Federal Criminal Trial for Killing of George Floyd: Prosecution Witnesses (Part III)

A prior post discussed the testimony of the first 11 prosecution witnesses: Kimberly Meline, Charles McMillian, Jena Scurry, Christopher Martin, Derek Smith, Genevieve Hansen, Jeremy Norton, Katie Blackwell, Dr. Bradford Wankhede Langenfeld, Andrew Baker and Christopher Douglas.[1]

Another post discussed the testimony of the next eight prosecution witnesses: Dr. David M. Systrom, Jr., Nicole Mackenzie, Vik Bebarta, McKenzie Anderson, Richard Zimmerman, Kelly McCarthy, Alyssa Funari and Matthew Vogel. [2]

This post provides resources that discuss the February 14th testimony of the prosecution’s final witnesses: Timothy Longo, Jr. and Darnella Fraser. [3]

 Timothy Longo, Jr.

A veteran of the Baltimore Police Department and Associate Vice President for Safety and Security at the University of Virginia, Longo testified that the three ex-MPD officers failed in their duty to care for George Floyd and that their restraining him on the ground was “inconsistent with generally accepted police practices.” More specifically, he faulted their “decision to put Floyd stomach-down on the ground, their failure to sit or stand him up and their failure to provide medical aid when he stopped breathing and showed no pulse.” Their duty “to care for . . . restrained subject[s] is ‘absolute’ because they’re no longer able to take care of themselves.”

Moreover, when one officer is using illegal force, other officers at the scene have a duty to “do something to stop the [illegal] behavior” and that duty is not dependent on rank or experience. “It’s a responsibility of everyone that’s there to do something.” In short, an officer has a duty to take “affirmative steps to stop another officer from using excessive force. “The term ‘intervene’ is a verb, it’s an action word. It requires an act . And what you do is, stop the behavior.”

Moreover, according to Longo, the appropriate legal force that may be used on a suspect is only enough to accomplish the objective in light of the seriousness of the alleged crime, whether the subject was a threat, environmental conditions and the presence of others at the scene.

Longo also testified that his review of the relevant evidence did not find any indication that Floyd posed a threat to anyone and that he simply did not want to get into a squad car because he was scared and having trouble breathing.

In short, in Longo’s opinion, Chauvin’s actions were “wholly contrary” to generally accepted police use of force policies.

On cross examination, Longo admitted he has close ties to the U.S. Department of Justice and Hennepin County prosecutors by testifying for the prosecution in the criminal case against former Minneapolis policeman Mohammed Noor. Yet he testified for two Baltimore police officers in the 2015 death of Freddie Gray in the back of a police van even though Gray was handcuffed with his legs tied.

Darnella Fraser[4]

Fraser, then age 16, was at the scene of George Floyd’s detention by the four MPD police officers and took the now infamous six-plus minute video of that restraint. Moments after she took the stand, she began crying and said, “I can’t do it. I’m sorry.” Then after the Judge took a short break, she resumed her testimony. She testified that she saw Floyd on the ground with Chauvin’s knee on his neck. He looked very uncomfortable and kept saying, “I can’t breathe.” At the same time, Thao looked like he was protecting and patrolling the area. I didn’t see George Floyd resist at all. The only thing I saw him do was really try to find comfort in his situation—try to breathe and get more oxygen.”

“I knew Floyd needed medical care when he became unresponsive. Over time, he kind of just became weaker and eventually stopped making sounds overall.”

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[1] Federal Criminal Trial for Killing of George Floyd: Prosecution Witnesses (Part I), dwkcommentaries.com (Feb. 2, 2022).

[2] Federal Criminal Trial for Killing of George Floyd: Prosecution Witnesses (Part II), dwkcommentaries.com (Feb. 11, 2022).

[3] Olson & Xiong, Veteran officer: Cops failed in their duty to provide care for George Floyd while in custody, StarTribune (Feb. 14, 2022); Olson & Xiong, At least two ex-officers plan to testify in federal civil rights trial as defense prepares to present its case, StarTribune (Feb. 14, 2022). Forliti & Karnowski, Expert takes issue with officers’ conduct in Floyd killing, AP News (Feb. 14, 2022); Foriiti & Karnowski, Prosecution rests in 3 cops’ trial in George Floyd killing. AP News (Feb. 14, 2022),

[4] See also these posts to dwkcommentaries: Derek Chauvin Trial: Week Four (April 2, 2021); Witnessing (April 25, 2021); Darnella Fraser’s Continued Witnessing (May 26, 2021); More Honors for Darnella Fraser (June 12, 2021).

Federal Criminal Trial for George Floyd Killing: Prosecution Witnesses (Part I)

Here is a summary of the testimony of prosecution witnesses on January 24-28, 31 and February 1-2. On February 2 at 10:00 a.m. the trial was recessed until Monday, February 7, 9:30 a.m. because Defendant Thomas Lane has COVID.[1]

Kimberly Meline.

As the first trial witness, Meline established foundation for various videos of the police encounter with George Floyd on May 25, 2020, near Cup Foods in south Minneapolis. This included synchronizing some videos to play side by side.

A 34-minute video showed officers Kueng and Lane walking into Cup Foods and then walking to the car outside where Floyd is at the steering wheel. Lane points his gun at him and asks him to put his hands on the steering wheel. He does not comply and one of the officers says, “When you’re moving around like that, that makes us think way more is going on than we even know.”

This video then shows Lane and Kueng cuff Floyd and take him to a squad car and try to put him inside. Floyd objects, “I’m not that kind of guy. I’m claustrophobic.” He also says “I can’t breathe.” After Floyd is placed on the pavement near a police vehicle, the video captures him saying, “I can’t breathe. Mama, I love you.”

Another video, this from Kueng’ body-worn camera, was fixed on the passenger-side rear tire of a squad car, as bystanders can be heard shouting from the sidewalk and Floyd is unresponsive. A bystander, Donald Williams, says, “You think that’s cool, bro? You’re a bum for that.” This video also shows Thao holding back a group of bystanders on the sidewalk.

Charles McMillian

McMillian, a 71-year -old neighbor, was the first witness on the scene on May 25, 2020, and told Floyd to get in the back of the squad car and make it easy on himself because “You can’t win.” With tears, McMillian said, “I knew something bad was going to happen to Mr. Floyd . . . that he was going to die.”

