Posts Tagged ‘U.S. Constitution’

The Outrageous, Dysfunctional U.S. Senate

April 17, 2013

Today (April 17th) the U.S. Senate again demonstrated its dysfunctionality in outrageously refusing to vote on the merits on adopting reasonable, common-sense legislation to combat the horrendous toll of gun violence in the U.S. Just look at the New York Times and Washington Post articles on this day in the Senate.

Under the unconstitutional Senate filibuster rule that requires 60 votes to end debate and proceed to voting on the merits, the compromise measure crafted by Democratic Senator Joe Machin and Republican Senator Pat Toomey to require background checks for sales of guns online and at gun shows (but not between neighbors and family members) failed to get the 60 votes although it had the support of 54% of the Senate.

Similarly a measure to increase enforcement and reporting on gun purchases by mentally ill persons had majority support (52%), but not the “necessary” 60 votes and thus failed to advance.

Another failure despite majority support (58%) was a measure to make straw purchasing and trafficking of guns a federal crime.

One gun control measure–renewal and strengthening of a ban on assault weapons and high-capacity magazines–also failed to even get a simple majority, 40-60.

For me these actions once again show the outrageousness of the filibuster rule and the failure of the Senate earlier this year to abolish or make significant changes to that rule. I have frequently railed against the filibuster rule and practice in this blog.

As President Obama said afterwards, it was a “shameful day for Washington.”

 

 

U.S. Supreme Court Shows Unjustified Hostility to the Voting Rights Act of 2006

March 18, 2013

On February 27, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, No. 12-96, which raises the following issue:

  •  ”Whether Congress’ decision in 2006 to reauthorize [for 25 years] Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act [of 1965] under the pre-existing coverage formula of Section 4(b) of [that] Act [requiring certain states to obtain preclearance from the U.S. Department of Justice or a special federal court for any changes in their election laws] exceeded           its authority under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and thus violated the Tenth Amendment and Article IV of the United States Constitution.”[1]

As has been frequently reported, during the argument Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justices Antonin Scalia, Samuel Alito and Anthony Kennedy asked questions and made comments strongly suggesting that they were prepared to invalidate this statutory provision,[2] a conclusion that already had been reached by Associate Justice Clarence Thomas in a prior case. If this is a correct reading of the recent argument, then there would be at least a 5-4 majority on the Court to declare the provision unconstitutional.

According to Linda Greenhouse, a leading Supreme Court follower, the “goal of [the petitioner] Shelby County and [apparently a majority] . . . on the Supreme Court is to depict Section 5 as an anachronism, a needless cudgel held by the big bad federal government over the head of a transformed South.“

Here are just a couple of examples of that attitude from the argument.

Chief Justice John Roberts

Chief Justice         John Roberts

Chief Justice Roberts asked or, as Greenhouse put it, “taunted” the U.S. Government’s lawyer (Solicitor General Donald Verrilli) with the following questions (and Roberts’ own answers) apparently to express Roberts’ belief that Mississippi has a better record than Massachusetts on black voter registration and turnout and that the Voting Rights Act provision at issue is no longer needed and, therefore, unconstitutional:

  • “Do you know how many submissions there were for preclearance to the Attorney          General in 2005?” (Roberts: “3700.”)
  • “Do you know how many objections the Attorney General lodged?” (Verrilli: “There          was one in that year.”)
  •  “[D]o you know which State has the worst ratio of white voter turnout to African American voter turnout?” (Roberts: “Massachusetts.”)
  •  “[W]hat [state] has the best, where African American turnout actually exceeds white       turnout?” (Roberts: “Mississippi.”)
  •  “Which State has the greatest disparity in registration between white and African American?” (Roberts: “Massachusetts. Third is Mississippi, where again the African American registration rate is higher than the white registration rate.”)
  •  ”[I]s it the government’s submission that the citizens in the South are more racist             than citizens in the North?”  (Verrilli: “It is not.”)

Roberts did not identify the source of his statistics, but afterwards the Massachusetts Secretary of State, William F. Galvin, and political scientists speculated that Roberts drew his conclusions from the U.S. Census Bureau’s “The Current Population Survey,” which collects information on voting and registration every other year. This data, however, should not be used in the way that Roberts did because of their large margins of error, as reported by Nina Totenberg of National Public Radio.

Indeed, Secretary Galvin said that Roberts’ assertion about Massachusetts and Mississippi is just plain wrong and that the only way that the Census Bureau source supports Roberts’ assertion is by including Massachusetts’ non-citizen blacks who are not entitled to vote. To do what Roberts did, according to Galvin, is “deceptive” and “a slur on black voters in Massachusetts.”

Nate Silver, the statistician, also criticizes Roberts’ trumpeting these figures about Mississippi and Massachusetts apparently to justify a conclusion that the Voting Rights Act provisions in question are no longer needed and, therefore, unconstitutional.

According to Silver, “If [Roberts] . . . meant to suggest that states covered by Section 5 consistently have better black turnout rates than those that aren’t covered by the statute, then his claim is especially dubious.” Moreover, says Silver, it is outright fallacious to conclude from this simple comparison of two states, however flawed the data, that the provisions of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and the formula in section 4(b) are no longer needed. For example, such data say nothing about whether whatever gains have been made in racial minority voting “might be lost if the Section 5 requirements were dropped now.”

I also fault the Chief Justice for focusing on only one small piece of evidence, however flawed or subject to qualification. Instead, he should be focusing on fundamental principles of judicial restraint as repeatedly proclaimed by the U.S. Supreme Court itself and as cited by the D.C. Circuit in its opinion in this case.

