U.S. designation of Cuba as “State Sponsor of Terrorism” – Page 3

Presidents Obama and Castro’s Meeting at the Summit of the Americas

On April 11th U.S. President Barack Obama and Cuba’s President Raul Castro had a private meeting at the Seventh Summit of the Americas in Panama after each of them had given their major speeches. Here are their public statements immediately before that meeting as well as Obama’s subsequent press conference on these issues. [1]

President Barack Obama’s Pre-Meeting Comments

“This is obviously a historic meeting. The history between the United States and Cuba is obviously complicated, and over the years a lot of mistrust has developed. But during the course of the last several months, there have been contacts between the U.S. and the Cuban government. And in December, as a consequence of some of the groundwork that had been laid, both myself and President Castro announced a significant change in policy and the relationship between our two governments.”

“[A]fter 50 years of policy that had not changed on the part of the [U.S.], it was my belief that it was time to try something new, that it was important for us to engage more directly with the Cuban government and the Cuban people. And as a consequence, I think we are now in a position to move on a path towards the future, and leave behind some of the circumstances of the past that have made it so difficult, I think, for our countries to communicate.”

“Already we’ve seen majorities of the American people and the Cuban people respond positively to this change. And I truly believe that as more exchanges take place, more commerce and interactions resume between the [U.S.] and Cuba, that the deep connections between the Cuban people and the American people will reflect itself in a more positive and constructive relationship between our governments.”

“Now, obviously there are still going to be deep and significant differences between our two governments. We will continue to try to lift up concerns around democracy and human rights. And as you heard from President Castro’s passionate speech this morning, they will lift up concerns about U.S. policy as well.” [2]

“But I think what we have both concluded is that we can disagree with the spirit of respect and civility, and that over time it is possible for us to turn the page and develop a new relationship in our two countries.”

“And some of our immediate tasks include normalizing diplomatic relations and ultimately opening an embassy in Havana, and Cuba being able to open an embassy in Washington, D.C. so that our diplomats are able to interact on a more regular basis.”

“So I want to thank President Castro for the spirit of openness and courtesy that he has shown during our interactions. And I think if we can build on this spirit of mutual respect and candidness, that over time we will see not just a transformation in the relationship between our two countries, but a positive impact throughout the hemisphere and the world.”

“And President Castro earlier today spoke about the significant hardships that the people of Cuba have undergone over many decades. I can say with all sincerity that the essence of my policy is to do whatever I can to make sure that the people of Cuba are able to prosper and live in freedom and security, and enjoy a connection with the world where their incredible talents and ingenuity and hard work can thrive.”

President Raul Castro’s Pre-Meeting Comments (English translation)

“Mr. President, friends from the press, we have been making long speeches and listening to many long speeches too, so I do not want to abuse the time of President Obama or your time.”

“I think that what President Obama has just said, it’s practically the same as we feel about the topics, including human rights, freedom of the press. We have said on previous occasions to some American friends that we are willing to discuss every issue between the [U.S.] and Cuba. We are willing to discuss about those issues that I have mentioned and about many others, as these — both in Cuba but also in the [U.S.].”

“I think that everything can be on the table. I think that we can do it, as President Obama has just said, with respect for the ideas of the other. We could be persuaded of some things; of others, we might not be persuaded. But when I say that I agree with everything that the President has just said, I include that we have agreed to disagree. No one should entertain illusions. It is true that we have many differences. Our countries have a long and complicated history, but we are willing to make progress in the way the President has described.”

“We can develop a friendship between our two peoples. We shall continue advancing in the meetings which are taking place in order to re-establish relations between our countries. We shall open our embassies. We shall visit each other, having exchanges, people to people. And all that matters is what those neighbors can do; we are close neighbors, and there are many things that we can have.”

“So we are willing to discuss everything, but we need to be patient — very patient. Some things we will agree on; others we will disagree. The pace of life at the present moment in the world, it’s very fast. We might disagree on something today on which we could agree tomorrow. And we hope that our closest assistants –some of them are here with us today — we hope that they will follow the instructions of both Presidents.”

President Obama’s Post-Meeting Press Conference

Immediately after his meeting with President Castro, Obama held a press conference with the following additional remarks about Cuba.

“In keeping with the Inter-American Democratic Charter, we continue to stand up strongly for democracy and human rights. This was the first Summit of the Americas to include a formal role for civil society. As I said at yesterday’s forum, the [U.S.] will continue to deepen our support for civil society groups across the Americas and around the world. I’m pleased that there was widespread agreement among the nations here that civil society groups have a permanent role in future summits. And the [U.S.] will support this work through the new innovation center we’re creating to empower civil society groups across Latin America.”

“How to promote greater opportunity for the Cuban people was also a major focus of my meeting with President Castro, the first between leaders of our two nations in more than half a century. I told President Castro in private what I’ve have said in public — that our governments will continue to have differences and the [U.S.] will continue to stand firmly for universal values and human rights. At the same time, we agreed that we can continue to take steps forward that advance our mutual interests. We’ll continue to work toward reestablishing diplomatic relations, reopening embassies in Havana and Washington, and encouraging greater contacts and commerce and exchanges between our citizens.”

“I’m optimistic that we’ll continue to make progress and that this can indeed be a turning point — not just between the [U.S.] and Cuba, but for greater cooperation among countries across the region.”

“[W]ith respect to Cuba, there is majority support of our policy in the [U.S.], and there’s overwhelming support for our policy in Cuba. I think people recognize that if you keep on doing something for 50 years and it doesn’t work, you should try something new.”

“And so the American people don’t need to be persuaded that this is, in fact, the right thing to do. I recognize that there are still concerns and questions that Congress may have; we’ve got concerns and questions about specific activities that are taking place in Cuba, and human rights and reform. And there were two members of the Cuban civil society that were in attendance at the meeting that I had yesterday who expressed much of what they have to go through on a day-to-day basis. They were supportive of our policy of engagement with Cuba. And so I don’t think that it’s so much we have to persuade anybody.”

“The issue of the State Sponsor of Terrorism list — as you know, the State Department has provided a recommendation; it’s gone through our interagency process. I’ll be honest with you, I have been on the road, and I want to make sure that I have a chance to read it, study it, before we announce publicly what the policy outcome is going to be.” [2]

“But in terms of the overall direction of Cuba policy, I think there is a strong majority both in the United States and in Cuba that says our ability to engage, to open up commerce and travel and people-to-people exchanges is ultimately going to be good for the Cuban people.”

“It was a candid and fruitful conversation between me and Raul Castro. I can tell you that, in the conversations I’ve had so far with him — two on the phone and, most recently, face-to-face — that we are able to speak honestly about our differences and our concerns in ways that I think offer the possibility of moving the relationship between our two countries in a different and better direction.”

“We have very different views of how society should be organized. And I was very direct with him that we are not going to stop talking about issues like democracy and human rights and freedom of assembly and freedom of the press — not because we think we are perfect and that every country has to mimic us exactly, but because there are a set of universal principles for which we stand.”

“And one of the goals of my administration is to have some consistency in speaking out on behalf of those who oftentimes don’t have a voice. And I think during his speech in the plenary session, he was pretty clear about areas of U.S. policy he doesn’t like, and I suspect he’s going to continue to speak out on those.”

“What’s been clear from this entire summit, though, is the unanimity with which, regardless of their ideological predispositions, the leaders of Latin America think this is the right thing to do. Because what they see is the possibility of a more constructive dialogue that ultimately benefits the Cuban people, and removes what too often has been a distraction or an excuse from the hemisphere acting on important challenges that we face.”

“So I am cautiously optimistic that over the coming months and coming years that the process that we’ve initiated, first announced in December, reaffirmed here at the Summit of the Americas, will lead to a different future for the Cuban people and a different relationship between the United States and Cuba.

“On Cuba, we are not in the business of regime change. We are in the business of making sure the Cuban people have freedom and the ability to participate and shape their own destiny and their own lives, and supporting civil society.”

“And there’s going to be an evolution, regardless of what we do, inside of Cuba. Partly it’s going to be generational. If you listened to President Castro’s comments earlier this morning, a lot of the points he made referenced actions that took place before I was born, and part of my message here is the Cold War is over. There’s still a whole lot of challenges that we face and a lot of issues around the world, and we’re still going to have serious issues with Cuba on not just the Cuban government’s approach to its own people, but also regional issues and concerns. There are going to be areas where we cooperate as well. Cuban doctors deployed during the Ebola crisis made a difference; Cuban activity in Haiti in the wake of the earthquake made a difference. And so there may be areas of collaboration as well.”

“What I said to President Castro is the same thing that I’ve said to leaders throughout the region. We have a point of view and we won’t be shy about expressing it. But I’m confident that the way to lift up the values that we care about is through persuasion. And that’s going to be the primary approach that we take on a whole host of these issues — primarily because they don’t implicate our national security in a direct way.”

“And I think that we have to be very clear if Cuba is not a threat to the United States. That doesn’t mean we don’t have differences with it. But on the list of threats that I’m concerned about, I think it’s fair to say that between ISIL and Iran getting a nuclear weapon, and activities in Yemen and Libya, and Boko Haram, Russian aggression in Ukraine and the impact on our allies there — I could go down a pretty long list — climate change — so I think our approach has to be one of trying to work with the region and other countries, and be very clear about what we believe and what we stand for, and what we think works and what doesn’t.”

“And so often, when we insert ourselves in ways that go beyond persuasion, it’s counterproductive. It backfires. That’s been part of our history — which is why countries keep on trying to use us as an excuse for their own governance failures. Let’s take away the excuse. And let’s be clear that we’re prepared to partner and engage with everybody to try to lift up opportunity and prosperity and security for people in the region.”

I “did not get into the [minute] details [about rescinding the State Sponsor of Terrorism with President Castro.] As I said before, the State Sponsor of Terrorism recommendation will be coming to me. I will read it; I’ll review it. There’s a process whereby if, in fact, I accept those recommendations, Congress has an opportunity to review it, as well, and it will be there for people to see.”

“I think that the concerns around the embassy are going to be mostly on the Cuban side. They haven’t dealt with an American embassy in Cuba in quite some time. And changing in this way is, I’m sure, an unsettling process. We’re accustomed to this. We . . . “are familiar with how that gets done in a way that’s consistent with improving diplomatic relations over the long term. This is probably a more profound shift for them than it is for us.”

