On October 18, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) imposed new sanctions against Cuba while the State Department denounced Cuba’s detention of dissident Jose Daniel Ferrer.
The BIS revoked “existing licenses for aircraft leases to Cuban state-owned airlines, and will deny future applications for aircraft leases.” This was based upon the Department’s assertion that “the Cuban regime is resorting to transporting tourists on leased aircraft subject to BIS jurisdiction.”
Additionally, “BIS is expanding Cuba sanctions to include more foreign goods containing U.S. content, and is imposing additional restrictions on exports to the Cuban regime.” According to a regulation set for October 21 publication, the Export Administration Regulations will be amended so that goods with as little as 10% U.S. content will be subject to U.S. jurisdiction and, thus, require a license from the U.S. Department of Commerce for export or reexport to Cuba. Previously, the policy only applied to goods with 25% or greater U.S. content. In addition, the amendment will, prohibit certain donations to the Cuban government and communist party and clarify the scope of telecommunications items that the Cuban government may receive without a license.
This action, says the Department, “supports the Administration’s earlier decision to hold the Cuban regime accountable for repressing its own people as well as continuing to provide support to the illegitimate Maduro regime which has terrorized the Venezuelan population and wantonly destroyed the once-prosperous economy relied on by millions.”
The Department’s Secretary, Wilbur Ross, said, “This action . . . sends another clear message to the Cuban regime – that they must immediately cease their destructive behavior at home and abroad. The Trump Administration will continue to act against the Cuban regime for its misdeeds, while continuing to support the Cuban people and their aspirations for freedom and prosperity.”
Cuba’s President Miguel Diaz-Canel in a tweet said these new sanctions were “an expression of impotence, moral degradation and imperial contempt. It is an inhuman, cruel, unjust and genocidal act that we strongly reject. We will not give up. and we will give sovereign answer.”
A similar tweet came from Cuba Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez: these are “additional acts of economic blockade, representative of a moral bankruptcy policy, internationally isolated and promoted by a corrupt government. The Cuban people will continue to give due and sovereign response.”
The Cuban dissident who has been detained is Jose Daniel Ferrer, the founder of the Patriotic Union of Cuba (UNPACU).
According to the State Department, “On October 1, “Castro regime officials detained Mr. Ferrer and several other human rights defenders in Santiago de Cuba. Mr. Ferrer reportedly has still not been informed of any charges against him, and has been denied access to a lawyer and to medical care. Mr. Ferrer’s family has not been permitted contact with him since October 4.” In addition, other “UNPACU activists Roilan Zarraga Ferrer, José Pupo Chaveco, and Fernando González Vailant also remain in custody.”
“Ferrer’s case is one more example of the Castro regime’s continuous and flagrant violation of human rights, which has recently escalated into a wave of repression against freedoms of speech, expression, and religion. The United States will not allow these abuses against the Cuban people to go unnoticed or unanswered. We will continue to increase sanctions and trade restrictions to diminish the resources available to the Cuban regime, which uses its income to suppress its own citizens and to prop up other regimes with shameful human rights records, including the former Maduro regime in Venezuela.”
Therefore, the U.S. “strongly condemns the Cuban regime’s unconscionable detainment of . . . [Senor] Ferrer, founder of the Patriotic Union of Cuba (UNPACU). We call on the Castro regime to immediately disclose Mr. Ferrer’s location and condition, to treat him humanely, and to release him from detention without condition.”
Similar protests of this detention have been registered by UNPACU, Cuba’s Legal Information Center (CUBALEX), Cuban Prisoners Defenders, Freedom House and Amnesty International.
An international coalition of 75 human rights organizations has asked the U.N. Human Rights Council to adopt a resolution on Cuban human rights at its meeting in Geneva, Switzerland on June 24 to July 12. 
Here are the terms of action in that proposed resolution:
“1. Strongly condemns the grave human rights violations and abuses committed by the Government of Cuba, including the denial of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and of the rights to freedom of opinion, expression and association, both online and offline; the widespread use of arbitrary arrest and detention, including preemptive detention, and other forms of harassment and intimidation as tools to suppress political dissent; use of violence by Government forces to threaten and intimidate arrestees and detainees; and widespread violations of the rights to due process and to a trial before a fair, independent and impartial tribunal; “
“2. Calls upon Cuba to fully grant its citizens internationally recognized civil, political, and economic rights and freedoms, including freedom of assembly, freedom of expression and free access to information;”
“3. Demands that Cuba, including its judicial and security branches, create and maintain, in law and in practice, a safe and enabling environment in which an independent, diverse, and pluralistic civil society can operate free from undue hindrance and insecurity;”
“ 4. Urges Cuba to end widespread and serious restrictions, in law and in practice, on the right to freedom of expression, opinion, associations and peaceful assembly, both online and offline, including by ending the harassment, intimidation and persecution of political opponents, human rights defenders, women’s and minority rights activists, labour leaders, students’ rights activists, journalists, bloggers, social media users, social media page administrators, media workers, religious leaders and lawyers;”
“5. Strongly urges Cuba to release persons arbitrarily detained for the legitimate exercise of their human rights, to consider rescinding unduly harsh sentences for exercising such fundamental freedoms and to end reprisals against individuals, including for cooperating with the United Nations human rights mechanisms;”
“ 6. Strongly condemns the lack of free, fair and transparent democratic elections in Cuba, and in particular the constitutional referendum of 24 February 2019, which was marked by fraud, lack of transparency and violence against the Government’s political opponents;”
“7. Determines that the new constitution has no legitimacy, and that members of the National Assembly, President Miguel Días-Canel and Communist Party leader Raul Castro lack any legitimacy, given that they were not elected by the people of Cuba in free, fair and multiparty elections;”
“8. Calls upon Cuba to launch a comprehensive accountability process in response to all cases of serious human rights violations, including those involving the Cuban judiciary and security branches, and calls upon the Government of Cuba to end impunity for such violations;”
“9. Calls upon the Government to cooperate with the Office of the High Commissioner, the mechanisms of the Human Rights Council and the relevant treaty bodies, as well as the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, including by facilitating visits, granting unfettered access throughout the country, including to detention facilities, and preventing and refraining from all acts of intimidation or reprisal, and to positively consider the recommendations made in their reports;”
“10. Decides to appoint a Special Rapporteur to monitor developments and make recommendations on the situation of human rights in Cuba for a period of one year, who will submit a report to the Human Rights Council at its forty-third session;”
“11. Calls upon the Government of Cuba to cooperate fully with the Special Rapporteur, to permit access to visit the country and to provide the information necessary for the fulfilment of the mandate;”
“12. Requests the Office of the High Commissioner to provide the Special Rapporteur with the assistance and resources necessary to fulfil the mandate;”
“13. Requests the High Commissioner to provide an oral update on the situation of human rights in Cuba to the Council at its forty-second session, and to submit a follow-up report to the Council and to hold an Interactive Dialogue on the situation of human rights in Cuba at its forty-third session;”
“14. Decides to remain seized of the matter.”
Now we wait to see if this proposed resolution is put to a vote by the Council and the results of any such vote.
In the meantime, Freedom House, which describes itself as “an independent watchdog organization dedicated to the expansion of freedom and democracy around the world,” recently released its 2019 annual report about 195 countries concluding that 86 were “FREE,” 59 “PARTLY FREE” and 50, including Cuba, as “NOT FREE.”
