The ICC Prosecutor is investigating allegations that the Gaddafi regime is systematically engaged in gang-raping of women with rebel flags. Men in the regime’s security forces allegedly are using sexual enhancement drugs as a “machete” for these rapes, some of which allegedly occurred in police barracks.
This investigation is part of the Prosecutor’s investigation of possible crimes against humanity and war crimes in Libya since February 15, 2011. This situation was referred to the ICC by the U.N. Security Council.
 See Post: The International Criminal Court: Introduction (April 28, 2011); Post: The International Criminal Court: Investigations and Prosecutions (April 28, 2011); Post: The International Criminal Court: Libya Investigation Status (May 8, 2011); Post: The International Criminal Court and the Obama Administration (May 13, 2011); Post: The International Criminal Court: Three Libyan Arrest Warrants Sought (May 16, 2011).
Two months ago I attended a dinner in New York City in honor of Richard Smethurst,  the retiring Provost of Oxford University’s Worcester College.
Richard and I were students together at Worcester, 1961-63, and studied together (or revised together, as they say at Oxford) for the final examinations (or Schools in Oxford parlance) in Philosophy, Politics and Economics (PPE). Richard recalled that our economics tutor told us and the other PPE students at the College that when he “took Schools” he had answered the first four questions on the examination paper to show the examiners that he knew everything. Richards also remembered that I thought our tutor’s suggestion was stupid or silly and instead said we should select the four questions out of the 12 to 15 on the paper for which we were best prepared.
Richard and I then embarked on our own revision together in the spring of 1963. In that effort I prepared the answer to a possible question on Public Finance that luckily turned up on the actual examination. Richard and I both answered that question, and we both received Firsts (the highest mark).
In New York I recounted this story in after-dinner comments to the group and joked that I was responsible for Richard’s receiving a First.
Also at the dinner was Bill Bradley, the former basketball player and U.S. Senator, who was a Rhodes Scholar and PPE student at Worcester, 1965-68, and who had Smethurst as his economics tutor.  Bradley told the group that while he was in the Senate, Smethust spoke at a dinner in Washington, D.C. and said that Bradley was the best economics student he had ever had . . . who became a U.S. Senator. Left unsaid at the earlier dinner, Bradley told us in New York, was the fact that he was Smethurst’s only economics student who had become a U.S. Senator.
At my dinner table were Bill Sachs, who was the brother of Daniel M. Sachs, and Dan’s widow, Joan Sachs Shaw. Dan was an all-Ivy League football player at Princeton University and a Rhodes Scholar at Worcester, 1960-63. Dan played for the Oxford University rugby team, but in 1961 was”aced” out of playing against the Cambridge University team for the all important “Oxford Blue” honor when the Oxford captain prevailed upon Pete Dawkins to return to the team for the Cambridge match. (Dawkins was a running back for Army who in 1958 won the Heisman Trophy for the best football player in the U.S. and who was a Rhodes Scholar PPE student at another Oxford college, 1958-62.)
Dan Sachs was a friend of mine during those Oxford days, and In June 1963 he was my best man when Mary Alyce and I were married in Oxford.
After Dan’s untimely death in 1967, friends established in his honor a Sachs Scholarship for a Princeton graduate to attend Worcester College. The most famous Sachs Scholar so far is Elena Kagan, now U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice.
Today the ICC’s Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, announced that his Office had applied to the Pre-Trial Chamber of the Court for the issuance of arrest warrants against Col. Gaddafi, his son Saif al-Islam, and intelligence chief Abdullah al-Sanussi.
The charges are crimes against humanity by murder and persecution against civilians in Libya since February 15, 2011. They are a result of the Prosecutor’s investigations into this situation, pursuant to the U.N. Security Council’s referral of the matter to the ICC.
