International Criminal Court: Possible U.N. Security Council Referral of Syrian Human Rights Abuses to ICC

As previously mentioned, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has jurisdiction over the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and one of the ways in which it can obtain jurisdiction over a specific situation is by referral from the U.N. Security Council. [1] The Council already has done so with respect to Sudan (Darfur) and Libya.[2]

Now the U.S. is considering asking the U.N. Security Council to refer possible Syrian human rights abuses to the ICC for investigation and possible prosecution. On June 17th U.S. officials said the possible referral was in reaction to the regime’s killing 1,100 civilians since March and another 20 on Friday.[3]

Russia and China, two other permanent Security Council members with veto power, have expressed opposition to pressuring Syria through the Council. But the U.S. now is pressing Russia to support a Council resolution on Syria.[4]

Earlier in June Syrian opposition and human-rights groups presented the ICC’s Prosecutor with information about alleged crimes against humanity by the Syrian regime. This information had details about attacks on civilians: over 1,100 killings, 3,000 injured and 900 forced disappearances. The report also alleged the regime’s use of torture, snipers, attack helicopters and tanks against civilians. [5]

In May U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes, Stephen Rapp, reiterated U.S. support for the ICC. He  mentioned how the U.S. as a non-member was cooperating with the ICC: participating as an observer at meetings of the Court’s Assembly of States Parties, assisting the Court with information-sharing, witness relocation and protection and the arrest and transfer of ICC fugitives. The U.S. also supported the Security Council’s referral of the Libyan situation to the ICC.[6]


[1] See Post: The International Criminal Court: Introduction (April 28, 2011).

[2] See Post: The International Criminal Court: Investigations and Prosecutions (April 28, 2011); Post: The International Criminal Court: Libya Investigation Status (May 8, 2011); Post: The International Criminal Court: Three Libyan Arrest Warrants Sought (May 16, 2011).

[3]  Solomon, U.S. Pushes to Try Syria Regime, Wall S. J. (June 18, 2011); Shanker, War Crimes Charges Weighed as Crisis Continues in Syria, N.Y. Times (June 19, 2011); Reuters, Russia’s Medvedev Opposed to U.N. Vote on Syria: Report, N.Y. Times (June 19, 2011).

[4]  Id.

[5] Id.

[6] Rapp, Where Can the Victims of Atrocities Find Justice? (May 10, 2011), http://www.state.gov/s/wci/us_releases/remarks/165257.htm.

International Criminal Justice: Winding Down Two Ad-Hoc Criminal Tribunals

We have seen that two of the institutions of international criminal justice are the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). They are both so-called ad hoc tribunals that were created by the U.N. Security Council.[1]

Both were created with the clear expectation that they would not be permanent institutions. Instead, they had set terms of existence that have had to be extended. Those termination dates are now July 1, 2012 (ICTR) and July 1, 2013 (ICTY). To cope with their anticipated unfinished business when they cease to exist, the Security Council created another institution with the awkward title of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT).[2]

On June 6, 2011, the Security Council heard from the ICTR and ICTY on the status of their efforts to complete their work by the above dates. Despite their diligent efforts, both tribunals face difficulties in meeting the deadlines.[3]

One problem is the recent arrests of defendants (Mladic for ICTY and Munyagishari for ICTR) and the resulting preparations for, and conducting, their trials.

Another problem for both tribunals is the departure of professional staff members who understandably are seeking new jobs with ongoing institutions, rather than be left standing on a sinking ship. One solution to this problem that was suggested at the recent Security Council meeting was paying retention bonuses to those who stay until the tribunals are terminated. Good idea, but what is the source of the funds to pay such bonuses? The tribunals are paid for by the Security Council, which always has difficulties in obtaining funds for its budget.

One way to help get their work done by their end dates is to refer as many remaining cases as possible to national courts. Both tribunals are doing so.

These inherent administrative difficulties that are associated with ending the ad hoc tribunals are one set of reasons for the establishment of the permanent International Criminal Court. Since it is a permanent body, it will not experience these problems.[4] In addition, unlike the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC, once established, is able to take on current problems like Libya.[5]

All three of these institutions, however, share the difficult challenge of trying to shorten the time required for trials. Given the nature of the crimes within the jurisdiction of these bodies, this is not easy. For example, the ICC has jurisdiction over defined “war crimes,” which require proof of certain acts when “committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.” Such proof is not simple.[6]

Thus, the recent Security Council meeting included discussion of the need for the ICTR and ICTY to have greater judicial efficiency while still providing due process to the defendants. The tribunals’  representatives  talked about the recent introduction of electronic filing, amendments to their rules of procedure and evidence and improved case management techniques, limiting amendments to the grounds for appeal, organization of judgment drafting and prioritization of work. There were no details of these efforts provided at the Security Council meeting, but although they sound good, they seem an inadequate response to me. More promising were suggestions on this subject from one of the ICC judges:

  • Have court-appointed experts present reports regarding context, background, general circumstances of alleged offenses and peripheral facts.
  • Use depositions for less central areas of evidence.
  • Increase use of video links to hear some witnesses.
  • Require parties for each witness to identify areas of undisputed and of disputed testimony.
  • Amend the Rome Statute to allow a single judge to hear some parts of trial instead of the three judges now required for all aspects of a trial.
  • Examine whether the ICC is efficiently operating and using its funds.
  • Develop expedited procedures for interlocutory appeals.[7]

Another problem was presented by the ICTR. It continues to face difficulties in relocating acquitted defendants and convicted individuals who have served their sentences.

The Security Council meeting was attended by a representative of the government of Rwanda, which is not a member of the Council. He raised a separate issue. He said of utmost concern to his government was the “scourge of genocide denial by some in the academic and legal professions, including ICTY defense lawyers, [who] are leading an international campaign to misrepresent, misinterpret and openly deny that, in 1994, there was a genocide perpetrated against the Tutsi in Rwanda. . . . Such attempts  . . . are . . . not only morally reprehensible, but also a violation of the ethics and rules of professional conduct for attorneys. . . . The Government of Rwanda will . . . continue to ensure that, without prejudice or favor, any individual who engages in revisionism or denial of [this] . . . genocide . . . be brought to justice in accordance with the Rwandan Constitution and other legal instruments.”

