“State Sponsor of Terrorism” – Page 2

Cuba’s Suffering from Continued U.S. Hostility

After the Obama Administration had taken steps to improve U.S. relations with Cuba, the Trump Administration has gone in the opposite direction, as discussed in many earlier posts.[1]

U.S. Actions and Policies Against Cuba

These negative actions and policies include the following: continuation of U.S. embargo of Cuba; elimination of one of the “general licenses” for U.S. nationals to travel to Cuba; cancelation of right of U.S. cruise ships to make stops on the island; reducing amount of money U.S. nationals legally may remit to relatives and friends in Cuba; allowing litigation in U.S. federal courts over alleged trafficking in U.S.-owned property on the island under the Halms-Burton Act; additions to the U.S. “Cuba Restricted List” of entities and sub entities with which U.S. nationals may not transact business; U.S. negative reports on Cuban human rights, religious freedom and human trafficking; unilateral U.S. report about increasing Cuban Internet access; U.S. consideration of re-designating Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism and of re-instituting U.S. parole for Cuban medical professionals; additional U.S. sanctions against Cuba for its alleged support of Venezuela.[2]

While there are recent bilateral bills in Congress to end the embargo and enhance U.S. nationals’ rights to travel to Cuba, they have not received, and are unlikely to receive, any consideration in the current Senate and perhaps the House of Representatives.[3]

Negative Impact on Cuba of U.S. Actions and Policies[4]

The negative impact, especially of the recent U.S. limiting the ability of Americans to travel to the island, has especially harmed Cuba’s emerging private sector. For example, a website and app used to make reservations, rate restaurants, and pay for meals at most restaurants throughout Cuba (AlaMesa) had to reduce its staff from 20 to 12 in response to a 30 to 40% decline in reservations.

But “Cuba’s economic woes go beyond U.S. policy. The island, with one of the world’s last communist governments, has been caught in a perfect storm. Its economy has been stagnant for years, averaging only about 1 percent annual growth. Its centrally-planned economy imports over two-thirds of its food. Its ally, Venezuela, has been in political and economic turmoil, causing an overall decline in oil shipments from the South American country. The island’s medical exchange program, a major source of revenue, also took a blow. Last November, Cuba recalled 8,517 medical professionals from Brazil in response to President Jair Bolsonaro’s tough stance against Cuba.”

The U.S. allowance of litigation over alleged trafficking in Cuba property owned by Americans is seen as discouraging foreign investment today.

Recently “there have been shortages in basic goods such as eggs, cooking oil and chicken.”

Cuban Government’s Response to Rough Economic Conditions[5]

At the July 13 closing session of the National Assembly, President Diaz-Canel reported that a series of emergency measures announced that month aimed to stimulate domestic production and he hoped for slight growth this year. “Even in the eye of the hurricane of adversity that the enemy conceived to suffocate us, the Cuban economy can grow slightly, thanks to the fact that we have the potential to resist and continue advancing in our development.” He added that the economy grew 2.2% in 2018, compared with an earlier estimate of 1.2%, and that stronger base would make it harder to reach this year’s goal of 1.5% growth.

The President also said there will be price controls and policies aimed at stimulating local production to meet increased consumer demand without sparking inflation.

The next week of July 15, Cuba experienced power outages and fuel shortages that prompted citizen concern about the possible emergence of a “Special Period II” of harsh economic shortages. Cuba Energy Commissioner Raul Garcia sought to reassure citizens that the power outages were due to breakdowns in power plants, not oil shortages, and that those outages would be fixed by the end of the week.

These measures came at a time when falling Cuban imports have caused scattered shortages of food, hygiene and other products across the country. Diaz-Canel admitted the country was suffering from a liquidity crisis and bureaucracy and was short on fuel. He called on officials and the public to join together in the national emergency and each do their part to move the country forward. “Putting aside vanities and selfishness, practicing honesty, industriousness and decency, we will also be contributing to GDP,” he said.

On August 2, the Cuban government for the first time published details of its foreign exchange earnings from services such as telecommunications, hotels, health and education assistance, in an apparent concession to creditors. The biggest export earner in 2018 was health services at $6.4 billion, followed by “support services” at $1.3 billion while hotel and related services garnered $970 million, followed by telecommunications at $722 million and transportation and support services, which includes everything from airlines to docking fees, at around $600 million. Total exports were $18.6 billion in 2013 and $14.5 billion last year, down from $18.6 billion in 2013. Imports fell from $15.6 billion to $12.6 billion.

All of these developments have resulted in an increase in the country’s foreign debt from $11.9 billion in 2013 to $18.2 billion in 2016, an increase of almost 53% percent.

Cuba Introduces Price Controls[6]

In early July President Miguel Diaz-Canel announced that the government had adopted a series of emergency measures to fight economic stagnation and dwindling foreign currency earnings that began in 2015 as the economy of key ally Venezuela imploded, and that have been aggravated by a series of new U.S. sanctions. The measures included increased wages and pensions for more than 2 million state employees, amounting to more than 8 billion pesos annually, or close to 13 percent of this year’s budget. The President also said there will be price controls and policies aimed at stimulating local production to meet increased consumer demand without sparking inflation.

The other shoe dropped on July 30, when the President announced a ban on all retail and wholesale price increases except for products imported and distributed by the state where already-set profit margins cannot be increased. In recent weeks, regional authorities have slapped price controls on taxi fares, beverages and haircuts, among other items. The price controls differ from province to province.

These price controls are especially difficult for the private sector.

For example, on August 15, retail prices in Havana were set for some basic foods such as beans, pork, lemons, bananas, onions and cabbage. The retail price of pork, a staple of the Cuban diet, was set at 45 pesos a pound, although market sellers said it previously went for some 65 pesos a pound. And farmers still charge 28 pesos a pound for pork. Another example is lemons, which used to sell for 30 pesos a pound, now has a new maximum price of 10 to 15 pesos, which is the same price that farmers charge for the lemons.

On August 12, Cuba Minister of Finance and Prices, Meisi Bolaños, stated, “We are going to be rigorous with those who try, by means of devices, to evade and violate the new measures approved to avoid the increase in prices. . . . We cannot allow that measures like these that the country approves to boost the economy and generate greater capacity to buy in the population to be spoiled by a few unscrupulous that cause Cubans to lose confidence in state control.” The Minister also denied that the purpose of the measures is “to stop the development of non-state forms.”

Economists assert that such price controls are ineffective. Andrew Zimbalist, a Cuba expert at U.S.’s Smith College, said, “Such measures are usually okay for short periods of time, but if they stay in place they begin to create serious distortions in the economy.” A similar opinion was expressed by Pavel Vidal, a former Cuban central bank economist who teaches at Colombia’s Universidad Javeriana Cali. He said, “The more they control prices in formal markets, the more inflation and instability there will be in informal markets and the less incentive the productive sector has.”

Experts also have criticized Cuba’s verbose regulations of the private sector that were introduced at the end of 2018. They concluded that these “regulations approved by the Council of Ministers were written in reverse: excessive documents (29) and processes that represent obstacles in the application process for licenses, cracking down on violations, excessive inspections, the definition of twenty-two oversight agencies for the private sector (with specific departments to deal with them), the new requirement of a bank account with two months’ worth of taxes as credit in this account, needing to pay payroll taxes from the very first employee, etc.”

Conclusion

Obviously Cuba is in a very perilous situation that the U.S. has helped to create. All who support normalization of the two countries relations need to voice their opinions to their senators and representatives and to Trump Administration officials.

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[1] See List of Posts to dwkcommentaries—Topical: CUBA.

