Tag: Lawyering

International Commercial Dispute Resolution

As previously noted, I have a strong professional preference for mediation and arbitration as methods for resolving disputes between manufacturers and distributors or dealers.[1] This assumes that the parties have tried and failed to resolve their disputes through direct negotiation, which is the least expensive and least time-consuming method and which enhances the possibility of amiable future relationships.

The reasons for preferring negotiation, mediation and arbitration hold as well for commercial disputes between entities in different countries.

  • Mediation (or conciliation as it is called in the international arena) where a neutral third-party assists the disputants in trying to settle their disputes is the first option after negotiation. This was my preferred dispute resolution method because it empowered the parties themselves to settle their disputes, because it opened the way for creative solutions that were not possible in court or in arbitration and because it was the least expensive option.[2]
  • Only if mediation (or conciliation) failed, would such a contractual provision call for submitting the dispute to arbitration under one of several general sets of arbitration rules where the arbitrator resolves the dispute. Arbitration was preferred to court litigation because the former eliminated the expensive pre-trial discovery and other processes of the court and because the parties participated in selecting the arbitrator who was seen as a safer decider than an unknown judge or jury. On the other hand, the costs of international arbitration are significant, especially with three arbitrators from different countries and international travel.[3]

Moreover, there are additional reasons why arbitration is a preferred method for international commercial dispute resolution. First, there is fear of prejudice against the foreigner by a court or jury of another country.  But such fear is less with an arbitrator or arbitrators that the sides help to choose. Second, there is a multilateral treaty that makes arbitration awards (the final decision in an arbitration) easier to enforce in other countries.[4] In contrast, it is more difficult to enforce one country’s courts’ final judgments in other countries. This is very important. For example, an arbitration award or a court judgment might hold the defending corporation (the respondent or defendant) liable to the complaining corporation (claimant or plaintiff) for $1 million for breach of contract, and most of the respondent or defendant’s assets might be in a different country than where the arbitration or litigation took place.

At Faegre & Benson, I frequently drafted dispute resolution provisions for international contracts prepared by other lawyers in the firm. In addition, I was counsel for two foreign companies in international arbitration proceedings under the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).[5] Each of these cases illustrated interesting facets of such proceedings.

Turkish distributor vs. U.S. (Minnesota) manufacturer.

In the first case, I represented the Turkish terminated distributor of medical devices that were manufactured by a Minnesota company. Their written agreement, written by Minnesota lawyers, called for Minnesota law as the governing law and arbitration in Minnesota under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules with three arbitrators and with English as the language of the arbitration.

Under Article 5 of the UNCITRAL Rules there are three arbitrators unless the parties agree to have only one arbitrator. When there are three arbitrators, the claimant (here, the Turkish company) selects the first arbitrator; the respondent (here, the Minnesota company) picks the second; and then these two arbitrators select the third and presiding arbitrator. Although the first two arbitrators are selected by the two parties, the arbitrators are to be independent, not representatives or advocates for the parties that selected them.

My Turkish client and I thus had to go first in selecting an arbitrator. My ideal candidate was a Minnesota lawyer from Turkey who was bilingual in English and Turkish and who knew Turkish business customs and circumstances, but not surprisingly I could not find such a person. I then called the Turkish consulate in Chicago and Embassy in Washington, D.C. for recommendations for such an arbitrator. I eventually found a U.S. (and Turkish) lawyer in New York City who was born in Turkey, who was bilingual and who knew its business customs and circumstances, and the Turkish company appointed him as arbitrator. The Minnesota company then appointed a professor from a Minnesota law school as the second arbitrator. The two of them then appointed a retired chief justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court as the third and presiding arbitrator.

IDS Center, Minneapolis

The hearings were held in a conference room of the Minneapolis office of the presiding arbitrator in the IDS Tower and lasted several days. The Minnesota company was represented by its in-house lawyer and two lawyers from its outside law firm while I was by myself for the Turkish company. (This was a role reversal for me.) The atmosphere was tense in the conference room. The husband of the couple who owned the Turkish company had been an arbitrator in his own country where things were handled much differently, and yet he enjoyed the battle in the Minneapolis conference room. His wife who was also involved in the business and was a witness, however, was appalled by the hostile questioning of the other side’s lawyer.

Several weeks after the hearing, I received in the mail the two-page award of the arbitrators requiring the manufacturer to pay a sum of money to the Turkish company. Thereafter the money was paid, and the case was over. My client and I were very pleased.

Under Article 32(3) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the arbitrators are required to provide a statement of the reasons for their award unless the parties waive this requirement. In this case, the requirement was waived because a relatively small amount money was claimed and because both sides wanted to avoid the expense of paying for the time of the arbitrators to prepare such a statement of reasons.

U.S. (Minnesota) Buyer vs. Asian manufacturer

In the second case, I was counsel for an Asian manufacturer responding to an arbitration claim for over $26 million for breach of contract and other alleged wrongs. The contract at issue had been prepared by a non-lawyer employee of a Minneapolis foreign-trade consulting firm. It had what I regarded as a very inartful arbitration provision. It called for arbitration under the rules of “the United Nations Uniform Commercial Codes,” which do not exist. Nor did it specify where the arbitration should be held or the number of arbitrators or the language of the arbitration.

The Minnesota company first suggested there be only one arbitrator and that a specified retired Minnesota state trial court judge be that sole arbitrator. Although I had experience before that individual when he was a judge and had full confidence in his ability to be a fair arbitrator in this case, my Asian client did not want to have the case decided by one person from Minnesota. Therefore, I told opposing counsel that we did not agree to only one arbitrator.

Nothing more was heard from opposing counsel, and I thought the case had died on the vine. I was greatly surprised, therefore, when I received a letter from the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, Netherlands. The letter said that under Article 7 (2)(b) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, it was the designating authority for appointment of arbitrators when a party defaults in so doing and that the Asian company had defaulted in appointing the second arbitrator. In response, I recited the above history and stated that the Minnesota company had never appointed the first arbitrator and that, therefore, the Asian company had not defaulted. An official at the Permanent Court said I should tell that to the person it was designating as the appointing authority, a barrister in Melbourne, Australia. I reiterated my argument to the barrister to no avail when he appointed the head of an Asian international arbitration center and a former attorney general of that country as the second arbitrator.

Thereafter, these two arbitrators appointed a Danish lawyer from Copenhagen with extensive experience in international commercial arbitration as the third and presiding arbitrator.

On behalf of the Asian company, I filed a motion to dismiss the arbitration as it had never agreed to arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, and the panel set a hearing in Minneapolis on this motion. Several weeks before the hearing, I was startled to receive a letter announcing the resignation of the second arbitrator (the Asian lawyer). My Asian co-counsel and I then immediately appointed a Queen’s Counsel barrister from London as the second arbitrator. (Later I found out that the Asian arbitrator had resigned because his fellow arbitrators refused to authorize him to fly first class (at substantial expense) to Minneapolis for the hearing.)