This Rwandan statement is not an idle threat. In 2010 Rwandan authorities arrested and jailed for nearly three weeks a defense lawyer before the ICTR, Peter Erlinder of Minnesota, for allegedly denying that genocide had happened.[8] Such threats and charges, I submit, are infringements of a defendant’s right to counsel and of the lawyer’s duty zealously to represent his client. The Minnesota State Bar Association stood up for Erlinder with a resolution that urged the Rwandan government “to drop all charges against him based on actions taken in the course of his professional representation of his clients in Rwanda and the exercise of his internationally recognized rights to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, and . . . to allow him to continue his legal representation and the exercise of his rights to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly without further intimidation, hindrance, harassment or improper influence.”[9]

Despite all of these administrative problems, the French Ambassador to the U.N. at the recent Council meeting reminded us all that the recent arrests of Mladic and the Rwandan fugitive and the continued efforts to find and prosecute those charged with these grave crimes send “an important message.” For “all of those who today still try to come to power–or stay in power–by ordering and planning attacks against civilians, to all those who, when faced with an international criminal justice arrest warrant . . ., think that they can count on weariness or inaction on the part of the [Security] Council [or the international criminal tribunals], [t]hey are mistaken.”


[1] See: Post: International Criminal Justice: Introduction (April 26, 2011); Post: International Criminal Justice: Mladic To Face Charges at ICTY (May 27, 2011); Post: International Criminal Justice: Mladic Update (June 1, 2011).

[2]  See Post: International Criminal Justice: The Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (May 28, 2011).

[3]  U.N. Security Council, 6545th Meeting (June 6, 2011); U.N. Security Council, Press Release: Arrests of Long-Sought Fugitives Commended in Security Council, But Challenges to Completing Work in War Crimes Tribunals Dominate Briefings by Officials (June 6, 2011).

[4]  See Post: International Criminal Court: Introduction (April 28, 2011); Post: International Criminal Court: Investigations and Prosecutions (April 28, 2011).

[5]  See Post: The International Criminal Court: Investigations and Prosecutions (April 28, 2011); Post: The International Criminal Court: Libya Investigation Status (May 8, 2011); Post: The International Criminal Court: Three Libyan Arrest Warrants Sought (May 16, 2011).

[6]  Rome Statute for ICC, Art. 8(1).

[7]  ICC Judge Adrian Fulford, The Reflections of a Trial Judge (Dec. 16, 2010).

[8]  Kron & Gettleman, American Lawyer for Opposition Figure Is Arrested, N.Y. Times (May 28, 2010); Ward, Hearing could end Erlinder’s “holding pattern” in Rwanda, StarTrib. (June 6, 2010); Herb, Erlinder is sent to prison after Rwanda denies bail, StarTrib. (June 7, 2010); Diaz, Erlinder essay on Rwanda has defense nervous, StarTrib. (June 11, 2011); Herb & Diaz, Erlinder acknowledges suicide attempt in jail, StarTrib. (June 15, 2010); Herb & Diaz, Rwanda frees Peter Erlinder on bail, StarTrib. (June 17, 2010); Diaz & Herb, Nightmare over, Erlinder’s home, StarTrib. (June 22, 2010); Kron, U.S. Lawyer Is Barred from Rwanda Tribunal Work, N.Y. Times (April 22, 2011).

[9] Minn. State Bar Ass’n, General Assembly Resolution (June 25, 2010).  Professor Erlinder has written an account of his arrest and jailing which, he says, was due to his having used discovery proceedings to uncover original documents in U.N. and U.S. Government archives that confirm that the victors in the four-year Rwandan war have told the story of the violence that occurred during that war; he also criticizes the record of the ICTR as one-sided prosecution. (Erlinder, The UN Security Council Ad Hoc Rwanda Tribunal: International Justice or Juridically-Constructed “Victor’s Impunity”?, 4 DePaul J. Soc. Justice 131 (2010).) Erlinder also has created the Rwanda Documents Project to collect and make available primary source materials from international and national agencies, governments, and courts that relate to the political and social history of Rwanda from 1990 to the present. (Rwanda documents project, http://www.rwandadocumentsproject.net/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.)

International Criminal Court: ICC Prosecutor Updates U.N. Security Council on Sudan (Darfur)

As previously reported, the ICC has been investigating the situation in Sudan (Darfur) for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes since July 1, 2002, at the request of the U.N. Security Council.[1]

On June 8, 2011, the ICC Prosecutor made his semi-annual report to the U.N. Security Council on the status of his office’s investigations and prosecutions in this matter.[2] The following are the main points of that report:

  • There are three pending ICC prosecutions from Sudan (Darfur). In two of them–Harun and Kushayh and Bashir–the defendants are still at large, and thus the proceedings have not really commenced. In the third case against two rebel commanders, the parties have agreed to certain facts and limited the trial to three issues: (1) whether a certain attack by the rebels was unlawful; (2) if the attack is deemed to be unlawful, whether the defendants were aware of the factual circumstances that established its illegality; and (3) whether the African Union Mission in Sudan was a peacekeeping mission in accordance with the U.N. Charter. In this third case, the defendants do not dispute their participation in the attack and both have committed to surrender voluntarily to the ICC.
  • The Prosecutor also said his office was considering presenting a fourth Sudanese case to the Court’s Pre-Trial Chamber for its decision whether or not to issue arrest warrants.
  • All of these cases concern past alleged crimes. In addition, the Prosecutor reported that the following crimes were continuing: bombing attacks targeting or indiscriminately affecting civilians; ground attacks targeting civilians; widespread sexual and gender-based violence; attacks on human rights defenders, civil society members and community leaders; deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to cause physical destruction of groups of people; forcible transferring of populations; recruitment and use of child soldiers; and concealing information on crimes.
  • The government of Sudan has announced its investigations of these alleged crimes and the creation of new entities to do so, but there are no such investigations, and the announcements are parts of a governmental policy of covering up the crimes and avoiding international scrutiny.
  • When the ICC exposes these crimes, the reaction of President Bashir and other leaders has been “to deny the crimes entirely, attribute them to other factors (such as inter-tribal feud), divert attention by publicizing . . . ceasefire agreements that are violated as soon as they are announced and threaten the international community with retaliation and even more crimes. . . . Bashir has successfully transformed public knowledge of his criminal responsibility as a negotiating tool.”
  • “It is the challenging responsibility of the . . . Security Council to use the information exposed by the [ICC] to stop the crimes in Darfur, to protect the civilians in Darfur. The [ICC] Prosecution, fulfilling its mandate, is willing to assist.”

