On March 28, 2013, the plaintiffs in the U.S. lawsuit against Ernesto Zedillo in federal court in Connecticut filed a copy of the Mexican court decision (with 108-page English translation) regarding the Mexican government’s request for immunity for the former president. The plaintiffs, however, did not ask the U.S. court for any relief as a result of the Mexican court decision. Presumably that will come later.
According to the U.S. plaintiffs’ attorneys’ summary, the Mexican court on March 6, 2013, (a) granted a writ of Amparo in favor of the plaintiffs; (b) declared that the immunity request lacked any constitutional or legal basis in Mexican law; and (c) instructed the current Mexican Ambassador to perform all official acts necessary to withdraw the immunity request, including notifying the U. S. Department of State of that withdrawal. (Pp.106-107.) The Mexican court provided the following reasons for its decision:
The immunity request violated the principle of Constitutional Supremacy set forth in Article 133 of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States because the Ambassador of Mexico to the U.S. disregarded the international legal standard adopted by Mexico forbidding requests for head-of-state immunity allowing public officials to evade their responsibilities. (Pp. 99 – 106.)
The immunity request lacks any rationale how Mexico’s national sovereignty would be damaged by civil proceedings against a former president who no longer occupies the post of, or performs the functions of, head of state. Id. at 94– 99.
The immunity request violates the plaintiffs’ human rights of equality and nondiscrimination under the Mexican Constitution, Article 1, because the Mexican Ambassador engaged in disparate treatment pursuant to criteria of a political nature, creating a discretionary exception of impunity in favor of Zedillo, thereby preventing plaintiffs’ ability to exercise their rights to equally seek damages for the injuries suffered. Id. at 83-94.
The immunity request violates plaintiffs’ human rights set forth in the Mexican Constitution, Articles 14 and 16, as applied by the Federal Law of Administrative Procedure, because it is not properly executed with the required formalities. Id. at 78-83.
The immunity request violates plaintiffs’ human rights set forth in the Mexican Constitution, Articles 14 and 16, because the Mexican Ambassador failed to set forth or justify any jurisprudential, statutory or regulatory basis for the degree or amount of subject matter or jurisdictional authority. Id. at 70-78.
As noted in a prior post, the case in Mexico is not yet final so we will have to wait to see what additional proceedings, if any, occur there.
In September 2011 Ernesto Zedillo, a former president of Mexico, was sued in the federal court in Connecticut for money damages for his alleged complicity in a massacre in the Mexican village of Acteal in 1997. In September 2012, the U.S. government asked the court to grant immunity to Zedillo and dismiss the case based upon the Mexican government’s request to that effect and the subsequent similar request by the U.S. Department of State. These matters were covered in prior posts (here and here).
The U.S. court has not yet resolved the immunity or any other preliminary issues in the case, and the latest dockets sheets reveal no activities whatsoever since early February this year.
In March 2013 a Mexican court decided that the Mexican request to the U.S. State Department requesting such immunity was legally insufficient, as discussed in a prior post.
Subsequently a Mexican lawyer and friend, Juan Carlos Arjona Estévez, has provided me with additional comments about the Mexican court decision that prompt these additional thoughts about Mexican and U.S. legal issues in the case.[1]
The Mexican Court Decision
The Mexican court said the Mexican Ambassador’s letter to the U.S. Department of State requesting such immunity was legally deficient.[2] First, it was a letter from the Ambassador in his diplomatic capacity, not an official communication of Mexican government policy. Second, the letter did not cite to all the Mexican legal provisions relevant to the case. Third, the letter did not explain why immunity for Zedillo in the U.S. case was appropriate under those Mexican legal authorities and why such immunity would not affect Mexican ethnic groups’ right to access justice.
Moreover, there is no basis in the Mexican constitution for immunity for a former president or other government officials. Such immunity under Mexican law applies only when such individuals are in office.
This court decision could be appealed in Mexico by the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, but reversal does not seem likely because the defense in the Mexican case is that the action of the Ambassador was not an “authorized act” that can affect the human rights of Mexicans, but only a diplomatic action.
If the decision is appealed, the three-magistrate appellate tribunal could affirm the decision and also refer to the provision in the Mexican Constitution stating that Mexican foreign policy has to promote human rights and that the request for Zedillo immunity for alleged human rights violations is contrary to such promotion.
Another possible outcome is for the Mexican Ambassador to rescind his request for immunity and to send a new letter to the U.S. Department of State saying that Senor Zedillo has not been sued in Mexico for the same claims and that Mexican courts should have the first opportunity to deal with these issues.
Related U.S. Legal Issues
These developments in Mexico raise at least two issues for U.S. law.
1. With or without a rescission of the original Ambassador’s letter, should the U.S. court grant immunity to Zedillo?
The original September 2012 letter from the U.S. State Department to the U.S. Department of Justice said “a sitting head of state’s immunity is based on his status as the incumbent office holder and extends to all of his actions.” (Emphasis added.)