The hearing on the dismissal motion was held in Minneapolis, and the panel denied the motion. They did so even though their decision recognized that the “United Nations Uniform Commercial Codes” did not exist and under a strict interpretation, the arbitration clause had no effect. Nevertheless, the order concluded that the clause must be understood as referring to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.

At the same time we also had a dispute as to the venue (or “seat”) of the arbitration due to the inartful arbitration clause’s not specifying such; my side argued for Hong Kong; the other side, London; and the arbitrators decided on London. The arbitrators also decided that the language of the arbitration would be English, which was not specified in the clause, but all agreed to English.)

In U.S. trials and arbitrations, witnesses are cross-examined on inconsistencies, real or apparent, between their testimony at the trial or hearing and prior testimony or statements. However, in this arbitration, the panel told the attorneys it was “not necessary during examination or cross-examination of witnesses for them to examine the witnesses on matters already in the written materials.” This was a surprise for me and a problem in preparing good cross-examination questions.

In the Fall of 1997, the hearings on the merits (or the trial) were held in three different cities. Minneapolis was first for the testimony of certain witnesses. I then flew to the Asian city where my client was located for hearings for the testimony of other witnesses. I then returned to Minneapolis for a brief stay, and then it was on to London.

Law Courts, London
St. Paul's Cathedral, London

London was the city for closing arguments. They were held in a conference room of an arbitration center in “legal London,” on the Strand near the Law Courts and the Inns of Court. The attorneys for the Minnesota company went first. Then my Asian co-counsel and I made our arguments.

I prepared for the closing arguments in Faegre & Benson’s London office, which is just several blocks from St. Paul’s Cathedral. Working on a Sunday morning, I could hear the pealing of the Cathedral’s bells and wished that I were in the church, rather than in the office.

Approximately four months later I received the 27-page Award that dismissed all of Claimant’s claims and all of my client’s counterclaims.  One of the key points was the conclusion that the Claimant’s predecessor-in-interest and assignor had waived all claims for breach of contract and that its conduct did not fall within the wording of a non-waiver clause in the contract.

Thereafter Claimant submitted a motion for correction and interpretation of that key point, which my client resisted. On the basis of the papers the panel decided, 2 to 1, that there was no need for any interpretation or correction of the Award. At last, the case was over.

Not surprisingly this was not an inexpensive arbitration. In addition to the fees and expenses of each side’s attorneys, the bill of the three arbitrators for their fees and expenses was $302,000 to be split equally by the two parties.

[1] Post: Resolving Disputes between Manufacturers and Distributors/Dealers (Aug. 9, 2011).

[2] One example of rules for this method of dispute resolution is the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules, which cover all aspects of the conciliation process, providing a model conciliation clause, defining when conciliation is deemed to have commenced and terminated and addressing procedural aspects relating to the appointment and role of conciliators and the general conduct of proceedings. The Rules also address issues such as confidentiality, admissibility of evidence in other proceedings and limits to the right of parties to undertake judicial or arbitral proceedings while the conciliation is in progress. (UNCITRAL, 1980–UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules, http://www.uncitral.org.)

[3] Post: Resolving Disputes between Manufacturers and Distributors/Dealers (Aug. 9, 2011).

[4] The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (also called “the New York Convention” or treaty) now has 146 of the 192 U.N. member states as parties, including China, Korea, Japan, India, Indonesia and other major trading partners of the U.S. The treaty requires courts of contracting States to give effect to an agreement to arbitrate when seized of an action in a matter covered by an arbitration agreement and also to recognize and enforce arbitration awards made in other States, subject to specific limited exceptions. (UNCITRAL, 1958–Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, http://www.uncitral.org.)

[5] The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules cover all aspects of the arbitral process, providing a model arbitration clause, setting out procedural rules regarding the appointment of arbitrators and the conduct of arbitral proceedings and establishing rules in relation to the form, effect and interpretation of the award. (UNCITRAL, 1976–UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, http://www.uncitral.org.)

Resolving Disputes between Manufacturers and Distributors/Dealers

Since at least the last half of the 20th century, manufacturers of consumer goods typically have gotten their products to the end user in the U.S. via independent distributors and dealers or franchisees. Usually the manufacturers are larger companies while the others are smaller entities. They all have a community of interest in promoting the sales of the products at the highest prices with the greatest profits. But there also is a constant tension and friction between them and the potential for disputes. This is at its worst when the manufacturer terminates the distributor or dealer or franchisee.

I frequently was the attorney for the manufacturer in such termination cases. I successfully represented Chrysler Motors Corporation against a terminated Duluth dealer and Benjamin Moore & Company against a terminated St. Paul distributor.[1] I also was able to obtain judicial reduction of adverse results against a manufacturer and a franchisor that had been represented by other counsel.[2] Three of these four cases started in Minnesota’s federal court (Post: Minnesota’s Federal Court (June 28, 2011).

In addition, I helped to settle other such cases. One was for a Canadian manufacturer of snowmobiles. Another, for a U.S. manufacturer of farm equipment. Both of these cases were in Minnesota’s federal court.

Another type of dispute erupted between Chrysler and its Dodge dealer in St. Paul over the planned relocation of another Dodge dealer from East Lake Street in Minneapolis (the automobile row of the early 20th century) to Roseville, a suburb between the Twin Cities. Under a Minnesota statute that sought to protect existing dealers, the St. Paul dealer sued to block the relocation. The trial court, however, decided in favor of Chrysler, and the appellate court affirmed that result.[3]

Because of the costs and risks of such litigation and because of my interest in Alternative Dispute Resolution, I helped other lawyers in the firm draft dispute resolution provisions for various agreements, including distribution agreements.

Often such provisions would first call for mediation where a neutral third-party assists the disputants in trying to settle their disputes. This was my preferred dispute resolution method because it empowered the parties themselves to settle their disputes, because it opened the way for creative solutions that were not possible in court or in arbitration and because it was the least expensive option. Only if mediation failed, would such a contractual provision call for submitting the dispute to arbitration under one of several general sets of arbitration rules where the arbitrator resolves the dispute. Arbitration was preferred to court litigation because the former eliminated the expensive pre-trial discovery and other processes of the latter and because the parties participated in selecting the arbitrator who was seen as a safer decider than an unknown judge or jury.

From the outside these disputes took the form of a large corporation versus a small corporation. But human beings were involved on both sides. The executives of the manufacturer had made decisions they thought were fully justified, and their careers and compensation conceivably could be affected by the resolution of the conflict. The same was true of those on the other side. Moreover, emotions often were intense in such quasi-divorce situations. In one case, the owner of the dealership sued his own lawyer over the settlement of his case against the manufacturer. Later that owner killed his girl friend and was acquitted on the grounds of insanity. I was worried because he might view me as part of the conspiracy against him.

