Important Questions for Judge Kavanaugh’s Confirmation Hearing 

                                                                                                                                        Judge Brett Kavanaugh, President Trump’s nominee for the U.S. Supreme Court, is supposed to be an “originalist” or someone who bases judicial decisions on the “original” meaning of the U.S. Constitution and statutes. The logic of this philosophy is impeccable. The framers of the Constitution and its amendments and the Congress in statutes make the law and judges seek to ascertain their original intent and then apply the original intent to decide cases.

Thus, some of the important questions for his confirmation hearing revolve around this question: how do you attempt to determine what the original intent of constitutional words or phrases is?

Important guidance on this problem is provided by a recent decision by the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland regarding the original meaning of the constitutional word “emolument” and by new searchable databases of various writings from the era of the framers of the Constitution.

The Meaning of the Constitutional Word “Emolument”[1]

On July 25, 2018, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland denied President Trump’s motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint alleging that his “actual or potential receipt, directly or indirectly, of payments by foreign, the federal, and state governments  (or any of their instrumentalities) in connection with his and the Trump Organization’s ownership of the Trump International Hotel in Washington, D.C.” violates the Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clauses of the U.S. Constitution.

The key issue for the court in its 52-page well-reasoned and well-written opinion denying the dismissal motion was the original meaning of the world “emolument” in these two constitutional clauses::

  • The Foreign Emoluments Clause. “And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them [the United States], shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.” (U.S. Const., Art I, sec. 9, cl. 8 (emphasis added).)
  • The Domestic Emolument Clause. “The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or any of them.” (U.S. Const., Art II, sec. 1, cl. 7 (emphasis added).)

After first reviewing the parties’ different interpretations of the text of these clauses, the court’s opinion began “with a strong presumption that the term ‘emolument’ should be interpreted broadly to mean ‘profit,’ ‘gain,’ or ‘advantage,’ essentially covering anything of value.” (P. 22.)

The court then turned to the “Original Public Meaning”  of the word since the Supreme Court has held that as the Constitution was “written to be understood by the voters at the time,” it is important to consider “the meaning of the term ‘emolument’ against the backdrop of what ordinary citizens at the time of the Nation’s founding would have understood it to mean.” (Id.) This analysis reinforced the court’s strong presumption from the text that the term had a broad meaning. Important in this regard for the court were the broad use of that term in the following (id. at 22-30):

  • An “article by Professor John Mikhail of Georgetown University Law Center in which, following exhaustive research, he concluded that “every English dictionary definition of ‘emolument’ from 1604 to 1806” includes Plaintiffs’ broader definition.”[2]
  • Drafters of state constitutions;
  • Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England; and
  • The Framers themselves.

Further support for the court’s conclusion was found in Interpretations of the term by the U.S. Office of Legal Counsel  and Comptroller of the United States.

 The Meaning of the Second Amendment’s Right To “Bear Arms”

The Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states the following: “A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” (Emphasis added.)

The U.S. Supreme Court in  District of Colombia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576-626 (2008) held, 5-4, that the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protected “an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home.” The majority opinion in Heller by Associate Justice Antonin Scalia concluded that the phrase “bear arms” in that amendment “was not limited to the carrying of arms in a militia.” (Id. at 586.)

Disagreement with that conclusion has been voiced by Dennis Baron, Professor of English and Linguistics at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The basis for this conclusion is the result of a search for the term “bear arms” in the following two new databases compiled by the Brigham Young University College of Law:[3]

  • The Corpus of Founding Era American English is composed of 96,615 texts with nearly 144 million words (as of 07/29/18) in documents used, 1760-1799, by ordinary people of the day, the Founders, and legal sources, including letters, diaries, newspapers, non-fiction books, fiction, sermons, speeches, debates, legal cases, and other legal materials.
  • The Corpus of Early Modern English, which is composed of 40,300 texts with nearly 1.3 billion words from 1475-1800.

The search of the first database yielded 281 instances of the phrase “bear arms” while the second search produced 1,572 instances. After eliminating about 350 duplicates, there were about 1,500 separate occurrences of “bear arms” in the 17th and 18th centuries, and only a handful did not refer to “war, soldiering or organized, armed action.” Therefore, Baron concludes, these databases confirm that the natural meaning of “bear arms” in the framers’ day was connected with militias or the military.

According to Baron, further support for this conclusion is found in the fact that the phrase “bear arms” “has never worked comfortably with the language of personal self-defense, hunting or target practice.” Here, Baron referred to this 1995 comment by historian Garry Wills: “One does not bear arms against a rabbit.”

And in 1840, said Baron, in an early right-to-bear-arms case, the Tennessee Supreme Court stated: “A man in the pursuit of deer, elk and buffaloes, might carry his rifle every day, for forty years, and, yet, it would never be said of him, that he had borne arms, much less could it be said, that a private citizen bears arms, because he has a dirk or pistol concealed under his clothes, or a spear in a cane.”

Moreover, Baron pointed out that in the oral arguments  in the Heller case itself, U.S. Solicitor General Paul D. Clement, who was advocating for the invalidity of the District of Colombia gun law, initially said that “bear arms” was meant to carry them outside the home. But he was interrupted by Associate Justice David Souter, who said, “But wait a minute. You’re not saying that if somebody goes hunting deer he is bearing arms, or are you?” Clement responded, “I would say that and so would [James] Madison and so would [Thomas] Jefferson.” But Souter was not persuaded and asked, “In the 18th century, someone going out to hunt a deer would have thought of themselves as bearing arms? I mean, is that the way they talk?” Clement finally retreated with this statement: “Well, I will grant you this, that ‘bear arms’ in its unmodified form is most naturally understood to have a military context.” Obviously the phrase is not modified in the Second Amendment.

