On March 28, 2013, the plaintiffs in the U.S. lawsuit against Ernesto Zedillo in federal court in Connecticut filed a copy of the Mexican court decision (with 108-page English translation) regarding the Mexican government’s request for immunity for the former president. The plaintiffs, however, did not ask the U.S. court for any relief as a result of the Mexican court decision. Presumably that will come later.
According to the U.S. plaintiffs’ attorneys’ summary, the Mexican court on March 6, 2013, (a) granted a writ of Amparo in favor of the plaintiffs; (b) declared that the immunity request lacked any constitutional or legal basis in Mexican law; and (c) instructed the current Mexican Ambassador to perform all official acts necessary to withdraw the immunity request, including notifying the U. S. Department of State of that withdrawal. (Pp.106-107.) The Mexican court provided the following reasons for its decision:
The immunity request violated the principle of Constitutional Supremacy set forth in Article 133 of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States because the Ambassador of Mexico to the U.S. disregarded the international legal standard adopted by Mexico forbidding requests for head-of-state immunity allowing public officials to evade their responsibilities. (Pp. 99 – 106.)
The immunity request lacks any rationale how Mexico’s national sovereignty would be damaged by civil proceedings against a former president who no longer occupies the post of, or performs the functions of, head of state. Id. at 94– 99.
The immunity request violates the plaintiffs’ human rights of equality and nondiscrimination under the Mexican Constitution, Article 1, because the Mexican Ambassador engaged in disparate treatment pursuant to criteria of a political nature, creating a discretionary exception of impunity in favor of Zedillo, thereby preventing plaintiffs’ ability to exercise their rights to equally seek damages for the injuries suffered. Id. at 83-94.
The immunity request violates plaintiffs’ human rights set forth in the Mexican Constitution, Articles 14 and 16, as applied by the Federal Law of Administrative Procedure, because it is not properly executed with the required formalities. Id. at 78-83.
The immunity request violates plaintiffs’ human rights set forth in the Mexican Constitution, Articles 14 and 16, because the Mexican Ambassador failed to set forth or justify any jurisprudential, statutory or regulatory basis for the degree or amount of subject matter or jurisdictional authority. Id. at 70-78.
As noted in a prior post, the case in Mexico is not yet final so we will have to wait to see what additional proceedings, if any, occur there.
In September 2011 Ernesto Zedillo, a former president of Mexico, was sued in the federal court in Connecticut for money damages for his alleged complicity in a massacre in the Mexican village of Acteal in 1997. In September 2012, the U.S. government asked the court to grant immunity to Zedillo and dismiss the case based upon the Mexican government’s request to that effect and the subsequent similar request by the U.S. Department of State. These matters were covered in prior posts (here and here).
The U.S. court has not yet resolved the immunity or any other preliminary issues in the case, and the latest dockets sheets reveal no activities whatsoever since early February this year.
In March 2013 a Mexican court decided that the Mexican request to the U.S. State Department requesting such immunity was legally insufficient, as discussed in a prior post.
Subsequently a Mexican lawyer and friend, Juan Carlos Arjona Estévez, has provided me with additional comments about the Mexican court decision that prompt these additional thoughts about Mexican and U.S. legal issues in the case.[1]
The Mexican Court Decision
The Mexican court said the Mexican Ambassador’s letter to the U.S. Department of State requesting such immunity was legally deficient.[2] First, it was a letter from the Ambassador in his diplomatic capacity, not an official communication of Mexican government policy. Second, the letter did not cite to all the Mexican legal provisions relevant to the case. Third, the letter did not explain why immunity for Zedillo in the U.S. case was appropriate under those Mexican legal authorities and why such immunity would not affect Mexican ethnic groups’ right to access justice.
Moreover, there is no basis in the Mexican constitution for immunity for a former president or other government officials. Such immunity under Mexican law applies only when such individuals are in office.
This court decision could be appealed in Mexico by the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, but reversal does not seem likely because the defense in the Mexican case is that the action of the Ambassador was not an “authorized act” that can affect the human rights of Mexicans, but only a diplomatic action.
If the decision is appealed, the three-magistrate appellate tribunal could affirm the decision and also refer to the provision in the Mexican Constitution stating that Mexican foreign policy has to promote human rights and that the request for Zedillo immunity for alleged human rights violations is contrary to such promotion.
Another possible outcome is for the Mexican Ambassador to rescind his request for immunity and to send a new letter to the U.S. Department of State saying that Senor Zedillo has not been sued in Mexico for the same claims and that Mexican courts should have the first opportunity to deal with these issues.
Related U.S. Legal Issues
These developments in Mexico raise at least two issues for U.S. law.
1. With or without a rescission of the original Ambassador’s letter, should the U.S. court grant immunity to Zedillo?
The original September 2012 letter from the U.S. State Department to the U.S. Department of Justice said “a sitting head of state’s immunity is based on his status as the incumbent office holder and extends to all of his actions.” (Emphasis added.)
On the other hand, the State Department letter went on, the “residual immunity of a former official . . . is based upon the character of that official’s conduct and extends only to acts taken in an official capacity. . . . [The] Department of State generally presumes that actions taken by a foreign official exercising the powers of his office were taken in his official capacity. This . . . is particularly appropriate when a former head of state is sued, because holders of a country’s highest office may be expected to be on duty at all times and to have wide-ranging responsibilities.” (Emphasis added.)
The State Department letter mentioned the Mexican Ambassador’s request for immunity based upon his assertion that “any actions [by Zedillo] . . . in connection with the events alleged in the complaint were taken in the course of his official duties as head of state.” This Mexican government assertion, the State Department letter says, corroborates its assessment to the same effect. In addition, the plaintiffs have not rebutted this assessment.
Therefore, the State Department’s letter concluded that Zedillo’s “alleged actions were taken in an official capacity, and he enjoys immunity from this lawsuit.”
This letter, taken by itself, might suggest that immunity might still be open even if the Mexican Ambassador’s letter were rescinded as it only corroborated that Zedillo was acting in his official capacity.
However, when the State Department in another case declined to request immunity for a former Somali official, it said any immunity protecting foreign officials for their official acts ultimately belongs to the sovereign, not the official. Thus, the foreign state must claim or waive any such immunity for the official. Where there is no recognized government, as was the case for Somali at the time, there was no one that could assert such a claim or make such a waiver. As a result, the State Department concluded that the former official did not enjoy immunity, and the court endorsed that conclusion and rejected the immunity claim.
Thus, if the Mexican Ambassador’s letter to the State Department is rescinded and not replaced by another request for immunity, the principles enunciated in the Somali case suggests that Zedillo would not be entitled to immunity.
2. Failure To Exhaust Mexican Remedies.
Another U.S. issue is whether the plaintiffs have failed to exhaust whatever remedies they have in Mexico.
Some of the claims in the U.S. case are asserted under the Torture Victims Protection Act (28 U.S.C. § 2350 note), which provides, in part, “A court shall decline to hear a claim under this section if the claimant has not exhausted adequate and available remedies in the place in which the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred [here, Mexico].” There is no similar provision in the Alien Tort Statute, under which some of the claims are also asserted, but the U.S. Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alverez-Machain suggested that failure to exhaust remedies in the other country could be a limitation on ATS claims.
Thus, the issue for the U.S. court in such a hypothetical situation would be whether the claims under Mexican law are “adequate and available” and whether the plaintiffs had exhausted whatever Mexican remedies they had. [3]
Conclusion
I would anticipate that the plaintiffs’ lawyers in the U.S. case will advise the court in Connecticut of the Mexican court decision;[4] that the U.S. court will wait until there is a final resolution of the Mexican case before doing anything, and if the recent Mexican decision is not reversed, request the views of the State Department on the significance of the former; and thereafter the U.S. court will make a decision on whether or not to grant immunity to Zedillo.
[2] Because of the significance of the Mexican Ambassador’s letter, its text is attached at the conclusion of this post.
[3] There also should be a U.S. procedural problem if Zedillo now tries to raise the plaintiffs’ alleged failure to exhaust Mexican remedies as a defense in the U.S. case. The original U.S. complaint anticipated such a defense with the allegation that the plaintiffs do not have adequate remedies in Mexico and that they have exhausted their available Mexican remedies. Zedillo’s U.S. motion to dismiss the complaint only asserted immunity, and Rule 12(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should prevent him from now raising this affirmative defense by motion.