After the submission of this report, the Council’s 15 members went into private session to discuss the report. They were joined by representatives of 37 other countries.[3]

Immediately after this Security Council meeting there were reports of a “growing sense of panic” in central Sudan with 60,000 displaced people, blocked relief convoys, ethnic clashes and many deaths. This week the Council was given an alarming report about current violence and threatened ethnic cleansing.[4] In short, the armed conflict in Darfur has not stopped. Nor has the illegal intentional practice of targeting civilians.

Sudanese President Bashir’s evasion of arrest to face ICC charges continues to make the news. On June 13th, Hillary Clinton, U.S. Secretary of State, addressed African leaders at a meeting of the African Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and pressed them to abandon authoritarian rulers. President Bashir also was in Addis Ababa for the meeting, but left before Clinton arrived.[5] On June 14th Amnesty International urged Malaysia to withdraw an invitation to President Bashir to attend an upcoming economic forum and to arrest him if he came. On June 16th Amnesty International made a similar plea to China after its announcement that Bashir would be visiting that country next week supposedly to talk about seeking peace in his country.[6]


[1] See Post: International Criminal Justice: Introduction (April 26, 2011); Post: International Criminal Court: Introduction (April 28, 2011); Post: International Criminal Court: Investigations and Prosecutions (April 28, 2011).

[2]  ICC Office of Prosecutor, Thirteenth Report of the [ICC] Prosecutor to the UN Security Council [on Sudan (Darfur)] (June 8, 2011); ICC Office of Prosecutor, Statement to the [U.N.] Security Council on the situation in Darfur, the Sudan (June 8, 2011); U.N. Security Council,6548th Meeting (June 8, 2011); U.N. Security Council, Press Release: President of Sudan Has Learned To Defy Security Council . . . . (June 8, 2011).

[3]  U.N. Security Council, 6549th (closed) meeting (June 8, 2011).

[4]  Gettleman, U.N. Officials Warn of a Growing ‘Panic” in Central Sudan as Violence Spreads, N.Y. Times (June 15, 2011); Lynch, Obama expresses concern over Sudan violence, Wash. Post (June 16, 2011); Reeves, In Sudan, genocide anew?, Wash. Post (June 17, 2011); Totten, Is Omar Hassan al-Bashir Up to Genocide Again?, N.Y. Times (June 18, 2011).

[5] Myers, Clinton Presses Africans to Abandon Authoritarian Rulers, Singling Out Qaddafi, N.Y. Times (June 13, 2011).

[6] AP, Amnesty urges Malaysia to withdraw invitation to Sudan president or arrest him when he arrives, Wash. Post (June 14, 2011); AP, China Invites Sudan Leader Accused of War Crimes, N.Y. Times (June 16, 2011); AP, US Seeks China’s Help in Sudan as Alarm Grows, N.Y. Times (June 16, 2011); AP, Sudan leader al-Bashir to skip Malaysia forum amid calls to arrest him on war crime charges, Wash. Post (June 15, 2011).

El Salvador’s Current Controversy over Its General Amnesty Law and Supreme Court

As indicated in a prior post, the issue of the constitutionality under Salvadoran law of the General Amnesty Law has not gone away. Indeed, that issue and a new law regarding its Supreme Court (Decree 743) have precipitated a major, still-unresolved controversy in the country.[1]

As an outsider, I have found it difficult to understand and analyze this controversy. I, therefore, will try to summarize what has been happening. I cannot predict how this will turn out, but will conclude with my observations and questions.

The first step in this still unfolding drama was the May 30, 2011, decision by a Spanish court to issue criminal arrest warrants for 20 Salvadoran military officers and soldiers for their alleged participation in the November 1989 murder of the six Jesuit priests.[2]

The next step was the adoption without debate three days later (June 2, 2011) of Decree 743 by the votes of the conservative political party legislators of the Salvadoran legislature (the National Assembly) with abstentions from all but two of the FMLN legislators and by the signing of the law the next day (June 3, 2011) by  President Funes of the FMLN party. Decree 743 requires through July 2012 the five-member Constitutional Chamber of the Salvadoran Supreme Court to act unanimously in order to declare a law unconstitutional.[3]

Decree 743 and the highly unusual and hasty manner in which it was adopted have caused major citizen protests in the capitol city and debate in the media and various organs of the State.[4]

Much debate and speculation has centered on why the Decree was proposed and adopted by the legislators from the conservative political parties. Foremost, as former President Cristiani, who is now the President of the ARENA political party, has admitted, was concern that the Constitutional Chamber would invalidate the General Amnesty Law. Was there worry that a decision invalidating that amnesty law would facilitate a Salvadoran court’s enforcing the Spanish arrest warrants? The conservative political parties, it is true, also disliked some of the recent decisions by the four moderate or progressive members of the Chamber that have invalidated various laws. Was that the main reason? If so, why did the Decree have to be adopted so quickly without debate? The “sunset” provision of Decree 743 is also seen as an implicit recognition that it is aimed at the four progressive members of the Chamber in that their current three-year terms expire in July 2012.

So too there is debate and speculation as to why President Funes from the FMLN political party quickly supported the Decree when the FMLN itself did not. Was there pressure by the U.S., which does not want El Salvador to withdraw from the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and to stop using the U.S. Dollar as the country’s currency and, therefore, feared the Constitutional Chamber’s invalidating those laws? Was something not yet known promised Funes by the conservative political parties in exchange for his supporting the Decree? Some speculate that Funes did so to gain support in the National Assembly for a moderate legislative agenda. True?