[1] Piccard Motor Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 940 F.2d 1163 (8th Cir. 1991)(held Minnesota statute requiring manufacturer to pay terminated dealer one-year’s fair rental value of facilities did not apply to dealer that owned the facilities); Elvgren Paint Supply Co. v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 948 F.2d 1082 (8th Cir. 1991)(affirmance of summary judgment for manufacturer’s termination of an at-will distributor).

[2] W.K.T. Distributing Co. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 746 F.2d 1333 (8th Cir. 1984)(remand to trial court to reconsider award of $300,000 damages); W.K.T. Distributing Co. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 786 F.2d 898 (8th Cir. 1986)(noting trial court’s reduction of damages from $300,000 to $85,000 after remand, but refusing to make further reduction); Team Central, Inc. v. Teamco, Inc., 271 N.W.2d 914 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1978)(en banc reduction of adverse judgment from $2,550,000 to $1,500,000).

[3] Wilkins Dodge, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 426 N.W.2d 903 (Minn. Ct. App.), pet. for review denied (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1988).

The Personal Jurisdiction Requirement for Civil Lawsuits in U.S. Courts

A certain connection between a defendant and the geographical jurisdiction of a court is necessary in order for a civil lawsuit to proceed in the U.S.

This connection exists, for instance, if an individual defendant is served with a summons and complaint while he is in the geographical jurisdiction of the court or if the defendant waives the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction. Similarly there is clearly personal jurisdiction when an individual defendant is a resident of the geographical jurisdiction of the court or a defendant corporation or other business entity was organized under the laws of that jurisdiction or is “doing business” there.

U.S. Supreme Court Building

In addition, there is personal jurisdiction if the defendant has sufficient “minimum contacts” with the forum state, such that summoning the defendant to the forum state would not offend “‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” This is the U.S. Supreme Court’s articulation of the requirement under the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court also has said that a defendant’s “minimum contacts” with the forum must be more than “random,” “fortuitous,” or “attenuated.” Sufficient contacts exist when “the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum . . . are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” In assessing the defendant’s reasonable anticipation, there must be “ ‘some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum . . ., thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.’ ”[1]

This test is the same whether the defendant is from another state in the U.S. or from a foreign country. However, as the United States Supreme Court has stated, “ ‘Great care and reserve should be exercised when extending our notions of personal jurisdiction into the international field.’ ”[2]

Thus, any defense lawyer in a civil case immediately must determine whether personal jurisdiction obviously is established or whether there is a legitimate basis to challenge this requirement by asserting the defense in the answer to the complaint or by moving to dismiss the case before anything else happens.[3]

As a civil litigator, I encountered this issue all the time in my practice. In two cases for foreign clients I obtained dismissal of the complaint for lack of such jurisdiction at the start of the cases.

Fraser Bridge, Delta, B.C., Canada

In one case, my client was a Canadian corporation from Delta, British Columbia that was a subcontractor to a company from the State of Washington that had an agreement with a Twin Cities FM-radio station to provide certain electronic equipment for the station. The equipment was manufactured by the Canadian company and sold to the Washington company that in turn sold it to the radio station. The equipment allegedly did not work properly so the station sued the Canadian company in a Minnesota state court. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and the appellate court affirmed. The latter emphasized that the Canadian company never had an office, owned property or filed tax returns in Minnesota, had never had a mailing address or telephone number in this State, and did not negotiate any agreement with the radio station. While the Canadian company, upon request, shipped the equipment directly to the station in Minnesota and later sent a technician to the state to attempt to fix the equipment, hand delivered a part for the equipment to the station and mailed certain drawings of the equipment directly to the station for use by its consultant, these contacts were insufficient to justify jurisdiction.[4]

Singapore skyline

In the other case, my clients were parent and subsidiary companies from Singapore. Again the trial court (Post: Minnesota’s Federal Court (June 28, 2011) dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction, and the appellate court affirmed. The latter court noted that the Singapore subsidiary had sent numerous letters and faxes and made several telephone calls to Minnesota in connection with the contract and that the contract contained a Minnesota choice-of-law provision. In addition, the Singapore subsidiary sent four samples of the product in question to Minnesota. These, however, the court held to be insufficient to justify personal jurisdiction.[5]

The appellate court in this second case concluded by saying that the negotiations, meetings, production, and delivery were all centered in Singapore. The contacts with Minnesota appeared at best as inconsequential rather than substantial under these circumstances. The Singapore subsidiary did not create a substantial connection between itself and Minnesota, it merely engaged in negotiations with a purchaser who happened to reside in Minnesota. Given the nature and quality of the Singapore subsidiary’s  contacts with Minnesota, traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice indicated that it would not expect to litigate in the State of Minnesota.[6]

The personal jurisdiction issue is part of the regular tool kit of the trial lawyer and litigator. Yet it is built on the constitutional bedrock of fair play.

[3] E.g., Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 (c ), 12(b)(2).

[4]  KSTP-FM, LLC v. Adtronics Signs, Ltd., 602 N.W.2d 919 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).

[5] Digi-Tel Holdings, Inc. v. Proteq Communications, Inc., 89 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 1996).

[6]  Id.

Ted Turner’s Superstation in the Crosshairs

Ted Turner

In 1969 Ted Turner, the now famous media mogul, bought a defunct Atlanta UHF (Ultra High Frequency) television station and put it back on the air as WTCG. As an over-the-air station, it also was microwave-linked to many cable companies in the Southeastern U.S. In December 1976, however, Turner through his company (Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.) decided to offer his station nationwide via satellite to all cable companies. By 1978 it was on cable systems in all 50 states and became known as a “superstation.”[1]

The company that carried the station’s signal to the satellite was Southern Satellite Systems, Inc.  under a license from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Initially Southern Satellite received the signal over the air by a UHF receiving antenna and then retransmitted it to a satellite transponder leased from RCA. The satellite transponder in turn relayed the signal down to cable systems’ receiving antennae on earth, and those systems retransmitted the signal by wire to cable customers.

In March 1979, pursuant to FCC permission, Southern Satellite began to receive the WTBS signal by direct microwave connection, instead of off the air except when the former was not operating. Under this approach, WTBS was able to send local commercials over the air in Atlanta and national commercials via the microwave connection to Southern Satellite.

WTBS’ programming included old movies like the classic “Casablanca” with Humphrey Bogart and Ingrid Bergman and old syndicated television programs like “The Bob Newhart Show” and “I Dream of Jennie,” under licensing agreements, exclusive to the Atlanta area, with the owners of the copyrights.

