Andrew Carnegie’s Quest for Peace

Andrew Carnegie
Andrew Carnegie

 

Andrew Carnegie (November 25, 1835 – August 11, 1919) was a Scottish-American industrialist who led the enormous expansion of the American steel industry in the late 19th century.[1] He also was one of the highest profile philanthropist of his era who had given away almost 90 percent of his large fortune to charities and foundations by the time of his death.[2]

 

Carnegie also was a pacifist at heart, and starting in 1903 devoted significant time and money to promoting peaceful resolution of international disputes, especially by arbitration pursuant to treaties.

Hague Peace Palace
Hague             Peace Palace

He helped to create the Palace of Peace at the Hague in the Netherlands with his 1903 formation of a Dutch foundation and his funding of the Palace’s construction that was completed in 1913. It initially was the site for the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which was established in 1899 and which now is an intergovernmental organization with 115 member states that provides dispute-resolution services for various combinations of states, state entities, intergovernmental organizations, and private parties.[3] From 1922 to 1946 it also was the site for the Permanent Court of International Justice of the League of Nations and since 1946 the International Court of Justice, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations.

Carnegie also funded the construction of the headquarters building for the Pan-American Union (later the main building for the Organization of American States) in Washington, D.C. and the building for the Central American Court of Justice in Costa Rica.

In 1910 he funded the establishment of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, whose trustees were charged to use the fund to “hasten the abolition of international war, the foulest blot upon our civilization.” The Endowment is still operating today with its headquarters in Washington, D.C. Now it describes itself as “a unique global network of policy research centers in Russia, China, Europe, the Middle East, and the [U.S.]. Our mission . . . is to advance the cause of peace through analysis and development of fresh policy ideas and direct engagement and collaboration with decision makers in government, business, and civil society. Working together, our centers bring the inestimable benefit of multiple national viewpoints to bilateral, regional, and global issues.”

Carnegie Hall
Carnegie Hall

Another activity Carnegie organized to promote peace was the April 1907 National Arbitration and Peace Congress at Carnegie Hall in New York City. The Hall, as its name suggests, was another Carnegie-financed project that opened in 1891 in Midtown Manhattan.[4]

The Congress with over 1,200 registered delegates was described as the “greatest gathering ever held in advocacy for the abolition of war as a means of settling national disputes.”

Carnegie himself, of course, gave a major speech at the Congress that in retrospect can be seen as an outline of the United Nations created after World War II. Carnegie said, “[W]e are met to urge the speedy removal of the foulest stain that remains to disgrace humanity, since slavery was abolished—the killing of man by man in battle as a mode of settling international disputes.” He also expressed his support for “the League of Peace idea—the formation of an International Police, never for aggression, always for protection to the peace of the civilized world. . . . “ States should agree “that no nation shall be permitted to disturb the peace.” Before use of the international police, there should be a proclamation of “non-intercourse [“sanctions” in our parlance] with the offending nation.”

President Theodore Roosevelt did not attend the Congress, but sent a letter that embraced its purpose. It said, “[I]t is our bounden duty to work for peace, yet it is even more our duty to work for righteousness and justice.” Moreover, the President stated,“[T]here can be at this time a very large increase in the classes of cases which [could ] . . .be arbitrated, and . . .provision can be made for greater facility and certainty of arbitration. I hope to see adopted a general arbitration treaty.” Roosevelt added that  the Hague court [of Arbitration] should be greatly increased in power and permanency.”

On the other hand, Roosevelt cautioned the delegates to not insist “upon the impossible [and thereby] put off the day when the possible can be accomplished.” “[G]eneral disarmament would do harm and not good if it left the civilized and peace-loving peoples . . . unable to check the other peoples who have no such standards.” Indeed, according to the President, “[T]here are few more mischievous things than the custom of uttering or applauding sentiments which represent mere oratory, and which are not, and cannot be, and have not been, translated from words into deeds.”

The Congress adopted resolutions endorsing international peace and international law; calling for permanency for the Hague Court of Arbitration open to all nations; the adoption of a general international arbitration treaty; the creation of a committee to investigate international disputes and attempt to mediate them before the parties resort to war; the establishment of the neutrality of personal property at sea; and limitations on armaments. [5]

Baron de Constant de Rebecque & Andrew Carnegie
Baron de Constant de Rebecque &     Andrew Carnegie

At the end of the Congress Carnegie was presented with the French Cross of the Legion of Honor by France’s Baron de Constant de Rebecque (nee Paul Henri Benjamin Balluet), a member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration and the 1909 winner of the Nobel Peace Prize. The Baron praised Carnegie for “his interest and energy in behalf of the peace movement” and for being “a good citizen of the whole world.”