These precedents emphasize that “Congress’s laws are entitled to a ‘presumption of validity’” and that “when Congress acts pursuant to its enforcement authority under the Reconstruction Amendments [including the Fifteenth Amendment], its judgments about ‘what legislation is needed . . . are entitled to much deference.‘“  Such deference is paid “‘out of respect for [Congress’] . . .  authority to exercise the legislative power,’” and in recognition that Congress “is far better equipped than the judiciary to amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing upon legislative questions.” (Citations omitted.)[3]

Justice Antonin Scalia

Justice Antonin Scalia

Associate Justice Scalia also interrupted Solicitor General Verrilli to make this long statement:

  •  “This Court doesn’t like to get involved . . . in racial questions such as this one. It’s something that can be . . . left to Congress.
  • “The problem here, however, is . . . that the initial enactment of this legislation in a time when the need for it was so much more abundantly clear . . . in the Senate, . . . it was double-digits against it. And that was only a 5-year term. Then, it is reenacted 5 years later, again for a 5-year term. Double-digits against it in the Senate. Then it was reenacted for 7 years. Single digits against it. Then enacted for 25 years, 8 Senate votes against it.
  • “And this last enactment [in 2006], not a single vote in the Senate against it. And the House is pretty much the same.
  •  “Now, I don’t think that’s attributable to the fact that it is so much clearer now that we need this. I think it is . . . very likely attributable, to a phenomenon that is called perpetuation of racial entitlement. It’s been written about. Whenever a society adopts racial entitlements, it is very difficult to get out of them through the normal political processes. I don’t think there is anything to be gained by any Senator to vote against continuation of this act. And I am fairly confident it will be reenacted in perpetuity . . .  unless a court can say it does not comport with the Constitution.
  •  “You have to show, when you are treating different States differently, that there’s a good reason for it. That’s . . . the concern that those of us . . . who have some questions about this statute have. It’s . . .  a concern that this is not the kind of a question you can leave to Congress.
  •  “There are certain districts in the House that are black districts by law just about now. And even the Virginia Senators, they have no interest in voting against this. The State government is not their government, and they are going to lose . . . votes if they do not reenact the Voting Rights Act.
  •  “Even the name of it is wonderful: The Voting Rights Act. Who is going to vote against that in the future?”

These remarks are shocking and totally inconsistent with the Court’s long-established principles of judicial restraint mentioned above and with Justice Scalia’s persistently stated views about judicial interpretation of statutes.

Indeed, Scalia’s remarks provoked the Washington Post’s Editorial Board to proclaim that Scalia was in “contempt of Congress.” The editorial concluded with these words, “Congress, after careful review, came to an overwhelming conclusion that protection of the franchise in America is much improved but not guaranteed, especially in certain areas. We heard in . . . [the Supreme Court] argument no grounds for the court to claim superior wisdom on that question.”

 Conclusion

What is your opinion on how the Voting Rights Act issue should be resolved? Some argue for holding that provision unconstitutional.[4] Others agree with me that the provision should be upheld.[5]

I went to the University of Chicago Law School before Mr. Scalia was on the faculty, and I have never met him. By all reports, he is a brilliant man who is gracious and funny in social settings. But his comments in this and other Court arguments along with some of his opinions lead me to believe that life tenure for Supreme Court Justices and perhaps other federal judges causes at least some of them to believe that they are omniscient.

A possible solution to such arrogance, as I suggested in a comment to a prior post, is to amend  the U.S. Constitution to impose a term limit on U.S. Supreme Court Justices and perhaps other federal judges. All 50 states in the U.S. and all major nations have age or term limits for high-court judges. The International Criminal Court limits its judges to one term of nine years. Such limits are not seen as restrictions on the necessary independence of the judiciary.

The U.S. Constitution does not specifically grant life tenure to the justices or other federal judges. The Constitution merely says, “The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour . . . .” Paul Carrington, a Duke University law professor, has suggested that the “good Behaviour” provision was not intended to provide life-time appointments and that term limits could be imposed by statute.


[1]  This issue was phrased by the Supreme Court itself in granting review of the case. Previous posts have reviewed the Voting Rights Act of 1965; the Voting Rights Act of 2006; the prior Supreme Court case regarding the latter statute (Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. One v. Holder); and the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in the Shelby County case. The transcript of the recent Supreme Court arguments in Shelby County is available online as are the petitioner’s brief, the respondent’s brief for the U.S. Government and the reply brief for the petitioner in the case. Other briefs in the case for three intervenors, 19 amici curiae (friends of the court) supporting the petitioner and 28 amici curiae supporting the U.S. Government can also be found on the web. Excellent commentaries about the case are available on the respected scotusblog.

[2]  E.g., Liptak, Voting Rights Law Draws Skepticism from Justices, N.Y. Times (Feb. 27, 2013); Gerstein, 5 Takeaways from the Voting Rights Act arguments, Politico (Feb. 27, 2013).

[3] Roberts’ hostility to the Voting Rights Act apparently goes back to 1981 when as a young lawyer in the Department of Justice he was working on Reagan Administration efforts to weaken the Voting Rights Act.

[4]  E.g., Blum, The Supreme Court Can Update the Obsolete Voting Rights Act, W.S.J. (Feb. 24, 2013); Room for Debate: Is the Voting Rights Act Still Needed?, N.Y. Times (Feb. 27, 2013) (Shapiro; Pilder); Savage, Decision on Voting Law Could Limit Oversight, N.Y. Times (Feb. 28, 2013); Will, The Voting Rights Act stuck in the past, Wash. Post (Mar. 1, 2013).

[5] E.g., Room for Debate: Is the Voting Rights Act Still Needed?, N.Y. Times (Feb. 27, 2013) (Wydra; Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer; Garza; Smith), supra;  Savage, Decision on Voting Law Could Limit Oversight, N.Y. Times (Feb. 28, 2013), supra.