The Prosecutor said that his office had evidence showing that Col Gaddafi had “personally, ordered attacks on unarmed Libyan civilians.” The evidence also shows, the Prosecutor said, that Gaddafi’s forces “attacked Libyan civilians in their homes and in the public space, repressed demonstrations with live ammunition, used heavy artilleryagainst participants in funeral processions, and placed snipers to kill those leaving mosques after the prayers.”
The evidence also shows, according to the Prosecutor, that such persecution is ongoing and that Gaddafi forces ” prepare lists with names of alleged dissidents,” who “are being arrested, put into prisons in Tripoli, tortured and made to disappear.”
These crimes, added the Prosecutor, had been, and were being, committed with the goal of preserving Gaddafi’s “absolute authority” under “a systematic policy of suppressing any challenge to his authority.” The evidence also shows that Gaddafi himself gave the orders, that his son organized the recruitment of mercenaries to carry out the orders and that Sanussi participated in the attacks against demonstrators.
We now await the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber on the application for these arrest warrants.
 See Post: The International Criminal Court: Introduction (April 28, 2011); Post: The International Criminal Court: Investigations and Prosecutions (April 28, 2011); Post: The International Criminal Court: Libya Investigation Status (May 8, 2011); Post: The International Criminal Court and the Obama Administration (May 13, 2011).
As previously mentioned, the Rome Statute granted the ICC jurisdiction over the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.
In addition, the Rome Statute also assigned “the crime of aggression” to the ICC. But the diplomats at the Rome Conference that drafted the Statute could not agree on a definition of this crime. As a result, the Statute’s Article 5(2) provided that the Court could exercise jurisdiction over this crime only after there was an amendment to the Statute “defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction.”
In June 2010 the Review Conference of the States Parties adopted an amendment to the Rome Statute to add a definition of the crime of aggression. Amazingly the U.S. news media had virtually no coverage of this important Conference or its adoption of the amendment for the crime of aggression.
The amendment states that “aggression” means “the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.” This makes clear that the crime applies only to a country’s highest officials.
The term “act of aggression” too is defined in the amendment as “the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations . . . [including]
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof;
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State;
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State;
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another State;
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement;
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State;
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.”
The amendment also has “statements of understandings” of the scope of these provisions. One of them provides that “in establishing whether an act of aggression constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the three components of character, gravity and scale must be sufficient to justify a “manifest” determination. No one component can be significant enough to satisfy the manifest standard by itself.”
This amendment, however, will not take effect unless and until 30 States Parties have ratified or accepted the amendment. In addition, the Court cannot exercise such jurisdiction unless and until there has been an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the Assembly of States Parties to approve the amendment after January 1, 2017. As a result, the amendment will not be circulated for ratification unless and until there is such an affirmative vote after January 1, 2017.
Moreover, the amendment will only apply to crimes of aggression that were committed one year after the ratification or acceptance of the amendment by 30 States Parties. In addition, there are the following other conditions or limitations on the ICC for this crime:
ICC States Parties that ratify the amendment have the option of filing a declaration with the ICC that they do not accept aggression jurisdiction.
Another provision will prevent the Court from exercising jurisdiction over nationals of non-States Parties or persons for alleged aggression on their territories.
Also, once jurisdiction is activated, non-Security Council situations will need to be approved by the entire Pre-Trial Division of the Court.
The amendment also included a mandatory review of the provision seven years after coming into effect in order to examine the performance of the Court with respect to the crime and to make any necessary changes to the provision.
Many of these conditions or limitations on jurisdiction over the crime of aggression were the result of lobbying at the Review Conference by the U.S. observers.
As a result of these conditions or limitations as well as the crime’s definition itself, most believe that U.S. officials could never be prosecuted for the crime of aggression because the U.S. is not a party to the Rome Statute and even if it became a party it could declare that it did not accept the aggression jurisdiction. Indeed, immediately after the Review Conference, U.S. State Department Legal Advisor, Harold Koh, stated that the U.S. successfully had pressed at the Conference for the addition of safeguards that “ensure total protection for our Armed Forces and other U.S. nationals” with respect to this crime.