According to the New York Times, Europeans were not interested in, or impressed by, this Congress. First, they did not have “a large number of peace propagandists.” Instead their prevailing view was that “universal, permanent peace is a long way off” and that the major issue was the practical one of adopting an agreement on the manner in which wars should be conducted. Second, many Europeans believe that U.S. policies regarding the Western Hemisphere threaten world peace, especially with respect to Germany’s interests in that part of the world. Indeed, The Times of London called Carnegie “an ardent but ill-informed amateur” and had “rushed in where sagacious statesmen fear to tread.” Another European critic said Carnegie should “endow a chair of contemporary history for his own instruction.”

Carnegie Mansion
Carnegie Mansion

Preceding the Congress, Carnegie hosted a large dinner at his beautiful mansion at Fifth Avenue and 91st Street in New York City to celebrate industrial peace in the U.S. and the upcoming Congress. In attendance were 100 “sons of toil” or workers’ representatives; prominent merchants; manufacturers’ executives; bankers; leaders of universities and other educational institutions; church leaders; publishers and editors; lawyers; and railroad executives, including William C. Brown, then Senior Vice President of the New York Central Railroad (and my maternal great-great uncle).[6]

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[1] This post is based in substantial part on Chapter XXIII (“The Quest for Peace, 1901-1910”) in Joseph F. Wall’s Andrew Carnegie (Oxford Univ. Press 1970), which won the 1971 Bancroft Prize for best book about history of the Americas (or diplomacy). Professor Wall was a revered History Professor at my alma mater, Grinnell College, and I was fortunate to have known him and learned from him.

[2] One of Carnegie’s philanthropic endeavors was funding the establishment of public libraries throughout the U.S. and other countries. My mother was the Librarian at the Carnegie Library in Perry, Iowa, and I studied at Grinnell College’s Carnegie Library during my first two student years.

[3] I have had two “contacts” with the Permanent Court of Arbitration. First, a Minnesota company had suggested arbitration of its claim against my client, an Asian manufacturer, under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. Because my client and I did not believe that there was a valid arbitration clause and the claimant had not appointed the first arbitrator, we did not appoint a second arbitrator and then were surprised to receive a letter from the Permanent Court designating an appointing authority to appoint a second arbitrator. There eventually was a three-person arbitration panel that issued an award in favor of my client. Second, I have researched the life and career of Edward Burnham Burling, a fellow Grinnell alumnus (Class of 1890), whose gift funded the College’s library (the Burling Library) that replaced its Carnegie Library. Burling was the co-founder of the eminent Washington, D.C. law firm of Covington & Burling and represented the Kingdom of Norway against the U.S. over expropriation of shipping contracts during World War I with the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 1922 issuing an award in favor of Norway. Writing blog posts about Burling and the Norway case are on my list of future posts.

[4] This account of the Congress is based upon Andrew Carnegie’s Plea for Peace, N. Y. Times (April 7, 1907); Stead Recommends a Peace Pilgrimage, N. Y. Times (April 8, 1907); Frenchmen Arrive for Peace Congress, N. Y. Times (April 9, 1907); Prelude to Peace Congress To-Night, N. Y. Times (April 14, 1907); Women’s Part in Peace, N. Y. Times (April 14, 1907); War Talk Opens Peace Congress, N. Y. Times (April 15, 1907); The Afternoon Session, N. Y. times (April 16, 1907); Editorial, Peace on Earth, N. Y. Times (April 16, 1907); Peace Conference Not All Harmony, N. Y. Times (April 17, 1907); Honor Carnegie Friend of Peace, N. Y. Times (April 17, 1907); Editorial, Peace Congress Resolutions, N. Y. Times (April 18, 1907); Editorial, Peace Congress Sequels, N. Y. Times (April 21, 1907); Europe Is Amused at Peace Congress, N. Y. Times (April 21, 1907); Proceedings of the National Arbitration and Peace Congress, New York, April 14th to 17th, 1907 (1907).