[2] E.g., Sabatinni, Trump Doubles Down on Failed Cuba Policy, N.Y. Times (July 24, 2019); U.S. Updates Cuba Restricted List (July 26, 2019); U.S. State Dep’t, State Department Updates the Cuba Restricted List (July 26, 2019); U.S. State Dep’t, List of Restricted Entities and Subentities Associated With Cuba as of July 26, 2019 (July 26, 2019); New U.S. Government Hostility Towards Cuba’s Medical Mission Program, dwkcommentareis.com (Aug. 14, 2019); “U.S. (Trump) and Cuba, 2016-2017,” “U.S. (Trump) and Cuba (2018),” “U.S. (Trump) and Cuba, 2019,” “U.S. Parole Program for Cuban Medical Professionals, 2019,” “Cuba, Venezuela and U.S., 2019,” “Cuba Restricted List, 2019,” “ Helms-Burton Act Title III Authorization, 2019” and U.S. Embargo of Cuba, 2019” sections in List of Posts to dwkcommentaries—Topical: Cuba.

[3] See these posts to dwkcommentaries.com: New Bill To End U.S. Embargo of Cuba (Feb. 9, 2019); Senator Leahy’s Senate Floor Speech To End Embargo of Cuba (Feb. 18, 2019); Congressional Bipartisan Bills for Reversal of U.S. Policies Regarding Cuba (Aug. 13, 2019).

[4] Sesin, In Cuba, entrepreneurs see a steep decline with Trump policies, NBC News (July 6, 2019); Cuba Says Fuel Shortage, Blackouts Are Temporary, Being Fixed, Reuters (July 19, 2019); Frank, Cuba hopes for slight growth as Trump pummels Caribbean island, Reuters (July 13, 2019).

[5] Kuritzkes, The End of Cuba’s Entrepreneurship Boom, Foreign Policy (July 15, 2019); The decline in tourism from the United States to Cuba already feels strongly on island, France23 (July 18, 2019);Taylor, Cubans Talk About Impact of Trump Administration Travel Policy Changes, Travel Pulse (July 22, 2019); Myers, A Visit To Cuba Reveals Economic Pain of Trump’s Travel Ban, Travel Weekly (July 29, 2019); Eaton, Cuba Trying to Attract Tourists and Investors Even as U.S. Clamps Down, Tampa Bay Times (July 30, 2019); Reuters, Cuba Reveals Health, Hotel, Other Service Earnings, N.Y. Times (Aug. 2, 2019); Whitefield, Cuba Feels the Pinch of the Trump administration’s travel restrictions, L.A. Times (Aug. 11, 2019); Torres, Cuba’s foreign debt is on the rise despite big profits from medical services abroad, Miami Herald (Aug. 12, 2019);Myers, Taking the pulse of demand for Cuba travel, Travel Weekly (Aug. 13, 2019); The Cuban economy is increasingly indebted, official figures reveal, Diario de Cuba (Aug. 15, 2019).

[6] The Government of Havana sets maximum prices for sale of products, Cubadebate (July 28, 2019); Frank, Cuba, battling economic crisis, imposes sweeping price controls, Reuters (July 30, 2019); Vela, Cuba’s Price Control Is Short-Term Fix To Production Problems, Economist Says, ABC10 News (July 30, 2019); Fuentes Puebla & Romeo Matos, Price control, a necessary complement to the salary increase in the budgeted sector, Cubadebate (Aug. 1, 2019); The Cuban Government warns that it will be relentless in the face of ‘artifice’ to avoid its price cap, Diario de Cuba (Aug. 13, 2019); Reuters, Cuban Government Imposes Price Controls as It Seeks to Keep Lid on Inflation, N.Y. Times (Aug. 15, 2019); Fernandez, It’s a Long and Winding Road for Cuba’s Private Sector, Havana Times (Aug. 15, 2019).

U.S. Considering Re-Designating Cuba as “State Sponsor of Terrorism”

According to the Miami Herald, the U.S. is considering re-designating Cuba as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism” if Cuba’s government and military continue to support Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela. A senior U.S. official said, ”What Cubans are doing in Venezuela is unacceptable,. And the United States is evaluating options to address that behavior.” [1]

This unnamed official added, ““The Cubans are executing a strategy to keep the military from second-guessing their support to Maduro. The only thing that is preventing the generals from supporting President Juan Guaidó is the surveillance Cubans are doing. What is keeping [Nicolas] Maduro going is Cuba’s logistical support.”

Another potential reason for such a re-designation is Cuba’s refusal so far to extradite Colombian leaders of the guerilla group ELN — in Havana for currently suspended peace negotiations —for suspected involvement in. last week’s fatal car bombing in Bogota. The Cuban government, however, condemned the attack, but said it would follow the protocols agreed at the start of peace negotiations in 2017. These provide security guarantees for guerrilla commanders to return to Colombia or Venezuela within 15 days of an end to talks and bar military offensives for 72 hours. [2]

Reactions

This possible re-designation predictably was endorsed by Senator Marco Rubio. He said, “Maduro had ‘bought’ the loyalty of the largely corrupt generals. They are also loyal, by the way, because the Cubans are spying on them. The Cuban intelligence agencies quickly pick up on any of these military officers that are being disloyal or expressing doubts and those guys are arrested. There has been a massive purge of Venezuelan military officers over the last two years … And it wasn’t because of corruption … It was because the Cubans caught them and reported them.”

According to William LeoGrande, a Cuba expert and American University professor, “Putting Cuba back on the list of state sponsors of international terrorism would not have a major practical impact on Cuba because almost all the financial sanctions that such a designation entails are already in place under the broader Cuban embargo. However, Cuba would take it as a great insult, and it would certainly have an extremely negative effect on state-to-state cooperation on issues of mutual interest.”

LeoGrande added, ““The Cuban government certainly recognizes that Maduro’s situation is dire and the worst outcome for Cuba would be complete regime collapse through civil violence or external military intervention. Regime collapse would probably mean an immediate end to Venezuelan oil shipments to Cuba — a blow to [Cuba’s] already fragile economy. Cuba would be willing to help find a negotiated political solution to the Venezuelan crisis . . . but only if both Maduro and the opposition are willing to seek such a solution. At the moment, neither side seems willing to accept any compromise. As a result, the Cubans are essentially stuck with Maduro, even as the chances for his survival diminish.”

Another U.S. expert on Cuba, Ted Henken, a professor at Baruch College, said, “Returning Cuba to the list could be disastrous for the Cuban economy because it would scare away desperately needed foreign investments, already very small.”

Background

The State Department summarizes the statutory requirements for “state sponsor of terrorism” as a state that has been “determined [by the Secretary of State] to have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.” [3]

The Cuban government was on the list of countries that sponsor terrorism from 1982 until 2015, when the Obama administration ruled the island was no longer supporting terrorist organizations. More specifically, the State Department in April 2015 stated its recommendation to President Obama for rescission “reflects the Department’s assessment that Cuba meets the criteria established by Congress for rescission . . . . whether Cuba provided any support for international terrorism during the previous six months, and whether Cuba has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future.” This conclusion was based, in part, upon “corroborative assurances received from the Government of Cuba. [4]

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[1] Gamez Torres, U.S. considers putting Cuba on terror list over island’s support of Maduro, Miami Herald (Jan. 25, 2019).

[2[ Reuters, Cuba Urges Colombia, ELN Rebels to Follow Peace Talks Protocol, N.Y. times (Jan. 26, 2019).

[3] State Dep’t, State Sponsor of Terrorism. The three statues are section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, and section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act.

[4] President Obama Rescinds U.S. Designation of Cuba as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism,” dwkcommentaries.com (April 15, 2015). See also other posts listed in the “Cuba: State Sponsor of Terrorism?” section of List of Posts to dwkcommentaries—Topical (CUBA).

No Mention of Cuba in U.S. State Department’s Latest Report on Terrorism

On July 19, 2017, the U.S. State Department released its Country Reports on Terrorism 2016. One of its chapters lists these three countries as “state sponsors of terrorism:” Iran, Sudan and Syria. Other chapters discuss the terrorism records of most countries in the world.[1]

This Reports document, however, made no mention of Cuba or statement as to the reasons for this omission.[2] This was in sharp contrast to previous reports for the years 1981-2013, that listed Cuba as a “state sponsor of terrorism” (i.e., the government of a country that has “repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism”) and the removal of Cuba from that category for 2014 and 2015.

