On November 12, Amnesty International reiterated its demand that Cuba release José Daniel Ferrer, the leader of Patriotic Union of Cuba (UNPACU).
Its release stated he “has been in detention for 40 days, since Oct 1, for reasons still unknown. As far as we can ascertain, he has not been informed of the charges against him or brought before a judge. In addition, recent alarming reports suggest he may have been tortured or ill-treated while in detention, something Amnesty International has not been able to independently verify in a context where lawyers and the judiciary are largely controlled by the Executive. Mass mobilization is needed to ensure that the Cuban government presents charges against him or release him, and refrains from potentially taking actions that may amount to ill-treatment against him.”
This blog has reported Ferrer’s recent arrest and detention and subsequent developments.
 U.S. Imposes New Sanctions on Cuba and Denounces Cuba’s Detention of Dissident, dwkcommentaries.com (Oct. 19, 2019). In addition, these comments have been added to that post: Cuban Court Denies Habeas Corpus for Ferrer (Oct. 21, 2019); Ferrer’s Family Released from Detention (Oct. 26, 2019); More Pressure for Release of Ferrer (Oct. 31, 2019); Cuban Attorneys Say Cuban Regime Frequently Forcibly Disappears Its Citizens (Nov. 2, 2019); No Cuban Government Report on Status of Ferrer (Nov. 2, 2019); Washington Post Editorial Calls for Cuba To Release Ferrer (Nov. 9, 2019); Cuba Allegedly Using Venezuelan Torture Technique on Ferrer (Nov. 11. 2019).
This year Cameroon’s human rights record is a subject of its third Universal Periodic Review (UPR) by the U.N. Human Rights Council in Geneva, Switzerland. A prior post reviewed the nature of the UPR process. Now we look at the pre-hearing papers for this UPR while future posts will cover the May 16 UPR hearing and then the results of the UPR.
Cameroon’s Third UPR Pre-Hearing Papers
Prior to the May 16, 2018, hearing on Cameroon’s UPR, the following materials have been translated from their original language into five other languages and made available on the Council’s website: (a) Cameroon’s National Report to the Council; (b) the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights’ Compilation of U.N. Information on Cameroon; and (c) the Council’s Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review’s Summary of Stakeholders’ submissions on Cameroon.
In the section “Implementation of recommendations from previous cycles,” it discussed ratification of various international human rights instruments, including the following: (a) persons charged with the crime of genocide under the Code of Military Justice “shall be tried by the military courts;” (b) the instruments for the ratification of the Optional Protocol to the [Torture convention] are being deposited; (c) the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance has been signed and is in process of ratification.
Paragraph 66 states, “the 2016/17 school year has been subject to some disruptions in the North-West and South-West regions occasioned by the actions taken by a number of trade unions, including teachers’ unions.” (Emphasis added.)
Paragraph 98 states, “Efforts to ensure access to justice have included the continuation of mobile court hearings in areas where there are no established courts to speak of.” (Emphasis added.)
Paragraph 112, it stated, “The realization of human rights in Cameroon is a work in progress, as security and economic constraints still limit their enforcement in certain areas. . . . In October 2017, there were around 236,000 internally displaced persons and 332,000 refugees scattered throughout the East, Adamaoua and Far North Regions of Cameroon. (Emphasis added.)
Paragraph 113 stated, “The social crisis in the North-West and South-West Regions, which was triggered in late 2016 by the mobilization of a number of teachers’ and lawyers’ unions, has also interfered with the enforcement of certain human rights.” (Emphasis added.)
Paragraph 115 states, “Dialogue, the obligation to preserve the integrity of the national territory, its people and their property, as well as to promote conciliation, have shaped the response to the aforementioned social crisis. If the crisis is to be resolved, all persons must show good will in working to live together more harmoniously. To this end, in addition to the steps taken to address the demands made by these unions, the institutional framework has been enhanced by the establishment of the National Commission for the Promotion of Bilingualism and Multiculturalism (annex 16).” (Emphasis added.)
Paragraph 116 states, “increased support in the fight against terrorism and a more equal sharing of the burden of caring for refugees and managing internally displaced populations are being requested, as is increased support for national efforts to consolidate social harmony.” (Emphases added.)
This report summarized comments about Cameroon from various U.N. agencies, including the following comments relating to the Francophone-Anglophone disputes:
“In November 2017, several special procedure mandate holders warned the Government of Cameroon to engage with representatives of the anglophone population in a meaningful political dialogue and halt renewed violence in the south-west and north-west, where the country’s anglophone minority was reportedly suffering worsening human rights violations. They urged the Government to adopt all necessary measures consistent with Cameroon’s human rights obligations to end the cycle of violence. Up to 17 people had reportedly been killed and dozens wounded and arrested in demonstrations in the country’s anglophone regions since 1 October 2017. The special procedure mandate holders were disturbed by reports of a series of measures taken by the national authorities, including curfews, a ban on public meetings, and other restrictions aimed at preventing peaceful protests. Excessive use of force by the security services, injuries, mass arrests, arbitrary detentions, torture and other ill-treatment had been reported.” (Para. 22; emphasis added.)
“The special procedure mandate holders asked the Government to take effective measures to prosecute and sanction all those responsible for such violations. The appeal for . . . action came nearly a year after other United Nations human rights experts publicly urged the Government to halt violence against the anglophone minority, following reports that anglophone protesters in Buea and Bamenda had suffered undue force. The special procedure mandate holders also denounced any use of violence against members of the security forces, after reports that several had been killed. Since December 2016, the special procedure mandate holders have repeatedly raised concerns directly with the Government of Cameroon, and continue to monitor and seek clarification of the alleged human rights violations in the north-west and south-west of the country.” (Para. 23; emphases added.)
“The Human Rights Committee raised its concern at the alleged existence of secret detention facilities that were not subject to oversight of any kind.” (Para. 26.)
“The Committee against Torture recommended that Cameroon put an end to the practice of incommunicado detention and ensure that no one is detained in secret or unauthorized places, including unlisted military detention centers. Cameroon should investigate the existence of such places and detainees should be released or transferred to official places of detention.” (Para. 27.)
“The Committee against Torture stressed that the State should ensure that all allegations of excessive use of force, extrajudicial executions, ill-treatment and arbitrary arrest by State officials during or after the demonstrations in the anglophone region are the subject of an impartial investigation, that those responsible are prosecuted and, if found guilty, punished, and that victims obtain redress.” (Para. 28; emphasis added.)
“The Committee against Torture requested Cameroon to put in place, as soon as possible, a programme to protect witnesses and victims of torture. (Para. 29; emphasis added.)
“The Human Rights Committee urged Cameroon to lift any unnecessary restrictions on the freedom of assembly and the freedom to demonstrate, in particular for members of the country’s English-speaking minority.” (Para. 33; emphasis added.)
“UNESCO noted that Cameroon had suspended Internet services in the country’s Northwest and Southwest regions after a series of protests that had resulted in violence and the arrest of community leaders.” (Para. 37; emphasis added.)
Sharp criticisms of Cameroon from various groups were registered in 54 paragraphs. The following focused on human rights violations against Cameroonian Anglophones.
“Southern Cameroons Public Affairs Committee indicated that the Anglophone minority suffered a policy of ongoing discrimination, including the prohibition of the use of their language in daily public life. It further noted that discrimination has been used in various sectors including education, employment and access to justice. It recommended ending discrimination and the harassment of Anglophones and adopting an antidiscrimination legislation and policy.” (Para. 10; emphasis added.)
“Plateforme EPU noted the adverse consequences that the crisis in the Englishspeaking parts of the country has had on the economy, in particular because of the shutdown of Internet access for several months.” Para. 15; emphasis added.)
“JS2 noted that the anti-terrorism legislation allowed for Cameroonian to be charged in military courts and to face death penalty if their sponsored terrorism, which contravenes the right to a fair trial. JS2 was concerned by the lack of impartiality and independence of the military courts as well as the vague definition of terrorism. It recommended revising the anti-terrorism bill in accordance with international human rights obligations. Amnesty International raised similar concerns and urged Cameroon to provide a definition of terrorism in line with international human rights standards and to limit the use of the military courts.” (Para. 18; emphasis added.)
“JS4 expressed concern about the increase in the number of death sentences being handed down by Cameroonian courts, especially in the northern part of the country.JS4 criticized the vague, general laws on terrorism, which are used as grounds for arresting defenders of the rights of the English-speaking minority.JS4 noted that persons on death row in Cameroon are denied their rights and are subjected to inhuman treatment and torture. JS4 recommended that Cameroon should take all necessary steps to amend the counter-terrorism law of 2014 and the Penal Code of 2016 to eliminate the death penalty. JS4 also recommended that the authorities should ensure that the rights of persons sentenced to death are respected, in particular by ensuring that proceedings are conducted transparently and that defendants are assisted by counsel.” (Para. 19; emphasis added.)
“The Southern Cameroons Public Affairs Committee reported that security forces have been using excessive force toward citizens, including torture and harass, and arbitrary arrested and detained incommunicado for prolonged periods without trial. It recommended ending all use of arbitrary arrest and detention of citizens, and use of torture or other cruel treatment. It further urged that Cameroon investigate into allegations, and prosecute those responsible for the violence against Anglophones.” (Para. 20; emphases added.)
“JS2 noted that many persons were arbitrary arrested and held in horrific conditions following the riots in the English-speaking regions of country. JS2 urged Cameroon to work with the judicial system to ensure detention periods are not excessive, subject the conduct of arrests to strict conditions and to ensure that national criminal legislation on arrest is compatible with international human rights standards.” (Para. 23; emphasis added.)
“Plateforme EPU pointed out that some individuals are still being held illegally in prisons in the wake of the crisis in the English-speaking parts of the country.” (Para. 24; emphasis added.)
“SCAPAC indicated that English language was excluded in courts and that Anglophones have been deprived of access to justice and an effective justice remedy. SCAPAC further noted that many Anglophone detainees are not informed of the charged for which they were accused. (Para. 26; emphases added.)
“JS7 noted that in 2017, the government ordered the suspension of internet services in the Northwest and Southwest Anglophone regions of Cameroon, following the protest against the dominance of French language in Cameroon. It recommended that Cameroon refrain from shutting down internet communication, take actions to adopt a law on access to information and further implement legal safeguards to prevent unlawful surveillance.” (Para. 28; emphasis added.)
“JS2 and JS5 noted that Cameroon continues to show high levels of intolerance towards human rights defenders who are critical of the government, especially in the context of the Anglophone crisis.” (Para. 31; emphasis added.)