[5] Roosevelt became a hero for Carnegie, but Roosevelt never liked Carnegie.

[6] Unique Party Carnegie Host, N. Y. Times (April 6, 1907). About one week before this special dinner, Carnegie, after a luncheon meeting with President Roosevelt at the White House, made a statement supporting the President’s policies regarding the railroads. The Carnegie Mansion now is the home for the Cooper Hewitt, Smithsonian Design Museum.

United States Ratification of the Genocide Convention

On December 11, 1946, the United Nations General Assembly in its first session unanimously adopted a resolution affirming that “genocide is a crime under international law which the civilized world condemns” and requesting the U.N. Economic and Social Council “to undertake the necessary studies, with a view to drawing up a draft convention [treaty] on the crime of genocide.”

John Maktos
John Maktos

Thereafter that Council established a U.N. Committee on Genocide to prepare a draft of such a treaty. The draft that subsequently was approved by that Committee and other U.N. agencies had been prepared at the U.S. Department of State by a U.S. diplomat, John Maktos, who also served as the Chair of the U.N. Committee.

On December 9, 1948, by unanimous action of the U.N. General Assembly that draft was adopted as the Genocide Convention. Two days later (December 11th) President Harry Truman signed the treaty on behalf of the United States.

President Harry Truman
President Harry Truman

Six months later (June 16, 1949) President Truman transmitted the treaty to the U.S. Senate and requested its advice and consent to ratification. In his transmittal message, President Truman said the General Assembly’s approval of the treaty was “one of the important achievements” of its first session and that the U.S. had played “a leading part” in that accomplishment. The Senate’s approval would demonstrate that the U.S. was “prepared to take effective action on its part to contribute to the establishment of principles of law and justice.”

Such Senate action, however, did not happen until early 1986, and it was not ratified by the U.S. until late 1988 or nearly 40 years after its adoption by the U.N. General Assembly and its signature by the U.S.[1]

Here are some of the highlights or lowlights of the Genocide Convention’s journey to U.S. ratification.

In January and February of 1950 a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on the treaty and favorably reported it to the full Committee in May 1950. The full Committee, however, took no action on the treaty, and it did not reach the Senate floor. For the next 20 years the treaty apparently gathered dust in the files of the Foreign Relations Committee.

President Richard Nixon
President Richard Nixon

That changed on February 19, 1970, when President Richard Nixon reiterated a presidential request for Senate advice and consent to ratification. His message to the Senate stated that the U.S. had “played a leading role in the negotiation” of the treaty and that “ratification at this time . . . would be in the national interest” of the U.S. and would demonstrate “our country’s desire to participate in the building of international order based on law and justice.”

In response to President Nixon’s request, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1970 held hearings on the treaty and favorably reported the treaty to the entire Senate. The latter, however, took no action.

The Foreign Relations Committee did the same in 1971, 1973, 1976 and 1978, but it was not until February 19, 1986, that the Senate voted, 83 to 11, to give its advice and consent to such ratification.[2]   It did so with two reservations that required specific U.S. consent for the submission of any dispute involving the treaty to the International Court of Justice and that stated the supremacy of the U.S. Constitution over any of the treaty’s provisions. The Senate also imposed five understandings limiting the meaning of certain parts of the treaty. Finally the Senate declared that the instrument of U.S. ratification could not be deposited until after the U.S. adopted implementing legislation required by Article V of the treaty.[3]

President Ronald Reagan
President Ronald Reagan

That implementing legislation was adopted on November 4, 1988, with President Ronald Reagan’s signature of the Genocide Implementation Act of 1987, 18 U.S.C. § 1091. That statue makes genocide a crime for offenses committed within the U.S. or by U.S. nationals. The statute imposes punishment of life imprisonment and a fine of not more than $1 million or both for genocide by killing; imprisonment up to 20 years or a fine of not more than $1 million or both for other acts of genocide; and imprisonment up to five years or a fine up to $500,000 or both for incitement of genocide. There is no statute of limitations for these crimes.