[4] One of the plaintiffs’ attorneys has said they would so advise the U.S. court and ask it to request the State Department for reconsideration of the immunity issue.
=================================================
EMBASSY OF MEXICO
07654
Washington, DC, on November 4, 2011.
Madam Secretary:
On behalf of my Government, I have the honor to refer to the case v Doe et al. Zedillo Ponce de León, filed with the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut as No. 3:11-cv-01433, in place of the former President of Mexico, Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León.
In this regard, I wish to express my Government’s rejection of any internal process that violates the sovereignty of Mexico, to exercise jurisdiction over alleged acts occurred in territory in which he allegedly spoke the President in his official capacity. In this regard it should be noted that any other act performed by former President Ernesto Zedillo regard to the facts in the lawsuit that gave rise to the case of history, took place in the course of his official duties as head of state and is Therefore, to rule in some sense, the Court would be deciding on actions the government of Mexico sovereign within their own territory.
In light of the above, I would sincerely request the intervention of the Department of State through the Department of Justice before the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut, by a suggestion of immunity to former senses of Mexico. In this regard, I note that the recognition of immunity enjoyed by foreign officials for acts performed in their official capacity is largely rooted in a principle of customary international law, whose application has been confirmed many times by the U.S. government, particularly in situations involving heads of state. There are also precedents in American jurisprudence that confirmed the practice.
In this regard, I quote Gemisen v cases. De la Madrid v Habyarimana. Kagame, Giraldo v. Drummond Co., Wei Ye v. Jiang Zemin and Lafontant v. Aristide, as a sign of the instances in which the State Department has intervened in the past the U.S. courts to reaffirm its position on immunity accompanying heads of state, even after completing your order. Enclosed is a legal memorandum that contains more elements on those precedents.
Similarly, I wish to present it as a process which aims to substantiate against former President of Mexico affect the bilateral relationship between Mexico and the United States, in dismissing the action of various national authorities in response to the event that occurred in the village of Acteal, Chiapas in December 1997, the Government made strongly condemned in turn, immediately abocándose research and presentation of those responsible to the law enforcement bodies.
In thanking Your Excellency in advance for your valuable support for the State Department’s intervention in the case of history, I do own the opportunity to renew the assurances of my highest consideration.
A prior post discussed the March 22, 2013, resolution by the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) that strengthened the Inter-American Human Rights System, especially the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“Commission”).
In so doing, the OAS rejected efforts to weaken the Commission under the guise of reform proposals that had been offered by Ecuador and other states that the Commission has criticized (Venezuela, Bolivia and Nicaragua).
We now examine the background to that surreptitious effort to weaken that System and the debate at the March 22nd General Assembly meeting
Background
1. Multilateral Treaties and Other Instruments Regarding the Right of Free Expression.
The right of free expression by the media and others is well established in international law.
The United Nation’s General Assembly’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 in Article 19 states, “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” In 1966 this was put into legally enforceable form in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which entered into force in 1976.
To like effect is the American Convention on Human Rights, which was adopted by the OAS in 1969 and which entered into force in 1978. Its Article 13(1) says, “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression . . . [including the] freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of one’s choice.” Article 13(3) goes on to say, “The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, such as the abuse of government or private controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the dissemination of information, or by any other means tending to impede the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions.”
Ecuador under the presidency of Rafael Correa since January 2007 has through policies and actions retaliated against journalists and media that have criticized him and his government. Correa has insulted and filed lawsuits against reporters and news outlets and promoted a series of legal measures to roll back press freedoms. His government has expropriated television channels, radio stations, newspapers and magazines.
Journalists in the country also have been subjected to physical threats and assaults with lackluster efforts by the government to investigate and prosecute those responsible.
3. The Commission and Civil Society’s Criticism of Ecuador’s Hostility to Freedom of Expression.
The Commission in 1997 created the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression “to encourage the defense of the right to freedom of thought and expression in the hemisphere, given the fundamental role this right plays in consolidating and developing the democratic system and in protecting, guaranteeing, and promoting other human rights.”
This Rapporteur has been in the forefront of criticizing Ecuador for these actions against journalists and the media. Since January 1, 2009 it has issued nine press releases expressing its concern over specific criminal prosecutions and imprisonments of journalists for libel for publication of articles about corruption of public officials and for specific physical threats and assaults on journalists.
In addition, since 2006 the annual reports of the Rapporteur have had sections specifically addressing Ecuador’s conduct in this area.
For example, the latest such report (for 2011) devotes 31 pages (78-108) for a detailed, footnoted review of Ecuador’s assaults and attacks on media and journalists; legal proceedings and arrests (the “Rapporteur is concerned about the consistent tendency of high-ranking public officials to rebuke, arrest, and prosecute citizens who criticize them at public events”); presidential broadcasts and government interruptions of news programs; disparaging statements by senior state authorities against media outlets and reporters critical of the government; constitutional amendment and legislative proposals to regulate the content of all media, establish the grounds for liability and the applicable sanctions and serve as an authority on enforcement; and cloture and regulation of communications media.
Such actions also have subjected the country to similar criticism by the U.N. Human Rights Council in its Universal Periodic Review of Ecuador in the summer of 2012. One of the Council’s closing recommendations in that Review was for Ecuador to reform its legislation regarding freedom of expression with a view to bringing it in conformity with international standards and those of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. In response Ecuador said that it could not agree to reform its legal framework in accordance with standards from the Commission, when it is the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, not the Commission, which has judicial competency over this matter. Nor could Ecuador, it said, eliminate laws that criminalize opinion since it had no such laws.
In addition, Ecuador has been severely chastised by the Committee to Protect Journalists, which put the country on its Risk List of the 10 countries in the world where press freedom suffered the most in 2012. Similar rebukes have come from Human Rights Watch, Freedom House and the Washington Post Editorial Board.
4. Ecuador’s Campaign for Its Proposed “Reforms” of the Commission.
In response to the Special Rapporteur’s persistent and documented criticism of Ecuador, the country developed a set of proposals to “reform” the Commission. Prominent in this package were reduction in funding (and hence the work) of the Special Rapporteur and elimination of his separate annual report.
Ricardo Patino
In early 2013 Ecuador conducted a lobbying campaign in support of these proposals. Its Foreign Minister, Ricardo Patino, went on a tour of Mexico, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Haiti and Venezuela to promote them. He also advocated them at a meeting of the Political Council of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our Americas (ALBA) [1] and at a March 11th meeting in Guayaquil, Ecuador of the 24 states that were parties to the American Convention on Human Rights.[2]
The latter event was opened by a long speech by Ecuadorian President Correa, who emphasized that the Commission should have its headquarters in a state that has ratified said Convention (not Washington, D.C.); that the Commission should have its own budget provided only by state parties to the Convention (without voluntary contributions by outsiders like the U.S., Canadian and European governments and NGO’s); that the Commission should not be “autonomous” and instead be controlled by said states parties; the abolition of the Commission’s rules authorizing its issuance of precautionary measures; having the Commission focus on general promotion of human rights, not investigating and deciding on alleged violations of human rights; and elimination of the separate annual report of the Special Rapporteur for Free Expression and instead including such a report in a comprehensive report for all of the rapporteurships.
The Ecuador meeting resulted in the Declaration of Guayaquil whereby the 24 states parties agreed that at the March 22nd meeting of the OAS General Assembly they would support the following: a group of their foreign ministers would press the U.S., Canada and other non-parties to the Convention to ratify or accede to same; the Commission would be refocused on promotion of human rights through national systems; financing of the Commission would be increased by states parties and by “neutral” others; all rapporteurships would be treated equally; an analysis of the costs of the OAS Human Rights System would be obtained; the Commission’s headquarters would be moved to a state party; and annual conferences about reforming the System would be held.
Opposition to such proposals came forward from the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, who urged the OAS members “to strengthen its exemplary human rights system, by promoting universal access for citizens . . ., respecting the Commission’s autonomy to progressively improve its policy and practices in response to the needs of victims and concerns of member states, and providing the necessary resources [to the System].” Similar concerns were voiced by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Committee to Protect Journalists, Freedom House, a group of 98 prominent Latin Americans and a coalition of 700 hemispheric human rights organizations.
