U.S. Defense Department – dwkcommentaries

Immense Problems Hampering U.S. Efforts To Resettle Afghans

Since the U.S. evacuation of Afghanistan on August 31, 2021, the U.S. has been engaged in the complicated task of resettling an anticipated 65,000 to 100,000 Afghans in the U.S. Now the U.S. Government is admitting that its initial goal of completing these resettlements by the end of this year cannot be achieved and that it will take through March 2022 if not longer. [1]

Locations of Afghans Evacuated by U.S.

The only somewhat comprehensive accounting of where these people are today that this blogger has been able to find is a Wall Street Journal article vaguely describing Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s October 8 written responses to written questions from Senator James Inhofe (R-Okla.), the ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Here are those approximate numbers:

During August 2021, 124,000 people were evacuated from that country by the U.S., 85% or 105,400 of whom were Afghans.
Approximately 53,000 of these Afghan evacuees were living at eight U.S. military bases in this country; 34% were male adults, 22% were female adults and 44% were children.
Other Afghan evacuees (perhaps 6,000 to 10,000) were at U.S. military installations in Germany, Spain, Italy and Kosovo.
Another 6,000 have been resettled in the U.S.
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates have provided temporary space for screening and vetting by Departments of Defense and State and other federal agencies..

U.S. Immigration Status of Afghan Evacuees.

Humanitarian Parole

Most Afghan evacuees arrive in the U.S. as humanitarian parolees with eligibility to apply for work authorization. Such permits are granted on a case-by-case basis permitting them to stay for two years after appropriate screening and vetting and subject to medical screening and vaccination and reporting requirements. Failure to meet these conditions may be cause for denial of work authorization and potentially termination of the parole and initiation of detention and removal.

Moreover, “humanitarian parolees lack a path to legal U.S. residency and the benefits and services offered to traditional refugees, according to U.S. officials and aid groups working closely with the government.” Instead, “Afghan parolees who have arrived at U.S. military bases will be eligible for an ad hoc State Department program that provides limited assistance for up to 90 days, including a one-time $1,250 stipend. But they will not have the full range of medical, counseling and resettlement services available to immigrants who arrive through the U.S. refugee program.”

Afghan Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs)

Some evacuees may qualify for the Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) by meeting the following requirements:

“Employment in Afghanistan for at least one year between October 7, 2001, and December 31, 2023, by or on behalf of the U.S. government or by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), or a successor mission in a capacity that required the applicant to serve as an interpreter or translator for U.S. military personnel while traveling off-base with U.S. military personnel stationed at ISAF or to perform activities for U.S. military personnel stationed at ISAF; “and
“Have experienced or be experiencing an ongoing threat as a consequence of their employment.”

On October 21, U.S. Senators Inhofe (R-Okla.), Risch (R-Idaho) and Portman (R-Ohio) sent a letter requesting a joint review and audit of the SIV program to the inspectors general of the Departments of State, Defense and Homeland Security and the U.S. Agency for international Development. These Senators contend that in the “chaotic and haphazard U.S. withdrawal” from Afghanistan “thousands of SIV applicants were shamefully left behind,[putting them] at great risk, vulnerable to retaliation from the Taliban due to their association with the [U.S.].”

The same day (October 21), Senator Inhofe stated that a classified briefing on security in Afghanistan confirmed that after the U.S. withdrawal the U.S. “is now less safe” and that the “Taliban can’t—and won’t –do anything to prevent al-Qaeda from training or launching attacks from Afghanistan” and in fact will only “enable al-Qaeda.” These issues will be probed in an upcoming hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Priority 2 (P-2) Designations

Other evacuees may be eligible for Priority 2 (P-2) designation granting U.S. Refugee Admissions Program access for Afghans and their eligible family members by satisfying on of the following conditions;

“Afghans who do not meet the minimum time-in-service for a SIV but who work or worked as employees of contractors, locally-employed staff, interpreters/translators for the U.S. government, U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOXRX-A), International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), or Resolute Support;”
“Afghans who work or worked for a U.S. government-funded program or project in Afghanistan supported through a U.S. government grant or cooperative agreement;” or
“Afghans who are or were employed in Afghanistan by a U.S.-based media organization or non-governmental organization.”