Jena Scurry

A 911 dispatcher, Scurry testified that the officers asked for a “Code 2” ambulance without lights and sirens for a “mouth injury.” They did not report that Floyd was having trouble breathing. If they had, she could have sent “rescue” medical help from the fire department which could get to the scene faster than from Hennepin County EMS. A few minutes later she “grew concerned” that the officers appeared so long on a city surveillance camera that she called and reported this to a Third Precinct sergeant

Christopher Martin

At 19 years of age, Martin was working the evening shift at Cup Foods in May 2020 and accepted a blue-hued, obviously counterfeit $20 bill from Floyd to pay for a pack of cigarettes. At the instruction of the store manager, Martin went outside to bring Floyd back inside. Floyd, he testified, looked high and did not want to return to the store so the manager had another employee call 911.

A few moments later Martin saw a crowd outside the store and went outside to see a police officer with his knee or his body weight on Floyd’s neck, who appeared “dead . . . not moving.”

Derek Smith

A paramedic for Hennepin Healthcare, Smith testified that he and his partner arrived at the scene on a Code 2 non-emergency call. He immediately noted that Floyd had large pupils, no pulse and a chest not rising and falling and then told his partner “I think he’s dead. I’d like to provide patient care away from the scene” because “I knew I would have to work cardiac arrest, probably taking off his clothes.” They removed the body to the ambulance and started to set up lifesaving equipment while officer Lane attempted CPR. Yes, Lane was helpful to the paramedics.

Genevieve Hansen

An off-duty Minneapolis firefighter, while on a walk, Hansen came upon the scene near Cup Foods on May 25, 2020, and observed the lights of a squad-car,  “a woman was yelling that they were killing him” and “the amount of people that were on top of one person.” She also noticed “there were no medics or fire [department personnel] there, so there was no medical attention available.” The man on the ground wasn’t moving, his face was really swollen and smashed to the ground. She saw fluid coming from his general body and thought he could have emptied his bladder, which” is a sign of death or near death.” (Later, she says she learned the fluid was runoff from vehicle exhaust.) She was “concerned that he needed help.”

Hansen offered to help and urged one of them (Thao) to check the man’s pulse only to be rebuffed and told to get back on the sidewalk. This officer said something like, “If you’re really a Minneapolis firefighter then you should know better than to get involved.” This prompted Hansen to yell and swear at the officers because the man on the ground needed help immediately and he wasn’t not getting it, so I was just trying everything.”

Jeremy Norton

Norton, a Minneapolis fire captain, arrived at the scene to provide EMS and heard someone yell, “You all killed that man,” to the officers. In the Cup Foods store Norton met and talked with Hansen, who said she thought the officers had killed Floyd. Yet Norton said the officers did not seem concerned. In response to a question by Robert Paule, Thao’s attorney, about “excited delirium,” Norton said it was part of firefighters training, but the American Medical Association had concluded that it lacked scientific evidence as a legitimate diagnosis.

At the end of the day on the 26th, Plunkett for the third time called for a mistrial, but the Judge denied the motion while telling the prosecution to be careful with leading questions.

Katie Blackwell

As a Police Department Inspector, Blackwell oversees training, which includes a medical component and scenarios officers may face in the field. MPD core values: trust, accountability and professional service. The Field Training Handbook asserts these values: (1) public safety and justice, not just absence of crime; (2) being truthful; (3) holding each other accountable; and (4) not committing public or private conduct that would sully the department.” Phases of training: (1) being in the field with a field training officer, getting comfortable with the public and computer system; and (2) being in a different precinct with a different field training officer.

MPD Code of Conduct: all employees to obey the code of conduct, rules, ordinances, laws. “The integrity of police service is based on truthfulness.” Other sections talk about being fair, unbiased and professional. “Required to immediately report any violation of rules, including but not limited to unreasonable use of force—regardless of rank.” Use of force starts with police presence and escalates to use of force. Use the lowest level of force necessary to detain someone. Once there is compliance, force stops. “Sanctity of life and protection of the public should be the cornerstones of MPD’s use of force policy.” If a person has stopped resisting, the person is complying. This includes protecting persons suspected of violating the law from police use of unnecessary force. Officers have a duty “to stop or attempt to stop another officer when force is being inappropriately applied or is no longer required.”

The Department’s officers have “a duty to intervene because there is an obligation for sanctity of life to protect the public and fellow employees.” This includes a “duty to “stop or attempt to stop” another officer ”when force is being inappropriately applied or is no longer required.” It also includes “rendering medical aid consistent with training, including CPR, chest seal/tourniquet, administering Narcan, checking breathing. These requirements take into consideration an individual’s medical conditions, mental impairment, developmental disability, physical limitations, language barriers, drug or alcohol use and behavioral crisis.

MPD policy defines neck restraint as “restricting the blood flow” and “chokehold” can be used before shooting someone. Although policy says “neck restraint” can be used with a leg, officers are not trained to do so. “Conscious neck restraint” can be used when someone is actively resisting arrest and usually takes 15 seconds. Hobble is used to prevent someone from kicking and being combative. Prone position sometimes is used to get someone handcuffed, but then turn the person on his or her side so they can breathe easier.

“Sanctity of life and protection of public shall be the cornerstones of the MPD’s use of force policy. No matter what kind of force we’re using, we have to protect people.” “MPD employees shall only use the amount of force ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of circumstances: the amount and type of force that would be considered rational and logical to an objective officer on the scene, supported by facts and circumstances known to an officer at the time the force was used.”  Force can be used for “lawful arrest, execution of legal process, enforcing order of court, legal duties.”

MPD crisis intervention policy requires police to treat vulnerable people with compassion. Must call EMS and “render first aid until EMS gets there.” MPD policy for police to not stop people from videotaping police events.

Blackwell worked with Chauvin at third precinct for many years.

Blackwell reviewed Thao’s 2018 training–“Defensive Tactics In-Service.” It said, “Sanctity of life and protection of public. Based on 4th amendment reasonableness standard. Restraint is a form of force. Proportional force based on what the subject is doing. Need to use lowest level of force and justify any use of higher level.” Use of force: active aggression (being combative or trying to assault), active resistance, passive resistance and flight.

MPD academy tries to get officers comfortable correcting one another. “You will be held responsible for your actions and inactions.”

Blackwell also testified that the first officers on the scene, Lane and Kueng, under MPD policy, were in charge of the scene and should not have deferred to Chauvin, especially when Chauvin violated policy by putting his knee on Floyd’s neck and not removing it as Floyd was gasping for air and ultimately dying.

Initially Floyd showed active resistance and aggression when officers were trying to put him in back seat of squad car, which would have justified the officers using a taser on him.

Chauvin’s actions were inconsistent with policy when he had his knee on Floyd’s neck and pulled on his hand for “pain compliance.”