Finally, there are many who believe it is highly unlikely that the ICC ever will prosecute anyone for this crime for similar reasons.
 Post: The international Criminal Court: Introduction (April 28, 2011).
The Obama Administration has adopted what it calls “an integrated approach to international criminal justice,” including the International Criminal Court. There are at least six points to this approach, the first three of which are specifically addressed to the ICC.
First, the U.S. will not be seeking U.S. Senate consent to U.S. ratification of the Rome Statute. In January 2010, U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes, Stephen Rapp, publicly stated that no U.S. president was likely to present the Rome Statute to the U.S. Senate for ratification in the “foreseeable future.” Rapp cited fears that U.S. officials would be unfairly prosecuted and the U.S.’s strong national court system as reasons it would be difficult to overcome opposition to ratification. He did not mention the virtual political impossibility in this Congress to obtaining the two-thirds (67) vote in the Senate that would be necessary for ratification. In addition, in March 2011, the U.S. told the U.N. Human Rights Council at the conclusion of its Universal Periodic Review of the U.S. that the U.S. did not accept the recommendations by a number of States that the U.S. ratify the Rome Statute.
Second, the U.S. Administration will not be seeking statutory changes to U.S. statutes and practices that are hostile to the ICC. This conclusion emerges by implication from the absence of any such proposed legislation and from the same political calculus just mentioned. The Obama Administration, therefore, is living with the laws on the books bolstered by a January 2010 legal opinion from the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel that U.S. diplomatic or “informational” support for particular ICC investigations or prosecutions would not violate U.S. law. Other hand-me-downs of past U.S. actions hostile to the ICC are the U.S.’ 102 Bilateral Immunity Agreements or “BIA”s, whereby the other countries agreed not to turn over U.S. nationals to the ICC. The last of these was concluded in 2007. There is no indication that the U.S. will seek to rescind these agreements or to negotiate new ones.
Third, the U.S. instead has been pursuing a policy of positive engagement with the ICC in various ways. Indeed, the U.S. National Security Strategy of May 2010 stated that as a matter of moral and strategic imperative the U.S. was “engaging with State Parties to the Rome Statute on issues of concern and [is] supporting the ICC’s prosecution of those cases that advance U.S. interests and values, consistent with the requirements of U.S. law.”
Foremost for positive engagement is the U.S. participation as an observer at meetings of the ICC’s governing body, the Assembly of States Parties. The U.S. did so in November 2009, March 2010, June 2010 and December 2010 and has announced its intention to do so at the next meeting in December 2011.
In addition to observing the debates and discussion at these meetings, the U.S. has made positive contributions. The U.S. experience in foreign assistance judicial capacity-building and rule-of-law programs, Ambassador Rapp has said, could help the ICC in its “positive complementarity” efforts, i.e., its efforts to improve national judicial systems. Similarly the U.S. experience in helping victims and reconciling peace and justice demands has been offered to assist the ICC. At the June 2010 Review Conference the U.S. made a written pledge to “renew its commitment to support projects to improve judicial systems around the world.” Such improvements would enable national courts to adjudicate national prosecutions of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide and thereby make ICC involvement unnecessary. The U.S. also pledged at the Review Conference to “reaffirm President Obama’s recognition . . . that we must renew our commitments and strengthen our capabilities to protect and assist civilians caught in the [Lord Resistance Army’s] wake [in Uganda], to receive those that surrender, and to support efforts to bring the LRA leadership to justice.”
The June 2010 meeting was the important Review Conference that adopted an amendment to the Rome Statute with respect to the crime of aggression; this will be discussed in a future post. Immediately after the Review Conference Ambassador Rapp and State Department Legal Advisor Koh said that U.S. participation at the Review Conference “worked to protect our interest, to improve the outcome, and to bring us renewed international goodwill.” All of this reflected U.S. (a) “support for policies of accountability, international criminal justice, and ending impunity,” (b) the U.S. “policy of principled engagement with existing international institutions” and (c) ensuring that lawful uses of military force are not criminalized.