On the other hand, the State Department letter went on, the “residual immunity of a former official . . . is based upon the character of that official’s conduct and extends only to acts taken in an official capacity. . . . [The] Department of State generally presumes that actions taken by a foreign official exercising the powers of his office were taken in his official capacity. This . . . is particularly appropriate when a former head of state is sued, because holders of a country’s highest office may be expected to be on duty at all times and to have wide-ranging responsibilities.” (Emphasis added.)
The State Department letter mentioned the Mexican Ambassador’s request for immunity based upon his assertion that “any actions [by Zedillo] . . . in connection with the events alleged in the complaint were taken in the course of his official duties as head of state.” This Mexican government assertion, the State Department letter says, corroborates its assessment to the same effect. In addition, the plaintiffs have not rebutted this assessment.
Therefore, the State Department’s letter concluded that Zedillo’s “alleged actions were taken in an official capacity, and he enjoys immunity from this lawsuit.”
This letter, taken by itself, might suggest that immunity might still be open even if the Mexican Ambassador’s letter were rescinded as it only corroborated that Zedillo was acting in his official capacity.
However, when the State Department in another case declined to request immunity for a former Somali official, it said any immunity protecting foreign officials for their official acts ultimately belongs to the sovereign, not the official. Thus, the foreign state must claim or waive any such immunity for the official. Where there is no recognized government, as was the case for Somali at the time, there was no one that could assert such a claim or make such a waiver. As a result, the State Department concluded that the former official did not enjoy immunity, and the court endorsed that conclusion and rejected the immunity claim.
Thus, if the Mexican Ambassador’s letter to the State Department is rescinded and not replaced by another request for immunity, the principles enunciated in the Somali case suggests that Zedillo would not be entitled to immunity.
2. Failure To Exhaust Mexican Remedies.
Another U.S. issue is whether the plaintiffs have failed to exhaust whatever remedies they have in Mexico.
Some of the claims in the U.S. case are asserted under the Torture Victims Protection Act (28 U.S.C. § 2350 note), which provides, in part, “A court shall decline to hear a claim under this section if the claimant has not exhausted adequate and available remedies in the place in which the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred [here, Mexico].” There is no similar provision in the Alien Tort Statute, under which some of the claims are also asserted, but the U.S. Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alverez-Machain suggested that failure to exhaust remedies in the other country could be a limitation on ATS claims.
Thus, the issue for the U.S. court in such a hypothetical situation would be whether the claims under Mexican law are “adequate and available” and whether the plaintiffs had exhausted whatever Mexican remedies they had. [3]
Conclusion
I would anticipate that the plaintiffs’ lawyers in the U.S. case will advise the court in Connecticut of the Mexican court decision;[4] that the U.S. court will wait until there is a final resolution of the Mexican case before doing anything, and if the recent Mexican decision is not reversed, request the views of the State Department on the significance of the former; and thereafter the U.S. court will make a decision on whether or not to grant immunity to Zedillo.
[2] Because of the significance of the Mexican Ambassador’s letter, its text is attached at the conclusion of this post.
[3] There also should be a U.S. procedural problem if Zedillo now tries to raise the plaintiffs’ alleged failure to exhaust Mexican remedies as a defense in the U.S. case. The original U.S. complaint anticipated such a defense with the allegation that the plaintiffs do not have adequate remedies in Mexico and that they have exhausted their available Mexican remedies. Zedillo’s U.S. motion to dismiss the complaint only asserted immunity, and Rule 12(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should prevent him from now raising this affirmative defense by motion.
[4] One of the plaintiffs’ attorneys has said they would so advise the U.S. court and ask it to request the State Department for reconsideration of the immunity issue.
=================================================
EMBASSY OF MEXICO
07654
Washington, DC, on November 4, 2011.
Madam Secretary:
On behalf of my Government, I have the honor to refer to the case v Doe et al. Zedillo Ponce de León, filed with the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut as No. 3:11-cv-01433, in place of the former President of Mexico, Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León.
In this regard, I wish to express my Government’s rejection of any internal process that violates the sovereignty of Mexico, to exercise jurisdiction over alleged acts occurred in territory in which he allegedly spoke the President in his official capacity. In this regard it should be noted that any other act performed by former President Ernesto Zedillo regard to the facts in the lawsuit that gave rise to the case of history, took place in the course of his official duties as head of state and is Therefore, to rule in some sense, the Court would be deciding on actions the government of Mexico sovereign within their own territory.
In light of the above, I would sincerely request the intervention of the Department of State through the Department of Justice before the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut, by a suggestion of immunity to former senses of Mexico. In this regard, I note that the recognition of immunity enjoyed by foreign officials for acts performed in their official capacity is largely rooted in a principle of customary international law, whose application has been confirmed many times by the U.S. government, particularly in situations involving heads of state. There are also precedents in American jurisprudence that confirmed the practice.
