El Salvador – Page 13 – dwkcommentaries

Teaching the International Human Rights Course

After I had audited the International Human Rights Law course at the University of Minnesota Law School in the Fall of 2001, Professor David Weissbrodt asked if I wanted to help him teachthe course. Given the vast disparity between his and my knowledge of the field, I thought he was joking. “David,” I said, “you don’t need any help.” But he persisted, and I relented and accepted his offer. I then served as an Adjunct Professor at the Law School for nine years, 2002-2010.

The course continued to have the same outline and structure that I had experienced in my auditing the course in the Fall of 2001,[1] and we continued to use the same book.[2] Professors Weissbrodt and Frey still taught most of the class sessions and later were joined by another expert in the field, Fionnuala D. Ní Aoláin.[3]

Professor Weissbrodt and I decided that I would teach two class sessions. One was on refugee and asylum law that built on my experience as a pro bono asylum lawyer. The other was on civil litigation over foreign human rights abuses in U.S. federal courts that took advantage of my considerable experience litigating civil cases in these courts.

Each year to prepare for my two class sessions, I conducted legal research to learn about the many new developments in order to write supplements for the chapters on these subjects. I also assisted in the rewriting of these chapters for the fourth edition of the book that came out in 2009.[4] I thereby continued to use my legal research and writing skills.

This involvement also guided my online reading of various U.S. and foreign newspapers and periodicals and to the creation of a system for email distribution of interesting articles on human rights to friends and colleagues. Many of these articles later became incorporated into the annual supplements for the two chapters that I prepared.

I decided that I would use moot courts for my two class sessions. For refugee and asylum law, four students volunteered to be lawyers for an asylum applicant and the U.S. Government for closing arguments before me, acting as an Immigration Judge in the Minnesota office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS and n/k/a Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS). For the other session, four additional students volunteered to be the lawyers for a corporate defendant and a foreign plaintiff in a civil lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota. The moot court was before me acting as the district judge on the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint alleging the corporation had aided and abetted human rights violations in a foreign country.

In addition to being one way to learn about the substantive law, the moot courts, in my opinion, had other advantages. I thought that the moot court approach would show the students how they could become involved in international human rights while engaged in a regular legal practice in the Twin Cities or anywhere else in the U.S. Given the strength of the international human rights program at the University of Minnesota Law School, many of its graduates have gone on to be lawyers for various U.N. agencies and international human rights NGOs, but most graduates become ordinary practicing lawyers. I also wanted to emphasize the importance of a lawyer’s work at the trial court level, rather than the typical law school moot court experience of arguing before a mock appellate court like the Minnesota or U.S. Supreme Court. Most litigators have much more experience at the trial court level and rarely, if ever, argue a case before the highest court of the state or the U.S. Finally it gave the participating students the opportunity to practice and develop their oral advocacy skills.

For each of the moot court sessions, I held preparatory meetings with the student-lawyers. I gave them guidance on what to expect and answered their questions about the substantive and procedural issues. A strong enjoyable mentorship relationship developed from this total experience.

As part of the moot court exercises, I emphasized to all the students the importance of a lawyer’s knowing the background and views of the judges before whom they appear.

The hypothetical district judge in the lawsuit over foreign human rights violations, for example, had excellent credentials. Appointed for life by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, the judge was intelligent, honest, hard-working, fair and with a lot of experience on many kinds of civil and criminal cases. The judge, however, had never studied international human rights and along with the fellow judges in his court and his supervising court (the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals) has never had a case like this under the Alien Tort Statute. As a result, the lawyers for this moot court needed to explain the case thoroughly and clearly. (Fortunately the judge had a law clerk who had studied the subject at the University of Minnesota Law School.)

The hypothetical immigration judge, on the other hand, has tried many asylum cases and has a thorough knowledge of the relevant law. This judge also was intelligent, honest, hard-working and fair. As a result, in this moot court there is no need to explain asylum law to the immigration judge. Instead, the attorney needs to focus on the facts of the instant case. Such judges, it should be noted, do not have lifetime appointments. Instead, they are appointed by the U.S. Attorney General as attorneys in the Department of Justice with no fixed term of office and are subject to discretionary removal and transfer by the Attorney General.

Soon after the classes were over, I sent email critiques of the students’ performance. Invariably the students rose to the challenge and made excellent arguments. I also usually issued a hypothetical decision on the dismissal motion and on the asylum request.

I also attended many other class sessions and the presentations by outside speakers in the course as well as various conferences at the Law School. As a result, I continued to learn more about the field.

Outside the classroom I was available to talk with students about the course and more generally about practicing law and other issues. I welcomed this opportunity to learn more about those who were getting ready to pursue various legal careers. I especially enjoyed getting to know the many foreign students in the course, some of whom were Hubert Humphrey Fellows. (My wife and I also volunteered to be a host family for Fellows from Ecuador, El Salvador and Brazil.)

Museum of the Republic, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 10.5.09 — Museum of Republic, Rio de Janeiro

DSCN3432 — Profs. Duane Krohnke & Elizabeth Sussekind @ Museum of Republic

My friendship with a Humphrey Fellow from Brazil resulted in her inviting me to participate in a symposium at the Museum of the Republic in Rio de Janeiro in the Fall of 2009. The symposium was the concluding event to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the Brazilian constitution of 1988 that ended its military dictatorship. This symposium focused on Memory and Justice, and my paper on the Truth Commission for El Salvador provided a Latin American perspective on Brazil’s not having had a similar truth commission.[5]

I thoroughly enjoyed these many aspects of having been an adjunct professor. I never would have had these experiences if I had continued practicing law after 2001. I, therefore, view them as confirmation of the wisdom of my decision to retire from lawyering that year.[6]

[1] See Post: Auditing the International Human Rights Law Course (June 30, 2011).

[2] David Weissbrodt, Joan Fitzpatrick & Frank Newman, International Human Rights: Law, Policy and Process (3d ed. 2001).

[3] University of Minnesota Law School, Fionnuala D. Ní Aoláin, http://www.law.umn.edu/facultyprofiles/niaolainf.html.

[4] David Weissbrodt, Fionnuala D. Ní Aoláin, Joan Fitzpatrick & Frank Newman, International Human Rights: Law, Policy and Process (4th ed. 2009).

[5] Museu da Republica, Memoria e Justica (2009).

[6] Post: Retiring from Lawyering (April 22, 2011).

Practitioner in Residence

UILaw — University of Iowa College of Law

For three days in February 1986 I was the practitioner in residence at the University of Iowa College of Law. I helped teach a class, made a presentation to a faculty seminar, gave a speech to an assembly of students and faculty and talked to a student group and a legal clinic seminar.[1]

Professor Patrick Bauer, a friend and former colleague at the Faegre & Benson law firm in Minneapolis, taught a first-year civil procedure class that I joined. The topic was Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that requires an attorney who submits a pleading, written motion or other paper to a federal district court to make an implicit representation that it was not presented for an “improper purpose,” that is was “warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument” for changing the law and that its factual contentions had or were likely to have “evidentiary support.” [2]

The problem for the class that day was posed by a recent case in which the court had denied a defense motion to dismiss a complaint and had directed defense counsel to submit a brief as to why they should not be subject to Rule 11 sanctions for their dismissal motion. The court thereafter decided that such sanctions were appropriate and imposed a fine on the defense counsel (in an amount to be determined). The violation of Rule 11, according to the court, occurred because the dismissal motion was not warranted by existing law and because the lawyers had not made a reasonable inquiry to determine if the motion was warranted by existing law.[3]

In the civil procedure class, I played the role of a law firm partner soliciting input and advice from his associate lawyers (played by the students) on preparing a complaint for a new civil lawsuit. Professor Bauer at the blackboard wrote down Rule 11 issues that were created by the ideas put forward by the associates.

“Sue the Bastard! Ruminations on American Litigiousness” was the title of my presentation to a faculty seminar. I had prepared this paper while on my sabbatical leave at Grinnell College. I discussed what I saw as the causes and effects of such litigiousness and suggested changes in our legal system and national psyche.[4]

An assembly of faculty and students was the forum for my speech, “The Pilgrimage of a Hired Gun–The First Twenty Years.” Accepting the challenge of Judge Frank M. Coffin for lawyers and judges to make “interiorly revealing” comments about their professional lives,[5] I discussed my first 20 years of practicing law and my search for meaning and spiritual values in a litigator’s life.

The first five years were my apprenticeship period when I was learning how to be a litigator and how to function in two large law firms in two new cities while also becoming a father to two sons. The self-sufficient, inner-directed person I thought I was had found a home in the well-paid, high-powered, eminently secular law firm.

The next five years I saw as my yuppie period. I was becoming more proficient as a lawyer. I advanced to partner at Faegre & Benson. We bought an upper-middle-class home. Still no room for a spiritual, religious life.

The next four or five years or so, in retrospect, was a time of mid-life crisis. I was increasingly skeptical of the significance of what I was doing for a living while facing personal challenges.

I started to sort out these problems over the next five years and started to integrate the various aspects of my life. In 1981 I joined Minneapolis’ Westminster Presbyterian Church and started to re-discover a spiritual life.[6] In 1982 I took a sabbatical leave from my law firm to teach at Grinnell College.[7] In 1984, I organized a liberal arts seminar for lawyers at the College.[8] I started to do research about two lawyers whom I admired: Joseph Welch and Edward Burling.[9] Being a practitioner in residence also gave me the opportunity to reflect on these issues and to share these thoughts with others.

I concluded my “Pilgrimage” speech by saying, “I embrace the tools of the trade [and] the craftsman’s pride in a job well done and let go of the omni-competent, omnipotent attitude of the successful lawyer.”