At the press briefing on the latest Reports, a journalist asked whether Secretary of State Tillerson himself had made the decision not to put Cuba back on the list of state sponsors since at his Senate confirmation hearing he had testified that he “wanted to examine the criteria under which Cuba was removed from the list” in 2015 for the year 2014.[3]

The State Department official responded: “Cuba was removed, and there is no requirement within the report for an individual chapter on every single country around the world. We produce chapters in the Country Reports based upon material, frankly, to include in the report. So it was assessed that there was not sufficient information there to provide a report this year on Cuba, but it was removed from the state sponsor list previously.”

Conclusion

The non-inclusion of Cuba as a “state sponsor of terrorism” in this latest report, in this blogger’s opinion, is the proper conclusion and perhaps is a sign that the Trump Administration’s rhetoric about Cuba is louder and stronger than its bite. Let us hope.

Moreover, the statement that the State Department did not have sufficient information about Cuban counterterrorism efforts to include Cuba in the latest report is disingenuous. From December 2014 through January 19, 2017 (the last full day of the Obama Administration), the U.S. and Cuba held discussions about their respective counterterrorism efforts, and on January 16, 2017 the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Law Enforcement that provided for cooperation on various matters, including “the fight against terrorism.” These discussions, although not a matter of public information, must have provided the U.S. with significant information about Cuba’s counterterrorism efforts.[4]]

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[1] U.S. State Dep’t, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016 (July 19, 2017); U.S. State Dep’t, Press Release: State Department Releases Country Reports on Terrorism 2016 (July 19, 2017); U.S. State Dep’t, Press Briefing: Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism Justin Siberell on the Release of Country Reports on Terrorism 2016 (July 19, 2017).

[2] Welsh, State Department drops Cuba entirely from annual detail of terrorist activity, McClatchy (July 19, 2017).

[3] Previous State Department reports about Cuba and terrorism have been discussed in posts to this blog. See posts listed in the “Cuba: State Sponsor of Terrorism?” section of List of Posts to dwkcommentaries—Topical: Cuba.

[4] See these posts to dwkcommentaries: United States and Cuba Hold Second Law Enforcement Dialogue (May 19, 2016); U.S. and Cuba Discuss Counterterrorism Cooperation (June 10, 2016); President Obama Issues Presidential Policy Directive—United States-Cuba Normalization (Oct. 14, 2016); U.S. and Cuba Continue to Implement Normalization of Relations (Jan. 17, 2017).

More Reasons To Believe There Is a Dim Future for U.S.-Cuba Normalization

Tomorrow the new Republican-controlled Congress convenes with the presidential inauguration of Donald Trump coming on January 20, and on their agendas is “unraveling some of the most significant policy prescriptions put forward by the Obama administration.”[1]

Most of this speculation about upcoming changes in national policies does not include cancelling Obama’s policy of normalization of relations with Cuba. But as prior posts have indicated, President-Elect Trump’s most recent statements have criticized that policy as have Vice President-Elect Mike Pence and some of the appointees to the transition team and the new administration, especially Reince Priebus, the new White House Chief of Staff; Cuban-American Mauricio Claver-Carone, a transition team member for the Department of the Treasury; Mike Pompeo, a Congressman from Kansas and the nominee for Director of the CIA; and General Michael Flynn, the proposed White House National Security Advisor. [2]

In addition, three more Cuban-Americans have been appointed to the transition team, two of whom have been opposed to such normalization. They are (1) Yleem Poblete, who has been assigned to the transition team for the National Security Council; (2) John Barsa, who will work with the Homeland Security team; and (3) Carlos E. Díaz-Rosillo, who will work on policy implementation. [3] Here is a preliminary examination of these appointees.

Yleem Poblete.

For nearly two decades Yleem Poblete has advised members of Congress on a wide variety of global issues as a member and director of the staff of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. She also co-leads a consulting group, The Poblete Analysis Group, with her husband, also a Cuban-American, Jason Poblete. She also has served as an assistant professor and researcher for the director of the Institute of Inter-American Studies at the University of Miami.[4]

She and her husband have written articles critical of President Obama’s pursuit of normalization with Cuba. They argued that Cuba was a ‘state sponsor of terrorism,” a designation rescinded by the State Department in May 2015; that the re-opening of the Cuban Embassy in Washington, D.C. increased the risk of Cuban spying on the U.S.; and that Cuba was a “pariah state [that] has earned every punitive measure imposed by the U.S.;” it “helped create and grow the Western Hemisphere drugs for arms network;” its “[h]ostile acts carried out by Havana’s spy recruits in the U.S. government are linked to American deaths;” it “also continues to collaborate with fellow rogues such as Iran;” it “harbors terrorists, as well as murderers and other dangerous fugitives of U.S. justice.”[5]

After the death of Fidel Castro last November she tweeted, “Lost in talk of #castrodeath is #cuba regime murder of Americans, safe haven 4 terrorists & US fugitives, #Iran ties, arms to #NorthKorea.”

John Barsa

Barsa was the first director of the Department of Homeland Security Public Liaison Office, where he worked with the Department’s Secretaries Tom Ridge and Michael Chertoff. Barsa also has experience with high-tech companies and was an assistant to Florida Republican Congressman, Lincoln Diaz-Balart, a Cuban-American known for his opposition to normalization. After Fidel Castro’s death, Barsa said, ““The contrast between Obama’s and Trump’s statements on the death of Fidel Castro is refreshing. MAKE CUBA GREAT AGAIN.” Barsa is a graduate in International Relations from the International University of Florida.[6]

Diaz-Rosillo.

According to his Harvard University biography, Diaz-Rosillo is a lecturer on government at Harvard University; Allston Burr Assistant Dean of Harvard College, Dunster House; and director of transfer advising at Harvard College. His research focuses on the American presidency, campaigns and elections, political leadership, public policy, and comparative chief executive politics. His work examines the different instruments of power that chief executives have at their disposal to affect policy. He holds undergraduate degrees summa cum laude in international relations (BA) and civil engineering (BSCE) from Tufts University, as well as graduate degrees in public policy (MPP) and government (AM, PhD) from Harvard University.[7]

Internet research did not uncover any statements by him about Cuba.

Conclusion

As a prior post stated, there regrettably are grounds for believing there is a dim future for continuation of normalization of U.S.-Cuba relations. Those of us in the U.S. who believe that this is an erroneous move need to continue to advocate for normalization and to share that opinion with our Senators and Representatives, the Trump Administration and our fellow U.S. citizens.

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[1] E.g., Steinhauer, With New Congress Poised to Convene, Obama’s Policies Are in Peril, N.Y. Times (Jan. 1, 2017).

[2] U.S. Reactions to Death of Fidel Castro, dwkcommentaries.com (Nov. 30, 2016); The Future of U.S.-Cuba Normalization Under the Trump Administration, dwkcommentaries.com (Dec. 22, 2016).

[3] People of the Year: DIARIO DE CUBA names the most noteworthy persons of the year, Diario de Cuba (Dec. 27, 2016).

[4] Cuban-American Trump Transition Team to National Security Council, News Marti (Dec. 1, 2016); Dr. Yleem Poblete, The Poblete Analysis Group.

[5] Poblete & Poblete, Yes, Cuba is a State Sponsor of Terrorism, Nat’l Review (Jan. 6, 2015); Poblete & Poblete, The U.S.-Cuba Deal Heightens the Spy Threat, W.S.J. (Jan 12, 2015) 2015); Poblete & Poblete, U.S. Cuba policy: Myth v. reality, The Hill (Jan. 26, 2015).

