On September 11, 2020, Spain’s highest criminal court, the Audiencia Nacional, found former Salvadoran Colonel, Inocente Orlando Montano (now 77 years old), guilty of the “terrorist murders” of five Jesuit priests who were Spaniards, in San Salvador, the Capital of El Salvador, 31 years ago. The court found that Montano took part in the decision to “execute Ignacio Ellacuría as well as anyone in the area – regardless of who they were – so as not to leave behind any witnesses.”
The court then sentenced Montano to 26 years, eight months and one day for each of the five murders for a total of 133 years. However, he will not spend more than 30 years in prison, the judges said. This was after a trial of the only Salvadoran military officer who was extradited to Spain to stand trial under the international legal principle of universal jurisdiction authorizing jurisdiction in a state other than the site of the crime for human rights crimes.
The Spanish NGO that was involved in the case, Guernica Centre for International Justice, published a background of the case, daily reports about the trial and the court’s decision. 
Also killed in the same event were a Salvadoran Jesuit and two Salvadoran women, but those killings were not before the Spanish court.
The path to this legal judgment has been long and complicated.
The Murder of the Jesuit Priests
The murder of the Jesuit priests, one of the most horrendous crimes during the country’s civil war, occurred in the early hours of November 16, 1989, when a group of Salvadoran soldiers entered the campus of the Central American University (UCA) in San Salvador. They made their way to the residences of the Jesuit priests, who were UCA professors and advocates for the poor people of the country, and shot and killed the five Spanish priests–Father Ignacio Ellacuria (UCA’s Rector), Ignacio Martin-Barò (UCA’s Vice Rector), Segundo Montes (Director of UCA’s Human Rights Center), Armando Lòpez and Juan Ramôn Moreno. The murdered Salvadoran Jesuit was Joaquin Lôpez y Lôpez, and the two murdered Salvadoran women were the priests’ cook and her daughter.
Salvadoran Legal Proceedings Over This Crime
Immediately afterwards high officials of the Salvadoran military engaged in attempting to cover up its involvement in this horrendous crime, but international outrage and pressure caused the country to create a Salvadoran commission that investigated and reported that four officers and five soldiers were responsible for this crime and they along with another officer were brought to trial in that country for this crime in September 1991. A jury decided that the five officers were guilty of various crimes and sentenced them to prison, but acquitted the five soldiers. 
In 1992 the Salvadoran legislature enacted a General Amnesty Law that led that year to the release from prison of those convicted of the Jesuit murders. In 2016, however, the Salvadoran Supreme Court held that the General Amnesty Law was unconstitutional, and at least one of those who had been convicted, sentenced and then released under that Law (Colonel Guillermo Alfredo Benavides Moreno) was ordered to return to prison after the invalidation of that Law.
On January 16, 1992, the Salvadoran government and the FMLN rebels signed the peace agreement to end the civil war. One of its provisions was the creation of the Truth Commission for El Salvador, whose report on March 15, 1993 had detailed findings about the murder of the Jesuits, including the following:
“There is substantial evidence that on the night of 15 November 1989, then Colonel René Emilio Ponce, in the presence of and in collusion with General Juan Rafael Bustillo, then Colonel Juan Orlando Zepeda, Colonel Inocente Orlando Montano and Colonel Francisco Elena Fuentes, gave Colonel Guillermo Alfredo Benavides the order to kill Father Ignacio Ellacuría and to leave no witnesses. For that purpose, Colonel Benavides was given the use of a unit from the Atlacatl Battalion, which two days previously had been sent to search the priest’s residence.”
“There is full evidence that:
(a) That same night of 15 November, Colonel Guillermo Alfredo Benavides informed the officers at the Military College of the order he had been given for the murder. When he asked whether anyone had any objection, they all remained silent.
(b) The operation was organized by then Major Carlos Camilo Hernández Barahona and carried out by a group of soldiers from the Atlacatl Battalion under the command of Lieutenant José Ricardo Espinoza Guerra and Second Lieutenant Gonzalo Guevara Cerritos, accompanied by Lieutenant Yusshy René Mendoza Vallecillos.”
In November 2008 a U.S. NGO (Center for Justice & Accountability) and a Spanish NGO filed a criminal case over the killing of the Jesuits against 14 Salvadoran military officers and the country’s former President Cristiani. In January 2009 the Spanish court accepted the case against the military officers and soldiers, but declined to do so with respect to Cristiani although reserving the right to do so later.
On May 30, 2011, the Spanish court issued an indictment and arrest warrants for 20 of the top leaders of El Salvador’s civil war, accusing them of crimes against humanity and state terrorism in meticulously planning and carrying out the killings of the Jesuit priests in November 1989. One was Inocente Orlando Montano, who in 1989 was the vice minister of public safety.
Subsequently in complicated proceedings El Salvador denied extradition of all these requests for those living in the country. Only Montano, who had been living in the U.S. and who had been tried and convicted for lying in U.S. immigration papers, was extradited to Spain by the U.S.
After this decision by the Spanish court, UCA requested the Criminal Chamber of El Salvador’s Supreme Court to resolve a long-pending appeal by six other former military officers accused of involvement in the Jesuits murders so that their guilt can be adjudicated. UCA’s Rector, Andreu Oliva, said, “”We are confident that the evidence presented at the Spanish hearing will serve to hold a trial here in El Salvador, since it is evident that, given the indications in the sentence, there are other parties involved who are in El Salvador and that there is no reason why they are not judged in our country.” This requires the “urgent” opening of the archives of the country’s Armed Forces. 
As we have seen in a recent post, the Spanish criminal investigation and prosecution of former Salvadoran military officers and soldiers for the murders of the Jesuit priests and their housekeeper and her daughter are still pending and hopefully the case will go to trial in 2015 against at least one of the 19 Salvadoran military officers and soldiers charged with the crime.
There, however, have been other legal proceedings regarding this horrible crime. Here is a summary of these proceedings.
Salvadoran Investigations. Immediately after the murders, the Salvadoran military took steps to destroy evidence and to cover up their involvement in the crime while supposedly conducting an independent investigation of the crime. With widespread international outrage at the crime, the Minister of Defense was forced to establish a Special Honor Commission, consisting of five officers and two civilians to do a more thorough investigation. It concluded that nine people were responsible for the murders: four lower-ranking officers and five soldiers. International Criminal Justice: Salvadoran Military’s Attempted Cover-Up of Its Committing the Murders of the Jesuit Priests (June 7, 2011), https://dwkcommentaries.com/2011/06/07/international-criminal-justice-salvadoran-militarys-attempted-cover-up-of-its-committing-the-murders-of-the-jesuit-priests/.
Salvadoran Criminal Charges. The murders of the Jesuit priests caused such a huge international uproar that El Salvador had to do something to make it appear as if it were pursuing justice in the case. As a result, in January 1990 the Salvadoran government commenced a criminal prosecution of five Salvadoran military officers and five soldiers of the Atlacatl Battalion. The highest-ranking officer was Colonel Guillermo Alfredo Benavides Moreno, the Director of the Military College, who was accused of having given the order to murder the priests. (International Criminal Justice: Salvadoran Criminal Case Regarding the Murders of the Jesuit Priests(June 8, 2011).)
Salvadoran Criminal Trial. After lengthy pre-trial proceedings, this criminal trial finally took place in September 1991. Benevides was convicted of all eight counts of murder and instigation and conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism. One of the Lieutenants was convicted of one count of murder (the 16-year-old girl), instigation and conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism and being an accessory. Benevides and this Lieutenant were sentenced to 30 years imprisonment. The other two Lieutenants were convicted of instigation and conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism; they were sentenced to three years imprisonment, but released on bail and continued to serve in the military. A Lieutenant Colonel was convicted of being an accessory and sentenced to three years imprisonment, but he too was released on bail and continued to serve in the military. The five soldiers were acquitted of all charges. (Id.)
Salvadoran Truth Commission Investigation and Report. The Peace Accords of January 1992 that ended the Salvadoran Civil War established the Truth Commission for El Salvador to investigate the most serious crimes that had occurred during the war, including the murders of the Jesuits. Its March 1993 final report found the following facts regarding the murders:
On the night of 15 November 1989, then Colonel René Emilio Ponce, in the presence of ad in collusion with General Juan Rafael Bustillo, then Colonel Juan Orlando Zepeda, Colonel Inocente Orlando Montano and Colonel Francisco Elena Fuentes, gave Colonel Guillermo Alfredo Benavides the order to kill Father Ignacio Ellacuría and to leave no witnesses. For that purpose, Colonel Benavides was given the use of a unit from the Atlacatl Battalion, which had been sent to search the priests’ residence two days previously.
