Criticism of U.S.-Cuba Law Enforcement Agreement 

The head of New Jersey’s state police has criticized the two countries’ law enforcement agreement of January 16, 2017, because, he says, he has read the agreement and it does not require Cuba to extradite Joanne Chesimard (a/k/a Assata Shakur) to the U.S.[1]

After reviewing what we know about this woman, we will examine the police statement and provide commentary.

Chesimard/ Shakur

In the 1960s-1970s Chesimard, a U.S. citizen, was a member of the Black Panther Party and the Black Liberation Army in the U.S. In 1977 she was convicted in New Jersey state court for aiding and abetting first-degree murder, assault and battery of a police officer (New Jersey State Trooper Werner Foerster), assault with a dangerous weapon, assault with intent to kill, illegal possession of a weapon, and armed robbery during a gunfight on the New Jersey Turnpike in 1973.

She was sentenced to life in New Jersey state prison, but in 1979 she escaped and in 1984 traveled to Cuba. At some time thereafter President Fidel Castro granted her asylum, and she has been living there under the name Assata Shakur. She is now around 70 years old. The FBI has listed her as one of its “Most Wanted” and offered a reward of $1 million for her apprehension; the New Jersey Attorney General has offered to match that reward.

Since at least 1997 there have been various unsuccessful attempts by the U.S. government and others to obtain her extradition to the U.S.

Statement by New Jersey State Police Superintendent

The Superintendent Rick Fuentes’ January 18 statement reads as follows:

  • “On Monday, January 16, 2017, the White House signed a law enforcement pact with the government of Cuba that included the sharing of national security information on matters related to fighting terrorism and the scourge of the international narcotics trade. I have read this pact with great interest, as any aspect of the continued negotiations to normalize relations with Cuba impacts our continued advocacy to seek the return of Joanne Chesimard. Chesimard executed New Jersey State Trooper Werner Foerster in 1973 and fled to Cuba after escaping a New Jersey prison in 1979. She is most prominent among a rogue’s gallery of cop killers and domestic terrorists that have been given sanctuary by the Castro regime these past thirty years.”
  • With a continued sense of bewilderment and confusion not uncommon to the course of these negotiations, the pact does not address the return of: Joanne Chesimard; Victor Manuel Gerena, a member of Los Macheteros who was removed from the FBI Top Ten list one month ago; Charlie Hill, a member of the Republic of New Afrika, alleged to have killed a New Mexico state trooper in 1971; or, William Guillermo Morales, the murderous bomb-maker for the Puerto Rican separatist group, FALN.”
  • “Their omission from this agreement and from the negotiations-at-large is so glaring as to signal a clear intent by the Obama Administration to ignore these fugitives. By burning the last bridge to this Administration’s opportunity to gain their negotiated return, families who have long suffered the consequences of their terrorist acts and law enforcement everywhere in this country have been shown the back of the hand. An ignominious torch has been passed to the next president.”
  • “We are not deterred. I can say, unequivocally, that Governor Chris Christie, State Attorney General Chris Porrino and I remain resolute in our efforts to follow every political course leading to the return of Joanne Chesimard and the other remaining terrorist fugitives. We approach the next presidential administration with a renewed sense of optimism and moral superiority that justice will prevail.”

Comments

The Superintendent’s statements regarding Chesimard/Shakur are believed to be basically correct, and it is most understandable that the New Jersey State Police want her extradited to the U.S. and returned to New Jersey state prison.

The Superintendent says he has read the recent MOU in question and that it does not require Cuba to make that extradition. I have not been able to locate that MOU so cannot independently verify the validity of his statement. But for present purposes I will assume that his statement about the MOU is basically correct.

I assume, on the other hand, that the MOU does not contain a U.S. agreement to not continue to seek her extradition or a Cuban statement or promise not to extradite her. If it had, I am confident that the Superintendent would have so stated and raised the ante for his protest.

He also asserts that the subject of this requested extradition has not been raised by the U.S. in “the negotiations-at-large.” Although I have not been personally involved in those negotiations, I believe this to be a false statement. As noted in earlier posts, public reports indicate that the two countries’ respective requests for extraditions of criminals or suspects, which I believe includes the U.S. request regarding Chesimard/Shakur, have been the subjects of several such bilateral negotiating sessions since December 17, 2014.