[6] A [fourth] Cuban American . . . joins Trump’s transition team, Diario de Cuba (Dec. 6, 2016); Secretary—John Barsa, Republican National Hispanic Assembly of Virginia; Prieto, The Mark of the Zorro; Cuban Americans in Trump’s Team, OnCuba (Dec. 15, 2016).

[7] Harvard University, Carlos E. Diaz-Rosillo, PhD.

Additional Details About White House’s Announcement of U.S.-Cuba Reconciliation

On December 17, 2014, President Barack Obama in a nationally televised speech announced the historic agreement with Cuba to restore diplomatic relations as one part of a reconciliation with Cuba. That same day the White House website had (a) “FACT SHEET: Charting a New Course in Cuba;” (b) “Background Conference Call on Policy Changes in Cuba and Release of Alan Gross;” and (c) “Readout of the Vice President’s Calls to the Presidents of Colombia and Mexico on the Administration’s Cuba Policy Changes.”

After reviewing these documents, the post will conclude with observations on some of the points raised in these documents.

“FACT SHEET: Charting a New Course in Cuba”

The introduction to the FACT SHEET, among other things, said, “It is clear that decades of U.S. isolation of Cuba have failed to accomplish our enduring objective of promoting the emergence of a democratic, prosperous, and stable Cuba. . . . It does not serve America’s interests, or the Cuban people, to try to push Cuba toward collapse. We know from hard-learned experience that it is better to encourage and support reform than to impose policies that will render a country a failed state. With our actions today, we are calling on Cuba to unleash the potential of 11 million Cubans by ending unnecessary restrictions on their political, social, and economic activities.” (Emphasis added.)

The FACT SHEET then provided the following “Key Components of the Updated Policy Approach:”

“Establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba-

The President has instructed the Secretary of State to immediately initiate discussions with Cuba on the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba, which were severed in January 1961.
In the coming months, we will re-establish an embassy in Havana and carry out high-level exchanges and visits between our two governments as part of the normalization process. As an initial step, the Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs will lead the U.S. Delegation to the next round of U.S.-Cuba Migration Talks in January 2015, in Havana.
U.S. engagement will be critical when appropriate and will include continued strong support for improved human rights conditions and democratic reforms in Cuba and other measures aimed at fostering improved conditions for the Cuban people. (Emphasis added.)
The United States will work with Cuba on matters of mutual concern and that advance U.S. national interests, such as migration, counternarcotics, environmental protection, and trafficking in persons, among other issues.” (Emphasis added.)

“Adjusting regulations to more effectively empower the Cuban people-

The changes announced today will soon be implemented via amendments to regulations of the Departments of the Treasury and Commerce. Our new policy changes will further enhance our goal of empowering the Cuban population.
Our travel and remittance policies are helping Cubans by providing alternative sources of information and opportunities for self-employment and private property ownership, and by strengthening independent civil society.
These measures will further increase people-to-people contact; further support civil society in Cuba; and further enhance the free flow of information to, from, and among the Cuban people. Persons must comply with all provisions of the revised regulations; violations of the terms and conditions are enforceable under U.S. law.”

“Facilitating an expansion of travel under general licenses for the 12 existing categories of travel to Cuba authorized by law-

General licenses will be made available for all authorized travelers in the following existing categories: (1) family visits; (2) official business of the U.S. government, foreign governments, and certain intergovernmental organizations; (3) journalistic activity; (4) professional research and professional meetings; (5) educational activities; (6) religious activities; (7) public performances, clinics, workshops, athletic and other competitions, and exhibitions; (8) support for the Cuban people; (9) humanitarian projects; (10) activities of private foundations or research or educational institutes; (11) exportation, importation, or transmission of information or information materials; and (12) certain export transactions that may be considered for authorization under existing regulations and guidelines.
Travelers in the 12 categories of travel to Cuba authorized by law will be able to make arrangements through any service provider that complies with the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) regulations governing travel services to Cuba, and general licenses will authorize provision of such services.
The policy changes make it easier for Americans to provide business training for private Cuban businesses and small farmers and provide other support for the growth of Cuba’s nascent private sector. Additional options for promoting the growth of entrepreneurship and the private sector in Cuba will be explored.”

“Facilitating remittances to Cuba by U.S. persons–

Remittance levels will be raised from $500 to $2,000 per quarter for general donative remittances to Cuban nationals (except to certain officials of the government or the Communist party); and donative remittances for humanitarian projects, support for the Cuban people, and support for the development of private businesses in Cuba will no longer require a specific license.
Remittance forwarders will no longer require a specific license.”

“Authorizing expanded commercial sales/exports from the United States of certain goods and services-

The expansion will seek to empower the nascent Cuban private sector. Items that will be authorized for export include certain building materials for private residential construction, goods for use by private sector Cuban entrepreneurs, and agricultural equipment for small farmers. This change will make it easier for Cuban citizens to have access to certain lower-priced goods to improve their living standards and gain greater economic independence from the state.”

“Authorizing American citizens to import additional goods from Cuba-

Licensed U.S. travelers to Cuba will be authorized to import $400 worth of goods from Cuba, of which no more than $100 can consist of tobacco products and alcohol combined.”

“Facilitating authorized transactions between the United States and Cuba-

U.S. institutions will be permitted to open correspondent accounts at Cuban financial institutions to facilitate the processing of authorized transactions.
The regulatory definition of the statutory term “cash in advance” will be revised to specify that it means “cash before transfer of title”; this will provide more efficient financing of authorized trade with Cuba.
U.S. credit and debit cards will be permitted for use by travelers to Cuba.
These measures will improve the speed, efficiency, and oversight of authorized payments between the United States and Cuba.”

“Initiating new efforts to increase Cubans’ access to communications and their ability to communicate freely-

Cuba has an internet penetration of about five percent—one of the lowest rates in the world. The cost of telecommunications in Cuba is exorbitantly high, while the services offered are extremely limited.
The commercial export of certain items that will contribute to the ability of the Cuban people to communicate with people in the United States and the rest of the world will be authorized. This will include the commercial sale of certain consumer communications devices, related software, applications, hardware, and services, and items for the establishment and update of communications-related systems.
Telecommunications providers will be allowed to establish the necessary mechanisms, including infrastructure, in Cuba to provide commercial telecommunications and internet services, which will improve telecommunications between the United States and Cuba.”

“Updating the application of Cuba sanctions in third countries-

U.S.-owned or -controlled entities in third countries will be generally licensed to provide services to, and engage in financial transactions with, Cuban individuals in third countries. In addition, general licenses will unblock the accounts at U.S. banks of Cuban nationals who have relocated outside of Cuba; permit U.S. persons to participate in third-country professional meetings and conferences related to Cuba; and, allow foreign vessels to enter the United States after engaging in certain humanitarian trade with Cuba, among other measures.”

“Pursuing discussions with the Cuban and Mexican governments to discuss our unresolved maritime boundary in the Gulf of Mexico-

Previous agreements between the United States and Cuba delimit the maritime space between the two countries within 200 nautical miles from shore. The United States, Cuba, and Mexico have extended continental shelf in an area within the Gulf of Mexico where the three countries have not yet delimited any boundaries.
The United States is prepared to invite the governments of Cuba and Mexico to discuss shared maritime boundaries in the Gulf of Mexico”

“Initiating a review of Cuba’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism-

The President has instructed the Secretary of State to immediately launch such a review, and provide a report to the President within six months regarding Cuba’s support for international terrorism. Cuba was placed on the list in 1982.”[1]

“Addressing Cuba’s participation in the 2015 Summit of the Americas in Panama-

President Obama will participate in the Summit of the Americas in Panama. Human rights and democracy will be key Summit themes. Cuban civil society must be allowed to participate along with civil society from other countries participating in the Summit, consistent with the region’s commitments under the Inter-American Democratic Charter. The United States welcomes a constructive dialogue among Summit governments on the Summit’s principles.” (Emphasis added.)