When President Reagan signed the statute, he made a public statement that by this signing the U.S. would “bear witness to the past and learn from its awful example, and to make sure that we’re not condemned to relive its crimes. . . . During the Second World War, mankind witnessed the most heinous of crimes: the Holocaust.” Reagan added that he was “delighted to fulfill the promise made by Harry Truman to all the peoples of the world, and especially the Jewish people. I remember what the Holocaust meant to me as I watched the films of the death camps after the Nazi defeat in World War II. Slavs, Gypsies, and others died in the fires, as well. And we’ve seen other horrors this century — in the Ukraine, in Cambodia, in Ethiopia. They only renew our rage and righteous fury, and make this moment all the more significant for me and all Americans.”

Reagan concluded by saying that the “timing of the enactment is particularly fitting, for we’re commemorating a week of remembrance of the Kristallnacht, the infamous ‘night of broken glass,’ which occurred 50 years ago on November 9, 1938. That night, Nazis in Germany and Austria conducted a pogrom against the Jewish people. By the morning of November 10th, scores of Jews were dead, hundreds bleeding, shops and homes in ruins, and synagogues defiled and debased. And that was the night that began the Holocaust, the night that should have alerted the world of the gruesome design of the Final Solution.”

On November 25, 1988 (three weeks after the adoption of that federal statute), President Ronald Reagan deposited notice of U.S. ratification with the U.N. Secretary-General. This constitutes the actual act of ratification.[4]

The 40 year delay between U.S. signing and ratification apparently was the result of many factors. Many Senators were hostile to approving any treaty that might be deemed to infringe on U.S. sovereignty. Some were concerned, especially during the Korean War and the Vietnam War, that U.S. officials might come under frivolous accusations of genocide. Others worried that if the U.S. ratified, it would be obligated to send military forces to distant countries to enforce it. Others felt the Convention’s definition of genocide was unclear. The American Bar Association opposed it through 1977. Some Southern Senators were concerned that genocide charges might result from the region’s history of segregation, lynching, and Ku Klux Klan activities. In addition, although the treaty was not retroactive, some feared it would be used to define the nineteenth century U.S. treatment of Native Americans as genocide.[5]

The Genocide Convention went into force on January 12, 1951, after 20 states had ratified or acceded to the treaty. Today 142 states are parties thereto.

This tale of the belated U.S. ratification of an important multilateral human rights treaty shows the complexity of the negotiation and adoption of such treaties and of their ratification by the U.S.  There is a similar history of the U.S. ratification of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.


[1] See David Weissbrodt, Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Joan Fitzpatrick, Fran Newman, International Human Rights: Law, Policy, and Process at 139-40 (4th ed. LexisNexis 2009).

[2] In January and February 1974 the Senate debated the treaty, but there were insufficient votes to stop debate and proceed to vote on the treaty itself.

[3] I have not had the opportunity to research the original historical record regarding the U.S. and this treaty during these years. I ask anyone who has knowledge of the details of this record, to share that knowledge with a comment to this post.

[4] In accordance with Article 20 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 12 states thereafter objected to or commented unfavorably on the U.S. reservation regarding the supremacy of the U.S. Constitution while three states objected to the U.S. reservation regarding submission of disputes to the International Court of Justice.

[5] Perhaps a more complete analysis of the historical record on the ratification of this treaty can be found in Lawrence LeBlanc, The United States and the Genocide Convention (Durham, NC; Duke Univ. Press 1991). Again I ask anyone who has knowledge of the details of this record, to share that knowledge with a comment to this post.

Ecuador’s Dispute with the United Kingdom and Sweden over Julian Assange: The Inviolability of Ecuador’s Embassy in London

OAS Meeting, 8/24/12

As noted in a prior post, on August 24, 2012, the Organization of American States (OAS) held a full-day Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers at its headquarters in Washington, D.C.

It was called at the request of the government of Ecuador to discuss certain issues in its dispute with the United Kingdom (and Sweden) regarding Julian Assange.[1] The central issue was the “inviolability” of Ecuador’s Embassy in London or its not being subjected to violation or invasion by U.K. officials.[2]

All of the states represented at the meeting, including observers representing the U.K. and Sweden, agreed that such inviolability has been a long-established practice and principle of international law, as expressed in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, to which 187 of the 193 U.N. members are parties. Its Article 22 states:

  • “1. The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the receiving State may not enter them, except with the consent of the head of the mission.
  • 2.The receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity.
  • 3. The premises of the mission, their furnishings and other property thereon and the means of transport of the mission shall be immune from search, requisition, attachment or execution.”