Three of the four officers who arrested and restrained Floyd did not act in accordance with use-of-force policy. Officers were not really communicating with each other. When Floyd went unconscious they were supposed to move him, but did not do so. Lane held Floyd’s legs. They did not move Floyd on his side as they were supposed to. Lane suggested doing so, but no one did so. When Floyd went unconscious, officers were supposed to render aid, but they did not do so. When Floyd had no pulse, they were supposed to perform medical aid, but they did not do so. MPD policy requires an officer to intervene to stop use of inappropriate force. The three officers failed in their duty to intervene.

There was a crowd of bystanders, but they were on sidewalk following orders and were not posing any threat to the officers.

Plunkett cross-examination: Blackwell disagrees with assertion that senior leadership establishes culture of organization and training. Instead recruits should mirror in field what they learned in training. Policy manual has 537 pages, and officers are supposed to know it. There are annual tests of some parts. DOJ is investigating pattern and practice of MPD, including alleged deficiency in officer training.

Paule cross-examination. The attorney for ex-officer Thao, Robert Paule, got Blackwell to agree that a MPD training slideshow cited a draft report by the city’s civil rights division that found a sharp rise in ketamine injections of detainees and examples of police asking emergency medical services for the sedative by name and joking about its powerful effects along with a footnote dismissing the report as a “reckless use of anecdote” that will “prevent the saving of lives.” Blackwell also testified, “If you’re dealing with somebody who is displaying signs of excited delirium, it can be very dangerous.”

Paule also identified other slides from the MPD course on its “excited delirium” training that had officers pinning down suspects with their knees, similar to the way Chauvin pinned down Floyd.

Dr. Bradford Wankhede Langenfeld

Langenfeld went into stabilization room for most critical patients to await Floyd’s arrival as a cardiac arrest patient. Floyd arrived at 8:55 p.m. Upon arrival, paramedics said no one at scene had started CPR before they arrived, and a minute’s delay in CPR reduces chances of success from cardiac arrest by 10-15%. But paramedics in ambulance tried resuscitation for about 30 minutes before arrival at hospital, but never found a pulse.

At hospital they continued compressions with Lucas device and gained additional IV access for more medications. Replaced windpipe tube with a more secure tube for better venting and arterial line. Dr. Langenfeld believes most likely cause of this cardiac arrest was “mechanical asphyxia” (inability to expand chest wall) and “excited delirium” or “severe agitated state.” There was a mouth injury which made him think the patient had been pinned down in prone position. Fentanyl by itself is a depressant, shows down breathing, but would not lead to severe agitated state.

After Dr. Langenfeld had worked on Floyd for about 30 minutes, cardiac arrest had come to near standstill; no clinical improvement; so doctor declared Floyd dead. When the heart stops, tissues and brain start to die, and irreversible brain damage occurs within 4-6 minutes of cardiac arrest.

Cross-examination by Paule (Thau’s attorney). Dr. Langenfeld says excited delirium is controversial because it is used almost exclusively when law enforcement is restraining an individual and predominantly people of color, thus raising concerns about bias and most often it is a pre-hospital diagnosis, which is condemned by  AMA and which typically is used for someone who is delirious, erratic, unable to be verbally de-escalated, sweaty.

If Floyd had been using illegal drugs and sweating profusely, this possibly could have been cause of cardiac arrest.

Cross examination by Plunkett (Kueng’s attorney). If someone had consumed methamphetamine and fentanyl and then was struggling hard, that possibly could kill someone.

Redirect by prosecution. Cardiac arrest from acidosis can be reversed by prompt chest compressions and CPR ventilation. After reviewing video of Floyd’s arrest, Dr. Langenfeld believes Floyd was not subject to severe agitation that would lead to cardiac arrest.

Andrew Baker

A medical examiner, Baker examined Floyd at HCMC and testified that his heart and lungs stopped due to restraint by law enforcement. “ I view his death as being multifactorial” due to the duration of his “interaction with law enforcement” for 9.5 minutes along with his already enlarged heart and hardened arteries. However, he denied that the fentanyl and methamphetamine found in Floyd’s body and carbon monoxide poisoning were contributory factors.

Under cross examination by attorney Paule, Baker testified that he and his office were targets of protests after Hennepin County Attorney Mike Freeman had published Baker’s preliminary autopsy findings that highlighted Floyd’s cardiovascular disease and “potential intoxicants” in his body. These protests included threatening phone calls, some of which targeted specific employees in his office and their families and included their home addresses. But Baker said the final conclusions on Floyd’s death were neither partisan nor driven by outside pressure. Baker also testified that excited delirium was not a cause of death.

Kueng’s attorney, Thomas Plunkett, showed Baker a photo of Kueng restraining Floyd, and Baker said that that position “wouldn’t impair his ability to breathe.” Baker gave the same answer to a question by Lane’s attorney (Earl Gray) about Lane’s position on Floyd.

Christopher Douglas

Attorney Gray objected to having Douglas testify because he trained Lane as a corrections officer in 2017 and, therefore, is not relevant. The objection, however, was overruled.

Douglas works for the Hennepin County Department of Community Corrections as the lead safety trainer for the County’s Juvenile Detention Center, where Lane worked before joining MPD. Douglas testified regarding the training about positional asphyxia that Lane would have received at that Center in 2017 and 2018. It emphasized getting “control of the subject quickly,” using arms instead of body weight while avoiding putting pressure on the torso and neck and monitoring the subject for medical issues and claiming inability to breathe. The trainees also learn de-escalation and physical restraint techniques, which aim to keep someone vertical and on their feet making it easier to transport someone and less likely to cause injury.

Comment

According to Holly Bailey, a Washington Post reporter, defense cross examination of Katie Blackwell suggests that a major defense argument will be that “Minneapolis officers are not given adequate scenario training on intervention policies and they operate in a militarized environment where younger officers are strongly discouraged from disagreeing with senior officers.” Thomas Plunkett, Kueng’s attorney, has argued that Kueng had received “inadequate training” and that the U.S. Justice Department currently is investigating the MPD, including its training programs.

