As reported in an earlier post, in June 2014, an U.S. Hellfire inert missile arrived in Cuba by an erroneous or criminal diversion from Charles de Gaulle Airport in Paris, France. The missile is a laser-guided, air-to-surface weapon that weighs about 100 pounds and that can be deployed from an attack helicopter or an unmanned drone. This diversion came to the public’s attention via a January 7, 2016, report in the Wall Street Journal.
A month later, on February 13, 2016, the missile was returned to the U.S. The same day an U.S. State Department spokesman said that the missile “has been returned with the cooperation of the Cuban government” and that the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries had allowed the U.S. to engage with Cuba on “issues of mutual interest.”Further details were not available, said the spokesman, due to restrictions under U.S. law and regulations.[1]
The same day the Cuban government confirmed the return of the missile. It said that its customs inspectors had discovered the missile while conducting a routine inspection of cargo on a flight that had arrived from Paris in June 2014 due to “error or mishandling” by persons in France. “For Cuban authorities, the arrival in the country of a U.S.-made military equipment that hadn’t been declared as such on the cargo manifest was worrying.”
Thereafter, according to the Cuban government, the missile was “duly conserved and taken care of.” Once the U.S. government officially had informed the Cuban government that the missile had ben shipped to Cuba by mistake and that the U.S. wanted the missile returned, Cuban commenced proceedings to return the missile.
Although the return is good news for the U.S., there are still serious unanswered questions:
What caused the diversion of the missile from France to Cuba? Error by airline or freight forwarders’ employees? Or intentional criminal act by unknown persons? Or act of espionage by unknown country or agency?
Why did it take roughly 20 months for Cuba to return the missile?
What happened with the missile during those 20 months?
What did Cuba mean when it said that the missile had been “duly conserved and taken care of”?
When and how did the U.S. advise the Cuban government that the missile had been shipped to Cuba by mistake and request its return to the U.S.?
What was said and by whom in the discussions or negotiations for the return of the missile?
On January 7, 2016, it became publicly known through a Wall Street Journal article that since sometime in 2014 Cuba has had possession of an inert U.S. missile that was erroneously shipped to Cuba from Europe.[1] This post will discuss what is now known about this missile in Cuba and the reactions to this news.
Diversion of U.S. Missile to Cuba
Hellfire missile
The object is a dummy U.S. Hellfire missile without any explosives that is a laser-guided, air-to-surface weapon that weighs about 100 pounds and that can be deployed from an attack helicopter or an unmanned drone.
Its manufacturer, Lockheed Martin, in early 2014, with U.S. State Department authorization, shipped the missile from Orlando, Florida to Spain for a NATO training exercise for later return to the U.S. After the completion of the training exercise, it was packaged in Rota, Spain and sent on another freight-forwarder’s truck to Madrid, where it was sent by plane to Frankfurt, Germany. There it was supposed to have been shipped to Lockheed in Florida. Instead for unknown reasons it was shipped from Frankfurt to Paris on an Air France flight, and from Paris to Havana on another Air France flight. Upon its arrival in Cuba, a Cuban official noticed the labeling on the crate and seized it.
Around June 2014 Lockheed, after realizing the missile was missing and likely was in Cuba, notified the U.S. State Department. Thereafter the U.S. has been pressing the Cuban government for information about the missile and for Cuba to return it to the U.S., but Cuba has not responded.
During the summer of 2014, of course, the U.S. and Cuba were engaged in the final steps leading up to the December 17, 2014, announcement that the two countries were embarked upon normalization of relations. Since then, they have been taking various steps toward normalization.
The reason for the shipment to Cuba is unknown. Was it a stupid mistake by a freight forwarder or several of such companies? That I find difficult to believe. That seems to leave it being an intentional criminal or espionage act.
The U.S. is concerned that Cuba has or could give access to the missile to learn about its technology to Russia, China or North Korea. But an article by someone who apparently is technically sophisticated in such matters discounts such dire consequences because “there’s good reason to suspect that China and other large cyber powers might already have blueprints and more, thanks to the still-vague scope of several highly successful military cyber attacks;” because “the US sells thousands upon thousands of working Hellfires to ‘close military ‘allies’ like Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey;” and because “the fall of Iraq’s Mosul to forces from ISIS . . . led to about $700 million worth of working Hellfire missiles falling into the hands of terrorists.”[2]
Unsurprisingly this news has prompted severe criticism of the Administration.
U.S. Senator Marco Rubio (Rep., FL), a Republican presidential candidate, voiced his criticism in a letter to Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Roberta Jacobson. Rubio opened with the seemingly incontrovertible statement, “Preventing the proliferation of sensitive U.S. technology is one of the most important duties carried out by the State Department.” Because Jacobson has been so deeply involved with normalization negotiations with Cuba, she was asked these questions:
“When was the State Department informed that a U.S. Hellfire missile had been sent to Cuba?
When were you personally first informed of this matter and by whom?
What has been done to obtain the missile’s return by the Cuban government?
What specific entity of the Cuban government is currently in possession of the missile?
Please provide a list of the specific occasions on which you or other U.S. Government officials have raised this issue with the Castro regime.
Why was the return of the missile not obtained as a result of the negotiations that led to President Obama’s December 17, 2014 announced change in U.S. policy toward Cuba?
Why was the return of the missile not a condition of removal of Cuba from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list?
Why was the return of the missile not a condition of establishment of embassies in Havana and Washington?
What members of Congress did you inform of this issue during your briefings and testimony regarding U.S. policy toward Cuba over the last 18 months?
Does the State Department know if the Cuban government shared the missile or its design with any foreign governments?”
The Rubio letter concluded, “Sensitive U.S. technology falling into the hands of such a regime [as Cuba’s] has significant implications for U.S. national security. The fact that the administration, including you, have apparently tried to withhold this information from the congressional debate and public discussion over U.S.-Cuba policy is disgraceful.”
Also on Friday, Republican presidential candidate Jeb Bush tweeted: “Whether it’s Iran holding U.S. citizens hostage or Cuba holding a U.S. missile hostage, Obama always caves. I won’t.’’
Four other lawmakers critical of the Obama position toward Cuba also criticized the handling of the missile case. In a joint statement, Reps. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R., Fla.), Mario Diaz Balart (R., Fla.), Carlos Curbelo (R., Fla.) and Albio Sires (D., N.J.) said:
“Regardless of how Cuba came into possession of a U.S. Hellfire missile – which must be investigated – it is unconscionable that the Obama administration knew the Castros were in possession of this sensitive U.S. military technology since June 2014 and still moved forward with its policy to open up travel, trade, investment and diplomatic relations with the regime.”
“The fact that the Castro regime was able to acquire a U.S. Hellfire missile could be indicative of the lengths it is willing to go to undermine our national security and harm our interests. Congress must provide oversight to determine how the U.S. export control system failed to prevent this gross violation from occurring, and if Cuba’s espionage apparatus played a role in this Hellfire acquisition.”
“The Cuban regime rebuffed the President’s efforts to secure the return of the Hellfire missile even as the negotiations were ongoing, and yet the regime still got everything it could have wanted. It is no wonder that the Castro brothers feel ever more emboldened to continue on with the repression of the Cuban people, with intimidation and unlawful arrests at an alarmingly high rate.”