As a result, I conclude that the parties have not been able to come to an agreement about such extraditions or about a judicial procedure for resolving any such disputes. Therefore, there apparently was no mention of the subject in the MOU in question.

Moreover, the Superintendent also fails to recognize a major legal issue regarding the requested Chesimard/Shakur extradition because of an extradition treaty between the two countries. Therefore, we will look at that treaty and the issue it raises regarding this possible extradition.

U.S.-Cuba Extradition Treaty.

As explained in an earlier post,[2] on March 2, 1905, the two countries entered into such a treaty, the “Treaty between the United States and Cuba for the mutual extradition of fugitives from justice.” Under this treaty, as amended, each country shall grant extradition of persons covered by Article I for crimes covered by Article II, as amended and expanded by Articles I and II of the Additional Extradition Treaty between the parties, which entered into force on June 18, 1926.

The persons covered by Article I are “persons who, having been charged as principals, accomplices or accessories with or convicted of any crimes or offenses specified in the following article, and committed within the jurisdiction of one of the high contracting parties, shall seek an asylum or be found within the territories of the other: Provided that this shall only be done upon such evidence of criminality as, according to the laws of the place where the fugitive or person so charged shall be found, would justify his or her apprehension and commitment for trial if the crime or offense had been there committed.” This obviously covers Chesimard/Shakur, who does not fall within the exception under Article V of the treaty, “Neither of the contracting parties shall be bound to deliver up its own citizens under the stipulations of this Treaty,” unless she has been granted Cuban citizenship.

The long list of crimes covered by Article II, as amended, includes (1) “Murder, comprehending the offenses expressed in the Penal Code of Cuba as assassination, parricide, infanticide and poisoning; manslaughter, when voluntary; the attempt to commit any of these crimes.” This obviously covers the requested extradition discussed here.

Under Article VI of the original treaty, however, the requested country (Here, Cuba) is not obligated to extradite someone when the offense is of “a political character.” The exact language of this provision states, “A fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered if the offense in respect of which his surrender is demanded be of a political character, or if it is proved that the requisition for his surrender has, in fact, been made with a view to try or punish him for an offense of a political character.” (Emphasis added.)

The only limitation on this exception is in Article VI itself, which states, “An attempt against the life of the head of a foreign government or against that of any member of his family when such attempt comprises the act either of murder, assassination, or poisoning, shall not be considered a political offense or an act connected with such an offense.” This exception, however, is not applicable to the case under consideration here.

Moreover, Article VI states, “If any question shall arise as to whether a case comes within the provisions of this article [VI], the decision of the authorities of the government on which the demand for surrender is made, or which may have granted the extradition shall be final. (emphasis added.) This exception seems to cover Chesimard/Shakur as discussed next.

The Treaty Issue Regarding Chesimard/Shakur

After fleeing to Cuba in 1984, at date unknown the Cuban government apparently granted her political asylum and perhaps Cuban citizenship. Assuming that to be the case, that appears to negate Cuba’s obligation under the treaty to extradite her to the U.S.

It is not known whether the Cuban government has the legal authority to revoke that grant of asylum (and of citizenship?) and whether it would do so in this case. However, after a bilateral negotiation session in Washington, D.C. in February 2015 Josefina Vidal, Cuba’s lead diplomat for these negotiations, said the issue of extraditing people between Cuba and the U.S. had been discussed many times in the past and that the two countries had signed a treaty on the topic in 1906 which has a clause such that it would not apply in cases involving political activities. “Therefore, Cuba has legitimately given political asylum to a small group of U.S. citizens, because we have reason to believe that they deserve this and that is how far we’ve gone. And when one grants political asylum, then you cannot get into these types of discussions.” She added that after the Cuban Revolution of 1959 the U.S. had not honored the treaty when Cuba asked the U.S. to extradite “members of the Cuban dictatorship who were responsible for terrible crimes.”[3]

In June 2016, the two countries held another negotiating session in Havana focused on counterterrorism cooperation, the subject of the January 16, 2017, MOU. Outsiders speculated that the meeting may have included discussions about a possible high-profile prisoner swap: U.S.-jailed Cuban spy Ana Belén Montes in exchange for Chesimard/Shakur). The State Department, however, has refused to confirm that such an exchange was being discussed. Instead the Department merely stated that the U.S. “continues to seek the return by Cuba of fugitives from US justice” and that the State Department “brings out the cases of fugitives to the Cuban Government to be settled and will continue to do so at every appropriate opportunity.” [4]

Therefore, unless there is some error in my analysis, the strong desire by many in New Jersey and elsewhere in the U.S. for this extradition appears to be a lost cause unless the Cuban government has the authority under its own laws to revoke the grant of asylum (and citizenship?) and chooses to exercise it. Or the Cuban government just decides to extradite her without changing her asylee or citizenship status.