“Amnesty International noted that Cameroon have continued to restrict the rights to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly, in particular during the protests in the Anglophone regions.” (Para. 32; emphasis added.)
“The Committee to protect journalist (CPJ) regretted that criminal defamation legislation against journalist continues to exist in Cameroon. CPJ noted that Cameroon is using the anti-terror law to prosecute journalist in military court, in particular since the unrest in English-speaking regions. It was concerned by the overly broad provisions of the law and the potential abuse of political opponents and the right to freedom of expression.” (Para. 33; emphasis added.)
“SCAPAC noted that Cameroon has taken measures to exclude Anglophones from participation in government and employment in the public servicesand to shut down the internet in the South in violation to the right to free speech and access to information. It recommended to release journalists and to ensure a favorable climate for the activities of human rights defender. The Law Society of England and Wales found it regrettable that the anti-terrorism law is used to bring proceeding against human rights defenders. It recommended that Cameroon should respect the rights to freedom of association and assembly and provide human rights defenders the protection required to carry out their functions. Plateforme EPU made the same observations on the counter-terrorism law and expressed concern about the law’s adverse effects on freedom of expression.” (Para. 35; emphasis added.)
“CPJ also noted that Cameroon led an internet shutdown in the English-speaking regions and suspended broadcast permission for several Medias. It recommended Cameroon to ensure an environment conducive to press freedom by revising the antiterrorism law and decriminalizing defamation. It further recommended that Cameroon ensure that arrests and detention comply with international human rights law and to maintain internet access across the entire country.” (Para. 36; emphasis added.)
“In the context of the government’s response to the Anglophone crisis, Front Line Defenders reported the deteriorating environment for the activities of human rights defenders in Cameroon. It also noted that human rights defenders were victims of threats, intimidation, smear campaigns and physical attacks.87It regretted the adoption of the antiterrorism law, which further increase the chance for human rights activist to be charged in military courts and to face the death penalty. It also noted the continued violation of freedom of assembly. Front Line Defenders urged Cameroon to review and amend the 2014 anti-terrorism law to ensure that its provisions are not used to restrict freedom of expression or association and to take actions to put an end to the arbitrary arrest and detention of human rights defenders. It further recommended that Cameroon guarantee the exercise of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and a safe environment for human rights defenders by ending the harassment against human rights defenders and bringing perpetrators to justice. Plateforme EPU made the same observations concerning infringements of freedom of expression and of the rights of human rights defenders.” (Para. 37; emphases added.)
“The Southern Cameroons Public Affairs Committee further indicated that Anglophones have been marginalized and assimilated in the sphere of education. It recommended to protect linguistic heritage of the Anglophones and ensure that education is adapted to their cultural heritage.” (Para. 44; emphasis added.)
The following advance questions were submitted by other Council members:
1.Does Cameroon plan to sign and ratify the UN human rights conventions to which it is not yet party?
2.Does the Cameroonian Government plan to ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the APIC or align its national legislation with the Rome Statute?
3.In the previous UPR, Belgium recommended that Cameroon investigate cases of police violence against persons because of their actual or perceived sexual orientation. What measures has the Cameroon authorities taken in this regard?
4. How does the Cameroonian government guarantee freedom of expression on the Internet in all parts of the country?
5. Does the Cameroonian government intend to continue the de facto moratorium on the execution of the death penalty, including the application of the anti-terrorism law?
6. What measures is the Government of Cameroon taking to put an end to the escalation of violence, arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment of State agents in the English-speaking areas of the country, and to ensure that after an independent investigation and impartial, those responsible are prosecuted and victims get redress? (Emphasis added.)
1.The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) has expressed concern about the persistence of gender-based violence. What efforts is Cameroon planning to make to address this situation and improve the socio-cultural status of women?
2.What measures is Cameroon taking to protect children from sexual exploitation, violence, and early or forced marriages?
1.In the past, repeated allegations for violating human rights have been made against the security forces of Cameroon. How does the government ensure that human rights standards are met by the police and the military? (Emphasis added.)
2.What position does the Cameroonian government have towards international criminal law? Will there be any steps to ratify the Rome Statute in the near future?
3.The humanitarian situation in Cameroonian prisons has worsened in recent years due to progressive overcrowding. What measures is the Cameroonian government planning to improve in the short and medium term?
1.What steps has Cameroon taken to ratify the Rome Statute in its 2010 version?
2.What steps has Cameroon taken to join the Code of Conduct regarding Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, as elaborated by the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group (ACT)?
1.Does Cameroon plan to sign and ratify the UN human rights conventions to which it is not yet party?
2.Has the State under review established a “national mechanism for implementation, reporting and follow-up” covering UPR recommendations, but also recommendations / observations made by the Treaty Organs? Human Rights, Special Procedures and relevant regional mechanisms? If so, could the State under review briefly share its experience in establishing such a mechanism, including difficulties encountered and lessons learned, as well as plans or needs for strengthening the mechanism in the future?
1.With regard to our recommendation from the 2nd cycle of the UPR on the elimination of female genital mutilation, we would like to request information on the efforts taken by the government in this regard.
2.When will the government establish the minimum age for marriage as 18 for both girls and boys?
of G.B. & N. I
1.What steps has the government of Cameroon taken to complete an investigation into security forces’ handling of peaceful student protest at the University of Buea on 29 November 2016, to hold to account those responsible and to support victims? (Emphasis added.)
2.What steps will the government of Cameroon take to address human trafficking, particularly of young women, for forced labor and sexual exploitation?
3.What steps is the government of Cameroon taking to ensure fair trials for Anglophone detainees and separatist leaders extradited from Nigeria who have been held incommunicado since January this year? (Emphasis added.)
4.What steps is the government taking to promote freedom of expression, including improving access to information and ensuring a free media.
This blogger’s Cameroonian friends have emphasized that their Francophone brothers and sisters constitute roughly two-thirds of the population and control the central government; that Francophone teachers who do not know the English language are being sent into schools in the Anglophone areas of the country and forcing students to take examinations in the French language which they do not know; that Francophone judges who do not know the English language and the laws of the Anglophone areas are also being sent into these areas and deciding cases under French-language laws; and that the central government’s military forces are being sent into Anglophone areas and destroying villages and crops, thereby forcing those individuals to flee into nearby cities.
As a result, this post has emphasized the allegations of human rights violations being suffered by the Anglophones.
Future posts will examine the hearing and the final report.
On October 14, the U.S. and Cuba met in Havana for another discussion of human rights.
According to Cuba’s Deputy Director General for Multilateral Affairs and International Law, Pedro Luis Pedroso Cuesta, Cuba “defended the universality, indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights,” including social and cultural rights. Cuba also emphasized “the need to develop this exchange with full respect for the sovereign equality, independence and non-interference in the internal affairs of the parties.”
He also said Cuba had demonstrated its commitment to the protection of human rights by ratifying 44 of the 61 international human rights treaties instruments whereas the U.S. had ratified only 18 of these instruments.
He then delivered the following indictment of the U.S. record on human rights:
Most significantly, he alleged, the U.S. “economic, commercial and financial blockade . . . constitutes a flagrant, massive and systematic violation of their human rights.”
Moreover, “the U.S. has documented violations of the right to life in deaths by firearms and police brutality and abuse, particularly against African Americans.”
The U.S. also has a “pay gap between men and women, discrimination against migrants and other minorities, low level of unionization of workers and restrictions on unions, lack of access to social security, health services and education of many Americans, child labor and the growing and serious manifestations of racism and racial discrimination.”
The U.S. also committed “human rights violations elsewhere in the world, especially in the context of its so-called fight against terrorism: acts of torture committed in detention centers and secret prisons and extrajudicial executions, including civilian deaths resulting from the use of drones. He criticized in particular the permanence of the detention center in the illegally occupied territory of Guantanamo Bay and the torture and serious violations committed there.”
“The [Cuban] delegation drew attention to double standards and selectivity that prevails in the consideration of human rights issues at the international level as well as the importance of the right to development, peace and others who are essential to the full exercise of human rights, respect for which is known complicit silence prevails in the mainstream media.”
The only U.S. State Department comment on this round of discussions found by this blogger was an announcement of the members of the U.S. delegation.
The prior round of such discussions took place in Washington, D.C. in March 2015.
In the wake of the July 15 failed coup in Turkey, its President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and others in his government have been pressing the United States as soon as possible to extradite Fethullah Gülen, a Muslim cleric now living in Pennsylvania. This request is based upon Turkey’s allegations that Gülen was the mastermind of the attempted coup. The U.S., however, has not done so, stressing instead that the established U.S. legal procedures for extradition need to be followed. Turkey publicly has not accepted this response and repeatedly has criticized the U.S. for not extraditing Gülen.
As explained in an earlier post, extradition is the legal process “by which one country (the requesting country) may seek from another country (the requested country) the surrender of a person who is wanted for prosecution, or to serve a sentence following conviction, for a criminal offense. In the U.S., international extradition is treaty based, meaning that the U.S. must have an extradition treaty with the requesting country in order to consider the request for extradition.”
Here then is a preliminary analysis of the U.S. legal issues governing any such extradition request by Turkey.
The U.S. and Turkey do have such an extradition treaty that was signed in Ankara, Turkey on June 7, 1979, and entered into force on January 1, 1981.
Under Article 1 of the treaty each party has an obligation “to surrender to each other, in accordance with the provisions and conditions laid down in this Treaty, all persons who are found within the territory of the Requested Party [here, the U.S.] and who are being prosecuted for or have been charged with an offense, or convicted of an offense, or are sought by the other Party [here, Turkey] for the enforcement of a judicially pronounced penalty for an offense . . . .”
Here, Mr. Gülen apparently is found in the U.S. (the territory of the Requested Party) and is being prosecuted by Turkey (the Requesting Party). Thus, the preliminary condition of the treaty is satisfied.
Thus, the next issue is where did Mr. Gülen allegedly commit the offense. Since he apparently has not been in Turkey for many years, it would appear that whatever alleged offense he allegedly has committed was done “outside the territory of the Requesting Party” (Turkey).
That presents the next issue. Is Mr. Gülen still a citizen and thus a “national” of Turkey (the Requesting Party)? If he is, it would appear that Turkey “has jurisdiction, according to its laws, to try” him. Thus, the issue becomes whether the U.S. has an obligation to extradite him under other provisions of the treaty.
If, on the other hand, Mr. Gülen no longer is a national of Turkey, then the issue is whether “the laws of the Requested Party [the U.S.] provide for the punishment of such an offense committed in similar circumstances” and if so, whether the U.S. has an obligation to extradite him under other provisions of the treaty. Analysis of this issue would have to start with the particulars of the criminal charges under Turkish law, which so far are not readily available in public sources.