Another opponent of Ecuador’s campaign was Cesar Gaviria Trujillo, a former president of Colombia and past secretary general of the OAS. He said that the so called “reforms” of the Commission put forward by Ecuador would “severely weaken the [C]omission and make it easier for governments to ignore basic rights and limit free speech.” They would “drastically curtail [the Commission’s] autonomy” and put a “financial stranglehold” on its operations, including a “devastating impact” on the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. [3]
The March 22nd OAS General Assembly Meeting
Jose Miguel Insulza, OAS Secretary General
In opening remarks that day, the OAS Secretary General, Jose Miguel Insulza from Chile, stressed that the autonomy of the System needed to be maintained. He also said that strengthening some of the Commission’s rapporteurships “cannot mean that others are weakened” and that the Special Rapporteurship on Freedom of Expression should be strengthened “with a program of ample defense of [such] freedom . . . . ” This would include “issues relating to the curtailment of that freedom by public authorities . . . as well as the threats and crimes to which journalists and the social media are increasingly subjected in our region and the obligation of states to protect them.”
William J. Burns, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State
Similar remarks were made by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, William J. Burns. He noted that even though the U.S. was not a party to the American Convention on Human Rights, the U.S. still collaborates with the Commission when it challenges the U.S. on such issues as the death penalty, the human rights of migrants and children and the status of detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. He added, “We must be vigilant against efforts to weaken the Commission under the guise of reform. [Such efforts] . . . seek to undermine the Commission’s ability to hold governments accountable when they erode democratic checks and balances and concentrate power through illiberal manipulation of democratic processes.”
Ecuadorian Foreign Minister Patino in his remarks accused the opposition and the media of distorting his government’s proposals. He also accused the Commission of improperly assuming the power to issue precautionary measures. Its decisions were independent, he said, but the Commission was not autonomous. He rhetorically asked, the Commission is autonomous and independent of whom? Sotto voce, a Spanish journalist answered, “You,” causing laughter by those around the journalist.
The resolution adopted by acclamation at the midnight conclusion of the March 22nd meeting already has been discussed. It clearly did not adopt all of the items in Ecuador’s package.
This resolution emerged after a long day in which the U.S., Canada, Mexico, Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama and Chile lead the opposition to the proposals from Ecuador, Bolivia, Venezuela and Nicaragua. A Human Rights Watch observer said, “It was a resounding victory for the Commission, and a major defeat for the Venezuela-Ecuador bloc. It became evident that [the latter] . . . were totally isolated, without the support they were expecting from other countries.”
Towards the end of the meeting Ecuador and Bolivia threatened to withdraw from the Commission and leave the meeting. To avoid such a rupture, Argentina offered a face-saving amendment to the resolution about the OAS’ Permanent Council continuing the dialogue on the “core aspects for strengthening” the System, which Ecuador and the other ALBA countries ultimately accepted.
Conclusion
Afterwards Ecuador’s Foreign Minister tried to whitewash his country’s defeat by saying that the resolution accepted its proposal to continue the debate in the future. Before the next meeting of the OAS General Assembly in June 2014, the Foreign Minister said that there would be another meeting of the states parties to the American Convention like the one on March 11th in Guayaquil to discuss these issues. He also hinted at Ecuador’s possible withdrawal from the OAS Commission by saying there was an agreement being negotiated to create a Human Rights Commission of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR).
Unless there are unexpected changes in regimes or policies in this Hemisphere over the next 14 months, I do not expect Ecuador and its allies will be successful at the June 2014 OAS meeting in gaining acceptance of its proposals to weaken the Inter-American Commission.[4] We will then see if this small group will leave that Commission and form its own, more limited, human rights system.
[1]ALBA is an alternative to the U.S.-sponsored Free Trade Area of the Americas. differing from the latter in that it advocates a socially-oriented trade block rather than one strictly based on the logic of deregulated profit maximization. The only members of ALBA are Ecuador, Bolivia, Venezuela, Nicaragua and three small Caribbean states (Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.
[2] This campaign is discussed in press releases from Ecuador’s Foreign Minister.
[3] Such a limitation on financing undoubtedly would result in a reduction of such funding and thus on the work of the Commission.
[4] I assume that Ecuador has another burden to overcome in attempting to win support for its “reform” proposals. Its credibility within the OAS, I suspect, has been adversely affected by its recent exaggerated, alarmist call for an OAS Consultative Meeting of Foreign Ministers over the alleged United Kingdom threat to invade Ecuador’s London Embassy because of its providing diplomatic asylum in that Embassy to Julian Assange.
OAS General Assembly, 3/22/13 (Photo: OEA OAS Photostream [2])On March 22, 2013, the Extraordinary General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS)[3]adopted by acclamation a resolution strengthening the Inter-American System of Human Rights (“the System”).[4] The resolution had the following provisions:
Requested the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“Commission”), an autonomous OAS organ that promotes and protects human rights in the American hemisphere, to continue to move forward with application of its responses to suggestions for reform by a special working group and the Commission’s March 18, 2013, reform of its rules.
Instructed OAS’ Permanent Council[5] to continue the dialogue on the “core aspects for strengthening” the System.
Urged the Commission to put into practice pending recommendations for reform.
Encouraged the Commission “to strengthen its efforts in the promotion of human rights, including through its support to national systems.”
Reaffirmed the OAS General Assembly’s commitment to obtain full financing of the
System through OAS’ Regular Fund “without prejudice to the financing of the other mandates” of the OAS.
Requested the OAS Secretary General to submit to the OAS Permanent Council “a detailed, up-to-date analysis of the full operating costs” of the System.
Proposed that the Commission “strengthen all its rapporteurships, including by giving consideration to granting special status to all existing rapporteurships, based on adequate financing, without prejudice to its other responsibilities.”[6]
Urged “OAS member states [i.e., U.S., Canada and seven others] to ratify or accede to . . . all inter-American human rights instruments, especially the American Convention on Human Rights,” and for the U.S., Canada and eight other states “to accept . . . the contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.”[7]
Understanding the significance of this resolution requires elaboration.
1.1. Recommendations of the Special Working Group. In its December 2011 report the Special Working Group proposed changes to the Commission’s rules regarding individual petitions and cases; precautionary measures; monitoring of human rights in member states; promotion of human rights; a permanent presidency; financing and allocation of resources; and dissemination of criteria and jurisprudence.[8] The most controversial ones that were seen by many as efforts to muzzle the Commission were these:
Restrict the Commission’s discretion in granting “precautionary measures,” by, among other things, setting forth “precise objective criteria” for granting same and determining whether the situation was “serious and urgent.” The addition of such criteria would help states as well as alleged victims who are affected by such measures.
Require its annual report to cover human rights conditions in all OAS members, not just those with the most pressing problems.
Reduce the activities and funding of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression by eliminating its separate funding and instead requiring balanced funding of all rapporteurs as well as eliminating this one’s special report.
Require the Commission to devote more time and resources to the general promotion of human rights and thereby reduce its time and resources to deciding individual complaints.
Impose restrictions on the Commission’s decisions regarding individual complaints.
1.2. Commission’s Responses to Recommendations of Special Working Group. On October 23, 2012, the Commission issued its second response expressing agreement with most of these recommendations.
However, the Commission did disagree with the recommendation to assign balanced resources to all of its rapporteurships. It pointed out that the first source of funds for the Commission is the OAS Regular Fund, which covers only 54% of the Commission’s financial needs. This necessitates soliciting outside funds, some of which are designated for specific purposes (one of which implicitly is for the Freedom of Expression Rapporteurship). “[P]rohibitting or impeding any of [these] . . . funding sources would lead to the immediate structural weakening of the thematic rapporteurships and units, as well as [their] . . . important promotional and technical assistance activities.”
Moreover, the request for balanced or equal allocation of resources legitimately was seen as a back-door way to reduce the funding for the Rapporteurship for Free Expression and hence its work, an objective of those states that had been criticized for retaliation against journalists and media for criticism of the governments.
1.3. Commission’s Recent Changes in Its Rules and Policies. On March 18, 2013 (only four days before the OAS General Assembly was to consider the whole subject of reforming the System), the Commission adopted a resolution amending its rules and adopting certain institutional policies, effective August 1, 2013.