That same night, Colonel Guillermo Alfredo Benavides informed the officers at the Military College of the order for the murder. When he asked whether anyone had any objection, they all remained silent.
The operation was organized by then Major Carlos Camilo Hernández Barahona and carried out by a group of soldiers from the Atlacatl Battalion under the command of Lieutenant José Ricardo Espinoza Guerra and Second Lieutenant Gonzalo Guevara Cerritos, accompanied by Lieutenant Yusshy René Mendoza Vallecillos.
Subsequently, all these officers and others, including General Gilberto Rubio Rubio, knowing what had happened, took steps to conceal the truth, including destruction of evidence.
Adoption of Salvadoran Amnesty Law. Five days after the delivery of the Truth Commission Report in March 1993, El Salvador’s National Assembly adopted the General Amnesty Law for the Consolidation of the Peace (Decree 486). Its provisions included “a full, absolute and unconditional amnesty to all those who participated in any way in the commission, prior to January 1, 1992 [the end of the civil war], of political crimes or common crimes linked to political crimes or common crimes in which the number of persons involved is no less than twenty.” (International Criminal Justice: El Salvador’s General Amnesty Law and Its Impact on the Jesuits Case (June 11, 2011).)
Implementation of Amnesty Law. Immediately after the adoption of the Amnesty Law and pursuant to this Law, Colonel Benavides and the Lieutenant who had been convicted and imprisoned in the Jesuits case were released from prison. (Id.)
Instigation of Case before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Meanwhile, on the same day the Jesuit priests were murdered (November 16, 1989), Americas Watch, a non-governmental human rights organization, filed a complaint with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights alleging that the Salvadoran government had violated the American Convention [Treaty] on Human Rights with respect to the murder of the Jesuits and their cook and her daughter. (International Criminal Justice: The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights’ Case Regarding the Jesuit Priests (June 13, 2011).)
Investigation and Report by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Ten years later (December 22, 1999), the Inter-American Commission issued its report. Relying heavily on the findings of the Truth Commission, the report made detailed findings about the murder and subsequent events and concluded that the state had violated the American Convention. As a result, the Commission recommended that the government conduct an expeditious, effective investigation and prosecute and punish those who were involved “without reference to the amnesty,” to make reparations and to render the General Amnesty Law null and void. (The Commission did not, and does not, have the power to order any of the states to do anything. (Id.)
Now twenty-five years after the crimes and 15 years after the Inter-American Commission’s report, no one has been convicted of the crime and imprisoned other than the two officers who were convicted by a Salvadoran court and who briefly were in prison before being released under the Amnesty Law.
Moreover, the government of El Salvador has not fully complied with the Commission’s recommendations.
In November 2009, however, El Salvador presented the nation’s highest award (National Order of Jose Matias Delgado) to the Jesuit priests’ relatives as an act of atonement and formally advised the Commission and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights that the Salvadoran state accepted the binding nature of their past decisions involving the country and the state’s responsibility to implement their recommendations in those cases.
In addition, in January 2010, Salvadoran President Mauricio Funes admitted that during the civil war state security forces “committed serious human rights violations and abuses of power,” including “massacres, arbitrary executions, forced disappearances, torture, sexual abuse, arbitrary deprivation of freedom” and other acts of repression. Funes then made a formal apology to all of the victims of these crimes and asked for their forgiveness and created a commission to offer redress to the victims. (Id.)
 There has been much debate in El Salvador about whether or not the Amnesty Law is valid and/or should be abolished. The country’s Supreme Court is expected in the next several months to decide whether the Law is constitutional. Meanwhile, U.S. courts have determined that the Salvadoran Amnesty Law is not applicable to litigation in U.S. courts.
A prior post reviewed some of the ways in which El Universidad de Centro America (the University of Central America or UCA) is commemorating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the brutal murders of six of their Jesuit brothers and professors on November 16, 1989. Here are some of the other ways.
On November 16th a memorial Mass was celebrated for the martyrs at the tomb of Archbishop Oscar Romero in the Crypt of the Metropolitan Cathedral of San Salvador.
Monsignor José Gregorio Rosa Chávez, the Auxiliary Archbishop of San Salvador, delivered the homily. He quoted the words of one of the martyrs, Ignacio Ellacuría: “With Archbishop Romero, God passed by El Salvador.” Chavez then said that God also passed through the country with the martyrs. They along with Archbishop Romero and Fr. Rutilio Grande “devoted their lives for the defense of the poor and the needy during a brutal armed conflict.”
All of the current Jesuits of El Salvador and others in attendance joined in songs and prayers to celebrate the work of the martyrs and to condemn the injustice of the perpetrators of this horrible crime not having been tried and convicted.
Comments by Fr. Jon Sobrino, S.J.
Separately Fr. Jon Sobrino, S.J., who escaped murder 25 years ago because he was in Asia giving lectures, remembered these words of Ellacuría: “It’s up to the university awakening more and more hope.” In other words, said Sobrino, “Hope is not optimism and, therefore, the crucial question is how hope is generated. Not every university exists in a time for hope, but it does so exist when, humbly and honestly, it works for the poor of this world, learns from them and is willing to give everything it has for them.”
“That’s exactly what our martyrs did at UCA,” continued Sobrino. “And they still generate hope. As Ellacuría wrote, ‘Let new men and women always continue to announce firmly a greater future, because El Salvador envisions God, the God of liberation.’”
Comments by Fr. Rodolfo Cardenal, S.J.
Rodolfo Cardenal, UCA’s Vice Rector for Academics and Social Projection, also separately recalled the university’s six years of “institutional depression” after the murders of the Jesuits. “This was overcome thanks to the work of the surviving Jesuits and others who came from abroad, and the active collaboration of a group of lay people who were very capable and committed to UCA’s vocation. In the end, they overcame the depression with the obstinacy of reason, truth and justice.”
In this effort they were aided by the martyrs who “were present with great clarity” in “the communion of saints. Their presence encouraged us to follow, despite uncertainty and fear during the remainder of the civil war and with the postwar academic, organizational and administrative challenges that seemed insurmountable. Among those challenges were dignifying the victims of state terrorism, demanding justice for the perpetrators of human rights, containing social violence and combating new forms of poverty and exclusion.”
The UCA website contains statements by today’s students on why we should remember the martyrs and the following words describing the legacy of the martyrs, each of which is linked to a statement about the word’s importance:
Twenty-five years ago today (November 16th), six Jesuit priests and professors at El Universidad de Centro America (the University of Central America or UCA) in San Salvador, the capital of El Salvador, were brutally murdered along with their housekeeper and her daughter. The priests were: (1) Ignacio Ellacuría, the Rector of the University; (2) Ignacio Martín Baró, an UCA social psychologist whose research focused on the psychic problems of living in a context of structural violence; (3) Segundo Montes, an UCA anthropologist interested in the effects of social stratification and displaced victims of the country’s civil war; (4) Amando López Quintana, the chair of UCA’s philosophy department, a parish priest and director of a mass-literacy campaign; (5) Joaquín López y López, director of UCA’s Fe y Alegria (Faith and Joy), a vocational training program for impoverished youth; and (6) Juan Ramón Moreno, who served at UCA’s Center for Theological Reflection, which addressed questions of faith and justice.
An U.S. journalist, Mary Jo McConahay, was in El Salvador that day, and after hearing reports that morning of the murders she was one of the first individuals to see the bodies of four of the Jesuits in a garden near their UCA apartments. In a recent article in the U.S. National Catholic Reporter she recounts what is was like to be there that morning:
“On the grass a few feet from the residence lay the forms of four bodies covered with white sheets. What appeared to be blood stained some of the sheets. . . .
In the hall [of the residence] with doors open to rooms on both sides, a body lay face down on the floor. A strip of what looked like blood marked the floor, as if the body had been dragged.”
[Fr. José María Tojeira, the Jesuit provincial for Central America] . . . bade me step inside one of the rooms, where another man lay dead . . . .”
We stepped outside past the white sheets and turned to descend a few steps to stand at the open door of a small apartment. Inside lay two bodies, a woman and a young girl, fallen backward a few feet from the threshold . . . . I recorded how the girl’s pelvic area looked as if the killer had emptied his gun there, how the woman’s legs had fallen over the girl’s, as if she had stood in front when the killers entered . . . . “
“[Back in the garden] the sheets came off [the bodies] and there in death were the priests I had known in life. . . . There was Ellacuría, his clear voice silenced, lying face up, as if he had looked at his killers at the moment of death” joined by Segundo Montes, Ignacio Martín-Baró and Amando López.”
Subsequent investigations have revealed that members of the country’s Armed Forces under the direction and command of higher officials committed these horrible crimes. They did so in order to silence Fr. Ellacuría’s publicly criticizing social injustices in the country and calling for peace negotiations to end the civil war and persecution of the poor and to leave no witnesses to the murder of Ellacuría.
UCA is marking this anniversary with nine days of programs and masses. This post will discuss two of those events, and subsequent posts will cover others as they become available on the UCA website.
In a discussion about the legacy of the martyrs, Hector Saymour said the legacy was the mission of social projection for UCA and other universities. Such universities by engaging in rational and scientific research seek to increase understanding of the current situation and to create viable theoretical alternatives. For UCA and other Jesuit universities Jesus Christ is the inspiration for this struggle to transform unjust structures and to construct a new civilization based on solidarity. Omar Serrano, the Director of UCA’s Social Projection, added that UCA “has a continuing commitment to continue the legacy of the martyrs and to ‘transform the reality of Salvadoran society.’”
UCA also published an essay–“Freedom and Martyrs”—by the previously mentioned José Maria Tojeira, now the Director of UCA’s Campus Ministry and the former UCA Rector (1997-2010). It focused “on one of the fundamental characteristics usually common to all martyrs, since the dawn of Christianity until today, including, of course, Romero and many other Salvadorans. This is freedom. As St. Paul said, “for Christ has set us free” (Gal 5: 1).
The martyred Jesuits, Tojeira continued, were “universal fellow human beings of goodwill, [who] lived their freedom in an exceptional way. They started practicing it very soon with their youthful decision to come to America, leaving their roots, family and familiar environment. Their maturing love opened them to the new world . . . with a true devotion to the particular world of the poor of El Salvador. The option for the poor is already an act of freedom, and they demanded the Latin American Church take the matter seriously. And they used [UCA] . . . to find the roots of reality, not only opted for the poor, but also for their causes: social change, liberation from injustice, fully incorporating human rights into existence, creating a new culture in which they predominate over having and work over capital.”
“The severe social tensions (the fruit of injustice), repression and later civil war posed new challenges. . . . When words soar and thinking intellectuals become an enemy to the military, it is not easy to keep . . . [one’s] balance and safeguard life. The Jesuits’ decision to stay, to continue speaking freely, to continue publishing, to continue to defend the victims, risking life even looking at the face of death without defending their trust in reason and the Gospel, shows their tough libertarian convictions. For freedom is not measured by speeches defending money, property, or self-interest, but by the life choices of defending human rights.”
According to Tojiera, “In the exercise of this freedom . . . the martyred Jesuits maintained [UCA as] a quality university in a time that viciously persecuted intelligence and condemned the national university. At the same time, they multiplied their analysis and social criticism, their choice for peace with justice and human rights, while the government encouraged the creation of universities to promote conservative ideologies. The martyred Jesuits wanted to remain faithful to the intellectual quality of their voices so that victims would be protected, so that peace would emerge. And from that intellectually respectable quality, they started to speak of dialogue and negotiation as the only valid way out of the conflict.”
UCA’s “publications, conferences, studies [in 1989 and before] were mainly aimed at saving lives. The Jesuits said they stayed in El Salvador to fight for peace: ‘Basically what we want and where we direct our efforts is to save lives.’ Wanting to save the lives of many is what eventually led to the Jesuits’ death. Finally, the Army, by a compact of silence and concealment, took the decision to kill the Jesuits, a crime against humanity, for which the military still has not apologized nor has recognized it as such. What 25 years ago was cause for tears, now is a cause for rejoicing. Because our comrades still are alive generating critical thinking, lucid intelligence and true freedom.”
U.S. Jesuit Conference
Father Timothy Kesicki, SJ, who is the president of the U.S. Jesuit Conference, said, “The slaughter of eight innocents had a visceral impact on me and my Jesuit brothers, one that continues to shape us. More importantly, 25 years later, it helps highlight the continuing failures of U.S. policy toward Central America. Back in 1989, the UCA killers were instructed to leave no witnesses, but by silencing eight people, they unintentionally and, ironically, gave voice to a generation of activists proud to walk in the footsteps of the martyrs. We need that same sense of urgency and mission now, as we struggle to help those suffering in Central America today.”
Last week Fr. Kesicki led a visit to El Salvador by Jesuit provincials, the incoming international director of Jesuit Refugee Service, the president of the Association of Jesuit Colleges and Universities and the presidents of nine Jesuit universities. They visited UCA, participated in its forum and commemorated the martyrs at Mass at the Cathedral in San Salvador and at the Romero Chapel, where Archbishop Óscar Romero was assassinated in 1980.
In addition, more than 1,300 participants from Jesuit universities, high schools and parishes converged on Washington, D.C. this weekend for the annual Ignatian Family Teach-In for Justice. It will feature a wide array of speakers and the premiere of a documentary about the martyrs, “Blood in the Backyard.” Other scheduled events include a Capitol Hill rally and congressional visits. Each of the nation’s 28 Jesuit colleges and universities also marked the anniversary with lectures, panel discussions, Masses and prayer services.
An article this month in the U.S. National Catholic Reporter remembered these words by Fr. Ellacuría when in 1982 he received an honorary degree from California’s Santa Clara University, “Our work is oriented . . . above all on behalf of a people who, oppressed by injustice, struggle for their self-determination—people often without liberty or human rights. The university should be present intellectually where it is needed: to provide science for those without science; to provide skills for those without skills; to be a voice for those without voices; to give intellectual support for those who do not possess the academic qualifications to make their rights legitimate.”
The website for the U.S. Conference of Jesuits has other fascinating relevant features: (a) “Legacy of the Martyrs: Lives Changed, Causes Embraced,” that contains recollections of 38 U.S. Jesuit priests and other religious workers of what they felt when they first heard the news in 1989 of the murders of the six priests in El Salvador; and (b) U.S. Jesuits’ recollections of the martyrs.
Fr. Michael McCarthy, S.J.
Fr. Michael McCarthy, another fellow Jesuit priest and a professor and the executive director of California’s Ignatian Center for Jesuit Education at Santa Clara University, also has expressed in the New York Times his inspiration by the martyred Jesuits. He credits Ellacuría’s recognizing “the responsibility of his institution as lending intellectual support to those who did not have the academic qualifications to legitimize their rights. His life has challenged me to keep my sights not on conventional measures of success but on what really matters: the contribution I am making to the world.”
In addition, McCarthy treasures Ellacuría’s “vision of a university that would be an ‘inescapable social force’ for good. That is no less important in 2014 than it was in 1989. I still believe that an education not grounded in justice is a farce and that we desperately need wise, courageous, even heroic academic leaders to realize the highest purposes of education.”
Many others have been transformed and inspired by the witness and ministry of the Jesuit priests of El Salvador.
One of them, Fran Rossi Szplczym, Pastoral Associate for Administration, Immaculate Conception Church of Albany, NY, said, “the lust for power, control, and domination is essentially the way of the world. That is one of the reasons we who are Catholic [and other] Christians live our faith as we do. We are not here to be against the world, nor to withdraw from the world. Jesus might have gone to the desert now and then, but he did not come here to simply be alone and pray, or to hide out with the apostles and feel superior to everyone else. Jesus came to transform us and the world with it.”
She added, “We cannot give up, we cannot turn away, we cannot turn to violence. To walk to the cross with Christ might mean lying face down on the ground with part of your brain splattered nearby, but it also means that we must all be changed. That is the call of discipleship put into action, no matter the cost. Let the Jesuit martyrs of El Salvador remind us of this daunting task of loving and changing the world in Jesus’ name. No matter what tiny and beautiful, or grand and magnificent ways that we are called to be that change in Christ.”
As a Christian of the Presbyterian persuasion, I too have been inspired by the Jesuit martyrs as I will discuss in a subsequent post.
On October 3, 2014, the 20 judges of the Criminal Chamber (Sala de lo Penal) of Spain’s National Court (Audiencia Nacional) issued an important ruling on Spain’s use of universal jurisdiction (UJ). In order to understand this decision, we first must look at UJ under customary international law and at Spain’s incorporation of this principle into its statutory law.
Customary International Law Regarding Universal Jurisdiction
Under customary international law and certain treaties, a nation state’s courts have UJ over certain crimes of international concern regardless of where the crime was committed or the nationality of the victim or perpetrator. These crimes of international concern are (a) piracy; (b) slavery; (c) war crimes; (d) crimes against peace; (e) crimes against humanity; (f) genocide; and (g) torture.
Spain’s Statutes Regarding Universal Jurisdiction
Spain implemented this principle in 1985 in its own domestic statutory law by conferring such jurisdiction on its National Court for certain crimes, including genocide; terrorism; and any other crimes under international treaties or conventions that should be prosecuted in Spain.
In 2009 Spain amended this statute to add these additional crimes for universal jurisdiction: crimes against humanity; illegal trafficking or illegal immigration of persons; and female genital mutilation (FGM). In addition, the amendment specified that these conditions or limitations had to be established for such jurisdiction: the alleged perpetrators were in Spain; or the victims were of Spanish nationality; or there was another connecting link to Spain.
The 2009 amendment also specified that for such Spanish jurisdiction to exist, another country or international tribunal had not started a process involving an investigation and successful prosecution of such offenses; if there were such another process, then the Spanish court should suspend or stay its case until the other investigation and prosecution has been concluded. The latter provision is referred to as the subsidiary principle.
In March 2014, Spain’s legislature (los Cortes Generales), approved another amendment to this statute (Article 23.4 of the 1985 Organic Law of the Judicial Power, as amended). Here are the principal provisions of the amendment that have been at issue in the October 3, 2014, decision by the Criminal Chamber of the National Court and in other recent judicial cases:
For genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, universal jurisdiction exists only if the accused individual is a Spanish citizen or a foreign citizen who is habitually resident in Spain or a foreigner who is found in Spain and whose extradition had been denied by Spanish authorities.
For torture and disappearances, universal jurisdiction exists only if the prospective defendant is a Spanish citizen, or the victims were (at the time of the events in question) Spanish citizens and the person accused of the crime was in Spanish territory.
Certain crimes were added for universal jurisdiction, including war crimes (crimes against persons or goods in armed conflict); torture and crimes against moral integrity; and crimes covered by the Council of Europe Convention on the prevention and combatting of violence against women and domestic violence.
The Criminal Chamber’s Decision Regarding Universal Jurisdiction
The October 3, 2014, Criminal Chamber’s decision concerned use of UJ in (i) the Jesuits Massacre Case; (ii) the Guatemala genocide case; (iii) the case against American service members for alleged murder of a Spanish cameraman in the Iraq war; (iv) the case against U.S. personnel for alleged torture of detainees at Guantanamo Bay; and (v) cases involving alleged Female Genital Mutilation (FGM).
Jesuits Massacre Case. The Chamber unanimously decided that Spain had UJ over the lower court’s criminal investigation of the November 1989 murders in El Salvador of the Spanish Jesuit priest, Ignacio Ellacuria, five fellow Jesuit priests and their cook and her daughter. Although the statutory amendment imposed limits on UJ for crimes against humanity, such charges could be considered in this case because they are related to the murder charges for which there is clear UJ.
The Chamber further explained that upon having asserted jurisdiction over a set of criminal facts that constitute the state terrorism crime, Spanish Judges have jurisdiction over all other crimes connected to the facts investigated, even if that crime is a crime against humanity.
The Chamber’s decision was a result of an appeal from a decision by Judge Eloy Velasco, who handled the Jesuits case and who previously had indicted 20 Salvadoran military officials for murder, terrorism, and crimes against humanity. Velasco rejected the crime against humanity claim and decided to continue only with the terrorism claim. The appeal was brought by the U.S.-based Center for Justice & Accountability and the Spanish Pro Human Rights Association.
Guatemala Genocide case. The Chamber also decided that investigations in the Guatemala Genocide case involving claimed UJ could proceed for the moment, but the Chamber did so on procedural grounds without reaching the merits.
The Chamber’s decision was the result of an appeal from the May 2014 decision by Judge Santiago Pedraz Gomez of the National Court. He decided that the case could proceed for two reasons. First, the charges include terrorism—a crime that falls within Spanish extraterritorial jurisdiction whenever there are Spanish victims. Second, the charges of terrorism, genocide, and other atrocities are all based on the same facts. Under Spanish law, as in many European countries, a court’s jurisdiction extends to all criminal charges that arise from the same acts. Because the Court has jurisdiction over the terrorism offenses, Judge Pedraz announced that he will investigate the other connected crimes.
Judge Pedraz’s rationale appears to be the same as the Chamber’s in allowing the Jesuits case to proceed on the merits.
Case Against American Servicemembers for Alleged Murder of a Spanish Cameraman. The lower court has been investigating a case under UJ against American soldiers in the Iraq war for the alleged murder in 2003 of a Spanish cameraman. The Chamber also allowed it to proceed for a procedural error by the prosecution without a ruling on the merits.
The Chamber’s decision was the result of an appeal from a March 2014, decision by the lower court’s Judge Santiago Pedraz Gómez. He held that the amendment could not be applied to this case because, he said, the amendment contradicted Spain’s obligations under the 1949 Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. The judge stated that the Geneva Convention obliges Spain to “prosecute the crime (search for people and make them appear) regardless of the perpetrators’ nationalities and wherever they may be.” Therefore, the court’s decision said, “The judge must refrain from applying . . . [the new statutory amendment]. The rule of law requires the existence of independent bodies to protect the rights and freedoms of citizens, by impartially applying standards that express the people’s will and control the activities of public authorities.”
Case Against American Personnel for Alleged Torture of Guantanamo Detainees. Another lower court judge has been investigating under UJ the alleged torture by American personnel of Guantanamo detainees. The chamber also allowed it to proceed because of a procedural error by the prosecution without the Chamber addressing the merits.
This decision occurred in an appeal from the March 2014 lower court’s Judge Pablo Ruz’ order. He concluded that under the new amendment “torture and war crimes cannot be pursued . . . because the target of the procedure is not a Spaniard or a resident of Spain.” These restrictions, however, are trumped, held the judge, by international treaties ratified by Spain–the Geneva Conventions and the Convention Against Torture–which force signatory countries to pursue crimes.
Judge Ruz also pointed out that the new amendment stipulates that crimes cannot be pursued in Spain if they are already being investigated by an international court or by the country where they were committed. Therefore, Judge Ruz this March renewed his request to the U.S. Government for information about U.S. investigation of this case. This blogger is not aware of any U.S. response to date to this request.
FGM Cases. The Chamber also unanimously decided that UJ could be used for criminal investigations and prosecutions of alleged Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) where the victims or perpetrators have some connection to Spain. This decision was based, in part, upon Spain’s August 1, 2014, ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, which requires Spain to prosecute such crimes. The case involved the FGM of a young woman in Gambia in 2005
On August 27, 2013, the federal court in Boston, Massachusetts sentenced Inocente Orlando Montano to 21 months in prison for violating U.S. immigration laws.
To obtain certain relief under those laws, Montano had stated to U.S. immigration officials that he had never served in any foreign military service, had never received military weapons training and had never been involved in persecuting others. A year ago he pleaded guilty to three counts of a federal indictment for those statements.
In fact, Montano had served in the Salvadoran military, had received such training and had been involved in persecuting others. The record in the U.S. criminal case established the following:
During the Salvadoran Civil War, Montano quickly rose to the highest echelon of its security forces, and the forces he commanded were responsible for death squad activities and numerous other human rights abuses. According to expert witness, Dr. Terry Karl, there were at least 1,169 such violations, including 65 extrajudicial killings, 51 disappearances and 520 cases of torture. His appointment as Vice Minister for Public Security coincided with “a strong resurgence [in such crimes] . . . aimed at prominent civilians and civilian groups.” 
Before the November 1989 murder of the Jesuit priests in El Salvador, Montano was an active participant in trying to publicly discredit the priests, including publicly calling Ignacio Ellacuria, the Jesuit Rector of the University of Central America (UCA) who was one of those murdered, as one “fully identified with subversive movements.”
In November 1989, according to the 1993 report of the Truth Commission for El Salvador, Montano was a member of a “small group of elite officers, one of whom gave the official order to ‘kill Ellacuria and leave no witnesses.” (Later in 1993 the Ad Hoc Commission, which was established by the Peace Accords that ended the Salvadoran civil war, recommended that virtually the entire military command, including Montano, be removed from office.)
After the murder of the Jesuits, Montano aided the cover up of the involvement of the security forces in this crime. He publicly insisted that the FMLN, not the security forces, had committed the crime. Although Montano initially was responsible for investigating the crime, he did not do anything to do so. He also pressured lower level military officers not to disclose the orders to kill Ellacuria and leave no witnesses to the Salvadoran court in charge of investigating the crime. In addition, Montano refused to cooperate with, or be interviewed by, the investigating judge, and in 2000 publicly rejected the claim that he was the indirect author of the murders, rebuked the Jesuits at UCA of “raking up the past” and called the reopening of the case as “orchestrated by the left” as part of “an international leftist plan.”
Moreover, in May 2011, Montano was one of 20 former Salvadoran military officials who were subjects of arrest warrants by a Spanish court investigating the murder of the Jesuit priests, and in December 2011 the Spanish court issued a request to the U.S. for Montano’s extradition to Spain to face trial on those charges.
The 21-month prison sentence was imposed by U.S. District Judge Douglas P. Woodlock.
The Judge noted that the site of the sentencing hearing–the Boston federal courthouse–was named after former U.S. Congressman John Joseph (“Joe”) Moakley, who had lead a congressional investigation of the murders of the Jesuits and whose words from a speech he had given at the site of the Jesuits murders had been engraved on the front of the courthouse: “There is no such thing as half justice. You either have justice or you don’t. You either have a democracy in which everyone–including the powerful–is subject to the rule of law or you don’t.”
Judge Woodlock closed the sentencing hearing by quoting the final summation of Justice Robert Jackson in the 1946 Nuremberg trials of Nazi perpetrators:
“These defendants now ask this Tribunal to say that they are not guilty of planning, executing, or conspiring to commit this long list of crimes and wrongs. They stand before the record of this Trial as bloodstained Gloucester stood by the body of his slain king. He begged of the widow, as they beg of you: ‘Say I slew them not.’ And the Queen replied, ‘Then say they were not slain. But dead they are…’ If you were to say of these men that they are not guilty, it would be as true to say that there has been no war, there are no victims, there has been no crime.”
Judge Woodlock then added, “In El Salvador, “there was a war, there are victims, and there has been a crime.”
 A prior post reported on early developments in the U.S. criminal case against Montano.
 A prior post discussed the actual murders of the Jesuits along with their housekeeper and her daughter while another post reviewed the Truth Commission’s report regarding same.
 The attempted cover up of the Salvadoran military’s planning and commission of the murders was discussed in a prior post while another post reviewed the Salvadoran criminal case about the murders.
 A prior post covered the Spanish court’s arrest warrants; another, developments in that case; and another, the requests for extradition. After Montano’s sentencing, the Center for Justice and Accountability, which backed the case against Montano, said that the U.S. has indicted that it would be amenable to his extradition to Spain after he had served his U.S. sentence.
Three methods of enforcing international human rights norms are found in U.S. laws relating to immigration.
First, certain foreign human rights violators can be deported or removed from the U.S. As section 237(a)(4)(D) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) states: “Any alien . . . in and admitted to the [U.S.] . . . shall . . . be removed if the alien . . . (ii) ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in genocide, as defined in section 1091(a) of title 18, United States Code . . . ; (iii) outside the [U.S.] . . . committed, ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in . . . (I)any act of torture, as defined in section 2340 of title 18, United States Code; or (II) under color of law of any foreign nation, any extrajudicial killing, as defined in section 3(a) of the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (28 U.S.C. 1350 note).” 
This provision of U.S. immigration law currently is being used with respect to former Salvadoran military officers Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova and Jose Guillermo Garcia, who jointly had been held civilly liable for torture in their country by U.S. federal courts under the Alien Tort Statute(ATS) and the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA), but who jointly had escaped similar civil liability under the TVPA for the torture and murder of the four American churchwomen in El Salvador.
These two immigration cases were brought by the Human Rights Violators and War Crimes Center of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (ICE) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), whose mission is to “prevent the admission of foreign war crimes suspects, persecutors and human rights abusers into the [U.S.],” to “identify and prosecute individuals who have been involved and/or responsible for the commission of human rights abuses across the globe” and to “remove, whenever possible, those offenders who are located in the [U.S.].”
Second, certain foreign human rights violators who had gained legal entry or presence in the U.S. can be criminally prosecuted for committing fraud in obtaining a U.S. visa or other immigration benefit (18 U.S.C. § 1546(a)) or committing perjury in statements to U.S. immigration officials (18 U.S.C. § 1621(2)).
This set of provisions currently is being used with respect to another former Salvadoran military officer, Innocente Orlando Montano, who allegedly was involved in various human rights violations in his country, including the November 1989 murder of the six Jesuit priests and their housekeeper and her daughter.
Third, last year the U.S. adopted the so-called Magnitsky Act which bans the issuance of U.S. visas to Russian individuals involved in certain human rights violations, including the detention, abuse or death of Sergei Magnitsky, a Russian lawyer and auditor who died in a Moscow prison in 2009 after investigating fraud involving Russian tax officials.
After an eight-day trial, a U.S. immigration judge on February 22, 2012, issued his 151-page decision on charges by DHS that Casanova, who had been residing in the U.S. since his retirement from the Salvadoran military in 1989, was removable from the U.S. on the grounds that he had committed, ordered, incited, or otherwise participated in torture and extrajudicial killings in El Salvador under the previously cited INA provisions. 
The immigration judge found that Casanova had ” assisted or otherwise participated in (a) “the extrajudicial killings of the four American churchwomen, five other named individuals, 29 unnamed others plus “countless civilians committed by the Salvadoran Armed Forces and Salvadoran National Guard while under [his] . . . command” and (b) “the torture of [Arce]” and “countless unnamed individuals [who had been] tortured by the Salvadoran [security forces] while under [his] . . . command.” Therefore, the immigration judge concluded that Casanova was removable from the U.S. under the previously cited statutory provision.
On August 16, 2012, the Immigration Judge denied Casanova’s application for cancellation of the removal order. The Judge held that the INA barred Casanova from seeking cancellation of removal, that under Board of Immigration (BIA) precedent immigration judges could not apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel against the U.S. Government and that the statutory provision authorizing his removal that was added in 2004 was explicitly made retroactive, thus rendering any contrary international law irrelevant.
On September 17, 2012, Vides Casanova appealed the latter decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals, where it is now pending.
Jose Guillermo Garcia
In October 2009, DHS charged that Garcia, who had been residing in the U.S. since his retirement from the Salvadoran military, was removable from the U.S. under the previously cited INA provisions on the grounds that he had committed, ordered, incited, or otherwise participated in torture and extrajudicial killings in El Salvador.
On February 27, 2013, an immigration judge in Miami, Florida concluded a seven-day trial or hearing on these charges. Closing briefs are due on June 3 and reply briefs by July 5. Thereafter the judge will issue a “timely written decision.”
The trial record consists of nine volumes of documents and the testimony of former U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador, Robert E. White; Dr. Juan Romagoza Arce (a plaintiff in the successful ATS and TVPA case against Garcia and Casanova); Dr. Terry Karl (expert witness); Garcia; and Ana Carolina Montoya (Garcia’s daughter).
Ambassador White testified to his frequent conversations with Garcia from March 1980 to early 1981, when the Ambassador urged Garcia to clean up human rights abuses and hold the perpetrators responsible. Garcia, however, failed and refused to do so even though he had admitted to White that 1% of the military were in the death squads. Garcia had expressed approval of the November 1980 assassination of the leadership of an opposition political party and of the strategy of assassinations as a means of dealing with dissidents.
Arce testified to his abduction in December 1980 and his horrendous torture over 22 days at a military barracks and the National Guard headquarters.
Dr. Karl, a Stanford University political science professor who has studied El Salvador for many years, testified that during the period Garcia was Minister of Defense (October 1979-April 1983) (1) he was the most powerful person, de facto and de jure, in the country; (2) the Salvadoran military engaged in widespread and systematic attacks on civilians; (3) Garcia was in control of the military; (4) Garcia presided over instituting measures of state terror; (5) Garcia’s actions gave a “green light” for human rights abuses; (6) Garcia promoted and protected known human rights abusers and fostered impunity of his fellow officers; and (7) Garcia repeatedly denied human rights abuses were occurring. She also described the widespread and systematic use of torture by the various units of the Salvadoran security forces.
Garcia testified that he did not commit or order any acts of torture or extrajudicial killings. He admitted that he knew there were widespread human rights abuses in the military while he was Minister of Defense; that “was public knowledge” and “can’t be denied.” He, however, had tried to identify and hold the perpetrators accountable, but the available evidence was insufficient to have successful prosecutions.
During questioning by the immigration judge, Garcia repeatedly admitted that he know of torture and other abuses by the military, but that he lacked control. Yes, he said, he did bear responsibility for those abuses, but not culpability.
Innocente Orlando Montano
In February 2012 the federal court in Massachusetts indicted Montano for perjury and lying to U.S. immigration officials in connection with his applications for Temporary Protected Status (TPS) in the U.S. under the previously cited criminal code provisions.
On September 13th he pleaded guilty to three counts of immigration fraud and three counts of perjury as a result of (a) his stating a false date of entry to the U.S. that qualified for TPS instead of his actual date of entry which did not so qualify and (b) his false statements to immigration officials that he had never served in a military unit, had never received military weapons training and had never been involved in persecution of others.
Since then the parties have been exchanging briefs on the appropriate sentence. The Government is recommending one of 51 months while Montano argues that is too long.
The Government’s Sentencing Memorandum of January 8, 2013, makes an interesting and, in my opinion, compelling argument for its recommendation. Here are its main points:
During the Salvadoran civil war, Montano quickly rose to the highest echelon of its security forces, and the forces he commanded were responsible for death squad activities and numerous other human rights abuses. According to expert witness, Dr. Terry Karl, there were at least 1,169 such violations, including 65 extrajudicial killings, 51 disappearances and 520 cases of torture. His appointment as Vice Minister for Public Security coincided with “a strong resurgence [in such crimes] . . . aimed at prominent civilians and civilian groups.”
Before the November 1989 murder of the Jesuit priests, Montano was an active participant in trying to publicly discredit the priests, including his publicly calling Ignacio Ellacuria, the Jesuit Rector of the University of Central America (UCA), as one “fully identified with subversive movements.”
In November 1989, according to the 1993 report of the Truth Commission for El Salvador, Montano was a member of a “small group of elite officers, one of whom gave the official order to ‘kill Ellacuria and leave no witnesses.” (Later in 1993 the Ad Hoc Commission, which was established by the Peace Accords that ended the Salvadoran civil war, recommended that virtually the entire military command, including Montano, be removed from office.)
After the murder of the Jesuits, Montano aided the cover up of the involvement of the security forces in this crime. He publicly insisted that the FMLN, not the security forces, had committed the crime. Although Montano initially was responsible for investigating the crime, he did not do anything to do so. He also pressured lower level military officers not to disclose the orders to kill Ellacuria and leave no witnesses to the Salvadoran court in subsequent charge of investigating the crime. In addition, Montano refused to cooperate with, or be interviewed by, the investigating judge, and in 2000 publicly rejected the claim that he was the indirect author of the murders, rebuked the Jesuits at UCA of “raking up the past” and called the reopening of the case as “orchestrated by the left” as part of “an international leftist plan.”
When Montano left El Salvador for the U.S. in 2001, there was “a great likelihood [he] . . . was motivated, at least in part, . . . [by] fear that he was vulnerable to prosecution for his role in the Jesuit murders.”
A fear of such vulnerability grew out of the arrest in 1998 of Chilean General Pinochet and of his being stripped of his immunity and ordered in 2001 to stand trial in Chile; the 1999 case against an Argentine military officer; a case against a Honduran general; and the June 2001 conviction of a Guatemalan military officer for the extrajudicial execution of a Roman Catholic bishop.
Also supporting such a likely fear was the Salvadoran election of March 2000 which gave the FMLN (the former guerrilla organization) a legislative majority and which immediately thereafter precipitated calls for reopening the Jesuit case from the Rector of UCA and the Archbishop of San Salvador. To the same effect were decisions in 2000 by the country’s courts that its General Amnesty Law could not be applied to human rights violations by public officials while in office and that even though the statute of limitations had run out in the Jesuits case, the writ of amparo could still be used for that crime.
Given the strength of the Government’s justification for the recommended sentence, the lack of any real response from Montano and the skeptical questioning of Montano by the judge, I have little doubt that the judge will find the grounds for removal substantiated by the evidence and order him removed or deported from the U.S.
Magnitsky Act Developments
On April 12, 2013, the Obama Administration issued a list of 18 Russians who were barred from entering the U.S. and whose assets, if any, in the U.S. were frozen, pursuant to this statute. Most were individuals tied to the death of Mr. Magnitsky, but two had been implicated in notorious murders of a Chechen dissident and an American journalist. There were other more highly placed Russian officials on a nonpublic list.
The reaction to the release of this list was mixed. Russian officials, or course, were critical although a Russian legislator said the Obama Administration was taking a “minimalist path” to avoid a deeper crisis before the visit this week to Russia by the Administration’s National Security Advisor, Tom Donilon. Mr. Megnitsky’s U.S. client and major advocate for the Act when it was in Congress, William F. Browder, said, “We’ve just crossed the threshold. This is the end of impunity.” U.S. Senator John McCain, however, said the list was “so damaging” because it was not robust enough and promised new legislation to go after Russian abusers.
The next day (April 13th) Russia retaliated by issuing a list of 18 U.S. citizens who were barred from entering Russia because of their alleged human rights violations. It included two people involved in preparing the so-called “torture memos” –David Addington, Chief of Staff to Vice President Dick Cheney, 2005-2009; and John Yoo, Assistant U.S. Attorney General, 2001-2003–and two who had responsibilities for the operations of the Guantanamo Bay detention facilities– Geoffrey D. Miller, retired U.S.Army Major General, Commandant of Joint Task Force Guantanamo, 2002-2003; and Jeffrey Harbeson, U.S. Navy officer, Commandant of Joint Task Force Guantanamo, 2010-2012. The others on the list were U.S. officials involved in the prosecution and trial of a Russian arms dealer and a Russian pilot allegedly involved in drug trafficking.
Russian officials said the U.S. must realize it cannot conduct its relationship with Russia “in the spirit of mentoring and undisguised diktat.” The statement continued, “Our principled opinion on this unfriendly step is well known: under the pressure of Russophobically inclined U.S. congressmen, a severe blow has been dealt to bilateral relations and mutual confidence. The war of lists is not our choice, but we had no right to leave this open blackmail unanswered.”
These three immigration cases show the interactive nature of the enforcement of international human rights norms. Casanova and Garcia were named as involved in some of the worst human rights abuses in El Salvador by the Truth Commission for El Salvador, and its conclusions were then used by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in cases against the State of El Salvador and by U.S. courts in civil lawsuits under the ATS and the TVPA. All of the results of these proceedings were then used in these three U.S. immigration cases.
Another interactive element in these cases is the competent, sustained efforts of the Center for Justice and Accountability in supporting the successful civil lawsuit against Casanova and Garcia under the ATS and TVPA and pressing ICE’s Human Rights Violators and War Crimes Center to bring these immigration cases. The Center is a California-based human rights organization “dedicated to deterring torture and other severe human rights abuses around the world and advancing the rights of survivors to seek truth, justice and redress.” It “uses litigation to hold perpetrators individually accountable for human rights abuses, develop human rights law, and advance the rule of law in countries transitioning from periods of abuse.”
The Magnitsky Act, in my opinion, is a different matter. I think it was unnecessary because the previously mentioned INA provisions now being used in the Casanova and Garcia immigration cases could be used to deny U.S. visas to the named Russians. I also think it was and is imprudent because it interferes with U.S. relations with Russia and our national interest in trying to obtain Russian assistance on problems with Syria and North Korea, for example. Professor of Russian Studies at NYU, Stephen Cohen, shares the latter view.
Yes, it is true that some of these means of enforcement are weaker than criminal conviction and imprisonment of the violators. Some only involve recommendations to the state (here, El Salvador) by such organizations as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. In this post we are concerned, in part, with orders by a country (here, the U.S.) for a violator to leave the country. But such “weakness” is a necessary consequence of a world essentially structured on the basis of an individual state’s sovereignty. Over time these various mechanisms hopefully will be improved and strengthened.
 Asylum, of course, is another part of immigration law that enforces human rights as covered in other posts. Additional ways of enforcement are discussed in another post.
 This provision about removal of foreign human rights violators was added by section 5501 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 118 Stat. 3638, 3740 (2004). The same language bars such a person from obtaining a visa for legal entry into the U.S. (Id. § 212(a)(3)(E)(ii), (III).)
 The ATS (28 U.S.C.§1350) provides that U.S.”district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the [U.S.].” Many prior posts have discussed this statute and cases thereunder.
 The TVPA (28 U.S.C.§1350 note) provides, “An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation . . . subjects an individual to torture [or extrajudicial killing] shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages . . . .” Many prior posts have discussed this statute and cases thereunder.
 A Spanish court under the principle of universal jurisdiction has charged Montano and other Salvadoran military officers with complicity in the murders of the Jesuit priests and their housekeeper and daughter. The Spanish government has asked the U.S. to extradite Montano and another former officer now living in the U.S. to Spain to stand trial on such charges, but the U.S. apparently has not yet acted upon the request. A similar request to El Salvador for extradition of other former officers has been rejected. A summary of these and other developments in the Jesuits case is available on this blog.
