U.N. Security Council – Page 3

Ecuador’s Dispute with the United Kingdom and Sweden over Julian Assange: The Inviolability of Ecuador’s Embassy in London

As noted in a prior post, on August 24, 2012, the Organization of American States (OAS) held a full-day Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers at its headquarters in Washington, D.C.

It was called at the request of the government of Ecuador to discuss certain issues in its dispute with the United Kingdom (and Sweden) regarding Julian Assange.[1] The central issue was the “inviolability” of Ecuador’s Embassy in London or its not being subjected to violation or invasion by U.K. officials.[2]

All of the states represented at the meeting, including observers representing the U.K. and Sweden, agreed that such inviolability has been a long-established practice and principle of international law, as expressed in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, to which 187 of the 193 U.N. members are parties. Its Article 22 states:

“1. The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the receiving State may not enter them, except with the consent of the head of the mission.

2.The receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity.

3. The premises of the mission, their furnishings and other property thereon and the means of transport of the mission shall be immune from search, requisition, attachment or execution.”

Mention was also made at the meeting to the strong endorsement of this principle of international law by the International Court of Justice [3] and the U.N. Security Council.[4]

OASEC3 — Ecuador’s Foreign Minister, Ricardo Patino

The Foreign Minister of Ecuador, Ricardo Patino, introduced the draft resolution that reiterated this principle and called for a conclusion that the U.K. had threatened to enter the Ecuadorian Embassy in London and thus violated this principle. The draft resolution also would have the meeting endorse Ecuador’s granting of asylum to Assange.

OASUK2 — U.K. Permanent Observer to OAS, Philip Barton

Toward the end of the meeting, the U.K.’s observer, Philip Barton, responded to Ecuador’s charges. He stressed the U.K.’s “absolute commitment to the principles of the Vienna Convention” and to its “always act[ing] in full compliance with [its] provisions.” He also stated that “at no time has the UK government made any threat against the Embassy of Ecuador.”

On the other hand, Barton implied, there obviously could be situations where the host country (or receiving state) will need to enter the diplomatic premises of other countries. This is alluded to in the obligations imposed on the sending State (here, Ecuador) in Article 41 of the Vienna Convention. That Article states, in part:

“1.Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it is the duty of all persons enjoying such privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving State. They also have a duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State. . . .

3. The premises of the mission must not be used in any manner incompatible with the functions of the mission as laid down in the present Convention or by other rules of general international law or by any special agreements in force between the sending and the receiving State.”

Barton added, “The rights of diplomatic missions conferred by the Vienna Convention comes with responsibilities. Article 41 of the Vienna Convention sets out the obligations of diplomatic missions to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving State [here, the U.K.]. And these include the duty not to impede the due legal process of that State.” Ecuador, however, according to the U.K. observer, had improperly failed to respect U.K. laws and regulations and impeded the due process and legal obligations of the U.K. to extradite Assange to Sweden by the Embassy’s providing refuge to Assange, who was a “fugitive from justice” and thereby denying “the women who have made serious allegations against him the right to have their own voices heard.”

These concerns by the U.K. were echoed by the representatives of Canada, Panama and St. Lucia.

This Vienna Convention and its parallel Vienna Convention on Consular Relations were mentioned in the preamble of the U.K.’s 1987 Diplomatic and Consular Premises Act, one of whose stated purposes was to “give certain [of their]provisions . . . the force of law in the [U.K.].”

Presumably the concerns expressed in Article 41 of the Vienna Convention were behind this U.K. statute, which was referenced in its August 15th communication to Ecuador and which in section 1(3) gives the government the power to withdraw recognition from diplomatic premises and thereby permit police to enter and arrest people on the premises. That section states, in part:

“In no case is land to be regarded as a state’s diplomatic or consular premises for the purposes of any enactment or rule of law unless it has been so accepted or the secretary of state has given that state consent under this section in relation to it; and if —

(a) a state ceases to use land for the purposes of its mission or exclusively for the purposes of a consular post; or
(b) the secretary of state withdraws his acceptance or consent in relation to land, ii thereupon ceases to be diplomatic or consular premises for the purposes of all enactments and rules of law.”