“But we stand ready to move forward. We’re confident that it can lead to an improved dialogue. And our bottom line at the end is, is that it can lead to an improved set of prospects for the Cuban people.”

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[1] In addition to the hyperlinked text of these remarks, this post is based upon the following: Lederman & Kuhnhenn, In historic face to face, Obama and Castro vow to turn the page, Wash. Post (April 11, 2015), DeYoung & Miroff, Obama and Castro hold historic meeting, agree to foster a ‘new relationship,’ Wash. Post (April 11, 2015). Future posts will cover other aspects of the Summit of the Americas. Prior posts set forth substantial extracts of Obama’s and Castro’s major speeches at the Summit.

[2] As discussed in a prior post, President Obama on April 14th rescinded the designation of Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, to be effective in 45 days.

President Obama Rescinds U.S. Designation of Cuba as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism”

On April 14^th President Barack Obama rescinded the U.S. designation of Cuba as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism” and so notified the Congress. This post will review that decision and its background. [1]

As discussed in a prior post, on December 17, 2014, President Obama asked Secretary of State John Kerry to undertake a review of whether the U.S. should rescind this designation while another post reviewed the statutory framework for this process: review and recommendation by the Department of State followed by a decision by the president and notification of such a decision to the Congress with such a decision to become effective 45 days after that notification. Yet another post set forth the reasons why this blogger believes that such past designations of Cuba have been unjustified, absurd, ridiculous.

State Department’s Recommendation

Secretary of State’s Press Statement.

On April 14, 2015, Secretary Kerry publicly announced that the State Department had recommended that the President rescind the designation of Cuba as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism.” His press release stated that last week the “Department submitted a report to the White House recommending, based on the facts and the statutory standard, that President Obama rescind Cuba’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism.”

“This recommendation,” the Statement continued, “reflects the Department’s assessment that Cuba meets the criteria established by Congress for rescission . . . . whether Cuba provided any support for international terrorism during the previous six months, and whether Cuba has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future.” This conclusion was based, in part, upon “corroborative assurances received from the Government of Cuba.”

Nevertheless, according to the Secretary’s statement, “the United States has had, and continues to have, significant concerns and disagreements with a wide range of Cuba’s policies and actions, [but] these concerns and disagreements fall outside of the criteria for designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism.”

Department’s Background Briefing.

At a special briefing on April 14^th, a senior State Department official noted, “the Cubans have for a long time shown us many, many, many speeches by their leaders, both Fidel and Raul, in which they have rejected terrorism; many instances, in fact, of terrorist acts that they have decried publicly, I think the latest probably being the Charlie Hebdo incident in France. But certainly, there are lots of incidents that they can point to. And in terms of commitments for the future, they point to both statements by their leadership and ratifications of international treaties, and the assurances that they gave us.”

Another senior official stated, ”the assurances they provide were fairly wide-ranging and fairly high-level. . . . [T]hey addressed the key elements that we know in the past have been a factor. [T]hey also addressed the pledge or the assurances that they will no longer support acts of terrorism in the future.”

One of the officials in response to a journalist question said, “The statutes . . . provide that no rescission can be made if within 45 days after the receipt of the report from the President the Congress enacts a joint resolution on the issue prohibiting the rescission. The President, of course, can veto any such joint resolution and Congress then, of course, can further act to override the veto. . . . Congress has the right to act.”

President Obama’s Decision

That same day (April 14) a White House press release stated the President had “submitted to Congress the statutorily required report and certifications indicating the Administration’s intent to rescind Cuba’s State Sponsor of Terrorism designation.”

This presidential decision was based upon the previously mentioned State Department recommendation that was based on its “careful review of Cuba’s record, which was informed by the Intelligence Community, as well as assurances provided by the Cuban government.”

This press release also stated, “As the President has said, we will continue to have differences with the Cuban government, but our concerns over a wide range of Cuba’s policies and actions fall outside the criteria that is relevant to whether to rescind Cuba’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. That determination is based on the statutory standard – and the facts – and those facts have led the President to declare his intention to rescind Cuba’s State Sponsor of Terrorism designation. More broadly, the [U.S.] will continue to support our interests and values through engagement with the Cuban government and people.”

The actual presidential message to Congress was even shorter. It stated, “Pursuant to the Constitution and the laws of the United States, and consistent with section 6(j)(4)(B) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, Public Law 96-72, as amended (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)), and as continued in effect by Executive Order 13222 of August 17, 2001, I hereby certify, with respect to the rescission of the determination of March 1,
1982, regarding Cuba that:(i) the Government of Cuba has not provided any support for international terrorism during the preceding 6-month period; and

(ii) the Government of Cuba has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future.

This certification shall also satisfy the provisions of section 620A(c)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Public Law 87-195, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2371(c)), and section 40(f)(1)(B) of the Arms Export Control Act, PublicLaw 90-629, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2780(f)).”

Reactions to the Decision

Senators Patrick Leahy (Dem., VT), Dick Durbin (Dem., IL) and Benjamin Cardin (Dem., MD) were among those officials who offered immediate support of the decision. Geoff Thale of the Washington Office on Latin America, a private group that promotes democracy in the hemisphere, said: “Taking Cuba off the list of terrorist states is a sensible, and long-overdue step. Whatever U.S. and Cuban differences, the Cuban government has not been a supporter of terrorism. Taking Cuba off the list will remove an unnecessary irritant in the relationship, and perhaps allow us to discuss the real differences we do have in a more serious way. It should help pave the way for normal diplomatic relations.” The same sentiment came from another U.S. NGO focusing on Latin America, the Latin American Working Group.

Josefina Vidal, Cuba’s top diplomat for U.S. Affairs, endorsed the decision. She said, “The Cuban government recognizes the just decision taken by the President of the [U.S.] to eliminate Cuba from a list on which it never should have been included, especially considering that our country has been the victim of hundreds of acts of terrorism that have cost 3,478 lives and disabled 2,099 Cuban citizens. As the Cuban government has reiterated on multiple occasions, Cuba rejects and condemns all acts of terrorism in all their forms and manifestations, as well as any action that is intended to instigate, support, finance or conceal terrorist acts.”

Not surprisingly long time Cuban-American opponents of the U.S.-Cuba rapprochement criticized this decision: U.S. Senators Marco Rubio (Rep., FL) and Robert Menendez (Dem., NJ) and Representatives Ileana Ros-Lehtine (Rep., FL) and Mario Diaz-Balart (Rep., FL).

Rubio’s opposition undercuts his just-announced presidential campaign assertion that the “time has come for our generation to lead the way toward a new American Century.” In contrast, he said, “too many of our leaders and their ideas are stuck in the twentieth century. They are busy looking backward. . . . They look for solutions in yesterday.” Sorry, Senator Rubio, your ideas and solutions for U.S.-Cuba relations “are stuck in the twentieth century . . . in yesterday.” Stop looking backward!

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[1] This post is based upon the sources which are hyperlinked in this post along with the following: Archibold & Davis, Obama Endorses Removing Cuba From Terrorism List, N.Y. Times (April 14, 2015); Reuters, Obama Tells Congress He Plans to Remove Cuba From Terrorism List, N.Y. Times (April 14, 2015), Reuters, Cuba Gave U.S. Assurances It Will Not Support Terrorism in Future: U.S. Officials, N.Y. Times (April 14, 2015); Assoc. Press, Obama to Remove Cuba From State Sponsor of Terror List, N.Y. Times (April 14, 2015); DeJong, Obama removes Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, Wash. Post (April 14, 2015); Tharoor, After 33 years, the U.S. dropped its claim that Cuba sponsors terrorism. Here’s what it means, Wash. Post (Apr. 14, 2015); Barack Obama announces intent to remove Cuba from list of state sponsors of terrorism, Granma (April 14, 2015); Wash. Office on Latin America, Press Release: White House Announces Cuba’s Removal from ‘State Sponsors of Terror List (April 14, 2015); Latin American Working Group, Statement about Cuba’s removal from list (April 14, 2015); Assoc. Press, Cubans Hail Removal From US List of State Terrorism Sponsors, N.Y. Times (April 15, 2015). The actual State Department recommendation could not be found on the Internet, but when it is so available, another blog post will review that document

Seventh Summit of the Americas Is Underway in Panama

The Seventh Summit of the Americas will take place in Panama City, Panama on April 10 and 11. Such Summits are institutionalized gatherings of heads of state and government of the member states of the Western Hemisphere where leaders discuss common policy issues, affirm shared values and commit to concerted actions at the national and regional level to address continuing and new challenges faced by countries in the Americas. [1]

In the meantime, preliminary Summit events are underway while planning for the meetings of heads of state and government are nearly complete.

This post will review the plans for this Summit by the organizers and then discuss Summit developments involving the U.S., Cuba and Venezuela. [2]

The Summit Organizers’ Plan

The Summit’s central theme is “Prosperity with Equity: The Challenge of Cooperation in the Americas” with several sub-themes, including education, health, energy, environment, migration, security, citizen participation and democratic governance. These issues will be discussed by 35 heads of state and government. In addition to these officials, the Vatican Secretary of State, Cardinal Pietro Parolin, will attend.

The priority of the organizers in Panama is to work on a comprehensive document titled “Mandates for Action”, which will contain agreements from all countries involved on topics related to health, education, security, migration, environment, energy, democratic governance and citizen participation.

The Summit’s main events will take place in the ATLAPA Convention Center in central Panama City as shown in the photograph below.

The Summit also will host the four following forums:

Civil Society Forum will seek to promote governments’ consultation and coordination, dialogue and exchange with civil society. It also will offer input and recommendations for the consideration of the participating States.

The Youth Forum will provide young entrepreneurs an opportunity to offer their recommendations to the participating States.

The Business Forum will explore the trade and investment opportunities and public-private sector cooperation.

The University Presidents’ Forum will focus on academic mobility, the role of innovation and technology in enhancing research skills and college education for the region; and the importance of scholarly research on entrepreneurship and sustainable economic development.