 

The Voting Rights Act of 1965

March 4, 2013

On February 27, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in a case challenging the constitutionality of an important provision of the Voting Rights Act of 2006.[1] This provision extended for 25 years a requirement in section 5 of the original Voting Rights Act of 1965 for certain states to obtain pre-clearance from a special federal court or the U.S. Attorney General for any changes in their election laws.[2]

Before we review that oral argument, we will examine in separate posts four predicates for that argument.[3] This post will discuss the first of these predicates–the relevant substance of the original Voting Rights Act of 1965.[4]

This 1965 statute (as well as the 2006 statute) was enacted pursuant to Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution that provides, “The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” That amendment, which was ratified after the Civil War in 1870, states in Section 1: “The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude”

LBJ signing VRA65

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 is seen as a major accomplishment of the Congress and President Lyndon B. Johnson. (The photo to the left shows President Johnson signing the statute; immediately behind him is Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.) It was adopted as a result of congressional recognition that case-by-case litigation over racial voting discrimination was slow, expensive and ineffective and that a stature was needed “to cure the problem of voting discrimination” and “rid the country of racial discrimination in voting,”  (South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 313, 315 (1966).)

The 1965 Act combined a permanent, case-by-case enforcement mechanism with a set of more stringent, temporary remedies designed to target those areas of the country where racial discrimination in voting was concentrated.

Section 2, the Act’s main permanent provision, forbids any “standard, practice, or procedure” that “results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.” (42 U.S.C. § 1973(a).) Applicable nationwide, section 2 enables individuals to bring suit against any state or jurisdiction to challenge voting practices that have a discriminatory purpose or result. (See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986).)

Section 5 of the statute and the focus of the current case before the Supreme Court only applies to certain “covered jurisdictions” and “prescribes remedies . . . which go into effect without any need for prior adjudication.” (Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 327-28.) Section 5 suspends “all changes in state election procedure until they [are] submitted to and approved by a three-judge Federal District Court in Washington, D.C., or the [U.S.] Attorney General.” (Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2509 (2009),

A “covered jurisdiction” seeking to change its voting laws or procedures must either submit the change to the Attorney General or seek preclearance directly from the three-judge court. If such a jurisdiction opts for the former and if the Attorney General lodges no objection within 60 days, the proposed law can take effect.(42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a).) But if the Attorney General lodges an objection, the submitting jurisdiction may either request reconsideration, (28 C.F.R. § 51.45(a)), or seek a de novo  determination from the three-judge district court. (42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a).)

Either way, preclearance may be granted only if the jurisdiction demonstrates that the proposed change to its voting law neither “has the purpose nor . . . the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.” (Id.) This provision “preempted the most powerful tools of black disenfranchisement ,” resulting in “undeniable” improvements in the protection of minority voting rights. (Northwest Austin, 129 S. Ct. at 2509. 2511.)

The “covered jurisdictions” subject to section 5 were identified in section 4(b), as originally enacted, as any state or political subdivision of a state that “maintained a voting test or device as of November 1, 1964, and had less than 50% voter registration or turnout in the 1964 presidential election.” (Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(b), 79 Stat. 437, 438.) Congress chose these criteria carefully because it knew precisely which states it sought to cover, those six southern states with the worst historical records of racial discrimination in voting: Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia.

In so doing, Congress recognized that these criteria for determining “covered jurisdictions” might have to be adjusted over time.

  • First, as it existed in 1965, section 4(a) allowed jurisdictions to earn exemption from coverage by obtaining from a three-judge district court a declaratory judgment that in the previous five years (i.e., before they became subject to the Act) they had used no test or device “for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.” (1965 Act § 4(a).) This so-called “bailout” provision, as subsequently amended, addresses potential over-inclusiveness of section 5, allowing jurisdictions with clean records to terminate their section 5 pre-clearance obligations.
  • Second, section 3(c) authorizes federal courts to require pre-clearance by any non-covered state or political subdivision found to have violated the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments. (42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c).) Specifically, courts presiding over voting discrimination suits may “retain jurisdiction for such period as [they] may deem appropriate” and order that during that time no voting change take effect unless either approved by the court or unopposed by the Attorney General. (Id.) This judicial “bail-in” provision addresses the formula’s potential under-inclusiveness.

In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of section 5, holding that its provisions “are a valid means for carrying out the commands of the Fifteenth Amendment.”  As originally enacted in 1965, section 5 was to remain in effect for five years. Congress subsequently renewed these temporary provisions, including sections 4(b) and 5, in 1970 (for five years), in 1975 (for seven years), and in 1982 (for twenty-five years).[5] The Supreme Court also sustained the constitutionality of each extension through 2007. (Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980); Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266 (1999).)

——————————

[1] The 2006 statute’s correct title is the Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006.

[2] The states now subject to section 5 are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas and Virginia.

[3] The other predicates to be examined in separate posts are the Voting Rights Act of 2006; the 2009 Supreme Court decision regarding the 2006 statute (Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. One v. Holder); and the 2012 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, 2 to 1, upholding the constitutionality of the 2006 statute in the case now pending in the Supreme Court. (Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder.)

[5] The 1982 extension also made the provision for “bailout” from section 5 restrictions substantially more permissive.

 

United States Ratification of the Genocide Convention

January 16, 2013

On December 11, 1946, the United Nations General Assembly in its first session unanimously adopted a resolution affirming that “genocide is a crime under international law which the civilized world condemns” and requesting the U.N. Economic and Social Council “to undertake the necessary studies, with a view to drawing up a draft convention [treaty] on the crime of genocide.”

John Maktos

John Maktos

Thereafter that Council established a U.N. Committee on Genocide to prepare a draft of such a treaty. The draft that subsequently was approved by that Committee and other U.N. agencies had been prepared at the U.S. Department of State by a U.S. diplomat, John Maktos, who also served as the Chair of the U.N. Committee.

On December 9, 1948, by unanimous action of the U.N. General Assembly that draft was adopted as the Genocide Convention. Two days later (December 11th) President Harry Truman signed the treaty on behalf of the United States.