This “superstation” operation was challenged by Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., a Minnesota corporation headquartered in Minneapolis. It owned television broadcast stations in Minneapolis/St. Paul, Tampa/St. Petersburg, Florida and Albuquerque, New Mexico that had exclusive copyright licenses for “Casablanca,” “The Bob Newhart Show” and “I Dream of Jennie.” All three of these Hubbard stations were in areas reached by the satellite-carried signal of WTBS.

The case, which was filed in Minnesota’s federal court,[2] alleged that Southern Satellite and Turner Broadcasting had violated the copyrights on these programs that had been licensed to Hubbard. The key issue for these claims was whether Southern Satellite qualified for the common carrier exemption in section 111 of the Copyright Act of 1976. This exemption existed for carriers that acted merely as a conduit between the distant broadcast station and the interested cable systems. I served as the principal lawyer for Southern Satellite in this case.

The Minnesota district court eventually concluded that Southern Satellite did qualify for this exemption and, therefore, granted its motion for summary judgment without a trial. The appellate court affirmed this decision.[3]

During the pre-trial discovery phase of the case, Hubbard’s attorneys took the deposition of Ted Turner in Atlanta. This was during the 1982 NFL players’ strike when Turner Broadcasting joined others in arranging games by substitute players. These substitute games were not well attended or watched on tv on the first weekend, and Turner was busy at his company making arrangements for the second weekend of such games.[4] At his request because of the press of business, his deposition was held at his company’s headquarters.

His regular outside counsel in Atlanta told me before the deposition that Turner was a tobacco chewer, and some of his depositions in other cases were shorter than anticipated because the female lawyers asking the questions were grossed out by his tobacco chewing and spitting his expectorate into a paper cup during the deposition. (This, however, was not a problem for Hubbard’s attorney.)

Ted Turner sailing

After the deposition, I joined Turner and his lawyer in Ted’s office to review the just completed deposition. I noticed the many sailing trophies in the room. (In 1977 he was the captain of the yacht that won the America’s Cup, was Yachtsman of the Year four times and recently was elected to the National Sailing Hall of Fame.[5])

This obviously was a very important case for both sides and was vigorously contested at the trial court, court of appeals and Supreme Court levels. Throughout it all, however, I had a thoroughly professional relationship with Hubbard’s attorneys, Sidney Barrows, Byron Starns and Patricia Schaffer of the Minneapolis firm of Leonard Street and Deinard. As noted elsewhere, unfortunately this was not always true in my career of lawyering.[6]

I, therefore, came to believe that is was important for attorneys publicly to acknowledge when lawyers live up to the best of the profession. Accordingly at the conclusion of this case’s hearing on cross motions for summary judgment at the district court, I told the court, “I would like to express my appreciation to Sidney Barrows and to Byron Starns and their law firm as well as John McDonough [Hubbard’s in-house lawyer]. This has been a lawsuit in which the adversaries have dealt very harshly with one another in terms of the legal issues, but in terms of professional relationships it has been great. I appreciate that.” Mr. Barrows responded, “It is in line with what Your Honor said in another argument about our being a noble profession.” The Judge said, “I sense that too and I appreciate it.”[7]

[1] Wikipedia, TBS (TV channel), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TBS_(TV_channel); Wikipedia, Ted Turner, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ted_Turner; Ted Turner Enterprises, http://www.tedturner.com/home.asp. In 1979 Turner renamed the station “WTBS” and branded it “Super Station WTBS,” and in 1981 he developed an electronic system to feed local ads over-the-air in Atlanta and national ads via satellite. There were other subsequent name changes. In 1987 it became “Super Station TBS;” in 1989, “TBS Superstation;” and in 1990, just “TBS.”

[2] Post: Minnesota’s Federal Court (June 28, 2011).

[3] Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. Southern Satellite Systems, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 808 (D. Minn. 2004), aff’d, 777 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 643 (1986), reh’g denied, 107 S. Ct. 964 (1987).

[4]  Farnsworth, NFL crossed the line on Replacement Sunday, Seattle Post-Intelligencer (Oct. 2, 1982), http://www.seattlepi.com/news/article/NFL-crossed-the-line-on-Replacement-Sunday-1097669.php.

[5] ajc, Turner in sailing hall (Aug. 2, 2011), http://www.ajc.com/news/ted-turner-in-sailing-1069456.html.

[6] Post: Ruminations on Lawyering (April 20, 2011).

[7] Transcript of Hearing, Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. Southern Satellite Systems, Inc., No. 3-81-Civil-330 (D. Minn. June 21, 1984.)

U.S. Litigation over a Russian Real Estate Project

Moscow, Russia

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, many U.S. businesses sought new opportunities in Russia.

One was Ellerbe Becket Construction Services, Inc. (Ellerbe), a Minneapolis-based firm that offered architectural, engineering and construction management services. To assist them in this effort, it hired Nicholas Loukianoff, a Russian-American citizen who was bilingual in English and Russian.

One of the potential projects for Ellerbe was a Korea-Russia Trade Center in Moscow, and Ellerbe asked Loukianoff to help find a site in Moscow for such a building. However, the potential Korean client decided not to proceed, and the building was not built.

Nevertheless, Mr. Loukianoff’s company sued Ellerbe in federal court in San Francisco, California for damages under various legal theories. I was the principal lawyer for Ellerbe in this case.

During the pre-trial discovery, I took the deposition of Mr. Loukianoff’s expert witness, a newly minted Russian real estate agent. I did so by telephone from my office in Minneapolis to Ellerbe’s Moscow office with the English-Russian interpreter in Moscow. During the course of my examination, I asked him something like, “Private real estate transactions in Russia have only been happening in the last several years, right?” He did not agree with that statement and mentioned Russia’s sale of Alaska to the U.S. in 1867. That comment still makes me chuckle.

Several weeks before the trial was scheduled to start in January 1999, the court granted Ellerbe’s motion for summary judgment on three of plaintiff’s claims. Thus, the only claims left for trial were breach of contract and quantum meruit (reasonable value of services).[1]

At the start of the trial, the court granted other Ellerbe motions to exclude certain plaintiff’s evidence at trial, including a new damage theory (1% of the total built-out cost of the Center that was never built).[2] As a result, the potential value of plaintiff’s case collapsed, and the case immediately settled with a very modest payment by Ellerbe.

I still wish that I had obtained a trip to Moscow for this case.

[1] Memorandum Decision & Order, NAL Associates, Inc. v. Ellerbe Becket Construction Services, Inc., No. C-97-0997 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 1999).

[2] Order , NAL Associates, Inc. v. Ellerbe Becket Construction Services, Inc., No. C-97-0997 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 1999).