U.S. Plans for the Summit

A prior post reviewed some of the U.S preparations for the Summit. In addition, the U.S. Department of State asserts that this Summit “is an historic opportunity to deepen partnerships, collaborate on shared challenges, and make tangible commitments to securing a brighter future for all of the people of the Americas. . . . The [U.S.] is working closely with partners throughout the Americas to ensure the 2015 Summit upholds our common commitment to inclusive economic development, democracy, and human rights, while providing robust engagement among government leaders, civil society groups, and regional business communities.”

The U.S. especially has been calling for the participation of Cuban civil society in the Summit. Indeed, in his December 17^th announcement of the rapprochement with Cuba, President Obama said, “we are prepared to have Cuba join the other nations of the hemisphere at the Summit. . . . But we will insist that civil society join us so that citizens, not just leaders, are shaping our future.”

Interestingly I have not seen any news or information about the U.S. inviting U.S. civil society, youth, business or university presidents to participate in the Summit.

The U.S. was hoping that by the time of the Summit, the U.S. and Cuba would have re-established normal diplomatic relations and that this would be an occasion for the two countries to enjoy receiving congratulations from the other countries in the Americas.

The resumption of normal relations, however, has not yet happened, and now there are many countries demonstrably upset over President Obama’s executive order of March 9^th imposing sanctions on seven Venezuelans. This week at Venezuela’s invitation, a senior Department of State official went to Venezuela to meet with the country’s foreign minister.

The Washington Post this week published an editorial criticizing the U.S. opening to Cuba. It said there have been no benefits to the U.S. to date while Cuba has gained. President Castro will attend the Summit. Soon the U.S. probably will rescind its designation of Cuba as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism” in disregard of Cuba’s alleged “continued support for Colombia’s terrorist groups, its illegal arms trading with North Korea and the sanctuary it provides American criminal JoAnne Chesimard.” In addition, says the editorial, Cuba is joining Venezuela in unjustifiably attacking the U.S. over President Obama’s executive order imposing sanctions on seven Venezuelans.

Cuba’s Plans for the Summit

According to the Cuban press, the country has been preparing for full participation in the Summit. The Cuban Minister of Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment, Rodrigo Malmierca, emphasized that over 100 representatives of Cuban civil society, including youth, academics, intellectuals, entrepreneurs and coop leaders would be going to the Summit. They will show the possibilities that Cuba provides for the development of international economic relations from the adoption of Law 118 Foreign Investment and Development Special Zone Mariel (ZEDM).

On Tuesday pro-government representatives of Cuban civil society in Panama issued a statement denouncing the presence at the Summit of other Cubans who allegedly were “mercenaries paid by the historic enemies of our nation,” i.e., the U.S. Such Cubans, the pro-government representatives said, “make up a tiny ‘opposition’ manufactured from abroad, lacking any legitimacy or decorum. Several of its members are publicly linked to recognized terrorists who have caused infinite pain to the Cuban people.”

The statement asserted, “It is offensive that such people, who have made betraying the homeland a well-paid profession and shamefully usurp the name of the country that they slander and offend day after day, are participating in these forums. For the dignified and sovereign Cuba that has withstood more than five decades of blockade and harassment, for the overwhelming majority of Cubans, for us, we who have come to Panama with modesty and a spirit of cooperation to share experiences of our social development, it is unacceptable that there are people of such low moral character here.”

The next day, Wednesday, during one of the forums, about 100 supporters of Cuba’s government heckled Cuban dissidents by calling them “imperialist” and “mercenaries” Organizers appealed for calm during the hour-long frenzied scene. The pro-government groups joined by pro-government groups from Venezuela angrily marched out, saying they wouldn’t attend the proceedings in the presence of individuals they accuse of trying to destabilize Cuba’s government.

From Havana, Cuban Vice-President (and reputed future president) Miguel Diaz-Canel, stated, “Nobody could think that in a process of re-establishing relations, which we’re trying to move forward on with the [U.S.], Cuban support for Venezuela could be made conditional. If they attack Venezuela, they’re attacking Cuba. And Cuba will always be on Venezuela’s side above all things.”

A Cuban online newspaper, CubaDebate, has a journalist in Panama to provide minute-by-minute tweets about the Summit.

Venezuela’s Plans for the Summit

Venezuela plans to make a major effort to obtain the Summit’s condemnation of President Obama’s executive order imposing sanctions on seven Venezuelans. For example, President Maduro will bring a petition against the executive order that has been signed by over nine million of his people. A Caracas pollster said, “Maduro is taking advantage of Obama’s order. It’s an extreme campaign that distracts from the internal problems of the country. You just want your people in the street, proselytizing and campaigning.”

In addition, Maduro’s political allies are sending 825 activists to the Summit to protest Obama and support Maduro.”There will be marches, caravans and anti-imperialist stands,” said Rafael Uzcategui, secretary general of the ruling Fatherland for All, who said that Nicaragua, a close ally of Chavez, will send a delegation with a similar purpose.

Others plan to focus on Venezuela’s alleged human rights violations. In recent weeks many countries and human rights organizations have criticized Venezuela’s imprisonment of political dissidents. This includes the U.N., the European Parliament, the governments of the U.S., Spain, Canada and Colombia and the Socialist International, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, among others.

Now 21 Latin American presidents have issued a statement to denounce the “democratic alteration” of Venezuela and to advocate for the release of prisoners and the restoration of political autonomy. Their proposed Declaration of Panama asks the Summit of the Americas to seek a solution to the Venezuelan crisis “that respects the constitutional principles and international standards.” The signers of this statement include Colombians Andres Pastrana, Alvaro Uribe and Belisario Betancur; Costa Ricans Laura Chinchilla, Rafael Calderon, Miguel Angel Rodriguez and Luis Alberto Monge; Chilean Sebastián Piñera ; and Spain’s José María Aznar.

In addition, this week 28 human rights organizations across the continent (including: Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Transparency International and the International Commission of Jurists) issued a statement requiring cessation of “harassment against human rights defenders of human rights ” and called on the governments participating in the Summit of the Americas” to demand the government of Nicolas Maduro to ensure that the defenders and human rights defenders can carry out their work without fear of reprisal.”

A group of Venezuelan human rights organizations will be going to Panama to present their complaints about human rights in their country. President Maduro’s response is to call them “CIA stooges.”

Conclusion

New York Times editorial has urged U.S. and Cuban government officials at the Summit to “not ignore” the Cuban civil society representatives, “but rather work to amplify their voices. They have struggled for years to be heard in their own country, where those critical of the Communist system have faced repression.” The Times also notes that some Cubans “who cannot afford a trip to Panama or are restricted from traveling have pledged to hold a parallel meeting in Cuba. . . . Increasingly, the [Cuban] government will have to reckon with the fact that many of the dissidents’ aspirations are shared by most Cubans.”

Now we will have to see what actually happens at the rest of the Summit.

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[1] Prior Summits were held in Miami, Florida, USA (I, 1994); Santiago, Chile (II, 1998); Quebec City, Canada (III, 2001); Mar del Plata, Argentina (IV, 2005); Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago (V, 2009); and Cartagena, Colombia (VI 2012). This process also held a Summit on Sustainable Development in Santa Cruz, Bolivia in 1996 and a Special Summit in Monterey, Mexico in 2004.

[2] In addition to information from the Summit’s website, this post is based upon the following: Vyas, Venezuela’s Maduro Takes Petition Against U.S. Sanctions to Summit of the Americas, W.S.J. (April 8, 2015); Sanchez, Senior U.S. official in Venezuela for meetings with Maduro, Wash. Post (April 8, 2015); Goodman & Rodriguez, Cuban dissidents heckled at Americas Summit, Wash. Post (April 8, 2015); Statement by the Cuban delegation to the parallel forums of the Summit of the Americas, Granma (April 7, 2015); Gómez, Given the presence of mercenaries, Cuban delegation abandons Civil Society Forum, Granma (April 8, 2015); Editorial, Mr. Obama’s opportunity in Panama, Wash. Post (April 7, 2015); Neuman, In a Surprise, a Top Kerry Adviser Visits Venezuela, N.Y. Times (April 8, 2015); Reuters, Defying U.S., Cuba Stands by Venezuela on Eve of Regional Summit, N.Y. Times (April 8, 2015); Meza, US seeks to open a channel for dialogue with the government of Maduro, El Pais (April 9, 2015).

European Union and Cuba’s Negotiations Over Human Rights and Other Issues

Since 1996 the European Union (EU) has had an overall strategy about engaging with Cuba that the EU calls its Common Position on Cuba. In early 2014, the EU determined that this Position would not be a precondition to negotiations and thus the two countries held negotiations in April 2014 in Havana and in August 2014 in Brussels. The third round of these negotiations took place in Havana, March 4-5, 2015, with the next round to take place in Brussels on a date to be determined. [1]

After reviewing the EU Common Position on Cuba and the subsequent history of EU-Cuba relations, we will discuss the recent negotiations and their implications.

EU’s Common Position on Cuba [2]

On December 2, 1996, the Council of the European Union [3] adopted its Common Position on Cuba, whose objective was “to encourage a process of [Cuban] transition to pluralist democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as a sustainable recovery and improvement in the living standards of the Cuban people. A transition would most likely be peaceful if the present regime were itself to initiate or permit such a process. It is not European Union policy to try to bring about change by coercive measures with the effect of increasing the economic hardship of the Cuban people” (Para. 1).

The Common Position also acknowledged “the tentative economic opening undertaken in Cuba to date” and the EU’s “wish to be Cuba’s partner in the progressive and irreversible opening of the Cuban economy. The [EU] considers that full cooperation with Cuba will depend upon improvements in human rights and political freedom, as indicated by the European Council” (Para. 2). To achieve these objectives, the E.U.

“(a) will intensify the present dialogue with the Cuban authorities and with all sectors of Cuban society in order to promote respect for human rights and real progress towards pluralist democracy;
(b) will seek out opportunities – even more actively than heretofore – to remind the Cuban authorities, both publicly and privately, of fundamental responsibilities regarding human rights, in particular freedom of speech and association;
(c) will encourage the reform of internal legislation concerning political and civil rights, including the Cuban criminal code, and, consequently, the abolition of all political offences, the release of all political prisoners and the ending of the harassment and punishment of dissidents;
(d) will evaluate developments in Cuban internal and foreign policies according to the same standards that apply to [EU] relations with other countries, in particular the ratification and observance of international human rights conventions;
(e) will remain willing in the meantime, through the Member States, to provide ad hoc humanitarian aid, subject to prior agreement regarding distribution; currently applicable measures to ensure distribution through non-governmental organizations, the churches and international organizations will be maintained and, where appropriate, reinforced . . .; [and]
(f) will remain willing, through the Member States, also to carry out focused economic cooperation actions in support of the economic opening being implemented” (Para. 3).