However, the U.K. Act of 1987 goes on to state in section 1(4), “The secretary of state shall only give or withdraw consent or withdraw acceptance if he is satisfied that to do so is permissible under international law,” while section 1(5) states that in deciding whether to withdraw consent, the minister “shall have regard to all material considerations, and in particular, but without prejudice to the generality of this subsection —

(a) to the safety of the public;
(b) to national security; and
(c) to town and country planning.”

These U.K. statutory considerations or limitations were highlighted at the OAS meeting by the representative of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, a former British colony and a self-proclaimed “proud” member of the British Commonwealth of Nations. He said these provisions should bar the U.K. from withdrawing its consent to the presence of the Ecuadorian embassy and thereby permitting entry of British police because there could be no threat by Assange to the U.K. public safety in light of his having been free on bail in the country for a long period of time, because there is no basis for alleging he is a threat to U.K. national security and because there was no issue of U.K. town and country planning. A similar opinion on the non-applicability of this statute to the current situation was expressed in the press by an English attorney.

These provisions of the Vienna Convention and the U.K. statute were the legal framework for the discussion at the OAS meeting as to whether the U.K. in its August 15th letter to Ecuador or otherwise had threatened the inviolability of the Ecuadorian Embassy over its providing refuge to Assange. As mentioned above, Ecuador strongly asserted that there had been such a threat while the U.K. strongly disagreed with support from the U.S., Canada and Panama. The purpose of the meeting, however, was not to make findings of fact and conclusions of law on this and other issues.

Instead, at the conclusion of the meeting, the OAS member states unanimously adopted the following resolution:

“1. To reiterate the full validity of the principles and standards that govern diplomatic relations among states, especially those that concern full respect for the inviolability of the premises of diplomatic missions and consular offices, as recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.
2. To reaffirm that those principles and standards constitute fundamental rules for ensuring the peaceful coexistence of all the countries that comprise the international community.
3. To reiterate the full validity of the principles enshrined in international law, such as respect for sovereignty, faithful compliance with international treaties, peaceful settlement of disputes, peaceful coexistence among states, and rejection of the threat or use of force to settle disputes.
4. To reject any attempt that might put at risk the inviolability of the premises of diplomatic missions, to reiterate the obligation / of all states not to invoke provisions of their domestic law to justify noncompliance with their international obligations, and, in this context, to express its solidarity and support for the Government of the Republic of Ecuador.
5.To urge the Governments of Ecuador and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to continue to engage in dialogue in order to settle their current differences in accordance with international law, taking into account the statements made recently by authorities of both governments.
6. To entrust the Permanent Council [of the OAS]with the due follow-up of this matter.”

In so doing, the meeting refused to adopt other parts of Ecuador’s draft resolution that mentioned and quoted the August 15th U.K. communication and that stated that there had been a threat by the U.K. on the inviolability of the Ecuadorian Embassy in London.[5]

On August 25th (the day after the OAS meeting), Ecuador’s government announced it had received “a communication from the British Foreign Office which said that there was no threat to enter the embassy.” In addition, Ecuador’s President Rafael Correa said in his weekly media address on Saturday, “We consider this unfortunate incident over, after a grave diplomatic error by the British in which they said they would enter our embassy.”

In fact, before, and at, the OAS meeting the U.K. had been reiterating that it had not and was not threatening the inviolability of the Ecuadorian Embassy. Ecuador’s sudden reversal on this issue suggests that all along it intentionally had exaggerated the U.K. August 15th communication in order to make a big splash in the international arena. Now I imagine some of the other Latin American foreign ministries will believe they were hoodwinked by Ecuador into agreeing to the extraordinary OAS meeting and will be more skeptical of any future Ecuadorian cries of alarm.

[1] I watched and listened to most of the live streaming video of this meeting, which is now archived on the OAS website. A press release and articles about the meeting are available in the OAS, the New York Times and the Guardian. The photographs of the meeting in this post are from the OAS website. Under Article 61 of the OAS Charter, such meetings of the foreign ministers are “to be held in order to consider problems of an urgent nature and of common interest to the American States,” and this was only the 27th such meeting in the 64-year history of the OAS.

[2] Also discussed at the meeting was Ecuador’s grant of asylum to Assange, a subject which will be addressed in a subsequent post.

[3] U.S.A. v. Iran, ICJ Reports 1980 3 (I.C.J. May 24, 1980), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/64/6291.pdf.

