauvin was precisely the type of reckless and dangerous officer that Kroll and other leaders of the Minneapolis Police Department encouraged him to be.”

“165. Upon information and belief, Thao was the subject of six citizen complaints from 2013 to 2017, none of which have resulted in discipline.”

“166. In 2017, Thao was the subject of a lawsuit for his use of excessive force, which the City of Minneapolis paid money to settle on his behalf.”

“167. Upon information and belief, the MPD has observed unlawful or otherwise improper conduct by Thao throughout his career but has tolerated it and refused to remedy or mitigate it.”

“168. The MPD has engaged for years in contract negotiations with the Minneapolis Federation of Police which make it more difficult for the MPD to terminate officers who have demonstrated repeated misconduct.

“The MPD’s History of Overlooking Racially Biased Policing”

“169. Upon information and belief, Black community members make up 19% of the population of Minneapolis and 58% of the subjects of police force.”

“170. The Minneapolis Police Department is currently being investigated for unlawful race-based policing, which deprives people of color, particularly Black community members, of their civil rights under the Minnesota Human Rights Act.”

“171. Prior to 2007, African American members of the MPD, including now-Chief Arradondo, received hate letters signed from the Ku Klux Klan in their interoffice mail, accessible only to MPD agents and employees.”

“172. Kroll has been accused by fellow officers, including now-Chief Arradondo,of publicly wearing a jacket with a patch depicting a racist ‘white power’ logo.”

“173. In recent years, Kroll, as president of the Minneapolis Police Federation, has publicly referred to the Black Lives Matter movement as a ‘terrorist organization.’”

“174. The Minneapolis Police Department ratified the culture of systemic racism and disparate treatment of the Black Community, by failing to remove or otherwise discipline Lt. Bob Kroll.”

“175. By 2018, as the result of a settlement, the Minneapolis Police Department was required to conduct racial sensitivity training which, upon information and belief, has not yet been completed.”

“The City of Minneapolis’s Notice of Prior Incidents of Excessive Force”

“176. The City had notice of a 2009 incident wherein MPD officers used excessive force against Ira Alexander Stafford for which Mr. Stafford filed suit against the City in 2010, alleging that while he was lying on the ground, face down with his arms around him, ‘at least one officer had a knee in Stafford’s back, making him effectively helpless.’ (Compl.) Stafford v. City of Minneapolis, et al, Civil Action No. 0:10-cv-03149-MJD-TNL (D. Minn. 2010).”

“177. According to media sources, the City entered into a monetary settlement with Zach King for a 2012 incident wherein MPD officers violated the Fourth Amendment and used excessive force against Mr. King by beating him and pressing a knee on Mr. King such that he could not breathe “almost like George Floyd.” Mr. King was hospitalized with a concussion and multiple visible physical injuries as a result of the police beating. The City took no disciplinary action against the officers for their use of excessive force against Mr. King.https://www.cbsnews.com/news/minneapolis-officers-cited-in-misconduct-lawsuits-face-little-discipline/.”

“178. The City had notice of a 2014 incident wherein MPD officers used excessive force against Alfred Flowers after he had been fully secured in handcuffs and not physically resisting. Mr. Flowers filed suit against the City and alleged that an officer suddenly grabbed him by his throat, choked him, and threw him to the ground and handcuffed him. After handcuffing Mr. Flowers, an MPD officer punched him in the head, following which several other officers entered the room and proceeded to kick and stomp on Mr. Flowers while he was handcuffed and laying on the ground. Flowers v. City of Minneapolis, et al, Civil Action No. 0:15-cv-03015-RHK-HB.”

“179. The City had notice of a 2014 incident wherein MPD officers used excessive force against Lamar Allen Ferguson after he had been fully secured in handcuffs and not physically resisting. Mr. Ferguson filed suit against the City in April 2017 and alleges that two MPD Officers threw him to the ground after he had been handcuffed and began punching him, following which MPD Officer Thao, a defendant in this action, lifted Mr. Ferguson’s head off of the ground and kicked him directly in his mouth. Ferguson v. City of Minneapolis, et al, Civil Action No. 0:17-cv-01110-PJS-TNL (D. Minn. 2017).”

“180. The City had notice of a 2016 incident wherein MPD officers used excessive and unjustified force against Abdi Hussen Hagad, a black male. MPD officers approached Mr. Hagad and violently threw him against a brick wall and dislocated his shoulder despite the absence of physical resistance from Mr. Hagad. Wagad v. City of Minneapolis, et al, Civil Action No. 0:17-cv-05239-MJD-TNL (D. Minn. 2017).”

“181. The City had notice of a 2016 incident wherein MPD officers used excessive force against Tomas Garcia-Orihuela during the course of an arrest. Mr. Garcia-Orihuel filed suit against the City and alleged that after he was handcuffed on the ground, ‘several police officers began to kick and hit him’ and continued to do so for several minutes while he was handcuffed and laying on the ground. Garcia-Orihuela v. City of Minneapolis, et al, Civil Action No. 0:17-cv-00292-RHK-KMM (D. Minn. 2017).”

“182. The City had notice of a 2018 incident wherein multiple MPD officers used excessive and entirely unjustified force against Jeremiah Jermaine Thomas when an officer drop-kicked Mr. Thomas in the chest area following which three other MPD officers joined in and immediately started punching, kneeing, and kicking. Mr. Thomas suffered a punctured lung, internal bleeding, fractured ribs, and various scratches and bruises as a result of MPD’s use of excessive force, and the City thereafter entered into a monetary settlement to resolve his claims. Jeremiah Jermaine Thomas v. City of Minneapolis, et al., 0:19-cv-00954-WMW-DTS (D. Minn 2019).”

“183. The City had notice of a 2013 incident wherein MPD officers used excessive and unjustified force against Catrina Johnson, a disabled woman who used a cane, by throwing her against her living room wall and onto the floor while using racial slurs. While MS. Johnson was pinned to the ground face down, an MPD officer put his knee on the back of her head and applied direct pressure thereby causing injury. The City entered into a monetary settlement with Ms. Johnson to settle her claims. Catrina Johnson v. City of Minneapolis, et al., 0:15-cv-02861-JRT-SER (D. Minn 2015).”

“184. The City had notice of a 2018 incident wherein multiple MPD officers used excessive and entirely unjustified force against Rico McKinnies during the course of a traffic stop, after he was handcuffed and not resisting arrest. The City entered into a monetary settlement with Mr. McKinnies for the injuries he sustained therein. Rico McKinnies v. City of Minneapolis, et al., 0:18-cv-02738-NEB-BRT (D. Minn 2018).”

“185. Each of the above-referenced incidents involved more than one officer at the scene and in each of those incidents, the non-participating MPD officers failed to intervene in the unconstitutional use of force against handcuffed, non-resisting citizens.”

“186. In addition to a substantial settlement with the family of David Smith, the City of Minneapolis has been forced to pay significant sums of money for the unlawful deaths caused by its officers.”

“187. In 2019, the City of Minneapolis approved a significant settlement with the family of Justine Ruszczyk, who was shot and killed by a Minneapolis Police Officer.”

“188. In 2019, the City of Minneapolis approved a significant settlement [with] the family of Jamar Clark, who was shot and killed by a Minneapolis Police Officer.”

“189. In 2020, the City of Minneapolis approved a significant settlement with the family of Terrance Franklin, who was shot and killed by a Minneapolis Police Officer.”

“190. While the settlement of the Justine Ruszczyk [claim] was locally billed as transformational, it had no meaningful impact on how the MPD conducts its business.”

“191. The Mayor and City Council receive notice of each lawsuit filed against the City.”

“192. All monetary settlements made by the City must be approved by the Mayor and City Council.”

“193. MPD’s Policy Manual requires that the Chief of Police report to the Mayor each instance of officer misconduct and in accordance with the same, the Chief of Police reported to the Mayor each instance of officer misconduct.”

“Count II—42 U.S.C. sec. 1983-Monell Liability”

“222. MPD’s Policy Manual provides that the Mayor is ‘vested with all the powers of said city connected with and incident to the establishment, maintenance, appointment, removal, discipline, control, and supervision of its police force, subject to the limitations herein contained and the provisions of the Civil Service chapter of this Charter, and may make all needful rules and regulations for the efficiency and discipline, and promulgate and enforce general and special orders for the government of the same, and have the care and custody of all public property connected with the Police Department of the city.’ (MPD Policy Manual Sec. 1-301 (citing City Charter reference-Chapter 6, Section 1)).”

“223. The Mayor, the City Council, and the Police Chief had final policymaking authority with regard to establishing written policies and training programs governing the conduct of MPD officers performing policing functions on behalf of the City.”

“224. The Mayor, the City Council, and the Police Chief established and/or approved of MPD’s written policies and training governing the conduct of MPD officers performing policing functions.”

“225. The written policies and training established and/or approved by The Mayor, the City Council, and the Police Chief constitute the official policy of the City and were the moving force behind and caused Plaintiff’s injuries.”

“226. The City, acting by and through its Mayor and/or other policymakers, had knowledge of MPD’s unconstitutional patterns and practices and knowledge that the same gave rise to a risk of violations of citizens’ federal rights. ”

“227. The City, acting by and through its Mayor and/or other policymakers, made a deliberate and/or conscious decision to disregard the known risk of harm that would result from MPD’s unconstitutional patterns and practices and was deliberately indifferent to and/or tacitly authorized the same.”

“228. On or prior to May 25, 2020, Minneapolis, with deliberate indifference to the rights of arrestees, detainees, and the like, tolerated, permitted, failed to correct, promoted, or ratified a number of customs, patterns, or practices that failed to provide for the safety of arrestees, detainees, and the like during arrest, including but not limited to the handcuffing and restraint process.”

“229. On or prior to May 25, 2020, Minneapolis, with deliberate indifference to the rights of arrestees, detainees, and the like, tolerated, permitted, failed to correct, promoted, or ratified a number of customs, patterns, or practices that condoned and required officers to turn a blind eye to and not intervene with the use of excessive force by MPD officers.”

