U.S. State Department Again Ranks Cuba in Tier 3 (the Lowest Ranking) of the 2025 Trafficking in Persons Report

The U.S. State Department’s Trafficking in Persons Office “leads the Department’s global efforts to combat human trafficking through the prosecution of traffickers, the protection of victims, and the prevention of human trafficking by: objectively analyzing government efforts and identifying global trends, engaging in and supporting strategic bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, targeting foreign assistance to build sustainable capacity of governments and civil society, advancing the coordination of federal anti-trafficking policies across agencies, managing and leveraging operational resources to achieve strategic priorities, and engaging and partnering with civil society, the private sector, and the public to advance the fight against human trafficking.”

On September 29, 2025 , this State Department Office released its 2025 report on Trafficking in Persons.[1] that identified the following:

  • 33 countries in Tier 1 (including the U.S.) “whose governments fully meet the TVPA’s minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking;”
  • 52 countries in Tier 2 which “do not fully meet the TVPA’s minimum standards but are making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those standards (with certain exceptions);”
  • 25 countries in Tier 2 Watchlist “whose governments do not fully meet the TVPA’s minimum standards but are making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those standards (with certain exceptions . . .), and for which: the estimated number of victims of severe forms of trafficking is very significant or is significantly increasing and the country is not taking proportional concrete actions; or there is a failure to provide evidence of increasing efforts to combat severe forms of trafficking in persons from the previous year, including increased investigations, prosecutions, and convictions of trafficking crimes, increased assistance to victims, and decreasing evidence of complicity in severe forms of trafficking by government officials.”
  • 20 countries in Tier 3 (including Cuba) which “do not fully meet the TVPA’s minimum standards and are not making significant efforts to do so.”

The Report’s Discussion of Cuba[2]

 “The government of Cuba does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so. Cuba remained on Tier 3. During the reporting period there was a “government policy or pattern” of forced labor in the government’s labor export program, which included medical missions, from which the regime profited. Despite this the regime took some steps to address trafficking, including prosecuting and convicting more cases of trafficking crimes against children, identifying more victims, and amending the immigration law to improve coordination on victim protection. However, the regime recruited and deployed Cuban workers using deception and threats of retaliation. Cuba included exploitative and coercive elements in contracts and agreements signed with foreign governments for the hiring of Cuban workers, which allowed indirect and unfair payment schemes, wage confiscation, and arbitrary and disproportionate punishments. The regime exerted undue control over Cuban workers working in foreign countries and placed unreasonable restrictions on their movements that did not appear to align with international standards on the health and safety of workers. Regime authorities kept a significant amount of most workers’ wages, confiscated workers’ passports and professional credentials, did not consistently inform participants of the terms of their contracts, and subjected workers to surveillance and strict curfews. The regime did not demonstrate any efforts to change its policies and practices and continued to compel workers into service. The regime did not make efforts to investigate, prosecute, or convict cases of forced labor or sex trafficking involving adults.”

“Prioritized Recommendations for Cuba:

  • Cease threats and deceptive practices in the recruitment of Cuban workers deployed to foreign countries.
  • Ensure contracts and agreements signed with foreign governments for Cuban workers provide treatment that aligns with international law and labor standards.
  • Stop withholding workers’ wages and allow direct payment of wages to workers in line with what other foreign workers receive for similar work.
  • Eliminate disproportionate punishments outlined in existing disciplinary regulations and laws.
  • Stop subjecting workers to unreasonable restrictions on movement and association, including surveillance, arbitrary curfews, and limitations of international travel when it does not align with their health and security, and preventing workers from befriending locals.
  • Allow all civilian workers, including those who are regulated, to obtain and retain tourist passports in addition to official passports and stop confiscating documents needed to exercise freedom of movement.
  • Vigorously investigate and prosecute sex and labor trafficking crimes to increase convictions and strengthen deterrence of traffickers.
  • Implement formal policies and procedures to proactively identify trafficking victims, including among vulnerable populations, refer identified victims to appropriate services, and train officials, including first responders, in their use.
  • Cease recruitment of children for military activities before the mandatory military service age.
  • Train those enforcing the labor code to screen for trafficking indicators and educate all Cuban workers about trafficking indicators and how to report trafficking-related violations.
  • Revise Article 363.1 of the penal code to remove the requirement to prove force, fraud, or coercion in child sex trafficking offenses.”

