Recent History of United States-Morocco Relations

On March 7, 1956, immediately after France’s recognition of Morocco’s independence, the United States did likewise with a statement of congratulations to Morocco, and later that same year Cavendish Cannon presented his credentials as the first post-independence U.S. ambassador to the country[1]

Since then, the two countries have had an increasingly close relationship. “The two countries share common concerns and consult closely on regional security and sustainable development. Morocco is a strong partner in counterterrorism efforts, and it works closely with U.S. law enforcement to safeguard both countries’ national security interests.”[2]

Counterterrorism Cooperation

As noted in an earlier post, Morocco participates in various multilateral counterterrorism efforts.

According to the U.S. State Department, “U.S. assistance to Morocco enhances the [latter’s] . . . capacity to promote security and prevent acts of terrorism, while addressing core drivers of instability and violent extremism, such as political and social marginalization, especially of youth. Our support has positive impact beyond Morocco’s borders in both the Middle East and Africa, bolstering Morocco’s emergence as a major partner for regional stabilization efforts and participation in the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) coalition and stabilization efforts in Libya, further contributing to U.S. security.”

Under the August 2014 “U.S.-Morocco Framework for Cooperation on Training for Civilian Security Services, [the U. S. provides] Anti-Terrorism Assistance funds [to] support the goal of developing Moroccan expertise in the areas of crisis management, border security, and terrorism investigations to strengthen regional counterterrorism capabilities and to deny space to terrorists and terrorist networks. The Framework outlines steps to identify and further develop a cadre of Moroccan training experts, jointly train civilian security and counterterrorism forces in partner countries in the greater Maghreb and Sahel regions, and measure the effectiveness of these trainings.”

The U.S. “International Military Education and Training (IMET)-funded Professional Military Education assists Morocco’s military force structure to become more similar to that of the [U.S.], which aids to further develop the interoperability required to meet shared counter-terror and counter-illicit-trafficking objectives. IMET also funds the installation of English language labs, significantly increasing Moroccan capacity and joint U.S.-Morocco efforts via a common operational language. The Moroccan military used Foreign Military Financing to bolster its air force, which conducts much of Morocco’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in support of counter-terrorism efforts.”

The U.S. “Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) Program is focused on facilitating the creation, adoption, and implementation of appropriate laws and regulations that comply with [a U.N. Security Council resolution obligating] member States ‘to adopt legislation to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and their means of delivery, and establish appropriate domestic controls over related materials to prevent their illicit trafficking.’ In addition, EXBS provides considerable training assistance to Moroccan law enforcement and border security officials as well as equipment, such as mobile cargo scanners, for [the] Tanger-Med Port.”

Morocco’s Criminal Justice Reform Agenda

The U.S. “Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs partners with [Morocco’s] . . . national police, the penitentiary administration and the judiciary to support Morocco’s reform agenda in the criminal justice sector. The corrections program is focused on prison management practices through training and technical assistance. The police program is focused on strengthening police capacity and professionalization. The justice sector programming supports the reforms called for in the 2013 Judicial Reform Charter.”

Morocco’s Peaceful Reform Agenda

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) “is working with Morocco to advance the country’s initiatives for implementing its peaceful reform agenda: USAID is enhancing the employability of Morocco’s large youth population through a model career development system and by supporting civil society initiatives that address the needs of marginalized youth susceptible to extremist recruitment. . . . USAID also improves learning outcomes in the early grades of primary schools, thus decreasing the likelihood of future dropouts. Lastly, USAID works to expand citizen participation in governance and political party engagement with citizens at the local level through more open structures and improved ability of political parties to implement policies that reflect citizens’ needs.”

Cooperation on Other Civil Matters

The November 2015 U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation-Morocco compact provides U.S. aid “for two [Moroccan] priorities: education and land productivity. The $220 million education for employability project will work to increase access to higher-quality secondary education and workforce development programs. The $170.5 million land productivity project will assist [Morocco’s development of] . . . a sector-wide land governance strategy to help remove institutional blocks to privatization and will also work with [Morocco] . . . to increase land productivity through investments in rural and industrial land.”