This was its Overview for Cuba: “Cuba is a one-party communist state that outlaws political pluralism, suppresses dissent, and severely restricts basic civil liberties. The government continues to dominate the economy despite recent reforms that permit some private-sector activity. The regime’s undemocratic character has not changed despite new leadership in 2018 and a process of diplomatic “normalization” with Washington, which has stalled in recent years.” 
 Footnotes to the operative paragraphs of the proposed resolution state that they are based upon various sources, including recommendations by European Union member states at Cuba’ Universal Periodic Review by the Council in July 2018. Previous blog posts have discussed other Council proceedings regarding Cuba. See the “Cuban Human Rights” section of List of Posts to dwkcommentaires—Topical: CUBA.
At the June 4 meeting of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS), U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo made remarks primarily addressing Venezuela. But he also made comments about Cuba.
The Secretary of State said, “there is no greater challenge today than the full-scale dismantling of democracy and the heartbreaking humanitarian disaster in Venezuela. While the [U.S.] welcomes the release of the unjustly imprisoned Holt family, our policy towards Venezuela remains unchanged. The [U.S.] stands steadfast in support of the Venezuelan people and their efforts to return to democracy. The Maduro regime’s efforts . . . to move towards unconstitutional government and its human rights abuses are now well known by all. All these actions have, among other ill consequences, resulted in an unconstitutional alteration of Venezuela’s constitutional order.”
“On more than one occasion, Venezuela has squandered opportunities to have the kind of dialogue that the [OAS] charter calls for. We seek only what all the nations of the OAS want for our people: a return to the constitutional order, free and fair elections with international observation, and the release of political prisoners. The regime’s refusal to take meaningful action on these issues has demonstrated unmistakable bad faith and exhausted options for dialogue under current conditions. Just two weeks ago, the Venezuelan Government staged sham elections that offered no real choice to Venezuelan people and its voters. Many of them responded sensibly by simply staying home.”
“For all of these reasons, Vice President Pence challenged member-states last month to do what the Democratic Charter asks of us when faced with an unconstitutional interruption in democratic order of a member-state: suspend Venezuela from this body. That suspension is not a goal unto itself. But it would show that the OAS backs up its words with action. And it would send a powerful signal to the Maduro regime: Only real elections will allow your government to be included in the family of nations.”
“In addition to suspension, I call on fellow member-states to apply additional pressure on the Maduro regime, including sanctions and further diplomatic isolation, until such time as it undertakes the actions necessary to return genuine democracy and provide people desperately needed access to international humanitarian aid.”
In response, Venezuela’s Foreign Minister Jorge Arreaza defiantly criticized the OAS as part of a “corporation” led by the U.S. to undermine Venezuela’s sovereignty. He accused the U.S. of fostering violence that has accompanied protests and the deprivation caused by sanctions and mocked U.S. offers of humanitarian aid. “You impose economic sanctions, and then you offer your help to wash your hands. The U.S. has been perpetrating a coup d’état against Venezuela for 20 years.”
Vowing not to buckle under to the pressure, Arreaza added, “We are free. We are sovereign. And no imperialist will intervene in our country and hinder our people from voting for their own authorities and having their own democracy. “We have moral authority. You do not have moral authority,” he said, citing U.S. invasions of Panama in 1989 and the Dominican Republic in 1965.
The U.S. along with Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Mexico and Peru submitted a draft Resolution on the Situation in Venezuela, which presumably will be voted upon at the June 5 session of the OAS General Assembly. After the preamble, it contains the following resolutions:
“To declare that the electoral process as implemented in Venezuela, which concluded on May 20, 2018, lacks legitimacy, for not complying with international standards, for not having met the participation of all Venezuelan political actors, and for being carried out without the necessary guarantees for a free, fair, transparent and democratic process.”
“To reaffirm that only through a national dialogue with the participation of all Venezuelan political actors and stakeholders can national reconciliation be achieved and the necessary conditions agreed upon for holding a new electoral process that truly reflects the will of the Venezuelan citizens and peacefully resolves the current crisis in that country.”
“To reiterate that an unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional order of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela has occurred, as stated in [OAS] resolution CP/RES. 1078 (2108/17) of April 3, 2017.”
“To urge the Government of Venezuela to take steps to guarantee the separation and independence of the constitutional branches of power and restore the full authority of the National Assembly, the rule of law, and the guarantees and liberties of the population.”
“To urge the Government of Venezuela to allow the entry of humanitarian aid and to implement epidemiological surveillance measures in its country to prevent the aggravation of the humanitarian and public health crisis, particularly against the reappearance of diseases such as measles, malaria, and diphtheria”
“To invite the member states to implement measures to address the humanitarian emergency in Venezuela, including supplying medicines, as well as considering contributions to the competent international organizations to strengthen the institutional capacities of the recipient countries.”
“To instruct the Permanent Council to identify, in coordination with the relevant inter-American and international institutions, the appropriate measures to support the member states that are receiving an increasing number of Venezuelan migrants and refugees.”
“To call upon the member and permanent observer states to implement, in accordance with their respective legal frameworks and applicable international law, the measures deemed appropriate at the political, economic, and financial levels to assist in the restoration of democratic order in Venezuela.”
“To remain seized of the situation in Venezuela in order to support diplomatic actions and additional measures that facilitate the restoration of democratic institutions and social peace, and that promote full respect for human rights and full adherence to the rule of law, within the constitutional framework of Venezuela and in a manner consistent with its international obligations and commitments.”
“To apply, in strict accordance with the letter and spirit of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, the mechanisms for the preservation and defense of representative democracy provided under its Articles 20 and 21.”
In the Secretary of State’s June 4 address to the General Assembly, he had the following words about Cuba: “In Cuba today, we see an expectation that change is inevitable and that it can’t come quickly enough. Young Cubans born under a dictatorship are uninterested in hollow revolutionary slogans. They demand educational opportunities free from political constraints or a totalitarian regime’s repression. They want what youth everywhere else wants: opportunities to use their talents, to exercise their voice, achieve their potential, and build a bright future for themselves. As democratic societies, we must support young people in Cuba and elsewhere in the hemisphere in their hopes for democratic change.”
The day before the OAS General Assembly. Ambassador Carlos Trujillo, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the OAS, appeared at a meeting organized by Freedom House and made these comments about Cuba. He “acknowledged that the Venezuelan case has stolen the role of other crises such as Cuba and Nicaragua, and . . . [suggested] that the organization should follow the same steps with Havana as with Caracas.” He also indicated that the agency must work to denounce “the crimes against humanity” that the Cuban Government has committed.
’’Why Cuba does not deserve the same as what we are demanding from the regime of (President of Venezuela, Nicolás] Maduro? Why Cuba is different? It is something that has to change, it has to change in the OAS.’”
According to Trujillo at this meeting, the countries of the Americas have to “accept that Cuba is ‘he mother of all evil’ in terms of the weakening of democracy on the continent and human rights violations.” Therefore, “If we talk about Venezuela and we talk about human rights abuses, we have to talk about Cuba.” This meant, he said, the OAS must denounce “the crimes against humanity” that the Cuban Government has committed.”
These comments by Trujillo echo what he said in early May in a Univision program. Then he said “Raul Castro should be tried for his crimes against human rights”, visible through the history of Cuba, “I personally, and the US, are available to do everything possible so that the victims of Raúl Castro, of the Castro brothers, have the justice they deserve,”
The above comments by Ambassador Trujillo are completely undiplomatic and inappropriate. They should not have ben uttered, especially since apparently there is no resolution regarding Cuba to come before the OAS General Assembly. His words as a Cuban-American attorney from Miami reveal his lack of any prior diplomatic experience and his having been an Ambassador for only one month.