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[1]  The above summary of witness testimony is based upon the following newspaper articles: Live: Federal trial of 3 former Minneapolis officers in George Floyd death, StarTribune; Mannix & Olson, Cup Foods clerk who interacted with George Floyd tells jurors of events leading to killing, StarTribune (01/25/22);  Olson & Mannix, Day 3 of testimony underway as paramedic describes how George Floyd was likely dead at scene, StarTribune (1/26/22); Mannix & Olson, ‘I think they killed him:’ Off-duty firefighter testifies of futile attempts to help unresponsive George Floyd, StarTribune (1/26/22); Mannix & Olson, Minneapolis police inspector testifies of training protocol in civil rights trial, StarTribune (1/27/22); Mannix & Olson, Kueng and Lane should have been in charge at George Floyd arrest, protocol not followed, StarTribune (1/28/22);  Mannix & Olson, Defense says poor training, paramilitary culture, stopped officer from intervening in George Floyd’s death, StarTribune (1/28/22); Bailey, Officers charged in George Floyd’s killing had been taught to intervene, police trainer testifies, Wash. Post (1/28/22); Jany & Furst, Minneapolis police training, policies under microscope in trial of 3 ex-cops in George Floyd’s death, StarTribune (1/30/22); Mannix & Olson, Testimony: Minneapolis police trained to ignore city’s civil rights report on ketamine, excited delirium, StarTribune (1/31/22); Olson & Mannix, Defense asks medical examiner about outside pressures during George Floyd death investigation, StarTribune (2/1/22); Olson & Mannix, Trial of ex-Minneapolis cops postponed by COVID diagnosis, StarTribune (2/2/22).

George Floyd Family’s Complaint Against the City of Minneapolis Over His Death: Count II     

As noted in a prior post, on July 15, the family of George Floyd filed a federal civil action with two claims (Counts II and III) for money damages against the City of Minneapolis. This post will discuss Count II while Count III will be covered in a subsequent post. That civil action also asserted one claim (Count I) against the four ex-police officers who were involved in Floyd’s death—Derek Chauvin, Tou Thao, Thomas Lane and J. Alexander Kueng– as discussed in another prior post.

Legal Basis [1]

Count II is asserted against the City of Minneapolis under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, which states as follows:

  • “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. . . .”

Count II also is based on so-called “Monell Liability,” which refers to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Monell v. Department of Soc. Svcs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), that held, “Local governing bodies (and local officials sued in their official capacities) can . . .be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief in those situations where, as here, the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted or promulgated by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy. In addition, local governments, like every other § 1983 “person,” may be sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental “custom” even though such custom has not received formal approval through the government’s official decision-making channels.”

Factual Allegations [2]

The Parties

“6. Plaintiff Kaarin Nelson Schaffer (“Schaffer”) resides in Hennepin county, Minnesota, and is an attorney duly licensed to practice before the State and Federal; Courts of Minnesota. On July 6, 2020, Schaffer was appointed as trustee for George Floyd’s next of kin.”

“7. Mr. Floyd is survived by next of kin including his children and siblings.”

“8. Minneapolis is and was at all times material hereto a political subdivision of the State of Minnesota, organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of Minnesota.”

“9. The Minneapolis Police Department (“MPD”) is and was at all times material hereto a Minneapolis agency, providing the vehicle through which the City fulfills its policing functions.

MPD Trains its Officers to Use Deadly force in Non-Deadly Circumstances

“86. MPD trained its officers that a ‘neck restraint’ was an authorized form of non-deadly force, and that a ‘chokehold’ was a form of deadly force capable of causing serious bodily injury and/or death.” [3]

“87. At all times material hereto, MPD defined a ‘neck restraint’ as ‘[c]ompressing one or both sides of a person’s neck with an arm or leg, without applying direct pressure to the trachea or airway (front of the neck).’ MPD defined a ‘chokehold’ as ‘applying direct pressure on a person’s trachea or airway (front of the neck).’”

“88. At all times material hereto, MPD trained its officers that a proper ‘neck Restraint’ required the officer to ‘[c]ompress veins. arteries, nerves & muscles of the neck.'”

“89. Serious bodily injury and/or death is reasonably likely to result from an officer ‘compress[ing] a person’s veins, arteries, nerves & muscles of the neck,’ regardless of whether direct pressure is applied to the front or back of the neck.”

“90. The use of a ‘neck restraint’ as defined by MPD constitutes deadly force.”

“91. The Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of deadly force in non-deadly circumstances which do not pose an immediate threat of serious bodily injury and/or death.”

“92. At all times material hereto, MPD’s written policies authorized the use of a deadly ‘neck restraint’ in non-deadly circumstances posing no immediate threat of serious bodily injury or death.”

“93. At all times material hereto, MPD trained its officers that use of a ‘neck restraint’ was authorized non-deadly force which officers could use in non-deadly situations.”

“94. It has long been known by the law enforcement community that the use of neck restraints on subjects can lead to death.”

“95. However, from at least April 15, 2012 until June 8, 2020, Minneapolis Police Department Policy 5-311 defined a neck restraint as ‘non-deadly force’ and did not warn it can cause death.”

“96. By policy, the MPD permitted and condoned the use of both conscious and unconscious neck restraints by its officers from at least April 15, 2012 until June 8, 2020.”

“97. At all times material hereto, MPD’s written policies authorized the use of a ‘neck restraint’ in non-deadly circumstances posing no immediate threat of serious bodily injury or death.”

“98. The City of Minneapolis possessed data indicating that since 2012, neck restraints/holds were used by its police officers on 428 people at an average rate of about one a week.”

“99. Of those 428 people, 14% who were subjected to a neck restraint/hold lost consciousness.”

“100. Upon information and belief, MPD officers regularly used neck restraints on passively resisting arrestees despite not being permitted to do so under policy.”

“101. Training offered by the City of Minneapolis in 2014 and received by Chauvin and Thao authorized and instructed on the use of neck restraints by officers, presented it to officers as a ‘non-deadly force’ option, and included instruction on how to employ neck restraints in order to most efficiently render subjects unconscious.”

“102. Upon information and belief, all training offered by the City of Minneapolis on the use of neck restraints, including that provided to the Defendant Officers, presented neck restraints to officers as a ‘non-deadly force’ option, and included instruction on how-to employ neck restraints in order to most efficiently render subjects unconscious.”

“103.Training offered by the City of Minneapolis to MPD officers, including the Defendant Officers, encouraged officers to “compress veins, arteries, nerves, and muscles of the neck” of arrestees.”

“104.Training materials offered to officers in 2014, including Defendants Chauvin and Thao, depict an officer placing a knee on the neck of an arrestee who is handcuffed in a prone position.”

“105. Since at least April 16, 2012, MPD policy has required that ‘[a]fter a neck restraint or choke hold has been used on a subject, sworn MPD employees shall keep them under close observation until they are released to medical or other law enforcement personnel.”