The rules that were changed were Rule 25 (Precautionary Measures); 28 (Requirements for the Consideration of Petitions); 29 (Initial Processing); 30 (Admissibility Procedure); 36 (Decision on Admissibility); 37 (Procedure on the Merits); 42 (Archiving of Petitions and Cases); 44 (Report on the Merits); 46 (Suspension of Time Limit to Refer the Case to the Court; 59 (Annual Report); 72 (Experts); 76 (Provisional Measures); and 79 (Amendment of the Rules of Procedure).
These changes adopted many of the suggestions made by the Special Working Group.
For example, one of the more signficant changes was to Rule 25 covering precautionary measures, which are actions the Commission requests a state to take to prevent irreparable harm to persons or to the subject matter of the proceedings in connection with a pending petition or case before its final resolution on the merits, as well as to persons under the jurisdiction of the State concerned, independently of any pending petition or case. The amended rules more precisely identifies the situations for same as “serious and urgent situations presenting a risk of irreparable harm to persons or to the subject matter of a pending petition or case before the organs of the inter-American system” and provides definitions of “serious situation,” “urgent situation” and “irreparable harm.” It also provides that decisions granting, extending, modifying such measures shall contain certain elements.
Similar changes were made to Rule 76 covering provisional measures, which are actions the Commission requests the Inter-American Court to take in cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable damage to persons. The amended rule provides for the first time the following criteria for deciding upon a request for such measures: (a) ” when the State concerned has not implemented the precautionary measures granted by the Commission;” (b) “when the precautionary measures have not been effective; ” (c) “when there is a precautionary measure connected to a case submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court;” or (d) “when the Commission considers it pertinent for the efficacy of the requested measures, to which end it shall provide its reasons.”
Foremost among the new institutional policies was the establishment of the following priorities: promotion of universal ratification of the American Convention on Human Rights and other similar instruments; promotion of economic, social and cultural rights; and development of a plan for a permanent presidency. Other adopted policies generally concerned measures to increase public transparency of the Commission’s activities.
2. Permanent Council’sContinuing Dialogue on Core Aspects of Reforming the System. Although most states and their representatives were ready to end the reform process with the adoption of the March 22nd resolution, they accepted this “open door” for further dialogue as a way to keep those states less friendly to the Commission (especially Ecuador, Venezuela, Bolivia and Nicaragua) involved in the Human Rights System and not renounce the American Convention on Human Rights and other treaties.
3. Commission’s Implementing Pending Reform Recommendations. I do not know what is meant by “pending [reform] recommendations,” and I solicit comments explaining this point. Presumably this refers to the Commission’s March 18th adoption of amended rules and of policy priorities.
4. Commission’s Strengthening Promotion of Human Rights. This is a commendable goal. The problem arises when decisions have to be made for allocation of insufficient financing of all the things that the Commission and Court would like to do to fulfill their mandates. In my opinion, such promotion should not come at the expense of reducing efforts on resolving specific complaints about alleged violations of human rights.
5. OAS’ Obtaining Full Financing of the System. This too is a commendable goal. The problem arises when decisions have to be made for allocation of insufficient financing of all the things that the Commission and Court would like to do to fulfill their mandates.
6. Analysis of Full Operating Costs of the System. This sounds like a straight-forward cost analysis of the Commission and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (“the Court”).
7. Commission’s Strengthening of Rapporteurships. There now are the following Rapporteurships on the Rights of (i) Indigenous Peoples, (ii) Woman; (iii) Migrant Workers and Their Families; (iv) the Child; (v) Human Rights Defenders; (vi) Persons Deprived of Liberty; and (vii) Afro-Descendants and Against Racial Discrimination.
There also is a Special Rapporteurship on Freedom of Expression, which has a “general mandate to carry out activities for the protection and promotion of the right to freedom of thought and expression.”
Subject to the qualification about outside funding designated for specific purposes, there is no quarrel with the objective of strengthening all of the rapporteurships.
8. Obtaining Universality of Ratification/Accession of the American Convention on Human Rights and Acceptance of Contentious Jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
Of the 34 members of the OAS, only 9 have not ratified or acceded to the American Convention on Human Rights with the U.S. and Canada being the major exceptions. Nor have the U.S. and Canada and 10 other states accepted the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to decide cases of their alleged violations of that Convention.[9]
The desire for universality expressed in this resolution, in my opinion, is appropriate even though I suspect it is motivated in part by the understandable resentment of the U.S. for not accepting the Convention and the Court’s jurisdiction while simultaneously criticizing other states in the Hemisphere for their violations of human rights.
Conclusion
The previously mentioned controversial recommendations by the Special Working Group were promoted by states that had been targets of individual complaints and of criticisms by the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression. Foremost among these states was Ecuador, which has become notorious for its legal claims against the media for criticism of its government and by states that understandably resent the U.S.’ not being a party to the American Convention on Human Rights and not consenting to the contentious jurisdiction of the Court. This background will be discussed in a subsequent post.
[1] The author would like to thank Mexican attorney, Juan Carlos Arjona Estevez, for his assistance in preparing this post. Muchas gracias, amigo!
[3] The OAS was established in 1951 to achieve among its member states “an order of peace and justice, to promote their solidarity, to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and their independence.” Its supreme organ is the General Assembly, which is composed of delegations of the member states.
[4] The OAS Human Rights System includes the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. A chronology of the Human Rights System reform process is available on the Commission’s website. Some of the work of the Commission has been discussed in prior posts.
[5] The OAS Permanent Council under Chapter XII of the OAS Charter is the organ that is in overall charge of its activities pursuant to delegations by the OAS General Assembly or other organs.
[6] Starting in 1990, the Commission began creating thematic rapporteurships under the leadership of an individual who is an expert in the area in order to devote attention to certain groups, communities, and peoples that are particularly at risk of human rights violations due to their state of vulnerability and the discrimination they have faced historically. The aim of creating a thematic rapporteurship is to strengthen, promote, and systematize the Commission’s own work on the issue.
[7] In footnotes to the consensus resolution, Guatemala urged the Commission to (i) move its headquarters from Washington, D.C. to San Jose, Costa Rica (which hosts the Court and the Inter-American Institute for Human Rights); (ii) draft a proposed protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to establish standards for precautionary measures (akin to preliminary injunctions in U.S. law); (iii) limit the Commission’s commissioners and special/thematic rapporteurs to a single term; (iv) set 2015 as the date for attaining full financing of the System; and (v) placing all rapporteurships under the leadership of the commissioners.
[8] The Special Working Group’s report with 53 recommendations for the Commission was adopted by the OAS Permanent Council on January 25, 2012 and ratified by the OAS General Assembly on June 5, 2012.
[9] The Court’s Statute’s Article 2(1) provides that its “adjudicatory jurisdiction shall be governed by . . . Articles 61, 62 and 63 of the Convention,” and the latter’s Article 62 requires a state’s declaration “unconditionally, or on the condition of reciprocity, for a specified period, or for specific cases” that it “recognizes as binding, ipso facto, and not requiring special agreement, the jurisdiction of the Court on all matters relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention.”
On February 27, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, No. 12-96, which raises the following issue:
“Whether Congress’ decision in 2006 to reauthorize [for 25 years] Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act [of 1965] under the pre-existing coverage formula of Section 4(b) of [that] Act [requiring certain states to obtain preclearance from the U.S. Department of Justice or a special federal court for any changes in their election laws] exceeded its authority under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and thus violated the Tenth Amendment and Article IV of the United States Constitution.”[1]
As has been frequently reported, during the argument Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justices Antonin Scalia, Samuel Alito and Anthony Kennedy asked questions and made comments strongly suggesting that they were prepared to invalidate this statutory provision,[2] a conclusion that already had been reached by Associate Justice Clarence Thomas in a prior case. If this is a correct reading of the recent argument, then there would be at least a 5-4 majority on the Court to declare the provision unconstitutional.
According to Linda Greenhouse, a leading Supreme Court follower, the “goal of [the petitioner] Shelby County and [apparently a majority] . . . on the Supreme Court is to depict Section 5 as an anachronism, a needless cudgel held by the big bad federal government over the head of a transformed South.“
Here are just a couple of examples of that attitude from the argument.
