Aiding and Abetting Second Degree Murder

Defendant Kueng Moves for Dismissal and Change of Venue in George Floyd Case

On August 27, J. Alexander Kueng, a former Minneapolis police officer, submitted a motion to dismiss the criminal complaint against him and to change the venue of the case from Hennepin County to a county with “appropriate facilities and demographics,” such as Stearns County. [1]

Motion To Dismiss [2]

Most of the eight-page dismissal motion was a legal memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss for alleged lack of probable cause for the charges of aiding and abetting second degree murder and second-degree manslaughter. Its statement of facts purports to be taken from the criminal complaint.

No Aiding and Abetting Second-Degree Murder. “The restraint used on Floyd by Chauvin was reasonable. As the complaint notes, officers are trained on how to use the neck restraint involved here. Moreover, the restraint has been found to be reasonable when the subject “actively resists,” citing Lombardo v. City of St. Louis, 956 F.2d 1009, 1013 (8th Cir. 2020).

Although the complaint does not say Floyd resisted, its description of his actions “show he resisted. He resisted and fell to the ground when Lane and Kueng tried to pick him up off the sidewalk. . . . Floyd would not voluntarily get into the squad [car]. Multiple officers tried to get him into the squad , and when Floyd continued to resist, Chauvin pulled Floyd onto the ground. Floyd continued to resist by calling out while he was on the ground. Given Floyd’s resistance, the use of neck restraint was reasonable.”

“[T]here is no evidence that Kueng knew Chauvin was going to commit a crime at the time and during the time Chauvin utilized the neck restraint. [Twice Chauvin rejected Lane’s suggestion of rolling Floyd onto his stomach, showing Chauvin did not consider his use of force to be unreasonable.] There is no evidence that Kueng knew Chauvin was going to commit or was committing a third-degree assault” or that “Kueng intended his presence to further a crime.”

No Aiding and Abetting Second-Degree Manslaughter. “Chauvin’s actions were not objective gross negligence. He used a technique that he was trained to use and that the Eighth circuit has found to be reasonable.” Nor was Chauvin’s conduct subjectively reckless. Moreover, the “complaint does not establish that Kueng knew Chauvin was going to negligently commit a crime or that he did so or that “Kueng intended his presence to further the commission of a negligent act.”

Motion To Change Venue [i3]

Kueng also moved for a change of venue from Hennepin County to another county “outside the seven-county metro area, such as Stearns County or another county with appropriate facilities and demographics.”

This motion was based upon “’potentially’ prejudicial material that has been disseminated publicly by the prosecution, creating a reasonable likelihood that a fair trial in the metro area cannot be had.” It also asserts that there have been over 1,700 local articles about these criminal cases.

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[1] Xiong, Former officer in George Floyd case seeks change of venue, dismissal of charges, StarTribune (Aug. 27, 2020).

[2] Notice of Motion and Motion To Dismiss for Lack of Probable Cause, State v. Kueng, Court File No. 27-CR-20-12953 (Hennepin County District Court August 27, 2020). Kueng also submitted a Notice of Additional Evidence regarding (a) Floyd’s May 6, 2019, Minneapolis arrest for sale and possession of large quantities of controlled substances and his immediate medical intervention at Hennepin County Medical Center; and (b) his August 9, 2007, Texas arrest and subsequent conviction for Aggravated Robbery with a Deadly Weapon. (Notice of Additional Evidence,, State v. Kueng, Court File No. 27-CR-20-12953 (Hennepin County District Court August 27, 2020).

[3] Notice of Motion and Motion To Change Venue, State v. Kueng, Court File No. 27-CR-20-12953 (Hennepin County District Court August 27, 2020).

Prosecution Opposes Defendant Thao’s Dismissal Motion for George Floyd Killing

Defendant Tou Thao has been charged with the crimes of aiding and abetting the murder and manslaughter of George Floyd, and on July 29, his attorney moved for dismissal of these charges.[1] On August 24, the prosecution responded to this motion.[2]

A prior post discussed Thao’s arguments for dismissal.[3] Now we look at the prosecution’s counter arguments.

Probable Cause That Thao Aided and Abetted Chauvin’s Committing Second-Degree Unintentional Murder[4]

“Minnesota law provides that a person is guilty of second-degree unintentional murder if he ‘causes the death of a human being, without intent to effect the death of any person, while committing or attempting to commit a felony offense other than criminal sexual conduct in the first or second degree with force or violence or a drive-by shooting.’ Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 2(1). “ (Prosecution Brief at 19.)

Here the other felony offense is third degree assault, which is “(i) an assault, defined as ‘the intentional infliction of or attempt to inflict bodily harm’ upon the victim; and (ii) the infliction of ‘substantial bodily harm’ upon the victim, defined as ‘bodily injury which involves a temporary but substantial disfigurement, or which causes a temporary but substantial loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or which causes a fracture of any bodily member.’” (Id. at 19-20.)

There is probable cause that Chauvin committed this crime: George Floyd died, per the Hennepin County Medical Examiner, as a result of “cardiopulmonary arrest complicating law enforcement subdual, restraint, and neck compression.” “Chauvin’s actions—pressing his knee into Floyd’s neck for approximately nine minutes”—inflicted “substantial bodily harm” on Floyd, was done intentionally and was a ‘substantial causal factor’ in the death. (Id. at 21-22.)

For “aiding and abetting” criminal liability for this crime, the defendant must be one who ‘intentionally aids, advises, hires, counsels, or conspires with or otherwise procures the other to commit the crime.’ (Minn. Stat. sec. 609.05 , subd. 1.” This requires the defendant to know that the other persons “were going to [commit] or were committing a crime” although such knowledge can arise “at the time of the acts or presence amounting to aid . . .[while the other persons are] in the process of committing the offense.” (Id. at 20-22.)