Instead tomorrow we will see the voting on the above resolution about Venezuela.
A recent post discussed challenges about Cuba facing the Trump Administration this April: President Trump’s attendance at the Summit of the Americas in Peru and the U.S. reaction to Cuba’s election of the new President of the Council of State.
Recent developments have added to the apprehension that these and other events may be occasions for more U.S. hostility towards Cuba.
Future U.S. Actions Regarding the Summit of the Americas
In a letter last week to the Secretary of the Organization of American States (OAS), Rick Scott, Florida Governor and rumored U.S. Senate candidate this year, called for the exclusion of Cuba at the upcoming Summit. This request was due to the “oppression and misery” that the Cuban people have suffered for more than 60 years. “For six decades, the sovereignty of the Cuban people has been taken hostage by a brutal dictatorship that has imprisoned, tortured and murdered innocent people to preserve their regime.”
Another reason for such exclusion, according to Scott, was the recent electoral process on the island as a “fraudulent effort to carry out the so-called elections as the dictatorship moves towards a dynastic succession.” In short, “Obama’s policy is a tragedy for the Cuban people, and a top priority for America’s next President to reverse.”
The Governor’s request was reiterated by the Cuban Resistance Assembly and anticipated this last February by Freedom House’s Director Carlos Ponce when he said that Castro’s attendance at the 2015 Summit in Panama was “a great spectacle that did not represent an advance in democracy and human rights on the island.” In fact, it included the regime sending “violent groups to threaten and persecute the Cuban leaders of civil society who participated.”
Future U.S. Reaction to Election of New President of Cuba
In addition to Governor Scott’s criticism of this year’s Cuban electoral process, the previous post about challenges to the Trump Administration mentioned that on March 9 Senator Marco Rubio (Rep., FL) and five Florida Republican U.S. Representatives sent a letter to President Trump urging him to “denounce Castro’s successor as illegitimate in the absence of free, fair, and multiparty elections, and call upon the international community to support the right of the Cuban people to decide their future.”
On March 14, Congressman Curbelo added this statement for his reasons for such criticism: “It’s clear the Cuban people are ready for a new beginning. Now more than ever they need the support and solidarity of the American people, the American government and its diplomats, and all freedom loving people throughout the world. Given the absence of free, fair, multiparty elections this past weekend, I continue to urge President Trump to declare Raul Castro’s successor as illegitimate.”
New Officials in Trump Administration
President Trump has nominated or appointed two officials who have a history of hostility towards Cuba–Mike Pompeo and John Bolton– while another appointee, Carlos Trujillo, may hold such views.
President Trump has nominated Mike Pompeo, the current Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), as the next Secretary of State, a position that requires confirmation by the U.S. Senate.
In 2015, when Pompeo was a member of the U.S. House of Representatives, he co-sponsored a bill, the Cuban Military Transparency Act, to prevent any U.S. financial transaction with companies managed by the Cuban military that did not become law, but was implemented last year by a President Trump executive order.
In June 2017 Pompeo and Senator Marco Rubio (Rep., FL) met at CIA headquarters with several members of the Brigade 2506, which is a CIA-sponsored group of Cuban exiles formed in 1960 to attempt the military overthrow of the Cuban government headed by Fidel Castro and which in 1961 carried out the abortive Bay of Pigs Invasion landings.
On March 23 President Trump appointed as his National Security Advisor, John Bolton, who over many years consistently has been hostile to U.S.-Cuba normalization. Here are examples of his views on this subject:
As Under Secretary of State for Arms Control, Bolton in 2002 accused Cuba of developing biological weapons in collaboration with U.S. adversaries and said Cuba remained a “terrorist” threat to the U.S. Bolton’s disputed claims were shown to be baseless in the 2004 National Intelligence Estimate, which found that while Cuba had the technical capability to produce biological agents, there was no evidence of any biological weapons development.
Bolton criticized the rapprochement between Cuba and the U.S. in December 2014, calling the decision to pursue normalized relations “an unmitigated defeat for the United States.”
In July 2015, just after the U.S. decided to resume full diplomatic relations with Cuba, he published an article saying that this decision “untethered our foreign policy from any discernible American interests.” In short, Bolton said, “Obama’s policy is a tragedy for the Cuban people, and a top priority for America’s next President to reverse.”
Unsurprisingly Senator Marco Rubio applauded the appointment of Bolton as “an excellent choice.”
Cuba immediately responded in Granma, saying Bolton had “a very dark past in relation to Cuba” with strong ties to “the ultra-right of Cuban origin in Florida.” This appointment “comes in the midst of a new campaign against Cuba in which pretexts and evidence have been used without scientific evidence to justify unilateral measures that affect hundreds of thousands of people on both sides of the [Caribbean] and hinder the exchange on issues of mutual interest.”
Last week the U.S. Senate confirmed the nomination of Carlos Trujillo as the new U.S. Ambassador to OAS. I have not discovered Trujillo’s views about U.S. policy towards Cuba and the OAS relationship with the island, but given his background and support by Senator Rubio, I suspect that he too is hostile towards the Cuban government.
Recently Nikki Haley, the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., participated in a conference at the Florida International University in Miami that was organized by Senator Rubio and some of his Republican colleagues in the House of Representatives.One of the topics of the meeting was how to improve democracy in Cuba and Venezuela. Before the meeting, Representative Mario Diaz-Balart said, “The Castro regime continues its decades-long oppression of the Cuban people, while providing illicit support to other sham regimes in the region, including those in Venezuela and Nicaragua. By promoting democracy, civil society and human rights in our hemisphere, we promote stability and prosperity among our neighbors, and strengthen friendships with allies.”
The budget approved by the United States Congress last week, which will allow government financing until mid-2018, includes $ 20 million for promotion of democracy in Cuba, scholarships to promote leadership among young Cubans and improving Cuba’s access to the internet. Granma, the official newspaper of the Communist Party of Cuba, says these are funds to “promote a supposed regime change in Cuba.”
On the other hand, Congress did not adopt a proposed amendment to the budget that would have restricted funding for the U.S. Embassy in Havana to pre-Obama Administration levels. This congressional rejection was applauded by Engage Cuba, a U.S. coalition of private companies and organizations working to end the travel and trade embargo on Cuba. It said, “By eliminating this senseless budget provision, Congress has averted a foreign relations debacle that would have upended progress on law enforcement cooperation, migration, and commercial ties. We commend the bipartisan majority of lawmakers that fought to preserve our diplomatic engagement with Cuba. Slashing embassy funding would hurt Cuban Americans and the Cuban people, and turn back the clock to a discredited counter-productive Cold War policy that failed for over 55 years.”
Although not surprising, these developments are unfortunate for those of us who advocate for increased normalization between the two countries. We must continue to be vigilant in resisting any and all Trump Administration hostility towards Cuba.
The original post about the U.S. establishment of the Cuba Internet Task Force (CITF) set forth the objections from Granma, the official newspaper of the Communist Party of Cuba, and two Cuban journalists (Sergio Gomez and Randy Alfonso Falcón)and another post focused on the Cuban Government’s objections to the CITF.
Now other objections have been registered by Cuban and other sources
Cuban objections came from representatives of its independent media and more from journalists Sergio Gomez and Randy Alonso Falcon.