In this regard, I quote Gemisen v cases. De la Madrid v Habyarimana. Kagame, Giraldo v. Drummond Co., Wei Ye v. Jiang Zemin and Lafontant v. Aristide, as a sign of the instances in which the State Department has intervened in the past the U.S. courts to reaffirm its position on immunity accompanying heads of state, even after completing your order. Enclosed is a legal memorandum that contains more elements on those precedents.
Similarly, I wish to present it as a process which aims to substantiate against former President of Mexico affect the bilateral relationship between Mexico and the United States, in dismissing the action of various national authorities in response to the event that occurred in the village of Acteal, Chiapas in December 1997, the Government made strongly condemned in turn, immediately abocándose research and presentation of those responsible to the law enforcement bodies.
In thanking Your Excellency in advance for your valuable support for the State Department’s intervention in the case of history, I do own the opportunity to renew the assurances of my highest consideration.
As a prior post reports, in September 2011, a group of Mexican nationals sued former Mexican President, Ernesto Zedillo, in federal court in Connecticut for his alleged complicity in a 1997 massacre in the Mexican village of Acteal. The complaint seeks $10 million in damages under the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victims Protection Act.
The U.S. Government on September 7, 2012, suggested that Former Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo should be immune from this lawsuit and that the case should be dismissed. This was based upon a request for such immunity from the Mexican government.
Eighteen days later (September 25th), the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut issued an Order To Show Cause requiring the plaintiffs by October 9th (later extended to October 16th) to show cause why the case should not be dismissed on the basis of former head-of state immunity. Simultaneously the court denied Zedillo’s dismissal motion as moot.
On October 16th the plaintiffs filed their Response to Order To Show Cause, Objection to the United States’ Suggestion of Immunity, and Motion To Stay Proceedings. It asserted, with supporting documents, the following:
• that on October 3rd they filed a petition for a writ of amparo in a Mexican federal court asking for a declaration that the Mexican Government’s request for immunity for Zedillo in this case violated Mexican law and the Mexican constitution and, therefore, is a nullity;
• that on October 9th the Mexican court “accepted” the petition, i.e., determined it was not dismissable; and
• that on October 9th the Mexican court also entered another order temporarily suspending the validity of the Mexican Government’s request for immunity for Zedillo in the U.S. case and enjoining any acts in furtherance of that request pending resolution of the Mexican case.
With this showing, the plaintiffs asked the U.S. court (a) to stay proceedings in this case pending the outcome of the Mexican case; or (b) to dismiss the U.S. case without prejudice while tolling the statute of limitations with leave to re-file the U.S. case if they succeed in the Mexican case; and (c) to request the U.S. Department of State to reconsider its position on immunity after the Mexican case is resolved; and (d) to provide guidance as to plaintiffs’ right to amend their complaint or to petition for leave to do so.
As of March 10, 2013, the U.S. case had been reassigned to another District Judge, and the dispute over the claimed immunity had not been resolved by the U.S. court.
On the afternoon of March 10th while walking in San Miguel de Allende, Mexico, I saw the page 1 headline in an issue of LaJournada, a Mexican newspaper: “Inconstitucional, pedir inmunidad para Zedillo en EU.” Even my limited Spanish language abilities told me that a Mexican court had decided that the Mexican government’s request for immunity for Zedillo in this U.S. case violated the Mexican constitution.
According to a Google English translation of the article on the Internet, a Mexican judge had determined that Mexican authorities had violated the Mexican Constitution and international human rights treaties by asking the U.S. government to grant immunity to former President Zedillo.
One of the treaties was the Havana Convention, which states that “no immunities must be claimed that are not essential to the performance of official duties,” and it was violated, the court said, because Zedillo does not currently occupy any public position in the Mexican government. The American Convention on Human Rights was also violated, according to the Mexican court, because immunity for Zedillo causes “undue discrimination and threatening the human right of equality” for those who allegedly were harmed.
I imagine that there will be appeals or further proceedings in the Mexican case. In the meantime, I predict that the U.s. court will do nothing until the Mexican case is finally resolved.
As discussed in a prior post, on February 15, 2011, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia decided that a former Somali General, Mohamed Ali Samantar, was not entitled to the former foreign government official immunity under federal common law.[1]
On November 2, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed this decision in an opinion that provided an interesting analysis of the role and power of the U.S. Department of State and of the federal courts in making decisions on immunity of foreign officials in civil lawsuits.
First, the appellate court said that there was common law immunity for a foreign head-of-state and that the courts must give “absolute deference” to the State Department’s position on such claims. This conclusion was based on the U.S. Constitution’s assignment in Article II, § 3, of the power to “receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers” to the Executive Branch. The State Department, however, has never recognized Samantar as the head of state for Somalia. Therefore, this type of immunity was not applicable in this case.