“Unwavering Commitment to Democracy, Human Rights, and Civil Society

A critical focus of our increased engagement will include continued strong support by the United States for improved human rights conditions and democratic reforms in Cuba. The promotion of democracy supports universal human rights by empowering civil society and a person’s right to speak freely, peacefully assemble, and associate, and by supporting the ability of people to freely determine their future. Our efforts are aimed at promoting the independence of the Cuban people so they do not need to rely on the Cuban state. (Emphasis added.)

The U.S. Congress funds democracy programming in Cuba to provide humanitarian assistance, promote human rights and fundamental freedoms, and support the free flow of information in places where it is restricted and censored. The Administration will continue to implement U.S. programs aimed at promoting positive change in Cuba, and we will encourage reforms in our high level engagement with Cuban officials. (Emphasis added.)

The United States encourages all nations and organizations engaged in diplomatic dialogue with the Cuban government to take every opportunity both publicly and privately to support increased respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cuba.

Ultimately, it will be the Cuban people who drive economic and political reforms. That is why President Obama took steps to increase the flow of resources and information to ordinary Cuban citizens in 2009, 2011, and today. The Cuban people deserve the support of the United States and of an entire region that has committed to promote and defend democracy through the Inter-American Democratic Charter.”

Background Conference Call

On December 17 two hours before President Obama’s speech to the nation, the White House conducted an hour-long “background” conference call with journalists and seven unnamed senior administration officials regarding these matters.

Among other things, one of the officials said the U.S. expects that “we’ll continue to have strong differences, particularly on issues related to democracy and human rights. The [U.S.] will continue to promote our values. We will continue to support civil society in Cuba. We’ll continue our democracy programming.” In President Obama’s December 16th telephone call with President Raúl Castro, Obama “made clear his intent . . . to continue our advocacy for human rights in Cuba.”

A State Department official stated the U.S. would not reduce its “emphasis on human rights, on democracy, on the importance of civil society. . . . In fact, our emphasis on human rights will be just as strong and we believe more effective under this policy. We will engage directly with the Cuban government on human rights.”

For example, the State Department official stated a U.S. diplomat in Havana “will be meeting with members of Cuban society and dissidents later today to walk them through the President’s initiatives of today, and to emphasize to them, as well, that their efforts on behalf of democracy and human rights in Cuba not only won’t be forgotten in these initiatives, but will, in fact, take center stage.”

In response to a question as to whether there were discussions with Cuba about “USAID programs that have been pretty controversial in Cuba,” an administration official said U.S. “democracy programming . . . did factor into the discussions [with Cuba]. The Cubans do not like our democracy programming. They consistently protest those initiatives. . . . [The U.S., however,] made clear that we’re going to continue our support for civil society for the advancement of our values in Cuba. [This] . . . was an issue of difference that we will continue to have with Cuba, and we fully expect them to raise those issues just as we will raise issues with the Cubans about democracy and human rights. However, we’re going to do that through a normal relationship. We’re going to do that through our embassy in Havana. We’re going to do that through contacts between our various agencies.”[2]

Vice President Biden’s Telephone Calls with Presidents of Colombia and Mexico

The White House reported that Vice President Joe Biden made telephone calls about the new initiatives with Cuba to President Juan Manuel Santos of Colombia and to President Enrique Pena Nieto of Mexico. After outlining the agreement, Biden told each of them that President Obama intended to attend the Summit of the Americas in Panama next April “as long as Cuban civil society is allowed to participate and human rights and democracy are on the agenda.” In the call to President Nieto, Biden said that the U.S. would initiate discussions with Cuba and Mexico about the unresolved maritime boundary of the Gulf of Mexico.

Conclusion

I concur in most of the FACT SHEET’s assertions about democracy and human rights that suggest that the U.S. will engage and work with the Cuban government to improve the Cuban people’s political, social and economic rights and that the U.S. no longer will seek to impose such rights or values on the Cuban people through covert or “discreet” programs. These statements are the following:

(i) “It does not serve America’s interests, or the Cuban people, to try to push Cuba toward collapse. We know from hard-learned experience that it is better to encourage and support reform than to impose policies that will render a country a failed state. With our actions today, we are calling on Cuba to unleash the potential of 11 million Cubans by ending unnecessary restrictions on their political, social, and economic activities.”
(ii) “U.S. engagement will be critical when appropriate and will include continued strong support for improved human rights conditions and democratic reforms in Cuba and other measures aimed at fostering improved conditions for the Cuban people.”
(iii) “A critical focus of our increased engagement will include continued strong support by the United States for improved human rights conditions and democratic reforms in Cuba. The promotion of democracy supports universal human rights by empowering civil society and a person’s right to speak freely, peacefully assemble, and associate, and by supporting the ability of people to freely determine their future. Our efforts are aimed at promoting the independence of the Cuban people so they do not need to rely on the Cuban state.”
(iv) The U.S. “will encourage [such] reforms in our high level engagement with Cuban officials.”

Other statements in the FACT SHEET, however, seems to undercut this benign interpretation: (i) “The U.S. Congress funds democracy programming in Cuba to provide humanitarian assistance, promote human rights and fundamental freedoms, and support the free flow of information in places where it is restricted and censored. The Administration will continue to implement U.S. programs aimed at promoting positive change in Cuba. . . .” (ii) “The U.S. Congress funds democracy programming in Cuba to provide humanitarian assistance, promote human rights and fundamental freedoms, and support the free flow of information in places where it is restricted and censored. The Administration will continue to implement U.S. programs aimed at promoting positive change in Cuba.” [3]

According to the FACT SHEET, “President Obama will participate in the Summit of the Americas in Panama. Human rights and democracy will be key Summit themes. Cuban civil society must be allowed to participate along with civil society from other countries participating in the Summit.” The account of the Vice President’s telephone calls, however, seems to add that President Obama intends to attend the Summit of the Americas in Panama next April “as long as Cuban civil society is allowed to participate and human rights and democracy are on the agenda.” I was surprised and disappointed to read that there was a precondition to Obama’s attending the summit: Cuba’s allowing members of its civil society to attend and participate in the Summit. While it may be a good idea to have civil society representatives from all countries, including Cuba, attend and participate, I think it unwise for the U.S. to provide Cuba with a veto on Obama’s attendance if it does not have such representatives there. I hope that this interpretation of the Vice President’s remarks is unfounded.

I am unaware of the details of the dispute about the maritime boundaries of the Gulf of Mexico, but assume that it relates to oil or other resources under the Caribbean.

================================================

[1] Prior posts discussed the legal and political issues of rescinding the designation of Cuba as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism” and the U.S.’ previous concessions that Cuba has provided assurances that it will not commit future acts of terrorism.

[2] On December 20^th Secretary of State John Kerry, Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker and Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew co-authored an article in the Miami Herald. It said the U.S. would have “continued strong support for improved human-rights conditions and democratic reforms in Cuba” and would “continue to implement programs to promote positive change in Cuba.”

[3] The previous democracy/human rights programs of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of State will be part of a subsequent post about the recent controversy about Cuba’s cancellation of n “open-microphone” event and arrests of its organizers.

The U.S. Has Conceded Many Reasons Why Cuba Has Provided Assurances That It Will Not Support Future Acts of International Terrorism

As mentioned in a prior post, the U.S. since December 17, 2014, has been investigating whether it may rescind the Department of State’s designation of Cuba as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism” under provisions of Section 6 (j) (4) of the Export Administration Act (50 U.S.C. § 2405(j)(4)). That statute allows any president to make such a rescission by submitting to Congress, at least 45 days in advance, “a report justifying the rescission and certifying that (i) the government concerned has not provided any support for international terrorism during the preceding six-month period; and (ii) the government concerned has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future.” (Emphasis added.)