[4] U.N. Sec. Council Res. 457 (Dec. 4, 1979) (with respect to the Iranian takeover of the U.S. Embassy, the Council reaffirms “the solemn obligation of all States parties to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations . . . to respect the inviolability of diplomatic personnel and the premises of their missions”), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/370/75/IMG/NR037075.pdf?OpenElement; UN Security Council strongly condemns attacks against British Embassy in Tehran, (Nov. 30, 2011), http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90777/7661653.html (Council “condemned in the strongest terms the [Iranian] attacks against [U.K.’s] embassy in Tehran, . . . which resulted in intrusions into diplomatic and consular premises causing serious damage;” the Council emphasized “the fundamental principle of the inviolability of diplomatic and consular premises, and the obligations on host governments, including under the [two Vienna Conventions mentioned here], to take all appropriate steps to protect diplomatic and consular premises against any intrusion or damage”).

[5] The meeting also refused to adopt Ecuador’s draft resolution’s endorsement of Ecuador’s grant of asylum to Assange.

Is the International Criminal Court Flawed?

A July 8th New York Times headline proclaims, “Arab Uprisings Point Up Flaw in Global Court.” It erroneously suggests that the people operating the International Criminal Court are stupid or cowardly or that the diplomats who in 1998 drafted the ICC’s governing treaty, the ICC’s Rome Statute, were similarly stupid or cowardly.

The article starts with the facts that the ICC has not initiated an investigation of human rights abuses in Yemen and Syria. That is lamentable, but it is not due to a flaw in the operations of the ICC or the Rome Statute.

It is due instead to the limitations on the Court’s jurisdiction that were intentionally established in the drafting of the Rome Statute because of opposition of states like the U.S. that did not want the Court commencing investigations or criminal prosecutions against their citizens if the state did not ratify that Statute.

That Statute’s Article 12 provides, in part, that the Court has jurisdiction if certain crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes) are committed on the territory of a state that is a party to the Rome Statute or by nationals of such a state. Neither Yemen nor Syria is such a party, as is true for all other states in the Mideast except Jordan. Thus, the Court does not have jurisdiction of such an investigation or prosecution under Article 12.

The Rome Statute’s Article 13(b) also provides jurisdiction for the Court if the U.N. Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression), refers a situation of suspected crimes of that nature to the ICC even if the state where the conduct occurred or whose nationals are involved had not ratified the Rome Statute. In fact, as the New York Times article points out, the Security Council has twice done so: Sudan (Darfur) and Libya.

However, as most people know, the U.N. Charter that was drafted in 1945 at the end of World War II grants in Article 27(3) a veto on any action by the Council to each of its five permanent members: the U.S., the United Kingdom, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [now Russia] and the Republic of China. The failure of the ICC to undertake any investigation of the Yemen situation is due to a threatened veto by the U.S. of such a referral.

With respect to Syria, the U.S. in June 2011 reportedly was seeking Russian and Chinese support for a Council referral of the situation to the Court, but that was obviously unsuccessful because no such proposal was actually advanced in the Council. In November 2011 four U.S. Senators (Dick Durbin, Benjamin Cardin, Robert Menendez and Barbara Boxer) sent a letter to the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. (Susan Rice) asking for such a Security Council referral. They said, “The people of Syria deserve to know that the people of the United States understand their plight, stand behind them, and will work to bring justice to the country.” Security Council referral of Syria to the ICC also has been endorsed by the New York Times.

The next month (December 2011) the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights urged the Security Council to make such a referral. But nothing happened, again because of threatened vetoes by Russia and China.

If there is any “flaw” in this structure with respect to Yemen and Syria it is the veto right of the five permanent members of the Security Council. Although many, if not most, of the U.N. members that are not permanent Council members dislike the superior status and veto rights of the permanent Council members and voice various suggestions for reform of the Security Council, expert observers of the U.N. do not think that is at all likely in the near future.

In the meantime, 121 of the 192 U.N. members are now parties to the Rome Statute, and the Court’s governing body (its Assembly of States Parties) is working towards its goal of universal ratification of the Rome Statute. If and when that happened, the Court could initiate investigations and prosecutions with respect to all such parties without Security Council action.

Over the last 60-plus years the peoples of the world through their nation-state governments have been struggling to climb out of the pits of depravity of World War II by creating or codifying international norms or human rights and by constructing mechanisms to protect individuals that are beyond the control of their own national governments while such governments still have sovereignty over most aspects of their lives. The creation and operation of the International Criminal Court and other so-called ad hoc international criminal tribunals are important pieces of this effort. This is an inherently difficult process, and many compromises are necessary in order to make any progress. But the story is not finished. Further development, I am confident, will occur.