The U.S. “Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) program supports direct engagement with Moroccan civil society through Washington-issued grants, local grants to Moroccan civil society organizations (CSO), and exchange programs for Moroccan citizens. MEPI has been active in Morocco and the region for over a decade and has a long history of building civil society capacity, while also enabling CSO partners to support women’s empowerment, youth leadership and volunteerism, increased civic engagement, entrepreneurship, skills training, and small business development.”

U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement

“In 2006, the U.S. and Morocco entered into a free-trade agreement (FTA). “Since its entry into force, Moroccan exports to the [U.S.] have more than doubled, and U.S. exports to Morocco have more than tripled. From 2005 to 2015, the total value of Moroccan goods exported to the [U.S.] increased from $445.8 million to $1 billion, and U.S. exports to Morocco have increased from $480 million to $1.6 billion. The FTA has paved the way for increased foreign direct investment [in Morocco] by helping to improve Morocco’s business climate, harmonize standards, and create legal guarantees for investors. While Morocco has made significant improvements in its business environment, foreign companies still encounter issues related to sluggish bureaucracy and lack of judicial expediency.”

Conclusion

Concluding this summary, the U.S. State Department states, “Morocco is a moderate Arab state that maintains close relations with Europe and the [U.S.]. It is a member of the [U.N., the African Union,] the Arab League, Arab Maghreb Union, Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States. King Mohammed VI is the chairman of the [OIC’s] Al-Quds [Jerusalem] Committee.”

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[1] U.S. State Department, A Guide to the United States’ History of Recognition, Diplomatic and Consular Relations, by Country, since 1776: Morocco. On June 23, 1776, Morocco became the first country in the world to recognize the new U.S.A. with a treaty of peace and friendship; this peaceful relationship continued until October 20, 1917, when the U.S. formally recognized the French and Spanish protectorates of Morocco. This peaceful relationship resumed on March 7, 1956, immediately after France’s recognition of Morocco’s independence,

 [2] U.S. State Department, Fact Sheet: U.S. Relations with Morocco (Jan. 20, 2017). The close relations between the two countries was also apparent in the 2013 White House meeting between President Obama and King Mohammed VI that was discussed in an earlier post. This State Department Fact Sheet was issued on the date of Donald Trump’s inauguration and thus obviously was the work of the Obama Administration’s State Department to assist the incoming administration, but to date it has not been countermanded by the Trump Administration.

 

 

 

An Exciting Introduction to Morocco 

Last month my wife and I went on a wonderful two-week tour of Morocco with Overseas Adventure Travel. Here is the OAT map for the tour:

We were impressed by the country’s fascinating history and people, its beautiful architecture, cities and rugged Atlas Mountains, the immensity of the rolling Sahara Desert along its southern border and its current construction boom.

While there we also learned of Morocco’s recent re-establishment of its diplomatic relations with Cuba, a country about which I have written a lot, and of Morocco’s membership in the African Union, both related to Morocco’s lingering conflict over the Western Sahara, which was the subject of a recent U.N. Security Council resolution, all of which were discussed in recent posts.[1]

Also fascinating was the country’s religious profile. Its population of 33.7 million is 99% Sunni Muslim with 1% Shia Muslims, Christians, Jews and Bahias. In every town the mosques’ minarets were the instantaneously recognizable tallest structures.[2]

Our OAT tour guide told us that the current king, Mohammad VI, has been leading efforts to ensure that Muslims in Morocco are not encouraged to join extremists groups like ISIS or Al Qaeda. All imams have to complete an education course at the capitol at Rabat that is organized and administered by the government’s ministry of religious affairs (The Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs of the Kingdom of Morocco) and that excludes the extremist ideologies promoted by ISIS and Al Qaeda.

We also were told that neither the government nor the Muslim leaders discriminate against Christians or Jews, and we visited a synagogue in Fez. On the other hand, we were told, the Christians and Jews are forbidden from preaching or proselytizing or evangelizing in public.

Previously I had learned that the five “pillars” of Islam are (1) shahada, declaring as a matter of faith and trust that there is only one God (Allah) and that Mohammad is God’s messenger; (2) salat, saying the Islamic prayer five times a day; (3) zakat, giving to the poor and needy; (4) slym, fasting during the month of Ramadan; and (5) haji, making a pilgrimage to the holy city of Mecca at least once in a lifetime.