“106. Since at least April 16, 2012, the MPD failed to provide its officers with proper policy guidance and training on how to properly observe and attend to the medical needs of arrestees subjected to neck restraints.”

“107. At all times material hereto, MPD trained its officers that a ‘neck restraint’ could be used in non-deadly situations despite the fact that it constituted deadly force as utilized by MPD.”

Prone Restraint Training by the MPD and the Death of David Smith

“108. It is well known throughout the law enforcement and medical communities that holding a subject in a position of prone restraint for prolonged periods of time can be deadly.”

“109. Compressing an arrestee in a prone position with weight on their back and/or abdomen restricts their ability to breathe and can result in asphyxiation.”

“110. Deaths caused by this form of asphyxiation are often interchangeably referred to as deaths from positional, mechanical, or compression asphyxia, even if technical distinctions exist.“

“111. The United States Department of Justice has warned law enforcement for decades about the dangers of prone restraint and as early as 1995: ‘The risk of positional asphyxia is compounded when an individual with predisposing factors becomes involved in a violent struggle with an officer or officers, particularly when physical restraint includes behind-the-back handcuffing combined with placing the subject in a stomach-down position. National Law Enforcement Technology Center, Positional Asphyxia—Sudden Death at *2 (June 1995).”

“112. These dangers were acknowledged in an October 18, 2012 deposition by then-MPD Chief Timothy Dolan in addition to many other high-ranking officers in the matter of Smith v. Gorman, Case No. 11-cv-3071 (SRN/JJK).”

“113. Due to the well-known risks associated with prone restraint, it has long been national best practice that once a subject is controlled, it is imperative that they be moved from the prone position, and that their breathing be assessed.”

“114. Minneapolis has had a policy in place addressing this issue since at least May 29, 2002: ‘When ANY restraint technique is used on a subject, the subject shall not be left in a prone position and shall be placed on their side as soon as they are secured. Once the subject is secured, an officer shall watch for any of the following signs:

  • Significant change in behavior or level consciousness;
  • Shortness of breath or irregular breathing;
  • Seizures or convulsions;
  • Complaints of serious pain or injury; and/or
  • Any other serious medical problem.’

MPD Policy & Procedure Manual § 9-111.01 (emphasis in original).”

“115. Despite this knowledge, as of 2012, officers were not provided official training on the dangers of positional or mechanical asphyxia associated with prone restraint.”

“116. As of 2012, officers were trained that if a subject in a prone restraint is speaking, that they need not be concerned that the subject may be having difficulty breathing.”

“117. Despite the well-known risk of death associated with placing a subject in prolonged prone restraint, particularly without properly monitoring their medical condition, Mr. Floyd was not the first black man to be killed by MPD officers under such circumstances.”

“118. On September 9, 2010, veteran MPD Officers Timothy Gorman (“Gorman”)and Timothy Callahan (“Callahan”) responded to the Minneapolis YMCA, where David Smith (“Mr. Smith”) was experiencing the effects of mental illness.”

“119. Rather than use de-escalation techniques, Gorman and Callahan immediately went hands on with Mr. Smith and subjected him to five Taser deployments in addition to other force.”

“120. Gorman and Callahan placed Mr. Smith a prone restraint position with his hands handcuffed behind his back.”

“121. Despite Smith being handcuffed and adequately controlled, Mr. Smith was restrained in a prone position by Callahan and Gorman for at least 4 ½ minutes, with Gorman kneeling on Mr. Smith’s back and Callahan straddling Mr. Smith’s upper thigh/buttocks region.”

“122. Despite the fact that Callahan and Gorman had Smith adequately controlled, they failed to monitor Mr. Smith’s breathing or medical condition throughout their restraint of Mr. Smith.”

“123. Rather than assist Mr. Smith, Callahan berated him, calling him a ‘mother fucker.’”

“124. It was 6 and ½ minutes before either Callahan or Gorman made any effort to check on Mr. Smith’s medical condition.”

“125. Mr. Smith was pulseless, breathless, and lifeless by the time Callahan and Gorman finally made the effort to observe Mr. Smith’s medical condition.”

“126. Paramedics were able to resuscitate Mr. Smith’s heart, but he never regained consciousness and was removed from life support and officially died on September 17,2010.”

“127. Hennepin County Chief Medical Examiner Andrew Baker determined that the manner of death was homicide, and that the cause of death was anoxic encephalopathy due to or as a consequence of cardiopulmonary arrest due to or as a consequence of mechanical asphyxia.”

“128. Callahan filmed the mechanical asphyxiation of Mr. Smith on a personal and non-departmentally issued ‘pen camera’ that Callahan wore in his short pocket.”

“129. Callahan and Gorman were both aware of the fact that Callahan filmed Mr. Smith’s asphyxiation on the pen camera, yet the pen camera was intentionally concealed from MPD investigators on September 9, 2010.”

“130. Callahan did not disclose the existence of the pen camera video of Mr. Smith’s asphyxiation until nearly a week later on September 15, 2010, but was not disciplined for concealing evidence of a homicide.”

“131. MPD pretended to conduct a homicide investigation into the acts of Callahan and Gorman but made no legitimate effort to investigate the actions of the officers.”

“132. The Grand Jury no-billed Gorman and Callahan due to the complete and utter lack of investigation conducted by the MPD as to Gorman and Callahan’s conduct.”

“133. The MPD Internal Affairs Unit then conducted no legitimate investigation into Gorman and Callahan’s conduct, also concluding that the officers did nothing actionably wrong—including the hiding of evidence (i.e., the pen camera) from investigators.”

“134. The MPD failed to take any disciplinary or other remedial action towards Callahan and Gorman despite the fact that multiple high-ranking officials within the MPD observed obvious constitutional or policy violations by officers Gorman and Callahan.”

“135. The City of Minneapolis ultimately approved a substantial settlement to the family of David Smith to resolve that litigation, one of the highest amounts it had ever paid.”

“136. As part of that settlement, the City of Minneapolis “agreed to require its sworn police officers to undergo training on positional asphyxia in the 2014 training cycle of the Minneapolis Police Department…”

“137.Despite publicly stating an intent to properly instruct its officers on the risks of asphyxiation during arrest, internally the MPD continued to minimize that risk and promote a false narrative that deaths like David Smith were the result of ‘excited delirium’ instead of asphyxiation.”

“138. Upon information and belief, the City of Minneapolis did not comply with the terms and/or the spirit of its 2013 Settlement Agreement with the family of Mr. Smith with respect to training on positional asphyxia.”