A potential treaty-based ground for the U.S. refusing to extradite Gülen is found in Article 3 (a), which states that extradition is not required, “If the offense for which extradition is requested is regarded by the Requested Party [here, the U.S.] to be of a political character or an offense connected with such an offense; or if the Requested Party concludes that the request for extradition has, in fact, been made to prosecute or punish the person sought for an offense of a political character or on account of his political opinions.” However, Article 3 (a) goes on to provide that “any offense committed or attempted against a Head of State or a Head of Government or against a member of their families shall not be deemed to be an offense of a political character.” Here, the public statements by the Turkish government certainly indicate that this exception might apply.
Another potential ground for a U.S. refusal to extradite is found in Article 3 (e): “If the offense for which extradition is requested has, according to the laws of the Requested Party [here, the U.S.], been committed in its territory and has been or will be submitted to its appropriate judicial authorities for prosecution.” (Emphasis added.) This obviously would require a U.S. prosecution, which has not yet happened and probably will not happen, in my opinion.
Yet another potential ground for a U.S. refusal to extradite Gülen is in Article 4(1): “Neither of the Contracting Parties shall be bound to extradite its own nationals.” This would require him to be a naturalized U.S. citizen, and the public information does not indicate if Gülen is such a citizen. There was a source that said he obtained a U.S. “green card” or permanent residency status in 2001, and the U.S. ambassador to Turkey in January 2015 said he believed that Gülen was not a U.S. citizen.
Article 7 of the treaty has great details about the evidence that needs to be submitted, here by Turkey, to initiate a formal request for extradition. The public information to date indicates that Turkey has provided the U.S. with certain information and evidence, but whether it satisfies the requirements of Article 7 is not clear.
As indicated in a prior post, the final step in the U.S. process of determining whether an individual should be extradited includes the Secretary of State examining whether extradition would violate the U.S. obligations under the torture treaty.
With respect to Turkey this is a serious concern.
A. Concerns Raised bythe U.S. State Department
The most recent U.S. State Department report on human rights around the world said this about Turkey and torture in 2015. “The [Turkish] constitution and law prohibit torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, but there were reports that some government officials employed them. Human rights organizations continued to report allegations of torture and abuse, especially of persons who were in police custody but not in a place of detention, and during demonstrations and transfers to prison, where such practices were more difficult to document.”
“[Turkish] Prosecutors investigated allegations of abuse and torture by security forces during the year but rarely indicted accused offenders. The National Human Rights Institution (NHRI) is administratively responsible for investigating human rights violations, including allegations of torture, excessive use of force, or extrajudicial killings. Domestic human rights organizations claimed the NHRI’s failure to follow through in investigating potential human rights violations deterred victims of abuse from filing complaints. Authorities regularly allowed officers accused of abuse to remain on duty during their trial.”
“Human Rights Watch (HRW) alleged in a report published in September  that [Turkish] police abused detainees in August and September while responding to perceived security threats in the Southeast. It documented three cases in which police severely beat detainees, forced men to remain in kneeling positions for hours, and threatened them with torture and execution. In another case police detained a boy who had a severe gunshot wound and for several hours denied him medical treatment.”
“[Turkish] Police in several parts of the country sometimes used disproportionate force to disrupt protests, often leading to injury.”
“Human rights groups alleged that although torture and mistreatment in police custody decreased following installation of closed-circuit cameras in 2012, police continued to abuse detainees outside police stations. On July 13,  a media report included footage from security cameras showing police beating 24-year-old university student Tevfik Caner Ertay multiple times in 2013 during the Gezi Park protests before transporting him to a police station in the trunk of a police car. Ertay suffered multiple injuries, including a broken nose. Police perpetrators included some of the same officers later accused of killing fellow university student Ali Ismail Korkmaz.”
“Some human rights observers reported detainees often refrained from reporting torture and abuse because they feared retaliation or believed complaining to authorities would be futile. Human rights organizations documented cases of prison guards beating inmates and maintained those arrested for ordinary crimes were as likely to suffer torture and mistreatment as those arrested for political offenses, such as speaking out against the government.”
“Through the first nine months of the year , the [Turkish] Ministry of Justice reported 98 investigations regarding allegations of torture, 26 of which resulted in indictments.”
“The HRA reported receiving hundreds of allegations of torture and excessive use of force, including 213 cases through September 21  that involved the alleged abuse of detainees. For example, on January 29, in Sirnak, police reportedly beat four citizens whom they had detained during raids of their homes.”
B. Concerns Raised by the U.N. Committee Against Torture
As explained in an earlier post, the multilateral treaty against torture created a Committee Against Torture, one of whose responsibilities is to review the records of the parties to the treaty. That Committee on June 4, 2016, did just that for Turkey by issuing 20 numbered paragraphs of “principal subjects of concern.” Here are the key concerns for purposes of the pending extradition request.
“The Committee is concerned that, despite the fact that the State party has amended its law to the effect that torture is no longer subject to a statute of limitations, it has not received sufficient information on prosecutions for torture, including in the context of cases involving allegations of torture that have been the subject of decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. The Committee is also concerned that there is a significant disparity between the high number of allegations of torture reported by non-governmental organizations and the data provided by the State party in its periodic report . . ., suggesting that not all allegations of torture have been investigated during the reporting period. Further, while the State party has undertaken many investigations into allegations of ill-treatment and excessive use of force by its officials, these have resulted in relatively few cases of disciplinary sanctions, and in fines and imprisonment in only a small number of cases. The Committee regrets that the State party did not provide information requested by the Committee on the six cases in which officials received sentences of imprisonment for ill-treatment between 2011 and 2013, nor on any cases in which officials received sentences of imprisonment for ill-treatment in 2014 or 2015. The Committee further regrets that State party did not respond to the concern raised by Committee members that law enforcement authorities have on many cases brought ‘countercharges,’ such as ‘resisting’ or ‘insulting’ police officers, against those individuals lodging complains of torture, ill-treatment and other police brutality. The Committee further regrets, with reference to its previous recommendations . . . that the State party has not yet created an independent State body to investigate complaints of torture and ill-treatment against law enforcement officers.”
“The Committee is seriously concerned about numerous credible reports of law enforcement officials engaging in torture and ill-treatment of detainees while responding to perceived and alleged security threats in the south-eastern part of the country . . . in the context of the resurgence of violence between the Turkish security forces and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) following the breakdown of the peace process in 2015 and terrorist attacks perpetrated by individuals linked to the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The Committee is further concerned at the reported impunity enjoyed by the perpetrators of such acts.”
“In addition to the allegations of torture and ill-treatment of detainees noted above, the Committee is concerned at reports it has received concerning the commission of extrajudicial killings of civilians by the State party’s authorities in the course of carrying out counter-terrorism operations in the south-eastern part of the country. The Committee regrets that the State party did not respond to requests for information as to whether investigations are under way into widely reported cases, such as the alleged killing by police snipers of two unarmed women, . . . on 8 September 2015. The Committee also regrets the failure by the State party to ensure accountability for the perpetrators of killings in cases previously raised by the Committee, such as the killing by security forces of . . . in November 2004, which was the subject of a decision of the European Court of Human Rights. The Committee is further concerned at reports that family members of those killed in clashes between security forces and members of armed groups have been denied the ability to retrieve their bodies, which has the effect of impeding investigations into the circumstances surrounding those deaths.”
“The Committee is concerned that allegations of excessive use of force against demonstrators have increased dramatically during the period under review. The Committee notes with regret that the State party’s investigations into the conduct of officials in the context of the 2013 Gezi Park protests in Istanbul and Ankara have not resulted in any prosecutions, despite the allegations of excessive use of force noted by observers, including the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The Committee also regrets that the State party did not provide any data on the specific sentences, if any, that police officers tried on charges of excessive use of force during the reporting period had received. It further expresses concern over the recent legislative amendments in the Domestic Security Package granting additional powers to the police, in particular the expanded power to use firearms against demonstrators.”
“Although the Criminal Code defines torture as a specific offence, the Committee notes that the definition set out in article 94 [of the Code] is incomplete inasmuch as it fails to mention the purpose of the act in question. There is also no specific mention of the act of torture carried out in order to intimidate, to coerce or to obtain information or a confession from a person other than the person who was tortured.”
“While taking note of the legal safeguards enshrined in Turkish legislation, the Committee is concerned at recent amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure, which give the police greater powers to detain individuals without judicial oversight during police custody. Placing suspects under constant video surveillance in their cells is another matter of concern.”
“The Committee is concerned at the ‘almost complete lack of accountability for cases of enforced disappearance’ in the State party and its ‘palpable lack of interest [in] seriously investigating, prosecuting and adjudicating these cases’, as reported by the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances in its preliminary observations publicly . . . announced at the end of its visit to Turkey from 14 to 18 March 2016. . . .”
“The Committee regrets the lack of complete information on suicides and other sudden deaths in detention facilities during the period under review.”
“The Committee is concerned by the restrictive conditions of detention for persons sentenced to aggravated life imprisonment, a sentence that was established after the abolition of the death penalty in 2004.”
C. Human Rights NGOs and Others
Especially after the failed coup, human rights NGOs have raised increasing concerns about human rights in Turkey. These concerns were heightened by the Turkish government’s July 20 declaration of a state of emergency for the next three months. This gives the government the power to impose rule by decrees that are published and rushed through parliament for approval the same day. The possibility of review by the Constitutional Court is curbed. Human Rights Watch expressed its alarm over this development: “A state of emergency imposed where there are clear signs that the government is ready to crack down more broadly – combined with far more scope for unchecked executive action – is an alarming prospect. It risks further undermining democracy by providing a legal – if not justifiable – basis for a crackdown on rights.”
Amnesty International (AI) on July 18 (only three days after the attempted coup) said that several Turkish “government officials have suggested reinstating the death penalty as punishment for those found responsible for the failed coup, and . . . [AI] is now investigating reports that detainees in Ankara and Istanbul have been subjected to a series of abuses, including ill-treatment in custody and being denied access to lawyers.” Two days later AI stated, “We are witnessing a crackdown of exceptional proportions in Turkey,” including freedom of expression.
On July 24 AI reported that it had “gathered credible evidence that detainees in Turkey are being subjected to beatings and torture, including rape, in official and unofficial detention centers in the country.” According to these accounts, “police held detainees in stress positions, denied them food, water and medical treatment, verbally abused and threatened them and subjected them to beatings and torture, including rape and sexual assault.”