International Criminal Court: Recent Developments

ICCphotologo — International Criminal Court

There have been significant recent developments at the International Criminal Court (ICC) with respect to Libya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Sudan/Darfur, the Office of the Prosecutor, the campaign to add more States Parties to the Court’s Rome Statute and commentary on one of the Statute’s provisions.

Libya

ICC Report to Security Council. On May 16th the ICC Chief Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, made his semi-annual and last report on the situation in Libya to the U.N. Security Council. This was discussed in a prior post.

Postponement of Surrender of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi. On June 1st the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber decided that Libya may postpones its execution of the Court’s request for the surrender of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi , pending the Court’s final determination of Libya’s challenge to the admissibility of the case.

Libyan Detention of ICC Personnel. On June 6th four ICC staff members arrived in Libya to meet with Mr. Gaddafi to discuss his legal representation before the ICC. They were Melinda Taylor, an attorney who works in the ICC’s office of public defense and who was appointed to act as one of two interim lawyers for Mr. Qaddafi; an interpreter, Helene Assaf, from Lebanon; and Alexander Khodakov, a former Russian diplomat, and Esteban Losilla, a Spanish lawyer, who were sent to find out whether Mr. Qaddafi wanted counsel of his own choosing. Their visit had been agreed to by Libya.

The next day (June 7th), however, the four people were detained by Libyan authorities. The ICC protested their detention and demanded their immediate release.

However, as of June14th they were still being detained. They are accused of bringing a camera disguised as a pen and suspicious documents–letters for Gaddafi from allegedly dangerous people who are supporters of the old regime and a page with drawings that looked like codes. They also had three blank pages that were signed by Mr. Gaddafi. The Libyan authorities say they will not be released until Ms. Taylor answers questions about her dealings with Mr. Gaddafi.

In addition, as of June 14th the Libyan attorney general had said he had decided that Ms. Taylor and Ms. Assaf could be held for up to 45 days awaiting the results of his inquiry into possible “threats to national security.” The other two could leave Libya, but had chosen to stay to support their colleagues. The National Transitional Council has said that it was powerless to release the four individuals or influence the investigation

On June 15th the ICC issued a press release announcing that on the 12th (with the cooperation of Libyan officials) representatives of the ICC had met with the four individuals, who said they were in good health and had been well treated. The press release also made conciliatory comments that the ICC welcomed the Libyan assistance, that the ICC was “very keen to address any regrettable misunderstandings on either side about the delegation’s mandate and activities during its mission in Libya” and that the ICC hoped “the release of the four detained persons will take place with no delay, in the spirit of the cooperation that has existed between the Court and the Libyan authorities.”

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Thomas Lubanga. On June 13th the ICC’s Trial Chamber held its hearing on the sentencing of Mr. Lubanga, who had been found guilty of war crimes regarding child soldiers. The Prosecutor asked for a sentence of 30 years imprisonment because of the seriousness of the crimes and the presence of these aggravating factors: (1) Lubanga as the top leader bears the greatest responsibility for the actions of the UPC militia; (2) his recruitment of children included particularly cruel treatment; (3) girls were recruited as sex slaves and were daily victims of rape by commanders and soldiers; and (4) children needed to be protected against violence and injuries and for their right to education.

Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui. The trial of these two gentlemen recently concluded, and the Trial Chamber’s judgment will be issued in the next several months. An interesting analysis of one of the issues raised in this case has been provided by Jennifer Easterday, a Ph.D. Researcher for the Jus Post Bellum project at the Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies at the University of Leiden in the Netherlands. That issue is whether the Trial Chamber may re-classify a conflict from international to non-international armed conflict or visa versa.

Callixte Mbarushimana. On May 30th, the ICC’s Appeals Chamber unanimously dismissedthe Prosecution’s appeal of the Pre-Trial Chamber’s refusal to confirm charges against Callixte Mbarushimana. The Appeals Chamber found that the Pre-Trial Chamber may evaluate ambiguities, inconsistencies, contradictions or credibility doubts in the evidence in determining whether to confirm charges under article 61 of the Rome Statute. The Appeals Chamber emphasized that “the confirmation of charges hearing exists to ensure that cases and charges go to trial only when justified by sufficient evidence” and that article 61(7) of the Rome Statute requires the Pre-Trial Chamber to evaluate whether the evidence is sufficient to establish substantial grounds to believe the person committed each of the crimes charged.