PROSECUTION

“The regime maintained prosecution efforts.”

“The regime criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking through various provisions of its penal code. Article 363.1 of the 2022 penal code criminalized all forms of labor trafficking and some forms of sex trafficking and prescribed penalties ranging from seven to 15 years’ imprisonment for offenses involving an adult victim and 10 years to life in prison for those involving a child victim. These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with regard to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other grave crimes, such as rape. The definition in Article 363.1 established the use of force, fraud, or coercion as an essential element of a trafficking offense, without including an exception for child sex trafficking cases. Thus, Article 363.1 did not criminalize all forms of child sex trafficking. However, Article 402.1 (“corruption of minors”) criminalized the use of a person younger than 18 “in prostitution” and prescribed penalties of seven to 15 years’ imprisonment, which were sufficiently stringent and commensurate with those prescribed for other grave crimes, such as rape. Article 176.1 prescribed penalties ranging from three to eight years’ imprisonment to regime-affiliated workers who did not complete a civilian mission in another country or did not return to Cuba upon completion of the civilian mission – thereby penalizing potential victims of labor trafficking.”

“In October 2024, the regime published its annual trafficking in persons report, which was the primary source of information on the regime’s anti-trafficking efforts and included official data for calendar year 2023 on prosecutions and convictions, the most recent data available. According to the report, the regime investigated 14 domestic trafficking cases, of which 13 were for sex trafficking and one for forced begging. Authorities prosecuted 20 alleged traffickers and convicted 19 traffickers in 2023. This compared with seven transnational trafficking case investigations involving eight Cuban traffickers and five foreign nationals, six prosecutions, and six convictions in 2022. According to regime reporting, sentences ranged from three to 20 years’ imprisonment. Authorities did not report investigating, prosecuting, or convicting any cases involving adult victims of trafficking. Authorities have not prosecuted or convicted any cases of labor trafficking since at least 2022.”

“The regime suppressed independent domestic sources, but some independent sources provided information on trafficking efforts and trends. According to an NGO, the regime banned independent organizations and civil society actors, including human rights activists, and individuals exposing abuses were threatened, persecuted, imprisoned, forced into exile and, in some cases, even killed or disappeared.”

“The regime organized and sponsored training for law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and judges on investigating and prosecuting sex trafficking crimes. Authorities had 27 bilateral cooperation agreements or MOUs that included counter trafficking measures; however, the regime did not report tangible results associated with these agreements.””

Authorities in the Ministry of Justice continued to be complicit in state labor export schemes by prosecuting people who left regime-sponsored labor export programs due to exploitation and forced labor. While exact figures were not available, a 2022 case involving 17 Cuban regime-affiliated medical workers who were captured after attempting to escape a mission in Venezuela were likely prosecuted by regime officials. Anecdotal reports indicate some individuals who did not complete a mission faced imprisonment if they returned to Cuba. Regime officials intimidated and threatened the families of workers who did not complete a mission. Authorities did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of regime officials complicit in trafficking, despite persistent allegations that officials threatened and coerced participants to remain in the regime-sponsored programs in foreign countries.”

PROTECTION”

“The regime maintained protection efforts.”

“The 2023 report produced by the regime, reflecting the latest year from which data was available, indicated authorities identified 14 child sex trafficking victims, all of whom were girls. This was compared with six victims in 2022, one woman and five girls. In previous years, the regime reported having procedures to proactively identify and refer sex trafficking victims to care. Authorities reported training law enforcement officials on victim identification; however, implementation of victim identification procedures was not consistent, and the regime relied on victims to self-identify. The regime did not report having procedures to identify forced labor victims. Regime- or communist party-organized and controlled NGOs, such as the Federation of Cuban Women (FMC), the Prevention and Social Assistance Commission, and the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution could identify and refer trafficking victims to state authorities and provide some victim services, including psychological treatment, health care, skills training, and assistance in finding employment. However, these services were often politicized and unavailable to people the regime and/or Communist Party deemed subversive. There were three child and adolescent protection centers where underage trafficking victims could receive non-specialized services. The regime has not reported protecting any identified victims since 2021. Children receiving services in protection centers could use video testimony to facilitate support the prosecution of their traffickers, but officials did not report using these tools. In 2024, Cuba amended its immigration law, expanding protections for trafficking victims, including allowing regime authorities to request assistance from international organizations and NGOs for victim repatriations and preventing foreigners accused of human trafficking crimes from entering Cuba. The regime did not have any mechanisms workers facing exploitation or forced labor conditions could use to seek compensation for through Cuban labor unions or courts.”