Here there is probable cause that Thao knew Chauvin was intentionally committing an assault on Floyd by hearing Floyd’s repeated “I can’t breathe” messages, Chauvin’s dismissive acknowledgements that he had heard those pleas, and the desperate similar comments from bystanders and later by Thao’s learning that Floyd had lost consciousness and by Thao’s understanding that Chauvin’s restraints were contrary to MPD policy. (Id. at 23-26.)

There also is probable cause that Thao aided Chauvin’s restraint of Floyd. Thao suggested that the other officers should continue to pin Floyd to the pavement when they rejected the idea of using a Hobble device to restrain Floyd. Thao prevented bystanders from intervening to assist Floyd, and the Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Parker, 164 N.W.2d 633, 644 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1969) recognized that the “lookout—” someone who stands watch nearby and helps to prevent others from interfering with the crime—is “classic example” of an aider and abettor. Thao also opposed the idea of using a Hobble device because it would be less convenient for all of the officers. (Prosecution Brief at 26-29.)

Probable Cause That Thao Aided and Abetted Chauvin’s Second-Degree Manslaughter[5]

A person guilty of second-degree manslaughter under Minnesota law is a “person who causes the death of another . . . by the person’s culpable negligence whereby the person creates an unreasonable risk and consciously takes chances of causing death or great bodily harm to another.” (Minn. State. 609.205(1).) (Id. at 33.) The previously cited grounds for Chauvin’s second-degree murder charge also establish his second-degree manslaughter charge. (Prosecution Brief at 32-36.)

Those same previously cited factual allegations also support that Thao meets the standards for aiding and abetting.

Conclusion

This blogger is perplexed that both the prosecution’s oppositions to the dismissal motions of Thao and Thomas Lane fail to mention that the MPD Policy and Procedure Manual in effect on May 25^th has an express duty to intervene provision that states: “A. Sworn employees have an obligation to protect the public and other employees. B. It shall be the duty of every sworn employee present at any scene where physical force is being applied to either stop or attempt to stop another sworn employee when force is being inappropriately applied or is no longer required.”[6]

Now we wait to see whether Thao will submit a reply to the prosecution’s opposition to his dismissal motion and the September 11 court hearing on this and other matters.

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[1] Ex-Officer Thao Moves for Dismissal of Criminal Charges for George Floyd Killing, dwkcommentaries.com (July 30, 2020); Notice of Motion and Motion To Dismiss, State v. Thao, Court file No. 27-CR-20-1249 (Hennepin County District Court July 29, 2020); Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, State v. Thao, Court file No. 27-CR-20-1249 (Hennepin County District Court Aug. 5, 2020).

[2] Xiong, Former officer who held back crowd at George Floyd death should face trial, prosecutors argue, StarTribune (Aug. 24, 2020); Assoc. Press, Prosecutors Depict Ex-Officer as Complicit in Floyd’s Death, N.Y. Times (Aug. 25, 2020); State’s Response Opposing Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss for Lack of Probable Cause, State v. Thao, Court file No. 27-CR-20-1249 (Hennepin County District Court Aug. 24, 2020); Affidavit of Matthew Frank, State v. Thao, Court file No. 27-CR-20-1249 (Hennepin County District Court Aug. 24, 2020).

[3] Defendant Thao’s Dismissal Motion, dwkcommentaries.com (Aug. 25, 2020).

[4] Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss (n. 1), at 9-12.

[5] Id. at 5-6.

[6] Ex. 1 (Minneapolis Police Department’s Policy and Procedure Manual, sec. 5-303.01) in Attachments to Frank Affidavit (8/24/20), State v. Thao, Court file No. 27-CR-20-1249 (Hennepin County District Court Aug. 24, 2020).

Defendant Thao’s Dismissal Motion

This post will discuss Thao’s arguments for dismissal, and a subsequent post will look at the prosecution’s counter arguments.

No Probable Cause That Chauvin Committed a Crime[3]

Under Minn. Stat. sec. 609.06, subd. 1, a police officer is immune when using reasonable force to effect a lawful arrest. Here, “Floyd became agitated and resisted [arrest] in both active and passive manners.” Therefore, Chauvin used “reasonable force” to effect a lawful arrest by administering a non-deadly MPD-approved neck restraint, either a “Conscious Neck Restraint” or an “Unconscious Neck Restraint.”

Therefore, Thao cannot be held criminally liable for aiding and abetting a non-crime.

No Probable Cause That Thao Had the Mens Rea for Aiding and Abetting[4]

The prosecution has failed to show probable cause that “Thao (1) knew Chauvin and others [Lane and Kueng] were going to commit a crime and (2) intended his presence to further the commission of that crime.” On the contrary, Thao saw the other three officers using force authorized by MPD policy.

No Probable Cause That Thao Aided The Others’ Committing a Crime[5]

The prosecution failed even to allege what Thao did that amounted to aiding and abetting his fellow officers in committing a crime. Moreover, “mere presence at the crime scene alone is not sufficient” . . .[for this purpose] because inaction, knowledge or passive acquiescence does not rise to the level of criminal culpability.” (State v. Pendleton, 759 N.W.2d 900 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 2009); State v. Huber, 877 N.W.2d 519, 525 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 2016); State v. Ostrem, 535 N.W.2d 916, 924 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1995); State v. Ulvinen, 313 N.W.2d 425 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1981).)