“This is a very serious breach and we are deeply concerned that the Castros have already shared the sensitive technology with the likes of Russia, North Korea or China. . . . We urge the Administration to start holding the Cuban regime accountable for its continued transgressions not only against its own people, but its continued disregard for international norms.”
Senator Ron Johnson (Rep., WI), the Chair of the Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, sent a letter to the heads of the Pentagon and the State Department, asking for an explanation “why the U.S. military would forgo complete control, care, and custody of such cargo when transporting it abroad.’’ Mr. Johnson also asked the administration for details of any other lost shipments of sensitive technology over the past five years.
White House spokesman Josh Earnest said on January 8 that the administration takes the issue very seriously. “The Department of Defense and the State Department are, again, I think for obvious reasons, quite interested in getting to the bottom of exactly what happened.’’
The same day the U.S. State Department spokesman, John Kirby, said, “I am restricted under federal law and regulations from commenting on specific defense trade licensing cases and compliance matters. What I can say is that under the Arms Export Control Act the State Department licenses both permanent and temporary exports by U.S. companies of regulated defense articles. U.S. companies are responsible for documenting their proposed shipping logistics in the application of their export license as well as reporting any shipping deviations to the department as appropriate.”
Conclusion
Although I have been, and still am, a strong advocate for U.S.-Cuba reconciliation, I am very troubled by the news of this missile ending up in Cuban hands and of its diversion in mid-2014 apparently not affecting U.S. negotiation of normalization. Final assessment has to await Assistant Secretary Jacobson’s responses to Senator Rubio’s questions and other news about this situation. I pray that it does not disrupt or sabotage further progress towards normalization.
The June 2014 issue of The Atlantic devotes 20 black-bordered pages to “The Case for Reparations” as the lead and cover article by Ta-Nehisi Coates, its national correspondent.
This is a serious subject by an author who has been obtaining some prominence or notoriety this year occasioned by his best-selling book, “Between the World and Me,” which was discussed in a previous post.
Moreover, on September 28, 2015, the MacArthur Foundation awarded one of its prestigious Fellows or “genius” grants to Coates and asserted that he “brings personal reflection and historical scholarship to bear on America’s most contested issues . . . without shallow polemic and in a measured style.” In “The Case for Reparations,” according to the Foundation, “Coates grapples with the rationalizations for slavery and their persistence in twentieth-century policies like Jim Crow and redlining . . . [and] compellingly argues for remuneration for the economic impact on African Americans denied the ability to accumulate wealth or social status for generations. [The article is] deeply felt and intensely researched.”
I, therefore, was expecting a serious discussion of this important issue.
Instead, I was profoundly disappointed in the analysis as well as the quality of the research and writing of this article and strongly disagree with MacArthur’s glowing commentary on the article.
Coates’ Discussion of Reparations
Coates mentions that certain scholars have discussed how reparations might be implemented. One, he says, suggested multiplying the number of African Americans in the population by the difference between white and black per capita income and then presumably paying that difference to each African American each year for a decade or two. Another, Coates reports, proposed a program of job training and public works for all poor people. (P. 69) But Coates does not endorse either one.
Instead Coates hides in generalizations. He says reparations means “the full acceptance of our collective biography and its consequences” and “a revolution of American consciousness, a reconciling of our self-image as the great democratizer with the facts of our history” (p.70).
On the last page of the article (p. 71) Coates becomes more specific by advocating congressional adoption of a bill for a federal study of the issue of reparations that has been offered by Representative John Conyers (Dem., MI) for the last 25 years. Without examining the details of the bill or the arguments advanced for the bill by Conyers, Coates states, “No one can know what would come out of such a [study and] debate. Perhaps no number can fully capture the multi-century plunder of back people in America. Perhaps the number is so large that it can’t be imagined, let alone calculated and dispensed. But I believe that wrestling with these questions matters as much as—if not more than—the specific answers that might be produced. An America that asks what it owes its most vulnerable citizens is improved and humane.”
This is not, as MacArthur suggests, a compelling argument “for remuneration for the economic impact on African Americans denied the ability to accumulate wealth or social status for generations.”
The Conyers’ Bill
An examination of the Conyers bill itself does not buttress the claimed genius of the Coates article. In the current session of Congress this bill is H.R.40: The Commission to Study Reparation Proposals for African Americans Act. A quick examination of the Library of Congress THOMAS website reveals that the bill (in sections 4, 5 and 7) would establish a commission of seven members (three to be appointed by the U.S. President, three by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and one by the president pro tempore of the U.S. Senate) to hold hearings and issue a report of its findings and recommendations.
The key to the bill is section 2(a), which would make the following factual findings that Coates takes most of 20 pages to elucidate:
“(1) approximately 4,000,000 Africans and their descendants were enslaved in the United States and colonies that became the United States from 1619 to 1865;
(2) the institution of slavery was constitutionally and statutorily sanctioned by the Government of the United States from 1789 through 1865;
(3) the slavery that flourished in the United States constituted an immoral and inhumane deprivation of Africans’ life, liberty, African citizenship rights, and cultural heritage, and denied them the fruits of their own labor; and
(4) sufficient inquiry has not been made into the effects of the institution of slavery on living African-Americans and society in the United States.”
Section 2(b) of the bill then states the commission would examine and report on these factual predicates plus the “de facto discrimination against freed slaves and their descendants from the end of the Civil War to the present, including economic, political, and social discrimination.” With such factual determinations the commission would be charged to “recommend appropriate ways to educate the American public of the Commission’s findings” and “appropriate remedies.”
Representative Conyers’ website contains a discussion of the bill that at least alludes to the following challenging sub-issues that would face such a commission and that are not examined by Coates: “whether an apology is owed, whether compensation is warranted and, if so, in what form and who should be eligible.”
Resolution for Rectification of Misdeeds Against African-Americans
More importantly, Coates’ article does not mention a resolution (H.Res.194) adopted in 2008 by the U.S. House of Representatives that has lengthy factual preambles about the evils of slavery and Jim Crow. [1] The House in H.Res.194 more importantly also:
“acknowledges that slavery is incompatible with the basic founding principles recognized in the Declaration of Independence that all men are created equal;”
“acknowledges the fundamental injustice, cruelty, brutality, and inhumanity of slavery and Jim Crow;”
“apologizes to African Americans on behalf of the people of the United States, for the wrongs committed against them and their ancestors who suffered under slavery and Jim Crow; and”
“expresses its commitment to rectify the lingering consequences of the misdeeds committed against African Americans under slavery and Jim Crow and to stop the occurrence of human rights violations in the future.”
Yes, this is only a resolution by only one chamber of the Congress, but it is closer to the result apparently being advocated by Coates than the Conyers’ bill.
U.S. Presidential Statements About Slavery
H.Res.194 in a preamble asserts that “on July 8, 2003, during a trip to Goree Island, Senegal, a former slave port, President George W. Bush acknowledged slavery’s continuing legacy in American life and the need to confront that legacy when he stated that slavery `was . . . one of the greatest crimes of history . . . The racial bigotry fed by slavery did not end with slavery or with segregation. And many of the issues that still trouble America have roots in the bitter experience of other times. But however long the journey, our destiny is set: liberty and justice for all.”[2]
In another preamble H.Res.194 asserts, “President Bill Clinton also acknowledged the deep-seated problems caused by the continuing legacy of racism against African-Americans that began with slavery when he initiated a national dialogue about race.”