Cuban Independent Media 
The day before the CITF’s inaugural meeting, Reuters reported from Havana that there are now “a handful of web-based news outlets in recent years in Cuba in the wake of the expansion of internet and broader social and economic freedoms. . . .These new outlets have been tolerated as long as they are not ‘counter-revolutionary’” and “have been chipping away at a half-century state monopoly, offering independent reporting and winning prestigious journalism prizes.”
Several representatives of these independent media, according to Reuters, have expressed opposition to the CITF.
Elaine Díaz, 32, in 2015 founded Periodismo de Barrio which focuses on the environment. She said, “We are not just talking about something that heightens tension in the country’s political situation but . . . [the CITF] could also damage the credibility of the independent media.” She added that “her outlet would refuse any money that the Trump program might award because in Cuba, people who receive aid from the U.S. government are branded mercenaries. These media are called independent, and that means independent of Cuban authorities as well as any other government.”
José Jasán Nieves, 30, director of El Toque, an online platform that focuses on entrepreneurship and citizenship, offered this comment. The CITF was “damaging us by giving arguments to [Cubans opposed to the independent media] … who are trying to link us to the enemy to minimize our presence in Cuban society.” Trump’s new policies were damaging the normalization of relations initiated by the Obama Administration.
Miguel Alejandro Hayes, 22, who writes for the outlet La Joven Cuba (The Young Cuba), said, “Trump’s policy is aimed at destruction: toppling the Cuban government. We don’t agree with that,” as elaborated in its open letter complaining to the State Department.
Sergio Gomez 
Gomez provides two additional comments.
In the first he says, “Although the State Department tries to camouflage its . . . [CITF] as a philanthropic project to improve access to the network of networks in . . .[Cuba], the list of participants in the first [CITF] meeting . . . betrays its true intentions.”
One participant, the Office of Cuba Broadcasting, “is the umbrella of Radio and TV Martí, two relics of the Cold War designed to issue enemy propaganda and carry out psychological operations against Cuba. Millions of dollars of American taxpayers have been wasted in the failed projects of this organization, [which has been] subjected to several audits for corruption scandals and embezzlement.”
Another participant, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), ”is the public arm of the CIA and financier of subversive projects against Cuba such as ZunZuneo and Commotion, whose disclosure by the press was a shame for the US authorities due to its ineffectiveness and violation of international laws.”
“If we take into account the history of those who make up . . .[CITF], nothing good can be expected.”
The second offering from Gomez with Iramsy Peraza Forte as co-author states that “the U.S. has been using communications technologies to attack Cuba ever since the age of shortwave radios and the emergence of television.” Indeed, “From psychological warfare propagated by the mass media to unconventional warfare, which has been adapted to the internet age, Cuba has been a test site for U.S. schemes designed to overthrow governments which do not respond to its interests.”
They then provide a list starting from March 17, 1960, of 14 U.S. schemesto do just that in Cuba before the CITF. Here are the ones specifically involving the Internet:
In 2004, the “Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba . . .is created . . . to identify additional ways to hasten an overthrow of the ‘Cuban regime.’” It proposesto ‘encourage willing third-country governments to create public access Internet facilities in their missions in Cuba” and to expand “‘the distribution of information and facilitate pro-democracy activities,” and “‘greater access to these types of equipment’ in order to do so.”
In 2006 the “Cuba Fund for a Democratic Future was created, providing 24 million USD worth of funding for anti-Cuban propaganda, including online initiatives.”
In February 2006 the State Department“creates the Global Internet Freedom Task Force, specifically aimed at ‘maximizing freedom of expression and free flow of information and ideas’ in China, Iran and Cuba.”
In December 2009 “U.S. citizen Alan Phillip Gross [is] arrested [in Cuba] for bringing illegal communication devices into Cuba as part of a USAID program. In March 2011 Gross was [convicted and sentenced by a Cuban court for violating Cuban law] to 15 years imprisonment.” On December 17, 2014, Gross was released from prison and returned to the U.S. “following the announcement of a process of rapprochement between the two countries.”
In March 2011 Cuban officials discovered and stopped the U.S. “Operation Surf,” which “consisted of smuggling equipment and software into the country to install illegal antennas to access the internet.”
In April 2014 USAID financed the launch of ZunZuneo, which “was designed as a messaging network similar to Twitter through which thousands of Cubans [eventually] would receive “political content aimed at inspiring Cubans to organize mass demonstrations akin to ‘smart mobs’ to destabilize the country.”
Also in April 2014 the U.S. “Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB) which oversees Radio and TV Martí, launched a service similar to ZunZuneo.”
In September 2016 OCB “organized the ‘ . . . [for] independent” journalists from the island and digital innovators and activists who support the use of new technologies to bring about a regime change in Cuba.”
Randy Alonso Falcon 
In CubaDebate, Randy Alonso Falcon attacked the CITF premise that Cuba has subnormal access to the internet and information. He asserts, “there are more than 4 million Cubans who access the internet services through various means, among them tens of thousands of students, professors, health workers, journalists, scientists and other workers who receive free connectivity by virtue of their professional needs.”
Moreover, according to Falcon, “Cuba was the fastest growing country in social networks last year, according to the Digital in 2017 Global Overview report . [It] highlights the growth of new users in the networks-with more than 2.7 million new users and 365% increase over the previous year-and the use of mobile phones to access social networks had 2.6 million new users and an increase of 385%.” Falcon also provides graphics to emphasize the rapid growth in Cuban access to the internet.
“Much remains to us to advance in the utilization of the new technologies, and especially in his better [means] to attain productivity and economic efficiency; but it will not be with Trump’s interventionist and subversive plans that we will achieve it. Political disposition, created talent, unity of action, culture and knowledge, will be our best weapons in that sovereign walk along the roads of the Internet. Without fear, with amplitude, with better contents and greater connectivity, but without naiveties.”
Other Objections 
Alan Gross, the previously mentioned U.S. citizen who was arrested, convicted and imprisoned in Cuba for illegally bringing communications equipment to the island, has objected to the CITF.“My first response was ‘Are you kidding me?’ We are supposed to learn from our mistakes. I learned the hard way that it’s illegal to distribute anything in Cuba that’s funded in full or part by the U.S. government. Until the government of Cuba wants the kind of assistance United States is capable of providing, the United States shouldn’t be doing stuff there.”
Cuba expert Ted Henken at Baruch College in New York, author of Freedom House’s annual report on Cuba, said, “”The solution proposed by the Trump administration is perhaps even worse than the disease. It will likely empower not the independent media or citizens but only the Cuban government to more easily justify the unjustifiable – more control and repression of independent media and unmediated access to information.”
The CITF is based upon the false and illegal premise that the U.S. unilaterally may and should decide what Internet services Cuba or any other country should have and then take unilateral steps to provide those services and equipment. Instead the U.S. should politely ask Cuba or any other country whether there was any way the U.S. could assist in improving their Internet service.
On February 7, the U.S.’ Cuba Internet Task Force (CITF) held its inaugural meeting in Washington, D.C., published its Charter and launched its website. As discussed in a prior post, this group burst onto the scene on January 23 with a State Department announcement of its creation “to promote the free and unregulated flow of information in Cuba” and expand “internet access and independent media in Cuba.”
Now we examine the CITF’s membership, inaugural meeting, Charter and website.