Finally the EU Common Position stated, “As the Cuban authorities make progress towards democracy, the [EU} will lend its support to that process and examine the appropriate use of the means at its disposal for that purpose, including: the intensification of a constructive, result-oriented political dialogue between the [EU] and Cuba; the intensification of cooperation and, in particular, economic cooperation; the deepening of the dialogue with the Cuban authorities, through the appropriate instances, in order to explore further the possibilities for future negotiation of a Cooperation Agreement with Cuba” (Para. 4).

EU-Cuba Relations 1997-2013

The EU suspended ties with Cuba in 2003 after the regime of President Fidel Castro arrested 75 dissidents in 2003 in a fierce crackdown known as Black Spring.

Upon the imprisonment of these political dissidents, the EU imposed stiff sanctions on Cuba in 2003. High-level visits to Cuba were reduced, and Fidel Castro stopped European aid from entering the country. European embassies were encouraged to invite both government officials and political dissidents to cultural events. Thereafter the Cuban government officials declined to attend any such events. Between 2003 and 2005, Cuba and the EU experienced a time of tension and animosity.

In 2005, relations between the EU and Cuba began to warm up again with Spain’s encouragement. The Cuban government released 14 political prisoners in 2005, an encouraging sign for anxious EU members looking for signs of progress. Thereafter the EU suspended sanctions and gradually repaired the economic ties between the two entities. Between 2005 and 2008, Cuba released another six political prisoners, which prompted the EU to remove all sanctions. In addition, the 2008 change of power from Fidel Castro to Raúl Castro produced optimism in the EU regarding future relaxation of tension.

After October 2008, the EU committed around € 60 million for cooperation on post-hurricane reconstruction and rehabilitation, food security, climate change and renewable energy, culture, and education. Cuba also took part in several EU-funded regional programs. The first EU Country Strategy/Paper Indicative Program for Cuba was adopted in May 2010 making available € 20 million between 2011 and 2013 for food security, climate change adaptation, and expertise exchanges. The EU also allocated € 4 million to support the population affected by Hurricane Sandy in November 2012.

In 2010, Spain unsuccessfully tried to muster support for a change in the EU’s Common Position on Cuba. The need for unanimity for such a change was thwarted by Poland and Czech Republic – both former Soviet bloc nations – which have been opposed to shifts in relations with Havana.

EU-Cuba Negotiations, 2014

In early 2014, the Dutch Foreign Minister called on the EU to change its policy toward Havana during a visit to the Caribbean island in January 2014.

The EU then decided that its Common Position on Cuba was not working and would not be used as preconditions for EU negotiations with the country. As a result, the EU Foreign Affairs Council, on February 10, 2014, extended an invitation to Cuba to start negotiations for a future bilateral agreement.

Following Cuba’s acceptance of the invitation, they conducted such negotiations In April and August 2014 on a “Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement” which would serve as an enabling framework for closer engagement in support of the on-going reform and modernization process in Cuba. According to the EU, human rights remain at the heart of its policy towards Cuba while seeking to expand relations with all parts of Cuban society, promoting economic and social progress, dynamic dialogue and strengthened respect for fundamental rights.

The April 29-30, 2014, round took place in Havana and focused on establishing modalities and a roadmap for negotiations. An understanding was also reached on the overall structure of the agreement, after which the parties held a first exchange of views on the main chapters and elements.

The August 27-28, 2014, negotiations took place in Brussels. The parties concentrated on the cooperation heading in the proposed agreement with progress on the global structure of the chapter, the issues and sectors to be addressed, as well as on the concrete wording of a number of articles. The EU also made a presentation on the trade chapter that would enhance commercial and investment relations based on joint objectives and established rules and principles of international trade. The political and institutional issues were not addressed.

Immediately after the August session, Christian Leffler, the European External Action Service Managing Director for the Americas, stated the parties had made “substantial progress” towards agreeing on a trade and political co-operation treaty and would discuss “more sensitive political questions,” in the next round to be held in Havana.

In addition, the August session prompted a NGO (Civil Rights Defenders) to urge the EU to press Cuba to ratify and implement the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [4] and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [5], which Cuba had signed in 2008. The group also called for inclusion of Cuban civil society and political opposition in the discussions.

The third round of negotiations was scheduled for early January 2015 in Havana, but on December 8, 2014, Cuba cancelled that round because it said it felt “disrespected” by a March 2014 cultural exhibit in Washington, D.C., which featured photos of Havana by a Lithuanian artist. (The real reason for the suspension is now apparent: the then upcoming December 17^th announcement of Cuba-U.S. rapprochement.)

March 2015 Negotiations

The latest round of negotiations was focused on the proposed agreement’s largest and most important chapter: Cooperation and Cooperation Dialogue Sectoral Policies. This included discussion of Political dialogue and issues related to national and government policy: governance, human rights, rule of law, and joint efforts in addressing global challenges.

Before the session, Christian Leffler said such talks with Cuba require “a clear vision, steady nerves and tons of patience” and “ no illusions there will be a sudden radical transformation of Cuban society and government structures.”

Afterwards Leffler said the parties had “progressed substantially in technical legal provisions and the scope of cooperation.” He also said that human rights “was deeply discussed,” but without reaching any concrete agreements, leaving the “finding of solutions” for future meetings without the EU seeking to “impose a model” on Cuba. (In the photograph, the Cuban delegation is on the left; the EU’s on the right.)

Leffler also noted that the recent decision of Cuba and the U.S. to restore normal diplomatic relations promises should aid the EU and Cuba in their negotiations. The EU goal is to advance a “concrete, constructive and honest dialogue, to identify areas of political and economic cooperation.”

Cuba reported making that the parties had made progress on issues such as labor, culture, education, health, agriculture, trade and aid.

Future Negotiations

Although no date has been set for the next round of negotiations, some of the 28 EU members are insisting the EU accelerate the process because of concern the U.S. might progress more quickly with normalization. Spain, which counts Cuba as a key trade partner, has urged fellow members to “give EU businesses the chance to compete with American companies” on the island. And French President Francois Hollande plans to visit Cuba on May 11, the first visit ever by a French president and the first by a European or American leader since the US rapprochement.

The EU is already Cuba’s top foreign investor. EU officials say the proposed accord would give Brussels a bigger role in Havana’s market-oriented reforms, position EU companies for Cuba’s transition to a more open economy and allow the Europe to press for political freedoms on the Communist-ruled island.

Conclusion

Despite protestations to the contrary, the EU and the U.S. are now competing to gain an economic competitive edge in future dealings with Cuba. This should be an additional argument for the U.S. quickly to rescind its designation of Cuba as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism, ” to end the embargo of Cuba and to proceed on the many other issues to effectuate a normalization of relations with the island.

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[1] This post on EU-Cuba relations and negotiations is based upon the following: Council on Hemispheric Affairs, The European Union and Cuba: The Common Position (July 15, 2010); Abellán, European Union prepares to defrost icy relations with Cuba, El Pais (Jan. 16, 2014); Council of EU, Authorizing Negotiations with Cuba (Jan. 28, 2014); LeoGrande, Relaxing the EU’s Common Position on Cuba would allow Europe to play a more active role in shaping the country’s future, LSE Blog (Jan. 28, 2014); LeoGrande, More Cracks in the EU’s “Common Position” on Cuba, AULA Blog (Jan. 31, 2014); Council of EU, Adopts Negotiating directives (Feb. 10, 2014); Council of EU, Press release on negotiating directives (Feb. 10, 2014); EU External Action, EU and Cuba launch talks on new agreement (May 5, 2014); European Parliamentary Research Service, A new phase in EU-Cuba relations (June 25, 2014); European Union, Second round of EU-Cuba negotiations toward a bilateral Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (Aug. 28, 2014); Fox, EU hails ‘substantial progress’ towards Cuba trade deal, eurobserver (Aug. 29, 2014); Civil Rights Defenders, Platform for Discussion on the Current EU-Cuba Negotiations (Aug. 2014); Civil Rights Defenders, The EU must put pressure on Cuba to respect human rights (Aug. 29, 2014); Reuters, EU-Cuba talks delayed by dispute over cultural event, Daily Mail (Dec. 9, 2014); EU External Action, Statement of the High Representative and Vice President Federica Mogherini on US-Cuba relations (Dec. 17, 2014); Whitefield, EU tip for U.S.-Cuba negotiators: patience is a virtue, Miami Herald (Feb. 11, 2015); Reuters, EU and Cuba to Restart Talks After Cultural Dispute, N. Y. Times (Feb. 27, 2015); Bendavid, EU, Cuba Officials to Meet in Wide-Ranging Talks, W.S.J. (Feb. 27, 2015); Abellán, Brussels starts talking about human rights with Cuba, El Pais (Mar. 1, 2015); Trotta, Cuba, EU renew talks on relations; will discuss human rights, Bus. Insider (Mar. 4, 2015); Reuters, Cuba, EU Renew talks on Relations; Will Discuss Human Rights, N.Y. Times (Mar. 4, 2015); Negrin, Dialogue between Cuba and the EU progresses in cooperation issues, Granma (Mar. 4, 2005); France hopes to shore up business with Cuba amid US policy shift, France 24 (Mar. 4, 2015); Perez & Rivero, Cuba and the European Union have “progressed substantially,” CUBADEBATE (Mar. 5, 2015); Trotta, EU says U.S. policy change helps its own talks with Cuba, Reuters (Mar. 5, 2015); EU-Cuba Negotiations Impacted by Cuba-USA, Havana Times (Mar. 6, 2015); Grosbois, US, EU in race to normalize Cuba ties, Business Insider (Mar. 6, 2015).

[2] EU Common Position on Cuba (Dec. 2, 1996 ). Before EU governments finally agree on a new piece of Union legislation, they usually reach a sort of pre-agreement called a common position. This can serve as a useful marker showing just how far governments have come towards agreeing the terms of a particularly complex piece of legislation. They have a certain legal weight and are published in the EU’s Official Journal. EU governments must adopt a common position before the European Parliament can begin its second reading of a particular proposal.