Little did I know at the time of this speech that my then just-starting involvement in the Sanctuary Movement case[10] would be an integrative experience that would lead to my becoming a pro bono asylum attorney,[11] my making a life-changing pilgrimage to El Salvador[12] and my becoming an adjunct professor of international human rights law at the University of Minnesota Law School.[13]

While a practitioner in residence at the Iowa College of Law in February 1986, I also spoke to a meeting of the Christian Legal Society on “Legal Issues Arising Out of the Sanctuary Movement and Government Infiltration of the Churches.” This was an account of the federal criminal case against leaders of the Sanctuary Movement and the Government’s disclosure that it had sent under-cover agents into worship services and Bible-study meetings at Arizona churches involved in the Movement. I also discussed the just-filed civil case against the U.S. Government over “the spies in the churches” by the American Lutheran Church and the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.).[14]

Another activity at the Iowa College of Law was attending a legal clinic seminar. I talked about the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct for lawyers and legal malpractice.[15] I shared my opinion that legislatures and courts were in the process of altering the balance between a lawyer’s role as advocate and the role as officer of the court to give greater importance to the latter. One example was the previously mentioned court’s imposing sanctions on lawyers for arguments that were not deemed in accordance with established law. I attributed this shift to increasing legal fees and the costs of litigation, the public perception that litigation processes had been abused and the knowledge that some lawyers are dishonest. This rebalancing carried with it a risk of diminishing a lawyer’s responsibilities to a client and hence an increased risk of malpractice. I concluded with this quotation: “Clients are entitled to much. They are entitled to dedication, diligent preparation, undivided loyalty, superb research, the most zealous advocacy and even sleepless nights; but they are not entitled to the corruption of our souls . . . . We do not lie, we do not cheat, we do not suborn, and we do not fabricate. We do not lie to clients. We do not lie for clients.”[16]

[1] Duane Krohnke Is First Daum Practitioner in Residence, Iowa Advocate, Fall/Winter 1985-86, at 15. The widow of F. Arnold Daum, a 1934 graduate of the Iowa College of Law and a senior partner in a Wall Street law firm, established the F. Arnold Daum Visiting Practitioner’s Program in the Law College to support bringing leading practitioners to the law school to appear in classes and exchange ideas with faculty and students. I was the first such practitioner to participate in this program.

[2] Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 11.

[3] Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1984).

[4] Post: A Sabbatical Leave from Lawyering (May 26, 2011).

[5] Post: A Liberal Arts Seminar for Lawyers (May 28, 2011).

[6] Post: Minneapolis’ Westminster Presbyterian Church (April 6, 2011).

[7] Post: A Sabbatical Leave from Lawyering (May 326, 2011).

[8] Post: A Liberal Arts Seminar for Lawyers (May 28, 2011).

[9] Post: Adventures of a History Detective (April 5, 2011).

[10] Post: The Sanctuary Movement Case (May 22, 2011).

[11] Post: Becoming a Pro Bono Asylum Lawyer (May 24, 2011).

[12] Post: My Pilgrimage to El Salvador, April 1989 (May 25, 2011).

[13] Post: My First Ten Years of Retirement (April 23, 2011).

[14] Post: The Sanctuary Movement Case (May 22, 2011)(account of the churches’ completed case against the Government).

[15] Krohnke, A Litigator’s Comments on the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Attorney Malpractice (Feb. 1986).

[16] Miller, A Report on the Morals and Manners of Advocates, 29 Cath. Law. 103, 108 (1984).

El Salvador’s Current Controversy over Its General Amnesty Law and Supreme Court

As indicated in a prior post, the issue of the constitutionality under Salvadoran law of the General Amnesty Law has not gone away. Indeed, that issue and a new law regarding its Supreme Court (Decree 743) have precipitated a major, still-unresolved controversy in the country.[1]

As an outsider, I have found it difficult to understand and analyze this controversy. I, therefore, will try to summarize what has been happening. I cannot predict how this will turn out, but will conclude with my observations and questions.

The first step in this still unfolding drama was the May 30, 2011, decision by a Spanish court to issue criminal arrest warrants for 20 Salvadoran military officers and soldiers for their alleged participation in the November 1989 murder of the six Jesuit priests.[2]

The next step was the adoption without debate three days later (June 2, 2011) of Decree 743 by the votes of the conservative political party legislators of the Salvadoran legislature (the National Assembly) with abstentions from all but two of the FMLN legislators and by the signing of the law the next day (June 3, 2011) by President Funes of the FMLN party. Decree 743 requires through July 2012 the five-member Constitutional Chamber of the Salvadoran Supreme Court to act unanimously in order to declare a law unconstitutional.[3]

Decree 743 and the highly unusual and hasty manner in which it was adopted have caused major citizen protests in the capitol city and debate in the media and various organs of the State.[4]

Much debate and speculation has centered on why the Decree was proposed and adopted by the legislators from the conservative political parties. Foremost, as former President Cristiani, who is now the President of the ARENA political party, has admitted, was concern that the Constitutional Chamber would invalidate the General Amnesty Law. Was there worry that a decision invalidating that amnesty law would facilitate a Salvadoran court’s enforcing the Spanish arrest warrants? The conservative political parties, it is true, also disliked some of the recent decisions by the four moderate or progressive members of the Chamber that have invalidated various laws. Was that the main reason? If so, why did the Decree have to be adopted so quickly without debate? The “sunset” provision of Decree 743 is also seen as an implicit recognition that it is aimed at the four progressive members of the Chamber in that their current three-year terms expire in July 2012.

So too there is debate and speculation as to why President Funes from the FMLN political party quickly supported the Decree when the FMLN itself did not. Was there pressure by the U.S., which does not want El Salvador to withdraw from the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and to stop using the U.S. Dollar as the country’s currency and, therefore, feared the Constitutional Chamber’s invalidating those laws? Was something not yet known promised Funes by the conservative political parties in exchange for his supporting the Decree? Some speculate that Funes did so to gain support in the National Assembly for a moderate legislative agenda. True?

The third step in this drama was the Constitutional Chamber’s decision in a case on June 6th (only three days after the adoption of Decree 743) that decided, by four of the five magistrates, that the country’s Budget Act 2011 was unconstitutional in two respects and that the just-adopted Decree 743 itself was unconstitutional. Decree 743 was held to violate the principle of separation of powers and to interfere with the constitutional powers of the Chamber; the decree, according to the court, was also adopted by the legislature in an unconstitutional manner.[5]

Yet another wrinkle was added to this controversy by the announcement on June 8th by Cristiani, as President of the ARENA political party. He said that ARENA had supported Decree 743 on June 2nd because of rumors that the Chamber was about to declare the General Amnesty Law unconstitutional. On June 8th (only six days after the legislature’s adoption of the Decree), however, Cristiani said that the information about the Chamber’s impending invalidation of the General Amnesty Law was erroneous and that instead the Chamber had made a “clear demonstration” that it did not intend to invalidate the amnesty. Therefore, Cristiani said, ARENA would be introducing a bill to repeal that Decree. This about-face, he said, was to end the conflict over the Decree and to promote dialogue among the three branches of government.[6]

This ARENA reversal itself has created more controversy and speculation. Why did it change its mind in only six days? Did it really want to end the conflict over the Decree and promote dialogue? Did it receive secret and improper leaks from the Chamber that it would not invalidate the General Amnesty Law? Was there in fact no pending case regarding the Amnesty Law? Was it discovery that the Chamber seven years ago had ruled that the Amnesty Law did not apply to the murders of the Jesuits because no administration may grant amnesty to itself?[7] Was it due to the Chamber’s June 6th decision holding that the Decree was unconstitutional and by respected attorneys publicly taking the same position?[8]

However, later on the very same day as the ARENA announcement of changing its position (June 8th), an attorney filed two cases with the Chamber challenging the constitutionality of the General Amnesty Law and El Salvador’s being a party to CAFTA. Will this cause ARENA to change its mind again?

The FMLN positions in this controversy are even more baffling. On June 2nd all but two of the FMLN legislators abstained on voting on Decree 743, saying it was a blow to democracy. The June 8th ARENA reversal of position on the Decree, therefore, presumably would be welcomed by the FMLN. The FMLN, however, also reversed its position. Its spokesman now said that the Decree had “no reverse gear” and that the Chamber’s June 6th invalidation of the Decree was a danger for the other institutions of the government. Why was the FMLN party taking these positions?[9]

President Funes from the FMLN appears to be the only participant who has had a consistent position. When he signed the Decree, he has said he did so because it was constitutional, it would prevent a looming conflict between the legislature and the judiciary and it would not obstruct the operations of the Chamber. Was this the real reason? After the ARENA reversal of position, he still supported the Decree and said that ARENA’s change appeared to reflect an improper agreement with the Chamber not to declare the amnesty unconstitutional and an improper attempt to influence the Chamber and cast doubt on the independence of some judges.[10] (The next day both ARENA and the President of the Supreme Court denied the existence of any agreement regarding the amnesty law between the Constitutional Chamber and ARENA or Cristiani.)[11]

As an outsider without full knowledge of all the facts, all I can do is speculate and raise questions.

The timing and manner of the adoption of Decree 743 and the comments by Cristiani suggest to me that the Decree is most directly connected with the Spanish court’s issuance of the indictment and warrants.