The Lutheran Pastor at the 1973 Siege of Wounded Knee

Wounded Knee, SD, 1973
Wounded Knee, SD, 1973

In February 1973, leaders and members of the American Indian Movement (AIM) and others occupied the town of Wounded Knee, South Dakota to protest the administration of a tribal chairman and the alleged U.S. failure to honor its treaties with the American Indian nations. They controlled the town for 71 days while U.S. government law enforcement, including FBI agents, surrounded the town. The two sides exchanged gunfire daily, and people on both sides were killed.[1]

In May 1973, AIM leaders invited Rev. Paul Boe of the American Lutheran Church (ALC) to visit them at Wounded Knee for religious counseling.[2] Boe had an established relationship with them as a result of the ALC’s ministry to American Indians under his leadership. Indeed, AIM had been formed with ALC financial assistance at Rev. Boe’s urging; he then was the Executive Director of its Division of Social Services.[3]

Thereafter a South Dakota grand jury conducted an investigation as to what happened during the siege. Rev. Boe was subpoenaed by the grand jury. He was not asked to divulge any confessions he received at Wounded Knee, but he was asked about what he saw. He answered those questions he deemed did not violate any confidences. But he refused to answer questions as to whom he saw carrying guns on the ground that it would require him to betray confidential communications.[4]

As a result, the federal district court held Rev. Boe in civil contempt of court and ordered him to be confined in jail until he decided to answer the questions. The latter order was stayed or postponed while he appealed the contempt finding to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.[5]

This is where I entered the drama with David E. Engdahl[6] as the lawyers to prepare an amici curiae (friends of the court) brief supporting Rev. Boe’s appeal of the contempt citation. The 11 amici were the ALC, the National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., the United States Catholic Conference, the Lutheran Church in America, the United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., the Right Rev. John E. Hines (Presiding Bishop of the Episcopal Church), the Center for Social Action of the United Church of Christ, the Board of Church and Society of the United Methodist Church, Msgr. John Egan (Executive Director of the Catholic Committee on Urban Ministry), the Department of Church and Society of the Division of Homeland Ministries of The Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) and the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod.[7]

The Amici Brief asserted two arguments. First, the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment religion clauses fobid compelling a clergyman to answer questions concerning communications and incident observations which his church requires him to keep confidential. Second, a clergyman has a federal common law privilege to refuse to disclose to a federal grand jury his confidential professional communications with his others and his observations incident thereto.[8]

On January 16, 1974, the Eighth Circuit reversed the judgment of contempt on the ground that Rev. Boe was denied due process requirements of notice and a meaningful opportunity to present his defense. The court said nothing about the issues raised by the amici curiae.[9]

Afterward two AIM leaders, Dennis Banks and Russell Means, were indicted on charges related to the events, but their 1974 case was dismissed by the federal court for prosecutorial misconduct, a decision upheld on appeal.[10]

[1] Wikipedia, Wounded Knee Incident, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wounded_Knee_incident.

[2] Reverend Boe (1915-1990) was a social activist who was instrumental in opening discussion about Native American issues in the ALC and with the American public. Boe’s position regarding AIM made him an unpopular figure in the ALC, and he resigned from the church in 1974 and traveled the country with his “Why Wounded Knee?” lecture series. (Center for Western Studies, Paul Boe Collection, http://www.augie.edu/cws/PaulBoespeech.html.

[3] Brief of the ALC, et al., Amici Curiae at 14-15, U.S. v. Boe (8th Cir. Jan. 9, 1974)[“Amici Brief”].

[4] Kelley, Tell All or Go to Jail: A Dilemma for the Clergy, Christian Century at 96 (Jan. 30, 1974).

[5] Id.

[6] At the time Mr. Engdahl was a professor at the University of Colorado Law School. Now he is a professor at Seattle University School of Law. (Seattle Univ. School of Law, David Engdahl, http://www.law.seattleu.edu/Faculty/Faculty_Profiles/David_Engdahl.xml.)

[7]  Amici Brief.

[8] Id. at 10-38.

[9] U.S. v. Boe, 491 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1974).

[10] Wikipedia, Wounded Knee Incident, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wounded_Knee_incident.

Buying Banks and Selling Hot Dogs Are the Same Under the Law

Federal Reserve Building, Washington, D.C.

In the early 1970’s the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the Board) approved the acquisition of two Iowa (Bettendorf and Keokuk) banks by Minneapolis-based Northwest Bancorporation (Northwest).[1]

At the time, federal law provided that no acquisition of a state bank by an out-of-state bank holding company was permissible unless such an acquisition was “specifically authorized by the statute laws of the State in which . . . [the acquired] bank is located.”[2] An Iowa statute at the time generally barred out-of-state bank holding company acquisitions of Iowa banks “unless such bank holding company was on January 1, 1971, registered with the federal reserve board as a bank holding company, and on that date owned at least two banks in [Iowa].”[3] This is what is colloquially called a “grandfather clause,” and at the time Northwest was the only out-of-state bank holding company owned or controlled any Iowa banks and thus was the only person covered by this grandfather clause.[4]

The Board’s approval was contested and challenged by the Iowa Independent Bankers Corporation (Iowa Bankers), an association of over 400 Iowa banks on various grounds. The key ground was the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Iowa Bankers argued that the Iowa statute violated equal protection by creating two classes of out-of-state bank holding companies: (a) those owning one or no Iowa banks and (b) those owning two or more Iowa banks with Northwest being the only such holding company in the latter class.[5]

The Board in approving the acquisitions declined to rule on this constitutional objection. It said that only the judiciary could do so.[6] Thus, the Iowa Bankers petitioned the appropriate federal court of appeals in Washington, D.C. to set aside the Board’s approval on this and other grounds.

Faegre & Benson was the regular outside general counsel for Northwest, and I was designated as the Faegre lawyer responsible for defending the Board’s approval of the acquisitions. With the help of others at the law firm, I wrote the appellate brief for Northwest and argued the case before the appellate court.

U.S. Courthouse, Washington, D.C.

In February 1975, the appellate court unanimously affirmed the Board’s approval of the acquisitions and dismissed the petition by the Iowa Bankers.

On the Equal Protection issue, the court stated that as the Iowa statute did not create a suspect classification or impinge upon fundamental rights, the court’s review was limited to determining whether the statute had a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. The appropriate classes under the statute, said the court, were those holding companies not owning any Iowa banks and those that already did. More importantly, the court concluded it was “perfectly rational for the Iowa legislature to determine that Northwest . . .  [had] a pre-existing stake in the Iowa banking system and [had] . . . proven itself to be a positive force in the system [and] should be allowed to compete on the same basis as other Iowa banks . . . .” Likewise it was rational for the Iowa legislature, according to the court, to decide that Iowa would not be well served if other out-of-state holding companies “were allowed wholesale entry into the Iowa market.”[7]

Jackson Square, French Quarter, New Orleans
French Quarter, New Orleans

At the same time as the Northwest litigation, the same legal issue was presented to the U.S. Supreme Court. In City of New Orleans v. Duke, a New Orleans ordinance banned pushcart vendors in the French Quarter except for those who already had done so continuously for over eight years with only two such vendors (one hot dogs; the other, ice cream) qualifying under that grandfather clause.[8] The Supreme Court held that the ordinance was constitutional. It stated, “When local economic regulation is challenged solely as violating the Equal Protection Clause, this Court consistently defers to legislative determinations as to the desirability of particular statutory discriminations.” Such regulations are valid, according to the Court, so long as their classifications are “rationally related to a legitimate state interest. States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.” Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that the “record makes abundantly clear that the . . .  ordinance, including the ‘grandfather provision,’ is solely an economic regulation aimed at enhancing the vital role of the French Quarter’s tourist-oriented charm in the economy of New Orleans.”[9]

That is why I say buying banks is the same as selling hot dogs under the law.