On August 2 President Erdogan in a public speech challenged AI’s research underlying its assertion that some detainees had been tortured. In response AI’s Secretary General stated, ““The serious human rights violations documented by an . . . [AI] team on the ground in Turkey are alarming. These findings are based on detailed interviews with lawyers, doctors, family members and an eyewitness to torture in a detention facility.”
A Turkish bar group in the capital of Ankara has stated that some of its members have reported alleged abuses of their clients in detention while other lawyers and human rights organizations have made similar allegations.
The Turkey-U.S. Dispute Over the Requested Extradition of Gülen
Turkey’s Foreign Ministry has to be aware of the terms of its extradition treaty with the U.S. and the latter’s procedures for handling extradition requests. Thus, Erdogran and his government’s strident complaints about the U.S. not immediately granting the request for Gülen has to be intended to show Turkish citizens the strength and resolve of the regime. There even have been rumors that the U.S. was behind the attempted coup.
In any event, “Usually deeply polarized, the two sides [of Turkey’s population] are largely united in their opposition to military coups and the . . . [extradition] of Fethullah Gülen, a Muslim cleric who lives in self-exile in Pennsylvania and has been accused by Turkey of orchestrating the failed uprising.” There even is widespread support for the “sweeping purge of suspected followers of Mr. Gülen from the state bureaucracy and other professions” and Mr. Erdogan’s asking “Turks to inform on those they believe are connected to Mr. Gülen.”
The unity was on vivid display at a recent Istanbul rally of at least two million Turks who put aside their political differences to express solidarity.” (To the right is a photograph of that rally.)
The U.S., however, needs to continue to resist acquiescence in these strong-arm tactics and to insist on following U.S. law and procedures for such requests. Secretary of State Kerry and President Obama have done just that. So too have State Department spokespeople at daily press briefings. This is not easy since the U.S. has a strong national security interest in maintaining Turkey as an ally in the fight against ISIS/ISIL.
Tomorrow U.S. Vice President Joe Biden will be visiting Turkey to see President Erdogan. The Associated Press opines that Biden will have difficulties in persuading Turkey that the U.S. values Turkey as a key NATO ally amid worrying signs that Turkey is flirting with having closer ties with Russia and that the U.S. and Turkish approaches to the Syrian conflict may be diverging.
Today, says the Associated Press, a U.S. Justice Department team is meeting with Turkish officials in Ankara to discuss U.S. technical requirements of Turkey’s extradition request. This includes firm evidence of Gülen’s involvement in the coup whereas senior officials in the Obama administration say Turkey’s extradition requests to date have been based on allegations of other crimes against Gülen, not evidence of involvement in the coup attempt. A Turkish professor of international relations said that Turkish “people have an expectation that Gülen should be returned to Turkey immediately. If the extradition request is refused or delayed I’m afraid that’s going to have serious repercussions.”
The Washington Post editorial board urges the Vice President “to reassure Mr. Erdogan once again that the two nations share vital interests, not the least of which are fighting the Islamic State and ending the conflagration that has consumed Syria.” The Vice President also “should make clear he understands how much Turkish civilians are suffering from terrorist attacks” and “convince Mr. Erdogan that the United States does not desire to destabilize Turkey.”
The Washington Post editorial further urges Biden “to candidly tell his host that the United States did not instigate the coup and that it will not relinquish Mr. Gülen to a witchhunt. Mr. Erdogan may not want to hear it, but he also should be reminded that crushing the rule of law will dim Turkey’s prospects.”
In the midst of this high-stakes squabble between the two countries, Gülen wrote an article for the New York Times in which he stated, “During the attempted military coup in Turkey this month, I condemned it in the strongest terms. ‘Government should be won through a process of free and fair elections, not force.’ I said, ‘I pray to God for Turkey, for Turkish citizens, and for all those currently in Turkey that this situation is resolved peacefully and quickly.’” President Erdogan’s suggestion that I was the mastermind of the coup “run[s] afoul of everything I believe in, it is also irresponsible and wrong. My philosophy — inclusive and pluralist Islam, dedicated to service to human beings from every faith — is antithetical to armed rebellion.”
Moreover, Gülen said, “Throughout my life, I have publicly and privately denounced military interventions in domestic politics. In fact, I have been advocating for democracy for decades. Having suffered through four military coups in four decades in Turkey — and having been subjected by those military regimes to harassment and wrongful imprisonment — I would never want my fellow citizens to endure such an ordeal again. If somebody who appears to be [my] . . . sympathizer has been involved in an attempted coup, he betrays my ideals.”
Gülen concluded his article with this plea to the U.S. government. The U.S. “must not accommodate an autocrat [Erdogan] who is turning a failed putsch into a slow-motion coup of his own against constitutional government.”
 U.S. State Dep’t, Report on International Extradition Submitted to the Congress Pursuant to Section 211 of the Admiral James W. Nance and Meg Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001 (Public Law 106-113) (2001); U.S. Justice Dep’t, Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Extradition.
On July 17, 2015, Spain’s National Court’s Judge Jose de la Mata terminated Spain’s criminal investigation of alleged torture of detainees at the U.S. detention facility in Guantânamo Bay Cuba. 
The reason for the termination was a 2014 statutory amendment narrowing Spain’s universal jurisdiction statute  and Spain’s Supreme Court’s May 2015, decision upholding that amendment in its affirmance of the dismissal of a case investigating alleged genocide in Tibet.
More specifically the dismissal of the Guantánamo case was required, said the judge, because the investigation was not directed against a Spanish citizen or a foreigner who was habitually resident in Spain or a foreigner who was found in Spain and whose extradition had been denied.
An appeal from this decision has been taken by the U.S. Center for Constitutional Rights and the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights. One of the points of the appeal is the assertion that the court ignored evidence of the participation of Spanish police officials in some of the interrogations at Guantánamo. 
 Under customary international law and certain treaties, a nation state’s courts have universal jurisdiction (UJ) over certain crimes of international concern regardless of where the crime was committed or the nationality of the victim or perpetrator. These crimes of international concern are (a) piracy; (b) slavery; (c) war crimes; (d) crimes against peace; (e) crimes against humanity; (f) genocide; and (g) torture.
Spain implemented this principle in 1985 in its own domestic statutory law by conferring such jurisdiction on its National Court for certain crimes, including genocide; terrorism; and any other crimes under international treaties or conventions that should be prosecuted in Spain. The March 2014 amendment of this statute, among other things, restricted universal jurisdiction for war crimes to cases where the accused individual is a Spanish citizen or a foreign citizen who is habitually resident in Spain or a foreigner who is found in Spain and whose extradition had been denied by Spanish authorities.
 Spain’s Audiencia Nacional (National Court) in June 2014 decided to terminate its investigation of alleged genocide in Tibet because of the amendment to the statute. Plaintiffs then appealed to Spain’s Supreme Court, which in May 2015 rejected that appeal.
On March 31st the U.S. and Cuba held their first talks about human rights. 
Afterwards the head of the Cuban delegation, Foreign Ministry official Pedro Luis Pedroso, said a decision on holding future talks would be reached during traditional diplomatic channels. Another Cuban delegate said the two sides held “a respectful, professional, civilized conversation.” Nevertheless, Anaysansi Rodriguez Camejo, Cuba’s ambassador to the U.N. in Geneva, told Cuban state television that the session underlined “that there are differences” on issues of human rights.
More specifically, Senor Pedroso said Cuba had expressed concern about the U.S. guarantees and protection of human rights and drew attention to alleged persistent patterns of discrimination, racism and police brutality in the U.S. Cuba also raised the issues of alleged U.S. limitations on the exercise of labor rights and trade union freedoms and the alleged U.S. violations of human rights in the so-called fight against terrorism, including torture, extrajudicial executions and the use of drones, spying and offshore surveillance as well as the legal limbo of prisoners at the “illegal” Guantanamo Naval Base.
Pedroso also asserted that human rights are universal and indivisible and no one has more value than another. The realization of social and cultural rights is a fundamental basis for the effective exercise of civil and political rights.
According to the U.S. State Department, the discussion concerned “the methodology, topics, and structure of a future human rights dialogue. The atmosphere of the meeting was professional, and there was broad agreement on the way forward for a future substantive dialogue, the timing and location of which will be determined through diplomatic channels. Each side raised concerns about human rights issues, and both sides expressed willingness to discuss a wide range of topics in future substantive talks.”
“This preliminary meeting reflects our continued focus on human rights and democratic principles in Cuba,” a State Department official said, speaking on condition of anonymity. “Human rights are a priority.”
The U.N. Human Rights Council, which is responsible for strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights around the globe, addressing situations of human rights violations and making recommendations on the subject,  is in the midst of its 28th regular session at its headquarters in Geneva Switzerland with the session ending on March 27th. 
At the opening of the session on March 2 the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein,  set forth his concerns on human rights. Three days later, on March 5th, he commented on his annual report on human rights. This post will examine both of these speeches.
From March 2 through 5, the Council conducted what it called its High Level Segment, in which national leaders addressed the Council on the overall subject of human rights. Two of those national leaders were U.S. Secretary of State john Kerry and Cuban Foreign Minister, Bruno Rodriguez Parrilla. Their remarks will be covered in subsequent posts while another post will analyze those remarks and the speeches of the High Commissioner.
High Commissioner’s Speech, March 2nd 
The “cruelty and moral bankruptcy of violent extremists . . . continue daily, and we condemn their merciless conduct daily.”
“And yet, if we are not careful, if we are not completely principled and cunning in our collective attempt to defang them, we will, unwittingly and inexcusably, be advancing their interests. How we define the opening chapters of this already agitated century depends heavily on us not becoming like them. For us, international humanitarian law and international human rights law cannot be trifled with or circumvented, but must be fully observed.”
“It has been 70 years since the great Charter of the [U.N.] was drawn up, and since then States have also written and agreed to a range of strong international treaties, to establish in binding law the legal principles of human rights. They are a distillation of all human experience, all the warnings and screams of our combined human history.” By “ratifying the U.N. Charter, [states] have made a clear commitment [in the words of its Preamble] to ‘reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights; in the dignity and worth of the human person; in the equal rights of men and women, and of nations large and small; and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties, and other sources of international law, can be maintained; and to promote social progress, and better standards of life in larger freedom.’”
“And yet, with alarming regularity, human rights are disregarded, and violated, sometimes to a shocking degree.”
“States claim exceptional circumstances. They pick and choose between rights. One Government will thoroughly support women’s human rights and those of the LGBT communities, but will balk at any suggestion that those rights be extended to migrants of irregular status. [U.S.?] Another State may observe scrupulously the right to education, but will brutally stamp out opposing political views. [Cuba?] A third State comprehensively violates the political, civil, economic, social and cultural rights of its people, while vigorously defending the ideals of human rights before its peers.”