“PREVENTION”

“The regime maintained prevention efforts.”

“The Cuban regime did not make sufficient efforts to prevent trafficking, particularly forced labor. In 2024, the regime approved the 2023-2024 NAP, which designated the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) as the central authority responsible for coordination and implementation of anti-trafficking efforts outlined in the plan. The MOJ chaired two national working groups focused on combating trafficking crimes that were expected to convene every three months, according to obligations outlined in the NAP; it was unclear if regime authorities met in 2023. The regime reported using the NAP and published the annual report on anti-trafficking efforts covering 2023. Authorities held awareness sessions for regime employees, students, and tourist industry employees on the prevention and identification of crimes, including trafficking crimes. The regime and the FMC continued to operate a 24-hour hotline for individuals needing legal assistance, including sex trafficking victims; for the fourth year in a row, none of the calls to this hotline resulted in trafficking investigations or victim identification.”

“Regime media continued to produce newspaper articles and television and radio programs, including public service announcements, to raise public awareness about exploitation, including sex trafficking. The FMC raised public awareness through workshops and training with regime officials, social workers, educators, and students, as well as the distribution of materials explaining trafficking and its risks; however, there were no publicly available materials that showed the effectiveness or impact of these programs. The Ministry of Tourism provided training for workers in the tourism sector on the prevention of child commercial sexual exploitation and abuse. Authorities did not make any efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts.”

“The Ministry of Labor and Social Security (MOL) did not make sufficient efforts to address forced labor. In 2023, MOL officials conducted 1,818 labor inspections, issuing more than 10,013 labor violations, but did not identify any cases of forced labor. The regime did not implement policies to prohibit the use of force, fraud, or coercion by foreign labor recruiters and regime-owned or controlled enterprises recruiting and retaining employees using forced labor. Regime law indicated males older than age of 16 must register with the country’s armed forces and prepare for mandatory military conscription starting at the age of 17; however, reports noted the regime’s involvement in the forced recruitment of children to serve in military community brigades. The revised immigration law removed clauses that previously punished Cuban nationals who didn’t return to Cuba within 24 months with loss of property rights; however, the restriction remained in place for regulated civilian workers who did not complete an international mission; preserving an intimidation measure Cuban authorities used to coerce regime-affiliated workers into service.”

“TRAFFICKING PROFILE”

“Trafficking affects all communities. This section summarizes the regime and civil society reporting on the nature and scope of trafficking over the past five years. Human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Cuba, and traffickers exploit victims from Cuba abroad. Sex trafficking, including commercial sexual exploitation and abuse of children by foreign visitors, occurs within Cuba. Traffickers exploit Cuban citizens in sex trafficking and forced labor in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, the Mediterranean, Latin America, and the United States. Traffickers exploit foreign nationals from Africa and Asia in sex trafficking and forced labor in Cuba to pay off travel debts. The regime identified children, young women, elderly, and disabled persons as the most vulnerable to trafficking.”