Mention was also made at the meeting to the strong endorsement of this principle of international law by the International Court of Justice [3] and the U.N. Security Council.[4]

Ecuador’s Foreign Minister, Ricardo Patino

The Foreign Minister of Ecuador, Ricardo Patino, introduced the draft resolution that reiterated this principle and called for a conclusion that the U.K. had threatened to enter the Ecuadorian Embassy in London and thus violated this principle. The draft resolution also would have the meeting endorse Ecuador’s granting of asylum to Assange.

U.K. Permanent Observer to OAS, Philip Barton

Toward the end of the meeting, the U.K.’s observer, Philip Barton, responded to Ecuador’s charges. He stressed the U.K.’s “absolute commitment to the principles of the Vienna Convention” and to its “always act[ing] in full compliance with [its] provisions.” He also stated that “at no time has the UK government made any threat against the Embassy of Ecuador.”

On the other hand, Barton implied, there obviously could be situations where the host country (or receiving state) will need to enter the diplomatic premises of other countries. This is alluded to in the obligations imposed on the sending State (here, Ecuador) in Article 41 of the Vienna Convention. That Article states, in part:

  • “1.Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it is the duty of all persons enjoying such privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving State. They also have a duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State. . . .
  • 3. The premises of the mission must not be used in any manner incompatible with the functions of the mission as laid down in the present Convention or by other rules of general international law or by any special agreements in force between the sending and the receiving State.”

Barton added, “The rights of diplomatic missions conferred by the Vienna Convention comes with responsibilities. Article 41 of the Vienna Convention sets out the obligations of diplomatic missions to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving State [here, the U.K.]. And these include the duty not to impede the due legal process of that State.” Ecuador, however, according to the U.K. observer, had improperly failed to respect U.K. laws and regulations and impeded the due process and legal obligations of the U.K. to extradite Assange to Sweden by the Embassy’s providing refuge to Assange, who was a “fugitive from justice” and thereby denying “the women who have made serious allegations against him the right to have their own voices heard.”

These concerns by the U.K. were echoed by the representatives of Canada, Panama and St. Lucia.

This Vienna Convention and its parallel Vienna Convention on Consular Relations were mentioned in the preamble of the U.K.’s 1987 Diplomatic and Consular Premises Act, one of whose stated purposes was to “give certain [of their]provisions . . . the force of law in the [U.K.].”

Presumably the concerns expressed in Article 41 of the Vienna Convention were behind this U.K. statute, which was referenced in its August 15th communication to Ecuador and which in section 1(3) gives the government the power to withdraw recognition from diplomatic premises and thereby permit police to enter and arrest people on the premises. That section states, in part:

  • “In no case is land to be regarded as a state’s diplomatic or consular premises for the purposes of any enactment or rule of law unless it has been so accepted or the secretary of state has given that state consent under this section in relation to it; and if —
  • (a) a state ceases to use land for the purposes of its mission or exclusively for the purposes of a consular post; or
  •  (b) the secretary of state withdraws his acceptance or consent in relation to land, ii thereupon ceases to be diplomatic or consular premises for the purposes of all enactments and rules of law.”

However, the U.K. Act of 1987 goes on to state in section 1(4), “The secretary of state shall only give or withdraw consent or withdraw acceptance if he is satisfied that to do so is permissible under international law,” while section 1(5) states that in deciding whether to withdraw consent, the minister “shall have regard to all material considerations, and in particular, but without prejudice to the generality of this subsection —

  • (a) to the safety of the public;
  • (b) to national security; and
  • (c) to town and country planning.”

These U.K. statutory considerations or limitations were highlighted at the OAS meeting by the representative of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, a former British colony and a self-proclaimed “proud” member of the British Commonwealth of Nations. He said these provisions should bar the U.K. from withdrawing its consent to the presence of the Ecuadorian embassy and thereby permitting entry of British police because there could be no threat by Assange to the U.K. public safety in light of his having been free on bail in the country for a long period of time, because there is no basis for alleging he is a threat to U.K. national security and because there was no issue of U.K. town and country planning. A similar opinion on the non-applicability of this statute to the current situation was expressed in the press by an English attorney.