Neither of these presidential statements is mentioned by Coates, both of which support his opinion favoring reparations.
Caribbean States’ Reparations Claims
Apparently at least 14 states in the Caribbean are preparing claims for reparations for slavery against their former colonial rulers: Great Britain, France, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands. Britain’s Prime Minister Cameron recently rejected that reparations idea.[3]
Again there is no mention of these claims by Coates even though they lend credence to his advocacy of similar reparations in the U.S.[4]
Litigation Over Contracts for Deed
Coates leads the article with a lengthy discussion of problems faced by blacks on the west side of Chicago in the 1960’s in financing purchases of homes and as a result being forced to do so on contracts for deed with unscrupulous sellers (pp. 56-59). Coates then enthusiastically endorses these black purchasers’ bringing a federal lawsuit against the sellers for reparations (or money damages). On the next page (p.60), however, Coates tells the reader, without any citation of source, that in 1976 the black plaintiffs lost a jury trial supposedly due to anti-black prejudice of the jury and even later in the article (p.67) he says that as a result of the lawsuit some of the plaintiffs were allowed to own their homes outright while others obtained regular mortgages.
Coates, however, fails to mention that according to a secondary source from the University of Illinois-Chicago, the west-side case went to trial in the Spring of 1976, and in November 1979, the jury decided that the sellers had taken advantage of the buyers for higher profits, but that the sellers were so ruthless they would have cheated anyone, not only blacks, and, therefore, the jury rejected the racial discrimination claim, and the plaintiffs’ lawyers decided not to appeal this decision.
That same secondary source reports that a related case from the south side of Chicago went to trial in 1972 before a federal district judge with a jury. At the close of the evidence, the court directed a verdict against the plaintiffs saying that they had not proved a prima facie case of discrimination. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial. That new trial occurred in 1979, without a jury, before a district judge who decided in favor of the defendants, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
Clyde Ross was prominently mentioned at the start of the Coates’ article about the housing discrimination that led to the above litigation, and after the publishing of the Coates article, Ross said in an interview, “I don’t know why we would even discuss [reparations] . . .when that would never happen. It involves taking money, property, from other people, from the people with power and wealth. How could that ever come to be? In theory, yes it is a good idea, but it’s better to be practical. I support equality under the law. I just want to be able to pay off a mortgage knowing that I am getting the same deal as the white guy. That’s all I ask.”
Coates also did not uncover in his research the successful Minnesota lawsuit in the 1920’s by a black couple against white landlords who after accepting contract-for-deed payments for 25 years denied the couple possession of the Minneapolis house on the false assertion that their payments were only rent. The couple’s attorney, by the way, was Lena Olive Smith, the state’s first black female lawyer who became the leader of the city’s NAACP branch in the 1930s.
Conclusion
I am not a scholar of race relations in the U.S. or of reparations generally or in the U.S. specifically. The above discussion of facts that apparently were not discovered by Coates was based upon this blogger’s perfunctory Internet searching.
The Coates article also is difficult to read because of the lack of an introduction and conclusion and of any headings or subdivisions amidst the parade of often densely packed paragraphs that do not follow in a logical order.[5]
This blogger as a retired lawyer might be seen as engaging in an inappropriate lawyerly criticism of the Coates’ article. But Coates presumably is advocating for others to embrace the conclusion that reparations are a necessary response to a major societal problem. As an advocate, he should write to be more persuasive.
This blogger as a white American is supportive of civil and human rights generally and is willing to consider a well-written and documented case for U.S. reparations for slavery and Jim Crow. Unfortunately the Coates article does not do that. It needs additional research and a major rewrite. (As always, I invite others’ comments of agreement or disagreement.)
[1] U.S. House of Reps., 110th Cong., 2nd Sess., H.Res.194 (July 29, 2008)..As February 23, 2007, was the bicentennial of the British Parliament’s abolition of slave trading, the 110th U.S. Congress (2007-2009) had 150 bills and resolutions that mentioned the word “slavery,” but this blog has not “drilled down” to determine their details.
[4] Coates does mention Massachusetts’ granting a 1783 petition for reparations by a black freewoman; 17th and 18th century Quakers’ granting reparations; the 1987 formation of a National Coalition of Blacks for Reparations in America; the 1993 NAACP’s endorsement of reparations; a lawsuit for reparations brought by Harvard Law School Professor Charles Ogletree, Jr. (without mentioning its details or outcome); and Germany’s reparations to Israel for the Holocaust (pp. 61, 70-71).
[5] The online version of the article added headings I through X, but most of them are quotations from sources in the sections, requiring the reader to dive into the sections to discover their significance. Another post discusses Coates’ “The Black Family in the Age of Mass Incarceration,” The Atlantic (Oct. 2015), which also has chapter headings, most of which do not help the reader.
The United States has damage claims against Cuba and visa versa. This post will review those claims and propose a method for resolving them.
U.S. Claims
Cuba’s Expropriation of Property of U.S. Nationals. [1]
According to a U.S. Government report, “in 1959 and 1960 . . . the Government of Cuba after the Castro regime came into power . . . effectively seized and took into state ownership most of the property in that country owned by the [U.S.] and its nationals, with the exception of the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay. No provision was made by the Cuban Government for the payment of compensation for such property as required under the generally accepted rules of international law.” (Cuba, however, has paid similar claims by Canada, France, Spain and Switzerland.) [2]
In response, a federal statute, the Cuba Claims Act, was enacted in 1964 to amend the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 to grant the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States (FCSC), a quasi-judicial, independent agency within the U.S. Department of Justice, jurisdiction to receive and determine in accordance, with applicable substantive law, including international law, the amount and validity of certain claims by U.S. nationals of the against the Government of Cuba.
The covered claims for this purpose were those arising since January 1, 1959, for (a) “losses resulting from the nationalization expropriation, intervention or other taking of, or special measures directed against, property including any rights or interests therein owned wholly or partially, directly or indirectly at the time by nationals of the [U.S.];” (b) debts for merchandise furnished or services rendered by U.S. nationals; and (c) disability or death of U.S. nationals resulting from actions taken by, or under the authority of, the Government of Cuba since January 1, 1959.
The statute, however, did not provide for the payment of claims against the Government of Cuba, but only for the Commission to determine the validity and amounts of such claims. After its determinations, the Commission certified its findings to the Secretary of State for possible use in future negotiations with the Government of Cuba.
In signing the statute on October 16, 1964, President Lyndon Johnson said: “The Castro regime has appropriated over $1 billion worth of property of [U.S.] nationals in total disregard for their rights. These unlawful seizures violated every standard by which the nationals of the free world conduct their affairs. I am confident that the Cuban people will not always be compelled to suffer under Communist rule-that one day they will achieve freedom and democracy. I am also confident that it will be possible to settle claims of American nationals whose property has been wrongfully taken from them.”[3]
The Commission had two programs for such claims against the Cuban government, resulting in the total submission of 8,821 claims and the Commission’s determinations that 5,913 were valid with a total principal value of $1,902,202,285 (or $1.9 billion) plus 6% per annum from the date of the loss. Although 90% of these claims were filed by individuals, the largest ones are by corporations: Cuba Electric (owned by Americans), $ 268 million; IT&T, $131 million; and Exxon, $71 million.