Here, “Thao spent the time during the arrest of Mr. Floyd focused on keeping the civilian bystanders out of the scene to allow the other three officers to effectuate the legal arrest and to turn Mr. Floyd over to responding medical personnel. Officer Thao did nothing to aid in the commission of a crime.”

Conclusion

On August 24, Thao’s attorney submitted a motion to compel disclosure of (1) the complete Hennepin County Medical Examiner’s Office file; (2) the reports and autopsies performed by Dr. Michael Baden; (3) the reports and autopsy performed by Dr. Allecia Wilson; and (4) the Office of the Armed Forces Medical examiner entire file.” Thao also moved to “continue the issue of causation of death from the September 11, 2020 Omnibus hearing date to a date to be scheduled.” [6]

The next post we will examine the prosecution’s responses to this motions for dismissal and disclosure. Then we wait to see if Thao will submit a reply to the prosecution’s arguments and the September 11 court hearing on this and other matters.

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[1] Ex-Officer Thao Moves for Dismissal of Criminal Charges for George Floyd Killing, dwkcommentaries.com (July 30, 2020), Notice of Motion and Motion To Dismiss, State v. Thao, Court file No. 27-CR-20-1249 (Hennepin County District Court July 29, 2020); Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, State v. Thao, Court file No. 27-CR-20-1249 (Hennepin County District Court Aug. 5, 2020).

[3] Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss (n. 1), at 9-12.

[4] Id. at 5-6.

[5] Id. at 6-9.

[6] [Thao’s] Motion To Compel Disclosure, State v. Thao, Court File No. 27-CR-20-1249 (Hennepin County District Court Aug. 24, 2020).

Lane’s Reply to Prosecution’s Opposition to Dismissal of Criminal Complaint

On July 7, the attorney for defendant Thomas Lane filed a motion to dismiss the criminal complaint against him.[1] On August 10 the prosecution filed its papers opposing that motion.[2] On August 17, Lane’s attorney submitted his reply to the State’s Response.[3]

As noted ,the first two sets of papers have been covered in prior posts. This post will review Mr. Lane’s reply papers.

Legal Standard for Aiding and Abetting Criminal Liability

Both sides necessarily are agreed that the standard for aiding and abetting criminal liability starts with the Minnesota statute on the subject—Minn. Stat. sec. 609.05 (Liability for Crimes of Another), which is derived from legislation adopted in 1963, 1986 and 1991. Its Subdivision 1 states as follows:

“A person is criminally liable for a crime committed by another if the person intentionally aids, advises, hires, counsels, or conspires with or otherwise procures the other to commit the crime.”

According to Mr. Lane’s attorney, the “seminal” Minnesota Supreme Court case on this provision is State v. Ulvinen, 313 N.W.2d 425 (1981)(en banc), which reversed a conviction of a mother for aiding and abetting her son’s first degree murder of his wife.

According to the Supreme Court, the son told the police that on the morning of the murder he told his mother, “I’m going to have to choke. . . [his wife] tonight and I’ll have to dispose of her body so that it will never be found.” In response his mother weeped and said, “it will be for the best.” Later that same day, the son told his mother, “Mom, tonight’s got to be the night.” She replied, as she had on other similar occasions, “Oh, you’re just kidding me. I’m not certain, that it would be the best for the kids.”

The mother was asleep when the son committed the murder and she did not participate in his dismemberment of the body. Afterwards that same night she “came upstairs to intercept the children, should they awake, and prevent them from going into the bathroom. She cooperated with her son by cleaning some items from the bathroom and corroborating David’s story to prevent anyone from finding out about the murder.”

Said the en banc Supreme Court, “ these subsequent actions do not succeed in transforming her behavior prior to the crime to active instigation and encouragement. Minn.Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1 (1980) implies a high level of activity on the part of an aider and abettor in the form of conduct that encourages another to act. Use of terms such as ‘aids,’ ‘advises,’ and ‘conspires’ requires something more of a person than mere inaction to impose liability as a principal.” (Lane’s Reply at 13; emphasis added.)

In addition, said the Court, the above statute “imposes liability for actions which affect the principal, encouraging him to take a course of action which he might not otherwise have taken. The state has not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of anything but passive approval. However morally reprehensible it may be to fail to warn someone of their impending death, our statutes do not make such an omission a criminal offense.” In so concluding, the Court said the mother “did not offer advice on how to kill his wife, nor offer to help him. She did not plan when to accomplish the act or tell her son what to do to avoid being caught. She was told by her son that he intended to kill his wife that night and responded in a way which, while not discouraging him, did not aid, advise, or counsel him to act as he did.”

Lane’s attorney also asserted that the above holding of Ulvinin was followed by at least the following subsequent Minnesota Supreme Court cases: (1) State v, Mahkuk, 367 N.W.2d 675, 683 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 2007)(reversal of conviction for aiding and abetting two murder counts because trial court’s jury instruction did not require the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant knew that a crime was going to be committed and intended his presence to encourage or further the crimes); (2) State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 804 (Minn. Sup Ct. 2012) (affirmance of conviction of first-degree felony murder and attempted first degree felony murder; defendant failed to show that his substantial rights were affected by the trial court’s plain error in failing to instruct the jury that “intentionally aiding” was required for accomplice liability); (3) State v. Bahtuoh, 840 N.W.2d 804, 812-13 (Minn. Sup Ct. 2013) (affirmance of conviction for accomplice liability for first degree felony murder; the “intentionally aids” requirement has ‘two and necessary principles: . . .that the defendant knew that his alleged accomplices are going to commit a crime’ and . . . that the defendant ‘intended his presence or actions to further the commission of that crime;’”[4] State v. McCallister, 862 N.W.2d 49 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 2015)(affirmance of conviction for aiding and abetting first degree murder and first degree felony murder); (5) State v. Huber, 877 N.W.2d 519, 524 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 2016))(reversal and remand of conviction for intentionally aiding another in committing second degree murder and second degree felony murder on the ground that the instructions on accomplice liability were plainly erroneous; such an instruction “must explain that to be criminally liable for the crimes of another, the State must prove that the defendant ‘knew his alleged accomplice was going to commit a crime and the defendant intended his presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.’”