Cuba has been put into the “State Sponsor” designation every year since 1982, and this blogger has read and reviewed all of the State Department annual terrorism reports that are available online (1996-2013). The five most recent reports (2009-2013) have been subjected to detailed analysis in blog posts with the conclusion that said designations of Cuba are absurd, ridiculous, stupid and cowardly. Those are the posts covering the reports for 2009, 2010, 2011, 2011 (supplement), 2012, 2013, 2013 (supplement).

One of the reasons why those designations are not justified is a collection of U.S. admissions in these very reports that in essence say that Cuba already “has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future,” one of the statutory grounds for rescission of the designation. Here are at least some of those admissions, the details of which can be found in the previously mentioned blog posts:

In 2001 (after 9/11) Cuba “signed all 12 UN counterterrorism conventions as well as the Ibero-American declaration on terrorism.” After 9/11, “the Cuban government and official media publicly condemned acts of terrorism by al-Qa’ida and affiliates.”

“Cuba no longer supports armed struggle in Latin America and other parts of the world.”

“There was no evidence that Cuba had sponsored specific acts of terrorism,” and “no indication that the Cuban government provided weapons or paramilitary training to terrorist groups.”

In 2010 the Government of Cuba was “aware of the border integrity and transnational security concerns posed by such transit and investigated third country migrant smuggling and related criminal activities. In November [2010], the [Cuban] government allowed representatives of the [U.S.] Transportation Security Administration to conduct a series of airport security visits throughout the island.”

In 2010 “the Cuban government continued to aggressively pursue persons suspected of terrorist acts in Cuba.”

In 2010 the Government of Cuba “maintained a public stance against terrorism and terrorist financing.”

There was “no evidence of terrorist-related money laundering or terrorist financing activities in Cuba” and “no evidence of direct financial support for terrorist organizations by Cuba.”

Cuba has adopted laws permitting the tracking, blocking, or seizing terrorist assets (Cuba’s Law 93 Against Acts of Terrorism and Instruction 19 of the Superintendent of the Cuban Central Bank).

After the multilateral “Financial Action Task Force (FATF) identified Cuba as “having strategic AML/CFT [Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism] deficiencies,” Cuba in 2012 “became a member of the Financial Action Task Force of South America against Money Laundering [GAFISUD], a FATF-style regional body. With this action, Cuba has committed to adopting and implementing the FATF Recommendations.” Thereafter Cuba “officially engaged with the FATF and has also attended [the meetings of the relevant regional organizations] CFATF [Caribbean Financial Action Task Force] and GAFISUD.”

Although not mentioned in the U.S. reports, FATF in June 2014 said, “ Cuba has made significant progress to improve its AML/CFT regime.” Four months later (October 2014), “FATF welcomes Cuba’s significant progress in improving its AML/CFT regime and notes that Cuba has established the legal and regulatory framework to meet its commitments in its action plan. . . . Cuba therefore is no longer subject to the FATF’s monitoring process. . . . Cuba will work with GAFISUD to further strengthen its AML/CFT regime.”

Also not mentioned in the U.S. terrorism reports was the CIA’s judgment in August 2003 that ‘We have no credible evidence, however, that the Cuban government has engaged in or directly supported international terrorist operations in the past decade, although our information is insufficient to say beyond a doubt that no collaboration has occurred.”

In addition to these U.S. admissions, Cuba publicly has stated that its “territory has never been and never will be utilized to harbor terrorists of any origin, nor for the organization, financing or perpetration of acts of terrorism against any country in the world, including the [U.S.]. . . . The Cuban government unequivocally rejects and condemns any act of terrorism, anywhere, under any circumstances and whatever the alleged motivation might be.”

Although not mentioned in the U.S. reports, in 2002, the government of Cuba proposed to the U.S. the adoption of a bilateral agreement to confront terrorism, an offer that it reiterated in 2012, without having received any response from the U.S.

Conclusion

As a result, I am confident that the Department of State’s investigation will conclude that Cuba “has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future,” one of the statutory grounds for rescission of the designation; that the other ground–Cuba “has not provided any support for international terrorism during the preceding six-month period”—will be satisfied; and that the President will decide, presumably this June, to rescind the designation effective 45 days thereafter.

Then the focus will shift first to Congress to see whether it will adopt a joint resolution against the rescission. If it does, presumably President Obama will veto the joint resolution. Then focus would return to Congress to see if there are the necessary two-thirds votes in each chamber to override the veto.

U. S. citizens supporting the U.S.-Cuba reconciliation should follow this issue closely and lobby their Senators and Representatives to oppose any measure to countermand a presidential decision for rescission.

Legal and Political Issues Regarding U.S. Rescinding Designation of Cuba as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism”

Under the December 17^th U.S.-Cuba agreements, the U.S. is obligated to review whether the U.S. should rescind its designation of Cuba as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism” under U.S. law. This review is to be completed with a report to the President within six months (or by June 17, 2015). The President already has instructed Secretary of State John Kerry to “immediately launch” that review.

Commentary by the Department of State

The same day Secretary of State Kerry announced that he already “had asked my team to initiate a review of Cuba’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism.”

The next day, December 18^th, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, Roberta S. Jacobson, held a press briefing on the many issues raised by the U.S.-Cuba rapproachment. She said the Bureau had “begun already – the process that we need to do under the law on the question of the state sponsor of terrorism listing, which has been in place since 1982.”

The Assistant Secretary added, “we’re not going to prejudge the outcome of the process we’ve just undertaken. . . . We’re going to undertake this review. We’re going to take it where the facts lead us on this. . . . At the end of that process, were Cuba to be removed from the list, there are a series of things that get taken off, some forms of sanction that get taken off. Although in Cuba’s case, I will say there are some overlapping . . . of things that may have been part of the state sponsor of terrorism list, and it may subsequently have been part of the Libertad Act or other legislation that deals with Cuba.”

In addition, she said,“[T]he law is fairly specific. . . . We have to review the record of Cuba over the last six months and ensure that they have not been participants or supported acts of international terrorism over the last six months. We have to look at whether they have renounced the use of terrorism. We have to look at their ratification of international instruments against terrorism. . . . I would have to look and check to see if there are other things that are in the law. . . . We then have to send any report that has conclusions on those subjects [to the President for his approval and transmittal] to the Congress, where it has to remain for 45 days. It’s an informing of Congress, not a request for approval or denial. It’s just an informing.”

Another point on the legislative process for the hypothetical recommended termination of such a designation was made at the November 17^th daily press briefing. The Departmental spokesperson said, “The relevant statutes also provide that . . . within 45 days after the receipt of the report from the President [deciding for rescission], the Congress would need to enact a joint resolution on the matter prohibiting this in order for it not to happen.” However, this statement is incomplete and, therefore, erroneous, as discussed below. While joint resolutions like bills have to be passed by both houses of Congress, they then have to be submitted to the president for signature or veto. In this hypothetical situation, any such joint resolution would be vetoed by the president.

The Merits of Past Designations of Cuba as a “State Sponsor“

This blog already has concluded that such designation is absurd, ridiculous, stupid and cowardly for 2009, 2010, 2011, 2011 (supplement), 2012, 2013, and 2013 (supplement). I believe that any rational person would come to the same conclusion as has the New York Times Editorial Board this October and December.

That, however, is not the end of the story.

Statute Regulating Rescission of a “State Sponsor” Designation

As Assistant Secretary Jacobson alluded to, under provisions of Section 6 (j) (4) of the Export Administration Act (50 U.S.C. § 2405(j)(4)) the following two alternative restrictions are imposed on any Administration’s rescission of any such designation.

First, the President may rescind such a designation by submitting, before the rescission takes effect, a report to Congress certifying that “(i) there has been a fundamental change in the leadership and policies of the government of the country concerned; [and] (ii) that government is not supporting acts of international terrorism; and (iii) that government has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future.” This is not relevant for Cuba because there has not been “a fundamental change of leadership” in Cuba.