First, I had thought that the validity or invalidity of the General Amnesty Law had become a theoretical issue. That Law grants amnesty for certain crimes committed before January 1, 1992 (the end of the Civil War) or over 19 years ago. But for that time period, El Salvador had a 10-year statute of limitations for such crimes that in December 2000 was held to bar a new Salvadoran criminal case over the murders of the Jesuits without regard to the General Amnesty Law.[12] Although there is a basis under international law for challenging the validity of such a short statute of limitations for such horrendous crimes,[13] that appeared to me to be unlikely to succeed in El Salvador.

Second, the Spanish indictment was issued on May 30th and gave the defendants, the majority of whom are still Salvadoran residents, only 10 days (until June 9th) to surrender themselves to the Spanish court before additional steps would be taken to secure their arrests.[14] On June 2d (only three days after the issuance of the indictment) the National Assembly without debate adopted Decree 743, and the next day (June 3) it was signed by President Funes and enacted into law. This suggests to me a desire by the conservative political parties (and the President) to have Decree 743 in place before the Spanish court would take steps to have the Salvadoran courts issue arrest warrants for the defendants and thereby give those defendants a possible legal basis (the General Amnesty Law) to resist the arrest warrants. Is this what happened?

Third, Cristiani was a subject of the original criminal complaint in Spain and a potential additional indicted defendant in the Spanish case.[15] Thus, he has a profound personal interest in having Salvadoran legal defenses to any future attempt by the Spanish court to have him arrested in his home country. Just this month he has been the principal spokesman for ARENA regarding its original support of Decree 743 and tying it to trying to ensure that the General Amnesty Law is not invalidated. Was this at least part of Cristiani and ARENA’s motivation for their original support of Decree 743?

Fourth, it is much more difficult to understand the reasons why President Funes immediately signed the Decree when his political party (the FMLN) was opposed. His rationale as stated on June 10th is not persuasive to me as an outsider. I, therefore, wonder if President Funes had received threats that the Salvadoran military (or a paramilitary organization) would intervene to prevent the removal of these officers from the country? Was the perceived elimination of a threatened invalidation of the General Amnesty Law by requiring unanimity in the Constitutional Chamber seen as a way to prevent the extradition of the military men through the courts and thus avoid a military intervention or coup?

Finally, is it possible that all of this controversy is unnecessary? Could the Constitutional Chamber hold the General Amnesty Law constitutional, but like the U.S. federal courts conclude it is not applicable to proceedings in other countries?[16]

[1] See Post: International Criminal Justice: El Salvador’s General Amnesty Law and Its Impact on the Jesuits Case (June 11, 2011).

[2] See Post: International Criminal Justice: Spanish Court Issues Criminal Arrest Warrants for Salvadoran Murders of Jesuit Priests (May 31, 2011); Post: International Criminal Justice: Spanish Court’s Case Regarding the Salvadoran Murders of the Jesuit Priests (June 15, 2011).

[3] Marinero, Funes sanciona reformas para que fallos de amparos e inconstitucionalides sean por decision unanime, (June 3, 2011), http://www.lapagina.com; ?Donde se gesto el decreto que le puso el freno legal a la Sala de lo Constitucional?, (June 4, 2011),www.lapagina.com.sv; Voices from El Salvador, Institutional Coup in El Salvador (June 4, 2011), http://voiceselsalvador.wordpress.com/2011/06/04/institutional-coup-in-el-salvador; Voices from El Salvador, Salvadorans Protest the Government’s Actions Against Constitutional Court (June 6,2011), http://voiceselsalvador.wordpress.com/2011/06/06/salvadorans-protest-the-governments-actions-against-constitutional-court; Tim’s El Salvador Blog, Broad opposition to Decree 743 (June 8, 2011), http://luterano.blogspot.com/2011/06/broad-opposition-to-decree-743.html.

[4] Id.; Ortiz, Attorney Oscar Luna condemns the decree 743 (June 13, 2011), http://www.lapagina.com.sv (English translation; Luna is El Salvador’s human rights ombudsman); Discussions in the Constitutional Court in El Salvador (June 13, 2011), http://www.centralamericadata.com (Salvadoran Chamber of Commerce and Industry calls for repeal of Decree 743); Voices on the Border, The Debate Over Decree 743 Continues (June 14, 2011).

[5] Arauz, Constitutional Chamber hereby declared the decree that would tie the hands, elfaro (June 6, 2011), http://www.elfaro.com.sv; Merinero, Guerra de poderes en El Salvador: La Corte Suprema declara inapplicable el articulo que exige unanimidad en fallos de la Sala de lo Constitucional, (June 6, 2011), http://www.lapagina.com.sv.

[6] Huete, Henriquez & Cabrera, ARENA perida derogatoria de decreto 743, La Prensa Grafica (June 8, 2011), http://www.laprensagrafica.com; Arauz, ARENA retract the decree against FMLN urges Chamber and fulfill, elfaro (June 8, 2011).; Perez, ARENA se retracta y promote pedir la derogacion del decreto 743, (June 8, 2011), http://www.lapagina.com.sv; Otto & Marinero, ARENA contra la pared: ya hay dos recursos de inconstitucionalidad contra la Ley de Amnistia y el TLC (June 8, 2011), http://www.lapagina.com.sv.

[7] I have not seen this case myself, but it is referenced in one of the articles about the current controversy. I solicit information about this case.

[8] See n.6.

[9] E.g., FMLN reiterated it would not support repeal of Decree 743 (June 14, 2011), http://www.lapagina.com.sv.

[10] Guzman, Funes: “Aqui no ha habido ningun compadre hablado entre el presidente y la derecha, (June 6, 2011), http://www.lapagina.com.sv; Guzman, Funes: La confesion publica de ARENA es una injerencia inacceptable en el Organo Judicial, (June 10, 2011), http://www.lapagina.com.sv.

[11] Voices on the Border, The Debate Over Decree 743 Continues (June 11, 2011).

[12] No New Trial Set in Deaths of 6 Jesuits, Miami Herald, Dec. 14, 2000.

[13] E.g., Barrios Altos v. Peru, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 75, ¶ 41 (Mar. 14, 2001); Convention on the Non-Applicabilty of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, Art. I (war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide); European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitation to Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes, Art. 1 (crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes and “any other violation of a rule or custom of international law which may hereafter be established and which the Contracting Party concerned considers . . . as being of a comparable nature to [the previous crimes]”); Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, Art. VII; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 29 (genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity). Moreover, El Salvador apparently has a new statute that has no time limit for criminal prosecutions for torture, genocide, war crimes and certain other crimes occurring after sometime in 1996. (Ruth A. Kok, Statutory Limitations in International Criminal Law at 45 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press 2007).)

[14] CJA, Spanish National Court Indictments and Arrest Warrants (May 30, 2011)(in Spanish), http://www.cja.org/downloads/JesuitsArrestWarrants.pdf; CJA, Update: Spanish Judge Issues Indictments and Arrest Warrants in Spanish Jesuits Massacre Case (May 31, 2011), http://www.cja.org/article.php?id=1004.

[15] See Post: International Criminal Justice: Spanish Court’s Case Regarding the Salvadoran Murders of the Jesuit Priests (June 15, 2011).

[16] See Post: El Salvador’s General Amnesty Law in U.S. Federal Court Cases (June 14, 2011).

International Criminal Justice: The Spanish Court’s Criminal Case Regarding the Salvadoran Murders of the Jesuit Priests

As previously noted, a Spanish court on May 30, 2011, issued an indictment and arrest warrants for 20 of El Salvador’s former top military leaders and soldiers, accusing them of crimes against humanity and state terrorism in meticulously planning and carrying out the killings of six Jesuit priests in November 1989.[1]

The Spanish indictment essentially follows the factual findings regarding the murders and the cover-up that was set forth in the Report of the Truth Commission for El Salvador.[2] The indictment, however, offers greater factual details.[3]

The indictment also emphasizes the military’s formal chain of command as well as the informal power of the military’s “Tandona of 1966,” i.e., the military officers who had graduated from the Salvadoran military college in 1966 and who in 1989 held the major positions of official power. In 1989 these officers, the indictment says, feared the proposed reform and restructuring of the military that was being discussed as a condition for a peace agreement to end the civil war. Such reforms would result in reduction in the Tandona’s power and ability to embezzle from U.S. military aid. They, therefore, were bitter opponents of the Jesuits, and especially Father Ellacuria, who were major public advocates for such negotiations. [4]

The criminal case was filed in November 2008 by a U.S. NGO (Center for Justice & Accountability) and a Spanish NGO against 14 Salvadoran military officers plus former Salvadoran President Cristiani.[5]

In January 2009, the Spanish National Court accepted the case and formally charged the 14 fourteen former officers and soldiers named in the complaint with crimes against humanity and state terrorism for their role in the massacre. Additionally the court reserved the right, during the course of the investigation, to indict Cristiani for his alleged role in covering up the crime.[6]

The May 2011 indictment discusses Crisitani’s attending meetings at the military’s headquarters for several hours immediately before the murders were committed and his providing false information months later about a military search of the UCA campus that preceded the murders. But the Spanish court did not indict Cristiani and did not provide reasons for that decision not to charge Cristiani.[7]

The indictment also mentions that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had an office in the Salvadoran military headquarters in November 1989 and that some U.S. military advisors attended meetings at that headquarters with El Salvador’s top military leaders in the 24 hours preceding the murders. But there is no discussion in the indictment as to whether this involvement carries criminal implications for U.S. personnel.[8]

In addition, the indictment states that in January 1990 one of the U.S. officers (Maj. Eric Buckland) told his U.S. superiors that Colonel Benavides had given the order to kill Father Ellacuria. Until January 2010, the indictment reports, public information about the Salvadoran investigation of this crime had not mentioned possible involvement of the country’s top military officers. Thus, the revelation by Maj. Buckland was explosive in El Salvador because Benavides was a member of the “Tandona of 1966.”[9]

The Center for Justice & Accountabilty of San Francisco, California is a human rights organization dedicated to deterring torture and other severe human rights abuses around the world and advancing the rights of survivors to seek truth, justice and redress. CJA uses litigation to hold perpetrators individually accountable for human rights abuses, develop human rights law and advance the rule of law.[10]

[1] See Post: International Criminal Justice: Spanish Court Issues Arrest Warrants for Salvadoran Murders of Jesuit Priests (May 31, 2011).