The Appeals Chamber also rejected the Prosecutor’s contention that under article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute, the contribution of an accused individual must be “significant”, because the alleged error did not materially affect the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber. One of the three appellate judges, however, stated that the Pre-Trial Chamber erred in finding that the contribution to the crimes must be significant under article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute.

An NGO has observed that the decisions in the Callixte case are indicative of a more significant problem regarding gender-based crimes. It asserts that “more than half of all charges for gender-based crimes which reach the confirmation stage are not being successfully confirmed[;] no other category of charges before the ICC faces this level of dismissal and contention.”

Sylvestre Mudacumura. On May 31st the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber unanimously dismissed, in limine (without examining the merits), the Prosecutor’s application for a warrant of arrest against Mr Sylvestre Mudacumura, considering that this application “fell short of the proper level of specificity” in describing the alleged crimes “for which the person’s arrest is sought”. The Chamber said the Prosecutor’s application did not provide “proper counts or any other kind of accompanying description of the specific facts underlying the crimes” and failed to “set out the specific references to the alleged crimes” as requested by the Rome Statute.

On June 13th the ICC Prosecutor submitted an amended application for an arrest warrant against Mr. Mucadumura, for five counts of crimes against humanity (murder, inhumane acts, rape, torture and persecution) and nine counts of war crimes (attack against a civilian population, murder, mutilation, cruel treatment, rape, torture, destruction of property, pillaging and outrage upon personal dignity). The Prosecution said it considers Mr. Mudacumura the Supreme Commander of the FDLR-FOCA, one of the most active militias in the Kivu Provinces of the DRC, and is allegedly responsible for a campaign of violence targeting civilians in these provinces.

Kenya

On May 24th, the ICC’s Appeals Chamber unanimously rejected challenges to the ICC’s jurisdiction in the two Kenyan cases. It said that the interpretation and existence of an ‘organizational policy’ for certain crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute relate to the substantive merits of these cases, not whether the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction. Therefore, the Chamber found that the ICC has subject-matter jurisdiction over the alleged crimes.

Sudan/Darfur

On June the ICC Prosecutor reported on the situation in Sudan/Darfur to the U.N. Security Council. This was discussed in a prior post.

New Chief Prosecutor

On June 15th, Fatou Bousouda, the ICC’s new Chief Prosecutor, officially took office. In her acceptance of this position, she said she was “humbled” by her appointment, and promised to continue pursuing all cases that fall under the court’s jurisdiction. Other major points in her speech were the following:

“The one thing which every one of you can rest assured of is that I will be the Prosecutor of all the 121 States Parties, acting in full independence and impartiality. Justice, real justice, is not a pick‐and‐choose system. To be effective, to be just and to be a real deterrent, the Office of the Prosecutor’s activities and decisions will continue to be based solely on the law and the evidence.”

“Thanks to the tireless efforts and the commitment of Luis Moreno‐Ocampo, [her predecessor, there is now] . . . a well‐respected and sound functioning Office [of the Prosecutor], with almost 300 staff from 80 countries, 7 situations under investigation, 14 cases before the Chambers, 7 preliminary examinations and one verdict.”

“As I speak, massive crimes continue to be committed in Darfur (Sudan); Joseph Kony and the Lord’s Resistance Army’s acts of violence continue unabated in central Africa. . . . In total, 11 arrest warrants remain outstanding. Nothing short of arresting all those against whom warrants have been issued will ensure that justice is done for millions of victims of . . . [their] crimes. . . .”

The Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and a former ICC Deputy Prosecutor, Serge Brammertz, has emphasized the urgent need for the new ICC Chief Prosecutor to have the support of states in arresting the Court’s fugitives. He stressed the need for universal acceptance of the ICC as one way to combat the concern about its current exclusive concentration on African situations. Another of his suggestions for the new ICC Chief Prosecutor was doing more to strengthen national court systems that are capable of handling the crimes that are within the ICC’s jurisdiction under the principle of complementarity.