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[1] Assoc. Press, With No Deal on Convicted Killer, Police Slam US-Cuba Pact, N.Y. Times (Jan. 20, 2017),‘Goodbye, Obama! NJ State Police slams president on the way out (Jan. 18?, 2017); New Jersey State Police, Colonel Rick Fuentes’ Response to the Recently Signed U.S./Cuban Law Enforcement Pact (Jan. 18?, 2017).

[2] Issues Regarding Cuba and U.S. Extradition of the Other’s Fugitives, dwkcommentaries.com (Feb. 24, 2015). Moreover, the “political offense” provision of the U.S.-Cuba treaty is not sui generis, but in fact is a common provision in other U.S. extradition treaties. (Ibid.; Extradition Has Become a Hot Topic for the United States, dwkcommentaries.com (July 25, 2016).

[3] U.S. and Cuba Hold Productive Second Round of Negotiations, dwkcommentaries.com (Mar. 6, 2015).

[4] U.S. and Cuba Discuss Counterterrorism Cooperation, dwkcommentaries.com (June 10, 2016).

U.S. and Cuba Hold Productive Second Round of Negotiations

On February 27th the United States and Cuba held a productive second round of negotiations at the U.S. Department of State in Washington, D.C. [1] (Below is a photograph of the U.S. delegation on the left; the Cuban, on the right.)

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At the conclusion of the session, “diplomats of both countries spoke positively about fulfilling the promise made by Presidents Barack Obama and Raul Castro in December to restore embassies in each other’s capitals.

  • Roberta Jacobson, the State Department’s senior envoy to Latin America, said, “We made meaningful progress“ and the negotiations were “open, honest and sometimes challenging, but always respectful.” She also said she thought the embassies could be opened before the Summit of the Americas.
  • Her Cuban counterpart, Josefina Vidal, indicated she received assurances that the U.S. would move on two of the biggest hurdles remaining: Cuba’s inclusion on the U.S. state sponsor of terrorism blacklist and its inability to conduct normal banking operations in the U.S. She expressed confidence of progress on both priorities “within the following weeks.” Vidal also said that “the Cuban delegation is presenting a proposal for the establishment of a bilateral dialogue on human rights.”

The diplomats also said there would be subsequent discussions about various issues, including (i) civil aviation; (ii) trafficking; (iii) telecommunications; (iv) increasing Cuba’s Internet connectivity; (v) immigration fraud prevention; (vi) regulatory changes that modify the implementation of the blockade; (vii) protection of marine protected areas; and (viii) human rights.

The post-session press release by the Cuban delegation stated they “reiterated the importance of . . . the exclusion of Cuba from the list of ‘state sponsors of international terrorism,’ the provision of financial services to the Cuba Interests Section in Washington services and the need to ensure compliance with the principles of international law and the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations, [especially] compliance with the rules relating to the functions of diplomatic missions, the behavior of their staff, to respect national laws and nonintervention in the internal affairs of States.”

Later Vidal made it clear that “Cuba is willing to restore diplomatic relations with the U.S. as soon as the Obama administration declares its intent to take the country off a list of state sponsors of terrorism.” Vidal said that if Cuba got word the Obama administration was recommending the removal from the terrorism list, diplomatic ties could go forward without a prior resolution of the banking issue.” [2]

Vidal further commented that the issue of extraditing people between Cuba and the U.S. had been discussed many times in the past, that the two countries had signed a treaty on the topic in 1906 which has a clause such that it would not apply in cases involving political activities. “Therefore, Cuba has legitimately given political asylum to a small group of U.S. citizens, because we have reason to believe that they deserve this and that is how far we’ve gone. And when one grants political asylum, then you cannot get into these types of discussions.” She added that after the Cuban Revolution of 1959 the U.S. had not honored the treaty when Cuba asked the U.S. to extradite “members of the Cuban dictatorship who were responsible for terrible crimes.” [3]

Before the session, there was optimism, but considerable uncertainty, about the likelihood of a positive outcome as indicted by the press reports before the session.