President Harry Truman

President Harry Truman

Six months later (June 16, 1949) President Truman transmitted the treaty to the U.S. Senate and requested its advice and consent to ratification. In his transmittal message, President Truman said the General Assembly’s approval of the treaty was “one of the important achievements” of its first session and that the U.S. had played “a leading part” in that accomplishment. The Senate’s approval would demonstrate that the U.S. was “prepared to take effective action on its part to contribute to the establishment of principles of law and justice.”

Such Senate action, however, did not happen until early 1986, and it was not ratified by the U.S. until late 1988 or nearly 40 years after its adoption by the U.N. General Assembly and its signature by the U.S.[1]

Here are some of the highlights or lowlights of the Genocide Convention’s journey to U.S. ratification.

In January and February of 1950 a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on the treaty and favorably reported it to the full Committee in May 1950. The full Committee, however, took no action on the treaty, and it did not reach the Senate floor. For the next 20 years the treaty apparently gathered dust in the files of the Foreign Relations Committee.

President Richard Nixon

President Richard Nixon

That changed on February 19, 1970, when President Richard Nixon reiterated a presidential request for Senate advice and consent to ratification. His message to the Senate stated that the U.S. had “played a leading role in the negotiation” of the treaty and that “ratification at this time . . . would be in the national interest” of the U.S. and would demonstrate “our country’s desire to participate in the building of international order based on law and justice.”

In response to President Nixon’s request, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1970 held hearings on the treaty and favorably reported the treaty to the entire Senate. The latter, however, took no action.

The Foreign Relations Committee did the same in 1971, 1973, 1976 and 1978, but it was not until February 19, 1986, that the Senate voted, 83 to 11, to give its advice and consent to such ratification.[2]   It did so with two reservations that required specific U.S. consent for the submission of any dispute involving the treaty to the International Court of Justice and that stated the supremacy of the U.S. Constitution over any of the treaty’s provisions. The Senate also imposed five understandings limiting the meaning of certain parts of the treaty. Finally the Senate declared that the instrument of U.S. ratification could not be deposited until after the U.S. adopted implementing legislation required by Article V of the treaty.[3]

President Ronald Reagan

President Ronald Reagan

That implementing legislation was adopted on November 4, 1988, with President Ronald Reagan’s signature of the Genocide Implementation Act of 1987, 18 U.S.C. § 1091. That statue makes genocide a crime for offenses committed within the U.S. or by U.S. nationals. The statute imposes punishment of life imprisonment and a fine of not more than $1 million or both for genocide by killing; imprisonment up to 20 years or a fine of not more than $1 million or both for other acts of genocide; and imprisonment up to five years or a fine up to $500,000 or both for incitement of genocide. There is no statute of limitations for these crimes.

When President Reagan signed the statute, he made a public statement that by this signing the U.S. would “bear witness to the past and learn from its awful example, and to make sure that we’re not condemned to relive its crimes. . . . During the Second World War, mankind witnessed the most heinous of crimes: the Holocaust.” Reagan added that he was “delighted to fulfill the promise made by Harry Truman to all the peoples of the world, and especially the Jewish people. I remember what the Holocaust meant to me as I watched the films of the death camps after the Nazi defeat in World War II. Slavs, Gypsies, and others died in the fires, as well. And we’ve seen other horrors this century — in the Ukraine, in Cambodia, in Ethiopia. They only renew our rage and righteous fury, and make this moment all the more significant for me and all Americans.”

Reagan concluded by saying that the “timing of the enactment is particularly fitting, for we’re commemorating a week of remembrance of the Kristallnacht, the infamous ‘night of broken glass,’ which occurred 50 years ago on November 9, 1938. That night, Nazis in Germany and Austria conducted a pogrom against the Jewish people. By the morning of November 10th, scores of Jews were dead, hundreds bleeding, shops and homes in ruins, and synagogues defiled and debased. And that was the night that began the Holocaust, the night that should have alerted the world of the gruesome design of the Final Solution.”

On November 25, 1988 (three weeks after the adoption of that federal statute), President Ronald Reagan deposited notice of U.S. ratification with the U.N. Secretary-General. This constitutes the actual act of ratification.[4]

The 40 year delay between U.S. signing and ratification apparently was the result of many factors. Many Senators were hostile to approving any treaty that might be deemed to infringe on U.S. sovereignty. Some were concerned, especially during the Korean War and the Vietnam War, that U.S. officials might come under frivolous accusations of genocide. Others worried that if the U.S. ratified, it would be obligated to send military forces to distant countries to enforce it. Others felt the Convention’s definition of genocide was unclear. The American Bar Association opposed it through 1977. Some Southern Senators were concerned that genocide charges might result from the region’s history of segregation, lynching, and Ku Klux Klan activities. In addition, although the treaty was not retroactive, some feared it would be used to define the nineteenth century U.S. treatment of Native Americans as genocide.[5]

The Genocide Convention went into force on January 12, 1951, after 20 states had ratified or acceded to the treaty. Today 142 states are parties thereto.

This tale of the belated U.S. ratification of an important multilateral human rights treaty shows the complexity of the negotiation and adoption of such treaties and of their ratification by the U.S.  There is a similar history of the U.S. ratification of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.


[1] See David Weissbrodt, Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Joan Fitzpatrick, Fran Newman, International Human Rights: Law, Policy, and Process at 139-40 (4th ed. LexisNexis 2009).

[2] In January and February 1974 the Senate debated the treaty, but there were insufficient votes to stop debate and proceed to vote on the treaty itself.

[3] I have not had the opportunity to research the original historical record regarding the U.S. and this treaty during these years. I ask anyone who has knowledge of the details of this record, to share that knowledge with a comment to this post.

[4] In accordance with Article 20 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 12 states thereafter objected to or commented unfavorably on the U.S. reservation regarding the supremacy of the U.S. Constitution while three states objected to the U.S. reservation regarding submission of disputes to the International Court of Justice.