Second, and alternatively, the President may rescind such a designation by submitting to Congress, at least 45 days in advance, “a report justifying the rescission and certifying that (i) the government concerned has not provided any support for international terrorism during the preceding six-month period; and (ii) the government concerned has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future.” Assistant Secretary Jacobson’s comments confirm that this is the relevant option for the Administration, and a future post will summarize concessions in the U.S.’ purported justifications for its prior designations that instead support the conclusion that Cuba ¨has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future.¨

Such a report to Congress is merely an “informing” function, as the Assistant Secretary mentioned. But if Congress disagrees with the President’s decision to remove a country from the list, it could seek to block the rescission through a bill or a joint resolution.

Given the Republicans control of both houses of the Senate (54 of 100 with 44 Democrats and 2 Independents) and the House (247 to 188 Democrats) in the 114^th Congress (2015-2017) and the belligerent opposition of some Republicans like Senator Marco Rubio to the new U.S.-Cuba path to reconciliation, such a legislative attempt to block the removal, in my opinion, can be expected.

But any such attempt, by bill or joint resolution, has to be submitted to the president for approval or veto. Obama presumably would veto any such measure, thereby requiring under Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution each house of Congress to obtain a two-thirds vote to override the veto. The Republicans by themselves will not have enough votes to override. If the Republicans had total party unity in such an effort, they would need 13 Democratic Senators and 43 Democratic Representatives to join them to overturn such a presidential veto. I think it unlikely they could obtain those extra votes. Let us hope they are not able to obtain such a super majority. We should lobby the Democratic Senators and Representatives (and some Republicans, like Senator Flake of Arizona) not to do so.

Conclusion

Stay tuned for future developments on the issue of rescinding the U.S. designation of Cuba as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism.” Be ready to lobby senators and representatives to resist any efforts to countermand any rescission.

Report for dwkcommentaries–-2014

This blog, which started on April 4, 2011, reports the following activity through December 31, 2014:

YEAR	POSTS	COMMENTS (by dwkcommentaries)	VIEWS
2011	190	26	9,189
2012	179	170	51,164
2013	86	708	49,082
2014	138	47	58,602
*TOTAL*	*593*	*951*	*168,037*

The busiest day for 2014 was December 11 with 321 views; for all time, 361 on December 13, 2012. For 2014 as a whole the viewers came from 183 countries with most from the U.S.A. followed by the Canada and the United Kingdom. This blog has 516 followers (Facebook, 324; direct, 154; Tumblr, 14; and commentators, 24).

The following were the most popular posts in 2014:

Great Britain’s Deteriorating Relationship with Her American Colonies, 1765-1775 (July 16, 2012);
The American Revolutionary War’s Battle of Bunker Hill, June 17, 1775 (July 30, 2012);
The American Revolutionary War’s Battles of Lexington and Concord, Massachusetts, April 19, 1775 (July 22, 2012);
The American Revolutionary War’s Siege of Boston, April 19, 1775–March 17, 1776 (July 27, 2012); and
Aeschylus on Suffering and Wisdom (February 10, 2014).

As indicated in detail in the Pages section on the right side of the home page, the posts and comments for 2011-2014 fall into the categories as stated in the following alphabetical Lists of Posts to dwkcommentaries-Topical:

Cuba [history and politics]
Education [my post-secondary education]
El Salvador [history and politics]
Law (Criminal Justice)
Law (International Criminal Court)
Law (Refugee & Asylum)
Law (Treaties)
Law (U.S. Alien Tort Statute)
Law (U.S. Torture Victims Protection Act)
Lawyering [my practice of law]
Miscellaneous
Personal [my personal background]
Religion [predominantly Christianity]
United States (History)
United States (Politics)

The blogger would appreciate receiving substantive comments on his posts, including corrections and disagreements.

U.S. and Cuba Embark on Reconciliation

December 17, 2014, was a historic day in the relations between the United States of America and Cuba. The day started with Cuba’s release of Alan Gross, a U.S. citizen, from a Cuban prison and his return to his home in the U.S. and of the similar release and return to the U.S. of an unnamed U.S. spy . Nearly simultaneously the U.S. released three Cuban spies from its prison..

President Obama’s Speech

At noon (EST) President Obama delivered a televised speech to the nation and the world about the U.S, and Cuba embarking on a new path of reconciliation. He opened with the bold proclamation,”Today the United States of America is changing its relationship with the people of Cuba. After noting the prisoner exchanges, he said:

First. he had instructed Secretary of State John Kerry “to immediately begin discussions with Cuba to reestablish diplomatic relations” with an embassy in Havana. “Where we can advance shared interests, we will. . . . Where we disagree, we will raise those differences openly–as we will continue to do on issues related to democracy and human rights in Cuba.”

Second, the President had “instructed Secretary Kerry to review Cuba’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism . . . to be guided by the facts and the law.”

Third, we are taking steps to increase travel, commerce, and the flow of information to and from Cuba.”

Fourth, the U.S. is “significantly increasing the amount of money that can be sent to Cuba, and removing limits on remittances that support humanitarian projects, the Cuban people, and the emerging Cuban private sector.” The U.S. is also facilitating “authorized transactions [with Cuba], . . including U.S. financial institutions opening accounts with their Cuban counterparts and increased U.S. exports as well as “increased telecommunications connections” with Cuba.

Fifth, the U.S. embargo against Cuba requires congressional action, and the President looks forward to “engaging Congress in an honest and serious debate about lifting the embargo.”

Sixth, the President also acknowledged that Cuba was releasing “a substantial number of prisoners” who had been jailed for political reasons, was increasing internet access to its citizens and its engagement with international institutions.

Nevertheless, the President acknowledged that there would not be “a transformation of Cuban society overnight.” He was convinced, however, “that through a policy of engagement we can more effectively stand up for our values and help the cuban people help themselves.”

Obama near the end of his speech said, “To the Cuban people, America extends a hand of friendship.” The U.S. “wants to be a partner in making the lives of ordinary Cubans little bit easier, more free, more prosperous.”

Cuban President Raul Castro’s Speech

Nearly simultaneously Cuban President Raúl Castro made a televised speech to his country about the new path for Cuba and the U.S. After acknowledging the prisoner exchange and the release of some Cuban political dissidents from prison, he said the countries had “agreed to the restoration of diplomatic relations.” Unfortunately the U.S. embargo will not be ended immediately, but will be modified until Congress can enact a repeal.

The two countries will take mutual steps “to improve bilateral climate and move toward normalization of ties . . . based on the principles of international law and the [U.N.] Charter.” Cuba has also reaffirmed its willingness to discuss all issues of democracy, human rights and foreign policy. Cuba has urged the U.S. “to remove obstacles that prevent or restrict th e links between our peoples, families and citizens . . ., in particular those relating to travel, direct mail and telecommunications.”

“Progress in sustained exchanges show that it is possible to find solutions to many problems. . . . [W]e must learn the art of living, in a civilized manner, with our differences.”

Conclusion

These historic agreements raise many issues that will be discussed in subsequent posts.

New York Times Reiterates Call for Ending U.S. Designation of Cuba as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism”

On December 15^th a New York Times editorial, “Cuba’s Economy at a Crossroads,” called for the U.S. to end its designation of Cuba as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism.” This recommendation first was made on October 11^th in the Times’ initial editorial in its series “Cuba: A New Start.”

Summary of the Editorial

Now, however, ending the designation is seen as a way the U.S. could assist a struggling Cuban economy. Surprisingly this editorial does not mention ending the U.S. embargo of the island as another, and more important, way the Cuban economy could be aided by the U.S. Instead the Times makes a vague suggestion of the U.S.’ “relaxing sanctions through executive authority and working with the growing number of lawmakers who want to expand business with Cuba.”

Most of the editorial is devoted to discussing the many problems of the Cuban economy.