Because the ICC cannot respond to atrocities the world over, Brammertz says, the U.N. should use the work of international fact-finding and investigatory commissions as bases “for choosing the right follow-up action, whether technical help to the affected country, setting up hybrid national/international structures, or referring the situation to the ICC.” There also needs to be standard procedures for collecting and storing evidence or conducting interviews as well as a permanent operational infrastructure for such commissions.

A columnist for London’s Guardian newspaper suggested the following priorities for the new Prosecutor:

Rebuild ICC relations with Africa. All of the Court’s active investigations and prosecutions come from Africa, and many Africans believe the Court is anti-African. Bensouda, herself an African, should consult more frequently with the African Union and work to restore confidence in the Court.
Prosecute cases in other regions. She should continue pending preliminary _– into Columbia, Afghanistan, Georgia, Honduras and North Korea and seek permission to start an investigation of Syria. She also should work to increase the number of Arab nations that are States Parties.
Restore transparency to the internal and external practices of the ICC. She should create clear and public processes for launching investigations and issuing arrest warrants, particularly in cases where she acts proprio motu – exercising her discretion to launch investigations of her own initiative.
Improve witness protection and investigatory techniques.
Improve investigatory techniques. The ICC needs to avoid over-reliance on NGOs that are not trained in interrogation and evidence gathering.

ICC States Parties

The ICC is engaged in a campaign for universal adoption of its Rome Statute to persuade the remaining 72 U.N. Members that are not States Parties to join the 121 that already have done so. This campaign, it has been suggested, could be strengthened by using the U.N. Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review process to press those 72 members on the subject.

As previously noted, the U.S. in the Obama Administration is now a member of the U.N. Human Rights Council, and its participation is credited with helping to increase international scrutiny of human rights abusers.

Other

Under Article 53 of the Rome Statute, the ICC’s Prosecutor may, in certain circumstances, decline to press charges “in the interests of justice,” and the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) has issued a policy paper on this provision.

Linda M. Keller, Associate Professor at Thomas Jefferson School of Law in San Diego, recently has explored an ongoing debate over whether the OTP should adopt ex ante guidelines for prosecutorial discretion in order to increase transparency and legitimacy, especially with respect to the “interests of justice” provision. She compared this provision of the Rome Statute with a similar provision in New York and concluded that (1) “requiring a written rationale regarding exercise of discretion does not necessarily yield thorough or convincing explanations, undermining arguments that the legitimacy of the ICC will be enhanced by public explanations of prosecutorial discretion; ” (2) “such explanations may backfire when the balancing of nebulous factors leads to apparently inconsistent or arbitrary reasoning and results, which may undercut the credibility of the decision-maker;” and (3) “the lack of a guiding theory to drive the interpretation of ambiguous criteria can lead to more confusion than clarity when there is no agreement on the theoretical justifications for prosecution.”

Dr. Kamari Maxine Clarke, Associate Professor of Anthropology at Yale University and a Research Associate at its Law School, also has written about the “interests of justice” provision in May 18 and 19 posts.

ICC Prosecutor Reports About Sudan/Darfur to the U.N. Security Council

Voting on Iran sanctions — U.N. Security Council

On June 5th the ICC’s Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, gave his semi-annual report to the U.N. Security Council.

He said the Court had “fulfilled its judicial mandate. The evidence collected uncovered the functioning of the State apparatus used to commit genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Those who bear the greatest responsibility have been indicted [Sudanese President al-Bashir, its defense minister, former interior minister and a leader of the Janjaweed militia]. The current challenge is their arrest.”

The Prosecutor added, “President Al Bashir is taking advantage of his position of power to continue with his strategy and to ensure his own impunity and the impunity of those who follow his instructions.” That strategy, the Prosecutor stated, includes:

“threats to the international community to commit new crimes in other areas of the Sudan;
denial of his own crimes, denial of the rapes in the villages and in the camps; attributing the killings to banditry, sporadic clashes between rebel groups, or reducing its relevance through statistic comparisons; and attributing conditions in the camps to other factors like drought, lack of proper seeds or inability to access farming land;
forcing the international community into a never-ending negotiation in order to gain access to those displaced;
a permanent promise of a peace negotiation. The international community chases promises of peace agreements that are systematically ignored while President Bashir’s forces commits more attack and creates the conditions for new promises of peace agreements;
announcements of justice initiatives followed only by new announcements, not by action. After more than seven years of instituting judicial mechanisms, the . . . [government] has conducted no proceedings relevant to the crimes committed in Darfur; and
the open defiance of the Security Council’s authority including public announcement that its resolutions will not be implemented.”