Lane’s reply also cites a number of decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which includes Minnesota., but since it is unlikely that any of them concern the Minnesota statute for accessory liability, it should not be necessary to analyze these cases.

Additional Factual Allegations about George Floyd

Lane’s reply contains nine-plus pages reciting additional “facts” about Mr. Floyd that his attorney recently has discovered. Since these “facts” were not known at the police’s May 25^th fatal encounter with Mr. Floyd, it is difficult to see how they relate to the complaint for alleged aiding and abetting and if admissible at trial would go to the jury’s weighing all of the evidence.

Conclusion

The Prosecution’s papers opposing the dismissal motion, for this retired attorney without criminal law experience, seem weak on this key requirement for the aiding and abetting charges against Lane.

This blogger invites anyone who has a more thorough analysis of the issues on Lane’s dismissal motion to add them in comments to this post.

Now we await the September 11 hearing on this motion and other matters in the four criminal cases over the killing of George Floyd.

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[1] Ex-Officer Lane Moves for Dismissal of Criminal Charges for George Floyd Killing, dwkcommentareis.com July 9, 2020); Notice of Motion and Motion To Dismiss, State v. Lane, Court file No. 27-CR-20-12951 (Hennepin County District Court July 7, 2020); Memorandum Supporting Motion To Dismiss, State v. Lane, Court file No. 27-CR-20-12951 (Hennepin County District Court July 7, 2020).

[2] State’s Response Opposing Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss for Lack of Probable Cause, State v. Lane, Court file No. 27-CR-20-12951 (Hennepin County District Court Aug. 10, 2020); Affidavit of Matthew Frank, State v. Lane, Court file No. 27-CR-20-12951 (Hennepin County District Court Aug. 10, 2020).

[3] Defendant’s Reply to the State’s Response to His Motion To Dismiss, State v. Lane, Court file No. 27-CR-20-12951 (Hennepin County District Court Aug. 17, 2020); Browning & Xiong, Lawyer for former officer charged as accomplice in killing of George Floyd says he ‘did nothing wrong,’ StarTribune (Aug. 18, 2020); Xiong, Audio of investigators questioning officer [Lane] in George Floyd killing released, StarTribune (Aug. 18, 2020); Read, Attorney for Minneapolis police officer says he’ll argue George Floyd died of an overdose and a heart condition, Los Angeles Times (Aug. 20, 2020).

[4] The Prosecution says that Bahtuoh suggests that Ulvinen’s requirement for a “high level of activity” by an alleged accomplice” is no longer the law. In the opinion of this blogger, however, this is a misreading of Bahtuoh, which merely states,”A jury may infer the requisite state of mind [of an accessory] from a variety of facts, including presence at the scene of the crime, a close association with the principal offender before and after the crime, a lack of objection or surprise under the circumstances, and flight from the scene of the crime with the principal offender.” (Prosecution’s Opposition at n.16, p. 25; emphasis added.)

Prosecution Opposes Lane’s Motion To Dismiss Criminal Complaint

As noted in a prior post, on July 7, the attorney for defendant Thomas Lane filed a motion to dismiss the criminal complaint against him.[1] On August 10 the prosecution filed its papers opposing that motion.[2] On August 17, Lane’s attorney submitted his reply to the State’s Response.[3]

The court hearing on this motion and other matters in the four criminal cases about the arrest and killing of George Floyd will be held on September 11.

Here is a summary of the prosecution’s legal and factual arguments opposing the dismissal motion that are set forth in the documents listed in the second footnote. Lane’s arguments for the motion are set forth in the papers listed in the first footnote, and a subsequent post will review Lane’s reply thereto.

The Evidence for the Dismissal Motion

Evidence regarding Lane and Defendant J. Alexander Kueng: Transcript of Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) Interview of Lane (Lane Ex. 1); Transcript of Lane body worn camera (BWC) (Lane Ex. 2); Lane’s BWC footage (Lane Ex. 3); Transcript of Kueng BWC footage (Lane Ex. 4; Keung’s BWC footage (Lane Ex. 5).[4]

Evidence regarding Defendant Tou Tao: Tao’s BWC video (State Ex. 1); Recording of BCA interview of Tao (State Ex. 2).

Other evidence: Pictures of money in Floyd vehicle (Lane Ex. 6); Minneapolis Police Department training materials (Lane Ex. 7); MPD Policy and Procedure Manual (pertinent portion in effect at time of Floyd’s death) (State Ex. 3); Hennepin County Medical Examiner’s Office’s Autopsy Report (State Ex. 4); Hennepin County Medical Examiner’s Press Release Report (State Ex. 5). and Armed Forces Medical Examiner’s Autopsy Report (State Ex. 6).

Legal Standard for Dismissal Motions[5]

Citing State v. Florence, 239 NW2d 892 (Mn Sup. Ct. 1976) and other Minnesota cases, the Prosecution states, “Probable cause exists if ‘the facts would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to hold an honest and strong suspicion that the person under consideration is guilty of a crime.’” “So long as the evidence ‘brings the charge against the prisoner within reasonable probability,’ the motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause must be denied.”