[5] Perhaps a more complete analysis of the historical record on the ratification of this treaty can be found in Lawrence LeBlanc, The United States and the Genocide Convention (Durham, NC; Duke Univ. Press 1991). Again I ask anyone who has knowledge of the details of this record, to share that knowledge with a comment to this post.

Report for dwkcommentaries —2012

January 1, 2013

This blog, which started on April 4, 2011, reports the following activity through December 31, 2012:

2011 2012 Total
Posts    190      179      369
Comments      26      170      196
Views 9,190 51,161 60,351

The busiest day so far was December 13, 2012, with 361 views. For 2012 as a whole the viewers came from 170 countries with most from the U.S.A. followed by the United Kingdom and Canada. This blog has 304 followers (Facebook, 235; direct, 59; and commentators, 10).

The following were the most popular posts in 2012:

As indicated in detail on Page: List of Posts and Comments to dwkcommentaries–Topical, the posts and comments for 2011-2012 fell into the following categories:

  • Personal
  • Higher Education
  • Religion/Christianity
  • Lawyering (practice of law)
  • U.S. History
  • U.S. Politics
  • El Salvador
  • Cuba
  • Human Rights Treaties & U.N. Human Rights Council
  • Refugee and Asylum Law
  • Alien Tort Statute & Torture Victims Protection Act
  • International Criminal Justice
  • International Criminal Court
  • Miscellaneous

The blogger would appreciate receiving substantive comments on his posts, including corrections and disagreements.

Effective January 1, 2013, this blog has its own domain: “dwkcommentaries.com.”

The U.S. Congress Continues To Demonstrate Its Dysfunctionality

December 27, 2012

Both houses of Congress continue to demonstrate their disgusting dysfunctionality in failing to agree on measures to avoid the so-called “fiscal cliff” at midnight on December 31, 2012.

The U.S. Senate

Already I have commented extensively on what I believe is the absurd Senate’s filibuster rule. Once again it is affecting how the Senate can take action before the end of the year on extending the current federal income tax rates on those earning less than $250,000 per year.

Actually the obstacles presented by the Senate’s filibuster and other rules to the chamber’s actually accomplishing something are worse than what I previously have described.

The  New York Times’ Jonathan Weissman starts his illustration of the current situation with the Senate Majority Leader, Senator Harry Reid’s, hypothetically moving this afternoon (December 27th) “to bring up legislation that would extend expiring Bush-era tax cuts on incomes under $250,000, set dividends and capital gains tax rates at 20 percent, ensure the alternative minimum tax does not expand dramatically to hit more of the middle class, extend expiring unemployment insurance and temporarily stop across-the-board cuts to military and domestic programs.”

If only one of the 100 Senators “objects to a request to move straight to voting [on the merits of  the bill] by unanimous consent, the Senate would then vote [on Saturday morning] at 9 a.m. to cut off debate on that motion to proceed to the bill.”

Weissman continues, “If that [cloture] motion got 60 votes Saturday morning [to end debate], there would then have to be 30 hours of ‘post-cloture ripening’ before the Senate actually votes on the motion to proceed to the bill. That would take the Senate to 1 p.m. Sunday. If again that procedural motion received 60 votes, the Senate would be on the “fiscal cliff” bill itself. Mr. Reid would then immediately file to cut off debate on the bill itself.”

“At that point, under Senate rules, the earliest possible vote on final passage would be Tuesday, Jan. 1. By then, the 112th Congress would have disbanded and efforts to pass the bill would have to start all over again — this time on the other side of the ‘fiscal cliff.’”

The U.S. House of Representatives

The recent inability of John Boehner, the Republican Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, to obtain sufficient Republican votes to support his so-called “Plan B” for resolving the “fiscal cliff” problems is only the latest example of his ineffectiveness as the Speaker. This is due, in my opinion, to the inflexibility of Republican Representatives who are supported by the right-wing “Tea Party.”

The resulting inability of the House to participate in governing our country is yet another example of the dysfunctionality of the U.S. government.

One way out of this impasse would be for the House to elect a Speaker who has the support of the centrists in both political parties. Based upon his public appearances, John Boehner, in my opinion, does not have the intelligence or gravitas to be such a Speaker. Because the Republicans have a majority in the House, presumably someone else from that party would have to step forward or be called forward to take on the responsibilities of such a coalition-backed Speaker. I do not know who that could be.

There is nothing in the U.S. Constitution that prevents such a Speakership. Its Article I, § 2(5) merely says, “The House of Representatives shall chuse [sic] their Speaker and other Officers . . . .”

Norman Ornstein, a noted Washington political commentator who has written about many of the current woes of our government, agrees that John Boehner is not able to wield the typical power of the Speakership.

Ornstein also notes that the just-quoted constitutional provision “does not say that the speaker of the House has to be a member of the House. In fact, the House can choose anybody a majority wants to fill the post.” Ornstein then goes on to suggest two centrist Republican who are not members of the House for this important position: Jon Huntsman, Jr., the former Governor of the State of Utah, U.S. Ambassador to Singapore and China and unsuccessful candidate for the Republican presidential nomination in 2012, and Mitch Daniels, the Governor of the State of Indiana.

This is an intriguing idea, but it would be difficult enough to elect someone from the House itself to be a centrist Speaker. To go outside the House membership for a Speaker in any circumstance, in my opinion, would make the task that much more difficult.

I invite suggestions for Republican Representatives to take on the role and responsibilities of a centrist Speakership. Also please add comments with any historical examples of Speakers who have had de facto coalition-backing.

