On December 21, 2012, Judge Emmet G. Sullivan of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the U.S. Senate’s filibuster rule.[1]
The court did not reach or discuss the merits of the constitutional issues even though it said that the filibuster rule was “an important and controversial issue” and that “in recent years, even the mere threat of a filibuster is powerful enough to completely forestall legislative action.” (P. 2.)[2]
Instead, there were two jurisdictional grounds given by the court for the dismissal. First, none of the plaintiffs, the court stated, had the necessary standing to sue. Second, the court found that “this case presents a non-justiciable political question.[3]
No Standing To Sue
In the introduction of the opinion, the Court said it “cannot find that any of the Plaintiffs have standing to sue,” which is a “bedrock requirement of an Article III court’s jurisdiction to resolve only those cases that present live controversies.” (P. 2.) This conclusion was elaborated in the “Analysis” portion of the opinion.
According to the court, there is a doctrine of “procedural standing” when (i) “the government violated [the plaintiff’s] . . . procedural rights designed to protect their threatened, concrete interest” and (ii) the violation resulted in injury to their concrete, particularized interest.” (P. 15.) However, the plaintiffs in this case “are unable to demonstrate that any alleged procedural right to majority consideration of proposed legislation is designed to protect [their] . . . particularized, concrete interests.” (P. 18.)
Quoting a Supreme Court case, Judge Sullivan said for an “irreducible constitutional minimum” showing of Article III standing, a plaintiff must show “(1) he has suffered an ‘injury in fact’ which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) there is a causal connection between the alleged injury and the conduct complained of that is fairly traceable to the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” (P. 14.)
The plaintiffs in this case, however, concluded the court, “cannot show that the invalidation of the Cloture Rule [the filibuster rule] has any connection to, or will have any connection to, their ability to benefit from a particular piece of legislation.” (P.27.)
Non-Justiciable Political Question
The opinion’s introduction stated, “the Court is firmly convinced that to intrude into this area would offend the separation of powers on which the Constitution rests. Nowhere does the Constitution contain express requirements regarding the proper length of, or method for, the Senate to debate proposed legislation. Article I reserves to each House the power to determine the rules of its proceedings. And absent a rule’s violation of an express constraint in the Constitution or an individual’s fundamental rights, the internal proceedings of the Legislative Branch are beyond the jurisdiction of this Court.” (P. 3.)
In the detailed analysis of this issue, the opinion appropriately quotes the relevant U.S. Supreme Court precedent of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). Judge Sullivan said that the “nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers.” The Judge then concluded that three of the six circumstances listed by the Baker decision for such political questions were presented by this case.
First, there was “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department.” Here, Article I, § 5(2) of the Constitution grants each House of the Congress the power to “determine the Rules of its Proceedings.” Moreover, there is no constitutional provision that explicitly limits this power. (Pp. 37-43.)
Second, according to Judge Sullivan, “no judicially manageable standards exist against which to review the Senate’s rules governing debate.” (Pp. 43-44.)
Third, it was impossible for “a court’s undertaking independent resolution [of the case] without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches of government.” Indeed, said the court, “reaching the merits of this case would require an invasion into internal Senate processes at the heart of the Senate’s constitutional prerogatives as a House of Congress, and would thus express a lack of respect for the Senate as a coordinate branch of government.” In short, “it is for the Senate, and not this Court, to determine the rules governing debate.” (Pp. 45-46.)
Conclusion
Immediately after the decision, Common Cause, the lead plaintiff, said it would appeal the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
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