[2] See Post: International Criminal Justice: The Salvadoran Murders of the Jesuit Priests (June 2, 2011); Post: International Criminal Justice: The Salvadoran Military’s Attempted Cover-Up of Its Committing the Murders of the Jesuit Priests (June 7, 2011); Post: International Criminal Justice: The Jesuits Case in the Truth Commission for El Salvador (June 9, 2011).

[3] Id.; CJA, Spanish National Court Indictments and Arrest Warrants (May 30, 2011)(in Spanish), http://www.cja.org/downloads/JesuitsArrestWarrants.pdf; CJA, Update: Spanish Judge Issues Indictments and Arrest Warrants in Spanish Jesuits Massacre Case (May 31, 2011), http://www.cja.org/article.php?id=1004.

[4] Id.

[5] CJA, Criminal Charges Filed before the Spanish National Court for 1989 Massacre of Jesuit Priests in El Salvador (November 13, 2008); CJA, Summary of Complaint in English (Nov. 18, 2009), http://www.cja.org/downloads/Jesuits_Summary_of_Complaint_in_English.pdf. Under Spanish law, citizens and NGOs may initiate criminal proceedings by filing criminal complaints as popular prosecutors.

[6] CJA, El Salvador: The Jesuits Massacre Case, http://www.cja.org/cases/jesuits.shtml; CJA, Spanish National Court To Pursue Criminal Investigation into 1989 Massacre of Jesuit Priests in El Salvador (Jan. 13, 2009); CJA, Spanish National Court’s Order Admitting the Complaint (Jan. 13, 2009)(in Spanish), http://www.cja.org/downloads/Jesuits_Order_Admitting_Complaint.pdf.

[7] CJA, Spanish National Court Indictments and Arrest Warrants (May 30, 2011)(in Spanish), http://www.cja.org/downloads/JesuitsArrestWarrants.pdf. There was a report that a former Salvadoran military officer testified to the Spanish court that Cristiani had advance knowledge of the planned assassinations and approved them. (Tim’s El Salvador Blog, More developments in Jesuits Case in Spain (July 7, 2010).)

[8] In November 2009 the Spanish court was provided with many declassified U.S. documents relating to the crime from the National Security Archive of George Washington University through the testimony of an analyst from the Archive and the expert testimony of Professor Terry Karl of Stanford University. At the same time, there were newspaper reports that the U.S. military attaché at the U.S. Embassy and a senior State Department official knew in advance that the Salvadoran military was planning to kill Ellacuria. (Id.; The CIA knew that the military of El Salvador would kill Ellacuria, El Mundo (Nov. 15, 2009)(English translation); Doyle, The Right to Information is the Right to Justice: Declassified Documents and the Assassination of the Jesuits in El Salvador (Nov. 16, 2009), http://nsarchive.wordpress.com; Sainz, CIA documents shed light on Jesuit massacre in El Salvador, (Nov.20, 2009), http://www.lapresnsagrafica.com/el-sa…-salvador.html (English translation); CJA, First International Witnesses To Testify in Madrid in the El Salvador Jesuits Massacre Case (Nov. 23, 2009); Ayala, El Salvador: Declassified Docs Shed Light on Jesuits Massacre Case (Nov. 27, 2009), http://ipsnews.net.); Tim’s El Salvador Blog, Spanish Paper–US know of attack on Jesuits in advance, (Nov. 28, 2009), http://luterano.blogspot.com.)

[9] Id.

[10] CJA, Mission, http://www.cja.org/article.php?list=type&type=86.

El Salvador’s General Amnesty Law in U.S. Federal Court Cases

We have examined El Salvador’s adoption of its General Amnesty Law, litigation in its courts regarding the validity of that Law under its own legal system and its impact on the defendants who had been convicted for involvement in the murders of the Jesuit priests.[1]

The General Amnesty Law also has been invoked by Salvadoran defendants as a defense to civil lawsuits for money damages in U.S. federal courts. But the U.S. courts have determined that the amnesty is limited to Salvadoran judicial proceedings and thus does not bar the U.S. lawsuits.[2]

In the U.S. lawsuit against Alvarao Saravia for complicity in the 1980 assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero, the U.S. court held him liable for $10 million compensatory and punitive damages for crimes against humanity. The court saw the General Amnesty Law and the dismissal of the Salvadoran criminal case against him as evidence of the plaintiff’s inability to obtain any judicial relief in that country. It thereby eliminated any U.S. requirement for the plaintiff to have exhausted his Salvadoran remedies. The U.S. court apparently assumed that the Salvadoran amnesty law had no application to the U.S. case as that issue was not discussed by the court.[3] However, the court did receive testimony that the Law was “directed to what the Salvadoran courts should do. It tells the Salvadoran courts how to deal with these cases” and that courts in other countries need not, and should not, take that Law into account.[4]

Another U.S. civil lawsuit for money damages was brought against Colonel Nicolas Carranza, a naturalized U.S. citizen living in Tennessee, who was Vice-Minister of Defense of El Salvador from late 1979 to early 1981. In late 2005, a civil jury after a three-week trial found Mr. Carranza liable to four of the five Salvadoran plaintiffs for $6 million in compensatory and punitive damages for crimes against humanity, extrajudicial killing and torture. The federal appeals court in early 2009 upheld that verdict.[5]

In the Carranza case, the trial court twice rejected the defendant’s argument that the Salvadoran amnesty law barred the U.S. lawsuit after the court concluded that the law did not purport to bar claims outside El Salvador.[6] The appellate court affirmed this ruling.[7]

On October 5, 2009, Carranza’s petition for review by the U.S. Supreme Court was denied.[8] Carranza, therefore, unsuccessfully argued that the lower court’s refusal to bar the suit constituted “an unwarranted intrusion into the sovereign affairs” of El Salvador and undermined “the very vehicle of [its] transformation from a war torn charnel house to a robust democracy.” In addition, Carranza pointed out that the Truth Commission Report also provided findings on crimes perpetrated by the FMLN, including the assassination of four unarmed U.S. Marines. This was the predicate for Carranza’s unsuccessful argument that the U.S. Supreme Court should consider “the implications of adjudicating monetary claims on behalf of members of groups committed to killing American soldiers.”[9]

Carranza’s petition to the U.S. Supreme Court was supported by the Government of El Salvador (then under the control of the right-wing ARENA political party). It argued that the ruling of the lower courts “impugns El Salvador’s sovereignty, contradicts international authority, and undermines El Salvador’s democracy.” Ignoring its own January 1992 Law of National Reconciliation that had banned amnesty for those found responsible by the Truth Commission until at least six months after its Report was released, the Government asserted that the amnesty law “was a principal, if not the pivotal, requirement of the [Peace Accords].”[10]

In addition, the Government of El Salvador asserted to the U.S. Supreme Court that plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their remedies in the Salvadoran courts as the Salvadoran Supreme Court had held in 2000, [11]that the country’s courts had discretion to waive the immunity of the amnesty law in particular cases involving “fundamental human rights.”[12] In the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, the Government of El Salvador, again as amicus curiae, did not mention the possible discretionary waiver of the amnesty law by Salvadoran courts and instead asserted that the amnesty law “specifically precludes the [plaintiffs’] claims . . . by granting absolute civil and criminal immunity to . . . Carranza.”[13]

[1] See Post: International Criminal Justice: El Salvador’s General Amnesty Law and Its Impact on the Jesuits Case (June 11, 2011).

[2] Doe v. Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112 (E.D. Cal. 2004); Chavez v. Carranza, 2005 WL 2659186, at 3-5 (W.D. Tenn. 2005); Chavez v. Carranza, 2006 WL 2434934, at 5 (W.D. Tenn. 2006), aff’d, 559 F.3d 486 (6th cir. 2009), cert. denied, 2009 WL 1513107 (U.S. Sup. Ct. Oct. 5, 2009); Ford v. Garcia, 289 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1147 (2003)(jury verdict for two Salvadoran generals by relatives of the four American church women who were raped an murdered in El Salvador in 1980; appellate court affirmed); Arce v. Garcia, 434 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2005)(jury verdict of $54.6 million for three Salvadoran plaintiffs against two Salvadoran generals; appellate court affirmed).

[3] Doe v. Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 1133-34, 1151-53.

[4] Trial Transcript at 772-73, Doe v. Saravia (E.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2004), http://www.cja.org/cases/RomeroTranscripts/9-3-04%20Trial%20Transcript.txt.

[5] Chavez v. Carranza, 559 F.3d 486 (6th Cir. 2009); CJA, El Salvador: Col. Nicolas Carranza, http://www.cja.org/cases/carranza.shtml.

[6] Chavez v. Carranza, 2005 WL 2659186, at 3-5 (W.D. Tenn. 2005); Chavez v. Carranza, 2006 WL 2434934, at 5 (W.D. Tenn. 2006).

[7] Chavez v. Carranza, 559 F.3d at 494-96. The plaintiffs’ argument against the amnesty law was supported in the Sixth Circuit by a group of law professors. (Brief Amici Curiae [26 international human rights law professors] in Support of Appellees and Affirmance at 14-15, Chavez v. Carranza (6th Cir. May 14, 2008).)