[1] Iowa Independent Bankers v. Board of Governors, 511 F.2d 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 875 (1976). Northwest Bancorporation in 1983 changed its name to Norwest Corporation, which in 1998 was merged into Wells Fargo & Company of San Francisco.

[2] 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d).

[3] Iowa Code Ann. § 524.1805.

[4] 511 F.2d at 1291-92.

[5] Id. at 1292, 1294.

[6] Id. at 1292-93.

[7] Id. at 1294-96.

[8] City of New Orleans v. Duke,  472 U.S. 297 (1976).

[9] Id.

[10] Iowa Independent Bankers v. Federal Reserve Board, 423 U.S. 875 (1975).

Minneapolis Police’s Pretextual Arrests of Political Dissidents in 1970

Early 1970 was a turbulent time in the U.S. We were still in the Viet Nam War in the Nixon Presidency. On February 18th a Chicago jury found the “Chicago Seven” guilty of conspiring to incite a riot at the 1968 Democratic National Convention. On March 6th a bomb being constructed by members of the Weathermen political dissenters group for use at an upcoming military dance exploded in Manhattan, killing three members of the group. On March 17th the U.S. Army charged Lieutenant Calley and other officers of suppressing information related to the 1968 My Lai massacre in Viet Nam. On April 29th the U.S. invaded Cambodia to hunt out the Viet Cong, sparking antiwar protests throughout the U.S. On May 4th four students at Kent State University in Ohio were killed and nine others wounded by Ohio National Guardsmen at a protest against the Cambodian incursion (only 10 days later (May 14th) two other students were killed and 12 injured at antiwar demonstrations at Jackson State University in Mississippi). On May 9th an estimated 100,000 marched on the Pentagon to protest the war and the killings at Kent State.[1]

These protests also touched Minnesota. On May 9th there was a large crowd that marched from the University of Minnesota (UM) campus in Minneapolis to the State Capitol Building in St. Paul. There also was a student strike at the UM.[2]

David Lykken

At the same time, a Minneapolis fundraiser was being planned by “People Against Missiles,” an ad hoc group, for Saturday night, May 9th, at the south Minneapolis home of Professor David Lykken, a noted UM behavioral geneticist and professor of psychology and psychiatry.[3] The fundraiser sought to raise money to send people to North Dakota to protest a proposed antiballistic missile installation. It was publicized by mailing postcards to people on local peace organizations’ mailing lists, by including notices in newsletters of several organizations and by distributing flyers primarily at the UM. The flyer stated that there would be “donations and cash bar.”[4]

Two days before the fundraiser, a Minneapolis policeman saw the flyer and took it to a meeting with the head of the Department’s Morals Squad. Since selling liquor without a license was a violation of a city ordinance, the Department head instructed two other policemen to “handle it in the usual manner,” which meant sending an officer to the gathering undercover and attempting to purchase some liquor.[5]

On the night of May 9th, 20 or so middle-aged adults attended the fundraiser. They were quiet, mainly engaging in small-group conversation about the antiballistic missile system, protesting the system, and current political issues, including the protest march earlier that day at the UM. Some had coffee and soda; others, beer. No one had wine or hard liquor. There was a basket for donations; another for “Donations, Beer 50 cents, Pop 25 cents.”[6]

Around 10:00 p.m. two police officers, under cover, came to the fundraiser. One of them had a beer and left a marked $5 bill in the basket and later 50 cents for another beer. He stayed for about an hour and engaged in conversation about the missile system and the activities of “People Against Missiles.”[7]

He and the other undercover policemen left the house for a nearby meeting with another officer of the Morals Squad and others from the Tactical Squad. They then made a plan for arresting the people at the professor’s home.[8]

Around midnight 10 to 20 uniformed officers descended on the house, arrested everyone and took them all (except the professor’s wife and their young son) downtown to Police headquarters where they were charged with being in a disorderly house and the professor with operating a disorderly house and selling liquor without a license; they also were fingerprinted, photographed and then released.[9]

One of the Police leaders conducted a search of the house and seized beer (and wine and hard liquor that was not available at the event) as well as every piece of paper in sight on the first floor of the house, including People Against Missiles and other anti-war literature.[10]

Later all of the criminal charges were dismissed by the local court, and another lawyer (Bill Kampf[11]) and I volunteered to be the pro bono (no fee) lawyers on behalf of the Minnesota Civil Liberties Union[12] for those who had been arrested in a lawsuit for damages against the policemen who were involved for violation of their constitutional rights. We did just that with a complaint by the 20 people who had been arrested against the 20 or so policemen and other officials who had been involved.[13]  The case was filed in Minnesota’s federal court.[14]

During the course of pretrial discovery, I obtained what turned out to be critical evidence in the Police files. These documents indicated that immediately after the arrests the Police leader of the raid called the local office of the FBI to report the identity of the arrestees and the political nature of the seized documents. Some, for example, mentioned the Socialist Workers Party.[15]

Eventually Bill Kampf and I tried the case to the court without a jury. U.S. District Judge Philip Neville[16] conducted the trial and concluded that three of the policemen were liable to the 20 plaintiffs for $11,500 compensatory damages plus $7,500 punitive damages. As the court stated, these three policemen “instigated, planned, and directed the raid [with two of them] . . . actually effecting the arrests. They had first-hand knowledge of the true nature of the gathering . . . and were the only ones who effectively might have and should have prevented the raid. . . . Their decision . . . not only evidences bad judgment . . ., but more importantly displays a callous disregard for the constitutional rights of other who may have been of different political persuasion. Such activity . . . will not be tolerated. . . .”[17]

In concluding that the three policemen had violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional protection under the U.S. Constitution’s  Fourth Amendment’s ban on unreasonable searches and seizures, the court stated, “the arrests . . . were improperly motivated, undertaken not in furtherance of good faith law enforcement but for the purpose of harassing those at the gathering because of their political beliefs.” Under all the circumstances, the “police could only have been motivated by a desire to harass the guests at the fundraiser, and/or attempt to set an example for others who might stage antiwar gatherings.” Important in that regard was the evidence of the lead Policeman’s immediately calling the FBI about the political documents that were seized.[18]

After the judgment was entered against the three policemen, the Minneapolis City Council voted to pay the judgment on behalf of the three, a decision that was upheld by the Minnesota Supreme Court in a taxpayer’s lawsuit.[19]

This case shows how the U.S. political passions of 1970 affected a city in the middle of the country. It also illustrates the importance of lawyers willing to defend civil liberties on a pro bono basis and of a strong, independent judiciary.