New Databases of Written Materials from Framers’ Era

In addition to the previously mentioned databases compiled by the Brigham Young University College of Law, a similar project is being undertaken by a legal historian at the University of Chicago Law School, Alison LaCroix , and a linguist, Jason Merchant, the Lorna Puttkammer Straus Professor, Department of Linguistics and Humanities at the University of Chicago. Their project seeks to utilize the vast collection of historical texts available through Google Books to enable users to study in a more rigorous and sophisticated way how language and meaning have changed. This project, Professor LaCroix, said, “meets originalism on its own terms.”[4]

Questions for Judge Kavanaugh

Therefore, this blogger suggests that at the confirmation hearing, Judge Kavanaugh be asked at least the following questions:

  1. How do you attempt to determine the original meaning or intent of a word or phrase in the U.S. Constitution?
  2. What sources do you use in such attempts?
  3. Do you use computer databases of written materials from the framers’ era?
  4. If so, which ones? Why those? How many texts are in those databases?
  5. If not, why not?
  6. Have you ever used the BYU Law School’s Corpus of Founding Era American English?
  7. If not, why not?
  8. If yes, for what issue? Result?
  9. Have you ever used BYU Law School’s Corpus of Early Modern English?
  10. If not , why not?
  11. If yes, for what issue? Result?
  12. If you were confirmed to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, would you be reluctant to overrule one of its own precedents that, in your judgment, erroneously interpreted the original intent or meaning of a constitutional word or phrase?
  13. If you had been on the Court in the 1950’s, for example, would you have been reluctant to overrule Plessy v. Ferguson?
  14. If you are confirmed, would you be reluctant to overrule the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Second Amendment’s “bear arms” phrase in District of Columbia v. Heller?

=========================================

[1] Order, District of Columbia v. Trump, Case No. 8:17-cv-01596-PJM (D. Md. July 25, 2018); Opinion, District of Columbia v. Trump, Case No. 8:17-cv-01596-PJM (D. Md. July 25, 2018);  LaFraniere, In ruling against Trump, Judge Defines Anticorruption Clauses in Constitution for First Time, N.Y. Times (July 25, 2018); Racine, Frosh & Eisen, Trump’s Emoluments Trap, N.Y. Times (July 26, 2018); Marimow, O’Connell & Fahrenthold, Federal judge allows emoluments case against Trump to proceed, Wash. Post (July 25, 2018); Barbash, Trump’s ‘emoluments’ battle: How a scholar’s search of 200 years of dictionaries helped win a historic ruling, Wash. Post (July 27, 2018); Editorial, The framers worried about corruption. Their words may now haunt the president, Wash. Post (July 27, 2018). The judge in this case, Senior District Judge, Peter J. Messitte, holds a B.A. degree from Amherst College (1963) and a J.D. degree from the University of Chicago Law School (1966), where he was a classmate of this blogger. He was appointed to the District Court by President Clinton in 1993. In 2008 he took senior status, but carried a full caseload through 2011.

[2] Mikhail, Abstract: The Definition of ‘Emolument” in English Language and Legal Dictionaries, 1523-1806 (June 30, 2017).

[3] Baron, Antonin Scalia was wrong about the meaning of ‘bear arms,’  Wash. Post (May 21, 2018); Brigham Young University Law School, Corpus of Founding Era American English; Brigham Young University Law School, Corpus of Early Modern English; Baron, Guns and Grammar: the Linguistics of the Second Amendment.

[4]  Allen, Alison LaCroix Leads New Law and Linguistics Project, Univ. Chicago Law School News (Feb. 2, 2015).

 

 

Spain Ready to Proceed with Case Over the 1989 Killing of Jesuit Priests in El Salvador

For the last nine years, a court in Spain has been trying to obtain the presence of 20 former Salvadoran military officers to face trial on their alleged involvement in the 1989 murders of six Jesuit priests and their housekeeper and her daughter in El Salvador. Recently one of them—Inocente Orlando Montano Morales (“Montano”)—Is about to be sent to Spain for trial.[1]

 Montano

Former Colonel Montano was the deputy minister of Salvadoran Public Security from 1989 to 1992 and since April 2015 has been the subject of a judicial request by the U.S. Department of Justice for his extradition from the U.S. to Spain to face these charges.

On February 4, 2016, a Magistrate Judge in the U.S. District Court for the District Court of the Eastern District of North Carolina, after an evidentiary hearing, granted this request for extradition based upon the following conclusions: the court had personal jurisdiction over Montano; the U.S. and Spain had an extradition treaty; Montano had been charged with extraditable offenses under that treaty (the terrorist murder of five Jesuit priests of Spanish original nationality); and there was probable cause the Montano committed these offenses.[2]

Montano then exercised his only means of appealing that order by filing in April 2016 an application for a writ of habeas corpus in the same court. After briefing and a hearing, a district judge of that court in August 2017, granted the U.S. government’s motion to dismiss the application and dismissed the application.  This was based on the court’s conclusion that this extradition followed accepted practice and did not appear to be infirm; the treaty “provides for the extradition of a defendant charged with murder when committed outside the territory of the requesting nation {Spain]; . . . [its] laws allow for such a prosecution; and the laws of the requested nation [the U.S.] would allow for a prosecution in similar circumstances.”[3]

Montano then appealed this order to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and simultaneously asked the district court for a stay or postponement of his extradition. This was denied by the district court on September 6 after concluding that he has “failed to make a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits [of his appeal]” and “cannot demonstrate that he will suffer irreparable injury in the absence of a stay.” Thereafter simple denials of the request for a stay were entered on September 28 by the Fourth Circuit and on November 15 by U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts.[4]