[3] The Council of the EU is part of the essentially bicameral EU legislature (the other legislative body being the European Parliament) and represents the executive governments of the EU’s member states.

[4] The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which is part of what is referenced as the International Bill of Human Rights, establishes international minimum standards for self-determination; legal redress; equality; life, liberty, freedom of movement; fair, public and speedy criminal trials, privacy; freedom of expression, thought, conscience, religion; peaceful assembly; freedom of association (including trade union rights); family; and participation in public affairs.. It also forbids “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; slavery; arbitrary arrest; double jeopardy; and imprisonment for debt. This treaty was approved by the U.N. General Assembly in 1966. Now 168 states, including the U.S., are parties to this treaty. The U.S. signed this treaty in 1977, but did not ratify it until 1992 with many qualifications (five reservations, five understandings, four declarations and a proviso), and the agency responsible for monitoring compliance with the treaty (U.N. Human Rights Committee) has criticized the U.S. for noncompliance with various provisions, including voting.

[5] The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Political Rights, also part of the International Bill of Human Rights, calls for the “progressive realization” of the rights to gain a living by work; to have safe and healthy working conditions; to enjoy trade union rights; to receive social security; to have protection for the family; to have adequate housing and clothing; to be free from hunger; to have health care and free public education; to participate in cultural life, creative activity and scientific research. This treaty was approved by the U.N. General Assembly in 1966, and now 162 states are parties thereto. Compliance is monitored by the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The U.S. by President Jimmy Carter signed this treaty in 1977, but the U.S. has never ratified it and thus is not a party thereto.

U.S. and Cuba Hold Productive Second Round of Negotiations

On February 27^th the United States and Cuba held a productive second round of negotiations at the U.S. Department of State in Washington, D.C. [1] (Below is a photograph of the U.S. delegation on the left; the Cuban, on the right.)

At the conclusion of the session, “diplomats of both countries spoke positively about fulfilling the promise made by Presidents Barack Obama and Raul Castro in December to restore embassies in each other’s capitals.

Roberta Jacobson, the State Department’s senior envoy to Latin America, said, “We made meaningful progress“ and the negotiations were “open, honest and sometimes challenging, but always respectful.” She also said she thought the embassies could be opened before the Summit of the Americas.
Her Cuban counterpart, Josefina Vidal, indicated she received assurances that the U.S. would move on two of the biggest hurdles remaining: Cuba’s inclusion on the U.S. state sponsor of terrorism blacklist and its inability to conduct normal banking operations in the U.S. She expressed confidence of progress on both priorities “within the following weeks.” Vidal also said that “the Cuban delegation is presenting a proposal for the establishment of a bilateral dialogue on human rights.”

The diplomats also said there would be subsequent discussions about various issues, including (i) civil aviation; (ii) trafficking; (iii) telecommunications; (iv) increasing Cuba’s Internet connectivity; (v) immigration fraud prevention; (vi) regulatory changes that modify the implementation of the blockade; (vii) protection of marine protected areas; and (viii) human rights.

The post-session press release by the Cuban delegation stated they “reiterated the importance of . . . the exclusion of Cuba from the list of ‘state sponsors of international terrorism,’ the provision of financial services to the Cuba Interests Section in Washington services and the need to ensure compliance with the principles of international law and the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations, [especially] compliance with the rules relating to the functions of diplomatic missions, the behavior of their staff, to respect national laws and nonintervention in the internal affairs of States.”

Later Vidal made it clear that “Cuba is willing to restore diplomatic relations with the U.S. as soon as the Obama administration declares its intent to take the country off a list of state sponsors of terrorism.” Vidal said that if Cuba got word the Obama administration was recommending the removal from the terrorism list, diplomatic ties could go forward without a prior resolution of the banking issue.” [2]

Vidal further commented that the issue of extraditing people between Cuba and the U.S. had been discussed many times in the past, that the two countries had signed a treaty on the topic in 1906 which has a clause such that it would not apply in cases involving political activities. “Therefore, Cuba has legitimately given political asylum to a small group of U.S. citizens, because we have reason to believe that they deserve this and that is how far we’ve gone. And when one grants political asylum, then you cannot get into these types of discussions.” She added that after the Cuban Revolution of 1959 the U.S. had not honored the treaty when Cuba asked the U.S. to extradite “members of the Cuban dictatorship who were responsible for terrible crimes.” [3]

Before the session, there was optimism, but considerable uncertainty, about the likelihood of a positive outcome as indicted by the press reports before the session.

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[1] The first round of negotiations was held in Havana on January 22-23 as discussed in a prior post. This post on the second round is based upon the following: U.S. Dep’t of State, Background Briefing on Talks to Re-establish Diplomatic Relations with Cuba (Feb. 25, 2015); Reuters, Cuba Says Fast Track to Restoring Ties, ‘Depends on U.S.,’ N.Y. Times (Feb. 25, 2015); Miroff & DeYoung, Cuba says terrorism list, banking issues are blocking better ties with U.S., Wash. Post (Feb. 25, 2015); Sosa, Cuba going to second round of talks with US constructively, Granma (Feb. 25, 2015); Derevit, Cuba comes with proposals and expects answers at the meeting in Washington, CUBADEBATE (Feb. 25, 2015); Assoc. Press, U.S., Cuba Cite Progress on restoring diplomatic ties, Wash. Post (Feb. 27, 2015); Reuters, U.S., Cuba Say Progress Made in Talks, No Date for Diplomatic Ties, N.Y. Times (Feb. 27, 2015); Gómez, Cuba and the U.S. hold talks in respectful climate, Granma (Feb. 27, 2015); Schwartz, U.S., Cuba Meet for Second Round of Diplomatic Talks, W.S.J. (Feb. 27, 2015); Press Release of the Cuba Delegation on restoration of diplomatic relations with the US, Granma (Feb. 27, 2015); Adams & Mohammed, U.S., Cuba say progress made in talks, no date for diplomatic ties, Reuters (Feb. 27, 2015); Archibold, Cuba’s Spot on US Terrorism List Gums Up Restoration of Relations, N.Y. Times (Feb. 28, 2015); Reuters, Cuba Signals Readiness to Fast-Track U.S. Diplomatic Ties, N.Y. Times (Mar. 2, 2015); Gómez, Closer to restoring relations, Granma (Mar. 4, 2015).

[2] A prior post discussed the U.S. legal and political issues regarding its rescission of the terrorism designation making it impossible for the U.S. to make the rescission before the April 10-11 Summit of the Americas in Panama, and Cuba’s acceptance of a U.S. intent to rescind before establishment of diplomatic relations recognizes that U.S. reality.

[3] The U.S.-Cuba extradition treaty of 1906 and its modification in 1926 were discussed in a prior post.

Nancy Pelosi and Other House Democrats Visit Cuba

A delegation of Democratic members of the U.S. House of Representatives led by Nancy Pelosi, the Minority Leader of the House, visited the island, February 17-19. They went “to build upon the announcement of U.S. normalization of relations and other initiatives announced by President Obama” and “to advance the U.S.-Cuba relationship and build on the work done by many in the Congress over the years, especially with respect to agriculture and trade.” [1]

The eight members of the delegation were David Cicilline (RI), member of the House foreign Affairs and Judiciary Committees; Rosa DeLauro (CT), the senior Democrat on the House Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee and Co-chair of the Democratic Steering and Policy Committee; Eliot Engel (NY), the senior Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee; Anna Eshoo (CA), Ranking Member on the House Energy and Commerce Committee’s Subcommittee on Communications Technology; Steve Israel (NY), Chair of the Democratic Policy and Communications Committee; Jim McGovern (MA), member of the House Agriculture Committee and Co-Chair of the congressional Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission; Collin Peterson (MN), the senior Democrat on the House Agriculture Committee; and Nydia Velazquez (NY), the senior Democrat on the House Small Business Committee. [2]

After their arrival in Cuba, they first went to the U.S. Interests Section’s building on Havana’s Malecon. There they met with the Chief of Mission, Jeffrey DeLaurentis, and his team. “We are proud of them and the U.S. Marines serving us there,” Pelosi said.

cuba-nancy-pelosi-bruno-rodriguez On February 18th the delegation had a three and one-half hour meeting with Cuban Foreign Minister, Bruno Rodriguez. and Josefina VIdal, the Foreign Ministry’s leader of the current negotiations with the U.S. (Left is a photograph of Pelosi and Rodriguez.) According to a Cuban website, they “discussed issues related to the current context of ties between the two countries, including restoring diplomatic relations, opening embassies and the debate in Congress on lifting the blockade [embargo] against Cuba.” Afterwards, Pelosi said, ““We discussed areas of interest to the United States and Cuba, and our delegation listened to their concerns, including the embargo, bank and credit financing,” Pelosi said. “We underscored our commitment to human rights in Cuba and agreed to build upon the historic opportunity before us to make progress in our relationship.”

On the 19th Pelosi and the delegation met with Miguel Diaz-Canel, Cuba’s First Vice President and presumptive next Cuban president. (Right is a photograph of Pelosi and Diaz-Canel.) They talked about Cuba’s market-style economic reforms, bilateral relations and prospects of the U.S. Congress lifting the country’s 53-year-old trade embargo of Cuba. Afterwards Pelosi told reporters, “There is strong bipartisan support to lift the embargo in the Congress, however it’s not universal and it certainly does not appear to be shared by those in power who have the ability to bring a bill to the floor.”

The delegation also met with leaders of Cuba’s legislature (National Assembly), including its vice president, Ana María Mari Machado. According to Pelosi, “During the meeting, we exchanged views about the actions taken by President Obama and President Raúl Castro. We agreed to continue our interparliamentary dialogue on areas of agreement and disagreement.”

Other meetings were held with Cuban Cardinal Jaime Ortega (left is a photograph of the Cardinal and the delegation); American students at the Latin American School of Medicine; young entrepreneurs of the island’s emerging private sector; and representatives of civil society, but not with Cuban dissidents.