Second, the Fourth Circuit held that federal common law also provided immunity for foreign government officials who were not heads of state and that State Department’s determinations on such claims carried “substantial weight” for the courts, but were “not controlling.”
The latter type of immunity, said the Fourth Circuit, is based on the “foreign official’s actions, not his or her status, and therefore applies whether the individual is currently a government official or not.” But not all such actions are entitled to such immunity. Indeed, the court concluded that “under international and [U.S.] domestic law, officials from other countries are not entitled to foreign official immunity for jus cogens violations, even if the acts were performed in the defendant’s official capacity.”
The appellate court correctly observed, “A jus cogens norm, also known as a ‘preemptory norm of general international law,’ can be defined as ‘a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.” Moreover, “Prohibitions against the acts involved in this case–torture, summary execution and prolonged arbitrary imprisonment–are among these universally agreed-upon [jus cogens] norms.”
In this case, the Fourth Circuit added, the State Department suggested to the court that Samantar was not entitled to the foreign official immunity because there was no Somali government to assert this immunity for him and because he was a permanent resident alien of the U.S. These are additional factors supporting the denial of this immunity to Samantar.
Therefore, Samantar was not entitled to the latter type of immunity.[2]
[1] Thereafter the district court held him liable for $21 million of compensatory and punitive damages in a civil lawsuit under the U.S. Alien Tort Statute and Torture Victims Protection Act.
On October 1, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court heard re-arguments in an important human rights case, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch PetroleumCo. (Sup. Ct. No. 10-1491).[1]
This case involves claims by a putative class of Nigerians against Netherlands/United Kingdom corporations (Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. and Shell Transport and Trading Company PLC (Shell)) for allegedly assisting in certain human rights violations in Nigeria in 1993-1995.
The claims in this case were asserted under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) that provides that U.S. federal district courts have “jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”[2]
The order for rehearing asked the parties to address the following issue:
Whether and under what circumstances the [ATS] . . . allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States.”
This issue was addressed in the Petitioners’ Supplemental Opening Brief; the Supplemental Brief for Respondents; the Supplemental Reply Brief for Petitioners; 31 amici curiae briefs supporting the petitioners; 14 amici curiae briefs supporting respondents; and 7 amici curiae briefs supporting neither party. One of those not supporting either party was the U.S. Government.[3]
During the hour-long hearing the Court heard from lawyers representing the plaintiffs-petitioners, the defendants-respondents and the U.S. Government. They all were actively questioned by eight of the Justices with only Justice Thomas not participating. Those eight Justices all seemed to be searching for a way to limit the reach of the ATS, especially when such cases adversely affected U.S. foreign policy.[4]
I will not attempt to predict how the Court will resolve the case. Instead I will set forth how I think the Court should do so.
First, Corporations are not immune from lawsuits under the ATS.
Second, As the Court held in Sosa v. Alverez-Machain in 2004, the ATS is a jurisdictional statute.[5] The Court’s presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. statutes (unless Congress specifically states otherwise), applies to statutes that impose substantive U.S. regulatory measures, not to jurisdictional statutes.[6] Therefore, there is no issue of extraterritoriality with respect to the ATS.
Third, there are various existing legal doctrines and jurisprudence that federal courts have used and should use, in appropriate cases, to dismiss ATS cases at the outset upon a motion by the defendant asserting such affirmative defenses. They include the following:
The court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant because it does not have sufficient contacts with the forum to make litigation consistent with U.S. notions of fair play and substantial justice as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ due process clauses.[7]
The case is not brought within 10 years after the acts in question under the statute of limitations borrowed from the Torture Victims Protection Act unless under established principles of equity the statute of limitations should be tolled or stayed.[8]
The plaintiff has failed to exhaust remedies in the country where the acts occurred unless those remedies are unavailable or futile.[9]
A foreign court is the more appropriate and convenient forum than an U.S. courts under the established principles of forum non conveniens.[10]
An individual defendant is entitled to official immunity according to the U.S. Department of State.[11]
A non-individual defendant is entitled to immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.[12]
The “act of state” doctrine protects the conduct in question.[13]
The case presents a “political question” that is inappropriate for judicial resolution.[14]
The case should be rejected because of concerns about its impact on U.S. foreign relations or because of “international comity.”[15]
The case presents an issue of U.S. state secrets that prevent adjudication of the case.[16]
Fourth, the affirmative defenses just mentioned were not raised by the defendants-respondents in their appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and, therefore, are not before the Supreme Court for decision.
Fifth, the Second Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Within the next four months the Court should issue its opinion(s) in this case.
[1] Prior posts reviewed the procedural background of this case, the Second Circuit decision rejecting such liability, the initial Supreme Court argument in this case regarding whether corporations could be held liable under the ATS, and the Supreme Court’s order for rehearing in this case.
[3] All of the briefs in Kiobel are available on the website of the Center for Justice and Accountability, a human rights organization, along with its summary of 18 of the 52 amici curiae briefs.