 The complete title of the statute is the Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012. Sections 404 (a) and 405(a) of the Act make ineligible for U.S. visas individuals identified on a subsequent U.S. presidential list of those “responsible for the detention, abuse, or death of . . . Magnitsky, participated in efforts to conceal the legal liability for the detention, abuse, or death of . . . Magnitsky, financially benefitted from the detention, abuse, or death of . . . Magnitsky, or was involved in the criminal conspiracy uncovered by . . . Magnitsky.” That presidential list is also to include a list of individuals “responsible for extrajudicial killings, torture, or other gross violations of internationally recognized human rights committed against individuals seeking–(A) to expose illegal activity carried out by officials of the Government of the Russian Federation; or(B) to obtain, exercise, defend, or promote internationally recognized human rights and freedoms, such as the freedoms of religion, expression, association, and assembly, and the rights to a fair trial and democratic elections, in Russia.”
 A previous post discussed this February 2012 decision. The complete (but redacted) text of the February and August 2012 decisions was only made publicly available in April 2013. A summary of this immigration case is available on the web.
 A summary of this immigration case is available on the web. Previously (January 2009), Garcia had been indicted for visa fraud and making false statements to U.S. immigration officials, but in September 2009 the indictment was dismissed when a government witness recanted her testimony.
In 1998 Westminster Abbey in London opened its gallery of Christian Martyrs of the Twentieth Century. Their 10 statues are set in outside niches above the main entrance. The Abbey did so to proclaim that the 20th century was one of Christian martyrdom greater than in any previous period in the history of the church.
In niche number 6 is the statue of Oscar Romero. He stands between the statues of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the great U.S. civil rights leader and preacher, and Dietrich Bonhoeffer, the German Lutheran pastor and theologian who was executed by the Nazi regime just before the end of World War II for his involvement in a plot to assassinate Adolph Hitler.
The biographical essay about Romero in a book about this gallery of martyrs is by Philip Berryman, an U.S. liberation theologian and leading authority on Christianity in Central and South America.
Berryman was in El Salvador in March 1980 and heard Romero’s famous homily ordering the military to stop the repression. Immediately afterwards, Berryman said he expressed his amazement at Romero’s boldness in saying what the Salvadoran military officers must have thought was treasonous. The next day when Berryman heard that Romero had been shot, he rushed to the hospital only to find out that Romero had died. Shortly after the assassination, he reports that Ignacio Ellacuria, the Rector of the Universidad de Centro America (UCA), celebrated a mass and said that with Archbishop Romero, God had visited El Salvador.
Berryman recounts the familiar story about Romero’s being conservative and soft-spoken when he was appointed Archbishop in early 1977 and being converted to social and political justice after the murder of his friend, Father Rutilio Grande. To the same point, he quotes another friend of Romero, Jesuit priest and liberation theologian at UCA, Jon Sobrino, who said that when Romero gazed “at the mortal remains of Rutilio Grande, the scales fell from his eyes. Rutilio had been right! The kind of pastoral activity, the kind of church, the kind of faith he had advocated had been the right kind after all. . . . [I]f Rutilio had died as Jesus died, if he had shown that greatest of all love, the love required to lay down one’s very life for others–was this not because his life and mission had been like the life and mission of Jesus? . . . Ah then, it had not been Rutilio, but Oscar who had been mistaken! . . . And Archbishop Romero , , , [made] a decision to change.” In short, Grande’s life and death gave Romero a new direction for his life and the strength to pursue it.
Romero, according to Berryman, prepared his homilies in consultation with a team of priests and lay people to review the situation in the country. Then he would write the homily from his notes, the newspapers of the week and the Biblical texts and commentaries. The homilies themselves usually lasted about 45 minutes, mostly devoted to a systematic and thematic reflection on the Biblical texts for the day, but also with Romero’s observations on the human rights violations of the prior week.
Berryman also comments on the strained relationship between Romero and the U.S. government. Early in 1978, for example, Romero met with Terrance Todman, the U.S. Under-Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, who urged Romero to have a less confrontational and more constructive relationship with the Salvadoran government. Romero immediately responded that the U.S. and Rodman did not understand what was happening in El Salvador. “The problem is not between Church and government, it’s between government and people. . . . It’s not the church, much less the archbishop! If the government improved its treatment of the people, we will improve our relations with the government.”
The Anglican Dean of Westminster Abbey came to El Salvador for the 20th anniversary of Romero’s assassination in 2000 and participated in a mass at the El Salvador de Mundo (the Savior of the World) traffic circle lead by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles. I cried during the service when Salvadorans passed the peace to me after all my country had done to support the Salvadoran government during their civil war.
 Andrew Chandler, Christian Martyrs of the Twentieth Century (Westminster Abbey; London 1999); Andrew Chandler (ed.), The Terrible Alternative–Christian Martyrdom in the Twentieth Century (Cassell; London 1998).
Christian Martyrs of the Twentieth Century at 3, 8, 10, 13.
The Terrible Alternative at 159-60. Father Ellacuria, of course, was one of the six Jesuit priests murdered by the Salvadoran military in November 1989. (See Post: International Criminal Justice: The Salvadoran Murders of the Jesuit Priests (June 2, 2011).)
Id. at 160, 164-65; Jon Sobrino, Archbishop Romero: Memories and Reflections at 9-10 (Orbis; Maryknoll, NY 1990); Post: Oscar Romero, A Saint for All People and All Time (Oct. 5, 2011). Jon Sobrino, whom I met at UCA in April 1989, escaped being murdered with his fellow Jesuits in November 1989 because he was lecturing in Southeast Asia. (Jon Sobrino, Ignacio Ellacuria, et al., Companions of Jesus: The Jesuit Martyrs of El Salvador at 4-9 (Orbis Books; Maryknoll, N.Y. 1990).)
As previously noted, a Spanish court on May 30, 2011, issued an indictment and arrest warrants for 20 of El Salvador’s former top military leaders and soldiers, accusing them of crimes against humanity and state terrorism in meticulously planning and carrying out the killings of six Jesuit priests in November 1989.
The Spanish indictment essentially follows the factual findings regarding the murders and the cover-up that was set forth in the Report of the Truth Commission for El Salvador. The indictment, however, offers greater factual details.
The indictment also emphasizes the military’s formal chain of command as well as the informal power of the military’s “Tandona of 1966,” i.e., the military officers who had graduated from the Salvadoran military college in 1966 and who in 1989 held the major positions of official power. In 1989 these officers, the indictment says, feared the proposed reform and restructuring of the military that was being discussed as a condition for a peace agreement to end the civil war. Such reforms would result in reduction in the Tandona’s power and ability to embezzle from U.S. military aid. They, therefore, were bitter opponents of the Jesuits, and especially Father Ellacuria, who were major public advocates for such negotiations. 
The criminal case was filed in November 2008 by a U.S. NGO (Center for Justice & Accountability) and a Spanish NGO against 14 Salvadoran military officers plus former Salvadoran President Cristiani.
In January 2009, the Spanish National Court accepted the case and formally charged the 14 fourteen former officers and soldiers named in the complaint with crimes against humanity and state terrorism for their role in the massacre. Additionally the court reserved the right, during the course of the investigation, to indict Cristiani for his alleged role in covering up the crime.
The May 2011 indictment discusses Crisitani’s attending meetings at the military’s headquarters for several hours immediately before the murders were committed and his providing false information months later about a military search of the UCA campus that preceded the murders. But the Spanish court did not indict Cristiani and did not provide reasons for that decision not to charge Cristiani.
The indictment also mentions that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had an office in the Salvadoran military headquarters in November 1989 and that some U.S. military advisors attended meetings at that headquarters with El Salvador’s top military leaders in the 24 hours preceding the murders. But there is no discussion in the indictment as to whether this involvement carries criminal implications for U.S. personnel.
In addition, the indictment states that in January 1990 one of the U.S. officers (Maj. Eric Buckland) told his U.S. superiors that Colonel Benavides had given the order to kill Father Ellacuria. Until January 2010, the indictment reports, public information about the Salvadoran investigation of this crime had not mentioned possible involvement of the country’s top military officers. Thus, the revelation by Maj. Buckland was explosive in El Salvador because Benavides was a member of the “Tandona of 1966.”
The Center for Justice & Accountabilty of San Francisco, California is a human rights organization dedicated to deterring torture and other severe human rights abuses around the world and advancing the rights of survivors to seek truth, justice and redress. CJA uses litigation to hold perpetrators individually accountable for human rights abuses, develop human rights law and advance the rule of law.
 See Post: International Criminal Justice: Spanish Court Issues Arrest Warrants for Salvadoran Murders of Jesuit Priests (May 31, 2011).
 See Post: International Criminal Justice: The Salvadoran Murders of the Jesuit Priests (June 2, 2011); Post: International Criminal Justice: The Salvadoran Military’s Attempted Cover-Up of Its Committing the Murders of the Jesuit Priests (June 7, 2011); Post: International Criminal Justice: The Jesuits Case in the Truth Commission for El Salvador (June 9, 2011).
