George W. Bush – Page 2 – dwkcommentaries

Will the U.S. Senate Finally Give Its “Advice and Consent” to U.S. Ratification of the Law of the Sea Treaty?

The United Nations Convention [Treaty] on the Law of the Sea sets out international rules for maritime navigation, territorial waters and countries’ use of offshore areas as exclusive economic zones. It was the result of an international conference that concluded on December 10, 1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica when the U.S. and 120 other nations adopted the text of the treaty, and it went into force on November 16, 1994. Now 162 of the 193 U.N. member states are parties to the treaty.

The U.S. signed the treaty on July 29, 1994, but it has not been ratified by the U.S. Such ratification, however, is once again on the table as we will see after reviewing what has happened in the U.S. with respect to the treaty in the nearly 30 years since it was adopted. This is another example of the complicated and difficult process of obtaining U.S. Senate advice and consent to ratification of a treaty by a two-thirds vote (67 Senators) under Article II, Section 2(2) of the U.S. Constitution that was examined in a post with respect to the Convention Against Torture.

Background

Although the treaty was concluded during his Administration, President Regan did not sign the treaty. Nor was it signed during the George H.W. Bush Administration.

But on July 29, 1994, President Bill Clinton signed the treaty along with a July 28, 1994, Agreement resolving U.S. and others’ objections to a part of the treaty. On October 7, 1994, Clinton submitted the treaty and the Agreement to the U.S. Senate for its “advice and consent” to ratification by the U.S. In his transmittal message, President Clinton said that since 1982 successive U.S. administrations had not signed the treaty because of flaws in its regime for managing the development of mineral resources of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction, but these provisions had been changed by the just mentioned Agreement.[i] Therefore, according to the President, it was now appropriate for the U.S. to join the treaty. President Clinton also stated:

“The United States has basic and enduring national interests in the oceans and has consistently taken the view that the full range of these interests is best protected through a widely accepted international framework governing uses of the sea. Since the late 1960s, the basic U.S. strategy has been to conclude a comprehensive treaty on the law of the sea that will be respected by all countries. Each succeeding U.S. Administration has recognized this as the cornerstone of U.S. oceans policy. Following adoption of the Convention in 1982, it has been the policy of the United States to act in a manner consistent with its provisions relating to traditional uses of the oceans and to encourage other countries to do likewise.”

Furthermore, President Clinton continued, this treaty had the following benefits for the U.S.:

“The Convention advances the interests of the United States as a global maritime power. It preserves the right of the U.S. military to use the world’s oceans to meet national security requirements and of commercial vessels to carry sea-going cargoes. It achieves this, inter alia, by stabilizing the breadth of the territorial sea at 12 nautical miles; by setting forth navigation regimes of innocent passage in the territorial sea, transit passage in straits used for international navigation, and archipelagic sea lanes passage; and by reaffirming the traditional freedoms of navigation and overflight in the exclusive economic zone and the high seas beyond.”

“The Convention advances the interests of the United States as a coastal State. It achieves this, inter alia, by providing for an exclusive economic zone out to 200 nautical miles from shore and by securing our rights regarding resources and artificial islands, installations and structures for economic purposes over the full extent of the continental shelf. These provisions fully comport with U.S. oil and gas leasing practices, domestic management of coastal fishery resources, and international fisheries agreements.”

The treaty is “a far-reaching environmental accord addressing vessel source pollution, pollution from seabed activities, ocean dumping, and land-based sources of marine pollution . . . . [It thereby] promotes continuing improvement in the health of the world’s oceans.”

The “Convention sets forth criteria and procedures to promote access to marine areas, including coastal waters, for research activities.”

“The Convention facilitates solutions to the increasingly complex problems of the uses of the ocean–solutions that respect the essential balance between our interests as both a coastal and a maritime nation.”

“Through its dispute settlement provisions, the Convention provides for mechanisms to enhance compliance by Parties with . . . [its] provisions.”

Nine years later in October 2003, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held the first hearings on the treaty, and on February 25, 2004, the Committee unanimously ordered it to be reported favorably without amendments to the full Senate. The treaty went to the Senate floor on March 11, 2004 with a report by Committee Chair, Republican Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana. However, no vote on the resolution of advice and consent had been taken when the congressional session ended in December 2004, and, therefore, the treaty was referred back to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

The George W. Bush Administration had asked for ratification in 2004. In fact, the Law of the Sea was one of only five treaties that the Bush Administration placed in its “urgent” category on its list of treaty priorities. Widespread support for ratification was expressed to the Committee:

Representatives from the Department of State, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Commerce Department testified in support of the Convention at various Congressional hearings.