Undoubtedly important in Chief Justice Roberts’ denial of a stay was the brief in opposition to such a stay that was submitted by the U.S. Solicitor General, the principal attorney for the U.S. in the U.S. Supreme Court. In its first three of 29 pages, before setting forth a detailed review and approval of the lower courts’ actions, that brief set forth the following facts from the record: “Toward the end of that war [between the military –led government and a leftist guerrilla group]– on November 16, 1989—members of the El Salvador Armed Forces . . . murdered six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper, and the housekeeper’s daughter at the Universidad Centroamerica (UCA) in El Salvador. . . . Five of them were Spanish nationals.” Moreover, evidence submitted by the Spanish authorities showed that “in the days leading up to the murders, the . . .  radio station that [Montano] oversaw made threats against the Jesuit priests; that on the day before the murders, [Montano] participated in a meeting at which one of this fellow officers gave the order to kill the priests; that [Montano] provided ‘necessary information’—namely, the location of one of the priests—to those who carried out the murders; and that following the murders, [Montano] attempted to conceal [the Armed Forces] involvement by threatening the wife of a witness.”[5]

The Solicitor General concluded his brief with these comments: “the [U.S.] has a strong interest in having extradition requests resolved without undue delay, both to comply with its treaty obligations and to further its reciprocal interest in having other Nations cooperate swiftly with its own extradition requests and other law enforcement objectives.” Moreover, “Spain is an important partner of the [U.S.] in terrorism and other cases of national importance, and timely compliance with its extradition requests advances the [U.S.’] foreign policy and law enforcement interests.” (Pp. 27-28.)

As a result, Montano is now headed for imminent extradition to Spain. Almudena Bernabéu, an expert from the Center for Justice and Accountability (CJA) and a private prosecutor of the Jesuits case in Spain with her organization Guernica 37, said about four weeks ago the State Department determined that extradition was appropriate. “From that moment, the two countries are ready for delivery and reception of Montano, but they did not want to do it” until he had exhausted all of his U.S. remedies.

Other Former Salvadoran Military Officers

Of the other 19 former Salvadoran military officers charged with this horrible crime, one was convicted of the crime in El Salvador and was re-imprisoned after its Supreme Court invalidated its Amnesty law, one (former Defense Minister Emilio Ponce) is deceased and two others are cooperating with the Spanish prosecutors (Yussy Mendoza and Camilo Hernandez).

These other 15 still live in their home country, but its Supreme Court twice (2012 and 2016) has denied their extradition to Spain.

Manuel Escalante, a human rights lawyer at Jose Simeon Canas Central American University, where the murdered priests lived and worked and were murdered, after learning of the imminent extradition of Montano, called for prosecution of the 14 in El Salvador. He said that a conviction in Spain would be a big step toward “eliminating historical impunity” and that Salvadoran prosecutors must also act to advance the case in the Central American nation. The victims and their defenders “are going to seek justice. We are going to ask for the reopening of the trial.”[6]

The university, however, previously had said it considers the case closed against those who carried out the killings and even has called for clemency for former Col. Guillermo Benavides, who has served four years of a 30-year sentence as the only military official in prison for his role in the crime.

================================================

[1] The charges subsequently were reduced to terrorist murder of the five priests of original Spanish nationality as a result of an amendment to Spain’s statute on universal jurisdiction. The priests, their murders, judicial proceedings about this crime, including the Spanish case, and these extradition proceeding have been discussed in the posts listed in “The Jesuit Priests” section in List of Posts to dwkcommentaries—Topical: EL SALVADOR.

[2]  Certification of Extraditability & Order of Commitment, In re Request by Spain for the Extradition of Montano, Montano v. Elks. No. 2:15-MJ-1021-KS (E.D.N.C. Feb. 5, 2016).

[3] Order, Montano v.  Elks, No. 5-16-HC-2066-BO (E.D.N.C. Aug. 21, 2017).

[4] Order, Montano v.  Elks, No. 5-16-HC-2066-BO (E.D.N.C.. Sept. 6, 2017); Order, Montano v.  Elks, N0. 17-7091 (4th Cir. Sept. 28, 2017); Order, Montano v.  Elks, No. 17A445 (U.S. Sup. Ct. Nov. 15, 2017); Drew, Last hurdle cleared for ex-Salvadoran official’s extradition, Assoc. Press (Nov. 15, 2017); Labrador & Rauda, Colonel Montano to Spain for the  murder of the Jesuits, El Faro (Nov. 15, 2017); Progress in Jesuit murder case on 28th anniversary, El Salvador Perspectives (Nov. 16, 2017); Alonso, The Supreme Court of the United States approves extraditing a Salvadoran ex-military man to Spain for the killing of the six Jesuits, El Pais (Nov. 15, 2017).

[5] Memorandum for the Federal Respondents in Opposition, Montano v. Elks, No. 17A445 (U.S. Sup. Ct. Nov. 8, 2017).

[6] Assoc. Press, El Salvador Jesuits Seek Reopening of Case in 1989 Massacre, N.Y. Times (Nov. 16, 2017); Lafuente, A halo of justice in the killing of the Jesuits in El Salvador, El Pais (Nov. 17, 2017.

Judge Gorsuch Might Be a Liberal Originalist on the Supreme Court

Akhil Reed Amar, a Yale Law School professor and the author of “The Constitution Today: Timeless Lessons for the Issues of Our Era,” argues that not all devotees of “originalism” in interpreting the Constitution and statutes are what are ordinarily called conservatives and that Judge Neil Gorsuch might be a liberal member of this group.[1]

Originalists, the professor says, “believe that faithful constitutional interpreters must build on the solid bedrock of the Constitution’s text, as that text was originally understood when drafted and ratified.” However, he adds, “not all conservatives are originalists, nor are all originalists conservative. Most jurists, most of the time, follow modern judicial precedents rather than pondering first principles of constitutional text and history. Practical considerations also factor into most jurists’ decision making. Originalists are no different in this regard, but they are more apt to dwell on first principles of text and original meaning and to discard precedents violating these first principles.”

A group of “liberal originalist lawyers, the Constitutional Accountability Center, where I serve on the board of directors, has been particularly effective in bringing liberal originalist scholarship to judicial attention. This month, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and four liberal colleagues [in Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado.] strengthened rules against racial animus in jury deliberations” in reliance . . . on the Center’s amicus brief and the historical scholarship it showcased” by another Yale Law School professor.