[8] Carranza v. Chavez, 2009 WL 1513107 (U.S. Sup. Ct. Oct. 5, 2009).

[9] Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Carranza v. Chavez, 2009 WL 1511732 (U.S. Sup. Ct. No. 08-1467 May 28, 2009).

[10] Brief of Amicus Curiae Republic of El Salvador in Support of Petitioner [Carranza], Carranza v. Chavez, 2009 WL 1511733, at 2 (U.S. Sup. Ct. No. 08-1467 May 28, 2009).

[11] See Post: International Criminal Justice: El Salvador’s General Amnesty Law and Its Impact on the Jesuits Case (June 11, 2011).

[12] Brief of Amicus Curiae Republic of El Salvador in Support of Petitioner [Carranza], Carranza v. Chavez, 2009 WL 1511733, at 2 (U.S. Sup. Ct. No. 08-1467 May 28, 2009).

[13] Brief of Amicus Curiae The Republic of El Salvador in Support of Appellant [Carranza] at 1, 3, Chavez v. Carranza (6h Cir. Apr. 22, 2008) (emphasis added).

International Criminal Justice: The Jesuits Case Before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights

We already have looked at a Spanish court’s recent issuance of 20 criminal arrest warrants regarding the November 1989 murders of six Jesuit priests in El Salvador[1] and the provisional facts of the murders themselves[2] and the Salvadoran military’s attempts to cover up its being the one responsible for the killings.[3] We also have summarized the Salvadoran criminal case regarding this crime.[4] Along the way we have encountered the findings regarding this crime by the Truth Commission for El Salvador and what that Commission was and how it did its work.[5] Yet another facet of this case has been exposed: El Salvador’s General Amnesty Law and its impact on the Jesuits case.[6]

Now we look at the Jesuits case in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), headquartered in Washington, D.C. It receives and analyzes petitions alleging human rights violations under the American Convention [Treaty] on Human Rights. When a petition meets certain conditions of eligibility, the IACHR solicits the views of the concerned State, investigates the violations and issues a report that typically sets forth its findings and conclusions plus recommendations to the State concerned.[7] As of 1993, according to a U.S. bar association, the IACHR “decides few cases, usually after a long delay, and often its decisions are not drafted in a persuasive manner,” and its “decisions receive very little notice, are not cited or relied on in other cases, and are often not obeyed.” [8]

On the same day the Jesuit priests were murdered (November 16, 1989), Americas Watch, a non-governmental human rights organization, filed a complaint with the IACHR alleging that the Salvadoran government had violated the American Convention [Treaty] on Human Rights with respect to the murder of the Jesuits and their cook and her daughter. Subsequently the government asked for dismissal on the ground that the case had been duly prosecuted in the country.[9]

Ten years later (December 22, 1999), the Commission issued its report making detailed findings about the murder and subsequent events and concluding that the state had violated the American Convention. It found the Truth Commission Report to be credible and placed heavy reliance on it.[10] As a result, the IACHR recommended that the government conduct an expeditious, effective investigation and prosecute and punish those who were involved “without reference to the amnesty,” to make reparations and to render the General Amnesty Law null and void.[11] The IACHR set forth its legal reasoning why that Law was invalid.[12]

Almost another 12 years now have passed since the IACHR’s decision, and still the government of El Salvador has not complied with these recommendations.[13]

In November 2009, however, on the 20th anniversary of the murder of the Jesuit priests, El Salvador at least partially complied with the recommendation for reparations. President Mauricio Funes presented the nation’s highest award (National Order of Jose Matias Delgado) to the Jesuit priests’ relatives as an act of atonement. Finally the Funes’ Administration formally advised the IACHR and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights that the Salvadoran state accepted the binding nature of their past decisions involving the country and the state’s responsibility to implement their recommendations in those cases.[14]

The IACHR has had three other cases that were investigated by the Truth Commission and at least two other cases of human rights abuses during El Salvador’s civil war. In all of these cases the IACHR concluded that the country had violated the American Convention on Human Rights and made recommendations similar to the ones in the Jesuits case. For the most part, El Salvador has not adopted IACHR’s recommendations in these cases.[15]

In January 2010, however, President Funes took steps for compliance with the recommendations to make reparations to the victims of these crimes, including the Jesuits case. President Funes admitted that during the civil war state security forces “committed serious human rights violations and abuses of power,” including “massacres, arbitrary executions, forced disappearances, torture, sexual abuse, arbitrary deprivation of freedom” and other acts of repression. Fuenes also made a formal apology to all of the victims of these crimes and asked for their forgiveness. In addition, Fuenes created three commissions (i) to offer redress to the victims, (ii) to search for children who went missing during the war; and (iii) to provide attention to disabled combatants. (The country’s Vice President, Salvador Sanchez Ceren, simultaneously apologized for the actions of FMLN guerrillas during the civil war.)[16]

[1] See Post: International Criminal Justice: Spanish Court Issues Criminal Arrest Warrants for Salvadoran Murders of Jesuit Priests (May 31, 2011).

[2] See Post: International Criminal Justice: The Salvadoran Murders of the Jesuit Priests (June 2, 2011).

[3] See Post: International Criminal Justice: El Salvador’s Military’s Attempt To Cover-Up Its Committing the Murders of the Jesuit Priests (June 7, 2011).

[4] See Post: International Criminal Justice: The Salvadoran Criminal Prosecution of the Murders of the Jesuit Priests (June 8, 2011).

[5] See Post: International Criminal Justice: The Jesuits Case in the Truth Commission for El Salvador (June 9, 2011).

[6] See Post: International Criminal Justice: El Salvador’s General Amnesty Law and Its Impact on the Jesuits Case (June 11, 2011). A future post will discuss the current Salvadoran controversy regarding the General Amnesty Law and the Constitutional Chamber of the country’s Supreme Court.

[7] IACHR, What is the IACHR?, http://www.cidh.oas.org/what.htm . (The other human rights body for the Americas is the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which is located in San José, Costa Rica.)

[8] Comm. on Int’l Human Rights of the Ass’n of Bar of City of N.Y., The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: a Promise Unfulfilled at 3 (1993). The author believes these 1993 conclusions about the IACHR are still valid and invites comments on this topic.

[9] Ignacio Ellacuria, et al. v. El Salvador, Rep. No. 136/99 ¶¶ 1-3 (IACHR Case No. 10.488, Dec. 22, 1999).

[10] Id. ¶¶ 25-26, 52, 59-60, 69-72, 75-86, 179-80, 184, 209, 219, 230-31.

[11] Id. ¶¶ 4, 52-142, 143-96, 237-38, 241.

[12] Id. ¶¶ 192-232. Accord Cea et al v. El Salvador, Rep. No. 1/99 ¶¶ 105-17, 160 (Case No. 10.480, Jan. 27, 1999).

[13] CJA, El Salvador: The Jesuits Massacre Case, http://www.cja.org/cases/jesuits.shtml.

[14] IACHR, Press Release No. 78/09: IACHR Concludes Its 137th Period of Sessions (Nov. 13, 2009); Aleman, El Salvador awards highest honors to 6 Jesuit priests killed by army 20 years ago, Washington Examiner (Nov. 16, 2009).

[15] Monsignor Romero v. El Salvador, Rep. No. 37/00 ¶¶ 1-2 (IACHR Case No. 11.481, April 13, 2000); Admissibility of El Mozote Massacre, Rep. No. 24/06, ¶¶ 1-29 (IACHR Case No. 10.720, Mar. 2, 2006); COMADRES, Rep. No. 13/96, ¶¶ 1-2, 5-7, 28 (IACHR Case No. 10.948, Mar. 1, 1996); Cea, et al. v. El Salvador, Rep. No. 1/99 (IACHR Case No. 10.480 Jan. 27, 1999); Vasquez v. El Salvador, Rep. No. 65/99 (IACHR Case No. 10.228 Apr. 13, 1999).

[16] Cervantes, Funes pide perdon por abusos durante la Guerra (Jan. 16, 2010),www.elfaro.net/es; IACHR, Press Release NO. 4/10: IACHR Welcomes El Salvador’s Recognition of Responsibility and Apology for Grave Human Rights Violations During the Armed Conflict (Jan. 21, 2010); El Salvador President Apologizes to War Victims, Latin American Herald Tribune (Jan. 22, 2010). The author is not aware of what has happened with these three commissions and invites comments with such information.

International Criminal Justice: El Salvador’s General Amnesty Law and Its Impact on the Jesuits Case

We already have looked at a Spanish court’s recent issuance of 20 criminal arrest warrants regarding the November 1989 murders of six Jesuit priests in El Salvador[1] and the provisional facts of the murders themselves[2] and the Salvadoran military’s attempts to cover up its being the one responsible for the killings.[3] We also have summarized the Salvadoran criminal case regarding this crime[4] and the work of the Truth Commission for El Salvador as it pertains to this crime.[5] Now we look at El Salvador’s General Amnesty Law and its impact on the Jesuits’ case.[6]

Adoption of the General Amnesty Law

Five days after the delivery of the Truth Commission Report in March 1993, El Salvador’s National Assembly adopted the General Amnesty Law for the Consolidation of the Peace (Decree 486). It granted in Article 1: “a full, absolute and unconditional amnesty to all those who participated in any way in the commission, prior to January 1, 1992 [the end of the civil war], of political crimes or common crimes linked to political crimes or common crimes in which the number of persons involved is no less than twenty.”