Representatives from six Bush Administration Cabinet departments participated in the interagency group that helped write the resolution of advice and consent accompanying the treaty. And the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, appointed by President Bush, strongly endorsed U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea.
In the private sector, every major ocean industry, including shipping, fishing, oil and natural gas, drilling contractors, ship builders, and telecommunications companies that use underwater cables, supported U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea and are lobbying in favor of it. The National Foreign Trade Council, representing hundreds of exporting companies, also supported ratification.

Moreover, a long list of environmental and ocean groups had endorsed the treaty because it would protect and preserve the marine environment and establish a framework for further international action to combat pollution.

During the Committee’s consideration of the treaty, it received just one inquiry voicing opposition to the measure and that was from an individual representing himself. Staff offered to receive written testimony from this individual, but none was sent.

Despite this strong support for ratification of the treaty, full Senate consideration of the treaty in 2004 had been held up by vague and unfounded concerns about its effects. Chairman Lugar commented that these concerns had been expressed primarily by those who oppose virtually any multi-lateral agreement. “Various conservative lobbyists have indicated strong objections—they believe our sovereignty will be impugned.” Senator Lugar lamented this inaction. He said, “If we cannot get beyond political paralysis in a case where the coalition of American supporters is so comprehensive, there is little reason to think that any multi-lateral solution to any international problem is likely to be accepted within the U.S. policy-making structure.” Moreover, the Bush Administration was not willing to expend political capital to push for ratification, and Senate Majority Leader Frist was not willing to put it on the Senate calendar in light of a threatened filibuster.

Joe_Biden,_official_photo — Senator Joe Biden

Nearly three years later, in September and October 2007, that Committee held another set of hearings on the treaty, and on October 31, 2007, ordered it to be reported favorably without amendments to the full Senate by a vote of 17 to 4. The treaty went to the Senate floor on December 19, 2007 with a report by Committee Chair, Democratic Senator Joe Biden of Delaware. However, no vote on the resolution of advice and consent had been taken when the congressional session concluded on January 2, 2009, and, therefore, the treaty was referred back to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Senator Lugar again reflected on this failure to obtain the Senate’s advice and consent to ratifying this treaty. He said there needed to be a “reinvigorated Senate commitment to the treaty process.” Senate leaders of both parties, he said, had allowed narrow objections to prevent Senate consideration of this and other treaties and had been unwilling to invoke cloture to terminate debate on treaties. For this blogger, this is another example of the abysmal rules of the U.S. Senate.

Renewal of Interest in U.S. Ratification of the Treaty

As previously mentioned, possible U.S. ratification of the treaty is back on the table.

On May 9, 2012, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta gave a lengthy speech calling for such ratification. He said this treaty is “the bedrock legal instrument underpinning public order across the maritime domain” and yet the U.S. is the only permanent member of the U.N. Security Council and the only industrialized country in the world that is not a party. This puts the U.S. at a distinct disadvantage, particularly when it comes to disputes over maritime rights and responsibilities.

Panetta noted, as detailed above, that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has held hearings and approved the treaty by large bipartisan majorities and that the treaty is supported among major U.S. industries in order to be able to do their business and to accomplish their goals.

The same is true for national security, Panetta said, as demonstrated in comments by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard Commandant. Panetta then listed some of the reasons why this treaty is essential to a strong national security.

First, as “the world’s pre-eminent maritime power,” the U.S. with one of the largest coastlines and extended continental shelf in the world “has more to gain from accession to the Convention than any other country because of the interest we have from our coastlines, from our oceans, and from our continental shelves. By . . . sitting at the table of nations that have acceded to this treaty, we can defend our interests, we can lead the discussions, we will be able to influence those treaty bodies that develop and interpret the Law of the Sea. If we’re not there, then . . . [others will] do it, and we won’t have a voice.” Under these circumstances, the U.S. will not be able “to ensure that our rights are not whittled away by the excessive claims and erroneous interpretations of others.” To be a party, on the other hand, “would give us the credibility to support and promote the peaceful resolution of disputes within a rules-based order.”

Second, by joining the Convention, the U.S. “would protect our navigational freedoms and global access for our military, our commercial ships, our aircraft, and our undersea fiber optic cables. As it currently stands, we are forced to assert our rights to freedom of navigation, asserting hopefully, through customary international law, which can change to our own detriment.” But by joining the Convention, “we would help lock in rules that are favorable to freedom of navigation and our own global mobility.”