“Cuban citizens reported being recruited by Russia-affiliated private military companies or by the Russian military with fraudulent employment contracts to be later coerced to fight in the Russia-Ukraine war. For example, two young Cuban men reported being deceptively recruited to work in Russia as construction workers; however, upon arriving in Moscow, they were allegedly coerced into fighting in Ukraine on behalf of Russian military forces. According to contacts, Cuban authorities allegedly expedited the issuance of passports to recruits, who had minimal income and no means to pay for travel independently, and Cuban authorities purposefully declined to place exit stamps in the Cuban potential victims’ passports to claim no knowledge of their travel. Months after the regime allegedly took action against those facilitating trafficking to Ukraine, credible media reports indicated Cubans were still traveling to Russia to fight in Ukraine. Some of these individuals reported Cuban authorities were aware of their recruitment and may have facilitated their travel, and they were received in Moscow by a Cuban military official. Press reports indicated the Cuban regime allegedly received payment for each Cuban citizen recruited to fight in Ukraine on behalf of Russia. According to media reports, between June 2023 and February 2024, more than 1,000 Cubans had traveled to Russia to serve as foreign fighters.”

“International observers and former participants reported regime officials coerce individuals to participate and remain in the Cuban regime’s labor export programs, particularly the medical missions, managed by the Comercializadora de Servicios Medicos Cubanos (CSMC), the Unidad Central de Cooperación Médica (UCSM), the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Investment. Cuban officials used a combination of inherently coercive laws and regulations to manipulate workers to remain in the program, while grossly profiting from their exploitation and forced labor. The Cuban regime created an inescapable situation for workers who, coerced by the economic circumstances in Cuba and out of fear of retaliation, joined labor export missions. According to the regime, medical professionals comprise 75 percent of its exported workforce. Cuba reported $7 billion in service exports in 2022 (the last year for which data is available), of which $4.9 billion were from the export of medical services.”

“The Ministry of Interior labeled workers who left the program without completing their assignment as “deserters,” thereby banning them from returning to Cuba for eight years. Regulated Cuban nationals who could not return to Cuba were categorized as having “emigrated,” losing citizen protections; rights, including custodial rights over children; and any property left behind; and were not allowed to visit their families remaining in Cuba. An international organization noted concern over Cuba’s policy to prohibit parents who terminated a civilian contract abroad from reuniting with their children. According to an international NGO, by 2021, the Cuban regime had sanctioned 40,000 regime-affiliated workers under these provisions. In 2022, there were approximately 5,000 children forcibly separated from their parents due to the regime’s provisions for the program.”

“There were approximately 26,000 medical workers in more than 55 countries by the beginning of 2025. The Cuban regime confiscates between 75 and 95 percent of the wages the receiving country agrees to pay for each worker. Of the remaining percentage, regime officials pay workers a living stipend, which was usually well below minimum wage and significantly less than what other foreign workers receive for the same or similar work, and allegedly deposit the rest of the funds in Cuban bank account in Cuban pesos rather than the currency the host government uses to pay Cuba for workers’ services. Funds deposited in Cuba were only paid in full to the workers when they successfully completed a mission, or partially, after 11 months of service, and while in Cuba.”

“According to a 2021 report documenting 1,111 testimonies of Cuban workers, 75 percent of participants did not volunteer for the program, 33 percent never saw a contract, 69 percent did not know their final destination, 38 percent had their passport confiscated by Cuban officials once they arrived at their destination, 76 percent had “minders,” 76 percent could not freely associate with locals, 79 percent had restrictions on their movement, 91 percent were told they could not return to Cuba if they defected, 75 percent suffered threats or witnessed coworkers being threatened, and 40 percent were separated from their children as punishment for defecting. Survivors of the labor export program reported regime minders coerced them into criminal activity by making them falsify patient records, manipulate medical files, report procedures that did not take place, and dispose of medications to corroborate fraudulent records and inflated statistics. In 2023, the UN Special Rapporteur (SR) on Contemporary Forms of Slavery sent a letter to Cuban authorities raising concerns over the alleged human rights abuses suffered by regime-affiliated Cuban workers, including medical professionals and other civilian personnel. In the letter, the SR focused on abuses documented in Italy, Qatar, and Spain, including insufficient wages paid to workers, exhaustive work hours without adequate remuneration, the confiscation of passports, precarious work conditions, and the retaliation workers faced if they left the program.”