Recent commentaries suggest that with interest the claims now total nearly $7 billion. [4]
Default Judgment Against Cuba for Deaths of U.S. Pilots Over International Waters
A prior post about “The Cuban Five” mentioned that Cuban military planes in 1996 shot down two U.S. private planes over international waters near Cuba and killed three of their pilots and that a U.S. federal court entered a default judgment of $187 million against the Government of Cuba for their deaths. That judgment plus interest remains unpaid.
Other Claims.
Any and all other claims for damages by the U.S. against Cuba should also be included and resolved as part of any dispute-resolution procedure.
Cuba Claims
Alleged Damages from U.S. Embargo (Blockade) of Cuba [5]
At the October 2014 session of the U.N. General Assembly, Cuba offered a resolution condemning the U.S. embargo (blockade), which overwhelmingly was approved. Speaking for the resolution, Cuba’s Foreign Minister, Bruno Gonzalez Parrilla, alleged that Cuba was damaged by the embargo and that the damages totaled $1.1 trillion.
The U.S. diplomat at the session obviously disagreed. The diplomat argued that Cuba’s economic difficulties were due to its own policies and that it would not thrive until it committed itself to a free and fair market, allowed unfettered access to information, opened its state-run monopolies and adopted sound economic policies.
Unpaid Rent for Use of Guantanamo Bay.
A prior post mentioned that Cuba for the last 56 years has not cashed the U.S. checks for the annual rent of $4,085 for Guantanamo Bay. This amounts to at least $228,760 for those years plus interest. If Cuba alleges that the annual unpaid rent should be a higher figure, then the total claim obviously would be higher.
Other Claims.
If there are any other damage claims by Cuba against the U.S., then it is fair to believe they will be asserted.
Conclusion
These claims, in my opinion, will not be resolved in negotiations between the two countries. I, therefore, suggest that the parties agree to submit all of their damage claims against each other for resolution to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague in the Netherlands under its Arbitration Rules 2012 before a panel of three or five arbitrators. A prior post made this recommendation for the expropriation claims,
My experience as a lawyer who handled business disputes in U.S. courts and in international arbitrations leads me to believe that arbitration is the appropriate way to resolve these claims by the two governments. The Permanent Court of Arbitration was established in the late 19th century to resolve disputes between governments. It would be a third-party, neutral administrator of the proceedings and the arbitrators who would be selected would also be neutral. Finally it has an existing set of arbitration rules and procedures.
A 2007 study commissioned by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) proposed a treaty or a U.S. presidential executive order to establish a bilateral arbitration tribunal that would be empowered to issue an award compelling Cuba to pay money or to provide tax benefits or other incentives for new investment. This proposal like the one just proposed by this blogger advocates having a neutral third-party decide the outcome of these claims, but it adds the necessity of preparing and agreeing to the composition and rules of a new ad hoc tribunal. [6]
Everyone recognizes that Cuba does not have the financial resources to pay any large claim like the one for expropriation of U.S. nationals’ property in 1959-1960 so any substantial monetary recovery would have to come from a determination that the U.S. was liable to Cuba for damages for the embargo. Otherwise, there would have to be some settlement of the larger expropriation claims with tax or other incentives for entering into new business ventures on the island.
============================================
[1] This section of the post is based upon the Commission’s website’s description of the agency, an overview of the two Cuba programs, a final report on the first program, copies of what it terms “lead decisions” in the programs, decisions on all the claims and a spreadsheet listing all of those claims and their amounts.
[3] Johnson Signs Bill To Aid Americans In Claims on Cuba, N.Y. Times (Mar. 18, 1964); Gordon, The Cuba Claims Act: Progress In the Development of a Viable Valuation Process in the FCSC, 13 Santa Clara Lawyer 624 (1973).
On March 26 Cuba announced that the U.S. and Cuba will commence their negotiations regarding human rights on March 31 in Washington, D.C.; this was covered in a prior post.
Issues of Cuban human rights that probably will be put on the agenda for further discussions were first examined in a prior post about the recent speech on this subject by Cuban Foreign Minister, Bruno Rodriguez Parrilla.
In Cuba’s March 26thannouncement of the upcoming talks, Pedro Luis Pedroso, Cuba’s Deputy Director General of Multilateral Affairs and International Law, referred to “the recognition Cuba received at the last Universal Periodic Review [UPR] by the U.N. Human Rights Council, where the international community praised and commended Cuban achievements in areas such as education, health and access to cultural rights, and the contribution the island has made in those same areas in other countries.”
Therefore, this post will look at that UPR of Cuba while another post will discuss the latest U.S. State Department report on Cuban human rights (the one issued in 2014 for 2013).
The Nature of the UPR Process [1]
In order to assess the recent UPR of Cuba, we first must understand the UPR process, which provides the opportunity for each of the 193 U.N. members, on a periodic basis, to declare what actions it has taken to improve its human rights and to fulfill its human rights obligations.
The UPR process includes a report on all human rights issues from the subject country, compilations of information about the country from various U.N. organizations and from “stakeholders” (non-governmental organizations), a public interactive session of the Human Rights Council about the country, a report by a working group about the proceedings that includes conclusions and recommendations, the subject country’s responses to those conclusions and recommendations and a subsequent evaluation of the UPR by the Council.
It is exceedingly important, however, to know that these conclusions and recommendations are merely a systematic compilation or listing of all those that had been offered by all of the countries participating in the UPR. Hence, there is a lot of duplication and overlapping in this part of the report, which is not similar to an independent judicial body’s reaching certain findings and conclusions based upon an evaluation of often conflicting evidence. Indeed, the Working Group’s report expressly states that the conclusions and recommendations “should not be construed as endorsed by the Working Group as a whole.” In short, there is no overall “grade” of a country’s human rights performance by the Working Group or by the Council as a whole.
Most Recent UPR of Cuba [2]
The most recent UPR of Cuba occurred in 2013.
1. The Report of the Working Group.
The key document in figuring out what happened in this UPR is the “Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review—Cuba” that was issued on July 8, 2013. It has the following standard structure, after a brief Introduction:
I. Summary of the proceedings of the review process
A. Presentation by the State under review
B. Interactive dialogue and response by the State under review
II. Conclusions and Recommendations
The “interactive dialogue.” This section of this report states that there was such a dialogue about Cuba involving 132 delegations at the session on May 1, 2013, and sets forth a brief summary of that dialogue in 144 numbered paragraphs. One example is paragraph 31, which states, “ Nicaragua highlighted the commitment of Cuba to human rights despite the blockade, and condemned the [U.S.] convictions against five Cubans.”
The only reference to U.S. comments in this dialogue is in paragraph 77, which states the U.S. “raised concerns for impediments to multiparty elections and freedom of expression and referred to Alan Gross and Oswaldo Paya.” Cuba, according to paragraph 111, responded to this U.S. comment by saying that “freedom of the press was guaranteed in Cuba“ and by “reiterated[ing its] . . . willingness . . . to continue talks with the [U.S.] . . . on the situation of Mr. Gross and of other individuals who were held in detention in Cuba and in the [U.S.].” [3]
Conclusions and Recommendations. This section starts with the following statement: “The recommendations formulated [by all the countries participating] during the interactive dialogue and listed below will be examined by Cuba, which will provide responses in due time, but no later than the twenty-fourth session of the Human Rights Council in September 2013” (para. 170). This section of the Report is concluded by this statement: “All conclusions and/or recommendations contained in the present report reflect the position of the submitting State(s) and/or the State under review. They should not be construed as endorsed by the Working Group as a whole” (para. 171).