At a press conference on their last day on the island, Pelosi said, “We’re very positively impressed by what we heard here about our future prospects and the relationship.” Representative Engel noted they had raised the topic of human because “We’re very concerned with human rights and dissident rights. I’d like to see more changes from the Cuban side.” Representative McGovern concurred with this comment: “The best way to promote human rights is to accelerate this new process to establish formal embassies in Havana and Washington.” The delegation also said they also spoken with Cuban officials about U.S. food sales to the island, internet technology and the island’s emerging small-business sector.

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[1] This post is based upon the following: Press Release, Pelosi Leads Congressional Delegation to Cuba (Feb. 17, 2015); Reuters, Pelosi Traveling with Lawmakers to Cuba, N.Y. Times (Feb. 17, 2015); Fram, Pelosi Leads House Democrats Visiting Cuba, Assoc. Press (Feb. 17, 2015); Press Release, Pelosi Statement on Historic Delegation’s Meetings in Havana (Feb. 18, 2015); Miller, Nancy Pelosi visits Havana, meets with top Castro regime officials, Wash. Times (Feb. 19, 2015); Oleaga, US, Cuba Relations Update: Representative Nancy Pelosi Leads congressional Delegation to Cuba, Hopes to Advance Renewed Relations, Latin Post (Feb. 19, 2015); Cuba FM Meets with Nancy Pelosi, Havana Times (Feb. 19, 2015); Cuban FM meets U.S. lawmakers on normalization of ties, Xinhua (Feb. 19, 2015); Trotta, U.S. congressional delegation meets Cuba’s heir apparent, Reuters (Feb. 19, 2015); Miroff, In Havana, Pelosi delegation promotes Obama’s Cuba thaw, Wash. Post (Feb. 19, 2015); Agence France-Presse, US-Cuba talks tackle human rights, reopening embassies (Feb. 19, 2015);Torres, Pelosi and other Democrats meet with Cuban officials in Havana, Miami Herald (Feb. 19, 2015); Miguel Diaz-Canel received the leader of the Democratic Party in the House of Representatives of the US, Granma (Feb. 19, 2015); Nancy Pelosi: The lock [embargo] is a “measure unsuccessfully,” CubaDebate (Feb. 19, 2015)(English translation by Google Translate); Press Release, Pelosi Statement on Historic Congressional Delegation’s Final Day of Meetings in Cuba (Feb. 20, 2015).

[2] Representative Peterson is a cosponsor of H.R.403 (Free Trade with Cuba Act) while Representatives DeLauro, McGovern and Velazquez are cosponsors of H.R.664 (Export Freedom to Cuba Act of 2015).

Recent News about U.S. Government’s Actions Regarding Cuba

On February 13th the U.S. Department of State announced that a new regulation will allow certain goods and services produced by independent Cuban entrepreneurs to be imported into the U.S. Cuba’s nascent private sector includes self-employed individuals, private small businesses, and private cooperatives that are independent of Cuba’s state sector. [1]

However, many goods were excluded from the liberalization, including food and agricultural products, alcohol, minerals, chemicals, textiles, machinery, vehicles, arms and ammunition.

Exports of all services are permitted. Some observers believe this may be more significant. This, for example, could allow Cuban graphic designers, computer programmers, market researchers or party planners to acquire U.S. clients.

On the diplomatic front, the U.S. reportedly is pressing Cuba to agree to restoration of normal diplomatic relations before the Summit of the Americas in Panama in April. This blogger, however, thinks that is unlikely given the inconclusive results of the initial negotiations in Havana in January and the lack of any announcement of a second round of talks that supposedly were going to happen in Washington this month.

More importantly Cuba has made statements suggesting that normal relations could not be commenced until the U.S. agrees its diplomats would not have private meetings with Cuban dissidents and rescinds its designation of Cuba as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism.” Based on publicly available information, neither of these will happen before April. In addition, President Raúl Castro has suggested that such relations could only happen after the U.S. ends the embargo, pays compensation to Cuba for its alleged damages from the embargo and returns Guantanamo Bay to Cuba. Clearly these will not happen before April, if ever.

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[1] This account of the new regulations is based upon a Department of State document and reports from Reuters and Associated Press.

United States Government’s Reactions to U.S.-Cuba Reconciliation

After looking at international and Cuban reactions to the December 17th announcement of U.S.-Cuba reconciliation, we now examine the reactions by the U.S. Government’s Executive Branch and Congress. A subsequent post will look at the reactions of the American people.

I. Executive Branch.

Led by President Barack Obama, the Executive Branch engaged in 18 months of secret negotiations with Cuba that resulted in the December 17th announcement of an accord between the two countries involving immediate release of certain prisoners, promised liberalization of U.S. regulations regarding U.S. exports to the island and U.S. citizens travel to Cuba, promised U.S. review of its designation of Cuba as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism” and further negotiations for reestablishment of normal diplomatic relations and for resolution of a long list of issues or disputes.

The U.S. Department of State immediately commenced review of the “terrorism’ designation and the Treasury and Commerce Departments in January announced the new and more liberal regulations regarding exports and travel.

The U.S., represented by Assistant Secretary of State Roberta Jacobson, participated in the first round of further negotiations with Cuba in Havana in January, and the second round will be this month in Washington, D.C.

In addition, as we will see in the discussion of reactions in the U.S. House of Representatives, bills have been introduced to end the U.S. embargo of the island.

In short, the U.S. is doing everything it can to further the progress toward normalization of relations and reconciliation of the two countries.

II. U.S. Congress

The following analysis of the positions of senators and representatives on reconciliation obviously is incomplete since I was not able to conduct exhaustive research on all 100 senators and all 435 representatives. I also used my judgment to assign pending bills as favoring or opposing reconciliation and assumed, absent specific information to the contrary, that being a sponsor or cosponsor of a bill in one category would preclude that individual’s voting for some or all of the bills in the other category. Moreover, the named individual legislators may change their minds if and when any of these measures reach the chambers’ floors for votes. I earnestly entreat readers to provide comments with other information to correct or supplement this analysis.

A. U.S. Senate

Of the 100 Senators, 25 so far appear to support reconciliation while 27 do not. The other 48 Senators apparently have not yet taken positions on this major issue.

1. Favoring reconciliation

As of February 10, I was surprised to discover that the Senate does not have a bill to abolish the U.S. embargo of Cuba. Minnesota’s Senator Amy Klobuchar clearly has stated her intent to offer and support such a bill, but has not done so to date because she believes that the Senate first should vote on confirmation of an ambassador to Cuba, who has not yet been nominated by the President. Moreover, Cuba’s President Castro has made noises that abolishing the embargo should come before restoration of normal diplomatic relations. As a result, Klobuchar’s legislative strategy may have to be revised.

In any event, as of February 10, the Senate had only two measures on its agenda that are at least tangentially favorable to the recent U.S.-Cuba accord.

The first is S.299 (Freedom to Travel to Cuba Act of 2015) offered by Senator Jeff Flake (Rep., AZ) with 13 cosponsors [1] It was referred to the Foreign Relations Committee.

The other is a proposed resolution (S.RES.26: Commending Pope Francis for his leadership in helping to secure the release of Alan Gross and for working with the Governments of the United States and Cuba to achieve a more positive relationship). It was offered by Senator Richard Durbin (Dem., IL) with 10 cosponsors, four of whom were not cosponsors of S.299 [2] The proposed resolution was referred to the Foreign Relations Committee.

In addition to these 18 senators, the following seven (for a total of 25) can also be regarded as supporters of reconciliation based upon statements on their official websites or other comments or actions mentioned in the press: Tammy Baldwin (Dem., WI), Chris Coons (Dem., DE), Al Franken (Dem., MN), Chris Murphy (Dem., CT), Rand Paul (Rep., KY), Pat Roberts (Rep., KS) and Harry Reid (Dem., NV).

Thus, at least 25 Senators are on record apparently supporting reconciliation with Cuba

2. Opposing reconciliation

As of February 10, the Senate had on its agenda one substantive bill relating to Cuba that can be seen as indirectly opposed to reconciliation.

S.165 (Detaining Terrorists To Protect America Act of 2015) would extend and enhance prohibitions and limitations with respect to the transfer or release of individuals detained at the U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.This bill was referred to the Armed Services Committee. It was offered by Senator Kelly Ayotte (Rep., NH) with 26 Republican cosponsors [3] One of the cosponsors, however, is Senator Jerry Moran, who was a cosponsor of S.299 and who spoke in favor of ending the embargo at the launch of the United States Agricultural Coalition for Cuba. Thus, I believe that only 25 of these cosponsors can be counted in the anti-reconciliation camp.

At least one other Senator belongs in this camp. Senator Robert Menendez (Dem., NJ), who is a Cuban-American, is vehemently opposed to reconciliation as are the other two Cuban-American Senators–Ted Cruz (Rep., TX) and Marco Rubio (Rep., FL), both of whom are cosponsors of S.165.

Thus, at least 27 Senators are on record apparently opposing reconciliation.

B. U.S. House of Representatives

There are at least 43 representatives favoring reconciliation while 52 do not. That leaves the other 340 representatives not accounted for.

1. Favoring reconciliation

As of February 10, the House had eight pending bills favorable to reconciliation with Cuba.

The following three seek to end the U.S. embargo of Cuba.

The leading one seems to be H.R.403 (Free Trade with Cuba Act) that was introduced by Representative Charles Rangel (Dem., NY) with 27 Democratic cosponsors [4] It has been referred for consideration to the House Foreign Affairs and six other committees.[5] The bill would end the embargo, and its section 2 would have Congress find that “Cuba is no longer a threat to the [U.S.] or Western Hemisphere;” the U.S. ” is using economic, cultural, academic, and scientific engagement to support its policy of promoting democratic and human rights reforms [in other Communist regimes];” and the U.S. “can best support democratic change in Cuba by promoting trade and commerce, travel, communications, and cultural, academic, and scientific exchanges.”
The other two similar bills to end the embargo are H.R.274 (United States-Cuba Normalization Act, 2015) by Rep. Bobby Rush (Dem., IL) without any cosponsors, and H.R.735 (To lift the trade embargo on Cuba, and for other purposes) by Rep. Jose Serrano (Dem., NY) with Rep. Rangel as a cosponsor, both of whom are on the record as supporters of of H.R.403. These bills too were referred to the same seven committees for consideration.