“139. Upon information and belief, the City of Minneapolis routinely trains officers to place handcuffed arrestees in a prone position without proper training on putting arrestees in a recovery position and monitoring their breathing and consciousness.”

“140. The impact of the excited delirium false narrative and the MPD’s failure to properly train on asphyxiation risks is highlighted here by Lane’s statement: ‘I am worried about excited delirium, or whatever.’”

“141. When holding a subject in a prone position, well-trained officers in Minneapolis should not be concerned about ‘excited delirium, or whatever.’ Officers in Minneapolis should know the risks of asphyxiation associated with prone restraint.”

“142. High-ranking MPD personnel have continued to publicly maintain other deadly false narratives.”

“143. MPD Lieutenant and agent of the City of Minneapolis Bob Kroll- who has served as the president of the Police Officers Federation of Minneapolis since 2015 and has sat on its board since 1996-has publicly expressed the opinion that Eric Garner, a Black man asphyxiated by the New York Police Department in 2014- could breathe at the time of his death because he was able to state ‘I can’t breathe’ several times as he was dying.”

“144. It is an accepted scientific fact that the ability to speak does not imply that someone is getting sufficient air to survive.”

“The MPD’s History Providing and Permitting Killology Training”

“145. Up and until 2019, the City of Minneapolis permitted officers to receive ‘Killology’ or ‘warrior style’ training, which teaches officers to consider every person and every situation as a potential deadly threat and to kill ‘less hesitantly.’”

“146.The City of Minneapolis was aware prior to the death of George Floyd that the officer who shot and killed Philando Castile in the nearby suburb of Falcon Heights had received Killology training.”

“147. Upon information and belief, a significant proportion of police officers employed by the MPD in May of 2020 had received Killology training during their employment.”

“148.High-ranking officers and agents of the MPD, including Kroll, encouraged all officers to receive warrior-style police training.”

“149. High-ranking officers and agents of the MPD, including Kroll, offered this training free of charge to all officers of the MPD who wanted to receive it.”

“150. The City of Minneapolis was aware that its officers had received and continued to receive Killology training before and through May of 2020, but did nothing to prevent officers from receiving it or re-training officers who had received it.”

“151. Kroll has further encouraged officers to behave aggressively, stating that MPD officers who do not receive citizen complaints are ‘low-level slugs’ who ‘[don’t] get out and investigate anything. And that’s not what we’re paying our officers to do.’”

“152. Kroll has stated that policing should be viewed like ‘a basketball game, in that if you’re not getting any fouls, you aren’t playing hard enough.’”

“153.The City of Minneapolis and high-ranking members of the MPD are aware that Kroll is an influencer for rank-and-file officers, and that its officers follow his lead with regard to law enforcement beliefs and behaviors.”

“154. Upon information and belief, Defendant City of Minneapolis has control over the amount of influence the Minneapolis Police Federation has over the officers, discipline, training, decision-making, and policy decisions of the Minneapolis Police Department.”

“155. The Minneapolis Mayor and City Council are responsible for negotiations with the Minneapolis Police Federation, including matters of officer discipline and retention. The Minneapolis Police Department Chief of Police is responsible for all decisions of hiring.””

“156.The Minneapolis Police Federation membership is made up of employees, agents, and officers of the Minneapolis Police Department.”

“157.The Police Officers within the Minneapolis Police Federation continue to be employees of the Minneapolis Police Department subject to the policies, training and orders.”

“158. The Minneapolis Police Department is responsible for maintaining training and discipline to ensure its officers follow its policies, orders, and training regardless of the opinions and actions of the Minneapolis Police Federation.”

“The City of Minneapolis and the MPD’s Failure to Terminate Dangerous Officers”

“159. The City of Minneapolis frequently fails to terminate or discipline officers who demonstrate patterns of misconduct.”

“160. Upon information and belief, Chauvin was the subject of 17 citizen complaints from 2006 to 2015, only one of which resulted in discipline, in the form of a letter of reprimand.”

“161. Upon information and belief, Chauvin has participated in the shooting and killing of at least three different individuals, including Wayne Reyes, Ira Latrell Toles, and Leroy Martinez.”

“162. In 2005, Defendant Chauvin engaged in a reckless police chase resulting in the deaths of three individuals but was not discharged from the Minneapolis Police Department.”

“163. Upon information and belief, the MPD has observed unlawful or otherwise improper conduct by Chauvin throughout his career but has tolerated it and refused to remedy or mitigate it.”

“164. Chauvin was precisely the type of reckless and dangerous officer that Kroll and other leaders of the Minneapolis Police Department encouraged him to be.”

“165. Upon information and belief, Thao was the subject of six citizen complaints from 2013 to 2017, none of which have resulted in discipline.”

“166. In 2017, Thao was the subject of a lawsuit for his use of excessive force, which the City of Minneapolis paid money to settle on his behalf.”

“167. Upon information and belief, the MPD has observed unlawful or otherwise improper conduct by Thao throughout his career but has tolerated it and refused to remedy or mitigate it.”

“168. The MPD has engaged for years in contract negotiations with the Minneapolis Federation of Police which make it more difficult for the MPD to terminate officers who have demonstrated repeated misconduct.

“The MPD’s History of Overlooking Racially Biased Policing”

“169. Upon information and belief, Black community members make up 19% of the population of Minneapolis and 58% of the subjects of police force.”

“170. The Minneapolis Police Department is currently being investigated for unlawful race-based policing, which deprives people of color, particularly Black community members, of their civil rights under the Minnesota Human Rights Act.”

“171. Prior to 2007, African American members of the MPD, including now-Chief Arradondo, received hate letters signed from the Ku Klux Klan in their interoffice mail, accessible only to MPD agents and employees.”

“172. Kroll has been accused by fellow officers, including now-Chief Arradondo,of publicly wearing a jacket with a patch depicting a racist ‘white power’ logo.”

“173. In recent years, Kroll, as president of the Minneapolis Police Federation, has publicly referred to the Black Lives Matter movement as a ‘terrorist organization.’”

“174. The Minneapolis Police Department ratified the culture of systemic racism and disparate treatment of the Black Community, by failing to remove or otherwise discipline Lt. Bob Kroll.”

“175. By 2018, as the result of a settlement, the Minneapolis Police Department was required to conduct racial sensitivity training which, upon information and belief, has not yet been completed.”