This case demonstrated that “originalists must honor not just the original understanding of words ratified in 1787-88, but also the letter and spirit of language added by later generations of amenders.”

Amar also noted “the extraordinary body of work of Steven G. Calabresi, who co-founded the conservative Federalist Society in the early 1980s and then clerked for Judge Bork and Justice Scalia. As “perhaps America’s pre-eminent conservative originalist,” [he] has shown that the 14th Amendment was plainly intended to apply the Bill of Rights to the states; that women’s equality was a central theme of that amendment, as originally understood; and that originalism in fact supports a right of same-sex marriage.”

Gorsuch, Amar asserts, “is a brainy and principled jurist” and his “embrace of originalism is honorable and admirable” and, if confirmed as seems likely, “may one day [be regarded] . . . as among the best of the century.”

==============================================

[1] Amar, What Gorsuch Has in Common with Liberals, N.Y. Times (Mar. 18, 2017).

 

 

 

 

George Will’s Embrace of Natural Law

Recently concepts of natural law have re-emerged as relevant to interpretations of the U.S. Constitution. George Will, the prominent political and legal commentator, has done so in at least three Washington Post columns and in a speech at the John C. Danforth Center for Religion and Politics. This post will discuss his views on this subject. A subsequent post will explore those of Judge Neil Gorsuch, the current nominee for Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, whose confirmation hearing starts tomorrow.

Background

Two important instruments of U.S. history are the U.S. Declaration of Independence and the Ninth Amendment to the Constitution. The Declaration states, “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these, are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” The Ninth Amendment, which is part of our Bill of Rights, states: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”[1]

Although I am a retired attorney, I have not attempted to make my own analysis of how the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Ninth Amendment. Instead I rely on my recollection that the Declaration and this Amendment have not been major authorities in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions and Wikipedia’s conclusion that the Court has not used them to further limit government power.

Wikipedia also cites this statement by Justice Scalia in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000): “The Declaration of Independence is not a legal prescription conferring powers upon the courts, and [the Ninth Amendment’s] . . . refusal to ‘deny or disparage’ other rights is far removed from affirming any of them, and even farther removed from authorizing judges to identify what they might be, and to enforce the judges’ list against laws duly enacted by the people.”

George Will’s Discussion of Natural Law

In a Washington Post column{2} Will argued that the Ninth Amendment’s protection of other rights “retained by the people” encompasses “natural law” rights, which are affirmed by these words of the Declaration of Independence:

  • “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness—that to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powered front he consent of the governed.”

Therefore, Will argues, “the Founders’ philosophy is infused into . . . [the Constitution] by construing . . . [the Constitution] as a charter of government that is, in Lincoln’s formulation, dedicated to [the above proposition in that Declaration].” As a result, says Will, “The drama of American democracy derives from the tension between the natural rights of the individual and the constructed right of the majority to make such laws as the majority desires. Natural rights are affirmed by the Declaration and a properly engaged judiciary is duty-bound to declare majority acts invalid when they abridge natural rights.”

“With the Declaration, Americans . . . began asserting rights that are universal because they are natural, meaning necessary for the flourishing of human nature.”

Will in this article does not go on to identify specific natural rights that are so encompassed by the Declaration. Presumably Will would not limit the protections of these words of the Declaration to those who were covered at the time of its proclamation in 1766: white men of property. In any event, his suggestion provides another “originalist” approach to interpreting the Constitution, an approach that is more open-ended than that promulgated by Justice Scalia.

George Will’s Speech at John C. Danforth Center for Religion and Politics

Additional light on George Will’s thoughts about natural law is shed by an adaption of his December 2012 speech at the John C. Danforth Center on Religion and Politics, University of Washington at St. Louis.[3]

He asserts that although he himself is non-religious, he believes that “religion has been, and can still be, supremely important and helpful to the flourishing of our democracy” and that “the idea of natural rights [does not] require a religious foundation, or even that the founders uniformly thought it did. It is, however, indubitably the case that natural rights are especially firmly grounded when they are grounded in religious doctrine.” Moreover, Will believes that the founders, who were not particularly religious themselves, “understood that Christianity, particularly in its post-Reformation ferments, fostered attitudes and aptitudes associated with, and useful to, popular government. Protestantism’s emphasis on the individual’s direct, unmediated relationship with God and the primacy of individual conscience and choice subverted conventions of hierarchical societies in which deference was expected from the many toward the few.”

According to Will, the founders “understood that natural rights could not be asserted, celebrated, and defended unless nature, including human nature, was regarded as a normative rather than a merely contingent fact. This was a view buttressed by the teaching of Biblical religion that nature is not chaos but rather is the replacement of chaos by an order reflecting the mind and will of the Creator. This is the Creator who endows us with natural rights that are inevitable, inalienable, and universal — and hence the foundation of democratic equality. And these rights are the foundation of limited government — government defined by the limited goal of securing those rights so that individuals may flourish in their free and responsible exercise of those rights.”

The U.S. Declaration of Independence asserts that “important political truths are not merely knowable, they are self-evident, meaning they can be known by any mind not clouded by ignorance or superstition. [As it states, “it is self-evidently true that ‘all men are created equal.’ Equal not only in their access to the important political truths, but also in being endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, including life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” [The Declaration goes on to state], ‘[T]o secure these rights, governments are instituted among men.’ Government’s primary purpose is to secure pre-existing rights. Government does not create rights; it does not dispense them.”

“Biblical religion is concerned with asserting and defending the dignity of the individual. Biblical religion teaches that individual dignity is linked to individual responsibility and moral agency. Therefore, Biblical religion should be wary of the consequences of government untethered from the limited (and limiting) purpose of securing natural rights.”