The third step in this drama was the Constitutional Chamber’s decision in a case on June 6th (only three days after the adoption of Decree 743) that decided, by four of the five magistrates, that the country’s Budget Act 2011 was unconstitutional in two respects and that the just-adopted Decree 743 itself was unconstitutional. Decree 743 was held to violate the principle of separation of powers and to interfere with the constitutional powers of the Chamber; the decree, according to the court, was also adopted by the legislature in an unconstitutional manner.[5]

Yet another wrinkle was added to this controversy by the announcement on June 8th by Cristiani, as President of the ARENA political party. He said that ARENA had supported Decree 743 on June 2nd because of rumors that the Chamber was about to declare the General Amnesty Law unconstitutional.  On June 8th (only six days after the legislature’s adoption of the Decree), however, Cristiani said that the information about the Chamber’s impending invalidation of the General Amnesty Law was erroneous and that instead the Chamber had made a “clear demonstration” that it did not intend to invalidate the amnesty. Therefore, Cristiani said, ARENA would be introducing a bill to repeal that Decree. This about-face, he said, was to end the conflict over the Decree and to promote dialogue among the three branches of government.[6]

This ARENA reversal itself has created more controversy and speculation. Why did it change its mind in only six days? Did it really want to end the conflict over the Decree and promote dialogue? Did it receive secret and improper leaks from the Chamber that it would not invalidate the General Amnesty Law? Was there in fact no pending case regarding the Amnesty Law? Was it discovery that the Chamber seven years ago had ruled that the Amnesty Law did not apply to the murders of the Jesuits because no administration may grant amnesty to itself?[7] Was it due to the Chamber’s June 6th decision holding that the Decree was unconstitutional and by respected attorneys publicly taking the same position?[8]

However, later on the very same day as the ARENA announcement of changing its position (June 8th), an attorney filed two cases with the Chamber challenging the constitutionality of the General Amnesty Law and El Salvador’s being a party to CAFTA. Will this cause ARENA to change its mind again?

The FMLN positions in this controversy are even more baffling. On June 2nd all but two of the FMLN legislators abstained on voting on Decree 743, saying it was a blow to democracy. The June 8th ARENA reversal of position on the Decree, therefore, presumably would be welcomed by the FMLN. The FMLN, however, also reversed its position. Its spokesman now said that the Decree had “no reverse gear” and that the Chamber’s June 6th invalidation of the Decree was a danger for the other institutions of the government. Why was the FMLN party taking these positions?[9]

President Funes from the FMLN appears to be the only participant who has had a consistent position. When he signed the Decree, he has said he did so because it was constitutional, it would prevent a looming conflict between the legislature and the judiciary and it would not obstruct the operations of the Chamber. Was this the real reason? After the ARENA reversal of position, he still supported the Decree and said that ARENA’s change appeared to reflect an improper agreement with the Chamber not to declare the amnesty unconstitutional and an improper attempt to influence the Chamber and cast doubt on the independence of some judges.[10] (The next day both ARENA and the President of the Supreme Court denied the existence of any agreement regarding the amnesty law between the Constitutional Chamber and ARENA or Cristiani.)[11]

As an outsider without full knowledge of all the facts, all I can do is speculate and raise questions.

The timing and manner of the adoption of Decree 743 and the comments by Cristiani suggest to me that the Decree is most directly connected with the Spanish court’s issuance of the indictment and warrants.

First, I had thought that the validity or invalidity of the General Amnesty Law had become a theoretical issue. That Law grants amnesty for certain crimes committed before January 1, 1992 (the end of the Civil War) or over 19 years ago. But for that time period, El Salvador had a 10-year statute of limitations for such crimes that in December 2000 was held to bar a new Salvadoran criminal case over the murders of the Jesuits without regard to the General Amnesty Law.[12] Although there is a basis under international law for challenging the validity of such a short statute of limitations for such horrendous crimes,[13] that appeared to me to be unlikely to succeed in El Salvador.

Second, the Spanish indictment was issued on May 30th and gave the defendants, the majority of whom are still Salvadoran residents, only 10 days (until June 9th) to surrender themselves to the Spanish court before additional steps would be taken to secure their arrests.[14] On June 2d (only three days after the issuance of the indictment) the National Assembly without debate adopted Decree 743, and the next day (June 3) it was signed by President Funes and enacted into law. This suggests to me a desire by the conservative political parties (and the President) to have Decree 743 in place before the Spanish court would take steps to have the Salvadoran courts issue arrest warrants for the defendants and thereby give those defendants a possible legal basis (the General Amnesty Law) to resist the arrest warrants. Is this what happened?

Third, Cristiani was a subject of the original criminal complaint in Spain and a potential additional indicted defendant in the Spanish case.[15] Thus, he has a profound personal interest in having Salvadoran legal defenses to any future attempt by the Spanish court to have him arrested in his home country. Just this month he has been the principal spokesman for ARENA regarding its original support of Decree 743 and tying it to trying to ensure that the General Amnesty Law is not invalidated. Was this at least part of Cristiani and ARENA’s motivation for their original support of Decree 743?

Fourth, it is much more difficult to understand the reasons why President Funes immediately signed the Decree when his political party (the FMLN) was opposed. His rationale as stated on June 10th is not persuasive to me as an outsider. I, therefore, wonder if President Funes had received threats that the Salvadoran military (or a paramilitary organization) would intervene to prevent the removal of these officers from the country? Was the perceived elimination of a threatened invalidation of the General Amnesty Law by requiring unanimity in the Constitutional Chamber seen as a way to prevent the extradition of the military men through the courts and thus avoid a military intervention or coup?

Finally, is it possible that all of this controversy is unnecessary? Could the Constitutional Chamber hold the General Amnesty Law constitutional, but like the U.S. federal courts conclude it is not applicable to proceedings in other countries?[16]


[1] See Post: International Criminal Justice: El Salvador’s General Amnesty Law and Its Impact on the Jesuits Case (June 11, 2011).

[2]  See Post: International Criminal Justice: Spanish Court Issues Criminal Arrest Warrants for Salvadoran Murders of Jesuit Priests (May 31, 2011); Post: International Criminal Justice: Spanish Court’s Case Regarding the Salvadoran Murders of the Jesuit Priests (June 15, 2011).