Chief Justice John Roberts
Chief Justice Roberts asked or, as Greenhouse put it, “taunted” the U.S. Government’s lawyer (Solicitor General Donald Verrilli) with the following questions (and Roberts’ own answers) apparently to express Roberts’ belief that Mississippi has a better record than Massachusetts on black voter registration and turnout and that the Voting Rights Act provision at issue is no longer needed and, therefore, unconstitutional:
“Do you know how many submissions there were for preclearance to the Attorney General in 2005?” (Roberts: “3700.”)
“Do you know how many objections the Attorney General lodged?” (Verrilli: “There was one in that year.”)
“[D]o you know which State has the worst ratio of white voter turnout to African American voter turnout?” (Roberts: “Massachusetts.”)
“[W]hat [state] has the best, where African American turnout actually exceeds white turnout?” (Roberts: “Mississippi.”)
“Which State has the greatest disparity in registration between white and African American?” (Roberts: “Massachusetts. Third is Mississippi, where again the African American registration rate is higher than the white registration rate.”)
“[I]s it the government’s submission that the citizens in the South are more racist than citizens in the North?” (Verrilli: “It is not.”)
Roberts did not identify the source of his statistics, but afterwards the Massachusetts Secretary of State, William F. Galvin, and political scientists speculated that Roberts drew his conclusions from the U.S. Census Bureau’s “The Current Population Survey,” which collects information on voting and registration every other year. This data, however, should not be used in the way that Roberts did because of their large margins of error, as reported by Nina Totenberg of National Public Radio.
Indeed, Secretary Galvin said that Roberts’ assertion about Massachusetts and Mississippi is just plain wrong and that the only way that the Census Bureau source supports Roberts’ assertion is by including Massachusetts’ non-citizen blacks who are not entitled to vote. To do what Roberts did, according to Galvin, is “deceptive” and “a slur on black voters in Massachusetts.”
Nate Silver, the statistician, also criticizes Roberts’ trumpeting these figures about Mississippi and Massachusetts apparently to justify a conclusion that the Voting Rights Act provisions in question are no longer needed and, therefore, unconstitutional.
According to Silver, “If [Roberts] . . . meant to suggest that states covered by Section 5 consistently have better black turnout rates than those that aren’t covered by the statute, then his claim is especially dubious.” Moreover, says Silver, it is outright fallacious to conclude from this simple comparison of two states, however flawed the data, that the provisions of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and the formula in section 4(b) are no longer needed. For example, such data say nothing about whether whatever gains have been made in racial minority voting “might be lost if the Section 5 requirements were dropped now.”
I also fault the Chief Justice for focusing on only one small piece of evidence, however flawed or subject to qualification. Instead, he should be focusing on fundamental principles of judicial restraint as repeatedly proclaimed by the U.S. Supreme Court itself and as cited by the D.C. Circuit in its opinion in this case.
These precedents emphasize that “Congress’s laws are entitled to a ‘presumption of validity’” and that “when Congress acts pursuant to its enforcement authority under the Reconstruction Amendments [including the Fifteenth Amendment], its judgments about ‘what legislation is needed . . . are entitled to much deference.‘“ Such deference is paid “‘out of respect for [Congress’] . . . authority to exercise the legislative power,’” and in recognition that Congress “is far better equipped than the judiciary to amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing upon legislative questions.” (Citations omitted.)[3]
Justice Antonin Scalia
Associate Justice Scalia also interrupted Solicitor General Verrilli to make this long statement:
“This Court doesn’t like to get involved . . . in racial questions such as this one. It’s something that can be . . . left to Congress.
“The problem here, however, is . . . that the initial enactment of this legislation in a time when the need for it was so much more abundantly clear . . . in the Senate, . . . it was double-digits against it. And that was only a 5-year term. Then, it is reenacted 5 years later, again for a 5-year term. Double-digits against it in the Senate. Then it was reenacted for 7 years. Single digits against it. Then enacted for 25 years, 8 Senate votes against it.
“And this last enactment [in 2006], not a single vote in the Senate against it. And the House is pretty much the same.
“Now, I don’t think that’s attributable to the fact that it is so much clearer now that we need this. I think it is . . . very likely attributable, to a phenomenon that is called perpetuation of racial entitlement. It’s been written about. Whenever a society adopts racial entitlements, it is very difficult to get out of them through the normal political processes. I don’t think there is anything to be gained by any Senator to vote against continuation of this act. And I am fairly confident it will be reenacted in perpetuity . . . unless a court can say it does not comport with the Constitution.
“You have to show, when you are treating different States differently, that there’s a good reason for it. That’s . . . the concern that those of us . . . who have some questions about this statute have. It’s . . . a concern that this is not the kind of a question you can leave to Congress.
“There are certain districts in the House that are black districts by law just about now. And even the Virginia Senators, they have no interest in voting against this. The State government is not their government, and they are going to lose . . . votes if they do not reenact the Voting Rights Act.
“Even the name of it is wonderful: The Voting Rights Act. Who is going to vote against that in the future?”
These remarks are shocking and totally inconsistent with the Court’s long-established principles of judicial restraint mentioned above and with Justice Scalia’s persistently stated views about judicial interpretation of statutes.
Indeed, Scalia’s remarks provoked the Washington Post’s Editorial Board to proclaim that Scalia was in “contempt of Congress.” The editorial concluded with these words, “Congress, after careful review, came to an overwhelming conclusion that protection of the franchise in America is much improved but not guaranteed, especially in certain areas. We heard in . . . [the Supreme Court] argument no grounds for the court to claim superior wisdom on that question.”
Conclusion
What is your opinion on how the Voting Rights Act issue should be resolved? Some argue for holding that provision unconstitutional.[4] Others agree with me that the provision should be upheld.[5]
I went to the University of Chicago Law School before Mr. Scalia was on the faculty, and I have never met him. By all reports, he is a brilliant man who is gracious and funny in social settings. But his comments in this and other Court arguments along with some of his opinions lead me to believe that life tenure for Supreme Court Justices and perhaps other federal judges causes at least some of them to believe that they are omniscient.
A possible solution to such arrogance, as I suggested in a comment to a prior post, is to amend the U.S. Constitution to impose a term limit on U.S. Supreme Court Justices and perhaps other federal judges. All 50 states in the U.S. and all major nations have age or term limits for high-court judges. The International Criminal Court limits its judges to one term of nine years. Such limits are not seen as restrictions on the necessary independence of the judiciary.
The U.S. Constitution does not specifically grant life tenure to the justices or other federal judges. The Constitution merely says, “The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour . . . .” Paul Carrington, a Duke University law professor, has suggested that the “good Behaviour” provision was not intended to provide life-time appointments and that term limits could be imposed by statute.
[1] This issue was phrased by the Supreme Court itself in granting review of the case. Previous posts have reviewed the Voting Rights Act of 1965; the Voting Rights Act of 2006; the prior Supreme Court case regarding the latter statute (Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. One v. Holder); and the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in the Shelby County case. The transcript of the recent Supreme Court arguments in Shelby County is available online as are the petitioner’s brief, the respondent’s brief for the U.S. Government and the reply brief for the petitioner in the case. Other briefs in the case for three intervenors, 19 amici curiae (friends of the court) supporting the petitioner and 28 amici curiae supporting the U.S. Government can also be found on the web. Excellent commentaries about the case are available on the respected scotusblog.
[3] Roberts’ hostility to the Voting Rights Act apparently goes back to 1981 when as a young lawyer in the Department of Justice he was working on Reagan Administration efforts to weaken the Voting Rights Act.
[5]E.g., Room for Debate: Is the Voting Rights Act Still Needed?, N.Y. Times (Feb. 27, 2013) (Wydra; Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer; Garza; Smith), supra; Savage, Decision on Voting Law Could Limit Oversight, N.Y. Times (Feb. 28, 2013), supra.
On February 27, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in a case challenging the constitutionality of an important provision in the Voting Rights Act of 2006. That provision imposes a requirement in section 5 for certain states to obtain pre-clearance from a special federal court or the U.S. Attorney General for any changes in their election laws.