Rep. Rangel on February 2nd also introduced H.R.635 (Promoting American Agricultural and Medical Exports to Cuba Act of 2015) to facilitate the export of U.S. agricultural products to Cuba, to remove impediments to the export to Cuba of medical devices and medicines, to allow travel to Cuba by U.S. legal residents, to establish an agricultural export promotion program with respect to Cuba. With 25 of the same Democratic cosponsors, the bill was referred to the Foreign Affairs and four other committees.

There are two bills to expand U.S. residents ability to travel to Cuba. Rep. Rangel on February 2nd introduced H.R.634 (Export Freedom to Cuba Act of 2015) with 25 of the same Democratic cosponsors of H.R.403 plus John Garamendi (Dem., CA) and Mark Pocan (Dem., WI). It has provisions for freedom to travel to Cuba for U.S. citizens and legal residents.It was referred to the Foreign Affairs Committee. A similar bill to expand U.S. citizens travel to Cuba (H.R.664: Freedom to Travel to Cuba Act of 2015) was offered on February 2nd by Rep. Mark Sanford (Rep., SC) with 12 cosponsors.[6] It also was referred to the Foreign Affairs Committee.

A more limited travel bill was introduced by Representative Jose Serrano (Dem., NY). It is H.R.738: To waive certain prohibitions with respect to nationals of Cuba coming to the United States to play organized professional baseball. Its sole cosponsor is Representative Rangel and was referred to the Foreign Affairs Committee.

On January 27th Minnesota’s Representative Betty McCollum introduced H.R.570 (Stop Wasting Taxpayer Money on Cuba Broadcasting Act) to stop Radio Marti and Television Marti broadcasts to Cuba. McCollum was a cosponsor of H.R.403 while HR. 570 has no cosponsors. It was referred to the Foreign Affairs and Judiciary Committees.

I am proud to say that all five Democratic Representatives from Minnesota by offering or cosponsoring bills appear to be in favor of this reconciliation. In addition, two of Minnesota’s three Republican Representatives have made statements indicating at least receptivity to favoring the reconciliation, and this analysis counts them as undecided. [7]

Our newest Representative Tom Emmer said, “By all accounts the Cuban people are worse off today than when [the embargo] started. So clearly that’s not working. And I’m supportive of engaging in diplomacy, starting to re-engage in diplomatic relations with Cuba, to begin that process to hopefully someday getting to normalize that relationship. But it’s two separate things. One, it’s diplomacy, and down the road is normalization.” In addition, as a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Emmer focused on three issues in questioning Administration witnesses: reparations for Cubans who have been persecuted by the Castro regime, payments for U.S. interests that lost property to the regime and safe harbor of U.S. fugitives within Cuba. Emmer also said or suggested if certain conditions are met he could support ending the embargo.

Another Minnesota Republican Representative, Rep. Erik Paulsen, said, “We should be looking at opportunities to open up trade between the United States and Cuba so we can export more American goods and services. However, the President should have engaged Congress before making concessions to the Cuban government.” (Id.) It may also be significant that his district includes the headquarters of Cargill Incorporated, the leader of the United States Agricultural Coalition for Cuba

Thus, there are at least 40 Representatives who appear to be in favor of this reconciliation with differing levels of commitment.

2. Opposing reconciliation

There are two pending bills, both relating to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba that can be seen as opposing reconciliation, as of February 10.

The first is H.R.654 (Naval Station Guantanamo Bay Protection Act). It was introduced by David Jolly (Rep., FL) with 36 Republican cosponsors, none of whom is from Minnesota. [8] It was referred to the Foreign Affairs Committee.

The other bill (H.R.401: Detaining Terrorists to Protect America Act of 2015) which would prohibit the release or transfer of certain Guantanamo Bay detainees and the construction or modification of any other facility to house such detainees. It was offered by Representative Jackie Walkorski (Rep., IN) with 29 Republican cosponsors, of whom 17 were not cosponsors of H.R.654. [9] It was referred to the Armed Services Committee.

Accordingly there are at least 54 Representatives on the record against reconciliation. Three of them are Cuban-Americans (Carlos Curbello, Mario Diaz–Balart and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen) with the latter two being the most vocal in their persistent criticism of reconciliation. Another Cuban-American Representative (Albio Sires (Dem., NJ)) has not been an author or cosponsor of any of these bills, but his website includes a rejection of the President’s decisions to seek reconciliation with Cuba. [10]

III. Conclusion

As a supporter of reconciliation, I am anxious that this year both houses of Congress abolish the embargo and support other measures to promote that reconciliation. Therefore, I urge all supporters to say thank you to those legislators who already are on our side, to identify the “undecided” legislators and seek to persuade them to become supporters and to inform our fellow citizens of the important issues in this controversy and to seek to persuade them to be supporters.

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[1] The 13 cosponsors of S.299 are the following: John Boozman (Rep., AR), Barbara Boxer (Dem, CA), Thomas Carper (Dem., DE), Susan Collins (Rep., ME), Richard Durbin (Dem., IL) ), Michael Enzi (Rep., WY), Amy Klobuchar (Dem., MN), Patrick Leahy (Dem., VT), Jerry Moran (Rep., KS), Jack Reed (Dem., RI), Debbie Stabenow (Dem., MI), Tom Udall (Dem., NM) and Sheldon Whitehouse (Dem., RI). Senator Moran also spoke in favor of ending the embargo at the launch of the United States Agricultural Coalition for Cuba.

[2] The four cosponsors of S.RES.26 who were not cosponsors of S.299 are the following: Sherrod Brown (Dem., OH), Benjamin Cardin (Dem., MD), Tim Kaine (Dem., VA) and Barbara Mikulski (Dem., MD).

[3] The 26 Republican cosponsors of S.165 are the following: John Barrasso (WY), Roy Blunt (MO), John Boozman (AR), Richard Burr (NC). John Cornyn (TX), Tom Cotton (AR), Ted Cruz (TX), Joni Ernst (IA), Deb Fischer (NE), Lindsey Graham (SC), Orrin Hatch (UT), James Inhofe (OK), Johnny Isakson (GA), Ron Johnson (WI), Mark Kirk (IL), James Lankford (OK), Mike Lee ((UT), John McCain (AZ), Jerry Moran (KS), Pat Roberts (KS), Mike Rounds (SD), Jeff Sessions (AL), Dan Sullivan (AK), Thom Tillis (NC), Pat Toomey (PA) and Roger Wicker (MS).

[4] The 27 Democratic Representative cosponsors of H.R.403 are Karen Bass (CA), William Clay (Mo), Steve Cohen (TN), John Conyers, Jr. (MI), Keith Ellison (MN), Sam Farr (CA), Chaka Fattah (PA), Raul Griaiva (AZ), Jared Huffman (CA), Sheila Jackson Lee (TX), Eddie Johnson (TX), Henry Johnson (GA), Barbara Lee (CA), Betty McCollum (MN), Jim McDermott (WA), Gregory Meeks (NY), Gwen Moore (WI), Rick Nolan (MN), Eleanor Holmes Norton (DC), Collin Peterson (MN), Jared Polis (CO), Janice Schakowsky (IL), Bennie Thompson (MS), Tim Walz (MN) and Maxine Waters (CA).

[5] A prior post listed the members of the seven House committees that have jurisdiction over different portions of the three bills to end the embargo.

[6] The 12 cosponsors of H.R.664 are Kathy Astor (Rep., FL), Jason Chaffetz (Rep., UT), Kevin Cramer (Rep., ND), Rosa DeLauro (Rep., CT), Sam Farr (Dem., CA), Barbara Lee (Dem., CA), Thomas Massie (Rep., KY), James McGovern (Dem., MA), Charles Rangel (Dem., NY), Chris Van Hollen, (Rep., MD), Nydia Velazquez (Dem., NY) and Peter Welch (Dem, VT).) Of this group, eight were not sponsors or cosponsors of H.R.403 (Chaffetz, Cramer, DeLauro, Massie, McGovern, Van Hollen, Velazquez and Welch). Cramer also announced his support for ending the embargo at the launch of the U.S. Agricultural Coalition for Cuba.

[7] Henry, Emmer on Cuba embargo: ‘Clearly that’s not working, MINNPOST (Feb. 6, 2015). The third Minnesota Republican Representative, John Kline, appeared to be less receptive to ending the embargo. He said he’s “not confident the Administration will follow through on its promises to hold the Castro dictatorship regime accountable, and I’m concerned about revisiting relations with Cuba until all Cubans enjoy a free democracy.”

[8] The 36 Republican cosponsors of H.R.654 are Gus Bilirakis (FL), Michael Burgess (TX), Bradley Byrne (AL), Jason Chaffetz (UT), Mike Coffman (CO), Carlos Curbello (FL), Rodney Davis (IL), Ron DeSantis (FL), Mario Diaz-Balert (FL), Bill Flores (TX), Trent Franks (AZ), Louie Gohmert (TX), Trey Gowdy (TN), Andy Harris (MD), Richard Hudson (NC), Duncan Hunter (CA), Darrell Issa (CA), Bill Johnson (OH), Jeff Miller (FL), Alexander Mooney (WV), Richard Nugent (FL), Gary Palmer (AL), Robert Pittenger (NC), Bill Posey (FL), Reid Ribble (WI), Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (FL), Keith Rothfus (PA), Matt Salmon (AZ), Austin Scott (GA), Marlin Stutzman (IN), Jackie Walorski (IN), Randy Weber (TX), Roger Williams (TX), Joe Wilson (SC), Ted Yoho (FL) and Ryan Zinke (MT). Diaz-Balert and Ros-Lehtinen are Cuban-Americans who have been and are most vocal in their criticism of reconciliation. Rodney Davis, however, spoke in favor of ending the embargo at the launch of the United States Agricultural Coalition for Cuba and should not be viewed as completely hostile to reconciliation.