“The City of Minneapolis’s Notice of Prior Incidents of Excessive Force”

“176. The City had notice of a 2009 incident wherein MPD officers used excessive force against Ira Alexander Stafford for which Mr. Stafford filed suit against the City in 2010, alleging that while he was lying on the ground, face down with his arms around him, ‘at least one officer had a knee in Stafford’s back, making him effectively helpless.’ (Compl.) Stafford v. City of Minneapolis, et al, Civil Action No. 0:10-cv-03149-MJD-TNL (D. Minn. 2010).”

“177. According to media sources, the City entered into a monetary settlement with Zach King for a 2012 incident wherein MPD officers violated the Fourth Amendment and used excessive force against Mr. King by beating him and pressing a knee on Mr. King such that he could not breathe “almost like George Floyd.” Mr. King was hospitalized with a concussion and multiple visible physical injuries as a result of the police beating. The City took no disciplinary action against the officers for their use of excessive force against Mr. King.https://www.cbsnews.com/news/minneapolis-officers-cited-in-misconduct-lawsuits-face-little-discipline/.”

“178. The City had notice of a 2014 incident wherein MPD officers used excessive force against Alfred Flowers after he had been fully secured in handcuffs and not physically resisting. Mr. Flowers filed suit against the City and alleged that an officer suddenly grabbed him by his throat, choked him, and threw him to the ground and handcuffed him. After handcuffing Mr. Flowers, an MPD officer punched him in the head, following which several other officers entered the room and proceeded to kick and stomp on Mr. Flowers while he was handcuffed and laying on the ground. Flowers v. City of Minneapolis, et al, Civil Action No. 0:15-cv-03015-RHK-HB.”

“179. The City had notice of a 2014 incident wherein MPD officers used excessive force against Lamar Allen Ferguson after he had been fully secured in handcuffs and not physically resisting. Mr. Ferguson filed suit against the City in April 2017 and alleges that two MPD Officers threw him to the ground after he had been handcuffed and began punching him, following which MPD Officer Thao, a defendant in this action, lifted Mr. Ferguson’s head off of the ground and kicked him directly in his mouth. Ferguson v. City of Minneapolis, et al, Civil Action No. 0:17-cv-01110-PJS-TNL (D. Minn. 2017).”

“180. The City had notice of a 2016 incident wherein MPD officers used excessive and unjustified force against Abdi Hussen Hagad, a black male. MPD officers approached Mr. Hagad and violently threw him against a brick wall and dislocated his shoulder despite the absence of physical resistance from Mr. Hagad. Wagad v. City of Minneapolis, et al, Civil Action No. 0:17-cv-05239-MJD-TNL (D. Minn. 2017).”

“181. The City had notice of a 2016 incident wherein MPD officers used excessive force against Tomas Garcia-Orihuela during the course of an arrest. Mr. Garcia-Orihuel filed suit against the City and alleged that after he was handcuffed on the ground, ‘several police officers began to kick and hit him’ and continued to do so for several minutes while he was handcuffed and laying on the ground. Garcia-Orihuela v. City of Minneapolis, et al, Civil Action No. 0:17-cv-00292-RHK-KMM (D. Minn. 2017).”

“182. The City had notice of a 2018 incident wherein multiple MPD officers used excessive and entirely unjustified force against Jeremiah Jermaine Thomas when an officer drop-kicked Mr. Thomas in the chest area following which three other MPD officers joined in and immediately started punching, kneeing, and kicking. Mr. Thomas suffered a punctured lung, internal bleeding, fractured ribs, and various scratches and bruises as a result of MPD’s use of excessive force, and the City thereafter entered into a monetary settlement to resolve his claims. Jeremiah Jermaine Thomas v. City of Minneapolis, et al., 0:19-cv-00954-WMW-DTS (D. Minn 2019).”

“183. The City had notice of a 2013 incident wherein MPD officers used excessive and unjustified force against Catrina Johnson, a disabled woman who used a cane, by throwing her against her living room wall and onto the floor while using racial slurs. While MS. Johnson was pinned to the ground face down, an MPD officer put his knee on the back of her head and applied direct pressure thereby causing injury. The City entered into a monetary settlement with Ms. Johnson to settle her claims. Catrina Johnson v. City of Minneapolis, et al., 0:15-cv-02861-JRT-SER (D. Minn 2015).”

“184. The City had notice of a 2018 incident wherein multiple MPD officers used excessive and entirely unjustified force against Rico McKinnies during the course of a traffic stop, after he was handcuffed and not resisting arrest. The City entered into a monetary settlement with Mr. McKinnies for the injuries he sustained therein. Rico McKinnies v. City of Minneapolis, et al., 0:18-cv-02738-NEB-BRT (D. Minn 2018).”

“185. Each of the above-referenced incidents involved more than one officer at the scene and in each of those incidents, the non-participating MPD officers failed to intervene in the unconstitutional use of force against handcuffed, non-resisting citizens.”

“186. In addition to a substantial settlement with the family of David Smith, the City of Minneapolis has been forced to pay significant sums of money for the unlawful deaths caused by its officers.”

“187. In 2019, the City of Minneapolis approved a significant settlement with the family of Justine Ruszczyk, who was shot and killed by a Minneapolis Police Officer.”

“188. In 2019, the City of Minneapolis approved a significant settlement [with] the family of Jamar Clark, who was shot and killed by a Minneapolis Police Officer.”

“189. In 2020, the City of Minneapolis approved a significant settlement with the family of Terrance Franklin, who was shot and killed by a Minneapolis Police Officer.”

“190. While the settlement of the Justine Ruszczyk [claim] was locally billed as transformational, it had no meaningful impact on how the MPD conducts its business.”

“191. The Mayor and City Council receive notice of each lawsuit filed against the City.”

“192. All monetary settlements made by the City must be approved by the Mayor and City Council.”

“193. MPD’s Policy Manual requires that the Chief of Police report to the Mayor each instance of officer misconduct and in accordance with the same, the Chief of Police reported to the Mayor each instance of officer misconduct.”

“Count II—42 U.S.C. sec. 1983-Monell Liability”

“222. MPD’s Policy Manual provides that the Mayor is ‘vested with all the powers of said city connected with and incident to the establishment, maintenance, appointment, removal, discipline, control, and supervision of its police force, subject to the limitations herein contained and the provisions of the Civil Service chapter of this Charter, and may make all needful rules and regulations for the efficiency and discipline, and promulgate and enforce general and special orders for the government of the same, and have the care and custody of all public property connected with the Police Department of the city.’ (MPD Policy Manual Sec. 1-301 (citing City Charter reference-Chapter 6, Section 1)).”

“223. The Mayor, the City Council, and the Police Chief had final policymaking authority with regard to establishing written policies and training programs governing the conduct of MPD officers performing policing functions on behalf of the City.”