The CITF is chaired by Deputy Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs John S. Creamer, a foreign service officer with a distinguished career of service in Latin America. Other members are officials of the Office of Cuba Broadcasting, which operates TV and Radio Marti; the Federal Communications Commission; the Department of Commerce’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration; the U.S. Agency for International Development; Freedom House; and the Information Technology Industry Council.
CITF Inaugural Meeting
Chair Creamer said estimates show internet penetration in Cuba is between 5 percent and 40 percent, with the higher figure including those who only can access government-run internet. He said the $1 per hour cost for wi-fi is onerous considering the average salary of roughly $30 per month. For internet access at home, Cubans must pay $17 to $80 per month, depending on speed, for only 30 hours of connectivity, Creamer said. He also claimed thatCuba’s government uses “filters and blocks websites in a bid to impede the Cuban people’s ability to criticize government institutions and policies.”
Tom Sullivan, chief of the FCC’s International Bureau, said there are no direct, undersea cables between the U.S. and Cuba, though he said there appear to be some U.S. satellites providing service in the island.
Apparently at the meeting, Andre Mendes, acting director of the Broadcasting Board of Governors’ Office of Cuba Broadcasting, declared, “Mr. Castro, tear down this firewall.”
The CITF decided to form two subcommittees: one to explore the role of media and freedom of information in Cuba, and the other to explore Internet access in Cuba. The subcommittees will provide the task force a preliminary report of recommendations within six months (by the end of August) based on input from relevant experts and stakeholders. The task force agreed to reconvene in October to review the preliminary reports, after which it will prepare a final report with recommendations for the Secretary of State and the President.
At the end of the meeting, the public was invited to make comments. Several Cuban dissidents lambasted Cuba’s government, drawing comparisons to World War II and to the governments of Syria and Iran. Others centered on a critique of the decades-old U.S. economic embargo and Trump’s policy toward Cuba. Some argued that any U.S. efforts would backfire, by undermining the perceived independence and credibility of burgeoning independent media in Cuba.
In addition to repeating the information about the CITF’sinaugural meeting and membership, the website has links to its Charter and Membership Balance Plan.
More importantly, it provides a form for submission of public comments.
CITF Charter and Membership Balance Plan
The Charter provides that the “Task Force will examine the technological challenges and opportunities for expanding internet access in Cuba, including through federal government support of programs and activities that encourage freedom of expression through independent media and internet freedom so that the Cuban people can enjoy the free and unregulated flow of information.”
According to the Membership Balance Plan, the CITF shall have no more than 12 members, of whom 10 shall be from relevant U.S. federal government departments and agencies. The other two shall be (a) a representative from an internet-related non-governmental organization and (b) a representative from an internet-related private-sector entity.
A subsequent post will examine reactions to the CITF and its inaugural meeting.
On July 27 the U.S. Department of State released its 2015 Trafficking in Persons Report, which upgraded Cuba from Tier 3 (a country that did “not fully comply with the [Trafficking in Persons Protection Act] minimum standards and [was] not making significant efforts to do so”) to Tier 2.Watch List (a country that did not fully comply with [that statute’s] minimum standards, but [was] making significant efforts to bring [itself] into compliance with those standards). A prior post reviewed that report’s discussion of Cuba and expressed disagreement with its assertion that Cuban medical personnel’s participation in foreign medical missions was illegal forced labor.
Since then there has been congressional criticism and concern about that report’s upgrading of several countries, including Cuba, as seen in recent congressional hearings.
The most recent hearing was on November 4, before a House of Representatives subcommittee. Most of the hearing was devoted to the report’s upgrading of Malaysia, Uzbekistan and China.
Cuba’s upgrade was the focus of the testimony at this hearing by Alex Lee, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. He testified that the shift in U.S.-Cuban relations did not influence the decision on Cuba. “It was completely separate,” he told the subcommittee.
This assessment of Cuba was challenged by the testimony at this hearing of Mark Lagon, the President of Freedom House. He stated that “Freedom House ranks Cuba as ‘Not Free’” and that the Department’s “grounds for an upgrade are deeply questionable.” Indeed, Lagon said, the Department’s report itself undercuts any rationale for an upgrade when it states: (a) “The penal code does not criminalize all forms of human trafficking on paper, not to speak of enforcement.” (b) “The Cuba regime did not even dissemble and claim any ‘efforts to prevent forced labor’ nor ‘any trafficking-specific shelters.” Moreover, according to Lagon, “It is far-fetched to suppose that there is no forced labor in state enterprises or for political prisoners in one of the world’s few remaining Marxist-Leninist states. Also, a burgeoning sex industry – welcoming sex tourism – fuels exploitation, despite steps the Report notes taken by Cuba to address sex trafficking.”
The attitude towards Cuba of this subcommittee’s chair, Christopher Smith (Rep., NJ), was revealed in his press release on July 27 (the date of the release of the 2015 TIP report), when he said, “For political reasons alone, President Obama has done a grave disservice to victims of human trafficking in Cuba . . . by upgrading the human trafficking tier rankings in those countries in the annual Trafficking in Persons report.” He added, “It seems quite clear that . . . Cuba’s unchecked march to normalized relations have captured the Obama Administration’s ability to properly access the worst of the worst when it comes to fighting to protect trafficking victims and punish the thugs who mastermind this modern day slavery. It is no coincidence that earlier this year the Obama Administration also removed Cuba from the national list of state sponsors of terrorism. One-by-one this Administration is overriding human rights and national security policies for another agenda.”
The same issue of the objectivity of the TIP Report was considered on September 17 by the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations at a closed briefing by Anthony Blinken, Deputy Secretary of State, entitled “State Department Processes in Establishing Tier Rankings for the 2015 Trafficking in Persons Report.” As the briefing was closed, we do not know what happened although at another hearing on September 22 Chairman Bob Corker (Rep., TN) mentioned that after this briefing he had made a request to the State Department for three unspecified items of information about the 2015 report.
Related to the issue of the objectivity of the 2015 TIP Report was the September 22 hearing by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the nomination of Susan Coppedge to be the Ambassador-at-Large and Director of the State Department’s Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons.
Although her written and oral testimony did not touch on Cuba, she made certain commitments if she were confirmed by the Senate, that bear on the overall issue of the objectivity of such future reports. Those commitments included the following: (a) “to use this position passionately to advocate for the rights of individuals to be free from forced labor or sex trafficking, for victims of human trafficking to have access to comprehensive services, for survivors to be empowered to have a voice in policy, and for an end to the trafficking of human beings;” (b) “to uphold the integrity of the annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report and its tier rankings, including by ensuring the facts from the field are accurately presented in the report;” and (c) “to maintain a close working relationship with Congress and with those federal agencies engaged in the fight against human trafficking.”
At the hearing all the members in attendance expressed support for the nomination, and afterwards Chairman Corker released a statement reiterating his strong support.
The issue of the objectivity of the 2015 TIP Report regarding Cuba and certain other countries still has not been resolved, and I am confident that we will hear more about this issue from Congress.
 The Tier 2 Watch List also requires that “a) The absolute number of victims of severe forms of trafficking is very significant or is significantly increasing; b) There is a failure to provide evidence of increasing efforts to combat severe forms of trafficking in persons from the previous year; or c) The determination that a country is making significant efforts to bring itself into compliance with minimum standards was based on commitments by the country to take additional future steps over the next year.”
A prior post reviewed the pending bills in this Session of Congress that support U.S.-Cuba reconciliation. Now we look at the 16 pending bills and resolutions opposing U.S.-Cuba reconciliation, all but two of which have had no substantive action taken by either chamber. Details on these measures are available on the Library of Congress’ THOMAS website.