“In recent months I have been disturbed deeply by the contempt and disregard displayed by several States towards the women and men appointed by [the Council] as [its] independent experts – and also by the reprisals and smear campaigns that are all too frequently exercised against representatives of civil society, including those who engage with the Council and its bodies. I appeal to all of you, once again, to focus on the substance of the complaint, rather than lash out at the critic – whether that person is mandated by States, is a member of my Office, or is a human rights defender.”
“The overwhelming majority of victims of human rights abuses around the world share two characteristics: Deprivation, and discrimination – whether it is based on race or ethnicity, gender, beliefs, sexual orientation, caste or class. From hunger to massacres, sexual violence and slavery, human rights violations are rooted in these hidden, and sometimes not so hidden, factors.”
“They are not spontaneously generated. Most violations of human rights result from policy choices, which limit freedom and participation, and create obstacles to the fair sharing of resources and opportunities.”
“The most powerful instrument in the arsenal we have against poverty and conflict is the weapon of massive instruction. Respect for the human rights of all, justice, education, equality – these are the strongly interlocking elements that will build fair, confident and resilient societies; true development; and a permanent peace.”
“Everybody knows when police use torture, and when tweets are brutally suppressed. Everybody knows when discrimination means poverty, while corrupt elites gorge on public goods, supported by a corrupt judiciary. Everybody knows when women are treated like property, and children go hungry, and unschooled, in squalid neighborhoods.”
“Some of the evidence may be hidden. But the reality, in far too many countries, of massacres and sexual violence; crushing poverty; the exclusive bestowal of health-care and other vital resources to the wealthy and well-connected; the torture of powerless detainees [U.S.?]; the denial of human dignity – these things are known. . . . [T]hey are what truly make up a State’s reputation; together with the real steps – if any – taken by the State to prevent abuses and address social inequalities, and whether it honors the dignity of its people.”
“The only real measure of a Government’s worth is . . . the extent to which it is sensitive to the needs – and protects the rights – of its nationals and other people who fall under its jurisdiction, or over whom it has physical control.”
“Some policy-makers persuade themselves that their circumstances are exceptional, creating a wholly new reality unforeseen by the law. This logic is abundant around the world today: ‘I arrest arbitrarily and torture because a new type of war justifies it. I spy on my citizens because the fight against terrorism requires it. I don’t want new immigrants, or I discriminate against minorities, because our communal identity is being threatened now as never before. I kill without any form of due process, because if I do not, others will kill me.’ “
“I must remind you of the enduring and universal validity of the international human rights treaties that your States wrote and ratified. In reality, neither terrorism, nor globalization, nor migration are qualitatively new threats that can justify overturning the legal foundations of life on Earth. They are not new.”
“At a time of intensifying global anxiety, I believe the people of the world are crying out for profound and inspiring leadership equal to the challenges we face. We must therefore renew, by the strongest action, our dedication to the reality of inalienable and universal human rights, to end discrimination, deprivation, and the seemingly inexhaustible litany of conflicts and crises that generate such terrible, and needless, suffering.”
“What will become of us, of our world, if we ignore our treaties and principles? Can we be so stupid as to repeat scenes from the twentieth century, punctured as it was by such awful inhumanity? You must not make it so. This is principally your burden, and ours. Together, if we succeed in turning the corner, in improving our global condition, we can then say the screams of history and of the millions upon millions of victims, have been heard, finally. Let us make it so.”
High Commissioner’sSpeech, March 5th 
The High Commissioner was “appalled by the massive suffering ISIL provokes [in Syria, Iraq and Libya]: from the murders, torture, rape and sale of children . . . ; to mass beheadings; burning people alive in cages; seemingly genocidal attacks on ethnic and religious groups; the obliteration of due process; torture; deprivation of income and every kind of service and resource; recruitment of children; the destruction of elements of the cultural heritage of humanity; and, not least, particularly vicious and comprehensive attacks on the rights of women and girls.” [Similar horrible actshe said, were perpetrated in Nigeria by Boko Haram and in Yemen and Somalia by other groups.]
“My Office strongly supports efforts by States around the world to prevent and combat terrorism, and to ensure that the perpetrators of terrorism, as well as their financiers and suppliers of arms, are brought to justice.”
“Terrorist attacks [,however,] cannot destroy the values on which our societies are grounded – but laws and policies can. Measures that build what has been termed the ‘national security state’ – such as arbitrary or prolonged detention; torture and ill-treatment; massive surveillance that contravenes the right to privacy; unfair trials; discriminatory policing; and the abusive use of legislation to curb legitimate rights to peaceful protest and to freedom of expression – are human rights violations. They generate legitimate resentment, harm social cohesion, and undermine the essential values of the international community.”
“There is real danger that in their reaction to extremist violence, opinion-leaders and decision-makers will lose their grasp of the deeper principles that underpin the system for global security which States built 70 years ago to ward off the horror of war. The fight against terror is a struggle to uphold the values of democracy and human rights – not undermine them. . . [C]ounter-terrorist operations that are non-specific, disproportionate, brutal and inadequately supervised violate the very norms that we seek to defend. They also risk handing the terrorists a propaganda tool – thus making our societies neither free nor safe. The use of torture, neglect of due process and collective punishment do not make the world any safer.”
“To be truly effective, any response to extremist violence must be targeted, proportionate, and legal. Military campaigns, financial sanctions and attempts to staunch the inflow of weapons – such as the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty – may be part of the solution.”
“But other actions are needed to stem the root causes that feed into these conflicts. We must acknowledge that large numbers of people do not join such extremist movements en masse because they have been suddenly and inexplicably hypnotized. Extremism – however repugnant – is nurtured by ideology, and by alienation fed by years of tyranny, corruption, repression, discrimination, deprivation and neglect of the legitimate rights of communities.”
He especially was “disturbed by a continuing trend of harsh restrictions on public freedoms by States across all regions. I refer to military crackdowns on demonstrations; harsh sentencing of human rights defenders, journalists and dissidents in politically motivated trials; brutal punishments for simple tweets; censorship; oppressive and illegitimate regulations of civil society movements; the use of new technologies to stifle human rights in the virtual space; and new security laws that are unjustly broad, endangering civil liberties and human rights.”
“And yet the great pillar of every resilient and participative society is freedom of expression. Freedom to formulate the ideas of equality led to the overthrow of colonialism, and has powered every movement against discrimination and injustice. To immunize against dictatorship or totalitarianism, to undo discrimination, to drive justice and accountability, we need freedom of expression – full and free and far-reaching. There is no good governance without free speech.”
The High Commissioner’s speech included specific criticisms of many countries. About the U.S., he said: “In the United States, the Senate report on torture in the context of counter-terrorism operations is courageous and commendable, but profoundly disturbing. For a country that believes so strongly in human rights to have swiftly abandoned their fundamentals at a time of crisis is as astonishing as it is deplorable. And yet few other countries have had the courage to likewise publicly investigate and publicly admit to rights abuses resulting from counter-terror operations – and many should.”
“Under international law, the [Senate] report’s recommendations must be followed through with real accountability. There is no prescription for torture, and torture cannot be amnestied. It should also lead to examination of the institutional and political causes that led the US to violate the absolute prohibition on torture, and measures to ensure this can never recur.”
“As the Senate report clearly demonstrates, the neglect of due process, use of torture and collective punishments that were permitted by US officials in the post-9/11 context did not make the world – or the US – any safer. On the contrary, they increased the threat of terrorism, by feeding into the grievances on which it thrives. The orange jumpsuits of Guantanamo are a recruitment tool for ISIL and other groups. As former President George W. Bush has conceded, Guantanamo became, I quote, ‘a propaganda tool for our enemies.’”
The High Commissioner also expressed regret at the renewed use of the death penalty in a number of countries – Jordan, Pakistan, and Indonesia – and “the continuing extensive use” of the death penalty in China, Iraq, Iran and the U.S.
In conclusion, he said, “It is the people who sustain government, create prosperity, heal and educate others and pay for governmental and other services with their labour. It is their struggles that have created and sustain States. Governments exist to serve the people – not the other way round.”
“Governments that protect human rights, combat discrimination and deprivation, and which are accountable to their people are more prosperous and more secure than those which stifle rights, hamper opportunities, and repress freedoms. When people’s rights are respected – when they are accorded dignity, have opportunities to express their skills and are given a fair share of resources – they form resilient societies. When they are wronged, their rights betrayed, there is a constant threat of turmoil. Respect for the human rights of the people is not destabilizing; but driving legitimate opposition underground is.”
Speeches about human rights in international fora often are replete with platitudes. These speeches by the High Commissioner are not. While he condemns the horrible actions of ISIL and Boko Haram, these groups are not represented at the Council. Instead the countries that are represented are often the victims of their evil deeds. Therefore, the High Commissioner spent most of his time chastising the latter countries for failing to live up to the human rights commitments they have made as they are combatting terrorism. Moreover, these speeches address some countries by name and point our their failings.
In a later post we will look again at these speeches in the context of the issues of human rights in the process of U.S.-Cuba reconciliation.
 The Human Rights Council has 47 member states elected by the U.N. General Assembly. Currently both the U.S. and Cuba are such members.
 Materials about the Council’s 28th session are available on its website.
 The High Commissioner for Human Rights is the principal human rights official of the U.N. and the head of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, which “spearheads the [U.N.’s] human rights efforts . . . by strengthening international human rights mechanisms; enhancing equality and countering discrimination; combating impunity and strengthening accountability and the rule of law; integrating human rights in development and in the economic sphere; widening the democratic space; and early warning and protection of human rights in situations of conflict, violence and insecurity.”
Prince Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein of Jordan was unanimously elected the High Commissioner by the U.N. General Assembly in June 2014. His many years of diplomatic service include being Jordan’s Ambassador to the U.S., his country’s Permanent Representative to the U.N. and his serving as an officer of the International Criminal Court. He holds a Bachelor of Arts degree from The Johns Hopkins University and a Doctorate in Philosophy from Cambridge University.
An Argentine court has invoked universal jurisdiction over a case brought by relatives of people who were victims of torture and other crimes committed in Spain during the Spanish Civil War (1933-1939) and the Franco regime (1939-1975).
In September 2013 the Argentine court issued an international warrant for the arrest of four suspects in that case. Two of them are residents of Spain; the other two are deceased.