“Some anecdotal reporting indicates the Cuban regime may be expanding its practices and exploiting citizens in forced labor outside of bilateral agreements and in private hospitals. For example, there were approximately 160 Cuban victims of forced labor working as medical professionals in a private hospital in the Republic of Congo. According to a report, survivors experienced debt bondage, harassment, exhausting work hours, threats, meager wages, sub-standard and crowded living conditions, and passport confiscation. Survivors did not receive a contractual agreement in a language they understood and could not seek legal advice or keep a copy of the contract they signed. Survivors reported unprecedented ease in obtaining a passport to travel abroad, which was highly unusual for regulated civilian workers. According to the survivors, a regulated status flag was added to their file again shortly after leaving Cuba. Cuban diplomats in the Republic of Congo reportedly overlooked concerns of forced labor and passport confiscation and failed to provide consular assistance, raising concerns of official complicity.”

“While the medical missions remain the most profitable for the regime, Cuba had other similarly coercive labor export programs; including, but not limited to, teachers, athletes and coaches, artists, musicians, architects, engineers, forestry technicians, construction workers, and almost 7,000 sea mariners who were vulnerable to exploitation and forced labor. The Cuban regime had approximately 85 state-affiliated entities exporting services to different sectors. While CSMC and UCSM were the primary entities and responsible for 75 percent of Cuba’s labor exports, other regime-controlled corporations were involved in forced labor schemes. A 2024 investigative report into the Cuban regime’s presence in Angola – where more than 2,000 forced labor victims were present in 2023 – confirmed other regime entities followed a similar pattern of exploitation and forced labor. The total number of Cuban regime-affiliated workers in other sectors remains unknown.”

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[1] U.S. State Dep’t, 2025 Trafficking in Persons Report (Sept. 25, 2025).

[2] U.S. State Dep’t, 2025 Trafficking in Persons Report—Cuba (Sept. 25, 2025).

Cuban Criminal Prosecution of “Trafficking Network” for Recruiting Cubans for Russian Armed Forces 

On September 4, Cuba’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement that its Ministry of the Interior “has detected and it is working to neutralize and dismantle a human trafficking network that operates from Russia in order to incorporate Cuban citizens living there and even some living in Cuba, into the military forces that participate in military operations in Ukraine. Attempts of this nature have been neutralized and criminal proceedings have been initiated against those involved in these activities.” Moreover, “Cuba’s enemies are promoting distorted information that seeks to tarnish the country’s image and present it as an accomplice to these transact actions that we firmly reject.”[1]

This statement also said, “Cuba is not part of the war in Ukraine. It is acting and it will firmly act against those who within the national territory participate in any form of human trafficking for mercenaryism or recruitment purposes so that Cuban citizens may raise weapons against any country.”

 

Finally, according to the Cuban statement, “Cuba has a firm and clear historical position against mercenaryism, and it plays an active role in the United Nations in rejection of the aforementioned practice, being the author of several of the initiatives approved in that forum.”

Without mention by the Cuban Ministry, a Russian newspaper in May had reported that “’several’ Cuban citizens had volunteered as contract soldiers in the Russian army, and some hoped to become Russian citizens in exchange for their service.”

Also without mention by the Cuban Ministry, “The Moscow Times [an independent English-language and Russian-language online newspaper now headquartered in Amsterdam] reported that a social media account under the name of Elena Shuvalova had for months been posting ads in a Facebook group called “Cubans in Moscow” offering a one-year contract with the Russian Army. On Tuesday, the group had nearly 76,000 members.”[2]

The U.S. State Department said the U.S. was “deeply concerned” by this news.

Reactions

This situation poses a difficult problem for Cuba.

As noted in other posts, Cuba and Russia recently have commenced various means of cooperating, and Cuba presumably does not want to interfere with that cooperation. Moreover, as previously mentioned, “Cuba has a firm and clear historical position against mercenaryism, and it plays an active role in the United Nations in rejection of the aforementioned practice, being the author of several of the initiatives approved in that forum” and Cuba does not want to blemish that reputation.[3]

Finally, as is well known, the United States is a strong supporter of Ukraine in its war with Russia, and Cuba does not need another point of contention with the U.S.