Third, “accession [to the treaty] would help lock-in a truly massive increase in our country’s resource and economic jurisdiction, not only to 200 nautical miles off our coasts, but to a broad continental shelf beyond that zone.”

Fourth, “accession would ensure our ability to reap the benefits of the opening of the Arctic – a region of increasingly important maritime security and economic interest. We already see countries that are posturing for new shipping routes and natural resources as Arctic ice cover melts and recedes. The Convention is the only means for international recognition and acceptance of our extended continental shelf claims in the Arctic, and we are the only Arctic nation that is not party to the Convention.” Accession would also “preserve our navigation and over-flight rights throughout the Arctic, and strengthen our arguments for freedom of navigation through the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route.”

Finally, the new U.S. “defense strategy emphasizes the strategically vital arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia.” Many countries “sit astride critical trade and supply routes and propose restrictions on access for military vessels in the Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, and the South China Sea.” The U.S. has had a consistent naval presence and engagement in these critical regions. Becoming a party to the Convention would strengthen the U.S. position in these key areas. By not acceding to the Convention, the U.S, potentially is undercutting “our credibility in a number of Asia-focused multilateral venues – just as we’re pushing for a rules-based order in the region and the peaceful resolution of maritime and territorial disputes.” Being a party to the treaty is also important for the U.S. efforts to preserve freedom of transit in the Strait of Hormuz in the face of Iranian threats to impose a blockade.

Democratic Senator John Kerry, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has said that he is considering holding new hearings on the treaty.

Conclusion

In a presidential election year bipartisan cooperation is even more difficult than normal, especially after Senator Lugar’s loss in the Indiana primary election this past Tuesday. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the Senate this year will give its advice and consent by a two-third’s vote to ratification of this treaty. We will wait and hope that this assessment is proven wrong.

[i] Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, with Annex, adopted at New York, July 28, 1994

Federal Appellate Court Grants Immunity to Author of Legal Memoranda Regarding U.S. Detention and Interrogation of Suspects in the “War on Terrorism”

9thcircuit — U.S. Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit

On May 2, 2012, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in San Francisco unanimously held that John Yoo was immune from civil liability to Jose Padilla (and his mother) for Yoo’s authoring legal memoranda in 2001-2003 for the U.S. Department of Justice regarding the detention and interrogation of U.S. citizens who had been declared to be “enemy combatants.”

This civil case arises out of Padilla’s arrest and detention by U.S. military officials. In May 2002 Padilla was arrested at O’Hare International Airport near Chicago on suspicion of plotting a radiological bomb attack in the U.S. and was detained under a federal material witness arrest warrant until June 9, 2002, when President George W. Bush declared Padilla to be an “enemy combatant.” For the next 3 and a half years Padilla was detained in a military brig where he repeatedly was subjected to sleep deprivation, shakling, stress positions, solitary confinement and administration of psychotropic drugs. In January 2006 he was transferred to a federal civilian detention facility in Miami, Florida, where a federal jury in August 2007 found him guilty of conspiring to kill people and to support overseas terrorism and a federal judge in January 2008 sentenced him to 17.3 years imprisonment. This conviction was affirmed in September 2011 by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which vacated the 17.3 sentence as too lenient. The case was remanded to the district court where the case awaits the new sentencing.

This civil case was commenced by Padilla and his mother in January 2008. The complaint alleged that Yoo, as an attorney in the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel, had authored various legal memoranda that provided purported legal justification for Padilla’s detention and interrogation, all in violation of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, Article III and the Habeas Suspension and Treason Clauses of the Constitution and a federal statute. The complaint sought nominal damages of one dollar and a declaration that his treatment violated these constitutional and statutory provisions.

After the district court denied Yoo’s motion to dismiss the complaint, he appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which reversed the trial court on the previously mentioned immunity ground.

The Ninth Circuit correctly concluded that this appeal was governed by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2011 decision, Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2974, which held that “[q]ualifed immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” The alleged right must be “sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.”

With this major premise in hand, the Ninth Circuit then concluded that in 2001-2003, when Yoo was at the Department of Justice, it was not clearly established that a U.S. citizen held in military detention as an enemy combatant was entitled to the same constitutional and statutory rights as convicted prisoners and that Padilla’s treatment amounted to torture.

John Yoo himself in an op-ed article in the Wall Street Journal naturally applauded the decision. His resistance to this lawsuit, he said, was “not just to defend the tough decisions that had to be made after 9/11. We fought to protect the nation’s ability to fight and win the war against al Qaeda—and other enemies—in the future.”