[3] Marinero, Funes sanciona reformas para que fallos de amparos e inconstitucionalides sean por decision unanime, (June 3, 2011), http://www.lapagina.com; ?Donde se gesto el decreto que le puso el freno legal a la Sala de lo Constitucional?, (June 4, 2011),www.lapagina.com.sv; Voices from El Salvador, Institutional Coup in El Salvador (June 4, 2011), http://voiceselsalvador.wordpress.com/2011/06/04/institutional-coup-in-el-salvador; Voices from El Salvador, Salvadorans Protest the Government’s Actions Against Constitutional Court (June 6,2011), http://voiceselsalvador.wordpress.com/2011/06/06/salvadorans-protest-the-governments-actions-against-constitutional-court; Tim’s El Salvador Blog, Broad opposition to Decree 743 (June 8, 2011),   http://luterano.blogspot.com/2011/06/broad-opposition-to-decree-743.html.

[4] Id.; Ortiz, Attorney Oscar Luna condemns the decree 743 (June 13, 2011), http://www.lapagina.com.sv (English translation; Luna is El Salvador’s human rights ombudsman); Discussions in the Constitutional Court in El Salvador (June 13, 2011), http://www.centralamericadata.com (Salvadoran Chamber of Commerce and Industry calls for repeal of Decree 743); Voices on the Border, The Debate Over Decree 743 Continues (June 14, 2011).

[5] Arauz, Constitutional Chamber hereby declared the decree that would tie the hands, elfaro (June 6, 2011), http://www.elfaro.com.sv; Merinero, Guerra de poderes en El Salvador: La Corte Suprema declara inapplicable el articulo que exige unanimidad en fallos de la Sala de lo Constitucional, (June 6, 2011), http://www.lapagina.com.sv.

[6] Huete, Henriquez & Cabrera, ARENA perida derogatoria de decreto 743, La Prensa Grafica (June 8, 2011), http://www.laprensagrafica.com; Arauz, ARENA retract the decree against FMLN urges Chamber and fulfill, elfaro (June 8, 2011).; Perez, ARENA se retracta y promote pedir la derogacion del decreto 743, (June 8, 2011), http://www.lapagina.com.sv; Otto & Marinero, ARENA contra la pared: ya hay dos recursos de inconstitucionalidad contra la Ley de Amnistia y el TLC (June 8, 2011), http://www.lapagina.com.sv.

[7]  I have not seen this case myself, but it is referenced in one of the articles about the current controversy. I solicit information about this case.

[8] See n.6.

[9] E.g., FMLN reiterated it would not support repeal of Decree 743 (June 14, 2011), http://www.lapagina.com.sv.

[10] Guzman, Funes: “Aqui no ha habido ningun compadre hablado entre el presidente y la derecha, (June 6, 2011), http://www.lapagina.com.sv; Guzman, Funes: La confesion publica de ARENA es una injerencia inacceptable en el Organo Judicial, (June 10, 2011), http://www.lapagina.com.sv.

[11] Voices on the Border, The Debate Over Decree 743 Continues (June 11, 2011).

[12]  No New Trial Set in Deaths of 6 Jesuits, Miami Herald, Dec. 14, 2000.

[13]   E.g., Barrios Altos v. Peru, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 75, ¶ 41 (Mar. 14, 2001); Convention on the Non-Applicabilty of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, Art. I (war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide); European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitation to Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes, Art. 1 (crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes and “any other violation of a rule or custom of international law which may hereafter be established and which the Contracting Party concerned considers . . . as being of a comparable nature to [the previous crimes]”); Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, Art. VII; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 29 (genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity). Moreover, El Salvador apparently has a new statute that has no time limit for criminal prosecutions for torture, genocide, war crimes and certain other crimes occurring after sometime in 1996. (Ruth A. Kok, Statutory Limitations in International Criminal Law at 45 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press 2007).)

[14] CJA, Spanish National Court Indictments and Arrest Warrants (May 30, 2011)(in Spanish), http://www.cja.org/downloads/JesuitsArrestWarrants.pdf;  CJA, Update: Spanish Judge Issues Indictments and Arrest Warrants in Spanish Jesuits Massacre Case (May 31, 2011), http://www.cja.org/article.php?id=1004.

[15]  See Post: International Criminal Justice: Spanish Court’s Case Regarding the Salvadoran Murders of the Jesuit Priests (June 15, 2011).

[16] See Post: El Salvador’s General Amnesty Law in U.S. Federal Court Cases (June 14, 2011).

International Criminal Justice: The Jesuits Case Before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights

We already have looked at a Spanish court’s recent issuance of 20 criminal arrest warrants regarding the November 1989 murders of six Jesuit priests in El Salvador[1] and the provisional facts of the murders themselves[2]  and the Salvadoran military’s attempts to cover up its being the one responsible for the killings.[3]  We also have summarized the Salvadoran criminal case regarding this crime.[4] Along the way we have encountered the findings regarding this crime by the Truth Commission for El Salvador and what that Commission was and how it did its work.[5] Yet another facet of this case has been exposed: El Salvador’s General Amnesty Law and its impact on the Jesuits case.[6]

Now we look at the Jesuits case in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), headquartered in Washington, D.C.  It receives and analyzes petitions alleging human rights violations under the American Convention [Treaty] on Human Rights. When a petition meets certain conditions of eligibility, the IACHR solicits the views of the concerned State, investigates the violations and issues a report that typically sets forth its findings and conclusions plus recommendations to the State concerned.[7] As of 1993, according to a U.S. bar association, the IACHR “decides few cases, usually after a long delay, and often its decisions are not drafted in a persuasive manner,” and its “decisions receive very little notice, are not cited or relied on in other cases, and are often not obeyed.” [8]

On the same day the Jesuit priests were murdered (November 16, 1989), Americas Watch, a non-governmental human rights organization, filed a complaint with the IACHR alleging that the Salvadoran government had violated the American Convention [Treaty] on Human Rights with respect to the murder of the Jesuits and their cook and her daughter.  Subsequently the government asked for dismissal on the ground that the case had been duly prosecuted in the country.[9]

Ten years later (December 22, 1999), the Commission issued its report making detailed findings about the murder and subsequent events and concluding that the state had violated the American Convention. It found the Truth Commission Report to be credible and placed heavy reliance on it.[10] As a result, the IACHR recommended that the government conduct an expeditious, effective investigation and prosecute and punish those who were involved “without reference to the amnesty,” to make reparations and to render the General Amnesty Law null and void.[11] The IACHR set forth its legal reasoning why that Law was invalid.[12]