“230. On or prior to May 25, 2020, Minneapolis, with deliberate indifference to the rights of arrestees, detainees, and the like, tolerated, permitted, failed to correct, promoted, fostered or ratified a number of customs, patterns, or practices that condoned and required officers to treat the members of the Black Community of Minneapolis differently, including but not limited to implementing deadly force at a higher rate against Black men who did not pose a threat to officers.”

“231. On or prior to May 25, 2020, Minneapolis, with deliberate indifference to the rights of arrestees, detainees, and the like, tolerated, permitted, failed to correct, promoted, or ratified a number of customs, patterns, or practices that shall be further identified in discovery.”

“232. Minneapolis, with deliberate indifference to the rights of arrestees, detainees, and the like, continued to employee Chauvin and Thao despite knowledge of their repeated unconstitutional, unlawful, or other improper conduct.”

“233. Minneapolis had to the power to terminate or appropriately discipline Chauvin and Thao for their misconduct prior to May 25, 2020, but failed to do so despite the City’s knowledge of a pattern of complaints regarding excessive force.”

“234. By refusing to terminate Chauvin or Thao, Minneapolis caused Chauvin and Thao to act with impunity and without fear of retribution.”

“235. Minneapolis’ failure to terminate or properly discipline Chauvin or Thao is part of its larger custom, police, or practice of failing to supervise, terminate, or properly discipline its officers for unconstitutional, unlawful, or otherwise improper conduct, and thereby encouraged Chauvin, Thao, and the other Defendant Officers to continue engaging in unlawful acts towards arrestees, including George.”

“236. On or prior to May 25, 2020, Minneapolis, with deliberate indifference to the rights of arrestees, detainees, and the like, tolerated, permitted, failed to correct, promoted, or ratified its agents, including Lt. Bob Kroll, providing improper and harmful training to officers.”

“237. Minneapolis had to the power to terminate or appropriately discipline Kroll prior to May 25, 2020, but failed to do so despite the City’s knowledge of Kroll’s perpetuation of dangerous ideology to officers.”

“238. By refusing to terminate or discipline Kroll or denounce his ideology, Minneapolis caused officers act with impunity and without fear of retribution.”

“239. On or prior to May 25, 2020, Minneapolis, with deliberate indifference to the rights of arrestees, detainees, and the like, participated in contract negotiations with the Police Officers Federation of Minneapolis that granted officers powers that allowed them to avoid discipline for misconduct, including but not limited to:

a. A grievance process that resulted in a nearly 50% rate of overturns of terminations of officers;

b. The ability to review evidence and video footage prior to giving statements in use of force and misconduct matters.”

“240. This participation by the City of Minneapolis caused officers to act with impunity and without fear of retribution.”

“241. The unconstitutional policies, practices, and customs defined herein were the moving force behind George’s death.”

“242. George died as a direct and proximate result of the acts and omissions by Minneapolis.”

“243. As a direct and proximate result of the acts and omissions described herein, George suffered compensatory and special damages as defined under federal common law and in an amount to be determined by jury.”

“244. Plaintiff is entitled to recovery of costs, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.”

“245. The conduct described in all of the preceding paragraphs amount to wrongful acts and omissions for purposes of Minnesota Statute Section 573.02, subdivision 1.”

“246. As a direct and proximate result of these wrongful acts and omissions, George’s next of kin have suffered pecuniary loss, including medical and funeral expenses, loss of aid, counsel, guidance, advice, assistance, protection, and support in an amount to be determined by jury.”

Conclusion

All of the legal references and assertions by the parties, of course, are subject to legal research to determine their current validity in light of any subsequent federal statutes and decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court and lower federal courts, especially by the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota and its direct appellate court (the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit).

As previously noted, Count I of this Complaint against the four ex-officers has been covered in a prior post while Count III against the City will be the subject of a future post.

Now we await the defendants’ responses to this Complaint and other further developments in this civil case and in the criminal cases against the four ex-officers.

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[1] Complaint, Kaarin Nelson Schaffer, as Trustee for the next of kin of GEORGE P. FLOYD, Jr., Deceased v. Derek Chauvin, in his capacity as a Minneapolis police officer; Tou Thao, in his capacity as a Minneapolis police officer; Thomas Lane, in his capacity as a Minneapolis police officer; J. Alexander Kueng, in his capacity as a Minneapolis police officer; and the City of Minneapolis, Case 0:20-cv-01577-SRN-TNL (July 15, 2020).

[2] Count II also includes by reference all of the allegations regarding the four ex-policemen defendants (Complaint, para. 247) that were recited in the post about Count I of the Complaint.

[3] On June 5, 2020, the City of Minneapolis and the Minnesota Department of Human Rights agreed to ban the Minneapolis police from using chokeholds and neck restraints, and on June  that was so ordered by the Hennepin County District Court. (Ban on Police Choke Holds and Neck Restraints in Agreement Between City of Minneapolis and Minnesota Human rights Department, dwkcommentaries.com (June 6, 2020); Court Approves Agreement on Police Conduct Between City of Minneapolis and Minnesota Department of Human Rights (June 9, 2020).)