Yoo also launched bitter attacks on human rights groups that support lawsuits like the one against him and others who hold opposite opinions on the interrogation tactics. Such groups, he said, seek to “advance their agenda by legally harassing officials, agents and soldiers, and so raise the costs of public service to anyone who does not hew to their extreme, unreasonable views.” Democratic Representative Nancy Pelosi was cited by Yoo as being misleading on the substance of a briefing by the CIA on its interrogation tactics. President Obama, according to Yoo, lacked “backbone” by declaring “the CIA’s interrogation methods to be ‘torture’ before the courts or his own Justice Department had delivered a considered opinion . . . [by launching] an independent counsel to hound CIA agents, even though career prosecutors had already looked into claims of abuse and found no charges appropriate . . . [by trying] to close Guantanamo Bay without any real alternative . . . [by stalling] special military commissions established by President Bush and ratified by Congress, and [by relying] on drones to kill rather than capture al Qaeda leaders for their intelligence.”

The Wall Street Journal, a long-time supporter of Mr. Yoo and the other authors of the legal memoranda in question, also welcomed the Ninth Circuit’s decision. The Journal declared in an editorial that the decision “vindicates the principle that government officials are immune from private litigation for their national-security decisions. The law has long held that executive branch officials can’t be sued for other than criminal acts so they can carry out their duties in the best interests of the country without threat of personal liability.” More vindictively, the Journal said the decision was a “watershed for repudiating sham tort claims whose goal is to intimidate—and perhaps bankrupt—anyone who dares to treat terrorists differently from shoplifters. In a better world, Padilla’s pals at the ACLU and the . . . [Yale Law School] Human Rights Clinic would be hit with sanctions and a bill for Mr. Yoo’s costs.”

The New York Times, on the other hand, criticized this decision. Its editorial acknowledged that the Ninth Circuit followed, as it had to, a U.S. Supreme Court ruling in 2011 that the so-called qualified immunity existed unless “existing precedent” put the claimed right “beyond debate.” This Supreme Court decision, however, had changed the legal standard for such immunity; previously it had required that a reasonable person would have known about the alleged right he allegedly had violated.

According to the New York Times, the Ninth Circuit’s decision this week showed why the new Supreme Court standard was “unworkable.” The newspaper said “the Bush administration manufactured both ‘debates’ — about torture and enemy combatants. . . . By using the ‘enemy combatant’ category, the Bush administration stirred debate that had not existed about whether rights of an American citizen in custody depend on how he is classified. By coming up with offensive rationalizations for torturing detainees, it dishonestly stirred debate about torture’s definition when what it engaged in plainly included torture.” The Ninth Circuit decision can be used, the Times said, by future administrations “to pull the same stunt as cover for some other outrage.”

In the meantime, as reported in a prior post, Yoo and five other authors of the legal memoranda regarding detention and interrogation of individuals in the so-called war on terrorism are the suspects in a criminal case in Spain under the principle of universal jurisdiction that the trial court had temporarily dismissed or stayed so that the issues could be pursued in the U.S. On March 23, 2012, an appeals court in Spain affirmed the trial court’s decision. However, three of the 17 members of this appellate court dissented on the grounds that the conduct authorized by these memoranda were crimes under international and Spanish law and that the requirements for a Spanish court to defer to U.S. authorities under Spain’s concept of “subsidiarity” had not been satisfied.

Are International Criminal Tribunals Successful?

Michael Ignatieff, a former Harvard professor and expert on international human rights and a former leader of Canada’s Liberal Party, in a recent issue of The New York Review of Books expressed a gloomy view of the post-World War II development of international criminal tribunals.

The actions of the U.S. and other great powers have contributed to his negativity. He says, “America is exceptional in combining standard great-power realism with extravagant idealism about the country’s redemptive role in creating international order. . . . [The] US has promoted universal legal norms and the institutions to enforce them, while seeking by hook or by crook to exempt American citizens, especially soldiers, from their actual application. From Nuremberg onward, no country has invested more in the development of international jurisdiction for atrocity crimes and no country has worked harder to make sure that the law it seeks for others does not apply to itself.”

This negative assessment is buttressed by the new memoir by David Scheffer (All the Missing Souls: A Personal History of the War Crimes Tribunals). Scheffer, who was one of the leading U.S. diplomats involved in the negotiations that created these tribunals, recounts the U.S. resistance to (i) providing U.S. intelligence information to the ICTY; (ii) seeking to arrest the most egregious defendants for the ICTY; and (III) having U.S. citizens, especially soldiers, being subject to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC). A review of this book is the nominal subject of this essay by Ignatieff.