Spain’s High Court’s Denial of Extradition
One of these suspects who lives in Spain, Jesús Muñecas, earlier this month appeared in Spain’s High Court to contest the Argentine court’s request to have him extradited to Argentina to face charges that while a Spanish Civil Guard captain in August 1968, he tortured and beat an individual at a Spanish prison. Muñecas’ opposition to extradition was supported by the Spanish prosecutor on the ground that the statute of limitations had expired on these charges.
On or about April 25th Spain’s High Court denied the extradition request. It said the Argentine charges did not reveal any facts that could be construed as genocide – a crime without a statute of limitations – and that even if torture were proven, Spain’s 10-year statute of limitations for torture had expired and, therefore, barred the case.
Spain’s High Court’s Invitation to Argentina To Start a Case in Spain
In denying extradition of Senor Muñecas, the High Court added that Argentina could try to get the case opened in Spain. According to the High Court, “This would give the victims the possibility to access proceedings and, in some way, satisfy their desire for justice.”
This invitation is utterly disingenuous and ironical as shown below.
Previously Spain’s High Court had opened a criminal investigation of certain crimes committed during the Spanish Civil War and Franco regime, but the investigation was quashed in May 2010. Simultaneously the judge who initiated that investigation, former High Court Judge Baltasar Garzón, was charged with a crime for doing so and suspended from his judicial service.
In February 2012, this criminal case against Garzón was dismissed when Spain’s Supreme Court decided that he had not abused his judicial power in initiating the investigation even though, according to the Court, he had overstepped his authority and “exceeded himself in the interpretation of the law” in doing so.
In the meantime, however, two other criminal cases were brought against Garzón.
One of these prosecutions resulted in his February 2012 conviction for prevarication (knowingly making an unjust decision) in a case involving his authorization of police bugging of communications between individuals charged with corruption and their attorneys. For this conviction, Judge Garzón was removed from the bench for 11 years and fined Euros 2,500.
These three criminal cases against Garzón and his conviction in one of them have been widely condemned as motivated by the Spanish government’s desire to punish him for his Franco-era investigation as discussed in posts of February 10, 11 and 14, 2012.
One of the criticisms of his conviction came from the European Magistrates for Democracy and Freedom (EMDF), an organization with 15,000 members from 11 states of the European Union. They petitioned the Spanish courts for a pardon of Garzón because the organization believes his conviction and sentence affects the entire international judicial community and runs the risk of limiting judicial independence, especially in countries trying to construct a democratic system of justice. Judges must have the freedom to render their own legal interpretations, said this organization, and the Garzón case could be used to curb judges’ independence and autonomy.
In late February 2014, Spain’s Supreme Court opposed the EMDF’s petition for such a pardon on the ground that it did not satisfy certain legal criteria. The court also said it was inappropriate to reinstate Garzón as he maintains that he was within his rights to order the recordings of the attorney-client communications. Said the court, “In the request there is no indication that he has expressed remorse, and this court is not aware of his having done so.” Moreover, according to the court, Garzón had displayed “indifference” to his suspension “as a way of reaffirming his position prior to the sentence.”
Now Spain’s Ministry of Justice will make the final decision on the request for pardon. As of April 27th, the prosecution apparently had advised the Ministry that there were no reasons of justice, fairness or public interest to grant such a pardon.
Meanwhile in reaction to the Supreme Court decision opposing his pardon, Garzón said it was “not legal” for the Court to demand he show remorse. “This is not a legal requisite,” he said. Nor, he added, does the fact that it was EMDF that had requested the pardon reflect his “indifference.” Garzón reasserted his innocence and said, “I believe that this offense was created with the express purpose of punishing me, and that I am within my rights to disagree and to resort to another court, as I have done in Strasbourg [the European Court of Human Rights], in order to evaluate whether the Supreme Court has violated my fundamental rights.”
Finally Spain High Court’s invitation for Argentina to start a case in Spain is ironic. Argentina decided to exercise universal jurisdiction over crimes committed during Spain’s Civil War and the Franco regime only after Spain quashed its own investigation of such crimes, the one initiated by Garzón.
 The other living suspect and Spanish resident, Juan Antonio González Pacheco, alias Billy the Kid, also is opposing his extradition to Argentina. He is a former police inspector who faces 13 charges of torture.
 The other criminal case against Judge Garzón involving alleged corruption was dismissed as being barred by the statute of limitations.
 In March 2011 Garzon brought a case before the European Court of Human Rights challenging the legality of his criminal prosecution, conviction and sentence on his approving the prosecution’s bugging of communications between certain criminal defendants and their lawyers. This case apparently is still pending.
As discussed in a prior post, in March 2014, the United Nations’ Human Rights Committee (the Committee) issued a negative evaluation of how the United States of America (U.S.) was implementing and complying with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR or Covenant), which is regarded as an important part of the International Bill of Rights. That prior post reviewed the background of the ICCPR and the events leading up to the Committee’s evaluation. Another post looked at the Committee’s recent hearings regarding U.S. human rights.
Now we examine the Committee’s report of concluding observations that resulted from the hearings and all the evidence on that subject.
After considering the written materials and the testimony and remarks at the hearing, on March 26, 2014, the Committee adopted its 11-page report (Concluding observations on the fourth report of the United States of America). Given the hostile nature of the Committee members’ comments during the hearing, it is not surprising that the report was very critical of the U.S.
With respect to various topics, the Committee expressed its regrets or concerns about the U.S. record and then made the recommendations outlined below.
Applicability of the Covenant at national level.The U.S. should: “(a) Interpret the Covenant in good faith, in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context, including subsequent practice, and in the light of its object and purpose and review its legal position so as to acknowledge the extraterritorial application of the Covenant under certain circumstances . . . .(b) [I]dentify ways to give greater effect to the Covenant at federal, state and local levels, taking into account that the obligations under the Covenant are binding on the State party as a whole. . . . (c) [E]nsure that effective remedies are available for violations of the Covenant, including . . . proposing to the Congress implementing legislation to fill any legislative gaps. . . . [and considering] acceding to the Optional Protocol to the Covenant providing for an individual communication procedure.  (d) Strengthen and expand existing mechanisms mandated to monitor the implementation of human rights at federal, state, local and tribal levels . . . . (e) Reconsider its position regarding its reservations and declarations to the Covenant with a view to withdrawing them.”
Accountability for past human rights violations. The U.S. should: “[E]nsure that all cases of unlawful killing, torture or other ill-treatment, unlawful detention, or enforced disappearance are effectively, independently and impartially investigated, that perpetrators, including, in particular, persons in command positions,  are prosecuted and sanctioned, and that victims are provided with effective remedies. The responsibility of those who provided legal pretexts for manifestly illegal behavior should also be established.  The State party should also consider the full incorporation of the doctrine of ‘command responsibility’ in its criminal law and declassify and make public the report of the Senate Special Committee on Intelligence into the CIA secret detention programme.”
Racial disparities in the criminal justice system and Racial profiling. The U.S. should: “[R]obustly address racial disparities in the criminal justice system . . . [and] effectively combat and eliminate racial profiling by federal, state and local law enforcement officials . . . .”
Death penalty. The U.S. should: “(a) take measures to effectively ensure that the death penalty is not imposed as a result of racial bias; (b) strengthen safeguards against wrongful sentencing to death and subsequent wrongful execution by ensuring inter alia effective legal representation for defendants in death penalty cases, including at the post-conviction stage; (c) ensure that retentionist states [those that maintain the death penalty] provide adequate compensation for the wrongfully convicted; (d) ensure that lethal drugs for executions originate from legal, regulated sources, and are approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and that information on the origin and composition of such drugs is made available to individuals scheduled for execution;  (e) consider establishing a moratorium on the death penalty at the federal level and engage with retentionist states with a view to achieving a nationwide moratorium;” [f] Consider acceding to on the Second Optional Protocol to the Covenant aiming at the abolition of the death penalty on or before July 11, 2116, the 25th anniversary of its entry into force.
Targeted killing using unmanned aerial vehicles (drones). The U.S. should: “revisit its position regarding legal justifications for the use of deadly force through drone attacks [and] . . . (a) ensure that any use of armed drones complies fully with its obligations under article 6 of the Covenant, including in particular with respect to the principles of precaution, distinction and proportionality in the context of an armed conflict; (b) subject to operational security, disclose the criteria for drone strikes, including the legal basis for specific attacks, the process of target identification and the circumstances in which drones are used; (c) provide for independent supervision and oversight over the specific implementation of regulations governing the use of drone strikes; (d) in armed conflict situations, take all feasible measures to ensure the protection of civilians in specific drone attacks and to track and assess civilian casualties, as well as all necessary precautionary measures in order to avoid such casualties; (e) conduct independent, impartial, prompt and effective investigations of allegations of violations of the right to life and bring to justice those responsible; (f) provide victims or their families with an effective remedy where there has been a violation, including adequate compensation, and establish accountability mechanisms for victims of allegedly unlawful drone attacks who are not compensated by their home governments.”
Gun violence. The U.S. should: “[T]ake all necessary measures to abide by its obligation to effectively protect the right to life. . . . [including] (a) continue its efforts to effectively curb gun violence, including through the continued pursuit of legislation requiring background checks for all private firearm transfers in order to prevent possession of arms by persons recognized as prohibited individuals under federal law . . . ; and (b) review Stand Your Ground Laws to remove far-reaching immunity and ensure strict adherence to the principles of necessity and proportionality when using deadly force in self-defence.”
Excessive use of force by law enforcement officials. The U.S. should: “(a) step up its efforts to prevent the excessive use of force by law enforcement officers by ensuring compliance with the 1990 UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officers; (b) ensure that the new CBP [U.S. Customs and Border Protection] directive on use of deadly force is applied and enforced in practice; and (c) improve reporting of excessive use of force violations and ensure that reported cases of excessive use of force are effectively investigated, alleged perpetrators are prosecuted and, if convicted, punished with appropriate sanctions, that investigations are re-opened when new evidence becomes available, and that victims or their families are provided with adequate compensation.”
Legislation prohibiting torture. The U.S. should: “[E]nact legislation to explicitly prohibit torture, including mental torture, wherever committed and ensure that the law provides for penalties commensurate with the gravity of such acts, whether committed by public officials or other persons acting on behalf of the State, or by private persons. . . . [and] ensure the availability of compensation to victims of torture.”
Non-refoulment [ban on returning persecuted to persecutor]. The U.S. should: “[S]trictly apply the absolute prohibition against refoulement under articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant,  continue exercising the utmost care in evaluating diplomatic assurances, and refrain from relying on such assurances where it is not in a position to effectively monitor the treatment of such persons after their . . . return to other countries and take appropriate remedial action when assurances are not fulfilled.”