Will’s Obituary for Antonin Scalia

In the obituary Will praised the late Associate Justice Antonin Scalia for his championing the principles of judicial modesty: “textualism and originalism: A justice’s job is to construe the text of the Constitution or of statutes by discerning and accepting the original meaning the words had to those who ratified or wrote them.” Moreover, said Will, Scalia “was a Roman candle of sparkling jurisprudential theories leavened by acerbic witticisms.”[4]

In Will’s opinion, “Democracy’s drama derives from the tension between the natural rights of individuals and the constructed right of the majority to have its way. Natural rights are affirmed by the Declaration of Independence; majority rule, circumscribed and modulated, is constructed by the Constitution.” Moreover, “as the Goldwater Institute’s Timothy Sandefur argues, the Declaration is logically as well as chronologically prior to the Constitution. The latter enables majority rule. It is, however, the judiciary’s duty to prevent majorities from abridging natural rights. After all, it is for the securing of such rights, the Declaration declares, that ‘governments are instituted among men.’”[5]

Will, however, does not attempt to reconcile his praise for Scalia with the Justice’s rejection of the Declaration as important for constitutional analysis.

Will’s Questions for Judge Gorsuch

In another Washington Post column, Will suggested questions to be asked Judge Gorsuch at his confirmation hearings.[6] Here are some of those questions:

  • Is popular sovereignty (majorities rights) or liberty the essence of the American project?
  • Was the purpose of the 14th Amendment’s “privilege and immunities” clause to place certain subjects beyond the reach of majorities?
  • Was the 14th Amendment’s “privilege and immunities” clause’s purpose to ensure that the natural rights of all citizens would be protected from abridgment by their states?
  • Was the Supreme Court wrong in the 1873 Slaughter-House Cases that essentially erased the privileges and immunities clause, holding that it did not secure natural rights (e.g., the right to enter contracts and earn a living)? If so, should it be overruled?
  • Do you agree with Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. who has said the doctrine ofstare decisis — previous court decisions are owed respect — is not an “inexorable command”?
  • Do you agree with the Supreme Court’s division of liberties between those deemed to be fundamental and thus subjecting any restrictions on them to strict scrutiny and all others whose restrictions are subjected only to “rational basis” scrutiny?
  • What, in your opinion, is the role of the Ninth Amendment in constitutional law?
  • Are there limits to Congress’ power over interstate commerce other than those enumerated in the Bill of Rights (the first 10 amendments to the Constitution)?
  • Was the Supreme Court correct in the 2005 Kelo v. City of New London case upholding a city’s seizure of private property not to facilitate construction of a public structure or to cure blight, but for the “public use” of transferring it to a wealthier private interest that would pay more taxes?
  • What limits, if any, are imposed upon Congress’ delegation of powers to administrative agencies by Article I of the Constitution’s provision: “All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress”?
  • Was the Supreme Court correct in Citizens United that Americans do not forfeit their First Amendment rights when they come together in incorporated entities to speak collectively?
  • Is it constitutional for Congress, by regulating political spending, to control the quantity and timing of political speech?
  • Would you feel bound to follow a previous Supreme Court decision that did not evaluate evidence of the original meaning of the Constitution and was, in your view, in conflict with it?

Conclusion

Although I do not generally agree with many of George Will’s political opinions, I think that the linkage of the Ninth Amendment and the Declaration of Independence makes sense and should be explored more fully in future constitutional litigation. However, it is not so easy to make the next step of identifying additional principles of natural law that could impose limits on the federal and state governments.

The Declaration’s statement that human beings are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights is part of that difficulty. First the First Amendment to the Constitution bans the federal government’s establishment of a religion. Second, there are now so many different religions in the world and in the U.S. Although as a Christian I believe that at least all of the major world religions honor peace and hospitality and that they all agree on the Golden Rule: do unto others as you would have them do unto you, I find it difficult see how that leads to principles of natural law that are useful. For example, I find it difficult to see how this linkage leads to the conclusion that the Citizens United case was correctly decided, as Will suggests.

In addition, although I have not studied the underlying sources, I am intrigued by the notion that the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to encompass all natural law rights of U.S. citizens and that the Slaughter-House Cases were wrongly decided.

In any event, we all should thank George Will for proposing interesting questions for Judge Gorsuch in his confirmation hearing. I am reasonably confident that most, if not all, of them will be asked and answered.

========================================

[1] United States Declaration of Independence, Wikipedia;  Ninth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Wikipedia. A prior post discussed the First Congress’ adoption of the Bill of Rights after ratification by the requisite number of states.

[2] Will, Maybe Gorsuch will fill in blanks left by Scalia, Wash. Post (Feb. 1, 2017).

[3] Will, Religion and the American Republic, Nat’l Affairs (Summer 2013). John C. Danforth, an ordained Episcopal priest, was Attorney General of Missouri, 1969-1976, and U.S. Senator for that state, 1976-1995.

[4] Will, In Memoriam: Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia 1936-2016, Wash. Post (Feb. 14, 2016).

[5]  Timothy Sandefur  is Vice President for Litigation at the Goldwater Institute and Adjunct Scholar with the Cato Institute. He also is the author of The Conscience of the Constitution: The Declaration of Independence and the Right to Liberty (2013),  which is a more extensive exposition of Will’s argument that the Declaration and the Ninth Amendment need to be important markers in constitutional analysis and litigation. Moreover, Sandefur argues that the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of 1868 recommitted the U.S. to the primacy of liberty and defined the terms of U.S. citizenship that unfortunately was demolished by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1873 decision in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873).

[6] Will, Questions for Judge Gorsuch, Wash. Post (Mar. 17, 2017).

U.S. First Congress: Creation of Federal Judiciary, 1789

As previously discussed, the First Congress of the United States of America began on March 4, 1789, and ended on March 4, 1791. We now look at its creation of the federal court system in the Judiciary Act of 1789, which was adopted on September 24, 1789.[1]

The Constitution

The backdrop for this legislation was Article III of the Constitution of the U.S.A., which provided the following:

  • Section 1 “The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”
  • Section 2 “The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”
  • “In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.”
  • “The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.”