These provisions of the Vienna Convention and the U.K. statute were the legal framework for the discussion at the OAS meeting as to whether the U.K. in its August 15th letter to Ecuador or otherwise had threatened the inviolability of the Ecuadorian Embassy over its providing refuge to Assange. As mentioned above, Ecuador strongly asserted that there had been such a threat while the U.K. strongly disagreed with support from the U.S., Canada and Panama. The purpose of the meeting, however, was not to make findings of fact and conclusions of law on this and other issues.

Instead, at the conclusion of the meeting, the OAS member states unanimously adopted the following resolution:

  • “1. To reiterate the full validity of the principles and standards that govern diplomatic relations among states, especially those that concern full respect for the inviolability of the premises of diplomatic missions and consular offices, as recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.
  • 2. To reaffirm that those principles and standards constitute fundamental rules for ensuring the peaceful coexistence of all the countries that comprise the international community.
  • 3. To reiterate the full validity of the principles enshrined in international law, such as respect for sovereignty, faithful compliance with international treaties, peaceful settlement of disputes, peaceful coexistence among states, and rejection of the threat or use of force to settle disputes.
  • 4. To reject any attempt that might put at risk the inviolability of the premises of diplomatic missions, to reiterate the obligation / of all states not to invoke provisions of their domestic law to justify noncompliance with their international obligations, and, in this context, to express its solidarity and support for the Government of the Republic of Ecuador.
  • 5.To urge the Governments of Ecuador and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to continue to engage in dialogue in order to settle their current differences in accordance with international law, taking into account the statements made recently by authorities of both governments.
  • 6. To entrust the Permanent Council [of the OAS]with the due follow-up of this matter.”

In so doing, the meeting refused to adopt other parts of Ecuador’s draft resolution that mentioned and quoted the August 15th U.K. communication and that stated that there had been a threat by the U.K. on the inviolability of the Ecuadorian Embassy in London.[5]

Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa

On August 25th (the day after the OAS meeting), Ecuador’s government announced it had received “a communication from the British Foreign Office which said that there was no threat to enter the embassy.” In addition, Ecuador’s President Rafael Correa said in his weekly media address on Saturday, “We consider this unfortunate incident over, after a grave diplomatic error by the British in which they said they would enter our embassy.”

In fact, before, and at, the OAS meeting the U.K. had been reiterating that it had not and was not threatening the inviolability of the Ecuadorian Embassy. Ecuador’s sudden reversal on this issue suggests that all along it intentionally had exaggerated the U.K. August 15th communication in order to make a big splash in the international arena. Now I imagine some of the other Latin American foreign ministries will believe they were hoodwinked by Ecuador into agreeing to the extraordinary OAS meeting and will be more skeptical of any future Ecuadorian cries of alarm.


[1] I watched and listened to most of the live streaming video of this meeting, which is now archived on the OAS website. A press release and articles about the meeting are available in the OAS, the New York Times and the Guardian. The photographs of the meeting in this post are from the OAS website. Under Article 61 of the OAS Charter, such meetings of the foreign ministers are “to be held in order to consider problems of an urgent nature and of common interest to the American States,” and this was only the 27th such meeting in the 64-year history of the OAS.

[2] Also discussed at the meeting was Ecuador’s grant of asylum to Assange, a subject which will be addressed in a subsequent post.

[3] U.S.A. v. Iran, ICJ Reports 1980 3 (I.C.J. May 24, 1980), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/64/6291.pdf.

[4]  U.N. Sec. Council Res. 457 (Dec. 4, 1979) (with respect to the Iranian takeover of the U.S. Embassy, the Council reaffirms “the solemn obligation of all States parties to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations . . . to respect the inviolability of diplomatic personnel and the premises of their missions”), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/370/75/IMG/NR037075.pdf?OpenElement; UN Security Council strongly condemns attacks against British Embassy in Tehran, (Nov. 30, 2011), http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90777/7661653.html (Council “condemned in the strongest terms the [Iranian] attacks against [U.K.’s] embassy in Tehran, . . . which resulted in intrusions into diplomatic and consular premises causing serious damage;” the Council emphasized “the fundamental principle of the inviolability of diplomatic and consular premises, and the obligations on host governments, including under the [two Vienna Conventions mentioned here], to take all appropriate steps to protect diplomatic and consular premises against any intrusion or damage”).

[5] The meeting also refused to adopt Ecuador’s draft resolution’s endorsement of Ecuador’s grant of asylum to Assange.