Three of them—H.R.1782, S.1388 and H.R.2466—seek to impose preconditions for seeking normalization of diplomatic relations with Cuba and thereby attack a major premise of the Administration’s current efforts regarding Cuba: for over 50 years the U.S. has failed to obtain Cuban reforms through imposing preconditions and sanctions.
The other 13 pending measures are less threatening to the Administration’s ongoing efforts to normalize relations with Cuba.
Improved Cuban Human Rights as Precondition for Reconciliation
The major premise of the Administration’s new approach to Cuba is attacked by H.R.1782 “Cuba Human Rights Act of 2015” authored by Rep. Christopher Smith (Rep., NJ) with 12 cosponsors. Until Cuba ceases violating the human rights of its citizens, the bill, among other things, would prohibit any changes in the U.S. relationship with Cuba and require the U.S. to oppose Cuban membership on the U.N. Human Rights Council. The bill was referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, which in turn referred it to its subcommittees on the Western Hemisphere and on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights and International Organizations. No substantive action on the bill has been taken by that Committee and said subcommittees.
Less intrusive on the Administration’s approach to Cuba on human rights is S.Res.152 “A resolution recognizing threats to freedom of the press and expression around the world and reaffirming freedom of the press as a priority in efforts of the United States Government to promote democracy and good governance.” It condemns actions around the world that suppress freedom of the press and reaffirms the centrality of freedom of the press to U.S. efforts to support democracy, mitigate conflict, and promote good governance. A preamble references a Freedom House report that ranked Cuba as one of the countries having the worst obstacles to access, limits on content, and violations of user rights among countries and territories rated by Freedom House as “Not Free.” More recently the Committee to Protect Journalists leveled another criticism of press freedom in Cuba. The resolution was offered by Senator Robert Casey, Jr. (Dem., PA) and was referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, which has not yet taken any action on the matter.
Plan for Resolving U.S. Claims for Expropriated Property as Precondition for Reconciliation
Two pending bills relate to Cuba’s expropriation of property of U.S. nationals without compensation in violation of international law. Resolution of U.S. claims for money damages for such acts clearly is an important subject for direct discussions with the Cuban government in the first instance. As discussed in a prior post, those claims are currently estimated to total at least $7.0 billion.
Although I am not privy to how the U.S. Government intends to proceed on such claims, that prior post anticipated an inability to resolve these claims through direct negotiations and, therefore, suggested that the U.S. submit such claims to the Permanent Court of Arbitration along with all other U.S. claims for money damages against the Cuban government and that Cuba similarly submit all of its claims for money damages against the U.S. government. Moreover, that prior post pointed out that any consideration of U.S. claims for money damages against the Cuban government has to recognize that Cuba does not have the financial resources to pay a large sum of money.
S.1388: “A bill to require the President to submit a plan for resolving all outstanding claims relating to property confiscated by the Government of Cuba before taking action to ease restrictions on travel to or trade with Cuba, and for other purposes.” This bill legitimately recognizes that such claims are important for the U.S. and need to be resolved, but in this blogger’s opinion, this bill unwisely makes a plan for resolution a precondition for proceeding with reconciliation. On the other hand, the bill does not require actual resolution of the claims as a precondition so maybe the bill is not as threatening to reconciliation as might first appear. The bill is authored by Senators Marco Rubio (Rep., FL) and David Vitter (Rep., LA) with 11 cosponsors. It was introduced on May 19th and referred to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, which has not taken any action on the bill. Senator Rubio, however, referred to this bill at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing about Cuba on May 20th.
The companion bill in the House with the same title is H.R.2466 introduced on May 20th by Rep. Thomas Rooney (Rep., FL) with no cosponsors. It was referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, which has not yet taken any action on the bill.
Limits on Certain Trademarks Expropriated by Cuba
Cuba’s expropriation of property owned by U.S. nationals without compensation, in some instances, included trademarks. Therefore, such trademarks need to be included in the previously mentioned U.S. claims against Cuba.
This subject is addressed by S.757 “No Stolen Trademarks Honored in America Act, ” which would prohibit U.S. courts from recognizing, enforcing, or otherwise validating, under certain circumstances, any assertion of rights by a designated Cuban national of a mark, trade name, or commercial name that was used in connection with a business or assets that were confiscated by the Cuban government. The bill is authored by Senator Bill Nelson (Dem., FL) with 2 cosponsors and was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, which has not taken any action on the bill.
The companion bill with the same title in the House (H.R.1627) was authored by Rep. Darrell Issa (Rep., CA) with 10 cosponsors. It was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary, which in turn referred the bill to its Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet. Neither that Committee nor the Subcommittee has taken any action on the bill.
These bills on trademarks are less troublesome, in this blogger’s opinion, and could provide an interim measure of relief until resolution of the U.S. claims for expropriated property.
Seeking Extradition of U.S. Fugitives from Cuba
Two pending congressional measures relate to fugitives from U.S. justice in Cuba. The U.S.’ seeking Cuba’s extradition of them has been recognized by the Obama Administration as an important subject for negotiations with Cuba. Indeed, some such discussions already have occurred, and further discussions are to take place. However, as discussed in a prior post, existing extradition treaties between the U.S. and Cuba provide each country the right to not grant extradition if it determines that the offense in the other country is of a “political character,” and Cuba has invoked that provision to deny previous U.S. requests for extradition of some of the most notorious U.S. fugitives.
H.R.2189 “ Walter Patterson and Werner Foerster Justice and Extradition Act” was authored by Rep. Christopher Smith (Rep., NJ) with 3 cosponsors. It would require the president to submit an annual report to Congress regarding U.S. efforts to obtain extradition of fugitives from U.S. justice. One of the proposed findings of the bill states, “The refusal of Cuba to extradite or otherwise render Joanne Chesimard, an escaped convict who fled to Cuba after killing Werner Foerster, New Jersey State Trooper, is a deplorable example of a failure to extradite or otherwise render, and has caused ongoing suffering and stress to Mr. Foerster’s surviving family and friends.” The bill was referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, which has not taken any action on the bill.
H.Res.181 “Calling for the immediate extradition or rendering to the United States of convicted felon William Morales and all other fugitives from justice who are receiving safe harbor in Cuba in order to escape prosecution or confinement for criminal offenses committed in the United States.” It was authored by Rep. Peter King (Rep., NY) with 15 cosponsors and was referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, which in turn referred the bill to the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere. Neither body has taken any action on the proposed resolution.
The above bill (H.R. 2189) does not interfere with the Administration’s efforts to pursue reconciliation with Cuba as the bill implicitly recognizes that the U.S. may seek, but not compel, extradition. A prior post reported that the U.S. has made several requests over the years for the extradition of Joanne Chesimard (a/k/a Assata Shakur) and that Cuba had rejected such requests on the ground that her offenses in the U.S. were of a “political character.” Anticipating that Cuba would continue to reject such requests, the prior post recommended submitting disputes over extradition to the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The proposed resolution is merely a call by Congress for such extradition.
Various Measures Regarding U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
As discussed in a prior post, the U.S. has leased Guantanamo Bay from Cuba since 1903, and since September 11, 2001, one of the U.S. uses of that territory has been to house, interrogate and make adjudications of detainees from other countries. Since President Obama took office in 2009, he has sought to end the use of Guantanamo Bay for such detentions. Moreover, Cuba has made it known that it wants to have the U.S. leave Guantanamo Bay and return the territory to Cuba. Another prior post examined whether Cuba had a legal right to terminate the lease and recommended submission of any unresolved conflicts over this territory to the Permanent Court of Arbitration.