District Court Dismisses Lawsuit Challenging Constitutionality of U.S. Senate’s Filibuster Rule

December 22, 2012

On December 21, 2012, Judge Emmet G. Sullivan of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the U.S. Senate’s filibuster rule.[1]

The court did not reach or discuss the merits of the constitutional issues even though it said that the filibuster rule was “an important and controversial issue” and that “in recent years, even the mere threat of a filibuster is powerful enough to completely forestall legislative action.” (P. 2.)[2]

Instead, there were two jurisdictional grounds given by the court for the dismissal. First, none of the plaintiffs, the court stated, had the necessary standing to sue. Second, the court found that “this case presents a non-justiciable political question.[3]

No Standing To Sue

In the introduction of the opinion, the Court said it “cannot find that any of the Plaintiffs have standing to sue,” which is a “bedrock requirement of an Article III court’s jurisdiction to resolve only those cases that present live controversies.” (P. 2.) This conclusion was elaborated in the “Analysis” portion of the opinion.

According to the court, there is a doctrine of “procedural standing” when (i) “the government violated [the plaintiff's] . . . procedural rights designed to protect their threatened, concrete interest” and (ii) the violation resulted in injury to their concrete, particularized interest.” (P. 15.) However, the plaintiffs in this case “are unable to demonstrate that any alleged procedural right to majority consideration of proposed legislation is designed to protect [their] . . . particularized, concrete interests.” (P. 18.)

Quoting a Supreme Court case, Judge Sullivan said for an “irreducible constitutional minimum” showing of Article III standing, a plaintiff must show “(1) he has suffered an ‘injury in fact’ which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) there is a causal connection between the alleged injury and the conduct complained of that is fairly traceable to the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” (P. 14.)

The plaintiffs in this case, however, concluded the court, “cannot show that the invalidation of the Cloture Rule [the filibuster rule] has any connection to, or will have any connection to, their ability to benefit from a particular piece of legislation.” (P.27.)

Non-Justiciable Political Question

The opinion’s introduction stated, “the Court is firmly convinced that to intrude into this area would offend the separation of powers on which the Constitution rests. Nowhere does the Constitution contain express requirements regarding the proper length of, or method for, the Senate to debate proposed legislation. Article I reserves to each House the power to determine the rules of its proceedings. And absent a rule’s violation of an express constraint in the Constitution or an individual’s fundamental rights, the internal proceedings of the Legislative Branch are beyond the jurisdiction of this Court.” (P. 3.)

In the detailed analysis of this issue, the opinion appropriately quotes the relevant U.S. Supreme Court precedent of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). Judge Sullivan said that the “nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers.” The Judge then concluded that three of the six circumstances listed by the Baker decision for such political questions were presented by this case.

First, there was “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department.”  Here, Article I, § 5(2) of the Constitution grants each House of the Congress the power to “determine the Rules of its Proceedings.” Moreover, there is no constitutional provision that explicitly limits this power. (Pp. 37-43.)

Second, according to Judge Sullivan, “no judicially manageable standards exist against which to review the Senate’s rules governing debate.” (Pp. 43-44.)

Third, it was impossible for “a court’s undertaking independent resolution [of the case] without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches of government.”  Indeed, said the court, “reaching the merits of this case would require an invasion into internal Senate processes at the heart of the Senate’s constitutional prerogatives as a House of Congress, and would thus express  a lack of respect for the Senate as a coordinate branch of government.”  In short, “it is for the Senate, and not this Court, to determine the rules governing debate.” (Pp. 45-46.)

Conclusion

Immediately after the decision, Common Cause, the lead plaintiff, said it would appeal the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.


[1] The complaint in this case was the subject of a prior post.

[2] A prior post discussed the merits of the constitutional challenge to the filibuster rule.

[3]  A prior post reviewed the jurisdictional arguments raised by the dismissal motion while the hearing on the motion was mentioned in another post.

Update on Changing the U.S. Senate Filibuster Rule

December 18, 2012

Prior posts have discussed the internal Senate movement for reforming its filibuster rule that now requires 60 of the 100 Senators to agree to vote on the merits of most proposed legislation and confirmation of presidential appointments. Other posts have covered the pending federal lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of that rule.

There have been further developments on both fronts.

Internal Senate Efforts

Jeff Merkley, Democratic Senator from the State of Washington and the leader of the filibuster reform effort, is building a simple majority (at least 51 votes) for reforming the filibuster rule on January 3, 2013, when the new session of Congress opens. His basic proposal is the so-called “talking filibuster” with these major points according to his December 12, 2012 memo to fellow Senators:

  • If at least 41 Senators voted for additional debate on a legislative proposal, there would be additional debate.
  • Such additional debate would require at least one Senator to be on the floor presenting arguments on the proposal.
  • If there were no Senator present to speak to the proposal, the presiding officer would rule that extended debate was over, and the Majority Leader would schedule a simple-majority cloture vote to end all debate after an additional 30 hours of debate,

Approving such a change by a simple majority vote has been called “the nuclear option” or “the constitutional option.”

In response to a simple majority coalescing to support such a reform, some of the leading Senate Republicans (John McCain, Lamar Alexander, Jon Kyle and Lindsay Graham) are trying to convince Democratic Senators (Mark Pryor, Carl Levin and Chuck Schumer) who are reluctant to use the “nuclear” or “constitutional” option to embrace a more limited reform that could be supported by 67 Senators (the number required by the existing Senate rules). The exact nature of such a more limited reform has not been disclosed. Nor has the likelihood of enlisting 67 Senators to support such a more limited reform been assessed.

Moreover, many observers are skeptical about the ability of the “talking filibuster” proposal put forward on December 12th by Senator Markley to stop the dysfunctionality of the Senate. They point out that the proposal does nothing to prevent “holds” by individual Senators that prevent Senate action or to prevent the offering of amendments during a debate. Nor does this proposal ban filibusters on motions to proceed with consideration of a bill or nomination or require any Senator’s remarks to be germane to the matter at hand. Moreover, who doubts the willingness of the Republican Senators to talk and talk?

As we come closer to January 3rd, a failure to resolve the “fiscal cliff” stalemate may preempt attention to filibuster reform that day and politically eliminate the possibility of changing the filibuster rule by a simple majority.