The actual conclusions and recommendations are summarized in 292 numbered subparagraphs of the Report. Those offered by the U.S. are for Cuba to “allow for independent investigations into the circumstances surrounding the deaths of Oswaldo Paya and Harold Cepero” (para. 170.138) [4], to “release Alan Gross and imprisoned journalists such as Jose Antonio Torres immediately” (para. 170.187) [5] and to “eliminate or cease enforcing laws impeding freedom of expression” (para. 170.176).
2. Cuba’s Responses to the Recommendations.
In response to the U.S. recommendations and 20 others from other countries, Cuba said they “do not enjoy [its] support . . . on the grounds that they are politically biased and based on false premises; they derive from attempts to discredit Cuba by those who, with their hegemonic ambitions, refuse to accept the Cuban people’s diversity and right to self-determination. These proposals are inconsistent with the spirit of cooperation and respect demanded by the UPR process.” Moreover, said Cuba, they “are incompatible with constitutional principles and national legislation, and whose content is contrary to the spirit of cooperation and respect that should predominate at the UPR.” [6]
The other 20 numbered recommendations that were so summarily rejected by Cuba related to protecting human rights defenders, including journalists, against abusive criminal prosecutions, harassment and intimidation (Czech Republic, Austria, Australia, Germany, Hungary); release of all political prisoners (Czech Republic, Belgium, Slovenia, Poland), end indefinite extensions of preliminary criminal investigations (Belgium); improve freedom of expression (Romania, Estonia, Hungary, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom, France, Canada); repeal laws relating to “pre-criminal social dangerousness” (Ireland); end repression, investigate acts of repudiation and protect targets of intimidation and violence (Netherlands); and end Internet censorship (Australia, Germany).
Cuba, however, did accept 230 of the recommendations while noting, “Many of these . . . have already been complied with, or are in the process of implementation , or are included among future national priorities.” Therefore, these items “will be implemented in accordance with our capabilities and in step with the evolution of the circumstances within which Cuba is pursuing its aim of complete social justice.”
The remaining 42 recommendations were “noted” by Cuba as matters to be examined with the understanding that its “process of ratifying an international instrument is very rigorous;” that is stands ready “to continue cooperating with . . . the UN System’s human rights machinery;” that it is “philosophically opposed to the death penalty: and wants to eliminate it when suitable conditions exist;” that it has an “extensive and effective” system for resolving human rights complaints; that its “system of criminal justice . . . ensures fair and impartial hearings and full guarantees to the accused;” Cuba is working at expanding internet access; and “the right to freedom of expression and assembly . . . [is] enshrined in the Constitution and . . . national legislation.”
3. Human Rights Council’s Evaluation of this UPR. As paragraph 170 of the Report of the Working Group provided, the Council was to review the UPR of Cuba at its session in September 2013 after Cuba had submitted its response to the conclusions and recommendations. That Cuban response was just summarized, and the Council on September 20, 2013, reviewed this UPR and approved, without a vote, a resolution “to adopt the outcome of the universal periodic review of Cuba, comprising the report thereon of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review . . ., the views of Cuba concerning the recommendations and/or conclusions made, and its voluntary commitments and replies presented before the adoption of the outcome by the plenary to questions or issues not sufficiently addressed during the interactive dialogue held in the Working Group.” [7]
Criticism of the Recent UPR of Cuba
It must also be noted that an observer has alleged that Cuba “corrupted and abused” this UPR process by prompting the submission of many “fraudulent” stakeholder NGOs; there was a total of 454 submissions regarding Cuba compared with the next highest, 48 on Canada. As a result, says this observer (UN Watch), “numerous statements of praise taint the UN’s official summary” of stakeholders’ submissions. UN Watch also alleges that the compilation of information from U.N. agencies was unfairly slanted in favor of Cuba. [8]
Another observer (International Service for Human Rights) reported that during the UPR of Cuba, 132 countries, at 51 seconds each, took the floor to ask questions and make recommendations. As a result, Cuba received 293 recommendations, the highest number that a State under review has ever received at the UPR, but 121 of them started with the verb ‘continue,’ thus requiring minimal action to be taken by Cuba. [9]
Conclusion
I do not know whether any of NGO stakeholders at this UPR were “fraudulent,” as alleged, but it does appear that Cuba “stacked” the process to minimize the time available to authentic critics of its human rights record and to maximize the time available to its supporters. It also appears as if Cuba rejected recommendations for improving many foundational human rights.
In any event, because the UPR process does not involve a truly independent fact-finder to assess the human rights record of Cuba or any other country in such a process, I reject the assertion by Cuba’s Deputy Director General of Multilateral Affairs and International Law, Pedro Luis Pedroso, that Cuba obtained a laudatory evaluation of its human rights record by the U.N. Human Rights Council. In short, I think this UPR is irrelevant to Cuba’s human rights issues.
===============================
[1] Details about the UPR process are provided on the Council’s website. The process involves a “working group,” which is composed of all 47 members of the Council.
[3] As discussed in a prior post, Alan Gross was released from a Cuban prison on December 17, 2014, and returned to the U.S. as part of the U.S.-Cuba agreement to re-establish normal diplomatic relations.
[4] Paya was a Cuban political activist, a leader of the political opposition to the to the Cuban government. He was the founder and organizer of the Varela Project, which collected enough signatures to present to the government a request for changes in legislation. He was awarded the Andrei Sakharov Prize for Human Rights of the European Parliament in 2002. On July 12, 2012, Paya was killed in an automobile crash in Cuba under suspicious circumstances; Harold Cepero, a youth leader, was also killed in the crash. Many people believe they were murdered by government agents.
[5] Torres, a correspondent for the Cuban government newspaper, Granma, wrote an article about alleged mismanagement of a Santiago Cuba aqueduct project and of the installation of the Cuba-Venezuela fibre-optic cable. Afterwards he was charged and convicted of spying and sentenced to 14 years in prison and cancellation of his university degree in journalism.
[6] Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review—Cuba: Addendum: Views on conclusions and/or recommendation, voluntary commitments and replies presented by the State under review [Cuba] (Sept. 2013).
Since 1996 the European Union (EU) has had an overall strategy about engaging with Cuba that the EU calls its Common Position on Cuba. In early 2014, the EU determined that this Position would not be a precondition to negotiations and thus the two countries held negotiations in April 2014 in Havana and in August 2014 in Brussels. The third round of these negotiations took place in Havana, March 4-5, 2015, with the next round to take place in Brussels on a date to be determined. [1]
After reviewing the EU Common Position on Cuba and the subsequent history of EU-Cuba relations, we will discuss the recent negotiations and their implications.
EU’s Common Position on Cuba [2]
On December 2, 1996, the Council of the European Union [3] adopted its Common Position on Cuba, whose objective was “to encourage a process of [Cuban] transition to pluralist democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as a sustainable recovery and improvement in the living standards of the Cuban people. A transition would most likely be peaceful if the present regime were itself to initiate or permit such a process. It is not European Union policy to try to bring about change by coercive measures with the effect of increasing the economic hardship of the Cuban people” (Para. 1).