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[1] Statement of [Cuba] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cuba counters human trafficking operations for military recruitment purposes (Sept. 4, 2023); Satronova, Cuba Says Its Citizens Were Lured to Fight in Russia’s Wat om Ukraine, N.Y. Times (Sept. 5, 2023); Sheridan & Dadouch, Cuba Says Russian human traffickers lure citizens to war with Ukraine, Wash. Post (Sept. 5, 2023); Cordoba, Cuba Says Russian Ring Is Recruiting Cubans to Ukraine, W.S.J. (Sept. 5, 2023).Torres, Cuba says it’s dismantling human trafficking ring sending Cubans to fight for Russia in Ukraine, Miami Herald (Sept. 5, 2023); U.S. State Dep’t, Department Press Briefing—September 5, 2023.

[2] The Moscow Times is an independent English-language and Russian-language online newspaper now headquartered in Amsterdam. (The Moscow Times, Wikipedia. .)

[3] E.g., U.S. Needs To Improve Relations with Cuba, dwkcommentaries (Aug. 4, 2023).

Cuba’s Suffering from Continued U.S. Hostility  

After the Obama Administration had taken steps to improve U.S. relations with Cuba, the Trump Administration has gone in the opposite direction, as discussed in many earlier posts.[1]

U.S. Actions and Policies Against Cuba

These negative actions and policies include the following: continuation of U.S. embargo of Cuba; elimination of one of the “general licenses” for U.S. nationals to travel to Cuba; cancelation of right of U.S. cruise ships to make stops on the island; reducing amount of money U.S. nationals legally may remit to relatives and friends in Cuba; allowing litigation in U.S. federal courts over alleged trafficking in U.S.-owned property on the island under the Halms-Burton Act; additions to the U.S. “Cuba Restricted List” of entities and sub entities with which U.S. nationals may not transact business; U.S. negative reports on Cuban human rights, religious freedom and human trafficking; unilateral U.S. report about increasing Cuban Internet access; U.S. consideration of re-designating Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism and of re-instituting U.S. parole for Cuban medical professionals; additional U.S. sanctions against Cuba for its alleged support of Venezuela.[2]

While there are recent bilateral bills in Congress to end the embargo and enhance U.S. nationals’ rights to travel to Cuba, they have not received, and are unlikely to receive, any consideration in the current Senate and perhaps the House of Representatives.[3]

Negative Impact on Cuba of U.S. Actions and Policies[4]

The negative impact, especially of the recent U.S. limiting the ability of Americans to travel to the island, has especially harmed Cuba’s emerging private sector. For example, a website and app used to make reservations, rate restaurants, and pay for meals at most restaurants throughout Cuba (AlaMesa) had to reduce its staff from 20 to 12 in response to a 30 to 40% decline in reservations.

But “Cuba’s economic woes go beyond U.S. policy. The island, with one of the world’s last communist governments, has been caught in a perfect storm. Its economy has been stagnant for years, averaging only about 1 percent annual growth. Its centrally-planned economy imports over two-thirds of its food. Its ally, Venezuela, has been in political and economic turmoil, causing an overall decline in oil shipments from the South American country. The island’s medical exchange program, a major source of revenue, also took a blow. Last November, Cuba recalled 8,517 medical professionals from Brazil in response to President Jair Bolsonaro’s tough stance against Cuba.”

The U.S. allowance of litigation over alleged trafficking in Cuba property owned by Americans is seen as discouraging foreign investment today.

Recently “there have been shortages in basic goods such as eggs, cooking oil and chicken.”

Cuban Government’s Response to Rough Economic Conditions[5]

At the July 13 closing  session of the National Assembly, President Diaz-Canel reported that a series of emergency measures announced that month aimed to stimulate domestic production and he hoped for slight growth this year. “Even in the eye of the hurricane of adversity that the enemy conceived to suffocate us, the Cuban economy can grow slightly, thanks to the fact that we have the potential to resist and continue advancing in our development.” He added that the economy grew 2.2% in 2018, compared with an earlier estimate of 1.2%, and that stronger base would make it harder to reach this year’s goal of 1.5% growth.

The President also said there will be price controls and policies aimed at stimulating local production to meet increased consumer demand without sparking inflation.