Litigation over the Filibuster Rule

In May 2012 Common Cause, four members of the U.S. House of Representatives and three private citizens sued certain Senate officers. The complaint alleged that the filibuster rule was unconstitutional, and the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on various grounds.

On December 5th the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued an order asking that at the upcoming hearing on the dismissal motion the parties should be prepared to discuss all arguments set forth in the briefs and in particular to address Plaintiffs’ vote nullification theory of standing for the plaintiffs who are members of the House of Representatives.[1] The following are the parties’ arguments on that theory from their previously filed briefs:

  • According to the plaintiffs, the House member plaintiffs were in the majority when the House passed the Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors Act (the DREAM Act) on December 8, 2010, only to have it die in the Senate when it subsequently failed to invoke cloture of the debate 55-41. So too the House member plaintiffs were in the majority when the House passed The Democracy Is Strengthened by Casting Light On Spending in Elections Act (the DISCLOSE Act), 219 to 206, on June 24, 2010 only to have it die in the Senate when a vote for cloture of the debate failed, 59-39 on September 23, 2010. As a result, it is contended, these plaintiffs’ legislative votes were nullified by the Senate’s filibuster rule, and they have standing to sue under Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939); and D.C. Circuit cases.
  • The defendants, on the other hand, assert that the House members lack standing under Raines because they have not been individually deprived of something they are personally entitled to  and because their votes would not have been sufficient by themselves to defeat or enact a bill if they had not been nullified.

The December 10th two-hour hearing itself apparently focused on the issue of whether the plaintiffs had standing to bring the lawsuit. Judge Emmit G. Sullivan said the case raised difficult issues and at the end of the hearing asked defense counsel to submit a short brief on certain questions. Later that same day, however, the court limited the request for an additional brief to whether the court could address the political question doctrine without reaching the issue of standing.

The defendants’ supplemental brief of December 11th cited precedents from the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit holding that a federal court may address the issue of lack of justiciability under the political question doctrine without first addressing the issue of the plaintiffs’ standing to bring the lawsuit.

The next day the plaintiffs filed their supplemental brief agreeing with that legal proposition. However, they argued, the case was justiciable on the grounds of U.S. Supreme Court cases holding that rules of the Senate or the House are subject to judicial review. In short, said the plaintiffs, there was no “political question” foreclosing the courts from considering this case.

We now await the court’s ruling on the dismissal motion.


[1] Perhaps related to the standing of the Congressmen in the filibuster case is the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision to review a case challenging the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act in which a so-called “Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group” of Congressmen intervened to defend that statute, and the Supreme Court’s order for the parties in that case  to address whether or not this Group has Article III [constitutional] standing in this case.”

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Difficulty of Obtaining U.S. Ratification of Multilateral Treaties

December 8, 2012

On December 4th the U.S. Senate once again demonstrated the difficulty of obtaining U.S. ratification of multilateral treaties.

Voting in U.S. Senate

Voting in U.S. Senate

The Senate that day voted 61 to 38 to give its Advice and Consent to U.S. ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.  This, however, fell six votes short of the two-thirds vote required by Article II, § 2(2) of the U.S. Constitution. This failure happened even though the treaty essentially adopted the terms of the Americans with Disabilities Act and was supported by all 51 Democratic, 2 Independent and 8 Republican Senators.

Former Senator Robert Dole in Senate

Former Senator Robert Dole in Senate

The 38 “No” votes were all cast by Republican Senators despite the support of the treaty by Robert Dole, the former Republican Majority and Minority Leader of the Senate and the Party’s presidential candidate in 1996,who was on the Senate floor in his wheelchair to garner support for the treaty.

Such Senate approval is only one critical step in the complicated U.S. procedures for such ratification. The following are the steps in that procedure:

  • The U.S. Government’s participating in the preparation of the treaty, including multiparty negotiation of its terms.
  • The President’s signing the treaty on behalf of the U.S. (This could also be done by another high-level official of the Administration.)
  • The President’s submitting the treaty to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent under Article II, Section 2 (2) of the U.S. Constitution.
  • The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s conducting a hearing on whether the Senate should give its advice and consent to ratification of the treaty, taking a committee vote on that issue and reporting the results of the hearing and the vote to the full Senate.
  • The U.S. Senate’s debating a resolution to grant its advice and consent to ratification of the treaty and voting by at least two-thirds of those Senators present, under Article II, Section 2 (2) of the U.S. Constitution, to do so.
  • The President’s submitting the U.S. ratification instrument to the person designated in the treaty as the recipient of such instruments; for multilateral treaties that is usually the U.N. Secretary-General.
  • For at least multilateral treaties, the passing of a stipulated amount of time after submission of the ratification instrument before the treaty goes into force for the U.S.[1]

The difficulty of completing all of these procedures, including the Senate’s granting its Advice and Consent, is also seen by the 17 to 19 years and five presidencies it took before the U.S. had ratified the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and before the treaty went into force for the U.S.

Yet another example of the mountain that must be climbed for ratification is the inability to date to obtain a two-thirds Senate vote for Advice and Consent to ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea despite endorsement by the Pentagon, labor and business and three presidents (Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and Barack Obama).

Reacting to the Senate’s rejection of the disabilities treaty, the New York Times’ “Room for Debate” feature posed the question–   “”Have Treaties Gone Out of Style?” Four people participated in this debate: David Kopel, Julian Ku, Catherine Powell and Jenny Martinez.

David Kopel [2] argues that the Senate was right to reject this treaty.  In his opinion, it “was rife with flaws — requiring government at every level in the U.S. to spend ‘the maximum of its available resources’ on disabled services, granting Congress new powers to regulate private homes and personal behavior, and creating a new legal right to abortion, independent of Roe v. Wade.” Moreover, he said, “Efforts by senators to add reservations to address some of these issues were rejected by treaty proponents.” Finally he asserted that “even if the textual language in the treaty were perfect, the fact that the future meaning of the disabilities treaty will be decided by U.N. bureaucrats” supported U.S. rejection.