Trafficking and forced labour. The U.S. should: “[C]ontinue its efforts to combat trafficking in persons, inter alia by strengthening its preventive measures, increasing victim identification and systematically and vigorously investigating allegations of trafficking in persons, prosecuting and punishing those responsible and providing effective remedies to victims, including protection, rehabilitation and compensation. [T]ake all appropriate measures to prevent the criminalization of victims of sex trafficking, including child victims, to the extent that they have been compelled to engage in unlawful activities. [R]eview its laws and regulations to ensure full protection against forced labour for all categories of workers and ensure effective oversight of labour conditions in any temporary visa program. [R]einforce its training activities and provide training to law enforcement and border and immigration officials, . . . [and] other relevant agencies. . . .”
Immigrants. The U.S. should: “review its policies of mandatory detention and deportation of certain categories of immigrants in order to allow for individualized decisions, to take measures ensuring that affected persons have access to legal representation, and to identify ways to facilitate access of undocumented immigrants and immigrants residing lawfully in the U.S. for less than five years and their families to adequate health care, including reproductive health care services.”
Domestic violence. The U.S. should: “[S]trengthen measures to prevent and combat domestic violence, as well as to ensure that law enforcement personnel appropriately respond to acts of domestic violence. [E]nsure that cases of domestic violence are effectively investigated and that perpetrators are prosecuted and sanctioned. [E]nsure remedies for all victims of domestic violence, and take steps to improve the provision of emergency shelter, housing, child care, rehabilitative services and legal representation for women victims of domestic violence. [T]ake measures to assist tribal authorities in their efforts to address domestic violence against Native American women.”
Corporal punishment. The U.S. should: “Take practical steps, including through legislative measures where appropriate, to put an end to corporal punishment in all settings. [E]ncourage non-violent forms of discipline as alternatives to corporal punishment and . . . conduct public information campaigns to raise awareness about its harmful effects. [P]romote the use of alternatives to the application of criminal law to address disciplinary issues in schools.”
Non-consensual psychiatric treatment. The U.S. should: “[E]nsure that non-consensual use of psychiatric medication, electroshock and other restrictive and coercive practices in mental health services is generally prohibited. Non-consensual psychiatric treatment may only be applied, if at all, in exceptional cases as a measure of last resort where absolutely necessary for the benefit of the person concerned provided that he or she is unable to give consent, for the shortest possible time, without any long-term impact, and under independent review. . . . [P]romote psychiatric care aimed at preserving the dignity of patients, both adults and minors.”
Criminalization of homelessness. The U.S. should: “[E]ngage with state and local authorities to: (a) abolish criminalization of homelessness laws and policies at state and local levels; (b) ensure close cooperation between all relevant stakeholders . . . to intensify efforts to find solutions for the homeless in accordance with human rights standards; and (c) offer incentives for decriminalization and implementation of such solutions, including by providing continued financial support to local authorities implementing alternatives to criminalization and withdrawing funding for local authorities criminalizing the homeless.”
Conditions of detention and use of solitary confinement. The U.S. should: “[M]onitor conditions of detention in prisons, including private detention facilities, with a view to ensuring that persons deprived of their liberty be treated in accordance with the requirements of articles 7 and 10 of the Covenant  and the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. . . . [I]mpose strict limits on the use of solitary confinement, both pretrial and following conviction, in the federal system, as well as nationwide, and abolish the practice in respect of anyone under the age of 18 and prisoners with serious mental illness. . . . [B]ring detention conditions of prisoners on death row in line with international standards.”
Detainees at Guantanamo Bay. The U.S. should: “[E]xpedite the transfer of detainees designated for transfer, including to Yemen, as well as the process of periodic review for Guantánamo detainees, and ensure either their trial or immediate release, and the closure of the Guantánamo facility. [E]nd the system of administrative detention without charge or trial and ensure that any criminal cases against detainees held in Guantánamo and military facilities in Afghanistan are dealt with within the criminal justice system rather than military commissions and that those detainees are afforded the fair trial guarantees enshrined in article 14 of the Covenant.” 
NSA surveillance. The U.S. should: “(a) take all necessary measures to ensure that its surveillance activities, both within and outside the [U.S.], conform to its obligations under the Covenant, including article 17;  in particular, measures should be taken to ensure that any interference with the right to privacy complies with the principles of legality, proportionality and necessity regardless of the nationality or location of individuals whose communications are under direct surveillance; (b) ensure that any interference with the right to privacy, family, home or correspondence be authorized by laws that (i) are publicly accessible; (ii) contain provisions that ensure that collection of, access to and use of communications data are tailored to specific legitimate aims; (iii) are sufficiently precise specifying in detail the precise circumstances in which any such interference may be permitted; the procedures for authorizing; the categories of persons who may be placed under surveillance; limits on the duration of surveillance; procedures for the use and storage of the data collected; and (iv) provide for effective safeguards against abuse; (c) reform the current system of oversight over surveillance activities to ensure its effectiveness, including by providing for judicial involvement in authorization or monitoring of surveillance measures, and considering to establish strong and independent oversight mandates with a view to prevent abuses; (d) refrain from imposing mandatory retention of data by third parties;(e) ensure that affected persons have access to effective remedies in cases of abuse.”
Juvenile justice and life without parole sentences. The U.S. should: “prohibit and abolish all juvenile life without parole sentences irrespective of the crime committed, as well as all mandatory and non-homicide related sentences of life without parole. . . .  ensure that all juveniles are separated from adults during pretrial detention and after sentencing and that juveniles are not transferred to adult courts. . . . [encourage] states that automatically exclude 16 and 17 year olds from juvenile court jurisdictions . . . to change their laws.”
Voting rights. The U.S. should: “ensure that all states reinstate voting rights to felons who have fully served their sentences, provide inmates with information about their voting restoration options and remove or streamline lengthy and cumbersome state voting restoration procedures, as well as review automatic denial of the vote to any imprisoned felon, regardless of the nature of the offence. [T]ake all necessary measures to ensure that voter identification requirements and the new eligibility requirements do not impose excessive burdens on voters resulting in de facto disenfranchisement. [P]rovide . . . full voting rights of residents of Washington, D.C.”
Rights of indigenous people. The U.S. should: “adopt measures to effectively protect sacred areas of indigenous peoples against desecration, contamination and destruction and ensure that consultations are held with the communities that might be adversely affected by State party’s development projects and exploitation of natural resources with a view to obtaining their free, prior and informed consent for the potential project activities.”
Other. The U.S. should: “widely disseminate the Covenant, the text of the . . . [recent U.S. report to the Committee], the written responses that . . . [the U.S.] has provided in response to the list of issues drawn up by the Committee and the present concluding observations so as to increase awareness among the judicial, legislative and administrative authorities, civil society and non-governmental organizations . . . [in the U.S.] as well as the general public.” “[For] its fifth periodic report, . . . continue its practice of broadly consulting with civil society and non-governmental organizations. [P]rovide, within one year, relevant information on its implementation of the Committee’s recommendations regarding accountability for [past human rights violations, gun violence, detainees at Guantanamo Bay and NSA surveillance]. [Submit] its next periodic report . . . [on March 28, 2019 with] specific, up-to-date information on all . . . [the Committee’s] recommendations and on the Covenant as a whole.”
One of the overriding issues in the Committee’s review was the geographical coverage of the entire treaty, whether it applies to U.S. conduct outside the U.S. territory, but where it has jurisdiction. The proper conclusion to this issue, in this blogger’s opinion, is that it does so apply or does have extraterritorial application. This conclusion was succinctly stated by the Committee’s Chairperson, Sir Nigel Rodley, during the hearing as noted in a prior post.
Essentially the same conclusion was reached in an October 2010 memo by Harold Koh, then the U.S. State Department’s Principal Legal Adviser. After what he described as an “exhaustive review,” he stated, “an interpretation of Article 2(1) [of the ICCPR] that is truer to the Covenant’s language, context, object and purpose, negotiating history, and subsequent understandings of other States Parties, as well as the interpretations of other international bodies, would provide that in fact, . . . [a] state incurs obligations to respect Covenant rights — is itself obligated not to violate those rights through its own actions or the actions of its agents– in those circumstances where a state exercises authority or effective control over the person or context at issue.”
Civil society organizations in the U.S. lauded the Committee’s “scathing report” and characterized the review as an opportunity for the Obama Administration to meaningfully improve its human rights legacy. The Electronic Frontier Foundation, among other groups, welcomed the Committee’s explicit recognition of the extraterritorial nature of the State’s obligations and its specific recommendations regarding surveillance, and urged immediate implementation by the United States.
The U.S. press coverage of this important international critique of U.S. human rights was pathetic. I did not find any such coverage in the Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal, two respected national newspapers.
The New York Times, on the other hand, had limited coverage. Before the hearings, the Times published one article on the then likely U.S. rejection of the treaty’s having extraterritorial effect along with the actual text of the contrary opinion on that issue by Harold Koh. Later the Times had an article about the first day of the Committee’s hearings that was primarily about the U.S.’ actual rejection of the treaty’s extraterritoriality with two short paragraphs about other issues. Finally the Times had an exceedingly short article about the Committee’s report that touched only on a few of its issues (drone strikes; the virtual lack of any U.S. investigation and prosecutions for alleged unlawful killings; use of torture and authors of legal memoranda purportedly justifying torture in the so called “war on terror;” and the call for publication of the U.S. Senate’s investigation of the CIA’s secret rendition program (turning over suspects to other countries)).
Finally, the Committee’s critique can be taken as an agenda for change by U.S. human rights advocates. Such change will not happen quickly given the dysfunctionality of the U.S. political system and culture. As President Obama frequently says, change does not come easily. —————————————————————–
 Before making its criticisms, the Committee noted its “appreciation [for] the many [U.S.] efforts undertaken, and the progress made in protecting civil and political rights.” The Committee then welcomed the U.S. Supreme Court’s abolition of the death penalty for offenders who were under the age of 18 when the crimes were committed (Roper v. Simmons (2005)); the U.S. Supreme Court’s recognition of extraterritorial habeas corpus for aliens detained at Guantanamo Bay (Boumediene v. Bush (2008)); the expansion of rights for such detainees (Presidential Executive Orders 13491 and 13493); and the U.S. President’s support of the U.N. Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
 This issue concerned Article 2(1) of the ICCPR, which states, “Each State Party . . . undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” (Emphasis added.)
 The Optional Protocol to the ICCPR allows alleged victims of an alleged violation by a State Party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant to submit a communication of complaint to the Committee, and after it has received a response from that State Party, the Committee shall submit ”its views” [akin to an advisory opinion] on the matter to the alleged victim and State Party.
 The U.S. reservations and understandings to its ratification of the treaty were covered in a prior post.