The Common Position also acknowledged “the tentative economic opening undertaken in Cuba to date” and the EU’s “wish to be Cuba’s partner in the progressive and irreversible opening of the Cuban economy. The [EU] considers that full cooperation with Cuba will depend upon improvements in human rights and political freedom, as indicated by the European Council” (Para. 2). To achieve these objectives, the E.U.
“(a) will intensify the present dialogue with the Cuban authorities and with all sectors of Cuban society in order to promote respect for human rights and real progress towards pluralist democracy;
(b) will seek out opportunities – even more actively than heretofore – to remind the Cuban authorities, both publicly and privately, of fundamental responsibilities regarding human rights, in particular freedom of speech and association;
(c) will encourage the reform of internal legislation concerning political and civil rights, including the Cuban criminal code, and, consequently, the abolition of all political offences, the release of all political prisoners and the ending of the harassment and punishment of dissidents;
(d) will evaluate developments in Cuban internal and foreign policies according to the same standards that apply to [EU] relations with other countries, in particular the ratification and observance of international human rights conventions;
(e) will remain willing in the meantime, through the Member States, to provide ad hoc humanitarian aid, subject to prior agreement regarding distribution; currently applicable measures to ensure distribution through non-governmental organizations, the churches and international organizations will be maintained and, where appropriate, reinforced . . .; [and]
(f) will remain willing, through the Member States, also to carry out focused economic cooperation actions in support of the economic opening being implemented” (Para. 3).
Finally the EU Common Position stated, “As the Cuban authorities make progress towards democracy, the [EU} will lend its support to that process and examine the appropriate use of the means at its disposal for that purpose, including: the intensification of a constructive, result-oriented political dialogue between the [EU] and Cuba; the intensification of cooperation and, in particular, economic cooperation; the deepening of the dialogue with the Cuban authorities, through the appropriate instances, in order to explore further the possibilities for future negotiation of a Cooperation Agreement with Cuba” (Para. 4).
EU-Cuba Relations 1997-2013
The EU suspended ties with Cuba in 2003 after the regime of President Fidel Castro arrested 75 dissidents in 2003 in a fierce crackdown known as Black Spring.
Upon the imprisonment of these political dissidents, the EU imposed stiff sanctions on Cuba in 2003. High-level visits to Cuba were reduced, and Fidel Castro stopped European aid from entering the country. European embassies were encouraged to invite both government officials and political dissidents to cultural events. Thereafter the Cuban government officials declined to attend any such events. Between 2003 and 2005, Cuba and the EU experienced a time of tension and animosity.
In 2005, relations between the EU and Cuba began to warm up again with Spain’s encouragement. The Cuban government released 14 political prisoners in 2005, an encouraging sign for anxious EU members looking for signs of progress. Thereafter the EU suspended sanctions and gradually repaired the economic ties between the two entities. Between 2005 and 2008, Cuba released another six political prisoners, which prompted the EU to remove all sanctions. In addition, the 2008 change of power from Fidel Castro to Raúl Castro produced optimism in the EU regarding future relaxation of tension.
After October 2008, the EU committed around € 60 million for cooperation on post-hurricane reconstruction and rehabilitation, food security, climate change and renewable energy, culture, and education. Cuba also took part in several EU-funded regional programs. The first EU Country Strategy/Paper Indicative Program for Cuba was adopted in May 2010 making available € 20 million between 2011 and 2013 for food security, climate change adaptation, and expertise exchanges. The EU also allocated € 4 million to support the population affected by Hurricane Sandy in November 2012.
In 2010, Spain unsuccessfully tried to muster support for a change in the EU’s Common Position on Cuba. The need for unanimity for such a change was thwarted by Poland and Czech Republic – both former Soviet bloc nations – which have been opposed to shifts in relations with Havana.
EU-Cuba Negotiations, 2014
In early 2014, the Dutch Foreign Minister called on the EU to change its policy toward Havana during a visit to the Caribbean island in January 2014.
The EU then decided that its Common Position on Cuba was not working and would not be used as preconditions for EU negotiations with the country. As a result, the EU Foreign Affairs Council, on February 10, 2014, extended an invitation to Cuba to start negotiations for a future bilateral agreement.
Following Cuba’s acceptance of the invitation, they conducted such negotiations In April and August 2014 on a “Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement” which would serve as an enabling framework for closer engagement in support of the on-going reform and modernization process in Cuba. According to the EU, human rights remain at the heart of its policy towards Cuba while seeking to expand relations with all parts of Cuban society, promoting economic and social progress, dynamic dialogue and strengthened respect for fundamental rights.
The April 29-30, 2014, round took place in Havana and focused on establishing modalities and a roadmap for negotiations. An understanding was also reached on the overall structure of the agreement, after which the parties held a first exchange of views on the main chapters and elements.
The August 27-28, 2014, negotiations took place in Brussels. The parties concentrated on the cooperation heading in the proposed agreement with progress on the global structure of the chapter, the issues and sectors to be addressed, as well as on the concrete wording of a number of articles. The EU also made a presentation on the trade chapter that would enhance commercial and investment relations based on joint objectives and established rules and principles of international trade. The political and institutional issues were not addressed.
Christian Leffler
Immediately after the August session, Christian Leffler, the European External Action Service Managing Director for the Americas, stated the parties had made “substantial progress” towards agreeing on a trade and political co-operation treaty and would discuss “more sensitive political questions,” in the next round to be held in Havana.
In addition, the August session prompted a NGO (Civil Rights Defenders) to urge the EU to press Cuba to ratify and implement the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [4] and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [5], which Cuba had signed in 2008. The group also called for inclusion of Cuban civil society and political opposition in the discussions.
The third round of negotiations was scheduled for early January 2015 in Havana, but on December 8, 2014, Cuba cancelled that round because it said it felt “disrespected” by a March 2014 cultural exhibit in Washington, D.C., which featured photos of Havana by a Lithuanian artist. (The real reason for the suspension is now apparent: the then upcoming December 17th announcement of Cuba-U.S. rapprochement.)
March 2015 Negotiations
The latest round of negotiations was focused on the proposed agreement’s largest and most important chapter: Cooperation and Cooperation Dialogue Sectoral Policies. This included discussion of Political dialogue and issues related to national and government policy: governance, human rights, rule of law, and joint efforts in addressing global challenges.
Before the session, Christian Leffler said such talks with Cuba require “a clear vision, steady nerves and tons of patience” and “ no illusions there will be a sudden radical transformation of Cuban society and government structures.”
Afterwards Leffler said the parties had “progressed substantially in technical legal provisions and the scope of cooperation.” He also said that human rights “was deeply discussed,” but without reaching any concrete agreements, leaving the “finding of solutions” for future meetings without the EU seeking to “impose a model” on Cuba. (In the photograph, the Cuban delegation is on the left; the EU’s on the right.)
Leffler also noted that the recent decision of Cuba and the U.S. to restore normal diplomatic relations promises should aid the EU and Cuba in their negotiations. The EU goal is to advance a “concrete, constructive and honest dialogue, to identify areas of political and economic cooperation.”
Cuba reported making that the parties had made progress on issues such as labor, culture, education, health, agriculture, trade and aid.
Future Negotiations
Although no date has been set for the next round of negotiations, some of the 28 EU members are insisting the EU accelerate the process because of concern the U.S. might progress more quickly with normalization. Spain, which counts Cuba as a key trade partner, has urged fellow members to “give EU businesses the chance to compete with American companies” on the island. And French President Francois Hollande plans to visit Cuba on May 11, the first visit ever by a French president and the first by a European or American leader since the US rapprochement.