The 1959 Cuban Revolution’s “[c]ommunism brought an ever more anemic and backward economy, one propped up largely by Moscow. But after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, so did Cuba’s economy.” After that collapse, Cuba found Venezuela as a “new benefactor” that provided “heavily subsidized oil” to the island, but now that country’s “worsening economic and political crisis” threatens that subsidy.

Low wages and poor prospects have forced many Cubans to leave the island “in recent years in search of a better life.” This could be accelerated by the elimination of the country’s two-currency system, which the government plans to do.

“The country’s birthrate is declining, while its elderly are living longer.” Couple these facts with the exodus of working-age citizens presents Cuba with an enormous demographic challenge.

“The agricultural sector remains stymied by outdated technology and byzantine policies. A foreign investment law Cuba’s National Assembly approved in March has yet to deliver a single deal.”

Cuba’s leaders have adopted various measures to reform the economy, but the “pace [of economic reform] has been halting, with plenty of backtracking from the government’s old guard.”

Yet these reforms have created a “small but growing entrepreneurial class.” All of them “struggle with the [Cuban] bureaucracy, since they are unable to import legally items as basic as mattresses and pillows. Bringing items from the United States is onerous and complicated by American sanctions.” Changes in U.S. policies could make “it easier for Americans to provide start up-capital for independent small businesses. Doing that would empower Cuban-Americans to play a more robust role in the island’s economic transformation. More significantly, it would gradually erode the Cuban government’s ability to blame Washington for the shortcomings of an economy that is failing its citizens largely as a result of its own policies.”

Continuing U.S. antagonism, on the other hand, “is only helping the old guard.”

Reactions

I concur in the Times’ call for ending the U.S. designation of Cuba as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism.” It is an unfounded, stupid, absurd action that is only counter-productive as has been argued in posts in 2010, 2011, 2012 (with supplement), 2013 and 2014.

But I do not see ending this policy as the linchpin for the U.S.’ helping the Cuban economy. Instead it is ending the embargo, which the Times on October 11^th recommended, but which is not mentioned in the latest editorial.

Moreover, I think the latest editorial understates the troubled state of the Cuban economy even though a prior post expressed optimism about Cuba’s attracting $8.0 billion of foreign investment for the Mariel port’s industrial park now under construction. Further reflection raises the following points that question that optimism:

First, the Cuban economy by itself is obviously unable to afford to purchase the many commodities that presumably will be unloaded from the new super-container ships that will be able to cross the expanded Panama Canal.
Second, for the commodities to go elsewhere will require the unloading of the super-container ships at Mariel and then reloading those commodities in smaller container vessels to go to the major countries on the northern and eastern sides of the South American continent: Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. How big are those markets?
Third, presumably the major Latin American countries with coasts on the Pacific Ocean like Mexico, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Chile will not be markets for commodities transshipped from Mariel.
Fourth, unless there is U.S.-Cuba reconciliation, the largest potential market for such transshipment, the U.S., presumably would not be importing commodities from the Mariel port.

Similar skepticism about Cuba’s ability to attract foreign investment for other reasons have been voiced by foreign investment experts. The Inter-American Dialogue, which is the leading U.S. center for policy analysis, exchange, and communication on Western Hemisphere affairs, has provided the following four such skeptics.

Matthew Aho, consultant in the corporate practice group of Akerman Senterfitt in New York, said, “While the [Cuban] rhetorical message was positive: ‘Cuba is open for business,’ little has changed to improve Cuba’s general investment climate, and foreign companies there report few changes to their dealings with Cuban counterparts. In fact, many businesses say the same bottlenecks, delays and idiosyncrasies that have long frustrated investors have been exacerbated recently by growing wariness among major banks to handle legitimate Cuba-related transactions.” He added, “While Cuba clearly has potential, most mainstream investors will steer clear until the Cubans define clearer rules of the road and improve their track record with new and existing partners.”

According to José R. Cárdenas, director of Visión Américas in Washington, “Eight billion dollars is a wildly exaggerated figure that Cuba has no chance of ever realizing. [Foreign investors] demand such things as transparency, legal guarantees and predictability, which the Cuban government is incapable of providing. Witness the widely publicized ordeals of Canadian businessman Cy Tokmakjian and Englishman Stephen Purvis, among others, who wound up in incarcerated in Cuba’s Kafkaesque legal system for unclear reasons. There may as well be a ring of flashing red lights surrounding the island warning foreign investors of the exorbitant risks to doing business in Cuba. . . . Any progressing economy needs the freedom to innovate, take risks and guarantee that one will reap the benefits of their efforts. Cuba, like China, cannot ultimately offer such conditions. As long as the primacy of the Communist Party remains the Cuban lodestar, the country will continue to head into an uncertain future.”

Scott J. Morgenstern, associate professor and director of the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Pittsburgh also was skeptical. He said, “Cuba must create new opportunities for private employment. Thus, while the reforms are making some investment possible, investors will not find wide-open markets and streamlined bureaucratic procedures. In many areas, there are severe limits concerning where people can invest and the types of businesses they can open. Currency convertibility will also be a critical issue for any business; currently there are two currencies, only one of which is convertible. Foreigners, formally, are only allowed to use the convertible currency, and the official exchange rates distort the currency values. Reforms are promised, but the uncertainty will likely discourage some investors. One other important concern for investors is the size of the Cuban domestic market. The country is attracting several million tourists per year, and many Cubans do receive financial support from abroad, but purchasing power is still limited.”

Carlos A. Saladrigas, chairman of the Cuba Study Group and Regis HR Group offered these comments. “Cuba’s economic reforms so far have been too little, too late and too timid to result in significant economic performance . . . . [Cuba’s] continuing economic mismanagement, the numerous distortions in Cuba’s economic and political systems, a stubborn ideology, an obtuse and weighty bureaucracy and the fears of change harbored by Cuba’s leaders all play even more heavily in keeping Cuba’s economy from reaching its full potential. Cuban leaders continue to expect ‘silver bullet solutions’ to their economic woes. The port of Mariel is a perfect example. Pinning hopes of an economic recovery on mega-projects or a few foreign investments take attention away from the core distortions and inefficiencies plaguing the entire domestic economy. Fear of change and ideological rigidity can be clearly seen in Cuba’s eight-month-old foreign investment law. Since the law was passed, Cuban authorities still don’t have any significant major investment projects to report. The foreign investment law was a great missed opportunity to really send a message to the world, and specifically to the United States, that Cuba is ready for business. Such a message would have added great momentum to the anti-embargo movement, which is building momentum in the United States and in Miami. Yet, they chose more of the same, leaving arbitrariness, lack of clarity and burdensome regulations.”

Similar skeptical opinions about the Cuban efforts to develop the Mariel port were expressed by Richard Feinberg, the Brookings Institution’s Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Latin American Initiative. He said, “the industrial sites are not yet fully leveled nor are they hooked up to basic infrastructure! But the problems run much deeper: previous Cuban efforts to launch free trade zones floundered on the requirement of hiring expensive labor through government employment agencies, and the continuing closure of the most logical export market, the nearby [U.S.]. Cuba’s newly revised foreign investment laws appear to allow investors greater flexibility in setting wage scales, but this potentially promising reform, and its impact on labor costs, remains to be fully tested in practice.”

Finally, Miguel Coyula, a retired Cuban government official on a trip to Washington before returning home to the island, stated ““Mariel is the most promoted place in Cuba, with special development zones for investors. But soon it’ll be a year after the opening of Mariel, and there is absolutely nothing. Even the container terminal in Havana was moved to Mariel to give it a sense of activity, but no one will invest there. For one thing, potential foreign investors in Mariel don’t like the fact that they can’t hire employees on their own, but instead must pay a government employment agency in dollars for that labor. The agency, in turn, pays workers in Cuban pesos. That’s because the Castro government wants to avoid creating a class of highly paid Cubans who work for foreign companies, ‘but inequalities are there whether you like it or not.’”