[4] The transcript of that hearing is available online. Reports about the hearing are available in the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journaland the widely followed U.S. Supreme Court blog. In an editorial the New York Times supported sustaining the ATS in this case; the Wall Street Journal did not.
[7] In one of the most recent Supreme Court cases on personal jurisdiction in another context, the Court unanimously determined, in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, that the South Carolina courts did not have personal jurisdiction over three corporations that were organized and operating in France, Luxembourg and Turkey, but were not registered to do business in South Carolina, had no place of business, employees or bank accounts in the state, did not design, manufacture or advertise its products in the state and did not solicit business in the state or sell or ship products to customers in the state. (Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, No. 10-76 (Sup. Ct. June 27, 2011). This defense has ended ATS cases for some foreign corporate defendants. (E.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 930-31 (9th Cir. 2001) (French corporation).) However, Shell and the other defendants in the Kiobel case did not raise this defense and thereby waived it under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12 (h)(1); another defendant (a Nigerian subsidiary) was dismissed from this case on this ground.
[8]E.g.,Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 462 (D.N.J. 1999); Doe v. Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1146-48 (E.D.. Cal. 2005)(10-year period tolled or stayed because plaintiff could not have obtained justice due to legitimate fear of being killed for making a claim).
[9] This defense was suggested by the Supreme Court in Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21, and the lower courts are split as to whether it is appropriate in ATS cases. (E.g., Lizarbe v. Rondon, 642 F. Supp. 2d 473 (D. Md. 2009)(civil remedy in Peru inadequate because it is contingent on conclusion of criminal charges that can take years and because civil damages are ineffective).)
[10] Here are two examples of dismissal of ATS cases on the forum non conveniens ground. (Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., 578 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2009), cert.denied, 549 U.S. 1032 (2010) (litigation in Guatemala, but with the proviso that the motion would be reconsidered if plaintiffs had to return to Guatemala where they feared for their safety); Turedi v. Coca-Cola Co., 343 Fed. Appx. 623 (2d Cir. 2009) (litigation in Turkey).) But such a dismissal was rejected in Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1274 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (Cuban plaintiffs would be in danger if forced to litigate in Curaco where they had been subjected to slavery-like conditions). In Kiobel, Shell did not assert the forum non conveniens defense and, therefore, waived it. Shell did do so in a parallel case, but the court rejected the defense. (Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Pet. Co., 226 F.3d 88, 108 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 941 (2001).)
[11] For example, the issue of official immunity for former government officials of Somalia and Mexico has been examined in prior posts.
[12] A prior post looked at some of the basic provisions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act while another post discussed the Supreme Court case that decided that his statute did not protect former foreign government officials.
[13] This defense was suggested by the Supreme Court in Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21, and it has been used in ATS cases. E.g., Doe v. Israel, 400 F. Supp. 2d 86, 114 (D.D.C. 2005) (acts of Israeli government).
[14] This defense was suggested by the Supreme Court in Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21, and it has been used in ATS cases. E.g., Corrie v. Caterpiller, 503 f. 3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007) (dismissal of ATS claim for selling bulldozers to Israeli Defense Force); Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1069 (2006) (dismissal on political question ground of ATS case against former U.S. National Security Advisor over killing of Chilean general in 1970 coup d’etat).
[15]E.g., Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F. 3d 1227, 1237-39 (11th Cir. 2004).
[16] Foreigners sued an U.S. corporation under the ATS and TVPA for allegedly aiding and abetting the CIA’s extraordinary rendition of five foreign nationals to other countries for torture and interrogation when the corporation provided flight training and logistical and support services to the aircraft and crew. Before the defendant answered the complaint, the U.S. Government intervened and moved to dismiss the complaint under the state secrets doctrine. The district court granted the motion, which the Ninth Circuit, en banc, ultimately affirmed, 6 to 5. The court held that the state secret privilege established by United States v. Reynolds, 348 U.S. 1 (1953), required dismissal because “there is no feasible way to litigate [the defendant’s] alleged liability without creating un unjustifiable risk of divulging state secrets.” (Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).)
On September 16, 2001, ten anonymous Mexican nationals sued Ernesto Zedillo, the former President of Mexico, in U.S. federal court in New Haven, Connecticut. The complaint asserted claims for money damages in excess of $10 million under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA) over the December 22, 1997, Mexican militia’s attack on civilians in the village of Acteal in Chiapas, Mexico. On January 6, 2012, Zedillo moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that as a former Mexican president, he was immune from the lawsuit. All of this was explained in a prior post and a January 10th comment thereto.
Not much happened in this lawsuit until September 7, 2012, when the U.S. Government filed its suggestion that Zedillo should be immune from the suit and the case be dismissed. The Government did so in a letter from Harold Koh, the Department of State’s Legal Advisor and a former Dean of the Yale Law School, to the U.S. Department of Justice and in a formal pleading in the lawsuit entitled “Suggestion of Immunity Submitted by the United States of America.”