The EU is already Cuba’s top foreign investor. EU officials say the proposed accord would give Brussels a bigger role in Havana’s market-oriented reforms, position EU companies for Cuba’s transition to a more open economy and allow the Europe to press for political freedoms on the Communist-ruled island.
Conclusion
Despite protestations to the contrary, the EU and the U.S. are now competing to gain an economic competitive edge in future dealings with Cuba. This should be an additional argument for the U.S. quickly to rescind its designation of Cuba as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism, ” to end the embargo of Cuba and to proceed on the many other issues to effectuate a normalization of relations with the island.
[2] EU Common Position on Cuba (Dec. 2, 1996 ). Before EU governments finally agree on a new piece of Union legislation, they usually reach a sort of pre-agreement called a common position. This can serve as a useful marker showing just how far governments have come towards agreeing the terms of a particularly complex piece of legislation. They have a certain legal weight and are published in the EU’s Official Journal. EU governments must adopt a common position before the European Parliament can begin its second reading of a particular proposal.
[4] The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which is part of what is referenced as the International Bill of Human Rights, establishes international minimum standards for self-determination; legal redress; equality; life, liberty, freedom of movement; fair, public and speedy criminal trials, privacy; freedom of expression, thought, conscience, religion; peaceful assembly; freedom of association (including trade union rights); family; and participation in public affairs.. It also forbids “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; slavery; arbitrary arrest; double jeopardy; and imprisonment for debt. This treaty was approved by the U.N. General Assembly in 1966. Now 168 states, including the U.S., are parties to this treaty. The U.S. signed this treaty in 1977, but did not ratify it until 1992 with many qualifications (five reservations, five understandings, four declarations and a proviso), and the agency responsible for monitoring compliance with the treaty (U.N. Human Rights Committee) has criticized the U.S. for noncompliance with various provisions, including voting.
[5] The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Political Rights, also part of the International Bill of Human Rights, calls for the “progressive realization” of the rights to gain a living by work; to have safe and healthy working conditions; to enjoy trade union rights; to receive social security; to have protection for the family; to have adequate housing and clothing; to be free from hunger; to have health care and free public education; to participate in cultural life, creative activity and scientific research. This treaty was approved by the U.N. General Assembly in 1966, and now 162 states are parties thereto. Compliance is monitored by the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The U.S. by President Jimmy Carter signed this treaty in 1977, but the U.S. has never ratified it and thus is not a party thereto.
On July 28, 2014, the U.S. State Department released its annual report on religious freedom around the world.[1]
Secretary of State Kerry’s Comments
Announcing the release of the report, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said although the U.S. was “obviously far from perfect,” it was important for the U.S. to treasure freedom of religion as “a universal value. . . . The freedom to profess and practice one’s faith is the birthright of every human being . . . [and] are properly recognized under international law. The promotion of international religious freedom is a priority for President Obama and it is a priority for me as Secretary of State.” In short, “religious freedom remains an integral part of our global diplomatic engagement.”
Executive Summary of the Report
The world had the largest displacement of religious communities in recent memory. In almost every corner of the globe, millions of Christians, Muslims, Hindus, and others representing a range of faiths were forced from their homes on account of their religious beliefs. Out of fear or by force, entire neighborhoods are emptying of residents. Communities are disappearing from their traditional and historic homes and dispersing across the geographic map.” In conflict zones (Syria, Central African Republic and Burma), this mass displacement has become a pernicious norm.
All around the world, individuals were subjected to discrimination, violence and abuse, perpetrated and sanctioned violence for simply exercising their faith, identifying with a certain religion, or choosing not to believe in a higher deity at all. Countries where this was a significant problem were Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Eritrea. Throughout Europe, the historical stain of anti-Semitism continued to be a fact of life.
Governments repressed religious freedom. Governments from all regions subjected members of religious groups to repressive policies, discriminatory laws, disenfranchisement, and discriminatory application of laws. These governmental actions not only infringed on freedom of religion themselves, but they also often created a permissive environment for broader human rights abuses. Restrictive policies included laws criminalizing religious activities and expression, prohibitions on conversion or proselytizing, blasphemy laws, and stringent registration requirements or discriminatory application of registration requirements for religious organizations. This was especially true in North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Sudan, China, Cuba, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Burma, Russia and Bahrain.
Governments engaged in discrimination, impunity and displacement of religious minorities. When governments choose not to combat discrimination on the basis of religion and intolerance, it breeds an environment in which intolerant and violent groups are emboldened, even to the point of physically attacking individuals on the basis of their religious beliefs. Governments in these countries failed to protect vulnerable communities and many religious minority communities were disproportionately affected, resulting in a large number of refugees and internally displaced persons. This was especially true in Syria, Sri Lanka, Egypt, Iraq, Bangladesh, Indonesia, India and Nigeria. Rising anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim sentiment in the following countries of Europe demonstrated that intolerance is not limited to countries in active conflict:Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Sweden and United Kingdom.
Religious minority communities were disproportionately affected by violence, discrimination and harassment. In many regions of the world, religious intolerance was linked to civil and economic strife and resulted in mass migration of members of religious minority communities throughout the year. In some of these areas, the outward migration of certain communities has the potential to permanently change the demographics of entire regions.
“Countries of Particular Concern”
Pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, the Secretary of State designated the following countries as “Countries of Particular Concern” (CPC): Burma, China, Eritrea, Iran, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Such countries “engage in or tolerate particularly severe violations of religious freedom” or “systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, including torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges, abduction or clandestine detention of persons, or other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of persons based on religion.”
Turkmenistan, which is new to this State Department list, is the only one of eight countries recommended for such designation by the latest report from the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. The others so recommended by the Commission are Egypt, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, Syria, Tajikistan and Vietnam.
Ambassador-at-large for International Religious Freedom
Simultaneously with this report’s release, the Obama administration announced the nomination of Rabbi David Saperstein as the next ambassador-at-large for international religious freedom. Rabbi Saperstein, a reform rabbi and lawyer known for his work in Washington to advance religious freedom, would be the first non-Christian to lead the State Department’s Office of International Religious Freedom, if confirmed by the Senate.
In 1754 both France and Great Britain had large colonial interests in North America. Britain, of course, had the 13 colonies[1] plus Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Hudson’s Bay. France had New France, which extended from Isle Royale (Cape Breton Island today) in the east to the Rocky Mountains in the west and from what is now southern Ontario in the north to the Gulf of Mexico in the south.
French & Indian War, 1754-1763
The two countries’ competition for expansion led in 1754 to what became known in the U.S. as the French and Indian War. The war was fought primarily along the frontiers separating New France from the British colonies and lasted until the signing of the Treaty of Paris on February 10, 1763, with France ceding New France to the British. (This war was part of the global Seven Years War, 1756-1763, focused on conflict between Britain and the Bourbons in France and Spain and territorial battles by others in the Holy Roman Empire.)
My sixth great-grandfather, John Brown, and two of his sons, Perley Brown (my fifth great-grandfather), and John Brown, Jr., served with the British forces in this war.[2]
In the Fall of 1756, the three men were members of a Minute Men brigade that went from their home town of Leicester, Massachusetts to join others in a planned assault on the French Fort St. Frederic (now Crown Point) at the southern end of Lake Champlain in today’s upstate New York. However, before the offensive got underway, word arrived of the French victory at Fort Oswego on the southeastern shore of Lake Ontario in present-day New York. The British feared that an overwhelming French army would be assembled in the Champlain Valley, and, therefore, the British cancelled the planed attack.