Almost another 12 years now have passed since the IACHR’s decision, and still the government of El Salvador has not complied with these recommendations.[13]

In November 2009, however, on the 20th anniversary of the murder of the Jesuit priests, El Salvador at least partially complied with the recommendation for reparations. President Mauricio Funes presented the nation’s highest award (National Order of Jose Matias Delgado) to the Jesuit priests’ relatives as an act of atonement. Finally the Funes’ Administration formally advised the IACHR and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights that the Salvadoran state accepted the binding nature of their past decisions involving the country and the state’s responsibility to implement their recommendations in those cases.[14]

The IACHR has had three other cases that were investigated by the Truth Commission and at least two other cases of human rights abuses during El Salvador’s civil war. In all of these cases the IACHR concluded that the country had violated the American Convention on Human Rights and made recommendations similar to the ones in the Jesuits case. For the most part, El Salvador has not adopted IACHR’s recommendations in these cases.[15]

In January 2010, however, President  Funes took steps for compliance with the recommendations to make reparations to the victims of these crimes, including the Jesuits case. President Funes admitted that during the civil war state security forces “committed serious human rights violations and abuses of power,” including “massacres, arbitrary executions, forced disappearances, torture, sexual abuse, arbitrary deprivation of freedom” and other acts of repression. Fuenes also made a formal apology to all of the victims of these crimes and asked for their forgiveness. In addition, Fuenes created three commissions (i) to offer redress to the victims, (ii) to search for children who went missing during the war; and (iii) to provide attention to disabled combatants. (The country’s Vice President, Salvador Sanchez Ceren, simultaneously apologized for the actions of FMLN guerrillas during the civil war.)[16]


[1] See Post: International Criminal Justice: Spanish Court Issues Criminal Arrest Warrants for Salvadoran Murders of Jesuit Priests (May 31, 2011).

[2]  See Post: International Criminal Justice: The Salvadoran Murders of the Jesuit Priests (June 2, 2011).

[3]  See Post: International Criminal Justice: El Salvador’s Military’s Attempt To Cover-Up Its Committing the Murders of the Jesuit Priests (June 7, 2011).

[4]  See Post: International Criminal Justice: The Salvadoran Criminal Prosecution of the Murders of the Jesuit Priests (June 8, 2011).

[5]  See Post: International Criminal Justice: The Jesuits Case in the Truth Commission for El Salvador (June 9, 2011).

[6]  See Post: International Criminal Justice: El Salvador’s General Amnesty Law and Its Impact on the Jesuits Case (June 11, 2011). A future post will discuss the current Salvadoran controversy regarding the General Amnesty Law and the Constitutional Chamber of the country’s Supreme Court.

[7]  IACHR, What is the IACHR?, http://www.cidh.oas.org/what.htm . (The other human rights body for the Americas is the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which is located in San José, Costa Rica.)

[8]  Comm. on Int’l Human Rights of the Ass’n of Bar of City of N.Y., The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: a Promise Unfulfilled at 3 (1993).  The author believes these 1993 conclusions about the IACHR are still valid and invites comments on this topic.

[9]  Ignacio Ellacuria, et al. v. El Salvador, Rep. No. 136/99 ¶¶ 1-3 (IACHR Case No. 10.488, Dec. 22, 1999).

[10]  Id. ¶¶ 25-26, 52, 59-60, 69-72, 75-86, 179-80, 184, 209, 219, 230-31.

[11]  Id. ¶¶ 4, 52-142, 143-96, 237-38, 241.

[12]  Id. ¶¶ 192-232. Accord  Cea et al v. El Salvador, Rep. No. 1/99  ¶¶ 105-17, 160 (Case No. 10.480, Jan. 27, 1999).

[13]  CJA, El Salvador: The Jesuits Massacre Case, http://www.cja.org/cases/jesuits.shtml.

[14] IACHR, Press Release No. 78/09: IACHR Concludes Its 137th Period of Sessions (Nov. 13, 2009); Aleman, El Salvador awards highest honors to 6 Jesuit priests killed by army 20 years ago, Washington Examiner (Nov. 16, 2009).

[15] Monsignor Romero v. El Salvador, Rep. No. 37/00 ¶¶ 1-2 (IACHR Case No. 11.481, April 13, 2000); Admissibility of  El Mozote Massacre, Rep. No. 24/06, ¶¶ 1-29  (IACHR Case No. 10.720, Mar. 2, 2006); COMADRES, Rep. No. 13/96, ¶¶  1-2, 5-7, 28 (IACHR Case No. 10.948, Mar. 1, 1996);  Cea, et al. v. El Salvador, Rep. No. 1/99 (IACHR Case No. 10.480 Jan. 27, 1999); Vasquez v. El Salvador, Rep. No. 65/99 (IACHR Case No. 10.228 Apr. 13, 1999).

[16] Cervantes, Funes pide perdon por abusos durante la Guerra (Jan. 16, 2010),www.elfaro.net/es; IACHR, Press Release NO. 4/10: IACHR Welcomes El Salvador’s Recognition of Responsibility and Apology for Grave Human Rights Violations During the Armed Conflict (Jan. 21, 2010); El Salvador President Apologizes to War Victims, Latin American Herald Tribune (Jan. 22, 2010). The author is not aware of what has happened with these three commissions and invites comments with such information.

 

International Criminal Justice: Salvadoran Criminal Case Regarding the Murders of the Jesuit Priests

We already have looked at a Spanish court’s recent issuance of 20 criminal arrest warrants regarding the November 1989 murders of six Jesuit priests in El Salvador[1] and the provisional facts of the murders themselves[2] and the Salvadoran military’s attempts to cover up its being the one responsible for the killings.[3] Now we examine the Salvadoran criminal prosecution of some of the individuals involved in this crime.[4]

The murders of the Jesuit priests caused such a huge international uproar that El Salvador had to do something to make it appear as if it were pursuing justice in the case. As a result, in January 1990 it commenced criminal prosecution of five Salvadoran military officers and five soldiers of the Atlacatl Battalion. Colonel Guillermo Alfredo Benavides Moreno, the Director of the Military College, was accused of having given the order to murder the priests. Three Lieutenants were accused of commanding the operation. The five soldiers were accused of committing the murders.