The letter stated that the U.S. State Department had determined that Zedillo was immune from the suit. It did so after “[t]aking into account principles of immunity articulated by the Executive Branch in the exercise of its constitutional authority over foreign affairs and informed by customary international law, and considering the overall impact of this matter on the foreign policy of the [U.S.].”
The letter and the formal filing set forth the following principles of the common law of officials immunity:
Under the law and practice of nations, a foreign sovereign is generally immune from lawsuits in the territory of another sovereign.
Until the 1976 enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), U.S. federal courts routinely “‘surrendered’ jurisdiction over suits against foreign sovereigns ‘on recognition, allowance and certification of the asserted immunity by the political branch of the government charged with the conduct of foreign affairs when its certificate to that effect was presented to the court.'”
Under the U.S. Constitution, the executive branch of the federal government had the responsibility for foreign affairs.
A “sitting head of state’s immunity is based on his status as the incumbent office holder and extends to all his actions.” (Emphasis added.)
For a former official, on the other hand, immunity “is based upon the character of that official’s conduct and extends only to acts taken in an official capacity” with a presumption that “actions taken by a foreign official exercising the powers of his office were taken in his official capacity.”
Such a presumption “is particularly appropriate when a former head of state is sued, because holders of a country’s highest office may be expected to be on duty at all times and to have wide-ranging responsibilities.”
That presumption is corroborated when “the foreign government itself has asserted that the actions of its official were taken in an official capacity.”
Here, the Mexican government had asserted that Zedillo’s actions that are challenged in this lawsuit were taken in his official capacity as President of Mexico. Indeed, according to the letter, this assessment of Zedillo’s actions is confirmed by the allegations of the complaint.
The letter’s reasons and conclusion are endorsed by the Suggestion of Immunity Submitted by the United States of America.
A Duke University Law Professor, Curtis A. Bradley, observed that the courts had the authority to make the ultimate decision on immunity for former officials and that the courts usually side with the State Department’s determination. This was certainly true in the ATS and TVPA case against a former Somali general as seen in a prior post.
I cannot see any legitimate basis for any challenge to this suggestion of immunity and anticipate that the District Court will conclude that Zedillo is immune and dismiss the case.
As discussed in a prior post, the U.S. Supreme Court in 2010 decided that former Somali General Mohamed Ali Samantar was not covered by the immunity provisions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and remanded the case to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to determine if he was entitled to common law immunity.
This was in a case brought by four Somalis against Samantar for money damages under two U.S. statutes–the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA). The complaint alleged that Samantar aided and abetted, and had command responsibility for, extrajudicial killing; arbitrary detention; torture; cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; crimes against humanity; and war crimes in Somalia from 1969 through 1991.[1]
U.S. District Court, Alexandria, VA
After remand, U.S. District Judge Leonie Brinkema of the Eastern District of Virginia in Alexandria [2] first decided that Samantar was not entitled to any common law immunity. She then decided that $21 million of compensatory and punitive damages were appropriate. Those decisions will now be reviewed.
No Common Law Immunity
On February 14, 2011, the U.S. Government provided the court with a letter from Harold Koh, the State Department’s Legal Adviser, stating that the Department had determined that Samantar did not enjoy immunity from this lawsuit. The key reason for this decision was the lack of any recognized Somali government that could assert or waive any immunity he might enjoy.
The formal U.S. filing with the court provided the relevant common law of immunity for former foreign government officials or what the filing called “Foreign Official Immunity Doctrine.” Here are the key points of that common law or doctrine without the filing’s citations of legal authority:
Under the law and practice of nations, a foreign sovereign is generally immune from lawsuits in the territory of another sovereign.
Until the 1976 enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), U.S. federal courts routinely “‘surrendered’ jurisdiction over suits against foreign sovereigns ‘on recognition, allowance and certification of the asserted immunity by the political branch of the government charged with the conduct of foreign affairs when its certificate to that effect was presented to the court.'”
“This deferential judicial posture was not merely discretionary [for the courts], but was rooted in the separation of powers.” Under the Constitution, the executive branch of the federal government had the responsibility for foreign affairs.
“The immunity of a foreign state was, early on, generally understood to extend not only to the state, heads of state, and diplomatic officials, but also to other officials in an official capacity.”
Any immunity protecting foreign officials for their official acts ultimately belongs to the sovereign, not the official. Thus, the foreign state must claim or waive any such immunity for the official. Where there is no recognized government, there is no one that can assert such a claim or make such a waiver.
When a former foreign official becomes a resident of the U.S., as Samantar had since 1997, the U.S. has a right to exercise jurisdiction over that individual.
The U.S. Supreme Court in this case agreed with the government’s position that FSIA did not apply to the issue of immunity for current or former foreign government officials. Instead, that issue was left to the State Department, whose decisions should be accepted by the courts.