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[1] The first round of negotiations was held in Havana on January 22-23 as discussed in a prior post.  This post on the second round is based upon the following: U.S. Dep’t of State, Background Briefing on Talks to Re-establish Diplomatic Relations with Cuba (Feb. 25, 2015); Reuters, Cuba Says Fast Track to Restoring Ties, ‘Depends on U.S.,’ N.Y. Times (Feb. 25, 2015); Miroff & DeYoung, Cuba says terrorism list, banking issues are blocking better ties with U.S., Wash. Post (Feb. 25, 2015);  Sosa, Cuba going to second round of talks with US constructively, Granma (Feb. 25, 2015); Derevit, Cuba comes with proposals and expects answers at the meeting in Washington, CUBADEBATE (Feb. 25, 2015); Assoc. Press, U.S., Cuba Cite Progress on restoring diplomatic ties, Wash. Post (Feb. 27, 2015); Reuters, U.S., Cuba Say Progress Made in Talks, No Date for Diplomatic Ties, N.Y. Times (Feb. 27, 2015); Gómez, Cuba and the U.S. hold talks in respectful climate, Granma (Feb. 27, 2015); Schwartz, U.S., Cuba Meet for Second Round of Diplomatic Talks, W.S.J. (Feb. 27, 2015); Press Release of the Cuba Delegation on restoration of diplomatic relations with the US, Granma (Feb. 27, 2015); Adams & Mohammed, U.S., Cuba say progress made in talks, no date for diplomatic ties, Reuters (Feb. 27, 2015); Archibold, Cuba’s Spot on US Terrorism List Gums Up Restoration of Relations, N.Y. Times (Feb. 28, 2015); Reuters, Cuba Signals Readiness to Fast-Track U.S. Diplomatic Ties, N.Y. Times (Mar. 2, 2015); Gómez, Closer to restoring relations, Granma (Mar. 4, 2015).

[2] A prior post discussed the U.S. legal and political issues regarding its rescission of the terrorism designation making it impossible for the U.S. to make the rescission before the April 10-11 Summit of the Americas in Panama, and Cuba’s acceptance of a U.S. intent to rescind before establishment of diplomatic relations recognizes that U.S. reality.

[3] The U.S.-Cuba extradition treaty of 1906 and its modification in 1926 were discussed in a prior post.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Issues Regarding Cuba and U.S. Extradition of the Other’s Fugitives

Another issue for U.S.-Cuba reconciliation is whether Cuba will extradite to the U.S. fugitives from U.S. criminal prosecution and whether the U.S. will do likewise for any fugitives from Cuban authorities who are in the U.S.

The U.S.-Cuba Extradition Treaty

This issue appears to be governed by the “Treaty between the United States and Cuba for the mutual extradition of fugitives from justice,” which entered into force on March 2, 1905. [1]

Under this treaty, as amended, each country shall grant extradition of persons covered by Article I for crimes covered by Article II, as amended and expanded by Articles I and II of the Additional Extradition Treaty between the parties, which entered into force on June 18, 1926 (44 Stat. 2392; TS 737).

The persons covered by Article I are “persons who, having been charged as principals, accomplices or accessories with or convicted of any crimes or offenses specified in the following article, and committed within the jurisdiction of one of the high contracting parties, shall seek an asylum or be found within the territories of the other: Provided that this shall only be done upon such evidence of criminality as, according to the laws of the place where the fugitive or person so charged shall be found, would justify his or her apprehension and commitment for trial if the crime or offense had been there committed.”  However, under Article V of the treaty, “Neither of the contracting parties shall be bound to deliver up its own citizens under the stipulations of this Treaty.”

The long list of crimes covered by Article II, as amended, includes the following: (1) “Murder, comprehending the offenses expressed in the Penal Code of Cuba as assassination, parricide, infanticide and poisoning; manslaughter, when voluntary; the attempt to commit any of these crimes.” (2) “Arson.” and (3) “Robbery, defined to be the act of feloniously and forcibly taking from the person of another money, goods, documents, or other property, by violence or putting him in fear; burglary; housebreaking and shopbreaking.”