Scheffer’s post-mortem on his frustrations as the lead U.S. diplomat at the Rome Conference that produced the Rome Statute for the ICC is especially instructive on why the U.S. voted against that treaty at the conclusion of the conference and more generally on the U.S. process for negotiating and ratifying multilateral treaties.

According to Scheffer, there were four main reasons for the inability of the U.S. to advance its positions at the Rome Conference and its eventual vote against the treaty at the conference’s conclusion. U.S. military officials failed to know and understand other nations’ perspectives on the ICC and to explain to other nations the role of the U.S. military after the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless the U.S. military’s opposition to the ICC dictated the terms of the unsuccessful U.S. negotiating positions at the conference. In addition, the U.S. government was unable to make timely policy decisions on key issues being negotiated for the treaty. Thirdly, there are always distractions and other matters clamoring for the attention of the President and his top advisors; for President Clinton and the Rome Conference it was the Monica Lewinsky scandal. Finally, Republican Senators Jesse Helms of North Carolina and Rod Grams of Minnesota, who were vehemently opposed to the idea of an ICC, attended the Rome Conference to make their views known to other governments.

Scheffer also provides important background information on two developments after the Rome Conference that remind us that there are important issues for a treaty like the Rome Statute after its terms have been adopted. First, he successfully pressed for significant U.S. participation in the drafting of the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the Elements of Crimes that helped to alleviate some of the U.S. concerns regarding due process at the new court. Second, Scheffer also was successful in lobbying for the U.S.’ signing the Rome Statute before the end of 2000 (the last possible date for a state’s signing the treaty), which he did on behalf of the U.S. at the U.N. headquarters in New York City on December 31st (a very wintery Sunday New Year’s Eve Day). He, however, was not pleased with some of the details of President Clinton’s signing statement that said the treaty had “significant flaws” and that he would not be submitting the treaty to the Senate for advice and consent. The latter point, says Scheffer, was unnecessary since the Clinton presidency was almost over and since it usually takes years to prepare a treaty for submission to the Senate.

Ignatieff’s negative assessment of the U.S. split personality on this subject is also supported by the fact that the U.S. has been actively involved in the post-1945 negotiation of treaties that establish or codify international human rights norms, but has not ratified 16 such treaties, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Moreover, the U.S. has subjected its ratification of 10 of 16 such treaties to reservations, declarations and understandings that attempt to limit the application of such treaties to the U.S. (David Weissbrodt, Joan Fitzpatrick & Frank Newman, International Human Rights: Law, Policy and Process at 136-66 (3d ed. 2001).)

We have seen this phenomenon in a prior post‘s examination of the U.S. ratification of the International Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and by another post’s noting that Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions has been languishing in the U.S. Senate for 25 years with no action on presidential requests for advice and consent to U.S. ratification of that treaty. Other posts examined the policies toward the ICC in the Clinton, George W. Bush and Obama Administrations.

According to Ignatieff, the development of mechanisms of international criminal justice “was supposed to rescue the possibility of universal justice from the revenge frenzies, political compromises, and local partialities of national justice.” This has not been the case, however, in his opinion, because “international justice turns out to be as much the prisoner of international politics as national justice is of national politics. Indeed, given the stakes, international justice may be more partial, that is, more politicized, than national justice.”

Therefore, he wonders if the creation of the international criminal tribunals—Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Cambodia, Sierra Leone, and the ICC —has been worth the effort and costs. From 1993 through 2009, he says, these tribunals collectively cost their donors $3.43 billion, but only 131 convictions were obtained.

In the next breath, however, Ignatieff seems to say that the tribunals have been worth all the trouble. He says that no one now is dying from atrocity crimes in Bosnia, or in Cambodia, Sierra Leone, or Rwanda, which have had special international criminal tribunals. “Justice—imperfect, partial, expensive—has been done and even been seen to be done. In these places, murderous rages have subsided. Some have reconciled. States have achieved stability. People are moving on. One of the reasons for this may be that in some cases justice was done.”

Although I share Ignatieff’s view of the imperfections of the mechanisms of international criminal justice and of U.S. (and other great powers’) resistance to application of such institutions or norms to themselves, I do not agree with his more pessimistic assessment of the development of international criminal tribunals.