At the December 2010 meeting, Ambassador Rapp emphasized three ways for the world community to help the important work of the ICC. First was protecting witnesses in cases before the ICC and in other venues from physical harm and death and from bribery attempts. Second was enforcing the ICC arrest warrants and bringing those charged to the Court to face prosecution. Third was improving national judicial systems all over the world. In this regard the U.S. endorsed the recent discussion in the Democratic Republic of the Congo about creating a “mixed chamber” of Congolese and foreign judges in its national judiciary with jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.
The U.S. also is meeting with the ICC’s Prosecutor and other officials to find ways the U.S. can support current prosecutions (consistent with U.S. laws). 
As another means of positive engagement with the ICC, the U.S. has continued to support the March 2005 U.N. Security Council referral of the Sudan (Darfur) situation to the ICC, and the U.S. has refused to support any effort to exercise the Council’s authority to suspend any ICC investigations or prosecutions of Sudanese officials for a 12-month period. In January 2009, Susan Rice, the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., stated that the U.S. supports “the ICC investigation and the prosecution of war crimes in Sudan, and we see no reason for an Article 16 deferral” by the Council. Following the ICC’s issuance of an arrest warrant for Omar al-Bashir, President of Sudan, in March 2009, Ambassador Rice reiterated U.S. support for the Court on Darfur and the requirement of Sudan to cooperate with the ICC. 
More recently, the U.S. supported the use of the ICC with respect to Libya. The previously discussed U.N. Security Council Resolution 1970 that referred the Libyan situation to the ICC Prosecutor was prepared by the U.S. and 10 other Council members. During the Council’s discussion of the resolution, U.S. Ambassador Susan Rice stated, “For the first time ever, the Security Council has unanimously referred an egregious human rights situation to the [ICC].”
Three days after the Security Council resolution on Libya, the U.S. Senate unanimously approved a resolution deploring the situation in Libya and Colonel Gadhafi. This resolution also stated that the Senate “welcomes the unanimous vote of the United Nations Security Council on resolution 1970 referring the situation in Libya to the [ICC] . . . .”
Another means of the U.S.’ positive engagement with the ICC is U.S. public diplomacy supporting the Court–publicly support the arrest and prosecution of those accused by the ICC’s Prosecutor and publicly criticizing those who seek to thwart such arrests. In any event, the U.S. has ceased its hostility and harsh rhetoric against the Court.
Fourth, the U.S. will continue to offer financial support and advice to strengthen other national court systems, particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo. As previously mentioned, this policy is part of the U.S. positive engagement with the ICC, but it is also part of the broader approach to international criminal justice.
Fifth, the U.S. will continue to support the final work of the ad hoc criminal tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia that were established by the U.N. Security Council with limited time periods of existence. The U.S. will do so by providing funding, by supporting their work diplomatically and politically and by providing evidence and concrete support to the prosecutors and defendants. In particular, the U.S. will work in the Security Council “to create a residual mechanism for the ad hoc tribunals that will safeguard their legacy and ensure against impunity for fugitives still at large” after those tribunals cease to exist.
Ambassador Rapp also has noted that the era of the U.N.’s establishing ad hoc and short-lived tribunals like the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to address specific problems was over. Only the ICC would be in business for future problems. Therefore, the U.S. needed to be positively engaged with the ICC.
Sixth, the U.S. has said that it must work with countries that exercise universal jurisdiction (like Spain) when there is some relation between the country and the crime. Exactly what that means is not clear. Ambassador Rapp publicly has endorsed the principle of universal jurisdiction as another way to hold human rights violators accountable. On the other hand, as will be discussed in a future post, Spain has at least two pending criminal cases against high-level U.S. officials under Spain’s statute implementing this jurisdictional principle.