Under Article VI of the original treaty, however, the requested country is not obligated to extradite someone when the offense is of “a political character.” The exact language of this provision states, “A fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered if the offense in respect of which his surrender is demanded be of a political character, or if it is proved that the requisition for his surrender has, in fact, been made with a view to try or punish him for an offense of a political character.” (Emphasis added.) [2]

The only limitation on this exception is in Article VI itself, which states, “An attempt against the life of the head of a foreign government or against that of any member of his family when such attempt comprises the act either of murder, assassination, or poisoning, shall not be considered a political offense or an act connected with such an offense.” (Emphasis added.)

Moreover, Article VI states, “If any question shall arise as to whether a case comes within the provisions of this article [VI], the decision of the authorities of the government on which the demand for surrender is made, or which may have granted the extradition shall be final. (emphasis added.) [3]

To have a better understanding of this treaty, it would be useful to see all documents regarding (a) the negotiation of the treaty in 1904-1905 and its amendment in 1926; and  (c) previous U.S. and Cuban requests for extradition.

U.S. International Extradition Practice

Being unfamiliar with extradition generally or with treaties on the subject specifically, I was surprised by the provisions about “political offenses” in the U.S.-Cuba extradition treaty, I wondered if they were sui generis and how they have been interpreted in practice.

Research indicated that they are not sui generis. This is at least the conclusion based upon a report for Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001 submitted to the Congress by the U.S. Department of State. It stated, in part, “A similarly widely adopted exception is that extradition is not required where the crime at issue is a “political offense” (a term which can cover treason, sedition or other crime against the state without the elements of any ordinary crime, or which under U.S. law can cover ordinary crimes committed incidental to or in furtherance of a violent political uprising such as a war, revolution or rebellion, especially when such crimes do not target civilian victims).”

That report to Congress also stated that U.S. extradition “treaties typically provide that extradition may be denied if the request is found to be politically motivated.  Some of our treaties provide that extradition may be denied if the request was made for the primary purpose of prosecuting or punishing the person sought on account of race, religion, nationality or political opinion.”

Research, however, did not disclose the rationale for such typical provisions although I could understand that a country making a request for extradition for a “political offense”  could not reasonably be expected to have an unbiased view on the legitimacy of its request while the requested country, if acting in good faith, could be expected to act more objectively and dispassionately. Nor have I uncovered sources explaining how such provisions have been interpreted and used in practice. I solicit comments that shed light on these issues.

Moreover, the U.S.-Cuba extradition treaty treaty by itself does not prohibit the requested country from granting a request for extradition that might be viewed as “political” or from reversing a prior determination by the requested country to reject a request on that ground. The requested country’s own laws, however, may prohibit such actions.

U.S. Fugitives in Cuba

According to U.S. Department of State annual reports purportedly justifying the designation of Cuba as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism,” there have been or still are over 70 individuals living in Cuba who are fugitives from criminal charges in U.S. relating to violent acts in the 1970’s purportedly committed to advance political causes. Pursuant to a 2005 Cuban government statement, however, these U.S. reports also say no additional U.S. fugitives have been permitted on the island and in a few instances Cuba has extradited such fugitives to the U.S.

However, a U.S. newspaper recently asserted, “The U.S. has no idea how many fugitives Cuba’s harboring,” And on January 23, 2015, U.S. Senator Marco Rubio (Rep., FL) and two other Republican Senators (David Vitter (LA) and Ted Cruz (TX)) asked the F.B.I. to submit a complete list of such fugitives with copies of their U.S. indictments.

In any event, one of the most notable U.S. fugitives still on the island is JoAnne Chesimard (a/k/a Assata Shakur), a political radical and former member of the Black Panther Party and the militant Black Liberation Army, who in 1979 broke out of a New Jersey prison where she was serving a life sentence for assault, armed robbery and aiding and abetting the murder of a New Jersey state trooper. After hiding in the New York area, she fled to Cuba in 1984, where she was granted political asylum that same year and has lived ever since. According to her U.S. attorney, she “has maintained from the time she was arrested that she was a victim of a counter intelligence program by the FBI and that she was stopped on the New Jersey turnpike as result of her being targeted by FBI.”