Fort William Henry
In August of the next year, 1757, the three men and other Minute Men from Leicester went to help defend the British Fort William Henry at the southern end of Lake George in the Province of New York. The Fort, however, was weakly supported, and after several days of French bombardment, the British surrendered. Afterwards the French destroyed the fort. (The fort has been reconstructed and is open with a museum for tourists.)
Under the terms of surrender, the French were to protect the British from the Indian allies of the French. The Indians, however, attacked the withdrawing British forces who had been stripped of their ammunition and killed and scalped a significant number of soldiers. The Indians also captured women, children, servants and slaves. (This incident was portrayed in James Fenimore Cooper’s 1826 novel, The Last of the Mohicans.) Fortunately the three Browns were not involved in this massacre.
[1] The 13 colonies were Province of New Hampshire, Province of Massachusetts Bay, Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantation, Connecticut Colony, Province of New York, Province of New Jersey, Province of Pennsylvania, the Lower Colonies on Delaware, Province of Maryland, Colony and Dominion of Virginia, Province of North Carolina, Province of South Carolina and Province of Georgia.
[2] Carol Willits Brown, William Brown–English Immigrant of Hatfield and Leicester, Massachusetts, and His Descendants c. 1669-1994 at 6, 11, 17 (Gateway Press; Baltimore, MD 1994).
A July 8th New York Timesheadline proclaims, “Arab Uprisings Point Up Flaw in Global Court.” It erroneously suggests that the people operating the International Criminal Court are stupid or cowardly or that the diplomats who in 1998 drafted the ICC’s governing treaty, the ICC’s Rome Statute, were similarly stupid or cowardly.
The article starts with the facts that the ICC has not initiated an investigation of human rights abuses in Yemen and Syria. That is lamentable, but it is not due to a flaw in the operations of the ICC or the Rome Statute.
It is due instead to the limitations on the Court’s jurisdiction that were intentionally established in the drafting of the Rome Statute because of opposition of states like the U.S. that did not want the Court commencing investigations or criminal prosecutions against their citizens if the state did not ratify that Statute.
That Statute’s Article 12 provides, in part, that the Court has jurisdiction if certain crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes) are committed on the territory of a state that is a party to the Rome Statute or by nationals of such a state. Neither Yemen nor Syria is such a party, as is true for all other states in the Mideast except Jordan. Thus, the Court does not have jurisdiction of such an investigation or prosecution under Article 12.
The Rome Statute’s Article 13(b) also provides jurisdiction for the Court if the U.N. Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression), refers a situation of suspected crimes of that nature to the ICC even if the state where the conduct occurred or whose nationals are involved had not ratified the Rome Statute. In fact, as the New York Times article points out, the Security Council has twice done so: Sudan (Darfur) and Libya.
However, as most people know, the U.N. Charter that was drafted in 1945 at the end of World War II grants in Article 27(3) a veto on any action by the Council to each of its five permanent members: the U.S., the United Kingdom, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [now Russia] and the Republic of China. The failure of the ICC to undertake any investigation of the Yemen situation is due to a threatened veto by the U.S. of such a referral.
With respect to Syria, the U.S. in June 2011 reportedly was seeking Russian and Chinese support for a Council referral of the situation to the Court, but that was obviously unsuccessful because no such proposal was actually advanced in the Council. In November 2011 four U.S. Senators (Dick Durbin, Benjamin Cardin, Robert Menendez and Barbara Boxer) sent a letter to the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. (Susan Rice) asking for such a Security Council referral. They said, “The people of Syria deserve to know that the people of the United States understand their plight, stand behind them, and will work to bring justice to the country.” Security Council referral of Syria to the ICC also has been endorsed by the New York Times.
The next month (December 2011) the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights urged the Security Council to make such a referral. But nothing happened, again because of threatened vetoes by Russia and China.
If there is any “flaw” in this structure with respect to Yemen and Syria it is the veto right of the five permanent members of the Security Council. Although many, if not most, of the U.N. members that are not permanent Council members dislike the superior status and veto rights of the permanent Council members and voice various suggestions for reform of the Security Council, expert observers of the U.N. do not think that is at all likely in the near future.
In the meantime, 121 of the 192 U.N. members are now parties to the Rome Statute, and the Court’s governing body (its Assembly of States Parties) is working towards its goal of universal ratification of the Rome Statute. If and when that happened, the Court could initiate investigations and prosecutions with respect to all such parties without Security Council action.
Over the last 60-plus years the peoples of the world through their nation-state governments have been struggling to climb out of the pits of depravity of World War II by creating or codifying international norms or human rights and by constructing mechanisms to protect individuals that are beyond the control of their own national governments while such governments still have sovereignty over most aspects of their lives. The creation and operation of the International Criminal Court and other so-called ad hoc international criminal tribunals are important pieces of this effort. This is an inherently difficult process, and many compromises are necessary in order to make any progress. But the story is not finished. Further development, I am confident, will occur.
On May 16, 2012, the ICC’s Chief Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, briefed the U.N. Security Council on the status of the ICC’s investigation and prosecution of crimes committed in Libya since February 15, 2011. He did so because the Council on February 26, 2011, had referred this situation to the ICC for investigation and prosecution.
Mr. Moreno-Ocampo reported that his office has been cooperating with states, INTERPOL, NGO’s and others, including the separate U.N. Commission of Inquiry on Libya and the Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC).
The Prosecutor emphasized that the “intensity of the cooperation [between the ICC and the NTC] . . . is only increasing” and that the NTC had asked the ICC to postpone its investigation and prosecution of two individuals to enable Libya to prosecute them for the same crimes. The Prosecutor said that his office was well aware of the “primacy of national proceedings” under the Rome Statute and on June 2nd would submit his comments on the request to the Court.
The report also discussed the Prosecutor’s continuing investigation of gender crimes (rape of opponents), the alleged arbitrary arrests and enforced disappearances of presumed Gaddafi loyalist and the alleged killings, looting, property destruction and forced disappearances of suspected Gaddafi loyalists in the town of Tawergha.
In addition, the Prosecutor stated that his office had investigated alleged crimes by NATO forces, but that it had “no information to conclude that the NATO air strikes which may have resulted in civilian deaths and injury or damaged civilian objects were the result of the intentionally directing of attacks against the civilian population as such or against civilian objects.” Nor did the Prosecutor have any “information to suggest that [NATO] . . . authorized the launching of strikes in the knowledge that such attacks would cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and directed overall military advantage anticipated.”
These conclusions regarding NATO were specifically welcomed by some of the NATO members on the Security Council (U.K., France and Germany). Russia and China, on the other hand, expressed concern that no charges had been brought against NATO leaders for some of their air strikes.
The Togo representative on the Council mentioned the need for greater cooperation between the ICC and African states and hoped that the recent visit to the African Union headquarters by the President of the ICC’s Assembly of States Parties “will enable a strengthening of ties so that the shared goal of combating the impunity of the perpetrators of heinous crime can be met.”
The most recent prior post on the ICC and Libya was on November 16, 2011 with nine comments thereto.