Although in Morocco I only experienced hearing the call to prayer over a minaret’s loudspeaker, I came to see these pillars of faith as similar to various practices of Christian spirituality, as ways of reinforcing a believer’s connections with God (Allah), and as ways that help believers live in accordance with the will of God (Allah). These pillars and practices, in my opinion, also rest on the belief that no one is perfect, that all find it too easy to stray from the path of faithfulness and that all need reminders of God or Allah’s way.

I felt fortunate that my Minneapolis church (Westminster Presbyterian) has warm relations with a local mosque and that we have hosted at least two worship services including its leaders. [3]

After returning to the U.S., I conducted research and discovered more about the previously mentioned government ministry; Morocco’s positive relations with international anti-terrorism groups; the important Declaration of Marrakesh promoting respect for religious minorities in Muslim countries; the most current U.S. State Department’s assessment of Morocco’s religious freedom; and the nature of current U.S.-Morocco relations. These topics will be explored in subsequent posts.

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[1] Cuba and Morocco Re-Establish Diplomatic Relations, dwkcommentaries.com (May 7, 2017); U.N. Security Council Orders More Negotiations About the Western Sahara Conflict, dwkcommentaries.com (May 9, 2017).

[2] CIA World Factbook, Morocco.

[3] Interfaith Worship Service at Minneapolis’ Westminster Presbyterian Church, dwkcommentaries.com (Dec. 2, 2015); A Christian-Muslim Conversation About Forgiveness, dwkcommentaries.com (May 15, 2017).

 

U.N. Security Council Orders More Negotiations About the Western Sahara Conflict

Disputes over the Western Sahara, a former Spanish colony, have followed its 1975 annexation by Morocco in opposition to competing claims by the Polisario Front. In 1991 the U.N. brokered a cease-fire and established a peacekeeping monitoring mission and to help prepare a referendum on the territory’s future that has never taken place. So far the parties have been unable to agree upon how to decide on self-determination. Morocco wants an autonomy plan under Moroccan sovereignty while Polisario wants a U.N.-backed referendum including on the question of independence. Below is a map of the Western Sahara.

Western_sahara_map_showing_morocco_and_polisaro.gif

On April 28, 2017, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2351 extending the mandate of the U.N. Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) until 30 April 2018 and calling on the parties to that conflict to resume negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General without preconditions and in good faith, in order to facilitate a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution.[1]

Other provisions of the resolution called on the parties to cooperate fully with the operations of MINURSO, to take the necessary steps to ensure unhindered movement for U.N. and associated personnel in carrying out their mandate, to demonstrate the political will to work in an atmosphere propitious for dialogue in order to resume negotiations, to implement the relevant Security Council resolutions, to resume cooperation with the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, to ensure that the humanitarian needs of refugees were adequately addressed.  It also supported an increase in the ratio of medical personnel within the current uniformed authorization, as requested in the Secretary-General’s most recent report to address MINURSO’s severely overstretched medical capacity. Yet another part of the resolution noted that both sides had withdrawn troops from the Guerguerat area of the territory, a vast swath of desert bordering the Atlantic Ocean that has been contested since 1975.

In support of the resolution, U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Michele Sisson, emphasized hat peacekeeping missions should support political solutions, said that postponing the [referendum] had been the key to allowing MINURSO to close out the 2016 chapter in the territory.  The U.S. was pleased with the mandate renewal, which helped in returning the Council’s attention where it belonged — supporting a political process to resolve the situation on the ground.  Emphasizing that the situation must change, she said the Council must look at the “big picture” in Western Sahara, including the absence of any political process for many years, she said.  The resolution demonstrated the importance of the parties working with the U.N. to return to the table.  The Mission must be able to hire the right staff in order to be as effective as possible, and to adjust components that were not working, as well as they should.  The U.S. would watch closely to see what happened on the ground, she said.

Also speaking in support of the resolution were the other Security Council members: Uruguay, Sweden, Senegal, Ethiopia, China, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Bolivia, Japan, Ukraine and the Russian Federation.

Although the resolution was passed unanimously, France, a permanent Council member, backs Morocco, its former colony, while Polisario has been supported by some non-permanent council members and by South Africa.