There has been considerable congressional opposition to ending the detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay and to ending the lease and returning the territory to Cuba. This is seen in the following six pending measures in this Session of Congress.
Ban on U.S. Abandoning Lease of Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. This is the intent of H.R.654 “Naval Station Guantanamo Bay Protection Act” authored by Rep. David Jolly (Rep., FL) with 56 cosponsors. It would bar the U.S. from modifying, terminating, abandoning, or transferring said lease. It was referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, which has not taken any action on the bill. This bill would limit the Administration’s discretion in negotiations over Guantanamo with Cuba, including obtaining a new lease with significantly higher rental fees.
Ban on Transferring Guantanamo Bay Detainees to Other U.S. Facilities. Senator Kelly Ayotte (Rep., NH) with 27 cosponsors submitted S.165: “Detaining Terrorists to Protect America Act of 2015.” It was referred to the Senate Committee on Armed Services, which on February 12thapproved the bill with an amendment in the nature of a substitute that would prohibit (i) the construction or modification of any U.S. facility to house certain individuals detained in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as of October 1, 2009; (ii) the transfer or release of certain detainees at Guantanamo Bay to other U.S. facilities and foreign countries; and (iii) judicial review of certain claims by said detainees. On 23rd February it was placed on the Senate’s Legislative Calendar.
The companion bill with the same title in the House (H.R.401) was authored by Rep. Jackie Walorski (Rep., IN) with 38 cosponsors. It was referred to the House Committee on Armed Services, which has not taken any action on the bill.
Neither of these bills about transfer of detainees would have direct adverse effects on U.S. reconciliation efforts although it could complicate any negotiations over Guantanamo with Cuba.
Ban on Aid to Certain Countries That Accept Transfer of Guantanamo Bay Detainees. S.778: “Guantanamo Bay Recidivism Prevention Act of 2015” would prohibit certain assistance for five years to a foreign country if: (1) the country received an individual who was released or transferred from Guantanamo Bay on or after February 1, 2015; and (2) after the date of such release or transfer, the individual is included in a report of individuals confirmed or suspected of returning to terrorist activities. The bill is authored by Senator Tom Cotton (Rep., AR) with 4 cosponsors and was referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, which has not taken any action on the bill.
The companion bill in the House (H.R.1689) “To prohibit the provision of certain foreign assistance to countries receiving certain detainees transferred from United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba” was authored by Rep. Ron DeSantis (Rep., FL) with 6 cosponsors. It was referred to the House Committee on foreign Affairs, which has not taken any action on the bill. Neither of these bills about foreign assistance would adversely affect U.S. negotiations with Cuba.
Fund for Constructing and Improving Guantanamo Bay Detention Facilities. S.Con.Res.11 establishes the congressional budget for the federal government for FY 2016. S.Amdt.664 to this Concurrent Resolution was offered by Senator Tom Cotton (Rep., AR) to establish a reserve fund for constructing or improving detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay. On March 27th this amendment was ruled out of order.
Continuation of Radio Marti and Television Marti.
H.R.2323 “United States International Communications Reform Act of 2015” would reform the U.S. government agencies responsible for international communications, but in section 124(b) would not affect Radio Marti and Television Marti. The bill was offered by Rep. Edward Royce (Rep., CA) with 14 cosponsors. It was referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, which on May 21st reported it with amendments to the full House.
This bill could be a minor irritant on advancing reconciliation as Cuba consistently has objected to these services.
Imposing Sanctions on North Korea.
This is the subject of H.R.204 “North Korea Sanctions and Diplomatic Nonrecognition Act of 2015,” which was authored by Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (Rep., FL) with 17 cosponsors and was referred to the House committees on Ways and Means and on Foreign Affairs, the latter of which referred the bill to its Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific. No action on the bill has been taken by either committee or by the subcommittee.
This bill is mentioned here for two reasons. First, Rep. Ros-Lehtinen, a Cuban-American, is a vigorous opponent of U.S.-Cuba reconciliation and conceivably would find ways to use the bill to oppose U.S.-Cuba reconciliation. Second, the bill’s proposed findings refer to the U.S. Treasury Department and the U.N. Security Council’s imposition of sanctions on North Korean shipping companies for attempting to import a concealed shipment of arms and related material from Cuba and to the U.S. telling the Security Council that Cuba had participated in a “cynical, outrageous and illegal attempt” to circumvent U.N. sanctions and had made “false claims” about the shipment.
U.S. citizens who support U.S.-Cuba reconciliation should contact their Senators and representatives in Congress to urge them to oppose the above measures, especially those–H.R.1782, S.1388 and H.R.2466— that would impose preconditions for such reconciliation.
A subsequent post will examine pending authorization and appropriation measures that relate to Cuba.
A prior post discussed the March 22, 2013, resolution by the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) that strengthened the Inter-American Human Rights System, especially the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“Commission”).
In so doing, the OAS rejected efforts to weaken the Commission under the guise of reform proposals that had been offered by Ecuador and other states that the Commission has criticized (Venezuela, Bolivia and Nicaragua).
We now examine the background to that surreptitious effort to weaken that System and the debate at the March 22nd General Assembly meeting
1. Multilateral Treaties and Other Instruments Regarding the Right of Free Expression.
The right of free expression by the media and others is well established in international law.
The United Nation’s General Assembly’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 in Article 19 states, “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” In 1966 this was put into legally enforceable form in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which entered into force in 1976.
To like effect is the American Convention on Human Rights, which was adopted by the OAS in 1969 and which entered into force in 1978. Its Article 13(1) says, “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression . . . [including the] freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of one’s choice.” Article 13(3) goes on to say, “The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, such as the abuse of government or private controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the dissemination of information, or by any other means tending to impede the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions.”
Ecuador under the presidency of Rafael Correa since January 2007 has through policies and actions retaliated against journalists and media that have criticized him and his government. Correa has insulted and filed lawsuits against reporters and news outlets and promoted a series of legal measures to roll back press freedoms. His government has expropriated television channels, radio stations, newspapers and magazines.
Journalists in the country also have been subjected to physical threats and assaults with lackluster efforts by the government to investigate and prosecute those responsible.
3. The Commission and Civil Society’s Criticism of Ecuador’s Hostility to Freedom of Expression.
The Commission in 1997 created the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression “to encourage the defense of the right to freedom of thought and expression in the hemisphere, given the fundamental role this right plays in consolidating and developing the democratic system and in protecting, guaranteeing, and promoting other human rights.”
This Rapporteur has been in the forefront of criticizing Ecuador for these actions against journalists and the media. Since January 1, 2009 it has issued nine press releases expressing its concern over specific criminal prosecutions and imprisonments of journalists for libel for publication of articles about corruption of public officials and for specific physical threats and assaults on journalists.
In addition, since 2006 the annual reports of the Rapporteur have had sections specifically addressing Ecuador’s conduct in this area.
For example, the latest such report (for 2011) devotes 31 pages (78-108) for a detailed, footnoted review of Ecuador’s assaults and attacks on media and journalists; legal proceedings and arrests (the “Rapporteur is concerned about the consistent tendency of high-ranking public officials to rebuke, arrest, and prosecute citizens who criticize them at public events”); presidential broadcasts and government interruptions of news programs; disparaging statements by senior state authorities against media outlets and reporters critical of the government; constitutional amendment and legislative proposals to regulate the content of all media, establish the grounds for liability and the applicable sanctions and serve as an authority on enforcement; and cloture and regulation of communications media.