 CJA, Criminal Charges Filed before the Spanish National Court for 1989 Massacre of Jesuit Priests in El Salvador (November 13, 2008); CJA, Summary of Complaint in English (Nov. 18, 2009), http://www.cja.org/downloads/Jesuits_Summary_of_Complaint_in_English.pdf. Under Spanish law, citizens and NGOs may initiate criminal proceedings by filing criminal complaints as popular prosecutors.
 CJA, Spanish National Court Indictments and Arrest Warrants (May 30, 2011)(in Spanish), http://www.cja.org/downloads/JesuitsArrestWarrants.pdf. There was a report that a former Salvadoran military officer testified to the Spanish court that Cristiani had advance knowledge of the planned assassinations and approved them. (Tim’s El Salvador Blog, More developments in Jesuits Case in Spain (July 7, 2010).)
 In November 2009 the Spanish court was provided with many declassified U.S. documents relating to the crime from the National Security Archive of George Washington University through the testimony of an analyst from the Archive and the expert testimony of Professor Terry Karl of Stanford University. At the same time, there were newspaper reports that the U.S. military attaché at the U.S. Embassy and a senior State Department official knew in advance that the Salvadoran military was planning to kill Ellacuria. (Id.; The CIA knew that the military of El Salvador would kill Ellacuria, El Mundo (Nov. 15, 2009)(English translation); Doyle, The Right to Information is the Right to Justice: Declassified Documents and the Assassination of the Jesuits in El Salvador (Nov. 16, 2009), http://nsarchive.wordpress.com; Sainz, CIA documents shed light on Jesuit massacre in El Salvador, (Nov.20, 2009), http://www.lapresnsagrafica.com/el-sa…-salvador.html (English translation); CJA, First International Witnesses To Testify in Madrid in the El Salvador Jesuits Massacre Case (Nov. 23, 2009); Ayala, El Salvador: Declassified Docs Shed Light on Jesuits Massacre Case (Nov. 27, 2009), http://ipsnews.net.); Tim’s El Salvador Blog, Spanish Paper–US know of attack on Jesuits in advance, (Nov. 28, 2009), http://luterano.blogspot.com.)
We already have looked at a Spanish court’s recent issuance of 20 criminal arrest warrants regarding the November 1989 murders of six Jesuit priests in El Salvador and the provisional facts of the murders themselves and the Salvadoran military’s attempts to cover up its being the one responsible for the killings. We also have summarized the Salvadoran criminal case regarding this crime. Along the way we have encountered the findings regarding this crime by the Truth Commission for El Salvador and what that Commission was and how it did its work. Yet another facet of this case has been exposed: El Salvador’s General Amnesty Law and its impact on the Jesuits case.
Now we look at the Jesuits case in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), headquartered in Washington, D.C. It receives and analyzes petitions alleging human rights violations under the American Convention [Treaty] on Human Rights. When a petition meets certain conditions of eligibility, the IACHR solicits the views of the concerned State, investigates the violations and issues a report that typically sets forth its findings and conclusions plus recommendations to the State concerned. As of 1993, according to a U.S. bar association, the IACHR “decides few cases, usually after a long delay, and often its decisions are not drafted in a persuasive manner,” and its “decisions receive very little notice, are not cited or relied on in other cases, and are often not obeyed.” 
On the same day the Jesuit priests were murdered (November 16, 1989), Americas Watch, a non-governmental human rights organization, filed a complaint with the IACHR alleging that the Salvadoran government had violated the American Convention [Treaty] on Human Rights with respect to the murder of the Jesuits and their cook and her daughter. Subsequently the government asked for dismissal on the ground that the case had been duly prosecuted in the country.
Ten years later (December 22, 1999), the Commission issued its report making detailed findings about the murder and subsequent events and concluding that the state had violated the American Convention. It found the Truth Commission Report to be credible and placed heavy reliance on it. As a result, the IACHR recommended that the government conduct an expeditious, effective investigation and prosecute and punish those who were involved “without reference to the amnesty,” to make reparations and to render the General Amnesty Law null and void. The IACHR set forth its legal reasoning why that Law was invalid.
Almost another 12 years now have passed since the IACHR’s decision, and still the government of El Salvador has not complied with these recommendations.
In November 2009, however, on the 20th anniversary of the murder of the Jesuit priests, El Salvador at least partially complied with the recommendation for reparations. President Mauricio Funes presented the nation’s highest award (National Order of Jose Matias Delgado) to the Jesuit priests’ relatives as an act of atonement. Finally the Funes’ Administration formally advised the IACHR and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights that the Salvadoran state accepted the binding nature of their past decisions involving the country and the state’s responsibility to implement their recommendations in those cases.
The IACHR has had three other cases that were investigated by the Truth Commission and at least two other cases of human rights abuses during El Salvador’s civil war. In all of these cases the IACHR concluded that the country had violated the American Convention on Human Rights and made recommendations similar to the ones in the Jesuits case. For the most part, El Salvador has not adopted IACHR’s recommendations in these cases.
In January 2010, however, President Funes took steps for compliance with the recommendations to make reparations to the victims of these crimes, including the Jesuits case. President Funes admitted that during the civil war state security forces “committed serious human rights violations and abuses of power,” including “massacres, arbitrary executions, forced disappearances, torture, sexual abuse, arbitrary deprivation of freedom” and other acts of repression. Fuenes also made a formal apology to all of the victims of these crimes and asked for their forgiveness. In addition, Fuenes created three commissions (i) to offer redress to the victims, (ii) to search for children who went missing during the war; and (iii) to provide attention to disabled combatants. (The country’s Vice President, Salvador Sanchez Ceren, simultaneously apologized for the actions of FMLN guerrillas during the civil war.)
 See Post: International Criminal Justice: Spanish Court Issues Criminal Arrest Warrants for Salvadoran Murders of Jesuit Priests (May 31, 2011).
 See Post: International Criminal Justice: The Salvadoran Murders of the Jesuit Priests (June 2, 2011).
 See Post: International Criminal Justice: El Salvador’s Military’s Attempt To Cover-Up Its Committing the Murders of the Jesuit Priests (June 7, 2011).
 See Post: International Criminal Justice: The Salvadoran Criminal Prosecution of the Murders of the Jesuit Priests (June 8, 2011).
 See Post: International Criminal Justice: The Jesuits Case in the Truth Commission for El Salvador (June 9, 2011).
 See Post: International Criminal Justice: El Salvador’s General Amnesty Law and Its Impact on the Jesuits Case (June 11, 2011). A future post will discuss the current Salvadoran controversy regarding the General Amnesty Law and the Constitutional Chamber of the country’s Supreme Court.
 IACHR, What is the IACHR?, http://www.cidh.oas.org/what.htm . (The other human rights body for the Americas is the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which is located in San José, Costa Rica.)
 Comm. on Int’l Human Rights of the Ass’n of Bar of City of N.Y., The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: a Promise Unfulfilled at 3 (1993). The author believes these 1993 conclusions about the IACHR are still valid and invites comments on this topic.
Ignacio Ellacuria, et al. v. El Salvador, Rep. No. 136/99 ¶¶ 1-3 (IACHR Case No. 10.488, Dec. 22, 1999).
 IACHR, Press Release No. 78/09: IACHR Concludes Its 137th Period of Sessions (Nov. 13, 2009); Aleman, El Salvador awards highest honors to 6 Jesuit priests killed by army 20 years ago, Washington Examiner (Nov. 16, 2009).
Monsignor Romero v. El Salvador, Rep. No. 37/00 ¶¶ 1-2 (IACHR Case No. 11.481, April 13, 2000); Admissibility of El Mozote Massacre, Rep. No. 24/06, ¶¶ 1-29 (IACHR Case No. 10.720, Mar. 2, 2006); COMADRES, Rep. No. 13/96, ¶¶ 1-2, 5-7, 28 (IACHR Case No. 10.948, Mar. 1, 1996); Cea, et al. v. El Salvador, Rep. No. 1/99 (IACHR Case No. 10.480 Jan. 27, 1999); Vasquez v. El Salvador, Rep. No. 65/99 (IACHR Case No. 10.228 Apr. 13, 1999).
 Cervantes, Funes pide perdon por abusos durante la Guerra (Jan. 16, 2010),www.elfaro.net/es; IACHR, Press Release NO. 4/10: IACHR Welcomes El Salvador’s Recognition of Responsibility and Apology for Grave Human Rights Violations During the Armed Conflict (Jan. 21, 2010); El Salvador President Apologizes to War Victims, Latin American Herald Tribune (Jan. 22, 2010). The author is not aware of what has happened with these three commissions and invites comments with such information.