Judge Leonie Brinkema
On February 15, 2011 (the day after the above government filing), Judge Brinkema issued a one-page order. It stated, “The government has determined that the defendant does not have foreign official immunity. Accordingly, defendant’s common law sovereign immunity defense is no longer before the Court . . . .” The court then directed the parties to agree upon a date to argue the remaining issues in the defendant’s dismissal motion.
Samantar’s motions for reconsideration of this order and for a stay pending appeal were denied. Nevertheless, he appealed to the Fourth Circuit (No. 11-1479), and on May 16, 2012, the appeal was argued to the appellate court, which as of September 13th had not yet issued its decision. In my opinion, he has virtually no chance of success on this appeal.
The Court’s Determination of Damages
The district court on August 28, 2012, determined that each of the seven plaintiffs was entitled to $1 million of compensatory damages plus $2 million of punitive damages for a total judgment of $21 million. How the court came to this determination is a fascinating story.
After the court’s rejection of his immunity defense, Samantar moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the latest complaint failed to state a claim for his secondary liability, that the TVPA did not retroactively apply to acts before 1991 and that the claims were untimely and nonjusticiable. That motion was denied on December 22, 2011.
Two days before the scheduled start of a jury trial on February 21, 2012, Samantar advised the court that he had filed for bankruptcy in the Eastern District of Virginia (1-12-bk-11085). The automatic stay of this case by the bankruptcy filing was soon lifted, and the start of the jury trial in the main case was rescheduled for February 23rd.
On February 23rd Samantar’s attorney informed the court that Samantar intended to take a default rather than contest liability and damages. The court then asked the defendant questions about this decision and was satisfied that he knowingly and voluntarily had conceded liability.
On August 28th the court filed its Memorandum Opinion that made extensive findings and legal conclusions regarding Samantar’s liability under theories of aiding and abetting and command responsibility.
After noting that compensatory damages were recoverable for physical and psychological injuries, the court found that the plaintiffs had provided the following “credible and compelling testimony of cognizable injuries stemming from the alleged violations:”
Plaintiff Yousuf had endured torture and seven years of imprisonment, largely in solitary confinement that had affected his memory and emotional health. He suffers from depression and nightmares and still relives the five-step length of his cell.
Plaintiff Baralle was tortured and barely escaped execution. He continues to experience pain and occasional shaking on the left side of his body as well as flashbacks. His two brothers were executed, and Baralle and his family have taken responsibility for raising his brothers’ children.
Plaintiff Gulaid went before a firing squad, but escaped death. He continues to suffer nightmares, flashbacks and anxiety, memory loss, high-blood pressure and poor vision.
Plaintiff Aziz and his sister testified about the extrajudicial executions of their father, who was the family’s breadwinner, and their brother.
The court then found that each of the three plaintiffs suing in their own capacity and each of the four decedents’ estates would be awarded compensatory damages of $1 million.
After finding that there was evidence of Samantar’s conduct having been intentional, malicious, wanton and reckless and that ATC and TVPA cases commonly awarding punitive damages, the court determined that $2 million of such damages for each of the seven claimants was appropriate. Such amount, said the court, reflected the “seriousness of [his] . . . uncontested conduct;” [eased] . . . any burden on plaintiffs in having to bring this case;” and recognized the award of substantial compensatory damages, the lack of any financial gain by Samantar and his prospective bankruptcy.
The execution of the judgment was stayed pending resolution of the bankruptcy case.
Conclusion
The ability of the plaintiffs to collect any significant amount of their $21million judgment is highly questionable. On April 3, 2012, the Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee reported Samantar had no assets available for distribution to creditors, but for unknown reasons that report was withdrawn on June 11th.
On August 23rd the plaintiffs commenced an adversary proceeding against Samantar in the bankruptcy court to have his judgment debt to them determined to be a non-dischargeable debt for willful and malicious injury under Bankruptcy Code § 727 (1:12-ap-01356). If the bankruptcy court agrees, this merely keeps open the possibility of future collections on the judgment if Samantar obtains any future assets or income.Judge L:
[1] This case was supported by the Center for Justice and Accountability, an human rights NGO based in San Francisco, California.
[2] Judge Brinkema presided over the criminal trial of Zacarias Moussaoui, who was convicted for conspiring to kill U.S. citizens in the 9/11 attacks. I appeared before her in another case, one involving Scientology.
As discussed in a prior post, the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) codifies the conditions for a U.S. court’s deciding that a “foreign state” as defined in that statute shall be granted immunity from a lawsuit in the U.S. courts.
Somali plaintiffs
The issue of whether the FSIA applied to individuals who had been officials of a foreign state was raised in a case brought by four Somalis against former Somali General Mohamed Ali Samantar for money damages under two U.S. statutes–the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA).