The pre-trial proceedings took nearly two years. During this time, Colonel (now General) René Emilio Ponce, Colonel (now General) Juan Orlando Zepeda, Colonel Inocente Orlando Montano and Colonel (now General) Gilberto Rubio Rubio pressured lower-ranking officers not to mention orders from above in their testimony to the court.

Finally, the trial by jury took place in September 1991 in the building of the Supreme Court of Justice and was broadcast live on television. Several ranking military officers attended the trial with the defendants’ families. On the last day of the trial, during the defendants’ closing arguments, a large crowd outside the courthouse shouted chants in favor of the defendants, interrupting the trial. In closing arguments, defense counsel barely mentioned the crime itself. Instead, they asked the jury to reject foreign intervention and pressure, emphasized that five of the six victims were Spanish born, and argued that the military generally and the defendants in particular were heroes protecting the nation against terrorism.

The five-person jury, whose identity was kept secret, was charged with deciding the charges of murder and acts of terrorism. The other charges were left to the judge to decide.

Benevides was convicted of all eight counts of murder and instigation and conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism. One of the Lieutenants was convicted of one count of murder (the 16-year-old girl), instigation and conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism and being an accessory. Benevides and this Lieutenant were sentenced to 30 years imprisonment. The other two Lieutenants were convicted of instigation and conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism; they were sentenced to three years imprisonment, but released on bail and continued to serve in the military. A Lieutenant Colonel was convicted of being an accessory and sentenced to three years imprisonment, but he too was released on bail and continued to serve in the military. The five soldiers were acquitted of all charges.

International observers of the trial thought the jury verdict defied logic and the weight of the evidence.

In March 2000 and soon after the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights had issued a report on the case that will be discussed in a subsequent post, the Central American University (UCA), where the Jesuit priests had taught, sought to open a new Salvadoran criminal case regarding their murders, ultimately to no avail. UCA asked the country’s Attorney General to do so on the basis of UCA’s charges against former President Cristiani and five members of the Armed Forces High Command, including former General and Defense Minister Emilio Ponce.  Then Salvadoran President Flores opposed the request, and the Attorney General refused to do so, but the Salvadoran Supreme Court ruled that only a court could decide to reopen such a case.[5]

Thereafter (October 2000), a lower court rejected the prosecutor’s request to reopen the old case because it was “without legal substance” while ordering the prosecutor to conduct a new investigation to determine whether there were legitimate grounds for reopening the case.[6]

The Attorney General then conducted a new investigation and reapplied to a court to reopen the case, this time against Cristiani and four military officers, including Ponce. Once again, however, the lower court refused to do so in December 2000 on the ground that any new charges were barred by the country’s 10-year statute of limitations. Immediately afterwards Ponce and the other three officers held a press conference where Ponce accused left-wing groups of trying to de-stabilize the country by making these charges and admitted that he and his fellow former officers were concerned about developments elsewhere in Latin America, especially the fate of Augusto Pinochet in Chile and former Argentine military officers.[7]


[1] See Post: International Criminal Justice: Spanish Court Issues Criminal Arrest Warrants for Salvadoran Murders of Jesuit Priests (May 31, 2011).

[2]  See Post: International Criminal Justice: The Salvadoran Murders of the Jesuit Priests (June 2, 2011).

[3]  See Post: International Criminal Justice: Salvadoran Military’s Attempted Cover-Up of Its Committing the Murders of the Jesuit Priests (June 7, 2011).

[4] This post’s summary of the Salvadoran criminal case is extracted from the Commission for the Truth for El Salvador’s Report: From Madness to Hope: The 12-year war in El Salvador  at 45-54 (March 15, 1993), http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/salvador/informes/truth.html  [“Commission Report”]. See also Martha Doggett, Death Foretold: The Jesuit Murders in El Salvador at 121-208 (Washington, D.C.; Georgetown Univ. Press 1993). In future posts we will talk about the Truth Commission for El Salvador; the country’s general amnesty; the Jesuits case before the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights; the Spanish implementation of the principle of universal jurisdiction; and more details about the Spanish case regarding this crime.

[5]  UCA Press Release (Mar. 27, 2000, http://www.uca.edu.sv/neuvo/pressrelease.html; Lanchin, Salvador ex-president accused of killings, BBC News, Mar. 28, 2000; El Salvador Former Air Force Chief Denies Role in Killings, Miami Herald, Mar. 29, 2000; The Necessity and Importance of the Truth, Processo, April 5, 2000, http://www.uca.edu.sv/publica/proceso/proci897.html;UCA Impugns the Attorney General of the Republic’s Decision on the Jesuit Case, Processo, April 26, 2000,  http://www.uca.edu.sv/publica/proceso/proci899.html#doc;  New Charges Barred in Salvador Killings, N. Y. Times, Oct. 24, 2000; Editorial: The Impunity of Power, Processo, Oct. 25, 2000;  Darling, El Salvador to Reopen Murder Probe; Attorney general, under pressure, will investigate an ex-president and others in 1989 slayings of six Jesuit priests, Los Angeles Times, Oct. 26, 2000; No New Trial Set in Deaths of 6 Jesuits, Miami Herald, Dec. 14, 2000; Lanchin, Salvadorean ex-general issues warning, BBC News, Dec. 15, 2000.

[6]  Id.

[7]  Id.

.

Reading PPE at Oxford

Once I knew I would be going to the University of Oxford in the Fall of 1961, I had to decide what I was going to study. At the time, most American Rhodes Scholars read for a second bachelor’s degree that involved Oxford’s traditional tutorial style of education. (Today, more choose to seek advanced degrees.)

I rejected “reading” Jurisprudence for a B.A. degree because at the time that required translation of Roman law from Latin into English, a skill I did not have and did not think I could acquire “on the side” while doing everything else at Oxford.