First, he pulls the number of convictions at 131 from a table of results (as of December 31, 2010) in the Scheffer book without mentioning or considering these tribunals’ other results according to that table . Nor does Ignatieff attempt to update the table.

Let me first update that table and then discuss the overall results of these tribunals. My examination on April 1, 2012, of the websites for these tribunals revealed the following results with respect to individuals who have been charged with crimes by said tribunals:

Tribunal	Pre-Trail	Trial	Convicted (includes pending appeals)	Withdrawn/Dismissed/Acquitted/ Deceased	Referred to Nat’l Court	At Large	TOTAL
ICTY	2	16	81	49	13	0	161
ICTR	1	3	62	14	3	9	92
Special Ct.-Sierra Leone	0	1	8	2	0	1	12
Extra Chambers Cambodia	5	4	1	0	0	0	10
ICC	7	3	1	6	0	11	28
TOTAL	15	27	153	71	16	21	303

According to this table, Ignatieff understates the convictions by 22, but more importantly he ignores the 16 who have been referred to national courts, the 42 who are still in pre-trial or trial proceedings and the 21 who are still fugitives. Thus, there eventually may be additional convictions for the crimes that have been charged. Moreover, these courts are not machines to produce convictions; they are intended to provide due process guarantees to those charged with crimes, and the 71 individuals who have had charges withdrawn or dismissed or who have been acquitted or who have died before their trials could be completed suggest that these courts have been operating fairly.

Second, Ignatieff ignores the fact that the existence and operation of these tribunals have given incentives and programs to various countries to improve their judicial systems so that eventually they can try individuals for the crimes within the jurisdiction of these international courts. Indeed, 16 of the individuals who have been charged with crimes by these tribunals have had their cases transferred to national court systems. As previously noted, the ICC’s Rome Statute has provisions incorporating the principle of complementarity whereby the ICC defers to national prosecutions by competent national judicial systems.

Third, Ignatieff also ignores the fact that these tribunals have been important in developing a more elaborate international law regarding genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and their precedents can be and are being used by other courts and agencies involved in cases or other proceedings regarding international human rights.

Fourth, Ignatieff fails to acknowledge that these tribunals are only one part of a complex, interactive global struggle against impunity for the worst crimes of concern to the international community. Various posts already have discussed many of these pieces to the puzzle, and a prior post summarized this interactive network

Finally, in my opinion, these tribunals have been successful for the foregoing reasons. The peoples of the world through their nation-state governments have been struggling to climb out of the pits of depravity of World War II by creating or codifying international norms or human rights and by constructing mechanisms to protect individuals that are beyond the control of their own national governments while such governments still have sovereignty over most aspects of their lives. This is an inherently difficult process, and many compromises are necessary in order to make any progress. But the story is not finished. Further developments, I am confident, will occur.

The International Criminal Court and the George W. Bush Administration

Following the lead of the Clinton Administration, the Bush Administration declined to submit the Rome Statute to the Senate for ratification. [1]

Moreover, in May 2002, the U.S. notified the U.N. Secretary General, as depositary of the Rome Statute, of the U.S. intent not to ratify the treaty.[2] The U.S. undoubtedly did so in order to prevent liability under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties that provides, “A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when . . . it has signed the treaty . . . until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty. . . .”[3]

The Bush Administration thereafter conducted a major campaign against the ICC. The campaign included a statute that originated with Senator Jesse Helms, then Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and that had what became known as the “Hague invasion clause,” authorizing the use of U.S. military force to retrieve any U.S. citizens held by the ICC. The U.S. also sought and obtained so-called bilateral immunity agreements with countries that were States Parties to the Rome Statute whereby they would not turn over any U.S. personnel to the ICC. Other federal legislation called for cancelling any foreign military aid to countries that would not sign such agreements.[4]

However, the Bush Administration, especially in its second term, softened its stance on the ICC. In March 2005, the U.S. abstained on the U.N. Security Council vote to refer the Sudan/Darfur situation to the ICC, thereby allowing the resolution to pass. The Administration also granted waivers from cancellation of foreign military aid.[5]

[1] See Post: The International Criminal Court and the Clinton Administration (May 11, 2011).

[2] Letter, John R. Bolton (U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security) to U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan (5/6/02), http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/05/06/court.letter.text/index.html.

[3] Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf.

[4] E.g., AMICC, U.S. Administrative Update, http://www.amicc.org/usinfo/administration.html; AMICC, U.S. Congressional Update, http://www.amicc.org/usinfo/congressional.html.

[5] Id.