Mohamed Ali Samantar
The complaint alleged that Samantar aided and abetted, and had command responsibility for, extrajudicial killing; arbitrary detention; torture; cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; crimes against humanity; and war crimes in Somalia from 1969 through 1991.[1]
U.S. District Judge Leonie Brinkema of the Eastern District of Virginia[2] in August 2007 dismissed the case on the ground that Samantar was an “agency or instrumentality of” the state of Somalia and, therefore, entitled to immunity under FSIA (2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56227). This judgment was reversed in January 2009 by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (552 F.3d 371) on the ground that the FSIA did not cover individuals, after which the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to review the case.
In Yousuf v.Samantar, 560 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 176 L.Ed.2d 1047 (2010), the Supreme Court decided, 9 to 0, that the FSIA did not apply to government officials and that the immunity of such individuals was a matter of federal common law.[3]
In an opinion for the Supreme Court by Justice Stevens that was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and five Associate Justices (Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito and Sotomayor), Justice Stevens said there was nothing in the FSIA suggesting that “foreign state” should be read to include an official acting on behalf of that state. Indeed, according to the opinion, FSIA specifies that a foreign state “includes a political subdivision . . . or an agency or instrumentality” of that state, §1603(a), and specifically delimits what counts as an “agency or instrumentality,” §1603(b). Moreover, the statutory “agency or instrumentality” definition militates against its covering individuals.
The Court’s opinion also stated that FSIA’s history and purposes do not support an argument that the Act governs individual immunity claims. There is little reason to presume, said the Court, that when Congress codified state immunity, it intended to codify, sub silentio, official immunity. [4]
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court for its determination in the first instance as to whether Samantar was entitled to any common law immunity.
Upon remand, as will be discussed in a subsequent post, the district court decided that Samantar was not entitled to common law immunity and awarded the plaintiffs compensatory and punitive damages of $21 million.
[1] This case was supported by the Center for Justice and Accountability, a human rights NGO based in San Francisco, California.
[2] Judge Brinkema presided over the criminal trial of Zacarias Moussaoui, who was convicted for conspiring to kill U.S. citizens in the 9/11 attacks. I appeared before her in another case, one involving Scientology.
[3] According to John B. Bellinger, III, a former Legal Adviser to the U.S. State Department, this Supreme Court decision vindicated the position of the Department’s Office of the Legal Adviser, which had long argued that the immunities of current and former foreign government officials in U.S. courts are defined by federal common law and customary international law as articulated by the Executive Branch, rather than by FSIA. But, says Bellinger, the decision will place a burden on that Office, which will now be asked to submit its views on the potential immunity of every foreign government official sued in the U.S.
[4] Justices Alito, Thomas and Scalia each filed concurring opinions to say that the Court’s references to FSIA’s legislative history were unnecessary.
On April 18, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously decided that legal entities, including corporations, are not liable under the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA).
The TVPA provides a civil cause of action for money damages by an “individual” who is a victim of torture or by his or her representative for extrajudicial killing against an “individual” who committed the wrong under authority or color of law of any foreign nation. The opinion for the Supreme Court by Justice Sotomayor held that the word “individual” in the statute encompasses only natural persons and thus does not impose liability against organizations. This conclusion was supported, the opinion stated, by the ordinary meaning of the word “individual” and the absence of any indication in the statute itself that Congress intended the word to have a different meaning. In addition, the counterarguments, including the legislative history of the TVPA, were not persuasive.
Justice Scalia joined the Sotomayor opinion, except for the portion that found support for its conclusion in the legislative history of the TVPA. Justice Breyer also joined the Sotomayor opinion, but filed a concurring opinion that said he did not believe the ordinary meaning of the word “individual” alone was sufficient to justify the Court’s conclusion, but that the legislative history supported the Court’s conclusion.
The unanimity of the Court and the issuance of the opinion only 49 days after the argument confirm my earlier opinion that this was an easy case for non-liability of organizations.
Congress, of course, at any time could amend the TVPA to expand or restrict the applicability of the statute.
There are numerous ways in which international human rights norms are enforced, many of which already have been examined in this blog. Here is at least a partial list of such methods:
Countries like the U.S. that are parties to certain regional organizations like the Organization of American States can be sued for alleged violations of human rights treaties in bodies like the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
Complaints about a country’s alleged violations can be reported to special rapportuers with specific subject-matter competence for an investigation and report.
Countries like the U.S. that are parties to certain human rights treaties like the Convention Against Torture submit reports to treaty bodies for review and recommendations for improving their compliance with the treaties.
All members of the U.N. are subject to Universal Periodic Review (UPR) by the U.N. Human Rights Council and obtain recommendations for ways they can improve their human rights records.
Victims of certain human rights violations can obtain protection through being recognized as a “refugee.”
Truth commissions can investigate and promulgate the results of those investigations as the “truth” of past violations which then can be used as evidence in the previously mentioned procedures.
These various institutions or mechanisms operate independently of one another. Other than the first two, they have limited power to force a recalcitrant government to change its behavior. Yet they also are all engaged in an interactive global struggle against impunity for violators of international human rights norms.