Afterwards Morocco’s foreign ministry said the kingdom was satisfied with the resolution and hoped for a “real process” toward a solution, which it said should be on its autonomy initiative. Morocco also called for neighboring Mauritania and Algeria, the latter of which backs Polisario and maintains tense relations with Morocco, to be involved in negotiations. Algeria, on the other hand, called the resolution a victory for the Sahrawi cause that put the process “back on track.”

Morocco recently has made at least two diplomatic moves that may be related to enhancing its position in such negotiations.

First, on January 31, 2017, the African Union (AU) at its Summit, 39 to 9, approved Morocco’s request for readmission after having left the AU in 1984 in response to a majority of its members recognizing the disputed territory in the Western Sahara.

Morocco’s King Mohammed VI in his speech at this year’s AU Summit emphasized “how indispensable Africa is to Morocco and how indispensable Morocco is to Africa.” As evidence he mentioned that “since 2000, Morocco has [signed] nearly a thousand agreements with African countries, in various fields of cooperation,” including providing scholarships for Africans to attend Moroccan universities, launching the African Atlantic Gas Pipeline, creating a regional electricity market, constructing fertilizer production plants, creating the Adaptation of African Agriculture program to respond to climate change. These actions, he asserted, demonstrated Morocco’s “commitment to the development and prosperity of African citizens, [who] have the means and the genius; [so that] together, we can fulfill the aspirations of our peoples.”

This readmission, say analysts, also enhances Morocco’s status in upcoming negotiations over the Western Sahara although the King did not mention this in his speech. Instead, he made a modest allusion to this conflict when he said, “We know that we do not have unanimous backing from this prestigious assembly. Far be it from us to spark off a sterile debate! We have absolutely no intention of causing division, as some would like to insinuate!”[2]

The other diplomatic move that can be seen as an attempt to soften resistance towards Morocco’s position in negotiations over the Western Sahara was its re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba, as discussed in a prior post.

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[1] U.N. Security Council, Press Release: Security Council Extends Mandate of United Nations Mission (April 28, 2017); U.S. Mission to the U.N., Ambassador Sisson Remarks at the Adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2351 on the [U.N.] Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) (April 28, 2017); U.N. Security Council, Press Release: Secretary-General Welcomes Withdrawal of Moroccan, Frente Polisario Elements from Western Sahara’s Guerguerat Area, Urging Adherence to Cease Fire (Apr. 28, 2017); Reuters, U.N. Security Council Backs New Western Sahara Talks Push, N.Y. Times (Apr. 29, 2017); Assoc. Press, UN Council Backs New Effort to End Western Sahara Conflict, N.Y. Times (Apr. 28, 2017).

[2] Quinn, Morocco rejoins African Union after more than 30 years, Guardian (Jan. 31, 2017); Morocco Ministry of Foreign Affairs, His Majesty the King delivers a speech at the 28th Summit of the African Union (AU) in Addis Ababa (Jan. 31, 2017); Abubeker, Why Has Morocco Rejoined the African Union After 33 Years, Newsweek Feb. 2, 2017).

International Criminal Court: Other Recent Developments

We recently have reviewed the taking of office of five new judges of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Court’s first conviction in the case of Thomas Lubanga Diyalo from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Now we look at some other recent ICC developments.

Central African Republic. The only case from the Central African Republic involves one defendant, Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, who is now on trial.

Darfur/Sudan. There are five cases involving seven defendants. Two are in ICC custody at The Hague and await trial. One had the charges dismissed. The other four, including Sudanese President Bashir, are at large.

Another of the at-large defendants is Abdel Raheem Muhammad, whose arrest warrant was just issued on March 1, 2012, for 41 counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes allegedly committed in the context of the situation in Darfur (Sudan). Mr. Hussein is currently Minister of National Defense of the Sudanese Government and former Minister of the Interior and former Sudanese President’s Special Representative in Darfur.

Democratic Republic of the Congo. There are four cases involving five defendants. One, Mr. Lubanga, was recently convicted. A case involving two other defendants is now on trial. The charges against another defendant were not confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber while the fifth defendant is at large.

After the conviction of Mr. Lubanga, the ICC Prosecutor said he plans to demand that DRC President Joseph Kabila hand over the defendant still at large. He is Bosco Ntaganda, who was promoted to DRC army general after being indicted with Lubanga by the ICC and who now faces new charges of mass rape and murder.