Before we discuss that argument, we will review the decision that was the subject of that argument: the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder upholding, 2 to 1, the constitutionality of that statute and, therefore, affirming the trial court’s judgment to the same effect.[1]
Judge David S. TatelJudge Thomas B. GriffithJudge Stephen F. Williams
The opinion for the majority in the Circuit Court was written by Judge David S. Tatel, a President Clinton appointee in 1994 and a University of Chicago Law School classmate and friend of mine. He was joined by Circuit Judge Thomas B. Griffith, an appointee of President George W. Bush in 2005, while the dissenter was Circuit Judge Stephen F. Williams, an appointee in 1994 by President Reagan.
Opinion of the Circuit Court
The D.C. Circuit stressed that it was “bound by fundamental principles of judicial restraint” as repeatedly proclaimed by the U.S. Supreme Court. These precedents emphasize that “Congress’s laws are entitled to a ‘presumption of validity’” and that “when Congress acts pursuant to its enforcement authority under the Reconstruction Amendments [including the Fifteenth Amendment], its judgments about ‘what legislation is needed . . . are entitled to much deference.‘“ Such deference is paid “‘out of respect for [Congress’] . . . authority to exercise the legislative power,’”and in recognition that Congress ”‘is far better equipped than the judiciary to amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing upon legislative questions.’” (Citations omitted.)
Indeed, the Circuit Court quoted the Supreme Court’s opinion in deciding a prior case about this very statute when that Court emphasized that “judging the constitutionality of an Act of Congress is `the gravest and most delicate duty that [a court] is called on to perform,’'” and that “[t]he Fifteenth Amendment empowers `Congress,’ not the Court, to determine in the first instance what legislation is needed to enforce it.”
These long-standing principles of judicial restraint, I believe, are even more relevant and important, when Congress adds congressional findings of fact to the statute itself, as it did in the Voting Rights Act of 2006.
The D.C. Circuit then addressed the two concerns or questions about the Voting Rights Act of 2006 that the Supreme Court had raised in the Northwest Austin case.
First, are the current burdens imposed by section 5 “justified by current needs”?
Even though there has been significant progress in combatting racial discrimination in voting, the D.C. Circuit stressed that “Congress [had] found that this progress did not tell the whole story.
It documented ‘continued registration and turnout disparities’ in both Virginia and South Carolina.” In addition, “although the number of African Americans holding elected office had increased significantly, they continued to face barriers to election for statewide positions. Congress found that not one African American had yet been elected to statewide office in Mississippi, Louisiana, or South Carolina. In other covered states, “`often it is only after blacks have been first appointed to a vacancy that they are able to win statewide office as incumbents.'”
The D.C. Circuit also noted that “Congress considered other types of evidence that, in its judgment, ‘show[ed] that attempts to discriminate persist and evolve, such that Section 5 is still needed to protect minority voters in the future.’ It heard accounts of specific instances of racial discrimination in voting. It heard analysis and opinions by experts on all sides of the issue.”
Congress considered six distinct categories of evidence, according to the D.C. Circuit: “(1) [U.S.] Attorney General objections issued to block proposed voting changes that would, in the Attorney General’s judgment, have the purpose or effect of discriminating against minorities; (2) ‘more information requests’ issued when the Attorney General believes that the information submitted by a covered jurisdiction is insufficient to allow a preclearance determination; (3) successful lawsuits brought under section 2 of the Act; (4) federal observers dispatched to monitor elections under section 8 of the Act; (5) successful section 5 enforcement actions filed against covered jurisdictions for failing to submit voting changes for preclearance, as well as requests for preclearance denied by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia; and (6) evidence that the mere existence of section 5 deters officials from even proposing discriminatory voting changes.”
Finally, said the D.C. Circuit, “Congress heard evidence that case-by-case section 2 litigation was inadequate to remedy the racial discrimination in voting that persisted in covered jurisdictions.”
The Circuit court then carefully reviewed the legislative record and concluded that it contained “sufficient probative evidence from which Congress could reasonably conclude that racial discrimination in voting in covered jurisdictions is so serious and pervasive that section 2 litigation remains an inadequate remedy.”
Second, does the congressional record support the requisite ‘showing that the statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets?
In addressing this issue, the Circuit court emphasized that the statute’s disparate geographic coverage depended not only on section 4(b)’s formula, but on the statute as a whole, including its mechanisms for bail-in and bailout. Therefore, for this court the question was whether the statute as a whole, not just the section 4(b) formula, ensures that jurisdictions subject to section 5 are those in which unconstitutional voting discrimination is concentrated.
After reviewing in detail the congressional record on this issue and the total structure of the statute, including bailout and bail-in, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the statute “continues to single out the jurisdictions in which discrimination is concentrated.”
Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting opinion of Judge Williams concluded that the formula in section 4(b) of the statute was unconstitutional because the significant burdens it imposed on “covered jurisdictions” were not “congruent and proportional” to the problems of racially discriminatory voting laws that it targeted.
As a prior post reports, in September 2011, a group of Mexican nationals sued former Mexican President, Ernesto Zedillo, in federal court in Connecticut for his alleged complicity in a 1997 massacre in the Mexican village of Acteal. The complaint seeks $10 million in damages under the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victims Protection Act.
The U.S. Government on September 7, 2012, suggested that Former Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo should be immune from this lawsuit and that the case should be dismissed. This was based upon a request for such immunity from the Mexican government.
Eighteen days later (September 25th), the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut issued an Order To Show Cause requiring the plaintiffs by October 9th (later extended to October 16th) to show cause why the case should not be dismissed on the basis of former head-of state immunity. Simultaneously the court denied Zedillo’s dismissal motion as moot.
On October 16th the plaintiffs filed their Response to Order To Show Cause, Objection to the United States’ Suggestion of Immunity, and Motion To Stay Proceedings. It asserted, with supporting documents, the following:
• that on October 3rd they filed a petition for a writ of amparo in a Mexican federal court asking for a declaration that the Mexican Government’s request for immunity for Zedillo in this case violated Mexican law and the Mexican constitution and, therefore, is a nullity;
• that on October 9th the Mexican court “accepted” the petition, i.e., determined it was not dismissable; and
• that on October 9th the Mexican court also entered another order temporarily suspending the validity of the Mexican Government’s request for immunity for Zedillo in the U.S. case and enjoining any acts in furtherance of that request pending resolution of the Mexican case.
With this showing, the plaintiffs asked the U.S. court (a) to stay proceedings in this case pending the outcome of the Mexican case; or (b) to dismiss the U.S. case without prejudice while tolling the statute of limitations with leave to re-file the U.S. case if they succeed in the Mexican case; and (c) to request the U.S. Department of State to reconsider its position on immunity after the Mexican case is resolved; and (d) to provide guidance as to plaintiffs’ right to amend their complaint or to petition for leave to do so.
As of March 10, 2013, the U.S. case had been reassigned to another District Judge, and the dispute over the claimed immunity had not been resolved by the U.S. court.
On the afternoon of March 10th while walking in San Miguel de Allende, Mexico, I saw the page 1 headline in an issue of LaJournada, a Mexican newspaper: “Inconstitucional, pedir inmunidad para Zedillo en EU.” Even my limited Spanish language abilities told me that a Mexican court had decided that the Mexican government’s request for immunity for Zedillo in this U.S. case violated the Mexican constitution.
According to a Google English translation of the article on the Internet, a Mexican judge had determined that Mexican authorities had violated the Mexican Constitution and international human rights treaties by asking the U.S. government to grant immunity to former President Zedillo.
One of the treaties was the Havana Convention, which states that “no immunities must be claimed that are not essential to the performance of official duties,” and it was violated, the court said, because Zedillo does not currently occupy any public position in the Mexican government. The American Convention on Human Rights was also violated, according to the Mexican court, because immunity for Zedillo causes “undue discrimination and threatening the human right of equality” for those who allegedly were harmed.
I imagine that there will be appeals or further proceedings in the Mexican case. In the meantime, I predict that the U.s. court will do nothing until the Mexican case is finally resolved.
On February 27, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in a case challenging the constitutionality of an important provision of the Voting Rights Act of 2006. [1] That provision imposes a requirement in section 5 for certain states to obtain pre-clearance from a special federal court or the U.S. Department of Justice for any changes in their election laws.