In conclusion, we have seen that there is substance to the claim that the Obama Administration has developed “an integrated approach to international criminal justice.” Although I personally believe the U.S. should become a full-fledged member of the ICC, I recognize the current political impossibility of that happening and believe that the U.S. is doing everything that it can to support the important work of the ICC and other courts that are tackling, in the words of Article 1 of the Rome Statute, the “most serious crimes of international concern.”
 On January 4, 2011, the Human Rights Council’s Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review of the U.S. issued its final report on the UPR of the U.S. It set forth all the recommendations of the States without endorsement by the Working Group as a whole. This report again included the specific recommendations for the U.S. to ratify the Rome Statute. (U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review–United States of America ¶¶ 92.1, 92.2, 92.16, 92.25, 92.28, 92.36 (Jan. 8, 2011), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G11/100/69/PDF/G1110069.pdf?OpenElement.) On March 8, 2011, the U.S. submitted its response to this final report. Among other things, the U.S. specifically rejected the recommendations that the U.S. ratify the Rome Statute. (U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review–United States of America: Addendum: Views on conclusions and/or recommendations, voluntary commitments and replies presented by the State under review ¶¶ 29, 30 (March 8, 2011), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G11/116/28/PDF/G1111628.pdf?OpenElement.) Nevertheless, the Council adopted the Working Group report in March 2011. (U.N. Human Rights Council, HR Council Media: Human Rights Council concludes sixteenth session (March 25, 2011).)
 E.g., Statement by President Obama on the Promulgation of Kenya’s New Constitution (Aug. 27,2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/08/27/statement-president-obama-promulgation-kenyas-new-constitution(“I am disappointed that Kenya hosted Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in defiance of International Criminal Court arrest warrants for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. The Government of Kenya has committed itself to full cooperation with the ICC, and we consider it important that Kenya honor its commitments to the ICC and to international justice, along with all nations that share those responsibilities”); U.N. Security Council, Press Release: Briefing Security Council on Sudan, United Nations, African Union Officials Tout Unified Strategy, Linking Peace in Darfur to Southern Sudan Referendum (June 14, 2010), (U.S. Ambassador Rice told Security Council that there was a need “to bring to justice all those responsible for crimes in Darfur, calling on Sudan to cooperate with the [ICC] and expressing deep concern at the Court’s Pretrial Chamber judges recent decision to refer the issue of Sudan’s non-cooperation to the Council”).
 U.N. Security Council 6491st meeting (Feb. 26, 2011). Other Council members (Bosnia & Herzogiva, Colombia, France, Germany, Libya and the U.K.) specifically commended the reference to the ICC. The other four Council members who did not join in drafting the resolution were Brazil, China, India and the Russian Federation. In the meeting, the Indian representative noted that “only” 114 of the 192 U.N. Members were parties to the Rome Statute and that five of the 15 Council members, including three permanent members (China, Russia and U.S.), were not such parties. He went on to emphasize the importance of Article 6 of the resolution’s exempting from ICC jurisdiction nationals of States like India that were not parties to the Rome Statute and its preamble’s stating that the Statute’s Article 16 allowed the Council to postpone any investigation or prosecution for 12 months. (Id.) The Brazilian representative was serving as President of the Council and, therefore, may not have participated in drafting the resolution, but she noted that Brazil was a “long-standing supporter of the integrity and universality of the Rome Statute” and expressed Brazil’s “strong reservation” about Article 6’s exemption of nationals of non-States Parties. (Id.) This suggests that the inclusion of Article 6 was the price of obtaining “yes” votes for the resolution from India, China and the Russian Federation. See Post: The International Criminal Court: Investigations and Prosecutions (April 28, 2011).
 U.N. Security Council 6491st meeting (Feb. 26, 2011).