The Prosecutor, therefore, suggested that the Council request all 193 U.N. member states or regional organizations to take action to enforce the arrest warrants.

The Council’s record of the meeting indicates that the Prosecutor’s report was supported by the representatives of the U.S., the U.K., France, Germany Portugal, Colombia, Guatemala and Togo. More qualified support with emphasis on assisting negotiation of peace accords to end the fighting in Sudan/Darfur was expressed by Morocco, South Africa, Pakistan, Azerbaijan, Russia, India and China.

The session ended with a heated exchange between Moreno-Ocampo and the Sudanese Ambassador after earlier he had rejected the Prosecutor’s assertions as “fallacious.”

The Prosecutor said that he was advising the Council and putting the Ambassador on notice that his denial of crimes in Darfur “could be considered part of those crimes” and that the Prosecutor’s office had “an obligation to investigate anyone responsible for the commission of crimes.” Therefore, his office would investigate whether this denial “could be considered a contribution to a group of perpetrators acting with a common purpose” and would take appropriate action if the evidence supports such a contention.

The Sudanese Ambassador responded in Arabic (and translated into English) that this statement was “a violation of all political and diplomatic norms. It is a threat that should be rejected . . . and a statement of a terrorist who is trying to silence the voice of justice and [a statement] of a politician who does not recognize the political and diplomatic rules and norms that give us the right to defend ourselves and make our voices heard by the Council.” The Ambassador added that the Prosecutor “has tackled all of these issues–in a totally illegal, immoral and illogical manner, to the extent of intimidation and terrorization.”

Earlier posts have discussed various aspects of the ICC’s investigation of the Sudan/Darfur situation, including the Security Council’s referral of the Sudan/Darfur situation to the ICC in March 2005 during the George W. Bush Administration and the Prosecutor’s report to the Council in June 2011 with a comment to the latter about the December 2011 report to the Council.

U.N. Security Council Briefing on Libya by ICC Prosecutor

On May 16, 2012, the ICC’s Chief Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, briefed the U.N. Security Council on the status of the ICC’s investigation and prosecution of crimes committed in Libya since February 15, 2011. He did so because the Council on February 26, 2011, had referred this situation to the ICC for investigation and prosecution.

Mr. Moreno-Ocampo reported that his office has been cooperating with states, INTERPOL, NGO’s and others, including the separate U.N. Commission of Inquiry on Libya and the Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC).

The Prosecutor emphasized that the “intensity of the cooperation [between the ICC and the NTC] . . . is only increasing” and that the NTC had asked the ICC to postpone its investigation and prosecution of two individuals to enable Libya to prosecute them for the same crimes. The Prosecutor said that his office was well aware of the “primacy of national proceedings” under the Rome Statute and on June 2nd would submit his comments on the request to the Court.

The report also discussed the Prosecutor’s continuing investigation of gender crimes (rape of opponents), the alleged arbitrary arrests and enforced disappearances of presumed Gaddafi loyalist and the alleged killings, looting, property destruction and forced disappearances of suspected Gaddafi loyalists in the town of Tawergha.

In addition, the Prosecutor stated that his office had investigated alleged crimes by NATO forces, but that it had “no information to conclude that the NATO air strikes which may have resulted in civilian deaths and injury or damaged civilian objects were the result of the intentionally directing of attacks against the civilian population as such or against civilian objects.” Nor did the Prosecutor have any “information to suggest that [NATO] . . . authorized the launching of strikes in the knowledge that such attacks would cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and directed overall military advantage anticipated.”

These conclusions regarding NATO were specifically welcomed by some of the NATO members on the Security Council (U.K., France and Germany). Russia and China, on the other hand, expressed concern that no charges had been brought against NATO leaders for some of their air strikes.

The Togo representative on the Council mentioned the need for greater cooperation between the ICC and African states and hoped that the recent visit to the African Union headquarters by the President of the ICC’s Assembly of States Parties “will enable a strengthening of ties so that the shared goal of combating the impunity of the perpetrators of heinous crime can be met.”

The most recent prior post on the ICC and Libya was on November 16, 2011 with nine comments thereto.