Moreover, for dismissal motions, “’[i]t is not necessary for the state to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ . . . This rule reflects the strong public interest in having adjudications of guilt and innocence take place before a jury, drawn from the community, after the extensive adversarial testing of a criminal trial.” In evaluating such a dismissal motion, “the court must examine the ‘entire record, including reliable hearsay, . . . the complaint, police reports, the statements of witnesses and the representations of the prosecutor, who is an officer of the court.’” Moreover, “the court must ‘view the evidence and all of the resulting inferences in favor of the State’ and then determine ‘whether the evidence is sufficient to present a fact question for the jury’s determination.’”

The Charge of Lane’s Aiding and Abetting Second-Degree Unintentional Murder

The Legal Standards for Aiding and Abetting Second-Degree Murder[6]

There are three elements of this crime in this case. First, Chauvin must have caused “the death of a human being [George Floyd] without intent to effect the death of any person, while committing or attempting to commit a felony offense [with certain irrelevant exceptions] on that person. Second, the other felony offense here is “third-degree assault,” which is Chauvin’s alleged “intentional infliction of or attempt to inflict substantial bodily harm” upon another person [George Floyd] and “the infliction of ‘substantial bodily harm” upon that other person. Third, Lane allegedly intended “his presence or actions to further the commission of that crime,” which includes “acquiring that knowledge while the accomplice is in the process of committing the offense” and that knowledge may be established by “circumstantial evidence.”

Probable Cause for Lane’s Alleged Aiding and Abetting Second-Degree Murder?[7]

The State must establish that Chauvin committed second-degree unintentional murder of Floyd by intentionally committing or attempting to commit a felonious assault on Floyd and that Lane intentionally aided that assault. These requirements are satisfied here because Lane acquired the requisite knowledge while Chauvin was in in the process of committing the assault and Lane intended his actions to further the commission of that crime.

Without challenge from Lane, the evidence establishes that Floyd died, that Chauvin’s conduct was “a substantial causal factor’ in his death, that Chauvin intentionally inflicted bodily harm on Floyd and that Chauvin’s actions inflicted “substantial bodily harm” on Floyd.

In addition, there is evidence that Lane knew Chauvin was intentionally inflicting substantial bodily harm on Floyd by hearing him say “I can’t breathe” at least 20 times and he feared he would die at least 10 times. This conclusion was emphasized when Floyd lost consciousness. Indeed, Lane’s twice suggesting that Floyd be turned on his side demonstrates his knowledge of this bodily harm. Then Lane later told the medics that Floyd was “not responsive.”

Lane’s police training reinforces his knowledge that Chauvin was applying unlawful force with his neck restraint.

Lane obviously intended to assist Chauvin by using his hands and knees to help pin down Floyd’s legs during the restraint. Lane’s actions also show that he was hearing bystanders’ comments about Floyd’s condition.

The “’severity of the crime at issue’—a nonviolent property crime”– would justify a jury’s concluding that the physical restraint of Floyd from its inception was not reasonably justified. Moreover, the length of the restraint would also justify a jury’s concluding that even if the restraint initially was justified, it later became unjustified. In addition, the nature of Floyd’s alleged resistance did not support the officers application of a neck restraint.

Lane’s having been on his “fourth day on the job “is not a legal excuse for what he did do and not do that day. Minneapolis Police Department policy states. “It shall be the duty of every sworn employee [that includes Lane] present at any scene where physical force is being applied to either stop or attempt to stop another sworn employee when force is being inappropriately applied or is no longer required.” And Lane was not an untrained rookie. He “was hired 15 months before the incident and then spent five months receiving skills training at a technical college, four months in the Minneapolis Police Academy, and four and a half months doing field training with other officers.”

Under Minn. Stat. sec. 609.05, subd. 3, Lane could escape aiding and abetting liability if he “abandon[ed] the crime or made a “reasonable effort” to prevent it before it happened, but there is no evidence to support such a defense.

At least “one autopsy report found evidence of asphyxiation while another concluded that “law enforcement subdual, restraint, and neck compression” was a cause of Floyd’s death.

At best, Lane’s arguments raise fact questions for resolution by the jury.

The Charge of Lane’s Aiding and Abetting Second-Degree Manslaughter[8]

The legal standard for aiding and abetting liability already have been discussed and why there at least is a jury question as to whether Lane meets that standard.

Manslaughter in the Second Degree is defined in Minn. Stat. sec. 609.205(1): “A person who causes the death of another . . . by the person’s culpable negligence whereby the person creates an unreasonable risk, and consciously takes chances of causing death or great bodily harm to another.” “Great bodily harm,” in turn, is defined as “bodily injury which creates a high probability of death, or which causes serious permanent disfigurement, or which causes a permanent or protracted loss of impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” Thus, this crime “requires proof of (i) ‘objective gross negligence on the part of the actor’; and (ii) “subjective ‘recklessness in the form of an actual conscious disregard of the risk created by the conduct.’”

Here, in accordance with Minnesota cases, evidence supports a finding that “Lane knew that Chauvin’s conduct was a ‘gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable’ officer would observe in that situation” and that “Lane knew that Chauvin was consciously disregarding the risk of death created by his conduct.”

Conclusion

Further details of the prosecution’s opposition to Lane’s dismissal motion can be found in the 36 pages of the State’s Response Opposing Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss for Lack of Probable Cause cited in note 2.

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[4] Summaries of the transcripts of the Lane and Kueng BWC footage and the BCA interview of Lane are contained in Ex-Officer Lane Moves for Dismissal of Criminal Charges for George Floyd Killing, dwkcommentareis.com July 9, 2020).

[5] State’s Response at 16-17.

[6] Id. at 18-20.

[7] Id. at 21-30.

[8] Id. at 31-35.

The Criminal Complaints Against the Other Three Policeman Involved in George Floyd’s Death

As is now well known, four Minneapolis policemen were involved in the May 25^th death of George Floyd.

On May 29^th and June 3^rd criminal charges were filed against Derek Chauvin, the one who placed his knee against Floyd’s neck; the later superseding pleading set forth charges of second and third degree murder and second degree manslaughter, all as discussed in a prior post.

Also on June 3rd Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison filed criminal charges against the other three policemen who were involved—Thomas K. Lane, J.A. Kueng and Tou Thao: aiding and abetting second degree murder and second degree manslaughter.[1]

In announcing these new charges and the additional charge against Chauvin, Ellison said the cases were still under investigation and encouraged anyone with additional evidence to come forward and cooperate. “We are following the path of all evidence, wherever it leads. We are investigating as quickly as we can, because speed is important. We are also investigating as thoroughly as we can, because thoroughness is also important — and thoroughness takes time.”

“[Such] thoroughness is important because every link in the prosecutorial chain needs to be strong. It needs to be strong because trying this case will be hard. Winning a conviction will be hard. I say that not because I doubt our resources or abilities or resolve, but because history shows that trying and winning a case like this one is hard.“[2]

At their initial hearing in June bail for each of the three officers was set at $1 million (without conditions) and $750,000 (with conditions), and on June 10 Lane posted bail of $750,000 and was released from jail.[3]

Here we will examine and analyze the specific allegations of these charges against the other three policemen.

Criminal Charges Against the Other Officers

All three face the same two Counts:

Count I. Aiding and Abetting Second Degree Murder (Unintentional While Committing a Felony)(Minn. Stat. 609.19.2(1) with reference to 609.05.1. “That on or about May 25, 2020, in Hennepin County, Minnesota, [Lane/Kueng/Thao] intentionally aided, advised, hired, counseled, or conspired with or otherwise procured the other to commit the crime, namely causing the death of a human being, George Floyd, without intent to effect the death of any person, while committing or attempting to commit a felony offense other than criminal sexual conduct in the first or second degree with force or violence or a drive-by shooting, namely assault in the third degree.”

Count II. Aiding and Abetting Second Degree Manslaughter (Culpable Negligence Creating Unreasonable Risk) (Minn. Stata. 609.205(1) with reference to 609.05.01. “That on or about May 25, 2020, in Hennepin County, [Lane/Kueng/Thao] intentionally aided, advised, hired, counseled, or conspired with or otherwise procured the other to commit the crime, namely caused the death of another, George Floyd, by his culpable negligence, creating an unreasonable risk and consciously took the chances of causing death or great bodily harm to another, George Floyd.”

The three complaints also contained the following essentially identical Statement of Probable Cause (except where indicated, Lane, Kueng and Thao had unique passages). These three Statements of Probable Cause also are the same, in many respects, as the Statement of Probable Cause in the Chauvin complaints):

“On May 25, 2020, someone called 911 and reported that a man bought merchandise from a Cup Foods at 3759 Chicago Avenue in Minneapolis, Hennepin County, Minnesota with counterfeit $20 bill. At 8:08 p.m. Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) Officers Thomas Lane . . . and J.A. Kueng . . . arrived with their bodyworn cameras (BWCs) activated and running. The officers learned from store personnel that the man who passed the counterfeit $20 was parked in a car around the corner from the store on 38th Street.”
“BWC video obtained by the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension shows that the Officers approached the car, Lane on the driver’s side and Kueng on the passenger side. Three people were in the car; George Floyd was in the driver’s seat, a known adult male was in the passenger seat and a known adult female in the backseat. As [Lane] began speaking with Mr. Floyd, [Lane] pulled his gun out and pointed it at Mr. Floyd’s open window and directed Mr. Floyd to show his hands. When Mr. Floyd put his hands on the steering wheel, [Lane] put his gun back in its holster.”
“While [Kueng] was speaking with the front seat passenger, [Lane] ordered Mr. Floyd out of the car, put his hands on Mr. Floyd and pulled him out of the car. [Lane] handcuffed Mr. Floyd.”
“Once handcuffed, Mr. Floyd walked with [Lane] to the sidewalk and sat on the ground at [Lane’s] direction. When Mr. Floyd sat down he said, “thank you man” and was calm. In a conversation that lasted just under two minutes, [Lane] asked Mr. Floyd for his name and identification. [Lane] asked Mr. Floyd if he was “on anything” and noted there was foam at the edges of his mouth. [Lane] explained that he was arresting Mr. Floyd for passing counterfeit currency.”
“At 8:14 p.m., . . . [Kueng] and [Lane] stood Mr. Floyd up and attempted to walk Mr. Floyd to their squad car. As the officers tried to put Mr. Floyd in their squad car, Mr. Floyd stiffened up and fell to the ground. Mr. Floyd told the officers he was not resisting but he did not want to get in the back seat and was claustrophobic.”
“MPD Officers Derek Chauvin and Tou Thao then arrived in a separate squad car.”
“[Lane] together with the other officers made several attempts to get Mr. Floyd in the backseat of their squad car by pushing him from the driver’s side. As the officers were trying to force Mr. Floyd in the backseat, Mr. Floyd repeatedly said that he could not breathe. Mr. Floyd did not voluntarily sit in the backseat and the officers physically struggled to try to get him in the backseat.”
“Officer Chauvin went to the passenger side and tried to get Mr. Floyd into the car from that side and [Lane] and [Kueng] assisted.”
“Officer Chauvin pulled Mr. Floyd out of the passenger side of the squad car at 8:19:38 p.m. and Mr. Floyd went to the ground face down and still handcuffed. [Kueng] held Mr. Floyd’s back and [Lane] held his legs. Officer Chauvin placed his left knee in the area of Mr. Floyd’s head and neck. Mr. Floyd said, ‘I can’t breathe’ multiple times and repeatedly said ‘Mama’ and ‘please,’ as well. At one point, Mr. Floyd said ‘I’m about to die.’ Officer Chauvin and the other two officers stayed in their positions.”
[Only in Thao Complaint: “[Thao] initially obtained a hobble restraint from the squad car to restrain Mr. Floyd in that manner, but the officers chose not to use it and maintained their positions. During this time [Thao] looked directly at how Chauvin was restraining Mr. Floyd with Chauvin’s knee on Mr. Floyd’s neck area, and observed that the three officers had Mr. Floyd subdued in this manner. [Thao] then became concerned about a number of citizens who had gathered and were watching the officers subdue Mr. Floyd, and potential traffic concerns, and so {Thao] stood between those citizens and the three officers restraining Mr. Floyd. When one citizen stepped off the curb, imploring Chauvin to get off of Mr. Floyd, [Thao] put his hands on the citizen to keep him back.”
“One of the officers said, ‘You are talking fine’ to Mr. Floyd as he continued to move back and forth. [Lane] asked, ‘should we roll him on his side?’ and Officer Chauvin said, ‘No, staying put where we got him.’ [Lane] said, ‘I am worried about excited delirium or whatever.’ Officer Chauvin said, ‘That’s why we have him on his stomach.’ Officer Chauvin and Kueng held Mr. Floyd’s right hand up.”[Only in Lane Complaint: “Despite his comments, [Lane] took no actions to assist Mr. Floyd, to change his position, or to reduce the force the officers were using against Mr. Floyd.”] [Only in Kueng Complaint: “[Kueng] was in between Chauvin and Lane and in a position to hear their comments.”] Officer Chauvin and [Keung] held Mr. Floyd’s right hand up. None of the three officers moved from their positions.”
“While Mr. Floyd showed slight movements, his movements and sounds decreased until at 8:24:24, Mr. Floyd stopped moving. At 8:25:31 the video appears to show Mr. Floyd ceasing to breathe or speak. [Lane] said, ‘want to roll him on his side.’ [Keung] checked Mr. Floyd’s right wrist for a pulse and said, ‘I couldn’t find one.’ None of the officers moved from their positions.”
“At 8:27:24, Officer Chauvin removed his knee from Mr. Floyd’s neck. An ambulance and emergency medical personnel arrived, the officers placed Mr. Floyd on a gurney, and the ambulance left the scene. Mr. Floyd was pronounced dead at Hennepin County Medical Center.”
“The Hennepin County Medical Examiner (ME) conducted Mr. Floyd’s autopsy on May 26, 2020. While the ME did not observe physical findings supportive of mechanical asphyxia, the ME opines that Mr. Floyd died from cardiopulmonary arrest while being restrained by law enforcement officers. The autopsy revealed that Mr. Floyd had arteriosclerotic and hypertensive heart disease, and toxicology testing revealed the presence of fentanyl and evidence of recent methamphetamine use. The ME opined that the effects of the officers’ restraint of Mr. Floyd, his underlying health conditions, and the presence of the drugs contributed to his death. The ME listed the cause of death as ‘ [c]ardiopulmonary arrest complicating law enforcement subdural, restraint, and neck compression,’ and concluded the manner of death was homicide.”[4]
Officer Chauvin, [Lane and Kueng] subdued Mr. Floyd prone to the ground in this manner for nearly 9 minutes. During this time, Mr. Floyd repeatedly stated he could not breathe and his physical condition continued to deteriorate such that force was no longer necessary to control him. Officer Chauvin had his knee on Mr. Floyd’s neck for 8 minutes and 46 seconds in total. Two minutes and 53 seconds of this was after Mr. Floyd was non-responsive. Police are trained that this type of restraint with a subject in a prone position is inherently dangerous. Officer Chauvin’s restraint of Mr. Floyd in this manner for a prolonged period was a substantial causal factor in Mr. Floyd’s losing consciousness, constituting substantial bodily harm, and Mr. Floyd’s death as well.”

Analysis of the Complaints Against the Other Three Officers

The predicate for all counts against the other three officers is a finding of Chauvin’s being guilty of second degree murder and/or second degree manslaughter that were analyzed in a prior post.

Under that scenario, the most direct statutory provision for the other policemen is the following: “A person is criminally liable for a crime committed by another if the person intentionally aids, advises, hires, counsels, or conspires with or otherwise procures the other to commit the crime.” (Minn. Stat. section 609.05, subd. 1.)(emphasis added).)

Here, there can be no claim that any of these three officers advised, hired, counseled or conspired with or otherwise procured Chauvin to use his knee to restrain Mr. Floyd on the ground for such a long period of time. Thus, the issue for these three officers is whether each of them aided Chauvin in some way to do so.

Since Lane and Kueng physically helped Chauvin in pinning Mr. Floyd to the pavement, they were clearly ‘intentionally aiding” Chauvin in pinning Mr. Floyd.

In addition, the two of them along with Thao failed to intervene to stop Chauvin from his pinning of Mr. Floyd. This raises the issue of whether the word “aids” includes failure to intervene to stop the commission of the crime of second degree murder or second degree manslaughter. Legal research should examine that issue under cases in Minnesota and other states.