Priority 1 (P-1) Designations

Afghans also could be eligible for “the Priority (P-1) program by virtue of their circumstances and apparent need for resettlement who are referred to the P-1 program . . . by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), a U.S. embassy, or a designated NGO.”

Asylum Applicants

Another option for the parolees is to apply for asylum on proof of “persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Such a claim realistically requires the services of a U.S. attorney knowledgeable about asylum law and procedures, preferably a pro bono attorney who serves without a fee. The current horrible backlog in immigration courts makes this a very challenging undertaking.

Green Card Proposal

On September 7, President Biden submitted to Congress a request for authorization of green cards for Afghan s after a year in the U.S. This was part of a request for $6.4 billion for the Afghan resettlement effort.

Other Practical Problems

Another problem causing delays is an outbreak of measles in the Afghan evacuees that prompted military base officials to carry out a broad vaccination effort against measles, Covid-19 and polio.

Yet another problem causing delays in Afghan resettlement is the current U.S. housing shortage coupled with soaring rents and the resulting reluctance of landlords to take on potential tenants with no existing income or credit scores. Moreover, initially the Afghans had to live within a hundred miles of a resettlement agency, the number of which shrunk as a result of the Trump Administration reducing the number of refugees the us. would accept for resettlement.

Resettling them in places that have sizable existing Afghan communities would make a lot of sense except that many of those places like California and northern Virginia are particularly expensive.

There also have been other practical problems. Some of the living facilities on U.S. military bases at least initially were inadequate in many ways, and warmer clothing for the Afghans was in short supply. In addition, travel for the Afghans from military bases to their final destinations was organized by the International Organization for Migration, a U.N. agency that has been understaffed in the U.S.

Conclusion

The issues presented by resettlement of Afghan evacuees are very complex, and this blogger would greatly appreciate comments correcting or amplifying this post’s discussion.

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[1] U.S. Dep’t Homeland Security, Fact Sheet on Operation Allies Welcome; Friedman, U.S. Housing Market Needs 5.5 Million More Units, Says New report, W.S.J. (June 16, 2021); Parti & Hackman, Biden Administration Proposes Asylum Overhaul to Reduce Backlog, Speed Deportations, W.S.J. (Aug. 18, 2021); Hackman, U.S. Refugee Organizations Race to Prepare for Influx of Afghans, W.S.J. (Aug. 31, 2021); Hackman & Hughes, Biden Administration Seeks New Law to Ease Afghan Refugees‘ Path to Green Cards, W.S.J. (Sept. 8, 2021); U.S. Resettlement of Refugees and Recent Afghan Evacuees, dwkcommentaries.con (Sept. 8, 2021); McBride & iddiqui, U.S. Suspends Flights of Afghans After Four Test Positive for Measles, W.S. J. (Sept. 10, 2021); Parker, Soaring Rents Makes It a Very Good time to Own an Apartment Building, W. S. J. (Sept. 14, 2021); Hackman, Afghan Refugees in the U.S.: How They’re Vetted, Where They’re Going and How to Help, W.S.J. (Sept. 15, 2021); Kesling, A U.S. Military Base Needs to Make 13,000 Afghan Evacuees Feel at Home, W.S.J. (Oct. 1, 2021); George & Mehrdad, Routes out of Afghanistan dwindle as Pakistan cancels flights, Wash. Post (Oct. 14, 2021); Kesling & Hackman, U.S. Afghan Resettlements Slowed by Housing Shortage, Old Technology, W.S.J. (Oct. 17, 2021); Youssef, Almost Half of Afghan Evacuees at U.S.Bases Are Children, Pentagon Says, W.S.J. (Oct. 20, 2021); Sen. Inhofe Press Release, Inhofe, Risch, Portman request Investigation of SIV Program Shortcomings Amid Afghanistan Withdrawal (Oct. 21, 2021); Sen. Inhofe Press Release, Inhofe Statement on Afghanistan Security Briefing (Oct. 21, 2021).

Cuba Reveals Purported U.S. TOP SECRET Document for Overthrow of Venezuela’s Government

On April 30, 2019, Granma, the official newspaper of the Communist Party of Cuba, published a summary with selected quotations of a purported TOP SECRET U.S. plan to overthrow the Venezuelan government issued by the U.S. Southern Command.[1] According to Granma, this plan outlines “[s]teps to speed up the definite overthrow of Chavismo and the expulsion of its representatives.” According to Granma, this “plan” has the following sections: Parts I, II and III and Media Plan, which are set forth below.

This “plan” may have been overtaken by this week’s apparent failure of the attempt by Venezuelan leader Juan Guaidó to oust Maduro from power, which will be discussed in a future post.

“Part I of the Plan”

Part I of this plan, according to Granma, was “implemented before the Venezuelan elections last year, but did not succeed in overthrowing Maduro. It contains the following:

– “Increase internal instability to a critical level, by ‘intensifying the undercapitalization of the country, the leaking out of foreign currency and the deterioration of its monetary base, bringing about the application of new inflationary measures.’”

– “The document suggests exacerbating divisions between members of the government, emphasizing the difference between the population’s living conditions and those of their leaders, and making sure that these are exaggerated.”

– “Fully obstruct imports, and at the same time discouraging potential foreign investors in order to make the situation more critical for the population.”

– “Appeal ‘to domestic allies as well as other people inserted from abroad in the national scenario in order to generate protests, riots and insecurity, plunders, thefts, assaults and highjacking of vessels as well as other means of transportation with the intention of deserting the country in crisis through all borderlands and other possible ways, jeopardizing in such a way the National Security of neighboring frontier nations.’”

– “The plan emphasizes the importance of ‘causing victims’ and ‘holding the Venezuelan government responsible.’”

– “Promote internationally the idea that the country is facing a humanitarian crisis.”

-“ Spread lies about extensive government corruption.”

– “Link the government to drug trafficking to discredit the Maduro administration before the world and among Venezuelan supporters.”

-“ Promote ‘fatigue inside the members of the PSUV (United Socialist Party of Venezuela), inciting annoyance and . . . [disunity?]among themselves, for them to break noisily from the government.’”

-:Design a plan to incite ‘the profuse desertion of the most qualified professionals from the country, to leave it with no professionals at all, which will aggravate even more the internal situation, and along these lines, putting the blame on the government.’”

“Part II of the Plan”

-“’Encourage dissatisfaction with the Maduro regime.’”

– “Highlight ‘the incompetence of mechanisms of integration created by the regimes of Cuba and Venezuela, especially the ALBA and PETROCARIBE, in order to tackle the situation of the country and its inability to find solutions to the problems that citizens are facing.’”

– “One section of the document is entitled: ‘Using the army officers as an alternative of definite solution.’”

– Continue preparing “conditions inside the Armed Forces to carry out a coup d’état before the end of 2018, if the crisis does not make the dictatorship collapse, or the dictator does not decide to move aside.’”

– “Continue ‘setting fire to the common frontier with Colombia, multiplying the traffic of fuel and other goods. The movement of paramilitaries, armed raids, and drug trafficking. Provoking armed incidents with the Venezuelan frontier security forces.’”

– “Recruit ‘paramilitaries, mainly in the campsites of refugees in . . . [three areas of Colombia], areas largely populated by Colombian citizens who emigrated to Venezuela and have returned.’”

“Part III of the Plan”

– “Prepare ‘involvement of allied forces in support of Venezuelan Army officers, or to control the internal crisis.’”

– “Establish ‘a speedy timeline that prevents the Dictator [Maduro] … winning control of the internal scenario.’”

– “Obtain support and cooperation from ‘friendly countries (Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Panama, Guyana).’”

– “Organize ‘provisioning, relief of troops, medical and logistical support from Panama.’”

– “Make ‘good use’ of electronic surveillance and intelligence signals; of hospitals and equipment deployed in Darién (Panamanian jungle), Plan Colombia’s drone equipment, as well as the ‘landing fields’ at the former Howard and Albroock military bases in Panama; as well as those of Río Hato; and the United Nations Humanitarian Regional Center, designed for catastrophe situations and humanitarian emergencies, which has ‘an aerial landing field and its own warehouses.’”

– “Propose ‘moving on the basification of combat airplanes and choppers, armored conveyances, intelligence positions, and special military and logistics units, police, military district attorneys, and prisons.’”

– “Develop ‘the military operation under international flag, patronized by the Conference of American Armies, under the protection of the OAS, and the supervision, in the legal and media context of [OAS] General Secretary Luis Almagro.’”

– “Declare the ‘necessity of the continental command be strengthened to act, using the instrument of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, in order to avoid the democratic rupture.’”

– “’Binding Brazil, Argentina, Colombia and Panama to contribute greater numbers of troops, to make use of their geographic proximity and experience in forest regions.’”

– “Strengthen the ‘international’ nature of the operation ‘with presence of combat units from the United States and the other named countries, under the command of a Joint General Staff led by the USA.’”

– “Promote ‘international participation in this effort, as part of a multilateral operation with contributions from States, Non-profit Organizations, and international bodies. Supplying the adequate logistic, intelligence, surveillance, and control support,’ anticipating as key geographical points . . .[six towns] in Colombia, and . . . [three] in Brazil.”

“Media Plan”

“’Create within the country, via local and international media, the dissemination of messages designed and based on testimony and publications originating in the country, making use of all possible capacity, including social media.’”

– “’Justifying and assuring through violent means the international backup to the deposing of the dictatorship, displaying an extensive dissemination, inside the country and to the entire world, through all open means and the capacities of the psychological war of the U.S. Army.’”

– “Back up and ‘strengthen’ the image of the OAS, as a multilateral institution to resolve regional problems.”

– “Promote ’the request of a dispatch of a UNO military force for the imposition of peace, once Nicolas Maduro’s corrupt dictatorship is defeated.’”

Conclusion

The Granma article says this purported plan was revealed [discovered? pilfered?] by Argentine intellectual Stella Calloni. A simple Google search of her name revealed that she is an 84-year-old Argentine journalist who specializes in Latin American international politics.[2]

That same Google search discovered that on May 17, 2018, Calloni did publish an article about this purported TOP SECRET U.S. document on Voltaire.net.org.[3]

That article by Calloni in turn cited to a publication on that same website of what appears to be an actual copy of a TOP SECRET U.S. document of that title and that date and authored by Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, Commander, U.S. Southern Command.[4]

The U.S. Southern Command, which is located in Doral, Florida,, is one of ten Unified Combatant Commands (CCMDs) in the United States Department of Defense. It is responsible for providing contingency planning, operations, and security cooperation for Central and South America, the Caribbean (except U.S. commonwealths, territories, and possessions), their territorial waters, and for the force protection of U.S. military resources at these locations. USSOUTHCOM is also responsible for ensuring the defense of the Panama Canal and the canal area. According to Its stated mission, it “deters aggression, defeats threats, rapidly responds to crises, and builds regional capacity, working with our allies, partner nations, and U.S. government (USG) team members to enhance security and defend the U.S. homeland and our national interests.”[5]

Admiral Kurt W. Tidd was the Commander of the Southern Command in May 2018 until he retired on November 26, 2018; the current Commander is Admiral Craig L. Faller. [6]

Although the Granma article purports to summarize an actual “TOP SECRET” document, there is no indication in this article or those by Calloni that this “plan” was actually adopted or approved by higher U.S. officials. And, as noted at the start of this post, this apparent “plan” may have been superseded by this week’s apparent failure of an attempt by Venezuelan leader Juan Guaidó to oust Maduro from power, which will be discussed in a future post.

This blog has not compared, line-by-line, Granma’s English translation of the Plan with the apparent English-language original, but Granma’s version does track the apparent original. Nor has this blog attempted to determine whether there was any action on this apparent plan by higher officials in the Department of Defense or other agencies of the U.S. government.

Thus, this purported or apparent U.S. document raises, but does not resolve, disturbing issues.

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[1] U.S. master plan to destroy Bolivarian Venezuela, Granma (April 30, 2019).

[2] Sierra, Calloni, chronicler of our time, Granma; Stella Calloni, Wikipedia; Stella Calloni, EcuRed: Cuban Encyclopedia.

[3] Calloni, The United States “Master Stroke” against Venezuela, Voltaire.net.org (May 17, 2018). The Hong Kong-based Voltaire website says it was founded by French intellectual Thierry Meyssan as a “web of non-aligned press groups dedicated to the analysis of international relations . . . from diversified political, social and cultural backgrounds . . . and does not aim to promote a particular ideology or a world vision, but to hone the critical thinking of its readers . . . [and place] reflection before belief and arguments before convictions.”

[4] Tidd, TOP SECRET: Plan to overthrow the Venezuelan Dictatorship—“Masterstroke,” Voltaire.net.org (Feb, 23, 2018).

[5] U.S. Defense Dep’t, U.S. Southern Command; United States Southern Command, Wikipedia.

[6] U.S. Defense Dep’t, Admiral Kurt W. Tidd; Kurt W. Tidd, Wikipedia; Inter-American Defense Board, Retirement Ceremony for Admiral Kurt W.Tidd and USSOUTHCOM Change of Command Ceremony (Nov. 29, 2018).

Update on Spain’s Case Regarding the Murders of the Jesuits of El Salvador

Spain’s National Court (Audicencia Nacional) since November 2008 has been conducting a criminal case regarding the murders of six Jesuits priests and their housekeeper and her daughter in El Salvador on November 16, 1989. This lead in January 2009 to the Spanish equivalent of indictments of 14 former Salvadoran military officials and soldiers for murder, crimes against humanity and state terrorism. In May 2011 the court added six indictees and issued 20 international arrest warrants. Thereafter in November 2011 Spain issued requests for extradition of these men to Spain to face the charges. [1]

However, in August 2011 El Salvador’s Supreme Court refused to enforce the Interpol arrest warrants for 13 of the indictees who were living in that country and in May 2012 denied the requests for their extradition on the ground that the country’s constitution prohibited extradition of its citizens. Another indictee, Inocente Orlando Montano, had been living in the U.S. and now is in U.S. prison after pleading guilty to lying multiple times to U.S. immigration officials. (One indictee, former Colonel René Emilio Ponce, died during the prior proceedings.)

Just this October the Spanish court’s Criminal Chamber, en banc, decided that the court did have jurisdiction over all of the charges: murder, crimes against humanity and state terrorism.

Last week Almudena Bernabeu, CJA’s International Attorney and Transitional Justice Program Director and the lead private attorney for the prosecution in this case, was in El Salvador to discuss the case in connection with the twenty-fifth anniversary of these horrible crimes. [2]

First, she reported that the case is now at a standstill because none of the suspects is physically present in Spain.

Next year, however, she hopes this will change. In April of 2015, Senor Montano will complete his incarceration in the U.S. [3] By then the U.S. must decide whether it will honor Spain’s request to extradite Montano to Spain.

Although the U.S. is not legally required to consult with El Salvador on this issue, as a matter of inter-state courtesy the U.S. probably would do so, she said. Therefore, Bernabeu has conferred with officials of the Salvadoran government, who have confirmed that there is absolute willingness to collaborate with the Spanish process for the extradition of Mr. Montano from the U.S. Thus, it is important to know that when the U.S. faces the decision whether to extradite Montano, the government of El Salvador has decided not to interfere.

Second, upon such an extradition and Montano’s arrival in Spain, the Spanish case would be re-activated to prepare the case for trial, presumably within 30 days.

Third, if, however, the U.S. deported Montano to El Salvador, the Salvadoran courts probably would refuse to extradite him in light of their prior refusal to extradite to Spain other indictees in the case who are Salvadoran citizens. In that event, the case in Spain could not proceed further.