[9] The 29 Republican cosponsors of H.R.401 are Andy Barr (KY), Susan Brooks (IN), Bradley Byrne (AL), Mike Coffman (CO), Paul Cook (CA), Ander Crenshaw (FL), Trent Franks (AZ), Andy Harris (MD), Jaime Herrera Beutier (WA), Duncan Hunter (CA), Darrell Issa (CA). Sam Johnson (TX), Doug Lamborn (CO), Robert Latta (OH), Luke Messer (IN), Mick Mulvaney (IN), Richard Nugent (FL), Steven Pearce (NM), Robert Pittenger (NC), Ted Poe (TX), Mike Pompeo (KS), Todd Rokita (IN), Aaron Schock (IL), Austin Scott (GA), Christopher Smith (NJ), Brad Wenstrup (OH), Joe Wilson (SC), Robert Wittman (VA) and Ryan Zinke (MT). Of these cosponsors, 16 (Barr, Brooks, Herrera, Sam Johnson, Lamborn, Latta, Messer, Mulvaney, Pearce, Poe, Pompeo, Rokita, Schock, Smith, Wenstrup and Wittman) were not cosponsors of H.R.654.

[10] Hook, Exile Haunts Cuba-American Lawmakers, W.S.J. (Dec. 20-21, 2014).

U.S. and Cuba Hold Inconclusive Talks on Restoring Diplomatic Relations

On January 22 and 23, 2015, U.S. and Cuban diplomats met in Havana to discuss a multitude of issues relating to the restoration of normal diplomatic relations. No agreements were reached other than an understanding that additional talks were necessary and would be held albeit without dates or location being set.[1]

The first topic focused on technical issues related to reestablishing diplomatic ties. Gustavo Machin, the Cuban foreign ministry’s deputy director for U.S. affairs, said, “We have spoken about the principles upon which our diplomatic relations should be re-established.” The participants were “very respectful and flexible,” and not all the outstanding issues would be resolved in the first meeting.

At the conclusion of the first day’s meetings, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Roberta Jacobson agreed that the participants had a “very productive and positive dialogue.” She added, “We discussed the real and concrete steps required to restore diplomatic relations and the terms for opening of embassies in our respective countries, as well as expectations about how the US Embassy in Havana would work.” She also agreed with Cuba’s assertion that the restoration of diplomatic relations would be in accordance with the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations. (In the photo to the right note the Cuban and U.S. flags at the podium at the site of the talks.)

Officials for both countries, however, outlined issues standing in the way of a normal U.S.-Cuba relationship.

Ms. Jacobson spoke of the U.S.’s persistent concerns about Cuban human rights while Cuba’s representatives talked about their concern for U.S. human rights, especially recent police killings of unarmed black men in Ferguson, Missouri and New York City and the treatment of detainees at the U.S. base in Guantanamo Bay Cuba.

An unnecessary note of discord was introduced by a problem over the U.S. translation into Spanish of the Jacobson’s English-language post-session written statement. The statement (with the English word in question put in bold) said, “As a central element of our policy, we pressed the Cuban government for improved human rights conditions, including freedom of expression and assembly.” The U.S. translation of this statement used the Spanish verb “presionar,” which means to pressure. Josefina Vidal, the head of the Cuban delegation, however, said, “I can confirm that the word ‘pressure’ was not used. I must say it’s not a word that is used in these types of conversations.” Later the U.S. apologized for its erroneous translation.

Ms. Vidal cited as problems for restoration of diplomatic relations Cuba’s inclusion in the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism and the various financial restrictions imposed on the country as a result of the U.S. trade embargo. (Again note the two flags at the same podium in the photo to the right.)

Both of the countries’ leaders talked about the need for further discussions and negotiations to resolve these many issues. I expect the two sides to develop an agenda and plan for addressing these many issues, including dates and location for the next set of talks. In a subsequent post I will set forth my views, as an outsider, as to how these differences can be resolved.

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[1] This post is based upon the following: Wroughton & Trotta, U.S. says mistrust must be overcome to restore Cuba Ties, Reuters (Jan. 22, 2015); Archibold, Conflict, and Smiles, as U.S. and Cuba Discuss Ties, N.Y. Times (Jan. 22, 2015); Reuters, U.S. Presses Cuba on Human Rights in Talks on Restoring Ties, N. Y. Times (Jan. 22, 2015); Sosa, U.S. aims to go beyond the restoration of relations with Cuba, Granma (Jan. 22, 2015); DeYoung, U.S., Cuba find ‘profound differences in first round of talks, Wash. Post. (Jan. 22, 2015); Klapper & Weissenstine, U.S., Cuba End Historic talks with More Questions than Answers, Assoc. Press (Jan. 23, 2015); Respectful and constructive climate brand rapprochement between Cuba and the United States, Granma (Jan. 23, 2015); U.S. is willing to discuss their differences with Cuba, Granma (Jan. 23, 2015); Ayuso, US and Cuba confirm a channel for dialogue despite their differences, El Pais (Jan. 23, 2015); Ayuso, The dialogue between Cuban and the US stumbles on human rights, El Pais (Jan. 23, 2015); An exchange that made world headlines, Granma (Jan. 23, 2015); Jacobson, Video of Statement on U.S.-Cuba Meetings (Jan. 23, 2015); Assoc. Press, U.S., Cuba End Historic Talks With More Questions than Answers, N. Y. Times (Jan. 23, 2015); Assoc. Press, U.S. admits: we’re not sure if new Cuba approach will work, Guardian (Jan. 23, 2015).

[1] This post is based upon the following: Wroughton & Trotta, U.S. says mistrust must be overcome to restore Cuba Ties, Reuters (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/22/us-cuba-usa-idUSKBN0KV0E720150122;

Archibold, Conflict, and Smiles, as U.S. and Cuba Discuss Ties, N.Y. Times (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/23/world/conflict-and-smiles-as-us-and-cuba-discuss-ties.html?ref=world;

Baseless Ground for U.S. Designation of Cuba as a ”State Sponsor of Terrorism”

One of the purported grounds for the May 30, 2013, U.S. designation of Cuba as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism” was the assertion,“The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has identified Cuba as having strategic anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism deficiencies.” That very U.S. statement, however, went on to contradict its own first sentence by saying, “In 2012, Cuba became a member of the Financial Action Task Force of South America against Money Laundering, a FATF-style regional body. With this action, Cuba has committed to adopting and implementing the FATF Recommendations.”

If the self-contradictory nature of this charge by itself was not enough to show the speciousness and unfairness of this charge, further confirmation of the unfounded nature of this U.S. claim has been provided by the following five public statements of FATF reporting Cuba’s progress and eventual compliance with “its commitments in its action plan regarding the strategic deficiencies that the FATF had identified in February 2013. Cuba therefore is no longer subject to the FATF’s monitoring process.”

On June 21, 2013, FATF said, “Since February 2013, Cuba has taken notable steps towards improving its AML/CFT [Anti-Money Laundering / Countering the Financing of Terrorism] regime, including by signing an MOU [Memorandum of Understanding] for cooperation with FIUs [Financial Intelligence Units] in GAFISUD [Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering in South America] and issuing new CDD [Customer Due Diligence] and STR [Suspicious Transaction Report] measures. Due to the recent nature of these measures, the FATF has not yet reviewed them. The FATF has determined that certain AML/CFT deficiencies exist. Cuba should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address these deficiencies, including by: (1) adequately criminalising [sic] money laundering and terrorist financing; (2) establishing and implementing adequate procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets; (3) improving customer due diligence measures; (4) improving suspicious transaction reporting requirements; (5) ensuring a fully operational and effectively functioning Financial Intelligence Unit; and (6) ensuring that appropriate laws and procedures are in place with regard to international cooperation and mutual legal assistance.”

On October 18, 2013, FATF said, “Since June 2013, Cuba has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by issuing regulations which improve provisions for customer due diligence and suspicious transaction reporting. Cuba has recently issued instruction 31/2013, aimed at further detailing the procedures for freezing of terrorist assets. Due to the recent nature of this instruction, the FATF is currently reviewing it. Cuba has also constructively engaged with GAFISUD. However, the FATF has determined that certain AML/CFT deficiencies remain. Cuba should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address these deficiencies, including by: (1) adequately criminalising [sic] money laundering and terrorist financing; (2) establishing and implementing adequate procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets; (3) ensuring comprehensive customer due diligence measures and suspicious transaction reporting requirements; (4) ensuring a fully operational and effectively functioning Financial Intelligence Unit; and (5) ensuring that appropriate laws and procedures are in place with regard to international cooperation and mutual legal assistance. The FATF encourages Cuba to address its remaining deficiencies and continue the process of implementing its action plan.”

On February 14, 2014, FATF said, “Since October 2013, Cuba has taken significant steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by enacting two Decree-Laws enhancing the criminalisation [sic] of money laundering and terrorist financing, the framework for freezing terrorist assets, and preventive measures for financial institutions. However, the FATF has determined that certain strategic AML/CFT deficiencies remain. Cuba should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address these deficiencies, including by: (1) addressing the remaining issues in the criminalization [sic] of money laundering (2) ensuring adequate procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets; (3) ensuring comprehensive customer due diligence measures and suspicious transaction reporting requirements; (4) ensuring that appropriate laws and procedures are in place with regard to international cooperation and mutual legal assistance. The FATF encourages Cuba to address its remaining deficiencies and continue the process of implementing its action plan.”

On June 27, 2014, FATF said, “Since February 2013, when Cuba made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GAFISUD to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Cuba has made significant progress to improve its AML/CFT regime. Cuba has substantially addressed its action plan, including by: becoming a member of GAFISUD; adequately criminalising [sic] money laundering and terrorist financing; establishing procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets; establishing adequate customer due diligence requirements; ensuring a fully operational and effectively functioning financial intelligence unit and enhancing suspicious transaction reporting requirements. The FATF will conduct an on-site visit to confirm that the process of implementing the required reforms and actions is underway to address deficiencies previously identified by the FATF.”

On October 24, 2014, “FATF welcomes Cuba’s significant progress in improving its AML/CFT regime and notes that Cuba has established the legal and regulatory framework to meet its commitments in its action plan regarding the strategic deficiencies that the FATF had identified in February 2013. Cuba therefore is no longer subject to the FATF’s monitoring process under its on-going global AML/CFT compliance process. Cuba will work with GAFISUDto further strengthen its AML/CFT regime.”

It, therefore, is not surprising that there was no mention whatsoever of this purported ground for the April 30, 2014, U.S. re-designation of Cuba as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism.”

U.S. Stupidity and Cowardice in Continuing to Designate Cuba as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism”