This is the title of a lengthy article in Foreign Policy by William H. LeoGrande, professor of government at American University in Washington, D.C. and a respected commentator on the important topic of this bilateral relation.[1]
Obama’s Normalization Effort
The starting point for his analysis is a review of the 10th anniversary of President Obama’s public announcement of his Administration’s start of normalization of relations with Cuba. Highlights of that effort were “ending the U.S. designation of Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism, reopening of both countries embassies, President Obama’s visit to Cuba, loosening of restrictions on U.S. citizens travel to the island and resumption of U.S. airlines travel to Cuba, resulting increases in U.S. travel to the island, establishing a bilateral commission to oversee the work of 18 diplomatic working groups; and Obama’s prediction of an end to the U.S. embargo” (that did not happen). Nevertheless, this effort at normalization “was immensely popular both at home and abroad. Pope Francis blessed it, the Cuban people loved it, and the general U.S. public supported it, including more than half of Cuban Americans.”[2]
Trump’s First Term’s Return to Hostile Relations
LeoGrande then notes that in his first term, Trump adopted new regulations to restrict U.S. travel to the island, impose limits on remittances, block business with Cuban companies managed by its military, disband bilateral working groups on various issues plus returned to Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism.[3]
Biden’s Failure To Return to Obama’s Normalization
Leo Grande then had these brief remarks about President Biden. “During [Biden’s] campaign, he criticized the impact of Trump’s policies on Cuban families and promised to restore Obama’s policy of normalization ‘in large part.’ But he never did. Biden did adopt some ‘half-measures.’ Most importantly, he left Cuba on the lise of state sponsors of terrorism. The result has been an incoherent hybrid policy . . .and there is little indication that he will use his lame-duck period to finally keep the Cuba-policy promises he made in 2020.” [4]
Trump Redux
Leo Grande says, “Trump’s return to the White House could presage a return to maximum pressure, especially with Rubio as secretary of states and Rep. Mike Waltz as national security advisor. Rubio and Republican Cuban Americans on the Hill will surely push for it, just as they did in Trump’s first term. They will point out that 70 percent of Cuban Americans in Florida voted for him and that a recent Florida International University (FIU) poll found 72 percent of Cuban American respondents support maximum pressure to promote regime change.” [5]
“But resuming maximum pressure would stir a political hornet’s nest. After eight years of intense sanctions exacerbated by the Cuban government’s policy mistakes, the island is suffering an unprecedented economic and social crisis. Life is so hard and prospects for the future are so grim that more than a million Cubans—9 percent of the population—emigrated in the past three years. Three-quarters of them have come to the United States, 690,000 arrived undocumented at the southern border, another 100,000 admitted under Biden’s humanitarian parole program. If Trump adopts policies that deepen Cuba’s crisis, the new surge of migrants could dwarf these numbers, which would seriously complicate his plans to end irregular immigration.”
Conclusion
LeoGrande concludes his article with the following words:
“[T]he key lesson from the fleeting rapprochement that began 10 years ago on Dec. 17, 2014, is that engagement benefits both countries and that bold and determined leaders can make it happen. The enthusiasm with which Cubans, Americans, and people around the world embraced the prospect of peace between the United States and Cuba underscored just how long overdue reconciliation was. Both Obama and Raúl Castro spoke of rebuilding bridges between their countries, and both acknowledged it would be hard to put decades of animosity to rest. It has proven harder than anyone expected in the halcyon days following Dec. 17, but the ties that bind Cuba and the United States—ties of family, commerce, culture, and the shared interests that come from living next door to one another—will eventually overcome the resistance of even the most recalcitrant politicians. As Henry Kissinger recognized half a century ago, ‘perpetual antagonism’ between the United States and Cuba need not be normal.’”
“Cuban Americans are not likely to support closing the southern border to Cuban migrants, and immigration law prohibits discrimination on the basis of nationality. If the administration tries to make an exception for Cubans, the policy will certainly be challenged in court. Trump’s plans to deport undocumented immigrants could face even bigger problems. Tearing recent Cuban migrants from their families, many of whom paid traffickers thousands of dollars to bring their relatives here, would cause a political firestorm in south Florida. The FIU poll found that 72 percent of respondents support humanitarian parole for Cuban migrants and that half are planning to bring relatives still in Cuba to the United States in the future.”
“In foreign policy, tougher Cuba sanctions would complicate relations with Mexico. President Claudia Sheinbaum is supporting Cuba by sending it cheap oil. In 2023, her predecessor, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, warned the Biden administration that Cuban migration spurred by U.S. sanctions was causing problems for Mexico and complicating cooperation with Washington on migration issues. Cooperation with Mexico, as Trump learned in his first term, is indispensable for limiting undocumented migration and narcotics trafficking across the southern border, which are all top priorities for him.”
“Escalating sanctions on Cuba could also complicate Trump’s desire to improve relations with Russia. Moscow has grown closer with Havana in recent years, expanding relations beyond economic cooperation into a ‘strategic partnership,’ as the two countries describe it. Cuba has defended Russia’s rationale for its invasion of Ukraine, making Havana a valuable ally in the Global South. And Russian President Vladimir Putin clearly values having an outpost in the United States “near abroad,” if only as a geopolitical thorn in Washington’s side. In short, Russia has a clear interest in the survival of the Cuban regime.”
“I f sanctions succeed in destabilizing Cuba to the point that the state fails and social violence erupts, the pressure from Cuban Americans for U.S. military intervention will be immense. Cuban American elected officials demanded intervention in July 2021, in response to the Cuban government’s suppression of nationwide demonstrations, even though the largely peaceful protests only lasted a few days. U.S. intervention would poison relations with Latin America for a generation.”
“But the key lesson from the fleeting rapprochement that began 10 years ago on Dec. 17, 2014, is that engagement benefits both countries and that bold and determined leaders can make it happen. The enthusiasm with which Cubans, Americans, and people around the world embraced the prospect of peace between the United States and Cuba underscored just how long overdue reconciliation was. Both Obama and Raúl Castro spoke of rebuilding bridges between their countries, and both acknowledged it would be hard to put decades of animosity to rest. It has proven harder than anyone expected in the halcyon days following Dec. 17, but the ties that bind Cuba and the United States—ties of family, commerce, culture, and the shared interests that come from living next door to one another—will eventually overcome the resistance of even the most recalcitrant politicians. As Henry Kissinger recognized half a century ago, “perpetual antagonism” between the United States and Cuba need not be normal.”
Reactions
This blog recently has been publishing posts about the horrible times currently being suffered in Cuba and hence the need for the U.S. to return to the normalization efforts of President Obama/ [6]
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[1] Leo Grande, Why Are Cuba and the U.S. Still Mired in the Cold War?, Foreign Policy (Dec. 12, 2024).
[2] See the posts listed in the following sections of List of Posts to dwkcommentaries—Topical: CUBA [as of 5/4/20]: U.S. (Obama) & Cuba Relations (Normalization), 2014; U.S. (Obama) & Cuba Relations (Normalization), 2015; U.S. (Obama) & Cuba Relations (Normalization), 2016; and U.S. (Obama) & Cuba Relations (Normalization), 2017.
[3] See the posts listed in the following sections of that List of Posts: U.S. (Trump) & Cuba Relations, 2016-17; and U.S. (Trump) and Cuba, 2018.
[4] I concur in LeoGrande’s analysis and conclusion.
[5] Another concurrence.
[6] E.g., U.S. Congressmen Ask President Biden To Provide Sanctions Relief and Other Aid to Cuba (Nov. 20, 2024); Cuba’s Unstoppable Spiral of Misery, dwkcommentaries.com (Dec. 4, 2024);Diario de Cuba’s Editorial on Its 15th Anniversary, dwkcommentaries.com (Dec. 5, 2024); Will Cuba Lose Almost Half of Its Population by 2100?, dwkcommentaries.com (Dec.14, 2024).