Fourth, Bernabeu said she unsuccessfully has tried three times to have former Salvadoran President Alfredo Cristiani added as a defendant and indictee because she believes the evidence shows he ultimately was responsible for the crime committed by the military’s High Command and was an accessory to the killing. Indeed, she said that the testimony of two former Salvadoran military officials and documents, including declassified U.S. documents from the CIA, FBI and Department of Defense, show that Cristiani knew of the plan to kill the Jesuits before the murders happened. Whatever the reasons, the Spanish court has been reluctant to join a former foreign president as a defendant. [4]

Fifth, she said El Salvador’s General Amnesty Act of 1993 was a major problem for this case and others like it. This was so even though the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in December 1999 decided in the Jesuits case that the Amnesty Law violated the American Convention on Human Rights and ordered El Salvador to declare it null and void and even though the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in December 2012 in another case (the El Mozote Massacre) ordered El Salvador to repeal the Amnesty Act. [5] That has not yet happened, but the Constitutional Chamber of El Salvador’s Supreme Court sometime soon is expected to rule on the constitutionality of that Act.

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[1] The Spanish court has jurisdiction over the case under Spain’s statute for universal jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of international concern. This statute is an implementation of the international legal principle of universal jurisdiction whereby a state has universal jurisdiction over certain crimes of international concern regardless of where the crime was committed or the nationality of the victim or perpetrator. A detailed summary of the Jesuits case along with some of the court documents and other materials is available on the website of the non-profit Center for Justice and Accountability (CJA) based in San Francisco, California. CJA, the sponsor of the case in Spain. It is an international human rights organization dedicated to deterring torture and other severe human rights abuses around the world and advancing the rights of survivors to seek truth, justice and redress. It uses litigation to hold perpetrators individually accountable for human rights abuses, develop human rights law, and advance the rule of law in countries transitioning from periods of abuse.

[2] This account of Bernabeu’s comments is based upon Castillo, 25 Yrs After El Salvador Priest Killings, Groups Press for Justice, NBC News (Nov. 13, 2014); Labrador & Fatima, The government of El Salvador has decided not to hinder Montano’s extradition to Spain, El Faro (Nov. 14, 2014); Jaminez, Await Extradition of Montano, DiarioCoLatino (Nov. 15, 2014); Dalton, “Cristiani knew at time of slaughter of Jesuits in El Salvador,” El Pais (Nov. 17, 2014). El Faro also recently published (a) a collection of articles from other Salvadoran newspapers evidencing the right’s hatred of the Jesuits before their murders; (b) biographies of the murdered priests, their housekeeper and her daughter and the six Salvadoran military personnel who were prosecuted for the crime in El Salvador (with only two convicted and then subsequently released from prison on the basis of the General Amnesty law); (c) an article describing how that Salvadoran prosecution for this crime was impeded by their attorney general; (d) an archive of U.S. diplomatic cables and other documents about the crime; and (e) a hyperlinked collection of El Faro’s prior articles about the Jesuits case.

[3] The U.S. legal proceedings against Montano are discussed in prior posts and comments: Comment [to “Spain Requests Extradition” post]: Ex-Salvadoran Military Officer [Montano] Indicted for Alleged Violations of U.S. Immigration Laws (Feb. 12, 2012); Comment [to “Spain Requests Extradition” post]: Former Salvadoran Military Officer [Montano] Pleads Guilty to Lying to U.S. Immigration Officials (Sept. 15, 2012); Former Salvadoran Colonel Inocente Orlando Montano To Serve 21 Months in U.S. Prison (Sept. 5, 2013).

[4] On December 16, 2008, the U.S. Embassy in El Salvador sent a cable to the U.S. Secretary of State. It reported that earlier that month senior officials of the Salvadoran government went to Spain and met with its attorney prosecuting the Jesuits case and with other top-level Spanish government officials, who said they were embarrassed about the case’s seeking to add Alfredo Cristiani, El Salvador’s former president, as a defendant. The Spanish prosecutor also promised support and cooperation to the Salvadoran officials.

[5] Yet another post reviewed the decision in the El Mozote Massacre case by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.