This law’s Article 6 stipulated that the amnesty shall apply “to the persons referred to in article 6 of the National Reconciliation Law . . . of January 23, 1992 [i.e., to those who would be named or implicated in the anticipated Truth Commission Report].” In addition, Article 2 of the Law broadened the definition of “political crime” to include “crimes against the public peace,” “crimes against the activities of the courts,” and crimes “committed on the occasion of or as a consequence of the armed conflict, without regard to political condition, militancy, affiliation or ideology.” Article 4 stated that all pending cases should be dismissed and all individuals being held should be released while anyone charged in the future could obtain dismissal of the charges. In addition, Article 4 provided that the amnesty extinguished all civil liability.[7]

This legislation had been recommended by then President Cristiani and passed by the ARENA- party-controlled Assembly over objections by the U.N. Secretary General and the new Salvadoran Human Rights Ombudsman. It should also be noted that the Truth Commission had not recommended any amnesty as the Commissioners thought that was a decision for the people to make after an appropriate dialogue on the subject. But the manner in which the General Amnesty Law was rushed through the legislature was later seen by at least one of the Truth Commissioners as “unseemly at the very least, indicative of a lack of respect for the democratic processes, and thus incompatible with the spirit of the Peace Accords.” [8]

In passing the General Amnesty Law, the Government overruled the agreed-on terms of the National Reconciliation Law of January 23, 1992, that provided amnesty for combatants in the civil war, but not for (1) persons convicted by juries and (2) those named by the Truth Commission as responsible for serious human rights violations, but that allowed the latter exception to amnesty to be overruled by the National Assembly six months after the issuance of the Truth Commission Report and presumably after public debate about any such overruling. Significantly the National Reconciliation Law of 1992 was a political compromise. The right-wing ARENA party that controlled the government wanted a blanket amnesty that would have immunized all persons committing any war crimes while opposition parties wanted a more limited amnesty, and the two sides instead agreed to the compromise provision just noted.[9]

Impact of the General Amnesty Law on the Jesuits Case in El Salvado

In 1993, pursuant to the General Amnesty Law, Colonel Benavides and the others who had been convicted in the Jesuits case were released from prison.[10]

Salvadoran Litigation over the General Amnesty Law

Immediately after the adoption of this law, Salvadoran human rights organizations brought a lawsuit to challenge its constitutionality, but the Salvadoran Supreme Court in 1993 rejected that claim. The court, in part, justified its conclusion by relying upon the following provision of Article 6(5) of the Protocol II to the Geneva Convention relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts: “At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they are interned or detained.” [11]

This broad reading of the above provision of Protocol II of this Geneva Convention, however, is not sustained by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which has primary responsibility for monitoring world-wide compliance with the Geneva Conventions. Instead, the ICRC says it is inappropriate to grant amnesty to persons who have violated international humanitarian law, i.e., the law of war; Article 6(5) instead was intended to encourage amnesty or immunity for combatants so long as they act in accordance with that humanitarian law.[12]

Moreover, notwithstanding this provision of Protocol II, El Salvador’s General Amnesty Law and similar laws in other countries have been criticized by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights as violating the American Convention on Human Rights. Similar criticisms have been leveled against this and similar laws in other countries under the American Convention on Human Rights and other multilateral human rights treaties by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the U.N. Secretary-General, several U.N. human rights bodies, the European Court of Human Rights and international criminal tribunals.[13] These arguments also have been advanced by human rights NGOs.[14]

Again in 2000 the Salvadoran Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the General Amnesty Law, but this time it also held that each investigative judge could determine whether application of the law in a particular case would interfere with the country’s treaty obligations or with reparation of a fundamental right, and if it would so interfere, the judge would not have to apply the law.[15]

The importance of the General Amnesty Law and whether it is constitutional under Salvadoran law has not gone away. Indeed, right now these are hot topics in El Salvador, as we will see in the next post.

In any event, as a result of the General Amnesty Law, the author is not aware of any new Salvadoran criminal prosecutions of those named in the Truth Commission Report, and the Commission’s recommendation of eventual punishment of the guilty by the Salvadoran government has been rejected. Moreover, in the years since the Supreme Court’s 2000 decision announcing the ability of a judge in an individual case to not apply the amnesty law, the author is not aware of any instance in which that has been done.

[1] See Post: International Criminal Justice: Spanish Court Issues Criminal Arrest Warrants for Salvadoran Murders of Jesuit Priests (May31, 2011).

[2] See Post: International Criminal Justice: The Salvadoran Murders of the Jesuit Priests (June 2, 2011).

[3] See Post: International Criminal Justice: El Salvador’s Military’s Attempt To Cover-Up Its Committing the Murders of the Jesuit Priests (June 7, 2011).

[4] See Post: International Criminal Justice: The Salvadoran Criminal Prosecution of the Murders of the Jesuit Priests (June 8, 2011).

[5] See Post: International Criminal Justice: The Jesuits Case in the Truth Commission for El Salvador (June 9, 2011) .

[6] In subsequent posts, we will examine the Jesuits case in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Spanish court.

[7] I-A Comm’n Human Rights, Report on the Situation in El Salvador § II (4) (Feb. 11, 1994); Doe v. Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 1133; U.S.State Dep’t, El Salvador Human Rights Practices, 1993, at 1 (Jan. 31, 1994); Hemisphere Initiatives, Justice Impugned: The Salvadoran Peace Accords and the Problem of Impunity at 6-7 (June 1993); Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, El Salvador’s Negotiated Revolution: Prospects for Legal Reform at 62-79; Popkin at 135, 150-52; Brief Amici Curiae [26 international human rights law professors] in Support of Appellees and Affirmance at 4, Chavez v. Carranza (6th Cir. May 14, 2008) [“Law Professors Amici Brief”].

[8] Miller, Compromise Amnesty Law OK’d in Salvador–Central America, Los Angeles Times, Jan. 24, 1992; Popkin at 150-52; Buergenthal at 536-38.There, however, was no significant political support for repeal of the General Amnesty Law, and in 1994 the FMLN said that if the Law were held unconstitutional, it would support a new, narrower amnesty law. Popkin at 157.

[9] Id.

[10] IACHR, Ellacuria v. El Salvador, Rep. No. 136/99 ¶ 36 (Case No. 10.488 Dec. 22, 1999); New Charges Barred in Salvador Killings, N. Y. Times, Oct. 24, 2000.

[11] Popkin at 152-53; International Comm. of Red Cross, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebList?ReadForm&id=475&t=art. Subsequently courts in South Africa and Chile apparently followed this ruling of the El Salvador Supreme Court. (Popkin at 153.)

[12] Roht-Arriaza, Combating Impunity: Some Thoughts on the Way Forward, 59 Law & Contemp. Problems 93, 97 (Fall 1996); Roht-Arriaza, The Developing Jurisprudence on Amnesty, 20 Hum. Rts. Q. 843, 865-66 (1998); IACHR, Cea, et al, v, El Salvador . Rep. No. 1/99, ¶ 116 (Case No. 10.480 Jan. 27, 1999); Popkin at 154.

[13] U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances–Mission to El Salvador , ¶¶ 62-75, 83 (Oct. 26, 2007); U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances ¶ 426 (Jan. 10, 2008); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Committee: El Salvador ¶ 6 (July 22, 2003); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Committee: Republic of Congo ¶ 12 (2000); U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment 20, ¶ 15 (Mar. 10, 1992); U.N. Comm. on Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations of the Committee: El Salvador ¶ ¶ 15, 22 (April 4, 2006); U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm’n, General Recommendations of the Special Rapporteur on Torture ¶ (k) (2003); U.N. Gen. Ass’bly Res. 47/133, Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances , Art. 18 (1) (Feb. 12, 1993); IACHR, 1985-1986 Annual Report of IACHR, ch. V (“only the appropriate democratic institutions—usually the legislature—with the participation of all the representative sectors, are the only ones called upon to determine whether or not to decree an amnesty of [sic] the scope thereof, while amnesties decreed previously by those responsible for the violations has [sic] no juridical validity”); Law Professors Amici Brief at 8-29; Weissbrodt at 500-01.

[14] E.g., Equipo de Concertacion por la paz, la dignidada y la justicia social, Evaluacion de 15 anos despues de la firma de los Acuerdos de Paz en El Salvador (Jan. 16, 2007); Equipo Regional de Monitoreo y Analisis de Derechos Humanos en Centroamerica, Derechos Humans y Conflictividad en C.A.: Violencia, impunidad y megaproyectos contra la vida y la dignidad (June 2008); Equipo Regional de Monitoreo y Analisis de Derechos Humanos en Centroamerica, 2008-2009 Informe Sobre Derechos Humanos y Conflictividad en Centroamerica at 30, 67-68 (2009).

[15] Brief of Amicus Curiae Republic of El Salvador, Carranza v. Chavez, 2009 WL 1511733 (U.S. Sup. Ct. No. 08-1497 May 28, 2009); Brief Amici Curiae [26 international human rights law professors] in Support of Appellees and Affirmance at 14-15, Chavez v. Carranza (6th Cir. May 14, 2008) [“Law Professors Amici Brief”].