Prior posts have reviewed the original Voting Rights Act of 1965 and its extension in the Voting Rights Act of 2006. Before we discuss the recent Supreme court argument, we now look at another of its predicates: the previous Supreme Court decision regarding the Voting Rights Act of 2006: Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. One v. Holder. [2]
Opinion of the Court
Chief Justice John Roberts
The opinion for the Court was written by Chief Justice John Roberts, who was joined by seven Associate Justices (Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer and Alito).
The Roberts opinion interpreted the statute as reauthorized in 2006 to allow any covered jurisdiction, including the utility district bringing suit in that case, to seek bailout, thus avoiding the need to resolve whether the 25-year reauthorization in 2006 was constitutional.
As a result, the rest of the opinion’s extensive discussion of constitutional concerns over the 2006 statute technically are dicta, but the Supreme court’s dicta are obviously important for the lower federal courts and legal observers to see which way the winds are blowing.
The opinion paid at least verbal homage to the longstanding legal principles that “judging the constitutionality of an Act of Congress is ‘the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called on to perform’” and that “Congress is a coequal branch of government whose Members take the same oath we do to uphold the Constitution of the United States.’” Moreover, Roberts emphasized that “the Fifteenth Amendment empowers ‘Congress,’ not the Court, to determine in the first instance what legislation is needed to enforce it.”
Roberts acknowledged that in 1965 when the original statute was passed, “unconstitutional discrimination was rampant and the ‘registration of voting-age whites ran roughly 50 percentage points or more ahead’ of black registration in many covered States” and that the Court had upheld the constitutionality of the original statute and its extensions through 2006.
However, Roberts left the distinct impression that at least he thought that since 2006 the work of abolishing racial discrimination in voting was over.
He said, “Things have changed in the South. Voter turnout and registration rates now approach parity. Blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare. And minority candidates hold office at unprecedented levels.” Moreover, “many of the first generation barriers to minority voter registration and voter turnout that were in place prior to the [original Voting Rights Act] have been eliminated.” The “registration gap between white and black voters is in single digits in the covered States; in some of those States, blacks now register and vote at higher rates than whites. Similar dramatic improvements have occurred for other racial minorities.”
“These improvements are no doubt due,” the opinion stated, “in significant part to the [original] Voting Rights Act itself [as extended through 2006] , and stand as a monument to its success.”
Almost offhandedly the opinion conceded, “It may be that these improvements are insufficient and that conditions continue to warrant preclearance under the Act.”
And the opinion did say that “Congress amassed a sizable record in support of its decision to extend the preclearance requirements, a record the District Court determined ‘document[ed] contemporary racial discrimination in covered states.’ The District Court also found that the record “demonstrat[ed] that section 5 prevents discriminatory voting changes’ by ‘quietly but effectively deterring discriminatory changes.’”
But Roberts did not refer to, quote or discuss the extensive congressional findings in the Voting Rights Act itself that fighting voter racial discrimination was not finished.
The Court’s opinion identified two “serious . . . questions” about section 5’s continued constitutionality, namely, whether the “current burdens” it imposes are “justified by current needs,” and whether its “disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.”
These burdens, said the opinion, were the “federal intrusion into sensitive areas of state and local policymaking.” Section 5, it continued, “goes beyond the prohibition of the Fifteenth Amendment by suspending all changes to state election law—however innocuous—until they have been precleared by federal authorities in Washington, D. C. The preclearance requirement applies broadly, and in particular to every political subdivision in a covered State, no matter how small.”
The second problem identified by Roberts stemmed from the statue’s differentiation “between the States, despite our historic tradition that all the States enjoy “equal sovereignty.” Such “distinctions can be justified in some cases. But a departure from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty requires a showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.”
Opinion of Justice Clarence Thomas
Associate Justice Clarence Thomas
Associate Justice Clarence Thomas filed a separate opinion in this case, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.
Thomas said, “the Court’s statutory decision does not provide appellant with full relief” and, therefore, he concludes, “it is inappropriate to apply the constitutional avoidance doctrine in this case. I would therefore decide the constitutional issue presented and hold that §5 exceeds Congress’ power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment.” The latter conclusion was based upon his assertion that there was a “lack of current evidence of intentional discrimination with respect to voting.”
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[1] The 2006 statute’s correct title is the Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006.
[2] Another predicate to the recent Supreme court argument will be discussed in a future post: the 2012 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit that is the subject of the recent argument in the Supreme Court (Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder).
On February 27, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in a case challenging the constitutionality of an important provision of the Voting Rights Act of 2006. [1] This provision extended for 25 years a requirement in section 5 for certain states to obtain pre-clearance from a special federal court or the U.S. Department of Justice for any changes in their election laws.[2]
Before we discuss that argument, we will look at the Voting Rights Act of 2006.[3]
Its stated Purpose in Section 2(a) was “to ensure that the right of all citizens to vote, including the right to register to vote and cast meaningful votes, is preserved and protected as guaranteed by the Constitution.” The last reference, of course, included the Constitution’s Fifteenth Amendment: “The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”
The 2006 statute did that by reauthorizing and extending for 25 years (until 2032) the following essential provisions of the original Voting Rights Act of 1965:
Section 2 forbids any “standard, practice, or procedure” that “results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.” Applicable nationwide, section 2 enables individuals to bring suit against any state or jurisdiction to challenge voting practices that have a discriminatory purpose or result.
Section 5 (the focus of the current case before the Supreme Court) only applies to certain “covered jurisdictions” and “prescribes remedies . . . which go into effect without any need for prior adjudication.” Section 5 suspends “all changes in state election procedure until they [are] submitted to and approved by a three-judge Federal District Court in Washington, D.C., or the [U.S.] Attorney General.”
Such approval or preclearance may be granted only if the jurisdiction demonstrates that the proposed change to its voting law neither “has the purpose nor . . . the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.”
The “covered jurisdictions” subject to section 5 were identified in section 4(b), as subsequently modified, as any state or political subdivision of a state that “maintained a voting test or device as of November 1, 1972, and had less than 50% voter registration or turnout in the 1972 presidential election.”
Upon satisfying certain criteria a state or other jurisdiction could obtain “bailout” from section 5 or be subject to “bail-in” to such coverage.
The Voting Rights Act of 2006 was overwhelmingly adopted by the Congress: 98 to 0 in the Senate and 390 to 33 (with 9 not voting) in the House. In doing so, the Congress acted on the basis of a legislative record over 15,000 pages in length, including statistics, findings by courts and the Justice Department, and first-hand accounts of discrimination.[4]
Given this extensive record before Congress, Section 2(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 2006 contains the following extensive congressional Findings:
“(1) Significant progress has been made in eliminating first generation barriers experienced by minority voters, including increased numbers of registered minority voters, minority voter turnout, and minority representation in Congress, State legislatures, and local elected offices. This progress is the direct result of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
“(2) However, vestiges of discrimination in voting continue to exist as demonstrated by second generation barriers constructed to prevent minority voters from fully participating in the electoral process.
“(3) The continued evidence of racially polarized voting in each of the jurisdictions covered by the expiring provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 demonstrates that racial and language minorities remain politically vulnerable, warranting the continued protection of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
“(4) Evidence of continued discrimination includes—
“(A) the hundreds of objections interposed, requests for more information submitted followed by voting changes withdrawn from consideration by jurisdictions covered by the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and section 5 enforcement actions undertaken by the Department of Justice in covered jurisdictions since 1982 that prevented election practices,such as annexation, at-large voting, and the use of multimember districts, from being enacted to dilute minority voting strength;
“ (B) the number of requests for declaratory judgments denied by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia;
“(C) the continued filing of section 2 cases that originated in covered jurisdictions; and
“(D) the litigation pursued by the Department of Justice since 1982 to enforce sections 4(e), 4(f)(4), and 203 of such Act to ensure that all language minority citizens have full access to the political process.
“(5) The evidence clearly shows the continued need for Federal oversight in jurisdictions covered by the Voting Rights Act of 1965 since 1982, as demonstrated in the counties certified by the Attorney General for Federal examiner and observer coverage and the tens of thousands of Federal observers that have been dispatched to observe elections in covered jurisdictions.
“(6) The effectiveness of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 has been significantly weakened by the United States Supreme Court decisions in Reno v. Bossier Parish II and Georgia v. Ashcroft, which have misconstrued Congress’ original intent in enacting the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and narrowed the protections afforded by section 5 of such Act.