Judiciary Act of 1789

The previously mentioned Judiciary Act of 1789 had the following key provisions:

  • Section 1. The “supreme court of the United States shall consist of a chief justice and five associate justices . . . .” [The Supreme Court’s cognizance or jurisdiction was established in Section 13.][2]
  • Section 2. The U.S. “shall be, and they hereby are divided into thirteen districts [as defined in that section].[3]
  • Section 3. There shall be “a court called a District Court, in each of the aforesaid districts, to consist of one judge, who shall reside in the district for which he is appointed, and shall be called a District Judge. . . .” [The cognizance or jurisdiction of each of the District Courts was specified in Sections 9 and 10.][4]
  • Section 4. These thirteen districts, except those of Maine and Kentucky, “shall be divided into three circuits, and be called the eastern, the middle and the southern circuit. . . . and that there shall be held annually in each district of said circuits, two courts, which shall be called Circuit Courts, and shall consist of any two justices of the Supreme Court and the district judge of such districts . . . .’ [The cognizance or jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts was specified in Section 11, and certain of their procedures were contained in Section 5.] [5]
  • Section 12 [Procedure for removal of certain cases from state court to federal court.]
  • Sections 6, 8, 14-26, 29-35. [Established rules of procedure for the federal courts.]
  • Section 7 [Supreme Court and District Courts have power to appoint clerks with specification of their duties.]
  • Sections 27-28. [District courts have power to appoint marshals with specification of their duties.]

According to Fergus Bordewich, the author of a leading book about the First Congress, the bill’s primary author was Senator Oliver Ellsworth, a staunch Federalist from Connecticut and an experienced litigator and state court judge. Ellsworth was especially concerned about maritime issues because virtually all of the federal government’s revenues would derive from import duties. Another maritime issue was regulating privately owned raiders by validating captured prizes and ensuring that they did not commit outright piracy. [6]

There was “vigorous debate” about the bill. Some believed that having only six Supreme Court justices was insufficient to combat the state courts; that it would be wrong to allow state courts to have jurisdiction over some federal cases; that there was insufficient federal revenue to support the federal courts; that this judiciary was intended to enrich lawyers; that the federal judges would have too much “inquisitorial power;” that the federal courts should not have the power to invalidate state laws that were believed to conflict with the Constitution or federal laws or treaties. James Madison in the House of Representatives thought the bill was too complicated and too expensive. Some even thought that having two overlapping judicial systems (state and federal) was totally unnecessary.

===================================

[1] U.S. First Congress, 1789-1791: Overview, dwkcommentaries.com (Feb. 15, 2017); Judiciary Act of 1789, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/judiciary_act.asp.

[2] Over the years Congress has passed various acts to change the number of Supreme Court justices from six to a low of five and a high of ten. The Judiciary Act of 1869 fixed the number of Justices at nine and no subsequent change to the number of Justices has occurred. (U.S. Sup. Ct., Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ). https://www.supremecourt.gov/faq.aspx#faqgi

[3] There now are 94 U.S. district courts as some states like New York have more than one such district and as some non-states (e.g., Puerto Rico) have such courts. (U.S. Courts, Court Role and Structure.) http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-and-structure

[4] Most, if not all, of today’s U.S. district courts have more than one judge. Thus, as of May 2012 there were 2,758 such judges.

[5] The U.S. circuit courts have been replaced by 13 U.S. courts of appeal, and as of May 2012 there were 714 judges on these courts. (U.S. Courts, Court Role and Structure.) http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-and-structure

[6] Bordewich, The First Congress at 105-12, 141-43, 159-60 (Simon & Schuster, New York, 2016). http://www.simonandschuster.com/books/The-First-Congress/Fergus-M-Bordewich/9781451691931

Richard and Mildred Loving’s Legal Entanglement with Anti-Miscegenation Laws

Last Saturday I saw the beautiful new movie “Loving,” which tells the true story about the love between Richard Perry Loving, a white man, and Mildred Delores Jeter, a black woman, who were married in June 1958 in the District of Columbia. Soon thereafter they returned to their home in Caroline County, Virginia, where they established their marital abode and where they were criminally prosecuted and convicted for violating the state’s anti-miscegenation laws. They then were sentenced to one year in prison, but with suspension of the imposition of that sentence for 25 years on condition they live outside the state, which they did by returning to the District of Columbia.

Later the movie depicts  their challenge with the aid of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), to the constitutionality of these Virginia statutes with the U.S. Supreme Court eventually ruling in their favor.[1] Below is an actual photograph of the couple and one of the actors (Ruth Negga and Joel Edgerton) who played the couple in the movie.

lovings

loving-movie

 

 

 

 

 

This beautiful movie prompted the following report of the legal details of their entanglement with anti-miscegenation laws.

Legal Proceedings in State Court

Their legal problems started with an October 1958 grand jury indictment charging the couple with violating the following provisions of Virginia’s ban on interracial marriages:

  • “Punishment for marriage. — If any white person intermarry with a colored person, or any colored person intermarry with a white person, he shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by confinement in the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than five years.” (Va. Code § 2-59)
  • “Leaving State to evade law.—If any white person and colored person shall go out of this State, for the purpose of being married, and with the intention of returning, and be married out of it, and afterwards return to and reside in it, cohabiting as man and wife, they shall be punished as provided in § 20-59, and the marriage shall be governed by the same law as if it had been solemnized in this State. The fact of their cohabitation here as man and wife shall be evidence of their marriage.” (Va. Code § 2-58)

On January 6, 1959, the Lovings pleaded guilty to those charges and, as previously mentioned were sentenced to one year in jail, but with suspension of the sentence for a period of 25 years on the condition that the couple leave the State and not return to Virginia together. The trial judge stated in his opinion that:

  • “Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And, but for the interference with his arrangement, there would be no cause for such marriage. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix.”

The Lovings then returned to the District of Columbia, where they established their home for at least the next eight and a half years.