Julian Ku[3] although generally skeptical of multilateral treaties like the one at issue this week, concluded that the stated fears of this treaty were unfounded. He said, the Obama Administration had “conditioned Senate approval on a ‘non-self-executing’ declaration that prevents any litigation under the convention in U.S courts [and] . . .  added a federalism reservation that would prevent the convention from overriding inconsistent state law.” In addition, the Administration “added a ‘private conduct’ reservation that would prevent it from regulating nonstate [sic] actors, like parents or small businesses. Taken together, these limitations would indeed render the convention a legal nullity within the United States.”[4]

Supporting ratification of the treaty, Catherine Powell [5] said that the treaty “extends abroad the same basic rights Americans already enjoy at home,” [would strengthen] . . . disabilities rights for others,. . . [and] would have helped Americans who travel, live, work and study abroad, including our wounded warriors. It would also benefit American businesses that sell power wheelchairs and other adaptive technologies that assist people with disabilities.” According to Powell, the two asserted objections to the treaty were invalid.

  • “First, the claim that the treaty would lead to interference with home schooling is nonsensical. If anything it would expand educational opportunities. It defends autonomy, independence and choice for people with disabilities (including parents of children with disabilities), by prohibiting discrimination and interference in decisions.
  • Second, the claim that this treaty would threaten U.S. sovereignty is specious. . . . Ratifying the convention requires no change in our law and no new rights, and it cannot be used directly to bring lawsuits. No international organization, including the nonbinding advisory committee established by the treaty, can force us to do anything.”

Jenny Martinez [6] also rejected the sovereignty objection. This conception of sovereignty, she said,  is isolationistic “that focuses on minimizing ties to the community of nations, rather than seeking to lead that community. But autonomy is just one meaning of sovereignty, and an elusive one at that in a globalized world economy. Sovereignty is also the power to make law, and sovereignty wisely exercised is the power to make good law.” Indeed, in “wiser moments, leaders of both parties have recognized that participation in international treaties that serve our national interests and reflect our national ideals represents an exercise of sovereign power, not a diminution of it.”

The Senate indeed has an important responsibility under the Constitution to ensure that U.S. entry into any proposed treaty is in accordance with the national and international interest of the country. Because adopted treaties, under the Constitution, are part of the supreme law of the land, The Constitution requires the Senate’s vote on such matters to be at least two-thirds. I regret that we are in a period where one of our major political parties has lost sight of the previous bipartisan consensus that our participation in multilateral treaties usually advances our national interest. Although the U.S. in many respects is the most powerful country in the world, it still needs allies and means to project its values and interests to others. Such treaties are one important way of doing just that.


[1] The same procedures are necessary for approval of bilateral treaties, but such treaties are less controversial.

[2] Kopel is the research director of the Independence Institute and an adjunct professor of law at the University of Denver and the co-author of ”Firearms Law and the Second Amendment.”

[3] Ku is a professor of law and the faculty director of international programs at the Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University and the co-author (with John Yoo) of “Taming Globalization, International Law, the U.S. Constitution, and the New World Order.”

[4] Ku argues that the Republican Senators should have saved their efforts for opposing Advice and Consent to ratification of  the Law of the Sea treaty that will come before the Senate in the future.

[5] Powell is a visiting associate professor of law at Georgetown University Law Center (on leave from Fordham University School of Law) and former staffer on the Secretary of State’s policy planning staff and the national security staff in the White House.

[6] Martinez is the Warren Christopher professor in the practice of international law and diplomacy at Stanford Law School and the author of “The Slave Trade and the Origins of International Human Rights Law.”

Former U.S. Senator and Vice President, Walter Mondale, Supports Changing the Senate Filibuster Rule

December 5, 2012

 MondaleFormer U.S. Senator and Vice President Walter Mondale supports changing the Senate’s filibuster rule to make the body more accountable and responsive to the needs of the people.

He did so in testimony before the Senate’s Rules Committee on May 19, 2010.

Mondale reminded the Committee that a majority of the Senate “shall constitute a Quorum to do Business” under Article I, Section 5(1) of the U.S. Constitution, and that the Senate with such a quorum has the constitutional power and authority under Article I, Section 5(2) of the Constitution to “determine the Rules of its Proceedings.” (Emphasis added.) This necessarily means that the Senate may establish such rules by a simple majority vote.

Moreover, according to Mondale, the Framers of the Constitution were wary of requiring super-majorities in the Congress and made such a requirement express in only a few instances.

Mondale was in the Senate in 1975 when the filibuster rule was last amended. He testified that he was a leader of that reform effort and that on at least three separate occasions at that time the Senate voted by a simple majority vote to change the body’s rules. This procedural point was endorsed by Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia, who was generally regarded as the expert on Senate procedures. In short, the Senate actions in 1975 recognized that the previously mentioned constitutional provisions trumped any Senate precedents or practices.

Mondale also made the following specific suggestions on any reform of the filibuster rule:

  • First, the power of an individual Senator to put a “hold” on the Senate’s consideration of its providing its Advice and Consent to a presidential nomination needs to be weakened so that a motion to proceed on any such nomination could be adopted by a simple majority vote either without debate or debatable for a limited amount of time such as two hours.
  • Second, the vote necessary to invoke cloture and stop debate should be lowered from 60 to somewhere between 55 and 58.

This past week Mondale said he was worried that the current proposed rule changes, while of value, may not be sufficient to prevent the Senate’s paralysis if 60 votes will still be required to invoke cloture and end debate. The record of the Senate’s Republican minority in the current session of Congress and their current rhetorical resistance to any changes in the filibuster rule do not give one confidence that there will be a significant change in their behavior in the next session of Congress.

This blogger concurs in this pessimism about the sufficiency of the current reform proposals. We do not want a perpetuation of the tyranny of the minority.


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