International Criminal Justice: The Jesuits Case in The Truth Commission for El Salvador

We already have looked at a Spanish court’s recent issuance of 20 criminal arrest warrants regarding the November 1989 murders of six Jesuit priests in El Salvador[1] and the provisional facts of the murders themselves[2] and the Salvadoran military’s attempts to cover up its being the one responsible for the killings.[3] We also have summarized the Salvadoran criminal case regarding this crime.[4] Along the way we have encountered the findings regarding this crime by the Truth Commission for El Salvador. Now we see what that Commission was and how it did its work.[5]

In January 1992, under United Nations’ auspices, the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN, a Salvadoran guerrilla group, successfully concluded their long negotiations to end the 12 years of civil war. The Peace Accords represent a genuine compromise: the FMLN renounced its aspiration to seize the state by military force and impose radical economic changes while the government and its political supporters relinquished their historical control and violent opposition to change.[6] The Accords laid out sweeping reforms to permit the FMLN to participate in political life, to transform the institutions that had accounted for the major human rights violations and to achieve greater equity in the economic and social life of the country.[7]

The Peace Accords also created the Commission for the Truth for El Salvador.[8] Its inclusion developed out of the desire of both sides for at least symbolic justice focused on the most notorious cases with the U.N. providing the compromise formula for such a commission.[9] The U.N. Secretary-General appointed the three members of the Commission. Notably none of its members was Salvadoran because its work was perceived to be too dangerous for anyone who lived in the country.[10]

The Commission was charged to consider and resolve “the need to clarify and put an end to any indication of impunity on the part of officers of the armed forces, particularly in cases where respect for human rights is jeopardized.”[11]

More specifically, the Commission was to investigate “serious acts of violence that have occurred since 1980 and whose impact on society urgently demands that the public should know the truth.”[12] In conducting these investigations, the Commission was to take into account “the exceptional importance that may be attached to the acts to be investigated, their characteristics and impact, and the social unrest to which they gave rise” and the “need to create confidence in the positive changes which the peace process is promoting and to assist the transition to national reconciliation.”[13]

In addition, the Commission was to make “legal, political or administrative” recommendations for specific cases as both sides had agreed that the Commission could recommend criminal prosecutions.[14] More generally, the Commission recommendations “may include measures to prevent the repetition of such acts, and initiatives to promote national reconciliation.”[15] Under the Peace Accords, the parties “undertake to carry out the Commission’s recommendations.”[16]

The Commission was to conduct its activities “on a confidential basis.” It was not to “function in the manner of a judicial body.” It could use “whatever sources of information it deems useful and reliable.” It could “interview, freely and in private,” anyone. Its procedures should “yield results in the short term, without prejudice to the obligations incumbent on the Salvadoran courts to solve such cases and impose the appropriate penalties on the culprits.”[17]

In evaluating and implementing this Mandate regarding its procedures and methodology, the Commission made the following decisions:

It would investigate individual cases or acts that outraged Salvadoran society and/or international opinion as well as a series of individual cases with similar characteristics revealing a pattern of violence or ill treatment that also outraged Salvadoran society.

Its sources would be confidential.

It would interview people and receive reports from governments and international bodies.

It would take all possible steps to ensure the reliability of the evidence used to arrive at a finding; to verify, substantiate and review all statements of facts by checking them against a large number of sources whose veracity had been established and by not basing any finding on a single source or witness or only on a secondary source.

It would name perpetrators of human rights violations.

Its report would specify the degree of certainty for each finding. “Overwhelming evidence” would indicate “conclusive or highly convincing evidence.” “Substantial evidence” would indicate “very solid evidence.” “Sufficient evidence” would indicate “more evidence to support the . . . finding than to contradict it.”[18]

On March 15, 1993, the Commission delivered its report to the U.N. Security Council, the Government of El Salvador, the FMLN and the National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ). The Report made findings on 32 cases of serious acts of violence, one of which was the murders of the Jesuit priests.[19]

The Commission had no power to prosecute anyone, and it recommended against immediate prosecutions by the Salvadoran government because the Commission believed the Salvadoran judicial system was not capable of handling such cases.[20] Instead, the Commission’s findings on specific cases were intended to be used by the Salvadoran judicial system after it had been reformed to make “whatever final decisions they consider appropriate at this moment in history.”[21]

Finally the Truth Commission Report has been held by U.S. federal courts to meet standards of trustworthiness and thus was admissible into evidence in cases involving El Salvador.[22] The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has reached the same conclusion for cases from the country.[23]

[1] See Post: International Criminal Justice: Spanish Court Issues Criminal Arrest Warrants for Salvadoran Murders of Jesuit Priests (May31, 2011).

[2] See Post: International Criminal Justice: The Salvadoran Murders of the Jesuit Priests (June 2, 2011).

[3] See Post: International Criminal Justice: El Salvador’s Military’s Attempt To Cover-Up Its Committing the Murders of the Jesuit Priests (June 7, 2011).

[4] See Post: International Criminal Justice: The Salvadoran Criminal Prosecution of the Murders of the Jesuit Priests (June 8, 2011).

[5] Commission for the Truth for El Salvador, Report: From Madness to Hope: The 12-year war in El Salvador at 13-14, 26-171 (March 15, 1993), http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/salvador/informes/truth.html [“Commission Report”]; Margaret Popkin, Peace without Justice: Obstacles to Building the Rule of Law in El Salvador at 3, 6-7, 41, 46-48, 50-57 (University Park, PA: Penn. State Univ. Press 2000) [“Popkin”]; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Annual Report 1991, ch. IV (Feb. 14, 1992); Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in El Salvador § I (1) (Feb. 11, 1994).

[6] Terry Karl, El Salvador’s Negotiated Revolution, 71 Foreign Affairs 147, 148 (1992).

[7] United Nations, El Salvador Agreements: The Path to Peace (1992) [“Peace Accords”]; Unitarian Universalist Service Comm., Provisional Summary of Key Accords by Salvadoran Negotiators (Jan. 15, 1992); Search for Justice, The Salvadoran Peace Accords: A Synopsis (circa Jan. 15, 1992) [“Accord Synopsis“]; El Rescate Human Rights Dep’t, The Salvadoran Peace Accords: An Outline (1992); Popkin at 3-4, 83-95; Human Rights Watch, World Reports: El Salvador (2001); Human Rights Watch, World Reports: El Salvador (2002).

[8] Id.

[9] Popkin at 87-94.

[10] Accord Synopsis; Commission Report; Popkin at 87-88, 94-95, 121-24; Buergenthal, The United Nations Truth Commission for El Salvador, 27 Vanderbilt J. Transnat’l L. 497, 499-500, 503-04 (1994) [“Buergenthal”]. Thomas Buergenthal was one of the members of the Truth Commission, and from 2000 to 2010 he was a judge on the International Court of Justice. (Int’l Court of Justice, Judge Thomas Buergenthal, http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=2&p3=1&judge=11.)

[11] Peace Accords at 53; Commission Report at 18; Popkin at 109-11.

[12] Peace Accords at 17, 29; Commission Report at 18.

[13] Peace Accords at 17, 30; Commission Report at 18; Popkin at 109-11.

[14] Peace Accords at 30; Commission Report at 18; Popkin at 94.

[15] Peace Accords at 30; Commission Report at 18; Popkin at 109-11.

[16] Peace Accords at 31; Commission Report at 19.

[17] Peace Accords at 30, 53; Commission Report at 22.

[18] Commission Report at 22-25; Popkin at 112-20. The El Salvador Government tried to persuade the Commission not to name individuals. Buergenthal at 519-22 (Commissioners assumed from the start that alleged perpetrators would have to be named and not to do so would reinforce the impunity that was supposed to end); Popkin at 113-14; David Weissbrodt, Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Joan Fitzpatrick, and Frank Newman, International Human Rights: Law, Policy and Process at 499-500 (4^th ed. 2009) [“Weissbrodt”].

[19] Commission Report at 43-171.

[20] Commission Report at 177-79; Popkin at 131-39, 140-43.

[21] Commission Report at 13.

[22] Doe v. Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1131-32, 1255 (E.D. Cal. 2005); Chavez v. Carranza, 413 F. Supp. 2d 891, 903-04 (W.D. Tenn. 2005), aff’d, 559 F.3d 486, 496 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 110 (2009); Fed. R. Evid. 801 (c), 803 (8).

[23] Monsignor Romero v. El Salvador, Rep. No. 37/00, ¶¶ 30-54, 88, 120 (IACHR April 13, 2000); Ignacio Ellacuria, et al. v. El Salvador, Rep. No. 136/99, ¶¶ 79-86 (IACHR Dec. 22, 1999); Admissibility of El Mazote Massacre, Rep. No. 24/06, ¶¶ 30-42 (IACHR Mar. 2, 2006).

International Criminal Justice: Salvadoran Criminal Case Regarding the Murders of the Jesuit Priests

The murders of the Jesuit priests caused such a huge international uproar that El Salvador had to do something to make it appear as if it were pursuing justice in the case. As a result, in January 1990 it commenced criminal prosecution of five Salvadoran military officers and five soldiers of the Atlacatl Battalion. Colonel Guillermo Alfredo Benavides Moreno, the Director of the Military College, was accused of having given the order to murder the priests. Three Lieutenants were accused of commanding the operation. The five soldiers were accused of committing the murders.

The pre-trial proceedings took nearly two years. During this time, Colonel (now General) René Emilio Ponce, Colonel (now General) Juan Orlando Zepeda, Colonel Inocente Orlando Montano and Colonel (now General) Gilberto Rubio Rubio pressured lower-ranking officers not to mention orders from above in their testimony to the court.

Finally, the trial by jury took place in September 1991 in the building of the Supreme Court of Justice and was broadcast live on television. Several ranking military officers attended the trial with the defendants’ families. On the last day of the trial, during the defendants’ closing arguments, a large crowd outside the courthouse shouted chants in favor of the defendants, interrupting the trial. In closing arguments, defense counsel barely mentioned the crime itself. Instead, they asked the jury to reject foreign intervention and pressure, emphasized that five of the six victims were Spanish born, and argued that the military generally and the defendants in particular were heroes protecting the nation against terrorism.