“(7) Despite the progress made by minorities under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the evidence before Congress reveals that 40 years has not been a sufficient amount of time to eliminate the vestiges of discrimination following nearly 100 years of disregard for the dictates of the 15th amendment and to ensure that the right of all citizens to vote is protected as guaranteed by the Constitution.
“(8) Present day discrimination experienced by racial and language minority voters is contained in evidence, including the objections interposed by the Department of Justice in covered jurisdictions; the section 2 litigation filed to prevent dilutive techniques from adversely affecting minority voters; the enforcement actions filed to protect language minorities; and the tens of thousands of Federal observers dispatched to monitor polls in jurisdictions covered by the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
“(9) The record compiled by Congress demonstrates that, without the continuation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 protections, racial and language minority citizens will be deprived of the opportunity to exercise their right to vote, or will have their votes diluted, undermining the significant gains made by minorities in the last 40 years.”
On July 27, 2006, President George W. Bush signed this statute in a ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House (as shown in the photo to the left). Attending the event were Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez and other members of the Cabinet, the leaders of the United States Senate and House of Representatives, representatives of the Fannie Lou Hamer family, representatives of the Rosa and Raymond Parks Institute, members of the Martin Luther King, Jr. family and civil rights leaders, including Dr. Dorothy Height, Julian Bond (the Chairman of the NAACP), Bruce Gordon, Reverend Lowery, Marc Morial, Juanita Abernathy, Jesse Jackson, Al Sharpton and Dr. Benjamin and Frances Hooks.
On that occasion President Bush said, “By reauthorizing this act, Congress has reaffirmed its belief that all men are created equal; its belief that the new founding started by the signing of the [Voting Rights Act of 1965] . . . by President Johnson is worthy of our great nation to continue.”
That original statute, President Bush continued, “rose from the courage shown on a Selma bridge one Sunday afternoon in March of 1965 . . . [when] African Americans . . . marched across the Edmund Pettus Bridge in a protest intended to highlight the unfair practices that kept them off the voter rolls.The brutal response [to the marchers that day] . . . stung the conscience of a slumbering America. . . . One week after Selma, President Lyndon Johnson took to the airwaves to announce that he planned to submit legislation that would bring African Americans into the civic life of our nation. Five months after Selma, he signed the Voting Rights Act [of 1965] into law in the Rotunda of our nation’s capitol.”
President Bush recognized that in the “four decades since the Voting Rights Act was first passed, we’ve made progress toward equality, yet the work for a more perfect union is never ending.” By signing the Voting rights Act of 2006, President Bush concluded, we “renew a bill that helped bring a community on the margins into the life of American democracy. My administration will vigorously enforce the provisions of this law, and we will defend it in court.”
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[1] The 2006 statute’s correct title is the Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (2006).
[2] The states now subject to section 5 are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas and Virginia.
[3] A prior post discussed the original Voting Rights Act of 1965. Other posts will discuss two other predicates for the recent Supreme Court argument: the previous Supreme Court case regarding the 2006 statute (Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. One v. Holder) and the 2012 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit that is the subject of the that argument (Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder).
[4] The 2006 Act also overruled two Supreme Court decisions interpreting the statute.
On February 27, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in a case challenging the constitutionality of an important provision of the Voting Rights Act of 2006.[1] This provision extended for 25 years a requirement in section 5 of the original Voting Rights Act of 1965 for certain states to obtain pre-clearance from a special federal court or the U.S. Attorney General for any changes in their election laws.[2]
Before we review that oral argument, we will examine in separate posts four predicates for that argument.[3] This post will discuss the first of these predicates–the relevant substance of the original Voting Rights Act of 1965.[4]
This 1965 statute (as well as the 2006 statute) was enacted pursuant to Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution that provides, “The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” That amendment, which was ratified after the Civil War in 1870, states in Section 1: “The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude”
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 is seen as a major accomplishment of the Congress and President Lyndon B. Johnson. (The photo to the left shows President Johnson signing the statute; immediately behind him is Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.) It was adopted as a result of congressional recognition that case-by-case litigation over racial voting discrimination was slow, expensive and ineffective and that a stature was needed “to cure the problem of voting discrimination” and “rid the country of racial discrimination in voting,” (South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 313, 315 (1966).)
The 1965 Act combined a permanent, case-by-case enforcement mechanism with a set of more stringent, temporary remedies designed to target those areas of the country where racial discrimination in voting was concentrated.
Section 2, the Act’s main permanent provision, forbids any “standard, practice, or procedure” that “results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.” (42 U.S.C. § 1973(a).) Applicable nationwide, section 2 enables individuals to bring suit against any state or jurisdiction to challenge voting practices that have a discriminatory purpose or result. (SeeThornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986).)
Section 5 of the statute and the focus of the current case before the Supreme Court only applies to certain “covered jurisdictions” and “prescribes remedies . . . which go into effect without any need for prior adjudication.” (Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 327-28.) Section 5 suspends “all changes in state election procedure until they [are] submitted to and approved by a three-judge Federal District Court in Washington, D.C., or the [U.S.] Attorney General.” (Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2509 (2009),
A “covered jurisdiction” seeking to change its voting laws or procedures must either submit the change to the Attorney General or seek preclearance directly from the three-judge court. If such a jurisdiction opts for the former and if the Attorney General lodges no objection within 60 days, the proposed law can take effect.(42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a).) But if the Attorney General lodges an objection, the submitting jurisdiction may either request reconsideration, (28 C.F.R. § 51.45(a)), or seek a de novo determination from the three-judge district court. (42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a).)
Either way, preclearance may be granted only if the jurisdiction demonstrates that the proposed change to its voting law neither “has the purpose nor . . . the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.” (Id.) This provision “preempted the most powerful tools of black disenfranchisement ,” resulting in “undeniable” improvements in the protection of minority voting rights. (Northwest Austin, 129 S. Ct. at 2509. 2511.)
The “covered jurisdictions” subject to section 5 were identified in section 4(b), as originally enacted, as any state or political subdivision of a state that “maintained a voting test or device as of November 1, 1964, and had less than 50% voter registration or turnout in the 1964 presidential election.” (Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(b), 79 Stat. 437, 438.) Congress chose these criteria carefully because it knew precisely which states it sought to cover, those six southern states with the worst historical records of racial discrimination in voting: Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia.
In so doing, Congress recognized that these criteria for determining “covered jurisdictions” might have to be adjusted over time.
First, as it existed in 1965, section 4(a) allowed jurisdictions to earn exemption from coverage by obtaining from a three-judge district court a declaratory judgment that in the previous five years (i.e., before they became subject to the Act) they had used no test or device “for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.” (1965 Act § 4(a).) This so-called “bailout” provision, as subsequently amended, addresses potential over-inclusiveness of section 5, allowing jurisdictions with clean records to terminate their section 5 pre-clearance obligations.
Second, section 3(c) authorizes federal courts to require pre-clearance by any non-covered state or political subdivision found to have violated the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments. (42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c).) Specifically, courts presiding over voting discrimination suits may “retain jurisdiction for such period as [they] may deem appropriate” and order that during that time no voting change take effect unless either approved by the court or unopposed by the Attorney General. (Id.) This judicial “bail-in” provision addresses the formula’s potential under-inclusiveness.
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of section 5, holding that its provisions “are a valid means for carrying out the commands of the Fifteenth Amendment.” As originally enacted in 1965, section 5 was to remain in effect for five years. Congress subsequently renewed these temporary provisions, including sections 4(b) and 5, in 1970 (for five years), in 1975 (for seven years), and in 1982 (for twenty-five years).[5] The Supreme Court also sustained the constitutionality of each extension through 2007. (Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980); Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266 (1999).)
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[1] The 2006 statute’s correct title is the Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006.
[2] The states now subject to section 5 are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas and Virginia.
[3] The other predicates to be examined in separate posts are the Voting Rights Act of 2006; the 2009 Supreme Court decision regarding the 2006 statute (Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. One v. Holder); and the 2012 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, 2 to 1, upholding the constitutionality of the 2006 statute in the case now pending in the Supreme Court. (Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder.)
[5] The 1982 extension also made the provision for “bailout” from section 5 restrictions substantially more permissive.