“224. The Mayor, the City Council, and the Police Chief established and/or approved of MPD’s written policies and training governing the conduct of MPD officers performing policing functions.”

“225. The written policies and training established and/or approved by The Mayor, the City Council, and the Police Chief constitute the official policy of the City and were the moving force behind and caused Plaintiff’s injuries.”

“226. The City, acting by and through its Mayor and/or other policymakers, had knowledge of MPD’s unconstitutional patterns and practices and knowledge that the same gave rise to a risk of violations of citizens’ federal rights. ”

“227. The City, acting by and through its Mayor and/or other policymakers, made a deliberate and/or conscious decision to disregard the known risk of harm that would result from MPD’s unconstitutional patterns and practices and was deliberately indifferent to and/or tacitly authorized the same.”

“228. On or prior to May 25, 2020, Minneapolis, with deliberate indifference to the rights of arrestees, detainees, and the like, tolerated, permitted, failed to correct, promoted, or ratified a number of customs, patterns, or practices that failed to provide for the safety of arrestees, detainees, and the like during arrest, including but not limited to the handcuffing and restraint process.”

“229. On or prior to May 25, 2020, Minneapolis, with deliberate indifference to the rights of arrestees, detainees, and the like, tolerated, permitted, failed to correct, promoted, or ratified a number of customs, patterns, or practices that condoned and required officers to turn a blind eye to and not intervene with the use of excessive force by MPD officers.”

“230. On or prior to May 25, 2020, Minneapolis, with deliberate indifference to the rights of arrestees, detainees, and the like, tolerated, permitted, failed to correct, promoted, fostered or ratified a number of customs, patterns, or practices that condoned and required officers to treat the members of the Black Community of Minneapolis differently, including but not limited to implementing deadly force at a higher rate against Black men who did not pose a threat to officers.”

“231. On or prior to May 25, 2020, Minneapolis, with deliberate indifference to the rights of arrestees, detainees, and the like, tolerated, permitted, failed to correct, promoted, or ratified a number of customs, patterns, or practices that shall be further identified in discovery.”

“232. Minneapolis, with deliberate indifference to the rights of arrestees, detainees, and the like, continued to employee Chauvin and Thao despite knowledge of their repeated unconstitutional, unlawful, or other improper conduct.”

“233. Minneapolis had to the power to terminate or appropriately discipline Chauvin and Thao for their misconduct prior to May 25, 2020, but failed to do so despite the City’s knowledge of a pattern of complaints regarding excessive force.”

“234. By refusing to terminate Chauvin or Thao, Minneapolis caused Chauvin and Thao to act with impunity and without fear of retribution.”

“235. Minneapolis’ failure to terminate or properly discipline Chauvin or Thao is part of its larger custom, police, or practice of failing to supervise, terminate, or properly discipline its officers for unconstitutional, unlawful, or otherwise improper conduct, and thereby encouraged Chauvin, Thao, and the other Defendant Officers to continue engaging in unlawful acts towards arrestees, including George.”

“236. On or prior to May 25, 2020, Minneapolis, with deliberate indifference to the rights of arrestees, detainees, and the like, tolerated, permitted, failed to correct, promoted, or ratified its agents, including Lt. Bob Kroll, providing improper and harmful training to officers.”

“237. Minneapolis had to the power to terminate or appropriately discipline Kroll prior to May 25, 2020, but failed to do so despite the City’s knowledge of Kroll’s perpetuation of dangerous ideology to officers.”

“238. By refusing to terminate or discipline Kroll or denounce his ideology, Minneapolis caused officers act with impunity and without fear of retribution.”

“239. On or prior to May 25, 2020, Minneapolis, with deliberate indifference to the rights of arrestees, detainees, and the like, participated in contract negotiations with the Police Officers Federation of Minneapolis that granted officers powers that allowed them to avoid discipline for misconduct, including but not limited to:

a. A grievance process that resulted in a nearly 50% rate of overturns of terminations of officers;

b. The ability to review evidence and video footage prior to giving statements in use of force and misconduct matters.”

“240. This participation by the City of Minneapolis caused officers to act with impunity and without fear of retribution.”

“241. The unconstitutional policies, practices, and customs defined herein were the moving force behind George’s death.”

“242. George died as a direct and proximate result of the acts and omissions by Minneapolis.”

“243. As a direct and proximate result of the acts and omissions described herein, George suffered compensatory and special damages as defined under federal common law and in an amount to be determined by jury.”

“244. Plaintiff is entitled to recovery of costs, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.”

“245. The conduct described in all of the preceding paragraphs amount to wrongful acts and omissions for purposes of Minnesota Statute Section 573.02, subdivision 1.”

“246. As a direct and proximate result of these wrongful acts and omissions, George’s next of kin have suffered pecuniary loss, including medical and funeral expenses, loss of aid, counsel, guidance, advice, assistance, protection, and support in an amount to be determined by jury.”

Conclusion

All of the legal references and assertions by the parties, of course, are subject to legal research to determine their current validity in light of any subsequent federal statutes and decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court and lower federal courts, especially by the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota and its direct appellate court (the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit).

As previously noted, Count I of this Complaint against the four ex-officers has been covered in a prior post while Count III against the City will be the subject of a future post.

Now we await the defendants’ responses to this Complaint and other further developments in this civil case and in the criminal cases against the four ex-officers.

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[1] Complaint, Kaarin Nelson Schaffer, as Trustee for the next of kin of GEORGE P. FLOYD, Jr., Deceased v. Derek Chauvin, in his capacity as a Minneapolis police officer; Tou Thao, in his capacity as a Minneapolis police officer; Thomas Lane, in his capacity as a Minneapolis police officer; J. Alexander Kueng, in his capacity as a Minneapolis police officer; and the City of Minneapolis, Case 0:20-cv-01577-SRN-TNL (July 15, 2020).

[2] Count II also includes by reference all of the allegations regarding the four ex-policemen defendants (Complaint, para. 247) that were recited in the post about Count I of the Complaint.

[3] On June 5, 2020, the City of Minneapolis and the Minnesota Department of Human Rights agreed to ban the Minneapolis police from using chokeholds and neck restraints, and on June  that was so ordered by the Hennepin County District Court. (Ban on Police Choke Holds and Neck Restraints in Agreement Between City of Minneapolis and Minnesota Human rights Department, dwkcommentaries.com (June 6, 2020); Court Approves Agreement on Police Conduct Between City of Minneapolis and Minnesota Department of Human Rights (June 9, 2020).)