 ___Cong. Record S1068-69 (March 1, 2011) (S. Res. 85).
Id. With the existence of the ICC, there is no need to create future ad hoc tribunals. This fact also avoids the administrative problems ad hoc tribunals face when they near the end of their lives and professional and other staff leave to pursue other opportunities with greater future prospects. (See Amann, Prosecutorial Parlance (9/12/10), http://intlawgrrls.blogspot.com (comments by officials of ICTY and ICTR).)
Following the lead of the Clinton Administration, the Bush Administration declined to submit the Rome Statute to the Senate for ratification. 
Moreover, in May 2002, the U.S. notified the U.N. Secretary General, as depositary of the Rome Statute, of the U.S. intent not to ratify the treaty. The U.S. undoubtedly did so in order to prevent liability under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties that provides, “A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when . . . it has signed the treaty . . . until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty. . . .”
The Bush Administration thereafter conducted a major campaign against the ICC. The campaign included a statute that originated with Senator Jesse Helms, then Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and that had what became known as the “Hague invasion clause,” authorizing the use of U.S. military force to retrieve any U.S. citizens held by the ICC. The U.S. also sought and obtained so-called bilateral immunity agreements with countries that were States Parties to the Rome Statute whereby they would not turn over any U.S. personnel to the ICC. Other federal legislation called for cancelling any foreign military aid to countries that would not sign such agreements.
However, the Bush Administration, especially in its second term, softened its stance on the ICC. In March 2005, the U.S. abstained on the U.N. Security Council vote to refer the Sudan/Darfur situation to the ICC, thereby allowing the resolution to pass. The Administration also granted waivers from cancellation of foreign military aid.
 See Post: The International Criminal Court and the Clinton Administration (May 11, 2011).
During the Clinton Administration, the United States supported the idea of creating an international criminal court and was a major participant at the Rome Conference that produced the Rome Statute. At the conclusion of that Conference in July 1998, the Rome Statute was approved by a vote of 120 to 7. The seven negative votes were cast by the United States, Iraq, Israel, Libya, People’s Republic of China, Qatar and Yemen. These were the reasons advanced for the U.S. negative vote:
The U.S. wanted an ICC that was controlled by the U.N. Security Council where the U.S. as a permanent member had a veto. Although the U.S. was able to get some provisions in the Statute that gave the Security Council certain rights vis-à-vis the ICC, the Statute allowed the Court to proceed with investigations and prosecutions based upon referrals by member states and upon the prosecutor’s own initiative.
The Statute left open the possible assertion of the Court’s jurisdiction over nationals of a non-State Party such as the U.S.
On December 31, 2000 (two and a half years after the Rome Conference and in the last month of his Presidency), however, President Clinton signed the treaty on behalf of the U.S. His formal statement on this action said that he did so “to reaffirm our strong support for international accountability and for bringing to justice perpetrators of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity” and for the U.S. “to remain engaged in making the ICC an instrument of impartial and effective justice.” On the other hand, President Clinton stated that the U.S. was not “abandoning our concerns about serious flaws in the treaty.” Foremost was the Court’s ability to “claim jurisdiction over personnel of states that have not [ratified the treaty].” Therefore, he said, he “will not, and do not recommend that my successor submit the treaty to the Senate for advice and consent until our fundamental concerns are satisfied.” Therefore, in the last month of his Presidency, President Clinton did not submit the Rome Statute to the Senate.
 Scharf, Results of the Rome Conference for an International Criminal Court, ASIL Insights (Aug. 1998), http://www.asil.org/insigh23.cfm; Wedgwood, Fiddling in Rome: America and the International Criminal Court, Foreign Affairs (Nov/Dec. 1998).
 President Clinton, Statement on Signature of the International Criminal Court Treaty (12/31/00), http://www.amicc.org/docs/Clinton_sign.pdf; Congressional Research Service, U.S. Policy Regarding the International Criminal Court (29/08/96), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/73990.pdf. Under Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, the President has the “Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”