Instead, like many American Rhodes Scholars, I chose Philosophy, Politics and Economics or PPE.[1] It was also known as “Modern Greats” to indicate that it was designed in the 1920’s to replicate some of the features of Classics or Greats or Literae Humaniores (Greek and Latin), one of Oxford’s traditional and famous courses of study. PPE, on the other hand, was designed to be a well-balanced course of study of the social problems of the modern world.[2]

PPE was organized in two subjects in each of the three PPE disciplines: General Philosophy (from Descartes to the present); Moral and Political Philosophy; Theory and Working of Political Institutions; British Political and Constitutional History Since 1830; Principles of Economics; and Economic Organization. The student also selected two additional subjects to study; I chose two in economics–Public Finance and Currency and Credit.

During Oxford’s three eight-week terms of the academic year, you had two tutorials a week in these subjects. For the six required subjects there were usually only two students with tutors from your own college. For the optional subjects, you usually were alone in the tutorial and sometimes with a tutor from another Oxford college who specialized in those subjects.

Each week the tutor would set the problem and suggest relevant readings for the next week. The subject would always be put as a question that required you to come to a conclusion and marshal the evidence and arguments for your conclusion. Here are examples of such problems:

  • “The Left was never right.” Discuss this verdict with regard to British foreign policy between the world wars. Was the Right ever wrong?
  • What do we mean by “James who now does this is the same person who did that?” How do we know we are correct?
  • Is the City [London’s financial industry] vital to the U.K.’s role in world trade?
  • Can it ever be justifiably claimed that a tariff is imposed for revenue purposes only?
  • Is infallibility a pre-condition for knowledge? If not, why do we often think it is?

During the following week, if you were doing your work, you would read at least the suggested readings and prepare an essay analyzing the problem. At the following tutorial one of the students (if there were two) would read his essay, and the tutor would comment, ask questions and start discussions about the problem. The tutorials, by the way, were held in the tutor’s rooms in the college, and the students were required to wear their academic gowns. (Although I was a Rhodes Scholar, I was not a scholar of Worcester College and, therefore, was not entitled to wear a scholar’s longer gown. Instead, I wore a skimpy “commoner’s gown.”)

The philosophy tutorials were the most difficult and frustrating for me. Oxford was then in the throes of linguistic analysis with its emphasis on careful examination of the language of philosophical argument.[3] We frequently were assigned very abstruse articles in British philosophical journals —Mind and Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. One of the articles that I recall had a title like “What do we mean when we say this is a Grade A apple?” I kept wondering  why I was spending my time reading these articles. Usually, however, during the tutorial I would say to myself that this was a worthy activity for someone like the tutor who was really good at it. But it was not for me. The tutor probably would say to himself, “Oh, these pragmatic Americans, they don’t get it.”

In addition to preparing for and participating in tutorials, the students could, if they wished, attend university-wide lectures on the PPE subjects (or, if you wished, on any other subjects that interested you.) I attended some and heard some of the famous Oxford dons of the day: J. R. Hicks (economist), Gilbert Ryle (philosopher) and A. J. Ayer (philosopher) are ones that I remember.

Finally during your “vacs” (vacations) and especially the “long vac” (the four-month summer vacation), you were encouraged to study independently. During one vac, for example, I spent several weeks at St. Deiniol’s Library (n/k/a Gladstone’s Library), a residence library near Hawarden, Wales[4] where I had room and board and a quiet library in which to study. (The Library was founded for “Divine Learning” by William Ewart Gladstone, Britain’s 19th century Prime Minister, and is close to Hawarden Castle, which was Gladstone’s estate.)[5]

At the end of each term, as I recall, your tutors gave practice exams, which were evaluated and returned with comments. Also at least once a year one of your tutors would give an “oral report card” on your performance to the head of your college.

The only “real” examinations were those given at the end of your time at Oxford. This memorable experience will be described in a subsequent posting.

As I reflect on this educational experience, I especially value the way that the subjects were presented to the students. You were forced to come to a conclusion and justify that conclusion, rather than saying a lot about a subject and avoiding coming to your own conclusions. You also had great freedom. You could look for, and read, resources beyond those suggested by the tutor. You could attend lectures if you wanted to. Given the one-on-one nature of tutorials, a student could not hide and never say a word.


[1]  Two of the more famous American Rhodes Scholars, Pete Dawkins and Bill Bradley, for example, read PPE. (See Post: Oxford in New York City (May 17, 2011).) Bill Clinton, who was a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford, 1968-70, started in PPE, but soon abandoned the program because he thought it was too repetitive of his U.S. undergraduate education. Clinton first switched to a graduate degree program (B. Litt. in Politics) that did not involve tutorials, but required a 50,000-word dissertation. His tutor, however, persuaded him that was a mistake and to switch instead to a graduate degree (B. Phil. in Politics), that had tutorials, essays, exams and a shorter thesis. Clinton made the switch, but did not finish this program and did not earn an Oxford degree; his memoir says he chose to go to Yale Law School rather than finishing the Oxford degree. (Bill Clinton, My Life at 141-43, 171 (New York: Knopf  2004); Ralph Evans (editor), Register of Rhodes Scholars 1903-1995 at 306 (Oxford: Rhodes Trust 1996).) In 2003 my wife and I attended a celebration of the centennial of the Rhodes Scholarships at Westminster Hall in London where Clinton was one of the speakers. He said his family was always embarrassed he had never earned an Oxford degree, but that year his daughter Chelsea redeemed the family honor by earning such a degree the prior day. (Bill Clinton, Speech: Rhodes Trust Centenary Celebration, July 2, 2003, http://www.clingtonfoundation.org.) Other American Rhodes Scholar-politicians who read PPE are U.S. Senator Richard Lugar and former Senators David Boren and Paul Sarbanes. (Register of Rhodes Scholars 1903-1995 at 201, 203, 269.) The current British Prime Minister, David Cameron, also read PPE, as did other prominent U.K. politicians (Harold Wilson, Edward Heath, Shirley Williams, Edwina Castle). (Wikipedia, David Cameron, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Cameron; BBC News, Why does PPE rule Britain? (Oct. 31, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-11136511.

[2]  Handbook to the University of Oxford at 147-50, 158-60 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1960); Wikipedia, Philosophy, Politics and Economics, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy,_Politics_and_Economics.

[3]  Wikipedia, Analytical Philosophy, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic_philosophy.

[4]  Wikipedia, Gladstone’s Library, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gladstone’s_Library.

[5]  Wikipedia, William Ewart Gladstone, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Ewart_Gladstone.