Apparently in February 2024, the U.S. State Department publicly announced the third step of the strategic planning process: Mission Strategic Planning, which has produced the Department’s Integrated Country Strategies (ICS) for every country in the world. [1]
“This ICS is led by the Chief of Mission to develop a common set of Mission Goals and Objectives through a coordinated and collaborative planning effort among Department of State and other U.S. Government agencies with programming in the country. Higher-level planning documents and strategies, such as the National Security Strategy, the State-USAID Joint Strategic Plan (JSP), and Department regional (JRS) and functional bureau strategies (FBS) inform the ICS.”
“Once completed the ICS frames and informs the annual Mission Resource Request and Mission-level performance management requirements” that are other steps in the Department’s complex “Managing for Results” system portrayed in the following diagram:
The State Department also stated that it “is in the process of developing a new 4-year State-USAID Joint Strategic Plan, which when drafted will allow Department bureaus and missions worldwide to begin drafting their own new strategies ensuring alignment to higher-level policy and priorities.”
The Department’s ICS for Cuba[2]
The ICS for Cuba, which was approved on May 27, 2022, sets forth the Chief of Mission’s following “three key priorities:” (1) “supporting Cubans seeking to exercise their universal human rights;” (2) “protecting the national security of the United States and its citizens;” and (3) “encouraging the growth of an empowered, innovative, and inclusive Cuba.” (Emphasis added) The following are the statements about these emphasized priorities.
Human Rights. “Since assuming leadership as First Secretary of Communist Party in 2021, President Miguel DiazCanel Bermudez added a new chapter to Cuba’s 63-year-long history of atrocious human rights abuses. Announcing on July 11, 2021 that “the order to combat has been given,” Diaz-Canel unleashed a wave of state-sponsored violence and repression on the thousands of Cubans who took part in overwhelmingly peaceful protests to express their frustration over Cuba’s economic failures and lack of democratic freedoms. State security forces detained roughly 1,300 people in response to the protests and created hundreds of new political prisoners who faced harsh detentions, rigged trials, and, in many cases, decades-long prison sentences for sedition.
Cuban authorities regularly harass, imprison, or force into exile those who express dissenting opinions.”
“In an environment where the state has criminalized expressing dissent, the embassy continuously seeks to advance the cause of human rights in Cuba. While aware of the very real risks they face, the mission maintains regular engagement with human rights activists, dissidents, and members of civil society. Supporting independent media, access to information, and building the capacity of the independent civil society organizations to effectively advocate for the democratic aspirations of the Cuban people will remain a constant area of focus for the entire mission.”
“Encouraging the growth of an empowered, innovative, and inclusive Cuba.” “Cuba faces a deepening economic crisis provoked mainly by years of economic mismanagement and compounded by the impacts of the COVID pandemic. Incremental reforms of Cuba’s planned economy – including the legal recognition of micro, small, and medium enterprises – have followed a pattern first set during the infamous ‘Special Period’ in the early 1990’s: slowly implemented, insufficient to the real needs of the economy, and always limited by the regime’s need for complete control of key sectors. Other reforms, such as the monetary unification and economic ‘re-ordering’ that took place during a grinding recession in 2021, failed miserably and unleashed severe inflation that greatly eroded the purchasing power of Cuban workers and retirees who must live on wages and pensions paid in local currency. Cuba’s economy remains heavily controlled, with large and inefficient state enterprises.”
“Economists estimate Cuba’s GDP shrank by as much as 13 percent during the recession that preceded the pandemic in 2020. Even optimistic projections suggest only modest GDP growth for the foreseeable future.”
“Cuba’s economic potential lies not in continued state investments in 5-star hotels controlled by the country’s military-controlled business conglomerate, but in the entrepreneurial potential of its people. The Embassy will continue to seek new ways to engage with Cuba’s independent economic actors, foster Cuba’s entrepreneurial eco-system, while expanding outreach to AfroCubans, women, and other historically disadvantaged groups.”
Reactions
As a U.S. citizen who is not an employee of the State Department or any other federal agency, but who regularly checks the State Department’s website for information about Cuba, this blogger was totally surprised by this undated announcement about ICS, especially when it mentions a May 2022 approval of the Cuba ICS. Did I miss an earlier announcement?
Nevertheless, this blogger has no objections to the “human rights” portion of the CUBA ICS. However, shouldn’t this portion mention whether the U.S. sanctions against Cuba, especially the U.S. embargo (blockade) of Cuba and the U.S. designation of Cuba as a “state sponsor of terrorism,” encourage or discourage improvements in Cuban human rights?
The other portion of this ICS (“Encouraging an Empowered, Innovative, and Inclusive Cuban Society”), raises many complicated issues that have been touched in this blog, but not thoroughly analyzed.
Finally, the “Managing for Results” diagram has a systematic, logical approach, but makes one wonder whether such complexity will interfere with the Department’s meeting the constantly changing, complex problems of the world.
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[1] U.S. State Department, Integrated Country Strategies (undated); U.S. State Department, Foreign Assistance Resource Library, Managing for Results.
[2] U.S. State Department, ICS for Cuba (Approved 5/27/22);
[1] U.S. State Department, Integrated Country Strategies (undated); https://www.state.gov/integrated-country-strategies/
[2] U.S. State Department, ICS for Cuba (Approved 5/27/22); https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/ICS_WHA_Cuba_Public.pdf
U.S. State Department, Foreign Assistance Resource Library, Managing for Results. https://www.state.gov/foreign-assistance-resource-library/