[2] Lykken v. Vavreck, 366 F. Supp. 586, 588 (D. Minn. 1973. I found copyrighted photos of the large May 9th crowd in front of the Minnesota Capitol under the heading Minnesota State Capitol Demonstrations at http://www.flickr.com/photos/minnesotahistoricalsociety.

[3] Obituary, David Lykken, U of M psychology professor, StarTribune (Sept. 20, 2006).

[4]366 F. Supp at 587.

[5] Id. at 588.

[6] Id.

[7] Id. at 588-89.

[8] Id. at 589.

[9] Id.

[10] Id. at 590.

[11] Lerner, Attorney W. Kampf dies; was expert on bankruptcy, StarTribune (Sept. 18, 2005). As Bill and I worked on the case together, we became friends and often joked that we brought our different skills to make a good team. I was organized, methodical and persistent, and Bill was more instinctive and risk-taking.

[12] The Minnesota Civil Liberties Union was an affiliate of the American Civil Liberties Union and is now known as the American Civil Liberties Union of Minnesota, http://www.aclu-mn.org.

[13] 366 F. Supp. at 587, 590.

[14] See Post: Minnesota’s Federal Court (June 28, 2011).

[15] 366 F. Supp. at 590; Minnesota Historical Society, Socialist Workers Party: Minnesota Section (Box 2), http://www.mnhs.org/library/findaids/00632.xml; Minnesota Historical Society, Minnesota Civil Liberties Union (Box 23), http://www.mnhs.org/library/findaids/00497.xml.

[16] Judge Neville also was in charge of the consolidated pretrial proceedings in the private IBM antitrust cases. (See Post: The IBM Antitrust Litigation (July 30, 2011).)

[17] 366 F. Supp. at 599.

[18] Id. at 593.

[19] Douglas v. City of Minneapolis, 304 Minn. 259, 230 N.W.2d 577 (1975).

The IBM Antitrust Litigation

In 1964 International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) introduced its System/360 mainframe computer system family, the first to cover the complete range of applications, from large to small, both commercial and scientific.[1]

One of the models in the family, System 360/91 (92?), was announced as being as fast as the then fastest machine on the market, Model 6600 from Control Data Corporation (CDC). IBM, however, was slow in producing its 360/91, but its mere announcement allegedly had adverse effects on CDC’s sales of Model 6600. As a result, in December 1968, CDC filed an antitrust lawsuit against IBM. The complaint alleged that IBM had monopolized the market for computers in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act and that this conduct had damaged CDC’s business, entitling CDC to treble damages plus attorneys’ fees under section 4 of the Clayton Act.[2] The case was filed in Minnesota’s federal court.[3]

 

Thomas D. Barr

IBM immediately engaged its outside general counsel, Cravath, Swaine & Moore (CS&M), to defend the case. Partner Tom Barr was in charge of the CS&M team, and drafted several young associates, including Jay Gerber, David Boies and me, for the team. (As previously noted, I was an associate attorney at CS&M, 1966-1970.[4])

All of the CS&M team members soon started to learn about computers at a special school for the IBM lawyers at one of its locations in Westchester County, New York. (I do not recall what we were taught or what we learned, but this was long before the advent of personal computers and long before I had become familiar with their operation.)

Other private antitrust complaints were filed against IBM, and all of these cases were transferred to the Minnesota federal court for pretrial discovery regardless of where they initially had been filed in other federal trial courts. Minnesota’s U.S. District Judge Philip Neville was put in charge of managing all of these complicated cases. As a result, the other members of the team and I had frequent trips to Minnesota for pretrial conferences in the cases with the assistance of IBM’s local counsel, Faegre & Benson. All of the plaintiffs in these cases then embarked on a lengthy process of requesting and obtaining production of millions of IBM documents relevant to the cases.[5]

One of the companies suing IBM, however, had a different strategy. Greyhound Computer Corporation, a leasing company, filed a case under Illinois’ state antitrust law in Illinois state court (Peoria, as I recall) in order to avoid the complications of the consolidated pretrial proceedings in the Minnesota federal court. In addition, Greyhound wanted to take depositions (oral questioning of witnesses under oath) of top IBM officials as soon as possible before spending years in collecting and analyzing millions of IBM documents.

Thomas J. Watson, Jr.
Nicholas Katzenbach

One of the IBM officials to be deposed in the Greyhound case was its President, Thomas J. Watson, Jr.,[6] and I was put in charge of assisting Tom Barr in preparing Mr. Watson for his deposition. This was a daunting challenge. It meant collecting and analyzing as many IBM and public documents as possible that were potentially relevant to the Greyhound and other cases, figuring out the possible questions that might be asked of Mr. Watson by opposing counsel and then meeting with him and IBM’s General Counsel, Nicholas Katzenbach,[7]  to go over these documents and questions, all in a relatively short time period.

At the time my wife and I lived in Brooklyn Heights, across the East River from Wall Street and CS&M’s office. But Cravath had established a special office in White Plains, Westchester County, New York for the IBM litigation; this is where all the documents were stored and where the team members, including IBM employees assigned to help the lawyers, did their work. Thus, every morning I had to drive through Brooklyn and Queens, over the Throgs Neck Bridge and then through the Bronx and Westchester County to White Plains, and every evening I had to reverse this commute to my home. Traffic was heavy both ways, adding to the stress of the job. (Like many New Yorkers at the time, I did not own a car, but IBM supplied a rental car for me.)

Soon after our second son was born in December 1969, there was a bad winter storm in Westchester County, and I did not want to drive back home that night in order to get up early the next morning to return to White Plains. I, however, could not find a hotel room anywhere in the White Plains area. As a result, I had a very slow and dangerous drive home that night, and after a night of little sleep with a crying baby, I had to return to White Plains the next morning in another slow drive. I think that was the night that pushed me over the edge in deciding to leave CS&M and New York City.

Sometime in the process of preparing for this important deposition, I vividly remember Tom Barr and I flew from New York City to San Francisco one day for the sole purpose of flying back to New York City early the next morning on the IBM corporate jet with Mr. Watson because he had time on that flight to talk with us.