After the December 17, 2014, announcement of the U.S.-Cuba accord, New Jersey’s Governor, Chris Christie, and law enforcement officials expressed their desire for her extradition to the U.S.

Cuba, however, has rejected previous U.S. requests for her extradition on the ground that Cuba had determined she was being sought on “political” grounds and, therefore, had decided to grant her asylum. In addition, there are also some indications that Chesimard/Shakur has been granted Cuban citizenship, which would provide Cuba with another reason under the treaty to deny a U.S. request for her extradition. It would be useful to know the details of all prior U.S. requests for her extradition.

After the December 17th accord, Josefina Vidal said, “every nation has sovereign and legitimate rights to grant political asylum to people it considers to have been persecuted. … That’s a legitimate right. We’ve explained to the U.S. government in the past that there are some people living in Cuba to whom Cuba has legitimately granted political asylum.”  Presumably this statement includes Chesimard/Shakur.

Cuban Fugitives in U.S.

Less is known about Cuban fugitives in the U.S., but they could include Cubans who fled to the U.S. after the Revolution of 1959, especially those who allegedly took part in organizing the failed 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion.

At the top of this list probably is Luis Posada Carriles, the alleged mastermind behind the bombing of a Cuban airliner, who entered the US in 2005. in 2011, he was put on trial in El Paso, Texas, for allegedly lying to U.S. immigration authorities about how he got into the country and his alleged participation in terrorist attacks, but he was acquitted of those charges.

Recently Josefina Vidal said, “We’ve reminded the U.S. government that in its country they’ve given shelter to dozens and dozens of Cuban citizens. Some of them accused of horrible crimes, some accused of terrorism, murder and kidnapping, and in every case the U.S. government has decided to welcome them.”

Proposed Means for Resolving Extradition Issues

Here is my suggestion for resolving outstanding extradition issues.

First, by a certain date the countries should exchange complete lists of suspected fugitives in the other country with requests for extradition.

Second, by another certain date the countries should exchange responses to the lists of suspected fugitives indicating whether they are alive and in the country and whether they will be extradited and if not, why not. In addition, these documents should include names of other fugitives in their countries that were not on the original lists.

Third, by another date certain, the countries should exchange statements indicating whether they object to any refusals to extradite and why.

Fourth, by another date certain, the countries should exchange responses to objections to refusals to extradite with reasons why they are still pursing the requests.

Fifth, on a date certain the countries should meet to determine whether they can resolve  any disputes over refusals to extradite.

Sixth, by a date certain, the countries would submit any remaining disputes over extradition to an arbitration panel of one or three arbitrators at the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague in the Netherlands for an award that the countries, in advance, agree to implement and enforce.

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[1] Recently there have been frequent assertions in the press that there is no extradition treaty between the two countries. And after December17th, Josefina Vidal, the Cuban official in charge of the current negotiations with the U.S., asserted, “There’s no extradition treaty in effect between Cuba and the U.S.” Those statements seem erroneous. Such a treaty has never been revoked and is still on the U.S. list of extradition treaties in force. However, there are some reports that after the Cuban Revolution of 1959, the U.S. ceased to honor the treaty.

[2] The Spanish language version of this sentence does not appear to be significantly different. It states:  “No será entregado el criminal fugitivo si el delito con respecto al cual se solicita su entrega es de carácter político, ó si se preuba que la reclamación de su entrega se ha formulado en realidad con el objecto de enjuiciarlo ó castigarlo por un delito de carácter polìtico.” However, the preamble to the 1926 Additional Extradition Treaty says the original treaty was signed on April 6, 1904, and the Protocol amending the Spanish text of that treaty was signed on December 6, 1904.  I have not been able to find that Protocol, but would like to know whether it concerns this sentence or the other sentence in Article VI mentioned above.

[3] The Spanish language version of this sentence does not appear to be significantly different. It states, “Cuando surgiere alguna duda respecto á si son aplicables á un caso dado las disposícíones de este artículo, lo que resolvieren las Autoridades del Govierno á quien se pidiere la entrega ó que hubiese accedido  á la extradición, será definitivo.”

[4] Report on International Extradition Submitted to the Congress Pursuant to Section 211 of the Admiral James W. Nance and Meg Donovan Foreign Relations Reauthorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001 (Public Law 106-113).