This statutory provision about aiding and abetting is buttressed by the Minneapolis Police Department’s Manual, which under the heading “Duty To Intervene” states: “ Sworn employees have an obligation to protect the public and other employees.” (Manual sec. 5-303.01(A).) And “It shall be the duty of every sworn employee present at any scene where physical force is being applied to either stop or attempt to stop another sworn employee when force is being inappropriately applied or is no longer required.” (Manual sec. 5-303.01(B).)

The Statement of Probable Cause clearly states that these three officers were in close proximity to Chauvin’s pressing his knee against Floyd’s neck, observed that action and Floyd’s reactions, heard Floyd’s saying he could not breathe and had the opportunity to intervene and stop the pressing of Floyd’s neck, but failed to do so.. Indeed, after Floyd stopped moving, they had three more minutes to intervene and stop the pressing of the neck before Chauvin did so himself, but none of the three intervened to stop that action. And after Floyd stopped breathing, they all had nearly two minutes (113 seconds) to intervene, but again did not do so. Lane came closest to doing so when he twice suggested that Floyd be turned over, but then he and the others did nothing further after Chauvin rejected the suggestion. And Officer Kueng could not find a pulse, but then he and the others did not intervene to stop Chauvin’s action in the following near two minutes (113 seconds) of that conduct.

Conclusion

These criminal charges against the other three policemen, according to Christy E. Lopez, a professor at Georgetown Law School and a former attorney in the U.S. Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division, are “appropriate, but difficult.” It would be good for the public . . . [and] in the best interest of police.” However, “Social science tells us that intervening to prevent wrongdoing in the middle of a tense incident is far more difficult than we recognize. Notwithstanding the legal duty, there are inhibitors to intervention that most officers will be unable to overcome in the moment unless they have been prepared in advance.”[5]

Lopez adds, “Progressive police agencies and reform advocates have long recognized the importance of officer intervention. Indeed, police have a legal “duty to intervene,” and the Minneapolis Police Department changed its force policy in 2016 to require officers to intervene if they witness another officer using excessive force. The Minnesota attorney general’s Working Group Report on Police-Involved Deadly Force Encounters, released this year, similarly recommended that all law enforcement officers in Minnesota be required to intervene to prevent unreasonable force.”

Such a change, she says, requires training of the police. But “creating a police culture of peer intervention requires more than training. It requires agency reinforcement at every level, and accountability for officers who fail to intervene when they clearly should have — as, again, the video of Floyd’s death depicts.”

The difficulties of one policeman’s intervening to stop another’s abuse are illustrated by a Buffalo New York female officer’s 2016 intervention to stop a white officer’s choking a handcuffed black protester. The white officer then accused her of jimping on him as he struggled for control and prevailed in an arbitration that led to her being fired. Since then she has been pursuing a lawsuit for reinstatement and passage of a new state law for protection of those who intervene.[6]

At the initial hearing for these three officers, the attorneys for Lane and Keung argued how could new cops like their clients tell or order Chauvin, a policeman with at least 19 years of experience, to stop pressing his knee against Floyd’s neck. Moreover, their lawyers did not mention what may well be true, that there is a culture of policemen backing up each other, and if you intervene and develop a reputation within the police force of being someone who cannot be trusted, then you will not be able to get timely backup when you need it.[7]

This conflict has emerged in other ways.

Immediately after the killing and before the firing of the four police officers involved in this case, Minneapolis Police Federation President Lt. Bob Kroll stated, ““Now is not the time to rush to judgment and immediately condemn our officers. We ask that the community remain calm and the investigation be completed in full.” And on June 1, Kroll said he was working with the union’s attorneys to help the four fired officers get their jobs back because they were “terminated without due process” while devoting most of his comments to criticizing the city’s handling of resulting riots and making policemen “scapegoats” for the violence.[8]

In addition, the bringing of these criminal charges and the associated protests against the Minneapolis police have caused seven of those officers to resign while another half dozen are in the process of leaving. “Morale has sunk to new lows in recent weeks, say department insiders, as officers reported feeling misunderstood and squeezed by all sides: by the state probe; by protesters, who hurled bricks and epithets their way; by city leaders, who surrendered a police station that later burned on national television, and by the media. Numerous officers and protesters were injured the rioting.”9]

Others at the Police Department have responded differently.[10]

The Minneapolis Police Chief, Medaria Arrandondo, immediately “condemned and fired the four officers involved. He visited the location where Floyd was killed. He spoke directly to Floyd’s family members on national television. He pledged to cooperate with the state’s probe into his department’s practices and make ‘substantive policy changes.’”

On June 11, 14 Minneapolis police officers wrote an open letter to Minneapolis citizens and everyone else. Claiming to speak on behalf of “the vast majority” of their colleagues, the letter’s signatories– Cmdr. Charlie Adams, who now runs its community engagement efforts; Lt. Mark Klukow, who now works in the First Precinct in downtown Minneapolis; Lt. Rick Zimmerman, who runs the homicide unit; Sgt. Darcy Klund, who commands the First Precinct community response team; John Delmonico, the former head of the police union; and others– said the following:

“We wholeheartedly condemn Derek Chauvin. We Are With You in the denouncement of Derek Chauvin’s actions on Memorial Day, 2020. Like us, Derek Chauvin took an oath to hold the sanctity of life most precious. Derek Chauvin failed as a human and stripped George Floyd of his dignity and life. This is not who we are.”
“We Are With You and want to communicate a sentiment that is broad within our ranks. We ask that our voices be heard. We are leaders, formal and informal, and from all ranks within the Minneapolis Police Department. We’re not the union or the administration. We are officers who represent the voices of hundreds of other Minneapolis Police Officers. Hundreds. We acknowledge that Chief Arradondo needs each of us to dutifully follow him while he shows us the way. We stand ready to listen and embrace the calls for change, reform and rebuilding.”