In the meantime, nearly five years after their convictions, on November 6, 1963, with the aid of attorneys from the ACLU, they filed a motion in the Virginia state trial court to vacate the judgment of conviction and set aside the sentence on the ground that the statutes which they had violated were unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

Nearly 15 months later, on January 22, 1965, the state trial judge denied the motion to vacate the sentences, and the Lovings perfected an appeal to the state’s Supreme Court of Appeals.[2]

On March 7, 1966, the seven justices of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals unanimously upheld the constitutionality of the anti-miscegenation statutes and, after modifying the sentence, affirmed the convictions.[3]  The entire opinion was based upon that court’s having upheld the constitutional validity of these statutes in a 1955 case (Naim v. Naim) and concluding that there had not been any change in the law on this issue in the subsequent 11 years. As the Virginia court stated:

  • “Our one and only function in this instance is to determine whether, for sound judicial considerations, the Naim case should be reversed. Today, more than ten years since that decision was handed down by this court, a number of states still have miscegenation statutes and yet there has been no new decision reflecting adversely upon the validity of such statutes. We find no sound judicial reason, therefore, to depart from our holding in the Naim According that decision all of the weight to which it is entitled under the doctrine of stare decisis, we hold it to be binding upon us here and rule that Code, §§ 20-58 and 20-59, under which the defendants were convicted and sentenced, are not violative of the Constitution of Virginia or the Constitution of the United States.”

Proceedings in U.S. Supreme Court

The Lovings appealed this decision to the U.S. Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction on December 12, 1966.[4]

After the attorneys’ briefing and oral arguments, The Supreme Court on June 12, 1967, issued its unanimous decision holding that the Virginia anti-miscegenation statutes were unconstitutional.[5]

In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Earl Warren noted that the two Virginia statutes in question were “part of a comprehensive statutory scheme aimed at prohibiting and punishing interracial marriages,”[6] that they were part of Virginia’s Racial Integrity Act, which was adopted in the “period of extreme nativism” of 1924 and that “[p]enalties for miscegenation arose as an incident of slavery, and have been common in Virginia since the colonial period.” Moreover, the opinion recognized that Virginia then was “one of 16 States which prohibit and punish marriages on the basis of racial classifications.”[7]

After rejecting various arguments advanced by the State of Virginia, the Chief Justice said, “There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies this classification. The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving white persons demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand on their own justification, as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy. We have consistently denied the constitutionality of measures which restrict the rights of citizens on account of race. There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.”

The Court’s opinion also concluded that the Virginia “statutes also deprive the Lovings of liberty without due process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”

“Marriage is one of the “basic civil rights of man,” fundamental to our very existence and survival. . . . To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State’s citizens of liberty without due process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual, and cannot be infringed by the State.”

Conclusion

 From a 2016 perspective, it is difficult for this blogger to believe that only 50 years ago 16 states in the U.S. still had anti-miscegenation laws and were trying to defend their constitutionality. As the movie clearly points out, the Lovings did not have the financial means to mount a challenge to these laws, and the legal assistance of organizations like the ACLU is absolutely necessary for such litigation to be conducted. [8]

While the various phases of the litigation were proceeding over nearly nine years, Mr. and Mrs. Loving had to live with this legal cloud hanging over them that prevented them from living in their native Virginia.

Since the Supreme Court’s decision in this case, the number of interracial marriages in the U.S. has increased from 0.4% in 1960 to 0.7% in 1970, 1.9% in 1980, 2.8% in 1990, 7.0% in 2000 and 10.0% in 2010. The date of the Supreme Court decision (June 12) is now remembered in the U.S. as “Loving Day” and the decision itself was cited as precedent in federal court decisions invalidating restrictions on same-sex marriage.

This case also reminded me of the personal story of Lawrence Hill, the noted Canadian author of “The Book of Negroes” about a young African woman who is kidnapped from her native village and taken by a slave ship to the U.S., where she becomes literate and is hired by the British forces at the end of the American Revolutionary War to create the actual Book of Negroes to register those Negroes who helped the British and who thereby were eligible to evacuate Manhattan with their forces. As discussed in a prior post, Hill’s parents— a black father and a white mother —were U.S. citizens who emigrated to Canada the day after they were married in 1953 in the District of Columbia in order to escape racial discrimination and anti-miscegenation laws. Both of them were involved in the human rights movement, an influence Hill readily acknowledges.

======================================================

[1] Dargis, Review: In ‘Loving,’ They Loved. A Segregated Virginia Did Not Love Them Back, N.Y. Times (Nov. 2, 2016)  The movie is directed by Jeff Nicols and stars Joel Edgerton and Ruth Negga.

[2] The Virginia trial court presumably was pressed finally to issue its decision on the motion to vacate by the Lovings commencing on October 28, 1964, a class action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia requesting that a three-judge court be convened to declare the Virginia anti-miscegenation statutes unconstitutional and to enjoin state officials from enforcing their convictions. On February 11, 1965, the three-judge District Court continued the case to allow the Lovings to present their constitutional claims to the highest state court.

[3] Loving v. Commonwealth,206 Va. 924, 147 S.E.2d 78 (Va. Sup. Ct. 1966) ; Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. Sup. Ct. 1955). remanded, 350 U.S. 891 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1955), aff’d, 197 Va. 734, 90 S.E.2d 849 (Va. Sup. Ct. 1956), appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 985 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1956).

[4] Loving v. Virginia, 385 U.S. 986 (1966).

[5] Loving v. Virginia, 386 U.S. 1 (1967). Mr. Justice Stewart submitted a brief concurring opinion to reiterate his  “belief that ‘it is simply not possible for a state law to be valid under our Constitution which makes the criminality of an act depend upon the race of the actor.’”

[6] Other provisions of the Virginia statutes automatically voided all marriages between “a white person and a colored person” without any judicial proceeding (§ 20-57) and defined “white persons” and “colored persons and Indians” for purposes of the statutory prohibitions (§§ 20-54 and 1-14).

[7] The other states with anti-miscegenation laws were Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and West Virginia. (Justices Upset All Bans On Interracial Marriage, N.Y. Times (June 13, 1967).)