International Criminal Court: Recent Developments in Proposed ICC Investigations

In addition to the seven investigations being conducted by the International Criminal Court (ICC), its Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) conducts preliminary examinations of other situations to determine if an official investigation should be conducted. Four such possible preliminary examinations deserve comment.

Syria. This June there were reports that Syrian opposition and human rights groups had asked the OTP to seek authorization for an investigation into alleged crimes by the Syrian government and that discussions about a possible U.N. Security Council referral of the Syrian situation to the ICC were occurring.[1] Since then the Syrian regime has continued to attack and kill protesters with at least 3,500 protesters killed since the uprising began in March.[2] So far the OTP has not commented on Syria.

Recently four U.S. Senators (Dick Durbin, Benjamin Cardin, Robert Menendez and Barbara Boxer) sent a letter to the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. (Susan Rice) asking for such a Security Council referral. They said, “The people of Syria deserve to know that the people of the United States understand their plight, stand behind them, and will work to bring justice to the country.” The Security Council, the Senators added, should be deeply troubled by the “credible threats to . . . [the] safety” of the U.S. Ambassador to Syria that forced him to leave the country. Security Council referral of Syria to the ICC also has been endorsed by the New York Times.[3]

Palestine. In January 2009, the Palestinian National Authority lodged a declaration with the ICC under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute which allows States not party to the Statute to accept the Court’s jurisdiction. Later (October 2009) representatives of the Authority and the Arab League visited the Court to support the Authority’s ability to delegate its jurisdiction to the ICC.[4]

The OTP will examine issues related to its jurisdiction: first whether the declaration accepting the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court meets statutory requirements; and second whether crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction have been committed. The Office will also consider whether there are national proceedings in relation to alleged crimes. The OTP has not made any determination on the issue, and recently the Prosecutor said that the issue of Palestinian statehood would have to be resolved elsewhere before the OTP issued any kind of statement on this request.[5]

The recent, and so far unsuccessful, efforts of the Authority to obtain U.N. membership for Palestine have heightened interest in the Authority’s seeking an ICC investigation of Israel’s military actions in the Gaza. Being a member of the U.N. would strengthen the Authority’s argument for ICC jurisdiction over alleged crimes committed by Israel in Gaza.[6]

Liberia. Before Liberia’s recent re-election of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf Tubman as its president, the OTP released a public statement that it was monitoring the pre-election activities of all of the candidates and political parties and that “resorting to violence will not be tolerated.”[7]

Roman Catholic Church Officials. In September a U.S. human rights NGO (the Center for Constitutional Rights) and the Survivors Network of Those Abused by Priests filed a complaint with the OTP seeking an investigation of high-level Vatican officials for alleged cover-up of rapes and sexual violence committed by individual priests as a crime against humanity.[8]

This application poses serious questions as to whether the ICC has jurisdiction over such claims, and I anticipate it will take a long time for the OTP to make any public statement about this request. I will be surprised if the OTP decides to seek approval for such an investigation from the Pre-Trial Chamber of the Court.

[1] Post: International Criminal Court: Possible U.N. Security Council Referral of Syrian Human Rights Abuses to ICC (June 6, 2011).

[2] Bakhi & Gladstone, Syria Faces New Threats as Opposition Seeks Allies, N.Y. Times (Nov. 15, 2011).

[3] US senators: Charge Assad before ICC, Google News (Oct. 25, 2011); Editorial, The Killing in Syria Goes On, N.Y. Times (Nov. 16, 2001).

[4] ICC, Palestine, www2.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Office+of+the+Prosecutor; Dunphy, An Interview with Luis Moreno-Ocampo (Oct. 1, 2011), http://amicc.blogspot.com.

[5] Id.; Dunphy, An Interview with Luis Moreno-Ocampo (Oct. 1, 2011), http://amicc.blogspot.com.

[6] Reuters, Committee Is Deadlocked Over Palestinian Membership Bid, N.Y. Times (Nov. 11, 2011); Maccarone, The Palestinian Authority’s Application for United Nations Membership and Its Implications for the International Criminal Court (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.amicc.org/docs/Palestine_and_the_ICC.pdf.

[7] ICC prosecutor “monitoring” Liberia elections, expatica. com (Oct. 14, 2011).

[8] Center for Constitutional Rights, In the Case Against Vatican Officials for Rape and Sexual Violence, We’ve come to the End of the Beginning (Sept. 27, 2011).