 “Persons in command positions” presumably include former President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.
 “Those who provided legal pretexts” presumably include John Yoo, Alberto Gonzalez and four other lawyers who in the George W. Bush Administration were authors of legal memoranda justifying the so-called “enhanced interrogation” techniques. At least some of these memoranda are available online. The issue of their legal responsibility for such memoranda has been raised in at least three proceedings. First, under Spain’s previous version of its universal jurisdiction statute, a Spanish court opened a criminal investigation regarding these six lawyers, but later the case was stayed when the Spanish court asked the U.S. for information about any U.S. investigation of such allegations. Second, Mr. Yoo was sued in U.S. federal court for money damages and declaratory relief by an individual who had been arrested and detained for interrogation in a military brig in the U.S. for three and a half years, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in May 2012 held that Mr. Yoo was entitled to immunity and thus reversed the district court’s denial of Yoo’s dismissal motion. Third, in January 2010, the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Professional Responsibility concluded that Yoo and another lawyer had used flawed legal reasoning in these memoranda, but that this had not constituted professional misconduct This issue also has been raised in other contexts. In the midst of all this, Yoo continues vigorously to assert the validity of the memoranda and thus his innocence.
 One of the Committee’s concerns that prompted this recommendation was, in the Committee’s words, “surveillance of Muslims undertaken by . . . the New York Police Department (NYPD) in the absence of any suspicion of wrongdoing.” On April 15th (or nearly three weeks after the issuance of the Committee’s report), the NYPD announced that it was terminating this program. This decision was welcomed by Muslim Advocates and the Center for Constitutional Rights of New York City while lamenting that the NYPD did not say it was ending its broad surveillance practices.
 There is litigation in U.S. courts over lethal drugs used in executions under death penalty laws. In Oklahoma, for example, a state trial court on March 26, 2014, decided that a state law mandating secrecy for the identity of suppliers of such drugs was unconstitutional. On April 21st the Oklahoma Supreme Court stayed two executions so that the court could resolve “grave constitutional claims.” Since then there has been an unseemly intra-state squabble over whether that court had the power to stay the executions with the Oklahoma Governor vowing to conduct the executions as previously scheduled, a state legislator introducing a resolution to impeach the court’s judges who voted for the stay and the Supreme Court itself on April 23rd vacating the stay.
 The U.S. has a criminal torture statute, 18 U.S.C. sec. 2340A. It states, “Whoever outside the United States commits or attempts to commit torture shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, and if death results to any person from conduct prohibited by this subsection, shall be punished by death or imprisoned for any term of years or for life.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, this criminal statute does not apply if the torture occurs in the U.S. In addition, the U.S. has the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA) that provides for a civil action for money damages by an “individual” who has been subjected to “torture” against an “individual, who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation” committed the torture. (Emphasis added.) Thus, this statute does not apply if the torture is committed by someone acting under U.S. law.
 The ICCPR’s Article 6 bans arbitrary deprivation of life and any derogation from the genocide treaty while its Article 7 bans torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
 The ICCPR’s Article 7 bans “torture . . . [and] cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment while its Article 10 requires all inmates to be “treated with humanity and respect for the dignity of the human person,” separation of accused persons from convicts and juveniles from adults and in facilities whose aims shall be “reformation and social rehabilitation” of inmates.
 Article 14 of the ICCPR contains detailed provisions that in the U.S. would be regarded as constitutional criminal due process rights.
 Article 17 of the ICCPR says “[e]veryone has the right to the protection of law against . . . arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, . . . [and] unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.”
 The Committee’s report recognized with satisfaction that the U.S. Supreme Court had decided under the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth Amendment’s ban on “cruel and unusual punishment” that (a) sentences of life without parole for juveniles for non-homicide crimes were not permitted (Graham v. Florida (2010)); and (b) mandatory sentences of life without parole for juveniles for homicide were not permitted (Miller v. Alabama (2012)).
Koh is one of the U.S.’ preeminent international lawyers. He has taught at the Yale Law School since 1985 except for his years as the State Department’s Legal Adviser (2009-2013) and as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (1998-2001). He served as the Dean of the Yale Law School (2004-2009) and returned to Yale in 2013 as the Sterling Professor of International Law. He has received many awards and holds degrees from Harvard University (B.A. and J.D.) and the University of Oxford (B.A. and M.A.)
 The Koh memorandum also stated that the contrary 1995 opinion by the Department’s Legal Adviser was “not compelled by either the language or the negotiating history of the Covenant . . . [and] that the 1995 Interpretation is in fact in significant tension with the treaty’s language, context, and object and purpose, as well as with interpretations of importantU.S. allies, the Human Rights Committee and the ICJ [International Court of Justice], and developments in related bodies of law [and, therefore,] was no longer tenable.” Nevertheless, the U.S. continues to rely on the 1995 opinion for its resistance to extraterritorial application of the ICCPR. The Koh memorandum was published by the New York Times along with a discussion of the document a week prior to the Committee’s hearings, and it is safe to assume that copies of same were provided to all the Committee members before the hearings.
As discussed in a prior post, in March 2014, the United Nations’ Human Rights Committee (the Committee) issued a negative evaluation of how the United States of America (U.S.) was implementing and complying with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR or Covenant), which is regarded as an important part of the International Bill of Rights. That prior post reviewed the background of the ICCPR and certain events preceding the Committee’s evaluation.
Now we look at the hearings that lead up to that negative evaluation. The evaluation itself will be the subject of another post.
On March 13 and 14, 2014, the Committee held sessions or hearings in Geneva, Switzerland regarding the U.S. report and other information.
The Committee’s questions focused on racial disparities in the criminal justice system; racial discrimination and profiling; police brutality; treatment of the homeless population; the death penalty; gun violence (including stand-your-ground laws); detention of immigrants; drone attacks; “enhanced interrogation techniques” including water boarding; National Security Agency surveillance; treatment of detainees held in Guantanamo; and transfers or renditions of detainees to third countries that practiced torture. Other covered issues were restrictions on voter registration and alleged mistreatment of mentally-ill and juvenile prisoners.
The Committee encouraged the U.S. to disclose a Senate investigative report on a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) interrogation program that reportedly involved torture. The U.S. delegation’s insistence that the NSA’s mass collection of data was lawful and subject to substantial oversight was disputed by non-governmental groups that attended the sessions.
One Committee member, Walter Kälin, was especially critical in his comments and questions. Here a few of those comments:
He attacked the US government’s refusal to recognize the ICCPR’s mandate over its actions beyond its own borders. He said if the U.S. position were adopted universally, it would foster “impunity and lack of accountability” for human rights violations.
Kälin said, “One hundred and forty-four cases of people wrongfully convicted to death [in the U.S.] is a staggering number.” He pointed out the “disproportional representation of African Americans on death rows . . . ‘Discrimination is bad, but it is absolutely unacceptable when it leads to death.’”
Kälin pointed to another “‘staggering figure’ – that there are 470,000 crimes committed with firearms each year, including about 11,000 homicides. . . . [M]uch more needs to be done to curb gun violence.”
The Committee’s Chairperson, Sir Nigel Rodley of the United Kingdom, addressed the issue of legal opinions in the George W. Bush Administration that provided a purported legal justification for the “enhanced interrogation” methods. Sir Nigel said, “When evidently seriously flawed legal opinions are issued which then are used as a cover for the committing of serious crimes, one wonders at what point the authors of such opinions may themselves have to be considered part of the criminal plan in the first place?” He added, “Of course we know that so far there has been impunity.”
Chairperson Rodley also zeroed in on the issue of extraterritorial application of the ICCPR. He said at the conclusion of the hearings, it “was difficult . . . to understand what principles underlay the [U.S.] non-acceptance of the extraterritorial application of the Covenant.” Indeed, he immediately followed this statement with his exposition of the Committee’s contrary view. In diplomatic language, Rodley was saying the U.S. position was absurd. Here is Sir Nigel’s exposition:
“The relevant applicable principles were the canons of interpretation contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, . . . [which] stated that a treaty should be interpreted in the light of its text, its context, and its object and purpose.”
“Consequently, it was difficult to see how the words of article 2 of the Covenant regarding a State party’s undertaking to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized therein [] were only capable of interpretation as meaning that they applied solely to people who were both within the territory and subject to its jurisdiction. An ordinary, grammatical reading of the article in question supported the interpretation that it applied to everybody in either of the circumstances provided for.”
“Furthermore, the idea that the object and purpose of the treaty was met by saying that its application stopped at the frontier, whatever effective control any State might have over certain individuals, was one that was hardly consistent with the treaty’s object and purpose. That was the position not only of the Committee  but also of the International Court of Justice and very many States.”
The Committee’s negative comments at the hearings were a preview of its very critical comments about U.S. human rights in the Committee’s concluding report or “observations.” Another post will discuss that report.
Walter Kälin is a preeminent Swiss humanitarian, constitutional lawyer, international human rights lawyer, activist, advocate, legal scholar and law professor. He has been published extensively on issues of human rights law, the law of internally displaced persons, refugee law and Swiss constitutional law. Since Since 2004, Kälin has served as the Representative of the United Nations’ Secretary-General on the Human Rights of InternallyDisplaced Persons, and In 1991-1992, he served as the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Kuwait under Iraqi occupation. He holds degrees from the University of Bern (Dr. Jur.) and the Harvard Law School (LL.M.)
Sir Nigel Rodley since 2001 has been a Committee member and since 2003 has served as its Vice Chair and now its Chair. He also is a Commissioner of the International Commission of Jurists and a trustee of the NGO Freedom from Torture. Since 1990 he has taught law and human rights at the University of Essex and since 1994 has been its Professor of Law and Chair of the Human Rights Centre. Formerly he was Amnesty International’s Legal Advisor and Head of the Legal and Intergovernmental Organisations [sic] Office (1973–1990) and U.N. Special Rapporteur on torture (1993-2001). He is a founding member and former Executive Committee Vice Chairman of INTERRIGHTS (the International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights). He is the author of books and articles about international human rights and holds degrees from the University of Leeds (LLB), New York University (LLM), Columbia University (LLM) and the University of Essex (PhD). In 1998 Queen Elizabeth awarded him the Knight of the British Empire (KBE) for his “services to human rights and international law.”
 The complete text of Article 2(1) of the ICCPR states: “Each State Party to the . . . [ICCPR] undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,property, birth or other status.”
 The Committee publishes “general comments” setting forth its interpretation of various provisions of the treaty, and its interpretation of Article 2(1) is set forth in General Comment No. 31 (The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant), which was issued on March 29, 2004.