The five-person jury, whose identity was kept secret, was charged with deciding the charges of murder and acts of terrorism. The other charges were left to the judge to decide.

Benevides was convicted of all eight counts of murder and instigation and conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism. One of the Lieutenants was convicted of one count of murder (the 16-year-old girl), instigation and conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism and being an accessory. Benevides and this Lieutenant were sentenced to 30 years imprisonment. The other two Lieutenants were convicted of instigation and conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism; they were sentenced to three years imprisonment, but released on bail and continued to serve in the military. A Lieutenant Colonel was convicted of being an accessory and sentenced to three years imprisonment, but he too was released on bail and continued to serve in the military. The five soldiers were acquitted of all charges.

International observers of the trial thought the jury verdict defied logic and the weight of the evidence.

In March 2000 and soon after the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights had issued a report on the case that will be discussed in a subsequent post, the Central American University (UCA), where the Jesuit priests had taught, sought to open a new Salvadoran criminal case regarding their murders, ultimately to no avail. UCA asked the country’s Attorney General to do so on the basis of UCA’s charges against former President Cristiani and five members of the Armed Forces High Command, including former General and Defense Minister Emilio Ponce. Then Salvadoran President Flores opposed the request, and the Attorney General refused to do so, but the Salvadoran Supreme Court ruled that only a court could decide to reopen such a case.[5]

Thereafter (October 2000), a lower court rejected the prosecutor’s request to reopen the old case because it was “without legal substance” while ordering the prosecutor to conduct a new investigation to determine whether there were legitimate grounds for reopening the case.[6]

The Attorney General then conducted a new investigation and reapplied to a court to reopen the case, this time against Cristiani and four military officers, including Ponce. Once again, however, the lower court refused to do so in December 2000 on the ground that any new charges were barred by the country’s 10-year statute of limitations. Immediately afterwards Ponce and the other three officers held a press conference where Ponce accused left-wing groups of trying to de-stabilize the country by making these charges and admitted that he and his fellow former officers were concerned about developments elsewhere in Latin America, especially the fate of Augusto Pinochet in Chile and former Argentine military officers.[7]

[1] See Post: International Criminal Justice: Spanish Court Issues Criminal Arrest Warrants for Salvadoran Murders of Jesuit Priests (May 31, 2011).

[2] See Post: International Criminal Justice: The Salvadoran Murders of the Jesuit Priests (June 2, 2011).

[3] See Post: International Criminal Justice: Salvadoran Military’s Attempted Cover-Up of Its Committing the Murders of the Jesuit Priests (June 7, 2011).

[4] This post’s summary of the Salvadoran criminal case is extracted from the Commission for the Truth for El Salvador’s Report: From Madness to Hope: The 12-year war in El Salvador at 45-54 (March 15, 1993), http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/salvador/informes/truth.html [“Commission Report”]. See also Martha Doggett, Death Foretold: The Jesuit Murders in El Salvador at 121-208 (Washington, D.C.; Georgetown Univ. Press 1993). In future posts we will talk about the Truth Commission for El Salvador; the country’s general amnesty; the Jesuits case before the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights; the Spanish implementation of the principle of universal jurisdiction; and more details about the Spanish case regarding this crime.

[5] UCA Press Release (Mar. 27, 2000, http://www.uca.edu.sv/neuvo/pressrelease.html; Lanchin, Salvador ex-president accused of killings, BBC News, Mar. 28, 2000; El Salvador Former Air Force Chief Denies Role in Killings, Miami Herald, Mar. 29, 2000; The Necessity and Importance of the Truth, Processo, April 5, 2000, http://www.uca.edu.sv/publica/proceso/proci897.html;UCA Impugns the Attorney General of the Republic’s Decision on the Jesuit Case, Processo, April 26, 2000, http://www.uca.edu.sv/publica/proceso/proci899.html#doc; New Charges Barred in Salvador Killings, N. Y. Times, Oct. 24, 2000; Editorial: The Impunity of Power, Processo, Oct. 25, 2000; Darling, El Salvador to Reopen Murder Probe; Attorney general, under pressure, will investigate an ex-president and others in 1989 slayings of six Jesuit priests, Los Angeles Times, Oct. 26, 2000; No New Trial Set in Deaths of 6 Jesuits, Miami Herald, Dec. 14, 2000; Lanchin, Salvadorean ex-general issues warning, BBC News, Dec. 15, 2000.

[6] Id.

[7] Id.

International Criminal Justice: Salvadoran Military’s Attempted Cover-Up of Its Committing the Murders of the Jesuit Priests

Immediately after the killings in the early morning of November 16, 1989, two of the military officers who were involved went to Colonel Ponce’s office to report on everything that had happened at UCA. They said that they had a small suitcase with photographs, documents and money which the soldiers had stolen from the Jesuits a few hours earlier. Colonel Ponce ordered it destroyed because it was evidence of the armed forces’ responsibility. They destroyed the suitcase at the Military College.

On returning to his unit after the killings, one of the Lieutenants who was involved informed the Commander of the Atlacatl Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Oscar Alberto León Linares, of what had happened.

Colonel Benavides, who was in charge of carrying out the order to kill Father Ellacuria and leave no witnesses, immediately after the murders told Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Antonio Rivas Mejía, the Head of the Commission for the Investigation of Criminal Acts (CIHD), what had happened and asked him for help. Mejia recommended that the barrels of the weapons that had been used be destroyed and replaced with others in order to prevent them from being identified during ballistic tests. This was later done with the assistance of Lieutenant Colonel Oscar Alberto León Linares.

Lieutenant Colonel Rivas Mejia, the Head of CIHD, also advised Colonel Benavides to make sure that no record remained of those entering and leaving the Military College the prior night and following morning so that it would not be possible to identify the military personnel involved in the murders. Subsequently, Colonel Benavides and another officer ordered that all Military College arrival and departure logs for that year and the previous year be burned.

Soon after the murders, President Cristiani entrusted the investigation of the crime to CIHD, whose head already had been involved in attempting to cover up the military’s involvement in the crime.

Shortly after the CIHD investigation began, Colonel René Emilio Ponce arranged for the head of a unit of the Armed Forces’ General Staff to join CIHD in order to assist in the investigation of the case. Yet this person also had been in charge of the General Staff Tactical Operations Centre during the entire night of 15 to 16 November.

Later in November 1989, CIHD heard two witnesses who testified that they had seen soldiers of the Atlacatl Battalion near UCA that night. They later changed their statements.

An UCA employee said that she had seen, from a building adjacent to the Jesuits’ residence, soldiers in camouflage and berets the night of the murders. In the United States, where she went for protection, she was questioned by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and retracted her earlier statement. Lieutenant Colonel Rivas Mejía, the Head of CIHD, was present when she was questioned by the FBI. Subsequently, she confirmed her original statement.

CIHD did not take a statement from Colonel Benavides, even though the incident had occurred within his command zone. According to the court dossier, the first statement Benavides made was in January 1990 to the Special Honor Commission of the Salvadoran military.

On 2 January 1990, a month and a half after the murders, Major Eric Warren Buckland, an officer of the United States Army and an adviser to the armed forces of El Salvador, reported to his U.S. superior that he recently had been told that Colonel Benavides had arranged the murders, that a unit from the Atlacatl Battalion had carried them out and that Benavides had asked Lieutenant Colonel Rivas Mejia for help. In a subsequent meeting with Buckland’s source, the source denied that he had so stated to Buckland.

In early January 1990, the Minister of Defense established a Special Honor Commission, consisting of five officers and two civilians, to investigate the murders. The Commission thereafter questioned some 30 members of the Atlacatl Battalion and a number of officers of the Military College, including Colonel Benavides. Three of the Lieutenants and the soldiers who had participated in the murders confessed their crime in extrajudicial statements to the Honor Commission.

A civilian member of the Commission and a legal adviser to the military’s General Staff altered these confessions in order to delete any reference to the existence of orders from above. He also deleted the references to some officers.

On January 12, 1990, the Commission submitted its report to Salvadoran President Cristiani. The report identified nine people as being responsible for the murders, four officers and five soldiers; they were arrested and later brought to trial. Subsequently, another Lieutenant Colonel was included in the trial. The Salvadoran criminal case will be discussed in a subsequent post.

[1] See Post: International Criminal Justice: Spanish Court Issues Criminal Arrest Warrants for Salvadoran Murders of Jesuit Priests (May 31, 2011).

[2] See Post: International Criminal Justice: The Salvadoran Murders of the Jesuit Priests (June 2, 2011).

[3] This post’s factual recitation is extracted from the Commission for the Truth for El Salvador’s Report: From Madness to Hope: The 12-year war in El Salvador at 45-54 (March 15, 1993), http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/salvador/informes/truth.html [“Commission Report”]. See also Martha Doggett, Death Foretold: The Jesuit Murders in El Salvador at 73-194 (Washington, D.C.; Georgetown Univ. Press 1993). Although, as will be discussed in a subsequent post, the Truth Commission adhered to an objective and reasonable methodology in conducting its investigations and writing its report, it must be recognized that there was no cross-examination of witnesses by attorneys for the accused or full opportunity for them to present evidence in their own defense. Thus, the findings of the Truth Commission must be taken as provisional in nature. In other future posts we will talk about the Salvadoran criminal prosecution of some of the military officers who were involved and the subsequent Salvadoran general amnesty for them and others; the Jesuits case before the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights; the Spanish implementation of the principle of universal jurisdiction; and more details about the Spanish case regarding this crime.