Such actions also have subjected the country to similar criticism by the U.N. Human Rights Council in its Universal Periodic Review of Ecuador in the summer of 2012. One of the Council’s closing recommendations in that Review was for Ecuador to reform its legislation regarding freedom of expression with a view to bringing it in conformity with international standards and those of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. In response Ecuador said that it could not agree to reform its legal framework in accordance with standards from the Commission, when it is the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, not the Commission, which has judicial competency over this matter. Nor could Ecuador, it said, eliminate laws that criminalize opinion since it had no such laws.
4. Ecuador’s Campaign for Its Proposed “Reforms” of the Commission.
In response to the Special Rapporteur’s persistent and documented criticism of Ecuador, the country developed a set of proposals to “reform” the Commission. Prominent in this package were reduction in funding (and hence the work) of the Special Rapporteur and elimination of his separate annual report.
In early 2013 Ecuador conducted a lobbying campaign in support of these proposals. Its Foreign Minister, Ricardo Patino, went on a tour of Mexico, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Haiti and Venezuela to promote them. He also advocated them at a meeting of the Political Council of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our Americas (ALBA)  and at a March 11th meeting in Guayaquil, Ecuador of the 24 states that were parties to the American Convention on Human Rights.
The latter event was opened by a long speech by Ecuadorian President Correa, who emphasized that the Commission should have its headquarters in a state that has ratified said Convention (not Washington, D.C.); that the Commission should have its own budget provided only by state parties to the Convention (without voluntary contributions by outsiders like the U.S., Canadian and European governments and NGO’s); that the Commission should not be “autonomous” and instead be controlled by said states parties; the abolition of the Commission’s rules authorizing its issuance of precautionary measures; having the Commission focus on general promotion of human rights, not investigating and deciding on alleged violations of human rights; and elimination of the separate annual report of the Special Rapporteur for Free Expression and instead including such a report in a comprehensive report for all of the rapporteurships.
The Ecuador meeting resulted in the Declaration of Guayaquil whereby the 24 states parties agreed that at the March 22nd meeting of the OAS General Assembly they would support the following: a group of their foreign ministers would press the U.S., Canada and other non-parties to the Convention to ratify or accede to same; the Commission would be refocused on promotion of human rights through national systems; financing of the Commission would be increased by states parties and by “neutral” others; all rapporteurships would be treated equally; an analysis of the costs of the OAS Human Rights System would be obtained; the Commission’s headquarters would be moved to a state party; and annual conferences about reforming the System would be held.
Opposition to such proposals came forward from the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, who urged the OAS members “to strengthen its exemplary human rights system, by promoting universal access for citizens . . ., respecting the Commission’s autonomy to progressively improve its policy and practices in response to the needs of victims and concerns of member states, and providing the necessary resources [to the System].” Similar concerns were voiced by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Committee to Protect Journalists, Freedom House, a group of 98 prominent Latin Americans and a coalition of 700 hemispheric human rights organizations.
Another opponent of Ecuador’s campaign was Cesar Gaviria Trujillo, a former president of Colombia and past secretary general of the OAS. He said that the so called “reforms” of the Commission put forward by Ecuador would “severely weaken the [C]omission and make it easier for governments to ignore basic rights and limit free speech.” They would “drastically curtail [the Commission’s] autonomy” and put a “financial stranglehold” on its operations, including a “devastating impact” on the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. 
The March 22nd OAS General Assembly Meeting
In opening remarks that day, the OAS Secretary General, Jose Miguel Insulza from Chile, stressed that the autonomy of the System needed to be maintained. He also said that strengthening some of the Commission’s rapporteurships “cannot mean that others are weakened” and that the Special Rapporteurship on Freedom of Expression should be strengthened “with a program of ample defense of [such] freedom . . . . ” This would include “issues relating to the curtailment of that freedom by public authorities . . . as well as the threats and crimes to which journalists and the social media are increasingly subjected in our region and the obligation of states to protect them.”
Similar remarks were made by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, William J. Burns. He noted that even though the U.S. was not a party to the American Convention on Human Rights, the U.S. still collaborates with the Commission when it challenges the U.S. on such issues as the death penalty, the human rights of migrants and children and the status of detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. He added, “We must be vigilant against efforts to weaken the Commission under the guise of reform. [Such efforts] . . . seek to undermine the Commission’s ability to hold governments accountable when they erode democratic checks and balances and concentrate power through illiberal manipulation of democratic processes.”
Ecuadorian Foreign Minister Patino in his remarks accused the opposition and the media of distorting his government’s proposals. He also accused the Commission of improperly assuming the power to issue precautionary measures. Its decisions were independent, he said, but the Commission was not autonomous. He rhetorically asked, the Commission is autonomous and independent of whom? Sotto voce, a Spanish journalist answered, “You,” causing laughter by those around the journalist.
The resolution adopted by acclamation at the midnight conclusion of the March 22nd meeting already has been discussed. It clearly did not adopt all of the items in Ecuador’s package.
This resolution emerged after a long day in which the U.S., Canada, Mexico, Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama and Chile lead the opposition to the proposals from Ecuador, Bolivia, Venezuela and Nicaragua. A Human Rights Watch observer said, “It was a resounding victory for the Commission, and a major defeat for the Venezuela-Ecuador bloc. It became evident that [the latter] . . . were totally isolated, without the support they were expecting from other countries.”
Towards the end of the meeting Ecuador and Bolivia threatened to withdraw from the Commission and leave the meeting. To avoid such a rupture, Argentina offered a face-saving amendment to the resolution about the OAS’ Permanent Council continuing the dialogue on the “core aspects for strengthening” the System, which Ecuador and the other ALBA countries ultimately accepted.
Afterwards Ecuador’s Foreign Minister tried to whitewash his country’s defeat by saying that the resolution accepted its proposal to continue the debate in the future. Before the next meeting of the OAS General Assembly in June 2014, the Foreign Minister said that there would be another meeting of the states parties to the American Convention like the one on March 11th in Guayaquil to discuss these issues. He also hinted at Ecuador’s possible withdrawal from the OAS Commission by saying there was an agreement being negotiated to create a Human Rights Commission of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR).
Unless there are unexpected changes in regimes or policies in this Hemisphere over the next 14 months, I do not expect Ecuador and its allies will be successful at the June 2014 OAS meeting in gaining acceptance of its proposals to weaken the Inter-American Commission. We will then see if this small group will leave that Commission and form its own, more limited, human rights system.
ALBA is an alternative to the U.S.-sponsored Free Trade Area of the Americas. differing from the latter in that it advocates a socially-oriented trade block rather than one strictly based on the logic of deregulated profit maximization. The only members of ALBA are Ecuador, Bolivia, Venezuela, Nicaragua and three small Caribbean states (Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.
 Such a limitation on financing undoubtedly would result in a reduction of such funding and thus on the work of the Commission.
 I assume that Ecuador has another burden to overcome in attempting to win support for its “reform” proposals. Its credibility within the OAS, I suspect, has been adversely affected by its recent exaggerated, alarmist call for an OAS Consultative Meeting of Foreign Ministers over the alleged United Kingdom threat to invade Ecuador’s London Embassy because of its providing diplomatic asylum in that Embassy to Julian Assange.