Soon the Watson deposition actually took place, probably in January 1970. Tom Barr and I thought it went well for IBM.[8] I then told Mr. Barr that I would be leaving CS&M in April to join Faegre & Benson in Minneapolis.

It is difficult in 2011 to understand how powerful IBM was in the late 1960’s. It did have a large percentage of the market for computers in that earlier period, and one of the major issues in those earlier antitrust cases was defining the market, geographical and product. The plaintiffs argued for definitions that produced large market shares for IBM while IBM argued for different definitions and lower market shares.

Now, however, IBM no longer is the dominant force in the U.S. and world markets for the manufacture of computers. In 2005, IBM sold its personal computer manufacturing operations to a Chinese company, Lenovo Group Limited. Now IBM is a large, multinational computer technology and IT consulting business with some computer manufacturing business.[9] IBM’s loss of a dominant position in the computer industry is another instance of what economist Joseph Schumpeter calls “creative destruction,” capitalism’s evolutionary process of revolutionizing itself from within.[10]

IBM thus survived after the scary early 1990’s when it nearly ran out of money. In June 2011 it celebrated its centennial as a company with strong profits, a robust portfolio of products and services and stock market valuation exceeding new-start Google. The central lesson of its survival and renewed success, experts believe, was an ability to identify and build upon its past success. For IBM, its key assets were strong, long-term customer relationships; deep scientific and research capabilities; and broad technical skills in computer hardware, software and services. The company was able to take these assets and recast itself as the one that can best manage and bring together diverse technologies in modern data centers.[11]

[1] Wikipedia, IBM System/360, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IBM_System/360.

[2]  Id.; Wikipedia, Control Data Corporation, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Control_Data_Corporation; Computers: Tackling IBM, Time, Dec. 20, 1968. Section 2 of the Sherman Act of 1890 provides that it is a felony for any “person . . . [to] monopolize or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire . . . to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States.” (15 U.S.C. § 2.) This crime requires proof of (a) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (b) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power (rather than the growth or development as a result of superior product, business acumen or historic accident). (U.S. v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).) Under section 4 of the Clayton Act of 1914, any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of the Sherman Act may sue for treble damages plus attorneys’ fees. (15 U.S.C. § 15(a).

[3] See Post: Minnesota’s Federal Court (June 28, 2011).

[4] See Post: Lawyering on Wall Street (April 14, 2011); Post: The Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. Litigation (May 31, 2011).

[5] In January 1969 the U.S. Department of Justice filed a civil lawsuit against IBM alleging that it had monopolized the market for general purpose computers. In 1982 the Department concluded that the case was without merit and dropped the suit. (Wikipedia, History of IBM, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_IBM.) I had no direct involvement in this case.

[6] Wikipedia, Thomas J. Watson, Jr., http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Watson_Jr. In 1952 Watson succeeded his father, Thomas J. Watson, Sr., as IBM’s president and held that office until 1971. In 1964 President Lyndon Johnson awarded him the Presidential Medal of Freedom, and in the Carter Administration, Watson was the U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union (1979-81). (Id.)

[7] Mr. Katzenbach was General Counsel of IBM from 1969 through 1986. From 1961 through 1966 he was an attorney in the U.S. Department of Justice, serving as the U.S. Attorney General, 1965-66. From 1966 through 1969 Katzenbach was Under Secretary of State. (Wikipedia, Nicholas Katzenbach, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicholas_Katzenbach.

[8] In 1972 the Greyhound case went to trial in federal court in Arizona with a directed verdict for IBM on the antitrust claims. However, in 1977 the court of appeals reversed this decision, holding there was sufficient evidence for a verdict for Greyhound, and remanded the case for retrial. (Greyhound Computer Corp. v. IBM, 559 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978).) Just before the retrial was to start in January 1981, IBM and Greyhound settled the case for $17.7 million. (IBM Antitrust Suit Records,  http://www.hagley.lib.de.us/library/collections/.) Earlier, in 1973 IBM settled the CDC case for about $80 million in cash and assets (transfer of an IBM computer service company at less than market value). (Computers: A Settlement for IBM, Time (Jan. 29, 1973).) (I had no involvement in any of these subsequent proceedings.)

[9] Wikipedia, History of IBM, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_IBM.

[10]  Schumpeter, Capitalism , Socialism and Democracy (1942); Wikipedia, Joseph Schumpeter, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Schumpeter.

[11] Lohr, Lessons in Longevity, From I.B.M., N.Y. Times (June 19, 2011).

Auditing the International Human Rights Course

In the Fall of 2001, after retiring from Faegre & Benson, I audited the International Human Rights Law course at the University of Minnesota Law School.[1] Although I had gained some knowledge of refugee and asylum law from my pro bono asylum work,[2] I knew very little about the rest of the field. Through this experience at the Law School I started to learn about other aspects of this area of law and developed a continuing interest in trying to keep up with new developments in the field.

Prof. David Weissbrodt
Prof. Barbara Frey

The course was lead by Professor David Weissbrodt, a world authority on the subject and now the first and only Regents Professor at the UM Law School.[3] He was the main author of the book that we used.[4] Some classes were taught by Professor Barbara Frey, whom I had met when she was the Executive Director of Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights (n/k/a Advocates for Human Rights) and had taken its training course in asylum law.[5]

The topics for the course were the following: (a) drafting, ratification and implementation of international human rights treaties; (b) state reporting under such treaties; (c) U.N. Charter-based mechanisms to address human rights violations; (d) humanitarian intervention; (e) international human rights fact-finding; (f) criminal liability for human rights violations; (g) regional human rights systems (Inter-American and European); (h) refugee and asylum law; (i) U.S. federal court litigation over foreign human rights violations; (j) use of international human rights treaties and law in litigation over U.S. issues; and (k) causes of human rights violations.

The course used different teaching styles. Some classes were the traditional law school Socratic questioning by the professor. Others were lectures while some involved role playing by the students. One class was a mock hearing before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee on whether the Senate should give its advice and consent to U.S. ratification of an international human rights treaty. The course also had an unusual structure. The class met once a week for two hours on Friday morning immediately followed by another hour when we were joined by an undergraduate human rights class for presentations by outside speakers on various related topics.

[1]  University of Minnesota Law School, International Human Rights, http://www.law.umn.edu/current/coursedetails.html?course=23.

[2] Post: Becoming a Pro Bono Asylum Lawyer (May 24, 2011).

[3] University of Minnesota Law School, David S. Weissbrodt, http://www.law.umn.edu/facultyprofiles/weissbrodtd.html.

[4] David Weissbrodt, Joan Fitzpatrick & Frank Newman, International Human Rights: Law, Policy and Process (3d ed. 2001).

[5] University of Minnesota, Barbara A. Frey, http://hrp.cla.umn.edu/about/people.htm; Post: Becoming a Pro Bono Asylum Lawyer (May 24, 2011).