The next week of July 15, Cuba experienced power outages and fuel shortages that prompted citizen concern about the possible emergence of a “Special Period II” of harsh economic shortages. Cuba Energy Commissioner Raul Garcia sought to reassure citizens that the power outages were due to breakdowns in power plants, not oil shortages, and that those outages would be fixed by the end of the week.

These measures came at a time when falling Cuban imports have caused scattered shortages of food, hygiene and other products across the country. Diaz-Canel admitted the country was suffering from a liquidity crisis and bureaucracy and was short on fuel. He called on officials and the public to join together in the national emergency and each do their part to move the country forward. “Putting aside vanities and selfishness, practicing honesty, industriousness and decency, we will also be contributing to GDP,” he said.

On August 2, the Cuban government for the first time published details of its foreign exchange earnings from services such as telecommunications, hotels, health and education assistance, in an apparent concession to creditors. The biggest export earner in 2018 was health services at $6.4 billion, followed by “support services” at $1.3 billion while hotel and related services garnered $970 million, followed by telecommunications at $722 million and transportation and support services, which includes everything from airlines to docking fees, at around $600 million. Total exports were $18.6 billion in 2013 and $14.5 billion last year, down from $18.6 billion in 2013. Imports fell from $15.6 billion to $12.6 billion.

All of these developments have resulted in an increase in the country’s foreign debt from $11.9 billion in 2013 to $18.2 billion in 2016, an increase of almost 53% percent.

Cuba Introduces Price Controls[6]

In early July  President Miguel Diaz-Canel announced that the government had adopted a series of emergency measures to fight economic stagnation and dwindling foreign currency earnings that began in 2015 as the economy of key ally Venezuela imploded, and that have been aggravated by a series of new U.S. sanctions. The measures included increased wages and pensions for more than 2 million state employees, amounting to more than 8 billion pesos annually, or close to 13 percent of this year’s budget. The President also said there will be price controls and policies aimed at stimulating local production to meet increased consumer demand without sparking inflation.

The other shoe dropped on July 30, when the President announced a ban on all retail and wholesale price increases except for products imported and distributed by the state where already-set profit margins cannot be increased. In recent weeks, regional authorities have slapped price controls on taxi fares, beverages and haircuts, among other items. The price controls differ from province to province.

These price controls are especially difficult for the private sector.

For example, on August 15, retail prices in Havana were set for some basic foods such as beans, pork, lemons, bananas, onions and cabbage. The retail price of pork, a staple of the Cuban diet, was set at 45 pesos a pound, although market sellers said it previously went for some 65 pesos a pound. And farmers still charge 28 pesos a pound for pork. Another example is lemons, which used to sell for 30 pesos a pound,  now has a new maximum price of 10 to 15 pesos, which is the same price that farmers charge for the lemons.

On August 12, Cuba  Minister of Finance and Prices, Meisi Bolaños, stated, “We are going to be rigorous with those who try, by means of devices, to evade and violate the new measures approved to avoid the increase in prices. . . . We cannot allow that measures like these that the country approves to boost the  economy and generate greater capacity to buy in the population to be spoiled by a few unscrupulous that cause Cubans to lose confidence in state control.” The Minister also denied that the purpose of the measures is “to stop the development of non-state forms.”

Economists assert that such price controls are ineffective. Andrew Zimbalist, a Cuba expert at U.S.’s Smith College, said, “Such measures are usually okay for short periods of time, but if they stay in place they begin to create serious distortions in the economy.” A similar opinion was expressed by Pavel Vidal, a former Cuban central bank economist who teaches at Colombia’s Universidad Javeriana Cali. He said, “The more they control prices in formal markets, the more inflation and instability there will be in informal markets and the less incentive the productive sector has.”

Experts also have criticized Cuba’s verbose regulations of the private sector that were introduced at the end of 2018. They concluded that these “regulations approved by the Council of Ministers were written in reverse: excessive documents (29) and processes that represent obstacles in the application process for licenses, cracking down on violations, excessive inspections, the definition of twenty-two oversight agencies for the private sector (with specific departments to deal with them), the new requirement of a bank account with two months’ worth of taxes as credit in this account, needing to pay payroll taxes from the very first employee, etc.”

Conclusion

 Obviously Cuba is in a very perilous situation that the U.S. has helped to create. All who support normalization of the two countries relations need to voice their opinions to their senators and representatives and to Trump Administration officials.

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[1] See List of Posts to dwkcommentaries—Topical: CUBA.

[2] E.g., Sabatinni, Trump Doubles Down on Failed Cuba Policy, N.Y. Times (July 24, 2019); U.S. Updates Cuba Restricted List (July 26, 2019); U.S. State Dep’t, State Department Updates the Cuba Restricted List (July 26, 2019); U.S. State Dep’t, List of Restricted Entities and Subentities Associated With Cuba as of July 26, 2019 (July 26, 2019); New U.S. Government Hostility Towards Cuba’s Medical Mission Program, dwkcommentareis.com (Aug. 14, 2019); “U.S. (Trump) and Cuba, 2016-2017,”  “U.S. (Trump) and Cuba (2018),” “U.S. (Trump) and Cuba, 2019,” “U.S. Parole Program for Cuban Medical Professionals, 2019,” “Cuba, Venezuela and U.S., 2019,”  “Cuba Restricted List, 2019,”  “ Helms-Burton Act Title III Authorization, 2019” and U.S. Embargo of Cuba, 2019” sections  in List of Posts to dwkcommentaries—Topical: Cuba.

[3] See these posts to dwkcommentaries.com: New Bill To End U.S. Embargo of Cuba (Feb. 9, 2019); Senator Leahy’s Senate Floor Speech To End Embargo of Cuba (Feb. 18, 2019); Congressional Bipartisan Bills for Reversal of U.S. Policies Regarding Cuba (Aug. 13, 2019).

[4] Sesin, In Cuba, entrepreneurs see a steep decline with Trump policies, NBC News (July 6, 2019); Cuba Says Fuel Shortage, Blackouts Are Temporary, Being Fixed, Reuters (July 19, 2019); Frank, Cuba hopes for slight growth as Trump pummels Caribbean island, Reuters (July 13, 2019).

[5]  Kuritzkes, The End of Cuba’s Entrepreneurship Boom, Foreign Policy (July 15, 2019); The decline in tourism from the United States to Cuba already feels strongly on island, France23 (July 18, 2019);Taylor, Cubans Talk About Impact of Trump Administration Travel Policy Changes, Travel Pulse (July 22, 2019); Myers, A Visit To Cuba Reveals Economic Pain of Trump’s Travel Ban, Travel Weekly (July 29, 2019); Eaton, Cuba Trying to Attract Tourists and Investors Even as U.S. Clamps Down, Tampa Bay Times (July 30, 2019); Reuters, Cuba Reveals Health, Hotel, Other Service Earnings, N.Y. Times (Aug. 2, 2019); Whitefield, Cuba Feels the Pinch of the Trump administration’s travel restrictions, L.A. Times (Aug. 11, 2019); Torres, Cuba’s foreign debt is on the rise despite big profits from medical services abroad, Miami Herald (Aug. 12, 2019);Myers, Taking the pulse of demand for Cuba travel, Travel Weekly (Aug. 13, 2019); The Cuban economy is increasingly indebted, official figures reveal, Diario de Cuba (Aug. 15, 2019).

[6] The Government of Havana sets maximum prices for sale of products, Cubadebate (July 28, 2019); Frank, Cuba, battling economic crisis, imposes sweeping price controls, Reuters (July 30, 2019); Vela, Cuba’s Price Control Is Short-Term Fix To Production Problems, Economist Says, ABC10 News  (July 30, 2019); Fuentes Puebla & Romeo Matos, Price control, a necessary complement to the salary increase in the budgeted sector, Cubadebate (Aug. 1, 2019); The Cuban Government warns that it will be relentless in the face of ‘artifice’ to avoid its price cap, Diario de Cuba (Aug. 13, 2019); Reuters, Cuban Government Imposes Price Controls as It Seeks to Keep Lid on Inflation, N.Y. Times (Aug. 15, 2019); Fernandez, It’s a Long and Winding Road for Cuba’s Private Sector, Havana Times (Aug. 15, 2019).