Ivory Coast (Côte d’Ivoire). There is only one case involving one defendant, Laurent Gbagbo (the former President of the country) for whom the hearing on the confirmation of charges is scheduled to start on 18 June 2012. He is in ICC custody at The Hague.

On February 22, 2012, the Pre-Trial Chamber decided to expand its authorization for the investigation in Côte d’Ivoire to include crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court allegedly committed between  September 19, 2002 and November 28, 2010. (The prior authorization only covered alleged crimes committed since November 28, 2010.)

The Chamber considered that the violent events in Côte d’Ivoire in this period (including the events since 28 November 2010) are to be treated as a single situation, in which an ongoing crisis involving a prolonged political dispute and power-struggle culminated in the events in relation to which the Chamber earlier authorized an investigation. Concentrating on the most significant of the samples of incidents, the Chamber concluded that there is reasonable basis to believe that, in the course of these events, acts of murder and rape that could amount to war crimes or crimes against humanity were committed.

In the country lawlessness and violence continues, and an U.N. agency recently determined that its security forces that have been accused of killings, arbitrary arrests and other human rights violations are acting alone and not under government orders.

Kenya. There are two Kenyan cases involving six defendants. On January 23, 2012, the Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed the charges against four of the defendants and committed them to trial while declining to confirm the charges against the other two.

The reaction to this decision in Kenya is reviewed elsewhere.

Libya. There is one case involving three defendants. One defendant, Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, is deceased, and his case has been terminated. The other two- Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi–are charged with crimes against humanity (murder and persecution) allegedly committed across Libya from February 15, 2011 until at least 28 February 2011, through the State apparatus and Security Forces.

Al-Islam Gaddafi is in detention in Libya, which has been resisting ICC demands for his being surrendered to the Court. Al-Senussi recently was captured in Mauritania, and Libya is pressing that country to turn him over to Libyan authorities, rather than the ICC.  The legal issue at the heart of this dispute over where these two men will be tried is whether Libya has a functioning judicial system that can provide a due-process criminal proceeding.

Uganda. There is one case involving four defendant leaders of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), including Joseph Kony. All four are at large.

The major recent development regarding the ICC’s case has happened outside the legal process. Earlier this month a 30-minute YouTube video “Kony 2012” portrayed  Mr. Kony’s involvement with child soldiers and called for his arrest and surrender to the ICC for trial. This video became a world-wide phenomenon (“it went viral”) and the subject of much controversy.

This increased attention to Kony has caused the Ugandan military to intensify its efforts to find Kony and other LRA leaders.

In the meantime, the U.S., although not a member of the ICC, has reiterated its commitment of military resources to locate the LRA leaders. The Department of State recently declared that the U.S. has a “comprehensive, multi-year strategy [that] seeks to help the Governments of Uganda, CAR, the DRC, and South Sudan as well as the African Union and United Nations to mitigate and end the threat posed to civilians and regional stability by the LRA. The strategy outlines four key objectives for U.S. support: (1) the increased protection of civilians, (2) the apprehension or removal of Joseph Kony and senior LRA commanders from the battlefield, (3) the promotion of defections and support of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of remaining LRA fighters, and (4) the provision of continued humanitarian relief to affected communities.”

Conclusion

As evident from the above, all of the ICC’s current investigations and cases come from Africa, which has produced tension between the Court and the continent’s leaders. Following the recent elections of an African (Fatou Bensouda) as the Court’s new Prosecutor and another African (Chile Eboe Osuji) as one of its new judges, nearly 36 NGOs from 19 African countries recently sent a joint letter to the foreign ministers of the African countries that are parties to the ICC’s Rome Statute urging them to seek to improve African relations with the ICC. The letter’s specific recommendations to this end included the following:

  • more meetings and “exchange of views” between officials of the African Union and the ICC;
  • establishment by the African Union of an ICC liaison office in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia;
  • fulfillment by states parties of their obligations under the ICC treaty to implement warrants and decisions of the court; and
  • improvement of national justice systems so that they might pursue persons accused of the core crimes that the ICC now prosecutes – genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes – domestically, as envisaged by the ICC Statute’s complementarity principle.