[8] As discussed in an earlier post, I was a pro bono volunteer attorney for the Minnesota ACLU chapter in a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of a Minneapolis Police Department raid and arrests of citizens at a political fundraiser.

 

Conservative Columnist George Will Condemns Donald Trump

This blog recently has discussed the severe criticism of Donald Trump by a Wall Street Journal editor and by other conservatives and Republicans. Another longtime conservative commentator, George Will, also has aggressively condemned Donald Trump, both before and after the latter’s July 21 Republican presidential nomination. Moreover, in June, when Trump was the presumptive nominee, George Will changed his party affiliation from Republican to “unaffiliated” because of Trump.[1]

Here are at least seven of these condemnations by Mr. Will.

Pre- Nomination

1.Donald Trump relishes wrecking the GOP[2]

Trump “boasts of his sexual athleticism, embraces torture and promises to kill terrorists’ families.” He has “ myriad [religious] conversions-of-convenience.” More importantly for Will, Trump has disavowed Will’s conservative milestones by liking the Obamacare mandate and by opposing Social Security reform and reductions.

2. The albatross of a Trump endorsement[3]

 “Trump’s distinctive rhetorical style — think of a drunk with a bullhorn reading aloud James Joyce’s ‘Finnegans Wake’ under water — poses an almost insuperable challenge to people whose painful duty is to try to extract clarity from his effusions.”

“Trump, the thin-skinned tough guy, . . . has neither respect for nor knowledge of the Constitution, and he probably is unaware that he would have to ‘open up’ many Supreme Court First Amendment rulings in order to achieve his aim. . . . [of chilling] free speech, for the comfort of the political class, of which he is now a gaudy ornament.”

Trump, “whose breadth of . . . ignorance is the eighth wonder of the world, actually thinks that judges ‘sign’ bills. Trump is a presidential aspirant who would flunk an eighth-grade civics exam”

3. Do Republicans really think Donald Trump will make a good Supreme Court choice?[4]

Trump is “a stupendously uninformed dilettante who thinks judges ‘sign’ what he refers to as ‘bills.’ There is every reason to think that Trump understands none of the issues pertinent to the Supreme Court’s role in the American regime, and there is no reason to doubt that he would bring to the selection of justices what he brings to all matters — arrogance leavened by frivolousness.”

“Trump’s multiplying Republican apologists do not deny the self-evident — that he is as clueless regarding everything as he is about the nuclear triad.”

4. If Trump is nominated, the COP must keep him out of the White House?[5]

“Donald Trump’s damage to the Republican Party, although already extensive, has barely begun. Republican quislings will multiply, slinking into support of the most anti-conservative presidential aspirant in their party’s history. These collaborationists will render themselves ineligible to participate in the party’s reconstruction.”

“If Trump is nominated, Republicans working to purge him and his manner from public life will reap the considerable satisfaction of preserving the identity of their 162-year-old party while working to see that they forgo only four years of the enjoyment of executive power.”

5. How entangled with Russia is Trump?[6]

After bewailing Trump’s many statements supporting Russia and Putin, Will says it “is unclear whether any political idea leavens the avarice of Trump and some of his accomplices regarding today’s tormented and dangerous Russia. Speculation about the nature and scale of Trump’s financial entanglements with Putin and his associates is justified by Trump’s refusal to release his personal and business tax information. Obviously he is hiding something, and probably more than merely embarrassing evidence that he has vastly exaggerated his net worth and charitableness.”

 Post- Nomination

 6. Trump’s shallowness runs deep [7]

Trump’s “speeches are . .syntactical train wrecks. . . . [He] rarely finishes a sentence. . . . [But maybe] he actually is a sly rascal, cunningly in pursuit of immunity through profusion.

“The nation, however, is . . . [being damaged] by Trump’s success in normalizing post-factual politics. It is being poisoned by the injection into its bloodstream of the cynicism required of those Republicans who persist in pretending that although Trump lies constantly and knows nothing, these blemishes do not disqualify him from being president.”

7. The sinking fantasy that Trump would defend the constitution,[8]

According to Will, “Trump knows nothing about current debates concerning the [Supreme Court’s]. . . proper role.”

Moreover, Trump has erroneous views on what Will regards as “the two most important [Supreme Court] decisions this century.

Trump has criticized Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), which held corporations have a first amendment free speech right to make financial political contributions and which Will favors on the ground that “Americans do not forfeit their free-speech rights when they band together in corporate form to magnify their political advocacy.”

The other case, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), held, 5-4, that a municipal government “behaved constitutionally when it bulldozed a residential neighborhood for the ‘public use’ of transferring the land to a corporation that would pay more taxes than the neighborhood’s residents paid to the government.” For Trump, his “interests as a developer and a big-government authoritarian converge in his enthusiasm for Kelo.” Will, however, thinks this decision “did radical damage to property rights.”

In addition, Will decries President Obama’s use of executive orders, which Trump promises to expand.

Conclusion

Although I disagree with George Will on the various political issues he discusses in these columns, I do endorse his condemnation of Donald Trump’s temperament, judgment and knowledge.

==================================================================

[1] Diaz, George Will: Trump’s judge comments prompted exit from GOP, CNN (June 21, 2016).

[2] Will, Donald Trump relishes wrecking the GOP, Wash. Post (Feb. 21, 2016).

[3] Will, The albatross of a Trump endorsement. Wash. Post (Feb. 28. 2016).

[4] Will, Do Republicans really think Donald Trump will make a good Supreme Court choice, Wash. Post ( March 18, 2016).

[5] Will, If Trump is nominated, the GOP must keep him out of the White House, Wash. Post (April 29, 2016).

[6] Will, How entangled with Russia is Trump?, Wash. Post (July 29, 2016).

[7] Will, Trump’s shallowness runs deep, Wash. Post (Aug. 3, 2016).

[8] Will, The sinking fantasy that Trump would defend the constitution, Wash. Post (Aug. 5, 2016).